“I Would Prefer to Be Famous”: Comparative Perspectives on the Re-entry of War Criminals Sentenced at Nuremberg and The Hague

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Abstract

The reentry of sentenced perpetrators of atrocity crimes is part and parcel of the pursuit of international and transitional justice. As men and women sentenced for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the other tribunals return from prisons into society and communities questions arise as to the impact their reentry has on deeply divided postconflict societies, in particular on victim groups. Contemporary international tribunals and courts mostly do not have penal or correctional policies of their own, and the legacy of early release, commuting of sentences and amnesties that Nuremberg and other post-World War II tribunals have left, is a particularly problematic one. Germany's historical experience provides an analytic blueprint for understanding in which ways contemporary perpetrators return into changed and still fragile societies. This comparative analysis between Nuremberg and the ICTY is based on two data sets including information on returning war criminals sentenced in both tribunals. The comparative analysis focuses on four themes: politics of reentry, admission of guilt and justification, memoirs, and political activism.

Keywords

war criminals, Nuremberg trials, ICTY, ex-prisoners, reentry

The Past and the Present

“I would prefer to be famous” was the answer that Albert Speer gave to British journalist Roger Clark in 1979, when asked whether he would prefer to be a nameless individual with a clear conscience or rather be famous as he was now as a sentenced perpetrator of war crimes and crimes against humanity (Brechtken, 2017, pp. 511–512). Speer had been sentenced to 20 years

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imprisonment for his responsibility for forced and slave labor by the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg and had been released in 1966 from the Spandau Prison which housed public figures and a number of “celebrities” from the former elite of the Nazi state.¹ He had by then acquired a new and different celebrity status nationally and internationally as the “Nazi who said sorry,”² which he had actually never done.³ Rather he had covered up and sometimes blatantly lied about his own involvement in and knowledge about the Holocaust and the orchestration of forced labor. Since the 1970s, and already during his lifetime, new documents, a growing body of historical research, and documentaries have shattered and finally destroyed the myth that he had carefully developed from the start, as a new book by the Director of the Institute of Contemporary History demonstrates (Brechtken, 2017).⁴ Thus, Speer’s response came as a shocking surprise to the journalist, who had mostly bought into the story of his admission of at least a moral, if not legal guilt, and he presented this response to his readers as a sign of Speer’s moral indifference (Brechtken, 2017, p. 512). It can also be read as an expression of Speer’s confidence in his celebrity and postwar status and his success in constructing an unblemished past in his published memoirs.

In an interview for Sputnik News in 2016, Biljana Plavšić gave an answer that echoed Speer’s in a way. She was asked whether if she could choose would she act and take decisions in the same way, as she had done as a member of the presidency of Republika Srpska when they prepared for and conducted the war in 1992 and for which she stood on trial before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).⁵ She unequivocally confirmed that she would. Moreover, in a surprising move, she compared her own trial and imprisonment with the Nuremberg trials and in particular with Speer’s trial and imprisonment. She referred to his memoir and the account of his imprisonment in Spandau⁶ that she said she had read, and now used as a backdrop against which she detailed her own experience of the Swedish prison at the hands of allegedly Muslim prison guards. While she indicates that she has been a victim of human rights abuses, she describes Speer’s imprisonment—not always correctly—as something she “could only dream of.” In view of the atrocities that were subject of the Nuremberg trials, she compares her sentence of 11 years to Speer’s 20 years (see Choi, 2014; Simic, 2011; Subotić, 2012). In sum, and like in her memoir (excerpts: Subotić, 2012, pp. 49–57), she feels treated unfairly by the ICTY and a victim of maltreatment in the Swedish prison.

In fact, Biljana Plavšić and Albert Speer have more in common, but they also differ widely. From an individualized and ahistorical perspective, they are both high-ranking sentenced perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity. From a historical and contextualized perspective, they both have a role in transitional justice processes of pursuing justice for mass atrocity crimes before international criminal tribunals, which are more than half a century apart. Beyond the legal setting, transitional justice processes have a “broader cultural meaning, which reflects their own time as well as a more painful past” (Goda, 2005, p. 419), thus providing bridges between the past and the present. Sentenced perpetrators in many ways literally embody this transition from the past to the present, when they after having served their sentence, return from prison into society and start to rebuild their “life after punishment.” The reentry of sentenced perpetrators of atrocity crimes is part and parcel of the transitional process and in a way the tail end of the efforts to end impunity for the atrocities and of doing justice to victims and survivors. Their reentry therefore epitomizes the justice that has been done, its failures and achievements, how it was perceived, and how it will live on; it was after Nuremberg and it is today (Brants & Karstedt, 2015; Karstedt, 2011, 2013, 2015; Vermeulen & De Vree, 2014).

Surprisingly, little thought had been given to this aspect by the international tribunals that hand out sentences (Choi, 2014; Hola & van Wijk, 2014, 2016; Kelder, Hola, & van Wijk, 2014; van Zyl Smit, 2005). Nuremberg had left no trace with regard to principles of executing prison sentences nor any guidance for handling early release. In the end, and after 1949, the Allies left this mainly to the West German government, with the result that most of the perpetrators, who served their time in

Germany, were released before the end of the 1950s. The average time served was 6.5 years for all sentenced at the Nuremberg trials, including the follow-up trials, which amounts to 56% of the original sentence (Karstedt, 2015, p. 732). This included many death sentences in the follow-up trials, which had been first commuted to life sentences and then ended in early release for diverse reasons (Karstedt, 2013, 2015). Thus, those who had received the harshest sentences got off most lightly and mostly did not even serve two third of their sentence.⁷ This was seen by those who had been sentenced as well as by the groups whom they represented in terms of the elites of the Nazi regime as an incentive to feel vindicated and a victim of victors' justice (Karstedt, 2013). This, however, did not apply to the Major War Criminals, who had been sentenced by the IMT in 1946, and served their time in the Spandau Prison, to which Biljana Plavšić referred. Three of them were released early for health reasons, and four served their full term, including Albert Speer. These policies of release exemplify the continuing failures of German postwar society, polity, and justice system to address the crimes of the Holocaust and to come to terms with the past (Frei, 1996, 2001).

Like their predecessor, contemporary international tribunals initially ignored the problems of the execution of sentences and were slow in developing principles for decision-making on early release and rehabilitation (Choi, 2014; Hola & van Wijk, 2014, 2016). However, the ensuing problems are increasingly recognized and discussed (e.g., Merryless, 2016; Vermeulen & De Vree, 2014; on Rwanda and former Yugoslavia, see Kelder et al., 2014). The reentry of prisoners is generally predicated on reactions from their families, social groups, communities, and society to the crimes they committed, and their (previous) position within **them** (Petersilia, 2003). Consequently, there is a wide range of pathways of reentry, and this will also apply to the men and women already sentenced for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, or standing on trial at the different courts and tribunals, when they have served their sentences. They include major and high-ranking perpetrators of atrocity crimes as well as the lower ranks (overview; Hola & van Wijk, 2016; Vermeulen & De Vree, 2014). Some might chose not to return at all like those sentenced by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, as Kelder, Hola, and van Wijk (2014) report. In post-war Germany quite a number of sentenced war criminals slipped back into an inconspicuous middle-class life after being sentenced by the follow-up trials at Nuremberg (see for cases, Karstedt, 2010, 2013). This also applies to well-known public figures who mainly remain in their own social and previous professional circles like military leaders in postwar Germany (Karstedt, 2013; Scholten, 2001; von Lingen, 2009). In contrast, both Subotic (2012) and Simic (2011) report complaints and protests from victim groups, when Biljana Plavšić received a hero's welcome on her return from the prison in Sweden. Her return, as did the return from prison of Albert Speer, or former Field Marshall Albert Kesselring (von Lingen, 2009) was widely publicized and elicited reactions on the international level.

The diversity of reentry pathways is shaped by the nature of the conflict as well as by the political and social conditions of the society, into which the ex-prisoners return. Reactions to the return of such perpetrators might well epitomize the emotional climate and the fragile peace in these societies and communities. As Karstedt (2010, 2011) points out for postwar Germany, the presence or absence of victims and their voices is important in shaping individual pathways as well as the reactions of wider communities. Thus, victims of a female doctor who had been sentenced for conducting atrocious experiments on prisoners in a concentration camp, spotted her in a small German town, and succeeded in barring her from further practice as a general practitioner in postwar Germany (Karstedt, 2011).

Given the different conditions in contemporary postconflict and transitional societies, the different courts and tribunals, and the range of different pathways of reentry for those sentenced for atrocity crimes, the question arises if there is space for a comparative perspective on the reentry of these perpetrators. Nonetheless, the history of postwar Germany demonstrates in which ways the life after punishment of perpetrators of the Holocaust turned out, as values and perspectives within the wider society and the polity, and even on the international level changed (for Japan, see Wilson,

Cribb, Trefalt, & Aszkielowicz, 2017). As the reentry and life after punishment of sentenced offenders more generally exemplify in which ways societies deal with crimes and criminals, this also applies to perpetrators of international crimes. Germany's rich historical experience provides a backdrop and analytic blueprint to explore pathways of reentry, the conditions under which they develop in different contemporary postconflict societies, and how individual perpetrators as well as collectives address guilt, accountability, and the plight of the victims.

The history of West Germany and its returning Nazi war criminals therefore can shed light on these processes and help understanding in which ways perpetrators return into a thoroughly changed society, and how they themselves shape these changes, if at all. Their experiences of their trials, imprisonment, and final release, as well as their life afterward exemplify the ways in which reputations were (re)constructed, managed, and shared by their social circles, the media, politicians, and the wider public. This in particular applies to those who had leadership roles and returned as celebrities as both Biljana Plavšić and Albert Speer did. Such high-ranking and very visible perpetrators are decisive in shaping the image and reputation of the groups and organizations to which they belonged and which they led. They thus have important roles in the formation of postconflict society, its shared identity and morality (Karstedt, 2015). What lessons can be learned from comparing the lives after punishment in postwar Germany and the postconflict societies of former Yugoslavia?

The following analysis focuses on two international tribunals, the IMT and the follow-up trials in Nuremberg, and the ICTY. It only includes those sentenced by these tribunals, and it further does not include any other mechanisms and routes of reentry, like, for example, disarmament and reintegration of combatants. It analyses these cases through a criminological/criminal justice lens on the reentry process of prisoners (see, e.g., Petersilia, 2003) rather than from the perspectives of international law or transitional justice. It is based on two data sets. The German data include 78 cases for which sufficient information on their lives after punishment was available. Most of these stood on trial in Nuremberg between 1945 and 1948, out of overall 204 sentenced defendants (Priemel & Stiller, 2013, p. 760). The cases also include a small number of those who stood on trial in martial courts of the (Western) Allies. The cases include one woman who was the only woman among those sentenced at the Nuremberg trials. All of these had been sentenced and had served a prison sentence; those who had been acquitted were not included. According to the judicial strategy of the Allies, they represent the top and the lower echelons of the party, government, military, and economy. Secondary sources were searched for information about their lives before and after punishment, which was often not available. Data collected include information on their position during the Nazi regime, the crimes committed, the sentence, release, and their lives after release. Secondary sources ranged from media reports to academic publications and published collections of biographical information (Klee, 2005; data collection: Karstedt, 2011). More information is available on high-ranking and "celebrity" defendants, including from their own memoirs. Consequently, the cases included are not representative, but the selection is biased toward the more well known, or whose cases and reentry elicited a particular interest from contemporary media or later historical research.

A similar data set was created that mirrors this information for perpetrators from the former Yugoslavia sentenced by the ICTY and released from prison until 2017, mainly canvassing information from web sources. It is a selection out of those who had been released from prison until 2017 and again biased toward those for whom information was available. Like the collection of cases for postwar Germany, it is not representative of all those who were released by 2017. Given the initial policy of prosecuting lower ranks, information about many of them is not available, as they did not attract sufficient media attention or made their voices heard. Nonetheless, 22 individuals are included, among them a number of high ranking ones.⁸ Information was gleaned from mainly international media reports, reports from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and academic

publications. Given the different nature of the crimes and prosecution strategies in Nuremberg and the ICTY, the two populations from which the cases are selected differ. Therefore, the data set of those sentenced by the ICTY mainly includes perpetrators from the military, paramilitary, and security forces; in contrast, the former data set also includes government officials, party functionaries, professionals, and industry leaders besides the military and SS (Schutzstaffel) leadership.

The comparative analysis in this article focuses on the interaction between perpetrators and the society, to which they return, and four themes: politics of reentry, admission of guilt and justification, memoirs, and political activism. In particular, those from the highest tier of command and decision-making represent not only elite groups from the military or industry but also the rank and file who followed their orders and thus might be implicated in the crimes. Their fate and life course might even symbolize the identity of the population and nation as a whole, “a community of accomplices” as in the case of Germany (Reemtsma, 2000, p. 278). They are figureheads, and their reputation is closely linked to the standing of their social, professional, or status groups in the transitional and postconflict society (Karstedt, 2015; e.g., the SS in postwar Germany Wilke, 2011). Their memoirs garner national and international attention as demonstrated by translations.⁹ They lend themselves to identification within narrow social and political circles, where they are respectfully received (see for postwar Germany, Karstedt, 2013, 2015). On the other hand, victims and survivors fearfully watch their return and activities, and in their persona, they exemplify the tensions of the past and present (Simic, 2011). I will focus on two main proponents, Biljana Plavšić and Albert Speer, and in addition will complement this with information from other cases. In the conclusion, I will explore whether lessons can be drawn for the future of release and reentry of international prisoners.

The Politics of Reentry: Open Defiance and Subtle Coding

In 2009, Biljana Plavšić was released from the Swedish prison and flew to Belgrade on a Republika Srpska airplane with the approval of its prime minister Milord Dodik. Pictures of her being greeted by the prime minister and later strolling with him through Belgrade were widely publicized and caused outrage and concern among victim groups, NGOs, and international observers. Her hero's welcome seemed to signify an attitude of defiance against the verdict of the ICTY. This was further confirmed by a comment on her sentence by the prime minister: “I believe it was unfair and of no relevance any more She needs to forget about it as soon as possible, and our friends need too.” Though it is not exactly clear who are addressed as “friends,” this can be certainly read as a statement defying the indictment and sentence and thus the ICTY itself (Simic, 2011, p. 1401; Subotic, 2012).

Biljana Plavšić was not the only one who received a welcome from ministers and other high-ranking politicians. A former military commander (Vladimir Lazarević), who had been sentenced to 14 years, was flown home by two Serbian ministers and honored in his hometown, not the least because of the allegedly wrongful conviction he had suffered (Simic, 2011). The only Macedonian convicted by the ICTY (Johan Tarčulovski), after returning from a 12-year sentence of which he served eight, was declared a hero by his political group.¹⁰ Other senior officers (Enver Hadžihasanović) who served time for war crimes are welcome guests and speakers at veterans' and army celebrations. Dario Kordić, a member of the Croatian political leadership in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was well received by the Catholic Church, when he returned to Zagreb in 2014 after serving two thirds of his sentence of 25 years.¹¹

In contrast to former Yugoslavian countries, it had been a foundational condition for West Germany to regain sovereignty that the verdicts of the Nuremberg trials were accepted as legitimate and not to be declared void or nullified (Karstedt, 2013, pp. 45–47). Consequently, publicly declaring them unjust and wrongful in individual cases was simply not an option and would have elicited

reactions from the watchful Allies. As a result, politicians in postwar Germany had to be more subdued and subtle in sending messages to those sentenced by the Allies, whether in Nuremberg or elsewhere. However, lobbying the Allies for early release in various ways was possible (see Karstedt, 2013; cases: Brechtken 2017; von Lingen, 2009). The German government toed a thin line between outrightly questioning the legitimacy of the convictions and sentences, blaming the Allies for violations of their own principles “of human dignity, as prevailing in the Western democracies” (Goda, 2007, p. 115), and just raising humanitarian issues for individual prisoners. As a matter of course, it also wanted to align with the public mood of closing the books on the past and in particular to win over large groups still attached to Nazi ideology to the emerging democratic state and society (Frei, 2001, pp. 330–332).

This line was transgressed in the case of von Neurath, one of the Spandau prisoners, who was released from the Spandau Prison in 1954 because of his ill health. As former Foreign Minister and governor of the Czech Protectorate, he was one of the Major War Criminals who stood trial at the IMT for all four charges (including war crimes and crimes against humanity) and was sentenced to 15 years. On his release, chancellor Konrad Adenauer sent a published telegram cautiously worded as greetings to von Neurath and his family. Less cautious was Federal President Theodor Heuss who expressed his gratitude that “the martyrdom of these years has come to an end for you” (Goda, 2007, p. 115). Even if Heuss had a record of opposition to the Nazis, the reference to martyrdom was ambiguous at best and ill-chosen at worst. Press reactions in the countries of Europe which had suffered under German occupation, as well as in Britain, were extremely negative, and Heuss and Adenauer’s words were condemned as “characterless policy of opportunism” to the public mood of collective amnesia at the time (see Karstedt, 2009). Public outrage in these countries was further fueled by comments in the conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* that “Neurath’s case should now occasion the revision of all the Nuremberg judgments.” Other newspapers went further and opined that von Neurath’s release represented “a delayed revision of a judicial mistake,” clearly suggesting to their readers that the Nuremberg trials had been a miscarriage of justice (all quotes; Goda, 2007, pp. 130–131).

West German politicians were present again in the major national and international media on the event of Albert Speer’s release from Spandau Prison in 1966, after he had fully served his sentence of 20 years. Willy Brandt, then Mayor of Berlin, who in this capacity also had campaigned for Speer’s early release, sent flowers to Speer’s daughter, who relentlessly had promoted his cause. This time, however, the victims raised their voice. Simon Wiesenthal, Holocaust survivor and founder and director of the Documentation Center of the Association of Jewish Victims of the Nazi Regime in Vienna, sent a letter of protest to Willy Brandt and asked him “never (again) to lay flowers at a memorial of Nazi-victims.” Brandt’s own Social Democratic Party let it be known that they “regretted . . . the sending of flowers” (all references: Brechtken, 2017, pp. 365–367, 454). Such voices from within the country were indicative of changes in public attitudes (see Karstedt, 2009) and might be linked to the influence of the Auschwitz trials, which were taking place in Frankfurt between 1963 and 1968. Prosecution and trials of Holocaust perpetrators had restarted in the second half of the 1950s and gained momentum throughout the 1960s, up to the major Majdanek trial from 1975 to 1981.

Nonetheless, even if politicians had to be increasingly cautious in publicly welcoming sentenced Nazi war criminals, this was perfectly possible at the lower level of communities or organizations. Particularly, former military leaders were welcomed by the newly established army during the 1950s. Former Admiral Karl Dönitz had been the commander of the Navy since 1943 and succeeded Hitler during the last days of the Nazi regime in 1945. One of the Major War Criminals, he was sentenced by the IMT in Nuremberg to 10 years imprisonment on charges of preparation of aggressive warfare and war crimes. He saw it as a miscarriage of justice as he indicated in an interview

much later in the 1970s (Dönitz, 1972). After his release from Spandau Prison in 1956, he soon became a sought-after speaker to the newly established Federal Army and its navy.

As Frei (2001, p. 312) points out, political leaders in newly established democracies need to solicit the support of the population, including the former elites. They thus tend to address the collective mood and secure support from specific groups, like, for example, the military, its leadership and the common soldiers, industry, and professionals. However, it is of critical importance not to violate the moral norms of the newly established democracy and its human rights regime. The history of Germany demonstrates in which ways such political constraints and imperatives shaped the political reaction to the reentry of prisoners. In contrast, the lower level of organizations or social circles is much less scrutinized. Both in Germany and the societies of former Yugoslavia, communities and NGOs are more welcoming toward returning prisoners. This in particular concerns the military in both cases but also the churches (see Karstedt, 2013, for the role of both the Lutheran and Catholic Church in postwar Germany).

Navigating Guilt: Admissions and Confessions

Both Biljana Plavšić and Albert Speer had been widely known among their people and as leaders had gained a status of celebrity; Albert Speer had even gained international recognition as the highly gifted organizer and logistics expert behind the German armament and war machinery (Brechtken, 2017, pp. 155, 293). However, their statements of remorse and accepting a kind of moral guilt and responsibility for the crimes with which they and other defendants had been charged, during their trials and on their return, were decisive in establishing them as public figures domestically and internationally. They were not the only ones who made such statements before the tribunals. The Nuremberg trials did not formally recognize guilty pleas; besides Speer, Hans Frank, Governor General in occupied Poland and responsible for the Holocaust in this country, in the first instance had acknowledged the crimes; however, Hans Frank later revoked the respective statement already during the trial. In contrast, guilty pleas could be made before the ICTY; besides Biljana Plavšić, 19 defendants had pleaded guilty before the ICTY.¹² The statements by both Biljana Plavšić and Albert Speer received wide domestic and international attention. Their pleas seemed to provide evidence that justice could instigate change not only in individuals but also in collectives. For the Hague process, this could signal that reconciliation in the region might be achieved, as the International Center for Transitional Justice stated (2004; see also Subotić, 2012, p. 45 for a range of different reactions). For the Nuremberg trials, this meant that the crimes of the Holocaust and the victims were acknowledged at least by one of the defendants.

After Biljana Plavšić had entered a plea agreement at the ICTY, in the sentencing hearing in December 2002, she issued a statement of acknowledgment of the crimes committed. She gave as a reason for this acknowledgment that she wanted to spare “her people” paying a price for the crimes. She accepted the “fact . . . that innocent people were the victims of systematic efforts . . . by Serbs,” and she “accepted responsibility for my part” (quoted by Subotić, 2012, pp. 43–45; also Choi, 2014; Simic, 2011). International organizations like the International Center for Transitional Justice, as well as a domestic human rights center (Research and Documentation Center, Sarajevo) welcomed the confession (Subotić, 2012, pp. 45–46). Former Ambassador to the United Nations and architect of the Dayton agreement, Richard Holbrook saw it as a “historical event” and the first prosecutor at the Hague Tribunal, Richard Goldstone deemed it a “big step forward” (Simic, 2011, p. 1398). In two public statements in 2005 and 2009, while serving her sentence in a Swedish prison, she retracted her confession and statement (Choi, 2014, pp. 1786–1787). She claimed that she had made it mainly to spare herself further proceedings and in an attempt to have the charges dismissed, that is, for purely instrumental reasons and as political opportunism. These interviews then paved the way for much more explicit denial of any involvement in the crimes committed on her part in her

memoirs, which were published in Serbian in 2005. She made such statements again on her return to Serbia in 2009 after early release. Those who had initially welcomed and praised her confession were shocked and regretted their support for her (Subotić, 2012, p. 49).

Albert Speer was the only defendant at the IMT who expressed “moral guilt” of having been part of a criminal regime in front of the tribunal and later. Like Plavšić, he stated that he had to take moral responsibility as part of the collective Nazi government in order to exonerate the German people from collective guilt and spare them further suffering. However, he pleaded “not guilty” and in particular denied any knowledge of the crimes of forced and slave labor under his command and of the Holocaust, a move that certainly saved his life.¹³ His interrogators, including Kenneth Galbraith, and the court indeed had little knowledge of the complex organization and responsibilities in Speer’s remit. Speer was the only defendant who ostentatiously accepted the court and trial and publicly stated the necessity of such a trial; he never retracted from this in public. Both his acceptance of the court and of a kind of collective guilt mainly confirmed his international reputation already during the trial and his imprisonment, and paved the way toward his postrelease reputation as the “only Nazi who said sorry.” However, it was more important to the German people that he shifted all blame and responsibility to Hitler, by whom he confessed to have been betrayed. This perfectly reflected the feelings of a large part of the German postwar population (Karstedt, 1998, 2008) and could send a message to those who had been involved as perpetrators.

Both, the victims and the international public, could relate to this statement of acceptance of moral guilt and were receptive to this image. Simon Wiesenthal supported him and his narrative in public and internationally; Eugen Kogon, survivor of the Buchenwald concentration camp and acclaimed author of books on the SS, and others saw an important role for the remorseful perpetrator in counteracting national socialist tendency and denial in German society (Brechtken, 2017, pp. 456, 490, 509). His supporters even included Robert Kempner, who had been chief prosecutor for the follow-up trials in Nuremberg (Brechtken, 2017, pp. 447–449). Speer’s claims that he had no knowledge neither of the atrocities committed in the underground armament factories nor of the Holocaust generally resonated with the German public: Like him, they could not have known.¹⁴ However, Speer’s claim of ignorance became ever more contested soon after the publication of his memoirs. Crucial in his memoir’s account was that allegedly he had left early and therefore had not been present at SS leader Himmler’s infamous speech to the party leadership and officials in October 1943, in which Himmler informed his audience in detail about the ongoing mass killings of men, women, and children. When in 1971 such evidence from a copy of Speer’s official diary held in London archives emerged, Speer frantically reacted and put together a declaration, which was supported by affidavits that he had solicited from two colleagues. However, step by step his claim was refuted, and in 1996, Kenneth Galbraith called Speer a liar (Brechtken, 2017, p. 550).

In the second- and third-tier group at the follow-up trials in Nuremberg, statements of moral responsibility were not made in public or before the courts; this is in contrast to the ICTY proceedings. After returning from prison, Simo Zarić, who had received a 6-year prison sentence from the ICTY for crimes against humanity, and was released in 2004, was elected as deputy mayor in the city, where he had carried out ethnic cleansing. His explicit aim was to rebuild a multiethnic community and he expressed the need to apologize to the victims.¹⁵ Hans Kehr, a close collaborator of Speer, was sentenced to 15 years in one of the follow-up trials at Nuremberg and only served two. He much later and a long time after his release accepted responsibility, however, never became a public figure like Speer (see his memoir Kehr, 1973; Karstedt, 2015).

As both the IMT with the follow-up trials and the ICTY differed in terms of handling guilty pleas, there is little acknowledgment of crimes and responsibility before the Nuremberg courts, and definitely more guilty pleas are made at the ICTY. In case of the two outstanding figures of Biljana Plavšić and Albert Speer, similar narratives were used before the court: that the crimes are acknowledged, in order to relieve the nation of guilt, however not as a personal responsibility. Such

statements were in both cases well received and deemed as signaling acknowledgment of the atrocious crimes and the necessity of prosecution. These statements critically shaped the further process of reentry of both, as will be seen in the following sections.

Memoirs and Other Accounts: Explanation and Justification

Memoirs, autobiographies, and all kinds of historical accounts are eagerly used by a number of sentenced perpetrators in Germany as well as in the countries of former Yugoslavia. These are the tools of choice to engage with the public; they convey the perspective of the accused on the unfolding of events and own involvement in them, on the trials and imprisonment. They are careful renditions for a historical record and mostly aim at managing the (criminal) reputation. They are written to set the record straight, from the perspective of the writer, and often against all evidence. Given the availability of new media for the defendants from former Yugoslavia, the number of books and diversity of publications is quite astonishing. Nine among the 22 individuals included in this analysis published a book, among them, for example, Simo Zarić, or Veselin Šljivančanin and Vinko Pandurević, who wrote several.¹⁶ These books are mostly written for domestic audiences rather than for international audiences, like the two volumes by Biljana Plavšić (Subotic, 2012). Autobiographical accounts, including on the Hague trial and detention, were written by four ICTY convicts of the 22, including, for example, Vinko Pandurević and Dragoljub Ojdanić; more general books on contemporary and historical politics, and in particular, the war have been written by five, including, for example, Momčilo Krajišnik with a book on “How the Republic of Srpska was born.” A popular writer is Veselin Šljivančanin who had been a high-level officer in the Yugoslav People’s Army and was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment; his autobiographical account focuses on his fateful rise and fall.¹⁷ Dragoljub Ojdanić, former chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army and sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment for aiding and abetting crimes against humanity, published a similar account titled “From the village Ravni to The Hague,” which became very popular.¹⁸

Biljana Plavšić’s two-volume memoir gives an impression of the potential themes of such memoirs (for all quotes and references, see Subotić, 2012, pp. 49–57). She casts the Serbs as victims of the conflict and international conspiracy, and consequently the atrocities as reactions to abuse at the hands of others, and as an unfortunate spiral of violence. She maintains that Serbs should keep apart from others and that they should strive for their own territory. She has nothing but praise for the other ICTY accused, including former General Mladic (Subotic, 2012, p. 56), who meanwhile stood trial and in 2017 received a life sentence for the genocide in Srebrenica and other crimes. Her account gives meaning to the conflicts and wars in Yugoslavia during the 1990s and establishes a shared identity and common fate with her audience.

Nearly all of the defendants at the Major War Criminals’ Trial at the Nuremberg IMT published autobiographical accounts. However, none was as popular as Albert Speer’s, nationally and internationally, as well as financially. He was the only one among the IMT defendants, who was a widely known public figure and famous already during the Nazi regime. Speer had skilfully used all media of his time to establish his reputation as a charismatic leader. He could seamlessly preserve his celebrity image during the trial and imprisonment; after his release, he used the same skills in promoting himself as “the only Nazi who said sorry.” His release on October 1, 1966 was a media event, with the national and international press present (Brechtken, 2017, p. 367).

Speer had received offers for his memoirs already when still in Spandau Prison. After his release, he set immediately out to produce them. His previous celebrity status was reconfirmed and reestablished by his two books, *Inside the Third Reich (Erinnerungen)* and *Spandau: The Secret Diaries (Spandauer Tagebücher)* published in German in 1969 and 1975. Both books were based on notes written during his time at Spandau and smuggled out of the prison. The memoir was an account of his role in the Nazi regime, and his exceptional rise within its hierarchy. The Spandau Diaries were

partially an account of life in prison and his fellow prisoners (not always complimentary) and partially a reflection on his involvement in the Nazi regime. They were an immediate success and made him the darling of the media and elites of German postwar society. They were careful renditions of the narrative and reputation he had already established at Nuremberg, and he never retracted from his account and admission of moral guilt. In this, he could rely on two helping hands, his publisher and a renowned German journalist. They carefully navigated him through the problems and pitfalls of his account, and the lack of evidence for parts of it (Brechtken, 2017, pp. 385–407).

Both books spoke directly to the German public that increasingly saw themselves confronted with the past and the horrendous crimes committed. They did this in several ways. First, Speer's account of his relentless efforts to keep the war economy going and to secure victory reassured Germans of their own sacrifice and their achievements; this established a seamless continuity between the past and the "economic miracle" of the 1950s and 1960s including technological advancement. Second, in these efforts, Speer presented himself as faithful to the German people until the end of the war, in contrast to Hitler, who deserted them. Finally, in firmly claiming ignorance of the crimes of the past, collective claims to such ignorance became more credible. This nourished a normative climate of a "community of accomplices" (Reemtsma, 2000, p. 278), in which Speer as a leading proponent and the public covered each other's guilt and involvement. He fulfilled the wish of postwar Germany that it had been possible to be deeply involved and nonetheless untainted by the unspeakable crimes. The fact that Speer had been sentenced as one of the Major War Criminals got completely lost in this interactive discourse (Trommer, 2016, p. 330).

All other memoirs turned out to have a comparably short shelf life and could never reach the public as Speer did with his. After his release in 1956, former Admiral Karl Dönitz (1959) wrote his memoirs "*Ten years and Twenty Days*" and "*My changeful life*" in 1958 and 1968, respectively; the first of these attracted international attention and was translated in 1959. He was very cautious and sought to dissociate himself from Hitler in these accounts. The two books were only modestly successful, including the English translation, presumably due to quite technical accounts of naval strategy and warfare. Baldur von Schirach was released from Spandau Prison on the same day as Albert Speer. He had been the leader of the Nazi Youth organizations and later had become governor of Vienna. Like Speer, he had been a member of Hitler's closest circle, but his positions within the Nazi state had been less important. In his capacity as governor of Vienna, he had been responsible for the deportation of 185,000 Austrian Jews, for which he was sentenced as a major war criminal to 20 years imprisonment at the IMT. He published his memoirs with the title "I believed in Hitler" in 1967 and cast himself as a young and idealistic believer in the "good causes" of the Nazi ideology (von Schirach, 1967). He denied ever having known about why and where he deported the Jewish population of Vienna and Austria and having been (knowingly) involved in the implementation of the Holocaust. However, in his biography, he admitted to having been present at the infamous speech by Himmler, which was also a crucial point for Speer. In this speech, Himmler had made the Nazi leadership complicit in the Holocaust and had openly spoken about it. However, von Schirach dated it nearly a year later in October 1944 and thus at the very end of the war (rather than correctly in 1943; Sereny, 1996, p. 396), which indicated that he had not known about the Holocaust until close to the end of the war. With its title his memoir expressed a common and shared fate as many adult Germans felt that they had been betrayed by the Nazi leadership and Hitler. Hans Kehr, a close collaborator of Speer, followed suite with an account, in which he described his role simply as a technocrat and expert within the Nazi regime, a line that Speer also had pursued successfully. His memoir with the title "*Crisis Manager in the Third Reich*" was published in 1973.

The memoirs of both groups of war criminal, German and Yugoslav, have numerous characteristics in common and represent individual strategies for the management of reputations upon reentry, notwithstanding the widely differing contexts of transitional societies (Fine, 2001; Karstedt, 2013, 2015). They address a public that is receptive to the tales of the conflicts and the individual's

trajectory through difficult times. They in particular aim at rejecting any label as criminal by recasting the crimes and the courts which adjudicated the authors. They seek to explain to the public what had happened and provide a morality tale, to which the readers can subscribe. As they engage with their readers, they provide them with a possible template for their own individual involvement in the events. Not all memoirs are widely read, and they often seem to circulate more in closed circles of social groups and organizations; however, they fulfill similar tasks within these.

Returning to Power: Reentering Politics

Perhaps the starkest contrast between the societies, which those sentenced at the Nuremberg trials and the ICTY reentered, is to be found in the opportunities open to sentenced perpetrators for returning to and regaining positions of power. None of those sentenced at Nuremberg, other Allied courts and tribunals could make their way back into political life and high level positions in the new democratic state of the Federal Republic.¹⁹ The Allies had prohibited those who had been in high positions or in one of the criminal organizations (e.g., the SS) from holding office in the government bureaucracy again; this proscription included major roles in political party activities, and standing for office in elections, thus keeping them out of political life. Many of these restrictions still applied when the Federal Republic was founded in 1949 and gained sovereignty in 1952, though they were loosened step by step and continuously. These restrictions turned out to be a double-edged sword. While on the one hand, the democratic state and polity had to rely on and solicit support from former elites and professionals, on the other hand, politicians in the democratic parties and government had to draw a line between themselves and former Nazi elite members in order to establish their democratic credentials (Frei, 2001; Karstedt, 2015). Unaware of these developments in the Spandau prison, Dönitz envisioned a major public role for himself within the new democracy and its military. However, in the press conference given on the occasion of his release in 1956, he cautiously stated that he would refrain from any comments on future political engagement until he had first made up his own mind (Goda, 2007, p. 385). He never returned to any position of power.

The German government embarked on a series of small-scale and de-facto amnesties; however, a general amnesty that would have opened up the way toward government and political office was never adopted (Eichmüller, 2012; Görtemaker & Safferling, 2016; Herbert, 1996). Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was opposed throughout his government from 1949 to 1963, not the least because of the havoc it would have wrecked on the international reputation of the new democratic state (see Brechtken, 2017; Goda, 2007; Karstedt, 2013; von Lingen, 2009). Nonetheless, those from the second and third tier of the Nazi regime were able to regain positions in the bureaucracy and in politics; this included some of those, who had been sentenced for war crimes by national courts in the occupied countries like, for example, France, Italy, Poland, Yugoslavia, or the Czech Protectorate (foreign office: Conze, Frei, Hayes, & Zimmermann, 2010; military: Scholten, 2001). Political parties were often closely related to networks and circles of former Nazi elites, according to their political orientation and program. A network comprising of former high-level party functionaries, bureaucrats from the Reich Security Main Office and the Gestapo, who had been sentenced as war criminals, is exemplary of such connections to the right-wing Liberal Party. However, its activities, including campaigning and lobbying for a general amnesty for war criminals raised the suspicion of the British, in whose zone it had been established. In 1953, the British arrested its leading figures thus demonstrating their vigilance and intention to prevent any rise of political National Socialism (Herbert, 1996, p. 467). In building the new democratic state in the Federal Republic of Germany, mainly those were allowed back into office, who had not been sentenced and imprisoned or who had been sentenced and had served their sentence in other countries, even if they had been part of orchestrating and preparing the Holocaust (see Frei, 2001, for an overview). Only later when

prosecution was resumed and their deep involvement in atrocity crimes was uncovered and scandalized, they had to resign from political office.²⁰

In stark contrast, six of the 22 ex-ICTY prisoners have reentered politics in their countries in various ways and capacities. Simo Zarić was deputy mayor of a town and was a candidate for municipal elections in 2004. Four other men—Blagoje Simić, Nikola Šainović, Momčilo Krajišnik, and Johan Tarčulovski entered party politics and were warmly welcomed by the mainly conservative right-wing parties.²¹ Perhaps the most outstanding case is that of Nikola Šainović, Deputy Prime Minister and a high ranking member of the former government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. He was sentenced for crimes against humanity and war crimes to 18 years imprisonment and released in 2015. He was appointed a board member of his political party only a week after his return. Johan Tarčulovski stood for national parliament as candidate of the ruling nationalist and center-right party in Macedonia and was elected in December 2016.²² According to commentators, his election was “potentially dangerous for the country’s still fragile inter-ethnic relations, adding to the mistrust between the Macedonian and ethnic Albanian communities . . . burdens Macedonia’s path to democratisation”.²³ As there are no restrictions in place, neither as part of early release requirements nor as part of the country’s own regulations, political activity is a perfectly legal and socially accepted option for those returning from prison in the successor countries of former Yugoslavia.

Political activity was clearly restricted for sentenced war criminals in postwar Germany; during the early years of the Federal Republic, this was monitored by the Allies and scrutinized by the international community. This did not prevent a number of those from the second and third tier to reenter government positions. There is agreement (see below) that this provided a level of stability for the new democracy. In turn, the increasing stability of the polity encouraged further domestic prosecution of the crimes of the Holocaust, which affected a number of ex-prisoners who had returned from other countries. At present, among the 22 cases of ICTY ex-prisoners, no such restrictions seem to be in place, and a number of them have reentered politics, most recently Momčilo Krajišnik.²⁴ Whether this will impact on the stability and transition in these countries is not clear. However, given the publicity on their return to politics, the media and the public seem to assume an active role in monitoring political activity of returning sentenced perpetrators.

Conclusion: Are There Lessons?

Biljana Plavšić was right when comparing the Nuremberg trials with the ICTY. The group of ex-prisoners returning to the countries of former Yugoslavia have mostly served between two thirds and three quarters of their sentences, which often include long periods in remand in The Hague. In contrast, those sentenced at Nuremberg served just over half of their sentences, and quite a number among these were commuted death sentences (Karstedt, 2015). We find striking similarities and contrasts between the two groups of ex-prisoners reentering society that are set apart by more than half a century. What are the mechanisms that shape the pathways of their reentry?

Starting with the similarities, common characteristics are found for individuals, as they (re)negotiate their guilt and manage their reputations, most visible for the well-known public figures such as Biljana Plavšić and Albert Speer in each group. Major tools in these efforts are memoirs, or political, historical or military analyses of the past. They are written with the purpose to set the record straight and to justify and explain not only the individual’s action but those of the group. Some outright claim innocence to any charges, some defy the authority of the court and tribunals, and others raise accusations as to human rights abuses of which they have suffered. Dragoljub Ojdanić claims that Serbia and its people have forgotten him and all he did for them.²⁵ They present themselves as martyrs of the cause of the people, as both Biljana Plavšić and Albert Speer did; other defendants from the Nuremberg trials and the ICTY followed suit, for example, Dönitz (Karstedt,

2013). Plavšić and Speer conveyed the impression of a kind of acceptance of wrongdoing, however, at the same time, distanced themselves from their involvement in the atrocities. Generally, the popularity of the authors and their books speak to collective needs of reassuring a shared fate and identity which is not blemished by the crimes of the past. As perpetrators address their own groups, and relieve them of guilt and shame, these renditions of the past fulfill such wishes for large parts of the society and its diverse communities. In this discourse, victims are excluded, often blamed or seen again as enemies. They are indeed the “missing souls” (Scheffer, 2012). While in postwar Germany, they were literally not present, in the societies of postconflict Yugoslavia they are, and they stage protests or alert the international community. Nonetheless, neither Plavšić nor Speer publicly recognized the victims of their crimes, though Speer sought contact with Jewish organizations (Brechtken, 2017, pp. 456–458, 500–501).

Though rare, any kind of admission of guilt and even of only moral responsibility address vital exigencies of the international criminal courts and tribunals, their rationale, justification, and legitimacy. The fact that both Chief Prosecutors at Nuremberg and The Hague, Robert Kempner and Richard Goldstone supported the statements by Albert Speer and Biljana Plavšić demonstrates the wish to find impact of the tribunals’ efforts on individuals and society. Similarly, victims’ organizations welcome such signs of acknowledgment of the crimes, as was done by Mirsad Tokaca, the director of a Sarajevo human rights NGO, as well as by Simon Wiesenthal, director of the Vienna Center in his name. In particular, because they are rare (“the Nazi who said sorry”), such statements are the more eagerly accepted and little scrutinized. It took only a few years until Plavšić retracted hers, and more than three decades until Speer’s was uncovered as deeply dishonest (mostly by historians, see for an overview Brechtken, 2017, pp. 535–576).

As returning prisoners engage with society and the polity, their trajectories into life after punishment are shaped by these contexts. The Allies had leverage on postwar Germany well beyond the Nuremberg trials, and they had put strict laws in place in order to prevent any resurrection of Nazism or return to power of leading members of the Nazi regime, which were inherited by the Federal Republic. In addition to their own vigilance, postwar Germany and its dealing with the crimes and perpetrators of the past was closely monitored by the countries who had suffered at the hands of the Germans. This kind of international “tutelage” turned out to be of tremendous advantage for the emerging democratic society; in hindsight, the “fundamental liberalization” of state and society, polity, and culture, that was achieved by the end of the 1960s, might not have been possible at this pace without this international vigilance, given the extent of integration of the Nazi state and society (Herbert, 2003, p. 7). This might also have compensated for the absence of victims in postwar Germany.

It is here, where the history of postwar Germany provides lessons for the postconflict and divided societies of former Yugoslavia and beyond. Certainly, the type of oversight and vigilance that the Allies and the international community then exercised is not possible today. However, the international community and the institutions of international criminal justice might become more proactive in monitoring the return of perpetrators sentenced for atrocity crimes more generally and see it as part of their task. This might include restrictions attached to conditions of release, preparation of and support for the victims’ communities when perpetrators are released back home, and international vigilance with regard to politicians and political parties, in particular, extremist ones. Presently, as increasing interaction and hybridization between international and domestic criminal justice is evolving for the prosecution of international crimes, domestic penal laws, courts, and practices might have more leverage in terms of restrictions and oversight.

However, one needs to be cautious in drawing conclusions as to the impact on the stability of the postconflict situation. If anything, the history of postwar Germany epitomizes the “longue durée” of the transition across decades. This historical account is one of slowly changing collective attitudes in addressing the past within an increasingly stable and liberal democracy (Karstedt, 2009), a course

which returning prisoners and sentenced Holocaust perpetrators obviously did not change. Thus, the comparison between the two groups of ex-prisoners provides a cautiously optimistic perspective for the future.

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Notes

1. The Major War Criminals Trial conducted by the International Military Tribunal (IMT) aimed at putting the top level of the Nazi-state on trial, including the party, the SS (Schutzstaffel), military, governors of occupied countries, government, and industry. The seven sentenced defendants who served their time in Spandau prison included two military leaders (Raeder and Dönitz), a foreign minister (von Neurath), sentenced mainly for crimes committed as governor of what is today Czech Republic and Slovakia, the deputy of Adolf Hitler (Rudolf Hess), the minister of the economy and president of the Reich Bank (Funk), the leader of the Nazi Youth organizations and sentenced for crimes committed in his capacity as governor of Vienna (von Schirach), and minister of armament, Albert Speer. They were all well-known figures among the German public, in particular, the two military leaders Raeder and Dönitz, the youth leader von Schirach, and the minister of armament, Speer. Particularly, Dönitz, Hess, von Schirach, and Speer can be seen as celebrities of the Nazi regime, not the least because they belonged to the close circle around Hitler.
2. This was the title of a BBC documentary in 1996 (Brechtken, 2017, p. 550).
3. Gitta Sereny wrote the most widely known biography of Speer, published in 1996; she had established a close relationship with him, and her book is mainly based on numerous personal interviews with Speer, during which she allegedly discussed the question of his involvement and guilt with him; however, she does not provide evidence for such a statement by Speer. Relying mostly on Speer's own account, she only consulted very few documents from his estate, but none from his time as minister during the Nazi regime, nor did she take notice of the scientific literature already available at the time, which is highly critical (see Brechtken, 2017, pp. 461–486, 547–559).
4. See Brechtken (2017) for a thorough and detailed account of this research, its results and the damning conclusion to be drawn for the perpetrator as contemporary witness (see also Chlevickaite & Hola, 2016). This does not only concern Speer's involvement as minister of armament, but his acquisition of Jewish property, art looted from occupied countries, and his business.
5. The original interview in Serbian: Milinčić (2016).
6. This refers to Speer's (1976) diaries from Spandau and might include his earlier memoirs (Speer, 1970), as well as Sereny's biography (1996).
7. Mean time served in prison and mean percentage of the sentence served includes all types of sentences except executed death penalties and suicides in prison. Life sentences were calculated as 30 years imprisonment, given the age of the defendants at the time of the trial (nearly all above 40 years) and male life expectancy at the time (at about 70 years). Time spent in internment camps was included as the courts mainly included this in the sentence and later release; for details of the data and sources, see Karstedt (2015).
8. The following 22 individuals are included in the ICTY data set: Vidoje Blagojević, Tihomir Blaškić, Ljubomir Borovčanin, Dražen Erdemović, Enver Hadžihasanović, Dragan Jokić, Dario Kordić, Momcilo Krajisnik, Amir Kubura, Miroslav Kvočka, Vladimir Lazarevic, Momir Nikolić, Dragoljub Ojdanic, Vinko Pandurević, Biljana Plavšić, Nikola Sainovic, Blagoje Simic, Veselin Šljivančanin, Duško Tadić, Johan

- Tarculovski, Zoran Vukovic, and Simo Zaric. Three individuals were added to the data set after finalising this analysis: Haradin Bala, Miodrag Jokic, and Pavle Strugar.
9. Albert Speer's memoir was published in English in 1970, only a year after the German edition in 1969; his Spandau diaries were published in German in 1975 and in English in 1976; Karl Dönitz published his memoir in 1958, 2 years after his release from the Spandau prison; it was translated in 1959.
 10. See Andonovska (2016).
 11. Various web resources, available from the author's data set.
 12. For guilty pleas in international law more generally, see Combs (2007) and Clark (2009).
 13. Speer managed to shift the blame and responsibility for forced and slave labor to the man who had been in charge under his command for executing his requests for laborers, taking advantage of the scant knowledge the Allies and the IMT had of his empire. Fritz Sauckel received the death penalty, while Speer got away with 20 years, a result that is generally seen as unjust. Pleading guilty would have certainly not spared him Sauckel's fate (Brechtken, 2017, pp. 300–309).
 14. Actually, the Holocaust had been an "open secret"; see Bajohr and Pohl (2006, 2008) and Johnson and Reuband (2008).
 15. See Kampschror (2005) and Balkan Transitional Justice (2010).
 16. These include Veselin Šljivančanin, Duško Tadić, Simo Zarić, Momčilo Krajišnik, Biljana Plavšić, Vinko Pandurević, Momir Nikolić, Dragoljub Ojdanić, and Ljubomir Borovčanin who works as author on security analyses.
 17. See Dekić (2013), Ristic (2012), Šljivančanin (2012), Šljivančanin (2014), and Šljivančanin (2015).
 18. See Radio Television of Serbia (2013) and Radio San (2016).
 19. There were of course many who could evade justice in the early postwar years or were never charged and who could get back to high level positions within the government bureaucracy; this in particular implicated the police forces (Mallmann & Angrick, 2009), but also the foreign office (Conze et al., 2010) or the ministry of justice (Görtemaker & Safferling, 2016).
 20. See the case of Heinz Reinefarth who had committed mass atrocities when suppressing the uprising in Warsaw in 1944; he was elected mayor of a North German town and stood for election to the parliament of the North German state of Schleswig-Holstein, when his responsibility for massacres in Warsaw became public (Marti, 2014). As a consequence he had to resign.
 21. See Blagoje Simić: Glas Regije (2016); Nikola Šainović: Pantovic et al. (2016) and Ristic (2015); Momčilo Krajišnik: Aljazeera Online (2013) and Blic Online (2016); Johan Tarčulovski: Pantovic et al. (2016) and Andonovska (2016).
 22. See Pantovic et al. (2016) and Andonovska (2016).
 23. See Andonovska (2016).
 24. See Popadić (2017).
 25. See Mandić (2017).

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