Ramesh Thakur, 'Using a Framework to Evaluate Peace Operations: The Role of the United Nations', *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 16 (2012) 353–371

United Nations activities in support of maintaining international peace and security were designed to fall under Chapter 6 of the Charter encouraging the peaceful settlement of disputes, or else under Chapter 7 which called for a range of coercive enforcement measures against errant member states. The system of collective security never came into being as envisaged. Instead, the United Nations embarked on the innovative practice of peacekeeping, a word that famously does not appear in the Charter yet has been the characteristic UN military operation. Since the UN's establishment in 1945, the nature of war and armed conflict has changed substantially, with inter-state warfare steadily waning.¹ With the end of the Cold War, the cover of superpower protection for local client regimes often disappeared at the same time as the major powers began to discover common interests in inserting international troops and other peace-supporting personnel into conflict and post-conflict situations. In these circumstances, the number of peacekeeping missions multiplied but also changed significantly in the types of tasks that they were required to undertake.

Typically, peace operations are inserted into environments where there is a fragile peace process but not yet a peace settlement. Peacekeeping missions are often the most critical prop upon which fragile governments lean as they seek to build capacity and legitimacy—and therefore the only bulwark between collapse and resilience—in the transition from armed conflict to sustainable peace. This explains why they have been transformed from a relatively modest instrument on the margins of international affairs to a key tool for conflict management and post-conflict transition from war to peace, with over 100,000 deployed personnel currently (mainly military, but also police and civilian officers in the tens of thousands) in about 15 operations across five continents.

The book by Paul Diehl and Daniel Druckman is an original and valuable contribution to the burgeoning literature on multilateral peace operations.² It does not purport to advance a theory of UN peacekeeping. Rather, it offers an innovative template or framework for how to evaluate peace operations. Their goal and hope was that the template will prove as useful to the policy as to the scholarly community. The number of peace operations remains quite high. The numbers of countries and peacekeepers involved in these operations have grown enormously. So too have books, journals and articles dealing with them. But, as Diehl and Druckman rightly pointed out, there is surprisingly little systematic, comparative theorizing about how to define, measure and explain success and failure in such operations. Their self-professed task was to remedy the lack by outlining the many variables that need to be studied in order to produce a workable body of lessons that satisfy the requirement of rigorous scholarship and are also useful to the community of policymakers and practitioners. Overall, the authors

¹ See Andrew Mack, et al., *Human Security Report 2005* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

² Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman, *Evaluating Peace Operations* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2010).

demonstrated an impressive grasp of the issues and coverage of the relevant literature. Their analysis was professional, systematic and methodical, providing clear standards, measurable benchmarks and operational indicators for assessing the progress and performance of peace operations.

In their book, Diehl and Druckman had presented only one case study, of Bosnia. The present collection of articles is therefore a crucial test of the utility of their framework for studying several different peace operations in discrete geographical theatres. Diehl and Druckman themselves have provided an introductory and a synthesizing essay. Rather than repeat or duplicate their efforts, I will situate their work and the four case studies here in the larger context of the origins and changing nature and requirements of peacekeeping.

From Collective Security to Peacekeeping as the Default UN International Security Activity

Pacific Settlement (Chapter 6) and Collective Security (Chapter 7)

Established to provide predictability and order in a world in constant flux, the United Nations—a bridge between power and principles, between state-based realism and international idealism—is at once the symbol of humanity's collective aspirations for a better life in a safer world for all, a forum for negotiating the terms of converting the collective aspirations into a common program of action, and the principal international instrument for the realization of the aspirations and the implementation of the plans. On balance, albeit with some major qualifications, the world has been a better and safer place because of the existence of the United Nations, because of what it does, and because of how it works.³

The problem of peace and order is not new. Napoleon Bonaparte imposed temporary order and unity on Europe through conquest. The other European powers set up an alternative Concert system in reaction and transformed the original impulse, of a military alliance for the single purpose of defeating Napoleon, into the longer-term political goal of preventing a similar domination of Europe by any one power in the future. The Concert of Europe was the most comprehensive attempt until then to construct new machinery for keeping the peace among and by the great powers.

The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 broadened international relations in participation and agenda. The two major international organizations of the twentieth century were the League of Nations after the First and the United Nations after the Second World War—the first attempts in history to create a universal collective security system. In both instances, people horrified by the destructiveness of modern wars decided to create institutions for avoiding a repetition of such catastrophes.

³ See Ramesh Thakur, *The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

The League was prepared to condemn Japanese aggression in Manchuria in 1931 despite no prospect of any collective action being undertaken. The Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 presented the League with its moment of greatest triumph: for the first time, the international community, acting through institutionalized channels, condemned aggression, identified the aggressor and imposed sanctions. Their eventual failure does not negate the advancement of the *ideal* that the world community can take joint coercive measures against international outlaws. But Ethiopia also stands as the symbol of failure to realize the high hopes held of the League at its creation, for the aggressor secured his ends through forcible conquest.

The League was killed by the Second World War; its collective security legacy lives on in the United Nations. The United Nations incorporated the League proscription on the use of force for national objectives, but inserted the additional prescription to use force in support of international, that is UN, authority. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was envisaged as the equivalent of a supreme war-making organization of the international community. It was given the power to decide whether international peace was threatened, whether sanctions were to be imposed and, if so, the nature of the sanctions, including military force as the instrument of last resort. Moreover, such decisions by the UNSC would be binding upon all member states, even on those who voted against the measures.

Narrowing the scope and circumstances of the permissible use of force by states has been matched by the historical movement to broaden the range of international instruments available to states to settle their disputes peacefully. The techniques of peaceful settlement (chapter 6 of the United Nations Charter) range from bilateral negotiations between the disputants to formal adjudication by third parties. The normative primacy of peaceful over forceful means is firmly entrenched, as is the proposition that the international community has a stake in war-avoidance justifying its involvement in bilateral disputes between member states. The United Nations has helped states to bring down levels of armed conflict as a proportion of interstate interactions, form habits of cooperation, and develop shared norms and perceptions.

After World War One, collective security was a conscious substitute for systems of alliances and balance of power policies that were "forever discredited." Predicated on the proposition that war can be prevented by the deterrent effect of overwhelming power being brought to bear against any state contemplating the use of force, collective security entails the imposition of diplomatic, economic and military sanctions against international outlaws. Unlike pacific settlement, collective security is not concerned with the causes and conditions of war.⁴ Only one assumption is necessary, that wars are probable; only one normative premise is required, that wars must be prevented or stopped. Enforcement measures are outlined in chapter 7 of the Charter. Articles 42 and 43 in particular authorize the UNSC to "take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security," and require member states to make

⁴ For elaboration of the differences between pacific settlement and collective security, see Inis L. Claude, *Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization*, 3rd ed. (New York: Random House, 1964), chapters 11, "Peaceful Settlement of Disputes" and 12, "Collective Security as an Approach to Peace."

available to the United Nations such "armed forces, assistance, and facilities" as may be necessary for the purpose.

There turned out to be many a slip between the theory of collective security as written in the Charter and the reality of its practice in the real world of international politics. Efforts to devise an operational collective security system have been thwarted by a conceptual conundrum. War between lesser states may be deplorable and unhealthy for their nationals, but cannot of itself endanger *world* peace. Only the prospect of war between powerful states directly, or their involvement on rival sides in a quarrel between minor powers, can threaten international order. Collective security understood as the maintenance of *international* peace and security is therefore superfluous in respect of small states. Equally, however, it is impossible to enforce against major powers. For any attempt to launch military measures against a great power would bring about the very calamity that the system is designed to avoid, namely a world war. Both these propositions hold true from the very definitions of "major" and "minor" powers.

The United Nations sought to avoid the latter eventuality by conferring permanent membership of the UNSC upon the great powers with the accompanying right of veto. The practical effect of the veto is that "the extensive decision-making competence" of the UNSC, necessary for the successful operation of a collective security system, is severely curtailed by the equally "extensive decision-blocking competence" of the five permanent members (P5).⁵ The mistrust between the Cold War great powers also put paid to the idea of a Military Staff Committee which was to have functioned as the UNSC's strategic adviser.

The closest that the United Nations has come to engaging in collective enforcement action was in Korea in 1950: the United States intervened against communist North Korean invasion, the United Nations followed the US intervention. The initiative was American, taken in the context of the Cold War and invoking the moral support of the United Nations for a resort to force that would have occurred anyway. That is, the UN action in Korea was made possible by a temporary marriage of convenience between collective security and collective defense,⁶ and by a fortuitous combination of other circumstances. The Soviet Union, absent from the UNSC in protest at an unrelated issue, was not able to veto the action. The United Nations had its own commission on the ground which was able to confirm immediately that aggression had occurred and by whom. The ready availability of American troops in nearby Japan allowed the United Nations to overcome the problems posed by the non-implementation of Article 43. In this early test of the United Nations, member states and foundation Secretary-General Trygve Lie were more readily inclined to adopt robust measures against a clear case of unprovoked aggression.

The next large-scale military action under UN mandate came four decades later in the Persian Gulf (1990–91) in response to Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait. Its most important long-term significance lay in the crossing of the conceptual Rubicon by

⁵ Ibid., p. 242.

⁶ See Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), chapters 11, "Collective Security and the War in Korea," and 12, "Collective Defense versus Collective Security."

authorizing enforcement of sanctions and military eviction of the aggressor by troops not even nominally under UN command. As in Korea in the 1950s, the advantage of the procedure was that it allowed the United Nations to approximate the achievement of collective security within a clear chain of command necessary for large-scale military operations. The cost was that the Gulf War, like the Korean War, became identified with American policy over which the organization exercised little real control.

Peace Operations (Chapter 6½)

Peacekeeping has been one of the most visible symbols of the UN role in international peace and security, with some two-thirds of UN member states having participated in or hosted such missions. With the attainment of a reliable system of collective security being deferred to a distant date, states moved to guarantee national security by means of collective defense and the international community groped toward damage-limitation techniques to avoid and contain conflicts. Peacekeeping evolved in the grey zone between pacific settlement and military enforcement, hence the claim that it is located in chapter 6½ of the United Nations Charter. It grew side by side with preventive diplomacy which Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld used to forestall the competitive intrusion of the rival power blocs into conflict situations that were either the result or potential cause of a power vacuum in the Cold War. It was given concrete expression by inserting the thin blue wedge of blue beret UN soldiers between enemy combatants.

Terms like "peacekeeping," "peace support operations," and "peace operations" are used generically to refer to missions and operations that fall short of military combat between clearly recognizable enemies. While specific UN activities have been varied, the theme common to all is to promote international stability and support peaceful change outside the axis of great power rivalry. Peacekeeping operations have been diverse in function and size, ranging from a few observers on the India–Pakistan border, to a 20,000-man force in the Congo. Traditional peacekeeping forces could never *keep* world peace, for they lacked both mandated authority and operational capability to do so. But they did succeed in stabilizing several potentially dangerous situations.

One of the originators of classical UN peacekeeping, Canadian foreign minister Lester Pearson, aptly characterized it as "an intermediate technique between merely passing resolutions and actually fighting."⁷ The constraining effect of many of the core principles of classical UN peacekeeping—non-use of force because of military neutrality between the belligerents, non-intervention in domestic quarrels because of political impartiality with respect to the conflict, non-participation by great powers because of their mutual suspicions—produced controversy and frustration in the organization. The United Nations refused to abandon them, however, because they represented a middle way between abdication of responsibility for management of the international order and turmoil if the organization attempted to shake off the Charter shackles on collective military action. Brian Urquhart argued that "It is precisely because the [Security] Council cannot agree on enforcement operations that the peacekeeping technique has been devised, and it is

⁷ Lester B. Pearson, "Force for U.N.," *Foreign Affairs* 35:3 (1957), p. 401.

precisely because an operation is a peacekeeping operation that governments are prepared to make troops available to serve on it."⁸ There is another important implication which follows from this. Since peacekeeping evolved as a second-best substitute for a non-obtainable collective security system, it cannot rightly be assessed on the criterion of collective enforcement.

By their very nature, then, peacekeeping operations cannot produce conclusive results either on the battlefield—they are peace operations, after all, not war—or around the negotiating table—they are military deployments, not diplomatic talks. Yet Diehl and Druckman describe the three core goals of peacekeeping missions as violence abatement, conflict containment, and conflict settlement. Moreover, these are postulated as being common to almost all peace operations. How can this be reconciled with my claim that peace operations could not keep the peace? First, they acknowledge that not all missions will pursue all three goals. More importantly, it is undoubtedly true that even with classical, consent-based peacekeeping, if conflict escalated to heightened intensity or spread to additional theaters or actors, both analysts and the UN community would treat this as evidence of mission failure. The causes of the failure may not lie with the peacekeeping mission, but it would generally be considered to have failed regardless.

The number of UN operations increased dramatically after the end of the Cold War as the United Nations was placed center-stage in efforts to resolve outstanding conflicts. However, the multiplication of missions was not always accompanied by coherent policy or integrated military and political responses.⁹ Traditional peacekeeping was under UN auspices, command and control. There was a reaction against UN peacekeeping because of widespread, if often inaccurate, perceptions that UN operations led to diplomatic ennui and could not be freed of the Cold War rivalry and other highly politicized antagonisms that had infected large parts of the UN system. The second generation of peacekeeping operations were mounted either unilaterally or multilaterally, but in any case outside the UN system, in Zimbabwe, the Sinai, Beirut, and Sri Lanka. The precursors to this sort of extra-UN peacekeeping operations were the international control commissions in Indochina set up by the Geneva Agreements of 1954.¹⁰ On the one hand, the non-UN operations adopted from traditional UN peacekeeping most of the principles of third-party military interposition and buffer. On the other, they expanded the range of tasks and functions that were required to beyond just military interposition.

Traditional peacekeeping aimed to contain and stabilize volatile regions and interstate conflicts until such time as negotiations produced lasting peace agreements. By contrast, the third generation of peacekeeping saw UN missions being mounted as part of package deals of peace agreements, for example in Namibia and Cambodia. The peacekeeping mission was an integral component of the peace agreement and meant to complete the peace settlement by providing third party international military reinforcement for the

⁸ Brian E. Urquhart, "Peacekeeping: A View from the Operational Center," in Henry Wiseman, ed., *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals* (New York: Pergamon, 1983), p. 165.

⁹ See Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel, eds., *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2001).

¹⁰ See Ramesh Thakur, *Peacekeeping in Vietnam: Canada, India, Poland and the International Commission* (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1984).

peace process. Reflecting the changing nature of modern armed conflict, UN operations expanded not just in numbers but also in the nature and scope of their missions. The newer "complex emergencies" produced multiple crises all at once:¹¹ collapsed state structures; humanitarian tragedies caused by starvation, disease or genocide; large-scale fighting and slaughter between rival ethnic or bandit groups; horrific human rights atrocities; and the intermingling of criminal elements and child soldiers with irregular forces. Reflecting this, third generation operations had to undertake additional types of tasks like military disengagement, demobilization and cantonment; policing; human rights monitoring and enforcement; observation, organization and conduct of elections; and rehabilitation and repatriation.

In Somalia and elsewhere the United Nations attempted the fourth generation of "peace-enforcement" operations, with results that were anything but encouraging—hence General Sir Michael Rose's metaphor of "the Mogadishu Line" that peacekeeping forces dare cross only at their peril.¹² A peacekeeping operation in a theater where there was no peace to keep, the UN Protection Force in former Yugoslavia failed to prevent the horrors of Srebrenica in 1995. The incident remains a stain on world conscience for passivity in the face of the calculated return of "evil" to Europe and a tragedy that, in the words of the official UN report, "will haunt our history forever."¹³

Partly in consequence of the disastrous venture into peace-enforcement, in Bosnia and Haiti UN peacekeeping underwent a further metamorphosis into the fifth generation of enforcement operations being *authorized* by the UNSC, but *undertaken* by a single power or ad hoc multilateral coalition. There was not a single such operation during the Cold War (1945–89); there were 15 such operations set up between November 1990 and September 2003.¹⁴ The United Nations itself took back responsibility for a traditional-type consensual peacekeeping, once the situation had stabilized, for a temporary period, but with the tasks of third generation expanded peacekeeping. Modifying the Gulf War precedent somewhat, this was the pattern that emerged of UN-authorized military action by the United States in Haiti, France in Rwanda, Russia in Georgia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Bosnia.

East Timor represents the evolution into the sixth generation of peacekeeping. A UN-authorized multinational force was prepared for combat action if necessary and was given the mandate, troops, equipment and robust rules of engagement that are required for such a mission. However, the military operation was but the prelude to a de facto UN administration, which engaged in state-making for a transitional period.¹⁵ That is, a

¹¹ The Congo crisis of the 1960s and the UN operation there (1960–64) were precursors to the complex emergencies and third generation missions.

¹² Michael Rose, "The Bosnia Experience," in Ramesh Thakur, ed., *Past Imperfect, Future UNCertain: The United Nations at Fifty* (London/New York: Macmillan/St. Martin's Press, 1998), p. 139.

¹³ *Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35 (1998)* (New York: United Nations Secretariat, November 1999), para. 503.

¹⁴ For a complete listing of the 15 cases, see David M. Malone, ed., *The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004), Appendix 2, pp. 665–68.

¹⁵ See Simon Chesterman, *You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); and Richard Caplan, *International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

"nation" was granted independence as a result of UN-organized elections. But the nation concerned had no structures of "state" to speak of. It was not even, like Somalia, a case of a failed state; in East Timor a state had to be created from scratch. In the latter the United Nations finally confronted and addressed the dilemma that haunted it in the Congo in the 1960s and Somalia in the 1990s, namely that peace-restoration is not possible without the establishment of law and order. In a country where the writ of government has either collapsed or is non-existent, the law that is made and enforced so as to provide order can only be that of the United Nations or of another foreign power (or coalition).

Brahimi Report

A significant cost of the cascade of generations of peacekeeping within a highly compressed timeframe was that most of the newer operations had little real precedent to go by; each had to make and learn from its own mistakes. The older certitudes of traditional peacekeeping no longer apply when peacekeepers find themselves operating with the executive authority of transitional administrators inside societies characterized by criminality, corruption, political instability, and armed power struggles. They have to ensure their own security in an environment in which far from being an emblem of safety, the blue helmet can be a target. They must learn to use modern information and communications tools to their advantage while being conscious of hostile elements also exploiting the newer opportunities to maximize mayhem. All this, and more, must be done in harmony with professional colleagues in a truly multinational, multicultural and multilingual effort operating in highly localized and particularized theaters.

Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed a high-level international panel, chaired by veteran Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi, to make recommendations for changes in UN peacekeeping in order to realign it with contemporary demands, expectations and realities. Its report was unusual in the candor of its analysis and recommendations.¹⁶ Most of the recommendations were accepted and several have been implemented. The Brahimi Report concluded that "when the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence with the ability and determination to defeat them." For in the final analysis, "no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force if complex peacekeeping, in particular, is to succeed."¹⁷ Mandates, and the resources to match them, have to be guided by pragmatic, realistic analysis and thinking. The United Nations Secretariat "must not apply best-case planning assumptions to situations where the local actors have historically exhibited worst-case behaviour."¹⁸ The United Nations needs to develop the professional civil service culture of providing advice that is sound, based on a thorough assessment of options, independent of what might be politically popular or fit the preconceptions of the decision-makers, and free of fear of consequences for politically neutral officials. The Secretariat was urged to tell the UNSC what it needs to hear, not what it wants to hear. Where clearly unimplementable missions have been approved

¹⁶ *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (New York: United Nations, document A/55/305-S/2000/809), 21 August 2000.

¹⁷ *ibid.*, p. viii.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 51.

because of confused, unclear or severely under-resourced mandates, the United Nations has to learn to say "No."

Nor should the need for impartial peacekeeping translate automatically into moral equivalence among the conflict parties on the ground: in some cases local parties consist not of moral equals but obvious aggressors and victims.¹⁹ The panel concluded that political neutrality has too often degenerated into military timidity, the abdication of the duty to protect civilians, and an operational failure to confront openly those who challenge peacekeeping missions in the field. Impartiality should not translate into complicity with evil. The Charter sets out the principles that the United Nations must defend and the values that it must uphold. The reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor implies a degree of moral equivalency between the two and damages the institution of UN peacekeeping.

Diehl and Druckman's Additional Goals

The various components of newer peace operations that go beyond the three core goals are aggregated by Diehl and Druckman as those associated with missions beyond traditional peacekeeping, and peacebuilding goals. Five of the most prominent extra-traditional missions are election supervision, promoting democratization, humanitarian assistance, DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration), and human rights protection. The potential list of peacebuilding missions, goals, and activities is very long and indeed a moving target. Diehl and Druckman focused on a limited number relating to local security, rule of law, governance, and restoration, reconciliation and transformation. Thus their conception of peace operation success is multidimensional.

In order to arrest and reverse the sense of drift, UN approaches to peacekeeping were transformed to reflect the multifaceted nature of UN action in countries afflicted by mostly civil wars. This meant promoting the rule of law and economic recovery by integrating the military, policing, institution building, reconstruction and civil administration functions of peacekeeping operations to a much greater degree than in the past. The United Nations became involved increasingly in post-conflict reconstruction, "building" peace in order to prevent a relapse into conflict. Modern peacekeeping demands a very broad range of skills and competence, including "innovation, flexibility, initiative and moral courage."²⁰ Peacekeepers have to determine the application of relevant domestic, international humanitarian and human rights law to their conduct and operation. Civilian, police and military elements have to cooperate willingly and coordinate effectively with one another and with NGOs in the pursuit of common objectives. They have to be adaptable as the focus changes from security in one mission to humanitarian assistance in another and peacebuilding in yet a third. The last has led to growing recognition of the importance of instilling and institutionalizing the rule of law and justice systems that avoid a "one-size-fits-all" approach on the one hand, and encompass the entire criminal justice process on the other—from police, prosecutors and defense lawyers to judges, court officials and prison officers—in a whole-of-legal-chain

¹⁹ Ibid., para. 50.

²⁰ *Challenges of Peace Operations into the 21st Century: Concluding Report 1997–2002* (Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, 2002), p. 17.

approach.

Overall, Diehl and Druckman claimed to have provided a framework that would permit cross-mission comparisons of performance in different locations and at different times, while still allowing for context-specific appraisals. The four articles on Cambodia (Whalan), East Timor (Braithwaite), Liberia (Farrall) and Cote d'Ivoire (Bellamy and Williams) suggest that the Diehl-Druckman organizational structure largely succeeds in the task the two authors set themselves, even while all four authors also raise questions and point to gaps—in coverage of issues, development of indicators, identification of proper sequencing, the importance of cooperation from the local actors—in the framework. On sequencing, for example, what is the optimum relationship between violence abatement, conflict settlement, and democratization? I would add that the relations among the key actors—stakeholders, drivers, financial underwriters, and spoilers—is also different in the different stages or phases of an operation.

It is relatively straightforward to point to success and failure on the various dimensions of performance appraisal provided by the Diehl-Druckman framework. It is far more challenging to try and provide sound and intersubjectively transmissible explanations for the successes and failures. Diehl and Druckman acknowledged the importance of such external factors as international events, restrictions imposed by host states, available resources, and the vagaries of national policies are some of the factors that influence a conflict but are largely out of the peacekeepers' control.

A good complement to the Diehl-Druckman framework is provided by Lise Morjé Howard who similarly subjected UN peacekeeping in civil wars to critical and rigorous scrutiny, to conclude that accounts of their failures have been much exaggerated.²¹ Having expected failure on the basis of the dominant narrative in popular, political and academic circles, she ended up having to explain successes instead. She did so through a systematic examination of the successful cases—Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Eastern Slavonia, and East Timor. Howard did not neglect the failures, with one chapter devoted to Somalia, Rwanda, Angola and Bosnia. The successes were studied with a chapter devoted to each case.

Howard's study proceeded by way of answers to four questions: when has UN peacekeeping been successful, what are the sources of success and failure, how can the United Nations learn to do better, and what types of learning does the UN record show? Howard notes that success is both unexpected and difficult, for external, multilateral actors have to alter the actions and behavior of leaders and peoples in post-conflict environments while simultaneously restructuring political and other institutions. Her argument can be stated with deceptive simplicity. Each one of three conditions is necessary, and in combination they are sufficient, for the success of UN peacekeeping in civil wars: consent of the warring parties (a “situational” factor) for the UN operation, consensual but not very intense interest by the UNSC (supportive but not micromanaging), and “first-level organizational learning” by the operation in the field.

²¹ Lise Morjé Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

For Howard, the last, whereby individual learning by key actors in their official roles is manifested as organizational change, is the most critically important of the three. It includes information gathering, coordination of international efforts, integration of the mission with the local post-conflict environment, and the exercise of leadership and judgment. She also identifies preconditions (“permissive situational factors”) for organizational learning in the field: information gathering mechanisms, centralized field coordination, experienced staff distributed over the field, and capable leaders. Additional preconditions include the supply of well-trained and well-equipped troops in adequate numbers and requisite funding.

At the second level, of the Secretariat learning the right lessons from one mission to the next (as opposed to learning in the field within any given mission), the typical behavior is incremental adaptation. One important lesson that has been learnt is the division of labor in the use of force, whereby the United Nations leaves this to powerful states or regional organizations while concentrating its own efforts on state-building. Similarly, the United Nations has been markedly reluctant to take on the burden of administration since the Kosovo and East Timor missions.

The use of force depends (i) on the mandate as written in the authorizing UNSC resolution; (ii) on the rules of engagement (ROE); and (iii) on the decision of military commanders on the ground. For UN operations, the use of force is restricted to self-defense, protecting UN personnel and property against attacks and protecting civilians targeted by spoilers. With UN-authorized but non-UN-led operations, as in Kosovo and Afghanistan, the rules of engagement are approved by the coalition or by NATO. The restrictions are far less stringent, the resources are far more robust. The UNSC gives them international legitimacy but has no say over the ROE nor does it exercise any effective authority over these forces. NATO countries who provide the troops, equipment and logistics have the military capability and the political clout to act independently of the United Nations; they have leverage over the United Nations, not the other way round. The UNSC is not the oversight body to which NATO forces in Afghanistan report. As the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, for example, was progressively transformed from a peacekeeping into a self-defense and counter-insurgency mission and force, and as it came under direct NATO command, it became correspondingly integrated into NATO doctrine. As the military operations intensified and caused growing civilian casualties and destruction, the UN legitimacy and credibility was held hostage to decisions by NATO military commanders and governments over whom the United Nations had zero authority. The three pillars of the international community’s engagement in and with Afghanistan—fighting the insurgency, protecting the population and promoting development—sometimes collided with one another. In particular, the pressing but short-term goal of fighting the revived insurgency often undermined the vital but longer-term goal of state and peace building.

Not surprisingly, all the case study authors in this collection conclude that their particular operation exhibited signs of success on some dimensions and failure on others. Thus all missions are mixed successes or failures, not absolute examples of one or the other. This leads Whalan to question the utility, to scholars or policymakers, of aggregate evaluations of success or failure. In every case, furthermore, peacekeepers are both independent

actors influencing the mission goals, and receptors of stimuli from local and international actors reacting to events which shape the mission outside peacekeepers' control. Moreover, in all cases the peacebuilding tasks proved to be the most difficult.

The Bellamy-Williams article is the strongest in pointing to civilian protection—mentioned with increasing frequency since 1999 and the key driver of the UN role in Libya and Cote d'Ivoire in 2011—as a core goal in contemporary UN peace operations. This is an important missing element in the Diehl-Druckman framework and has consequences for their analysis. For example efforts to enforce civilian protection can clash horribly with the requirement for impartiality, as in the attacks on incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo in Cote d'Ivoire in 2011 when he refused to accept defeat in the presidential election. But I remain agnostic on the Bellamy-Williams suggestion to add conflict prevention as a core goal. This could potentially confuse more than clarify in relation to the core goals already included. And none of the authors takes up explicitly the problematique of the liberal peace paradigm—constructed on very contestable notions of peace, democracy and justice—as the implicit normative foundation of the peacebuilding goals.

Other nuances that will have to be addressed within the context of each operation include mandated (whether by the United Nations globally or by regional organizations within their area of jurisdiction) vs. unilateral peacekeeping missions; a distinction between goals formulated by donors often with an eye to their own domestic political constituencies, and the demands and expectations of the local populations and actors; the interplay between in-theater local politics and the politics of the UNSC, especially the intra-P5 politics; and the dynamic interaction between actors, structures, processes, and personalities.

In addition, Cedric de Coning makes the point that "complicated" is different from "complex." In the former, for example a space mission, the causal factors are linear, can be mastered by different people working together, and are therefore predictable. A complex system has a dynamic and nonlinear relationship among its constituent elements. They evolve and change over time, adapt to their environment, do not follow a specific cause-and-effect path and can flip with dramatic suddenness in a highly volatile environment. Complexity is a function of the interaction between the elements, each of which is dynamic and nonlinear in its own right. UN peace operations are complex.²² They are required to perform multiple tasks in pursuit of multiple goals. They have to work and interact with numerous actors at the global, regional, national and subnational levels, each with its own agenda. Typically, they must operate in insecure environments and tenuous political contexts, with "spoilers" only too alert to any opening to exploit managerial, political and legal weaknesses and vacuums to paralyze the mission. This is why participants in a seminar in New York concluded that the success of UN peace operations "depends on the UN's ability to leverage its partnerships with other organizations and groups, coordinate activities among them, bring spoilers into the political process, and enable and strengthen host governments."²³

²² Cedric de Coning, "Planning for Success," in Caty Clement and Adam C. Smith, eds., *Managing Complexity: Political and Managerial Challenges in United Nations Peace Operations* (New York: International Peace Institute, 2009), pp. 24–27.

²³ Clement and Smith, eds., *Managing Complexity*, p. 2.

Different organizations have different mandates, standard operating procedures and chains of command. This amplifies the possibility of confusion, diffusion of authority and accountability, with units and individuals working at cross-purposes, and so provides an opening for divide-and-conquer strategies by spoilers. Humanitarian actors, for example, often seek to maintain their distance from military partners and protectors in order to proclaim and maintain their neutrality. But if there is an important military component to a mission, rare is the mission that can resist mission success being defined through the prism of military operations. How then can humanitarian and military "partners" come to a common understanding and shared purpose of the mission?

To my mind, there is still one very critical missing variable, perhaps the most critical of all: leadership. By this I mean the quality of the head of the mission (the special representative of the UN secretary-general or SRSG), the force commander, the under-secretaries general for peacekeeping and political affairs, and of course the secretary-general himself. Their leadership abilities are important even when things are going well; they are absolutely critical when things start to go wrong. For that is when initiative and creative solutions are at a premium. Some of the worst disasters and failures are attributable to deficient military and political leadership in the field and/or at UN headquarters, including, of course, relations among the different sets of leaders both in the field and at headquarters.

Thus Pierre Schori, a former cabinet minister in Sweden and then its permanent representative to the United Nations who served as the SRSG in Cote d'Ivoire, writes that:

When Kofi Annan asked me to take over the leadership of the UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (ONUCI), he explained that he needed a Francophone person who knew the UN and European Union (EU) from the inside, a diplomat and a politician, with experience from government and parliament, who came from a country with no colonial past and knew South African president and AU mediator Thabo Mbeki and other African leaders.²⁴

He adds that "as the head of a UN peacekeeping mission," the SRSG "functions as the node of a complex web of diplomatic actors and activities that links the international community organically to a variety of actors in a theatre of operation experiencing or recovering from armed conflict." Yet insufficient attention seems to be paid to the demanding skills required of the mission head, with political calculations influencing the choice even more than mission effectiveness.

The problem of unintended and perverse consequences of peacekeeping also need to be addressed.²⁵ The reality is that peacekeeping missions are external interventions into local contexts which produce negative externalities, including social costs and ills of increased prostitution and HIV/AIDS infection, alongside the intended beneficial consequences.

²⁴ Pierre Schori, "UN Peacekeeping," in Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine and Ramesh Thakur, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2013).

²⁵ See Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning and Ramesh Thakur, eds., *Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2007).

Peace operations also offer one of the best examples of how, within the parameters of the 1945 Charter, the United Nations has demonstrated remarkable policy innovation, institutional adaptation and organizational learning. On policy innovation: the best example is peacekeeping itself, a word and concept that is alien to the Charter. On institutional adaptation: the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Peacebuilding Commission did not exist in 1945. On organizational learning: the Brahimi Report on peace operations is a good example. Thus while classical peacekeeping adopted the practice of passive neutrality, consistent with the Brahimi Report contemporary peacekeepers are expected to be more assertive in protecting the mandate itself by penalizing infractions.²⁶ A final test of the Diehl-Druckman framework, therefore, will be to see if it contributes to such policy innovation, institutional adaptation, and organizational learning; and if it facilitates a comparative evaluation of this progress from one mission to another over time and from one geographical theater to another across space.

²⁶ See Emily Paddon, "Partnering for Peace: Implications and Dilemmas," *International Peacekeeping* 18:5 (2011), pp. 516–33.