Third-party policing is defined as police efforts to persuade or coerce organizations or non-offending persons, such as public housing agencies, property owners, parents, health and building inspectors, and business owners to take some responsibility for preventing crime or reducing crime problems (Buerger and Mazerolle 1998: 301). In third-party policing, the police create or enhance crime control nodes in locations or situations where crime control guardianship was previously absent or non-effective. Sometimes the police use cooperative consultation with community members, parents, inspectors, and regulators to encourage and convince third parties to take on more crime control or prevention responsibility. Central, however, to third-party policing is the police use of a range of civil, criminal, and regulatory rules and laws, to engage, coerce (or force) third parties into taking some crime control responsibility. It is the regulatory and legal provisions that dictate the process for third-party intervention.

In third-party policing, laws and legal mechanisms are directed at willing or unwilling non-offending third parties, with the object of facilitating or coercing them into helping to control the behavior of offending ultimate targets. This type of policing, however, is not new. Some might argue that this is just good, proactive policing. Indeed, for many years the police have sought alternative solutions to regulate activities and solve crime problems (Eck and Spelman 1987; Goldstein 1990; Goldstein 2003). The police often create “place managers” to guard and protect problem places (Eck 1994; Felson 1994) and they have used situational responses for many years to deal with on-going crime problems (Clarke 1992). The police have been carrying out this mode of policing for years, whether as part of their routine patrol activities, their problem-oriented policing program, or as a crime prevention initiative.

A systematic review of third-party policing evaluations reveals that about less than a third of third-party policing initiatives occur within the context of problem-oriented policing (Mazerolle and Ransley 2005). We suggest, therefore, that third-party policing (e.g., legal levers, civil
remedies, coercion of third parties) is more than a subset of problem-solving responses (see Goldstein 1990; Scott 2000; Goldstein 2003). We argue that third-party policing is distinguished from other models of policing through its intrinsic links with societal trends in regulation more generally and the legal/regulatory provisions that dictate the intervention processes. Indeed, we argue that the proliferation of third-party policing has not occurred in a vacuum as an idea born at the grassroots of policing or because the police have just gotten better at good, proactive policing. Rather, we argue that the pace, context, and prominence of third-party policing initiatives has escalated in recent years as one of many consequences in the move from centralized state control to a system of decentralized networks of governance and crime control agents. The proliferation and development of third-party policing is, we suggest, reflective of external pressure and the general transformation of government and governance taking place in contemporary society.

In this chapter we provide an analysis of third-party policing in a societal context. We begin with an overview of the trends in regulation more generally that have set the stage for third-party policing to emerge as a popular crime control tactic. We then describe the key dimensions of third-party policing and summarize the evaluation evidence. We conclude our chapter with a short examination of the side-effects, fairness, and equity concerns that are raised through third-party policing and propose ways in which third-party policing could be appropriately implemented into mainstream policing activities.

**Governance, regulation, and third-party policing**

The proliferation of third-party policing is part of a pattern of major change, indeed a transformation, of government and governance taking place in contemporary society. This political, legal, economic, and social transformation has affected the institutions of government and civil society and is also altering how we think about crime, its prevention, and its control (Braithwaite 2000). Big, organizing themes like governance, risk, and plurality are now intrinsically affecting crime control and policing and the rise of third-party policing has emerged in the context of these broader trends in governance and crime control.

Recent transformations of governance in Western democracies have involved a movement away from state sovereignty and control to networks of power (see Braithwaite 2000). These changes have influenced contemporary police practice and driven the societal push to third-party policing. In this contemporary model of governance the state provides only one of many nodes in a network of regulation.
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The main mechanism for this transformation has been the development of the notion of risk – economic, social, and political activities are less subject to central control, and more likely to be monitored for risks that need to be managed (Ericson and Haggerty 1997; O’Malley 2000). Garland (1996; 1997) argues that risk and insurance promote a form of "responsibilized" autonomy (Garland 1996: 452–455). That is, the burden of managing risk has been shifted from governments to individuals, who must become responsible for the outcomes of their own decisions on risk. Prudent individuals will obtain insurance, identify and minimize risk, and manage their own security.

Feeley and Simon (1994) apply the concepts of risk to criminal justice, to develop the notion of actuarial justice. They describe an old and a new penology – the old marked by "concern for individuals, and preoccupied with such concepts as guilt, responsibility and obligation, as well as diagnosis, intervention and treatment of an individual offender" (Feeley and Simon 1994: 173). The new penology, however, is "concerned with techniques for identifying, classifying and managing groups assorted by levels of dangerousness. It takes crime for granted. It accepts deviance as normal" (Feeley and Simon 1994: 173). Interventions are less directed at determining responsibility or ensuring accountability, and more at managing and regulating risky groups of people or places.

The impact of these trends on crime control and policing has been to change the focus from state responsibility for preventing and correcting criminal behavior to a system where crime control and prevention networks are responsible for identifying and managing risks. Public police form one node of these networks, with private police, insurance companies, regulatory agencies, communities, schools, and parents as other nodes. These networks may exist within legislated frameworks, but are often episodic and ad hoc. The prime concern of police and the criminal justice system is less with the detection and rehabilitation of individual offenders, and more with identifying and corralling risky groups – repeat offenders, sex offenders, drug users, homeless or mentally ill people. The new technologies involve systematic identification of target groups or places (Eck and Weisburd 1995), and then new forms of surveillance, preventive detention, and incapacitation via longer or mandatory sentences.

It is now well documented that the rhetoric of market solutions and privatization espoused by Thatcherist and Reaganist proponents of the 1980s–90s was not deregulation, but rather a new form of regulation (Braithwaite 1999; 2000). For every privatized industry there was created a new regulatory agency to supervise, monitor, and investigate the new private players. But the new regulators differ from the old, state-centered models. They rely on regulatory techniques ranging from voluntary and
enforced self-regulation through to selective use of the old command-and-control techniques and sanctions. They work with industry bodies, and increasingly as part of globalized regulatory networks (Braithwaite and Draho 2000). The practical effect has been a shift in regulatory model, from state control to market models, from hierarchical systems of command and control to responsive regulation. The new forms of governance actually require state control of the direction of regulation and risk management, with many of the operational regulatory and compliance functions then shifted out to the market, community, and other social institutions.

The scope of regulation has been expanding significantly since the 1960s. In recent years traditional areas of regulation (such as health, education, and taxation) have been joined by new forms of social regulation (such as occupational health and safety, building codes, consumer protection, and environmental regulation). In many of these areas, formal regulation, or law, has been only one form of social control, with self, peer, and professional regulation also being significant. Recognition of this plurality of regulatory methods, coupled with ideologically inspired shrinkage of state activities, has led to a departure from reliance on command and control as the only way of securing compliance with regulation. Nowadays, the regulatory pyramid (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992) sets out a tiered ranking of techniques, beginning with persuasion and self-regulation, progressing through professional discipline, adverse publicity and fines, through to prosecution and the withdrawal of occupational licenses. Responsive regulation requires a logical working through of these techniques, resulting in the use of the most coercive only in a small number of cases of intransigence. Hence, regulation becomes a layered web, with strands contributed by public regulatory agencies, professional and community organizations and individuals, and international organizations.

The impact of these methods on regulatory agencies is to transform them from reactive, hierarchical command structures to problem-oriented, team-based units focused on risk management (Sparrow 1994; 2000). The emphasis moves from after the event use of formal legal sanctions, to cooperation, persuasion, and the creation of incentives for compliance. The attraction for the regulated is the comfort that the “big stick” of coercive sanctions will only be used as a last resort, and also that those who are regulated will have some input into the rule-making and compliance processes. The attraction for governments is also twofold – first, persuasion and the other techniques are cheaper and give quicker results than formal legal process (see Cheh 1998), but more importantly, they help build an image of government as supportive of business, rather than focused on bureaucracy and red tape.
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These changes in societal context have far-reaching implications for police and the organization of police work. One oft-cited effect of the shift in regulation has been the movement away from state-dominated policing to the situation where most developed economies have more private than state police (Shearing and Stenning 1987). As private security guards replace police in public and private buildings, community centers, even public spaces, and as private prison administration proliferates, the role of the state increasingly becomes one of regulating standards rather than actually controlling policing and criminal justice functions. The end result is a “reconstitution of policing as a mechanism of governance oriented to the management of conduct across civil society, and the advent of a loosely coupled network of policing agencies” (Loader 2000: 333–334, emphasis added) and a partial shift in the control of policing away from the state towards political subcenters (Shearing 1996).

Perhaps the most pervasive impact of the shift in governance is the assumption now that the public police no longer (if they ever did) have a monopoly over responding to and preventing crime, but are expected to work in partnership with a range of other institutions, agencies, and individuals. There is no clear framework for these types of partnerships, but rather a set of expectations that police will work cooperatively with their partners (what we define as “third parties”) in identifying and responding to crime, in ways that are likely to vary from community to community and problem to problem. We note that the notion of police partnerships is now entrenched in legislation in the United Kingdom with the requirement for police and local authorities to cooperatively develop crime reduction policies.

Police have become, as Ericson and Heggarty (1997) describe, the brokers for these partnerships – coordinating, providing information and resources, and responding to the risks. Risks are identified through the analysis of statistical data and technologies such as computerized crime mapping systems and utilized systematically by the police through management systems like Compstat (see Weisburd, Mastrofski, McNally et al. 2003). Interagency task forces and intervention teams with multiagency membership all utilize these technologies for crime control purposes.

We argue that the proliferation of third-party policing is an intrinsic outcome of these transformations in governance and the rise of the new regulatory state. Third-party policing is the result of global, regulatory processes and the accompanying pressures on the police to conform to contemporary regulatory practice. It is no coincidence that cooperation, risk management, problem identification and solving, and partnerships are the new primary foci for regulatory practice, as well as policing.
Dimensions of third-party policing

Third-party policing is defined and distinguished from other models of policing through the intrinsic links it has with transformations in governance more generally and in regulatory trends more particularly. The general form of third-party policing includes the police forming willing (or unwilling) partnerships and using legal levers to control and prevent crime. We describe the key dimensions of third-party policing below.

Purpose of action

We identify two primary purposes of third-party policing activities: crime prevention or crime control. In crime prevention, the police seek to anticipate crime problems and reduce the probability of an escalation of the underlying conditions that may cause crime problems to develop. Third-party policing that has crime prevention as its purpose of action operates to control those underlying criminogenic influences that may (or may not) lead to future crime problems. By contrast, third-party policing that seeks to control existing crime problems explicitly aims to alter the routine behaviors of those parties that the police believe might have some influence over the crime problem.

Initiators of third-party policing

In our analysis of third-party policing we focus on the public police as the initiators of third-party policing. There are, however, a variety of collectivities and individuals that have (or could) initiate similar activities. We define these activities, however, as third-party crime control in order to distinguish the activities of the public police as initiators from other potential initiators such as prosecutors, individual citizens, private security, community groups, and law enforcement agents in regulatory agencies. Whilst we focus exclusively in this chapter on the public police as the initiators of third-party policing, we recognize the plurality of potential initiators of similar activities and that different communities, states, and countries will most likely emphasize different types of third-party initiators.

Focal point

The focal point of third-party policing can be people, places, or situations (see Mazerolle and Roehl 1998; Smith 1998). Sometimes third-party policing efforts are directed specifically at categories of people such as young people, gang members or drug dealers. To address some types of crime problems, the focal point of third-party policing efforts might
The case for third-party policing

be directed against specific places, more often than not places that have been defined by the police as hot spots of crime. Drug dealing corners, parks where young people hang out, and public malls are typically the focal point of third-party policing activities that address specific places as opposed to certain categories of people.

The third focal point of third-party policing activities includes situations that give rise to criminogenic activity. An example of a criminogenic situation that gives rise to third-party policing responses include fights occurring in entertainment precincts. In third-party policing licensees are encouraged (or coerced) into partnerships that induce them to control the supply of alcohol and the off-site conduct of patron behavior (see the Valley Alcohol Management Partnership, an interdepartmental initiative in Brisbane, Queensland). In this third-party policing example, the police draw on legal provisions to coerce third-party partners such as government agencies (e.g., Department of Communities, Brisbane City Council), statutory authorities (Liquor Licensing Authority), and businesses (local pubs, bars, and nightclubs) into signing onto an Alcohol Management Accord. The accord governs the training of bartenders, the ratio of trained versus untrained personnel working at any time, the supply of alcohol to patrons, and the assistance provided by the local businesses to better disperse patrons throughout the night.

Types of problems

Third-party policing can be directed against a broad range of crime and quality of life problems (see Finn and Hylton 1994; National Crime Prevention Council 1996). However, most examples and evaluations of third-party policing comprise police efforts to control drug problems (see Green 1996; Eck and Wartell 1998; Mazerolle, Kadlec, and Roehl 1998) and disorderly behavior.

There is one main reason why third-party policing tends to proliferate in efforts to control low-level, street types of crime activity. In the new regulatory state, nodes for crime control are created not in a vacuum but as the result of centralized state policymaking. A higher-order, complex crime problem such as child sexual assault is the type of crime that grabs newspaper headlines and challenges the state to create wide-ranging policies to guide intervention. The crime control partners (doctors, police, educators, child safety officers) and legal levers (e.g., mandatory notification) for these types of problems are usually initiated at a state level and generally not by the police. As such, the police are just one partner (albeit important) in the process, but not the initiator of the third-party intervention.
Ultimate targets

The ultimate targets of third-party policing efforts are people involved in deviant behavior. In theory, the ultimate targets of third-party policing could include those persons engaged in any type of criminal behavior including domestic violence, white-collar offending, street crime, and drug dealing. In practice, however, the ultimate targets of third-party policing are typically street level offenders. Young people (see White 1998), gang members, drug dealers (Green 1996), vandals, and petty criminals typically feature as the ultimate targets of third-party policing.

Proximate targets, burden bearers and third parties

A key, defining feature of third-party policing is the presence of some type of third person (or third collectivity or regulatory node) that is utilized by the police in an effort to prevent or control crime. The list of potential third parties is extensive and can include property owners, parents, bar owners, shop owners, local and state governments, insurance companies, business owners, inspectors, and private security guards. Indeed, any person or entity that is engaged by the police to take on some type of role in controlling or preventing crime could potentially be identified as a third-party or what Buerger and Mazerolle (1998) refer to as “proximate targets” and what Mazerolle and Roehl (1998) have referred to as “burden-bearers.” These are the people or entities that are coerced by the police and who carry the burden for initiating some type of action that is expected to alter the conditions that allow crime activity to grow or exist.

Proximate targets of third-party policing are often stakeholders or regulators that are identified by the police as being useful levers in controlling a crime problem. Indeed, the roles in third-party policing can change rapidly, they vary depending on the situation, sometimes reciprocal in nature and idiosyncratic to the problem at hand. Indeed, the proximate targets of a third-party policing activity in one context may become the ultimate targets of third-party policing in another context. Moreover, cooperative police partners in one context might become hostile “partners” in another context. We suggest that the dynamic nature of third-party policing reflects the fluidity and chaotic nature of crime prevention and crime control more generally.

There are many potential partners in third-party policing including education authorities who prosecute the parents of truants, bar owners who work with police to reduce street drunkenness, and property owners who screen potential tenants and maintain the physical conditions of their properties. However, a predominant group involved with police in third-party policing networks comprises the regulatory authorities. These
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are government agencies or officials with a function of regulating and maintaining standards in some legal activity, such as housing, building, business, or industry. Typical regulatory officials who might become involved in third-party policing include building, health and safety inspectors, and environmental protection officers. These officials are attractive to police because their functions are often accompanied by coercive powers to enter properties, inspect and search, issue closure orders, or take other retaliatory action against people in breach of the regulatory scheme. For police, partnering with such officials can act as a de facto extension of their own powers, as well as increasing their potential weapons and sanctions against people they suspect of involvement in criminal activity. But it is important to remember that crime control and prevention are not the primary aims of regulators, who instead have specific statutory functions to fulfil.

Legal basis

In third-party policing, compliance is obtained through the threat, or actual use of, some type of legal provision. As such, a key defining feature of third-party policing is that there must be some sort of legal basis (statutes, delegated or subordinate legislation or regulations, contractual relationships, torts laws) that shapes police coercive efforts to engage a third-party to take on a crime prevention or crime control role. The most common legal basis of third-party policing includes local, state, and federal statutes (including municipal ordinances and town by-laws), health and safety codes, uniform building standards, and drug nuisance abatement laws, and liquor licensing. We point out that the legal basis does not necessarily need to be directly related to crime prevention or crime control. Indeed, most third-party policing practices utilize laws and regulations that were not designed with crime control or crime prevention in mind (e.g., Health and Safety codes, Uniform Building Standards). For the vast majority of third-party policing activities, the legal basis that provides the coercive power for police to gain the “cooperation” of third parties derives from delegated legislation and obscure, non-criminal sources.

The partnerships between police and third parties occur within a legal framework that authorizes the conduct of the third-party – the building inspector, local authority, licensing agency, or parent. This legal framework establishes the source of authority of the third-party, the extent to which they can partner with police, the contexts in which they can do that, the types of action they can take against targets (criminogenic places and individuals), and the limits of their legal ability to cooperate with, or be coerced by, police.
In third-party policing, laws and legal mechanisms are directed at willing or unwilling non-offending third parties, with the object of facilitating or coercing them into helping to control the behavior of offending ultimate targets. The types of law used can be criminal or civil, and the distinction between these two categories is becoming increasingly blurred (see also Cheh 1991). The laws or legal devices used may be established specifically for the relevant crime control purpose, or may be directed at some other issue but coopted, by police, community groups, victims, or regulators, to achieve crime control or prevention goals.

Much of what we describe as third-party policing has arisen as an unintended consequence of law, rather than as its specific object (notable exceptions include Britain’s Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which specifically mandates police networks). Third-party policing has arisen largely in the space known as “the shadow of the law” – that is, it is influenced by the law, uses the law where necessary, is limited in scope by the law, but often occurs in practice as an extralegal activity.

**Types of sanctions and penalties**

Civil sanctions and remedies vary greatly including court-ordered repairs of properties, fines, forfeiture of property or forced sales to meet fines and penalties, eviction, padlocking or temporary closure (typically up to a year) of a rented residential or commercial property, license restrictions and/or suspensions, movement restrictions, lost income from restricted hours and ultimately arrest and incarceration (see Mazerolle and Roehl 1998). Oftentimes, several civil remedies and sanctions may be initiated simultaneously to solve one problem.

**Tools and techniques**

Dozens of examples can be provided to illustrate the processes by which third parties are recruited and used by the police. Against the backdrop of a legal foundation to force a third-party to cooperate, the police operate on a continuum to engage third parties in their crime prevention or crime control activities. At the more benign end of the spectrum, the police can approach third parties and politely ask them to cooperate. The police might consult with members of the community as well as local property owners and ask them about ways that they see fit to control an existing crime problem or help them to alter underlying conditions that the police believe might lead to future crime problems. For these types of cases the ultimate sanctions that might be unleashed on third parties most likely go unnoticed. The police may themselves consciously utilize their persuasive powers, yet be unconscious about the alternative methods of coercion.
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that they may resort to if the third-party target proves to be an unwilling participant. At the more coercive end of the spectrum the police engage third parties to participate in their crime control activities by threatening or actually initiating actions that compel the third party to cooperate. We point out that there are several stages in the forcible initiation of third parties in taking a crime control role: the first stage may involve a building services agency issuing citations to a property owner following building inspections of their property (see Green 1996). The latter stages of this most coercive practice involve the initiation of prosecutions against the non-compliant landowner and ultimately court-forced compliance by the third party.

Types of implementation

There are many different ways that the police implement third-party policing practices including third-party policing within the context of problem-oriented policing or situational crime prevention programs. Problem-oriented policing provides the management infrastructure (see Goldstein 1990) and step-wise approach to solving a crime problem (Eck and Spelman 1987) and situational crime prevention offers the police an appreciation for situational opportunities that might be exploited using third-party policing tactics (Clarke 1992; 1995). A review of the Goldstein awards from 1993 to 2003 reveals that about 50 percent of problem-oriented policing submissions incorporated third-party policing activities (see Mazerolle and Ransley 2005), yet just one third of third-party policing occurs within a situational crime prevention or problem-oriented policing framework.

The most common manifestation of third-party policing, however, is the ad hoc utilization of third-party principles initiated by patrol officers. These police are simply “flying by the seats of their pants,” there is no script for them to follow, no police department policy that they are working within, and generally very little accountability for their actions.

Evaluation evidence

Measuring program performance and being able to say whether or not an intervention works is the bread and butter of sound policy decisionmaking. We use performance measurement for “evidenced-based policymaking” or making policies based on the outcomes of well-designed and executed evaluations. In the policing arena, Sherman and colleagues (1997) draw analogies with “evidence-based medicine” and defines evidenced-based policing as the use of the best available research on the outcomes of police work to implement guidelines and evaluate agencies, units, and
Table 10.1 *Summary of third-party policing evaluation evidence*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Studies</th>
<th>Studies where an effect size was calculated</th>
<th>Most common third-party from all 77 studies</th>
<th>Most common type of legal lever</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>percent</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Drugs</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Violent crime</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Places</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Young people</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Property crime</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Mazzerolle and Ransley (2005).*
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officers. In short, evidenced-based policing "uses the best evidence to shape the best practice" (Sherman et al. 1997: 4).

Mazerolle and Ransley (2005) conducted a search of the international literature to uncover evaluations of police tactics involving third-party policing. We categorized the studies into five groups: the use of third-party policing in controlling drugs, violent crimes, property crime, youth problems and crimes at criminogenic places. Our search strategies resulted in the identification of seventy-seven studies that included an evaluation component and also involved a third-party policing tactic. Of these, only twelve studies included sufficient data to calculate effect sizes (see Table 10.1). These twelve studies generated twenty-three effect sizes (odds ratios and standardized mean differences) across a variety of outcome measures (calls for service, arrests, field contacts, observations). The heterogeneous units of analysis and the variety of ways researchers had operationalized their outcome measures precluded calculation of mean effect sizes. As such, the individual outcomes were examined independently (see Mazerolle and Ransley 2005).
Table 10.1 summarizes the evaluation evidence.

As the table shows, it appears that third-party policing is an effective mechanism to control drug problems. It is likely that it is an effective strategy for controlling violent crime and for dealing with young people. Whilst the number and quality of the reported outcomes limits our assessment of the effectiveness of third-party policing, Table 10.1 also indicates that third-party policing is somewhat ineffective at controlling property crime problems. Our review suggests that the majority of evidence collated about third-party policing involves property owners (commercial property owners in particular) as third parties. We were also able to uncover limited, yet important, evidence that identifies parents, local councils, housing authorities, and victims as third parties.

Despite our systematic attempts to uncover the evidence surrounding third-party policing tactics, limited evaluations of third-party policing initiatives exist in the research literature and very little systematic effort has been expended to document, collate, and consolidate the third-party policing research evidence. We suggest that there is a great need to continue to evaluate, document, and assess the effectiveness of third-party policing.

Conclusions

In this chapter we provided a synopsis of third-party policing and discussed the regulatory context of third-party policing. We described how third-party policing is part of a general transformation in contemporary society that has seen a movement from state sovereignty and control to
networks of power. We argued that third-party policing is a manifestation of these broader societal trends. We have also discussed what we know about the effectiveness of third-party policing in preventing or responding to crime.

We argue that the future of the third-party policing approach is reinforced by a number of factors: first, third-party policing is not a bottom-up, grassroots innovation in the way that problem-oriented policing has been articulated and developed (see Goldstein 2003). Rather, third-party policing is part of a broader transformation in regulation. As such, the partnership approach is likely to be foisted upon the police in the future not from within, but rather from external forces. An example of this is Britain's Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which specifically mandates police networks. We are likely to see more of this type of top-down approach in the future. Second, the future of third-party policing is reinforced by early evidence that suggests it is a successful way of handling at least street level crime problems. Obviously, success breeds success and the more a strategy is found to reduce a problem, then the more likely it is to be used again.

But to examine the context, mechanics and effectiveness of third-party policing is to consider only half the equation – we also need to ask about the side effects of third-party policing, intentional and unintentional, positive and negative, on the partners who work with police, as well as on other groups in the community, on the proximate and ultimate targets, and even on the police organizations themselves (see Meares in this volume). Some of the questions raised in third-party policing include: How does third-party policing affect the community in which it is practiced? How equitably does it affect different communities, both internally and in comparison to other communities? Just as importantly, who is held accountable for the outcomes and impacts of third-party policing, and how? Are traditional police accountability mechanisms adaptable to take account of this new way of doing business, or is there a need for new mechanisms to be developed? In short, is third-party policing an ethical policing practice?

NOTE

Many of the arguments presented in this chapter are more fully developed in Mazerolle and Ransley (2006).

REFERENCES

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