1. Introduction: 2005 – China and Japan’s year of living dangerously

Michael Heazle and Nick Knight

In purely economic terms, Sino–Japanese relations appear to be at an all time high. China has replaced the US as Japan’s largest trading partner (Japan–China trade had already outpaced Japan’s trade with the US in the January–June period of 2004), with total trade between Japan and the PRC (including Hong Kong) exceeding 20 percent of Japan’s total trade by 2005.¹ And since mid-2002, Japanese exports to China have maintained an average annual growth rate of around 40 percent (Japan now imports more from China than from the US).² But, contrary to some expectations, rapidly increasing levels of economic interdependence between the two countries over the last 20 years have not engendered closer political ties. Rather than helping to build on the good relations both countries established in the late 1970s and 1980s when economic ties were much weaker, greater economic interdependence appears instead to have foreshadowed an era of political strife between the two nations. While most observers see the economic relationship as the main factor preventing a major crisis in China–Japan relations, others believe that closer economic ties can also introduce new pressures, such as the trade war that erupted over China’s agriculture exports to Japan in 2001. As Denny Roy has noted, ‘Trade and investment generate their own set of problems while helping little to alleviate tensions in other troubled areas of the bilateral relationship.’³

Indeed, 2005 – China and Japan’s year of living dangerously – saw a re-opening of some old wounds as Sino–Japanese political relations deteriorated to their lowest point since normalisation in the 1970s. Historically rooted grievances – made more potent by nationalist rhetoric, energy competition and mutual suspicion over future intentions – underpinned a rising tide of acrimonious exchanges between the two countries and a series of often violent anti-Japanese demonstrations and riots in China. By early 2006, the relationship appeared to have reached a point where reconciliation would soon become all but impossible. And although some respite in the worsening relationship has been provided by jointly-held concerns over North Korea’s
nuclear testing and the hope of a more cordial relationship under new
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the two Asian powers are yet to
overcome several enduring obstacles to better relations that will require a
good deal more than skyrocketing trade figures, and even the threat of a
nuclear North Korea, to be overcome.

The failure of China and Japan’s increasing economic interdependence to
prevent rising political tensions in the relationship illuminates the
significance of non-economic factors and also the strong influence of
perceptions rooted in the troubled and often violent interaction between the
two countries. The history of the Sino-Japanese relationship, and the
differing perceptions of this history on both sides, has contributed in a very
major way to a widespread sense of suspicion, resentment, and hostility
between the two nations. As a number of the contributors to this book point
out, public opinion in both China and Japan is very negative about the other
country, and this has impacted on the way in which the two countries’
political leaders have handled the bilateral relationship. Many Chinese retain
a deep sense of grievance about Japan’s pre-war and wartime activities in
China, and express anger that Japan has (supposedly) not shown sufficient
remorse for its injurious behaviour stretching back well over a century.
Certain incidents in particular arouse fury on the Chinese side, none more so
than the ‘rape of Nanjing’ in 1937, in which several hundred thousand
civilians were reportedly massacred by Japanese troops. The nature, extent,
and significance of such incidents are contested, as is the wont of all
historical interpretation; but the very fact that Japan’s wartime history is
understood differently by many Japanese adds to China’s suspicion that
Japan, not having acknowledged and sufficiently atoned for its wartime
activities in China, is not to be trusted either now or in the future. Moreover,
China views with suspicion and some alarm Japan’s move to alter its so-
called peace constitution and its participation in external military operations,
such as Cambodia and more recently Iraq. From the Chinese perspective,
these changes in Japan’s military and diplomatic orientation are possible
precursors to its re-militarisation, a fear that has haunted China since the end
of World War II. From the other side of this perceptual divide, many
Japanese, especially on the right of the political spectrum, view with
impatience (what they regard as) China’s harping on ‘incidents’ from the
past; this constant reiteration of grievances not only serves to distract
attention from the imperatives of the present, but is founded on a selective
and misguided view of Japan’s history. The history textbook controversy
highlights only too clearly that many in Japan, including some particularly
influential intellectuals and political leaders, do not accept conventional
accounts of Japan’s motivations for invading China or its activities there.
They perceive Japan, rather than the initiator of the war, as a victim
responding to a context of unreasonable impositions and limitations by other nations. Japan’s wartime activities, and the behaviour of its soldiers abroad, should thus be seen in a very different and much more positive light to the picture painted of them in China. On both sides of the Sino–Japanese divide, the past (or reconstructions of it) thus lives on to sour a relationship that, from the economic angle at least, appears founded on a reasonably secure footing.

A central theme of this book is the importance to the Sino–Japanese relationship of historical memory as this issue relates to contemporary Chinese and Japanese viewpoints and visions of the future. Questions about how perceptions of the past are shaped by the present are, we believe, central to understanding the ‘hot–cold’ nature of Sino–Japanese relations. Moreover, this approach is significant for it challenges the view that the benefits of economic interdependence are, in themselves, sufficient to ensure the relationship will run smoothly. Similarly, it challenges the realist notion that states will invariably behave as ‘rational’ unitary actors in pursuit of clearly defined national interests. As the contributors to this book argue, there is a need to look beyond structurally driven perspectives, and acknowledge the role of historical memory and ideological constructions as factors in China and Japan’s bitter–sweet relationship. Similarly, the nexus between internal and external policy imperatives needs to be acknowledged; domestic imperatives for stable economic growth are linked closely to broader perceptions of government legitimacy in both countries, especially in China, which in turn feed into notions of national identity and pride.

For Japan, asserting nationalist pride is about leaving the past behind in a way that the post-war generations are comfortable with. In China, however, it is the injustices of the past – particularly those of Japan’s making – that underpin China’s contemporary national identity as a once great power reasserting its traditional status and prestige. In this sense, the complexity of persisting historical tensions becomes clear, as do their political impacts on the present; indeed, competing perceptions of the past are shaping both the present and the future nature of Sino–Japanese relations. Yet it is also the current political and economic circumstances faced by both societies – domestically, regionally, and globally – that are shaping perceptions of history as they do contemporary notions of nationalism. To unpack this seemingly paradoxical interrelationship between the past, present, and future, this book adopts an interdisciplinary approach, drawing on the findings of scholars in the disciplines of history, anthropology and sociology, political science, and international relations, and attempts to set in a historical, political, cultural and international context the increasing tensions between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Japan.
This book’s examination of the rising tensions between China and Japan is significant for several reasons. First, while recognising the importance of examining the Sino–Japanese relationship from an international relations perspective, the book incorporates changing regional and international relations into a broader multivariate analysis that sets the tensions between China and Japan in the context of their historical relations, the influence of culture on their mutual perceptions, the role of ideologies and particularly nationalism in their construction of the world, and domestic political and economic changes that influence China and Japan’s state-to-state perceptions and relations. Second, and premised on this approach, a number of the studies in the book emphasise the importance of history and historical memory in the construction of China–Japan relations, on the assumption that their relations are constructed on present perceptions of the past and how this relates to the future. Third, the book acknowledges that a positive and cooperative Sino–Japanese partnership is of immense significance in dealing with regional and international challenges. As the Asia–Pacific region’s two most powerful nations, the policies adopted in Tokyo and Beijing, whether mutually competitive or cooperative, will directly influence the prosperity, security and stability of the region. Several of the book’s chapters investigate the regional role that China and Japan are seeking to play. They demonstrate that, while there is competition between the two nations, the establishment and extension of multilateral regional institutions has the potential to draw the two powers into networks of interaction that may constrain the competitive dynamic between them.

The book thus provides fresh insights into the Sino–Japanese relationship, and evaluates the causes and contemporary significance of the tensions between the two nations. It reflects on the countervailing pressures within the relationship, between hostility and conflict, and between cooperation and conflict.

The most conspicuous source of political tension between the two Northeast Asian powers is Japan’s past military aggression in Asia and, in particular, China. This wound in the national psyche of both nations is exacerbated by rising nationalist sentiment in China and Japan, with specific events such as former Prime Minister Koizumi’s repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo having become focal points for growing nationalism-inspired animosity between the two countries. A common view in China, reinforced by the Chinese media and government, is that Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni and efforts to revise Japan’s Constitution demonstrate that Japan remains a recalcitrant state that holds no real remorse for its past transgressions; for many Japanese, Chinese protests are little more than further proof that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is ungrateful for
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Japan’s economic help and committed only to exploiting the ‘history card’ for its own political ends.

The fact that much of the resentment expressed against Japan is coming from younger, rather than only older, generations of Chinese indicates that ill-feeling against the Japanese has been kept very much alive in China. The causes of Japan’s ongoing vilification lie on both sides, with neither government doing much to curtail it. Prime Minister Koizumi provided the most visible source of irritation for the Chinese by visiting the Yasukuni Shrine to commemorate Japan’s war dead each year during his five-year tenure (Koizumi visited the shrine more frequently than any other Japanese leader in the post-war era). If current Premier Shinzo Abe decides to follow Koizumi’s example and visit the Yasukuni Shrine during his tenure, he will become only the fourth leader to do so in the last 20 years.

The controversy over these visits arises because the shrine is the spiritual resting place of Japanese soldiers convicted of war crimes, and is linked to right-wing nationalist groups in Japan. For the Chinese, these visits are proof of the insincerity of past Japanese apologies and expressions of regret to China. Japanese critics of Koizumi’s visits argue that the Prime Minister made them to gain the support of conservatives in the LDP – many of whom were alienated by Koizumi’s (largely unsuccessful) attempts at reform and heavy-handed approach within the Party during his first two years – and also to appeal to a growing feeling among some Japanese, particularly the younger generations, that Japan has already apologised for its misdeeds and should no longer live in the shadow of its military past. Koizumi’s successor Shinzo Abe, a close Koizumi confidant with a reputation as a tough Japanese nationalist, appeared to make mending relations with China his top priority when he visited Beijing shortly after assuming office in late 2006. That his first overseas visit was to China to meet with Chinese President Hu Jintao was widely commended as a positive step towards improved bilateral relations (newly elected Japanese leaders usually make Washington their first port of call). However, there remains considerable uncertainty over how Abe will, if at all, be able to balance the sensitivities of Japan’s relations with China with domestic pressure for the Japanese government not to be seen as giving in to Chinese demands.

Another high profile source of complaint for China and other countries in the region, particularly South Korea, is the Japanese government’s revision of high school history texts. Japan’s education authorities regularly check new textbooks for depictions of Japan’s military past that are deemed inappropriate or inaccurate, and any required changes must then be made by the author before the book can be approved for use in Japanese schools. The numerous critics of this screening process, both within and outside of Japan, believe it is heavily biased towards promoting texts that play down or distort
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Japan’s wartime aggression and war crimes. In April 2005, Japan’s ambassador to Beijing, Koreshige Anami, responding to Chinese Foreign Ministry complaints over texts approved in Japan’s latest screening, accused the CCP of using its own education system to encourage anti-Japanese sentiment. In a thinly veiled criticism of Chinese education policy, Mr Anami added that Japan ensured freedom of speech and publication. Tensions sharply increased soon after the Japanese ambassador’s comments, and on 9 April thousands of anti-Japanese demonstrators marched in Beijing calling for boycotts on Japanese goods and decrying Japan’s wartime aggression in China. Protesters attacked Mr Anami’s Beijing residence along with several Japanese businesses, providing a clear indication of the rising hostility of many Chinese towards Japan and its policies.

In the opening two sections of this book, several authors explore on the one hand the changing attitudes in Japan towards Japan’s actions during World War II and, on the other hand, their impact on contemporary Chinese nationalism and its evolution in the context of China’s increasing regional influence and power. Jian Zhang points to the grass roots nature of anti-Japanese sentiment in China, and emphasises how Chinese nationalist perceptions of Japan are often informed and motivated independently of state-run media and rhetoric. Meanwhile, Eric Johnston argues, in his discussion of the Japanese media’s reporting on China and treatment of the history issue, that domestic pressure on Japan’s leaders from revisionist elements in the media, academia, and a variety of lobby groups to present Japan as a fully independent power in regional and global affairs has become far more acute in recent years. According to Johnston, the more militant, nationalistic perspectives on the Pacific War and in particular Japan’s occupation of China had until recently been confined to Japan’s far right wing. What has changed, and what became evident in 2005, is just how much more integrated into mainstream thinking those views, aided and abetted by the Japanese media, have become.

Similarly, Rumi Sakamoto points to the emergence of nationalistic and historically revisionist discourse in Japan’s non-mainstream media outlets, those more likely to reach an audience amongst Japan’s youth. Employing the extremely popular mangas (comic books) of Kobayashi Yoshinori, who was associated with the nationalist movement of the 1990s and is also an honorary director of the New History Textbook Group, she critically explores the thinking underpinning increasingly prevalent exhortations to Japanese patriotism and nationalism. Nevertheless, as Barbara Hartley demonstrates, this influential perspective of Japan’s wartime past is strongly contested within Japan itself. Post-war Japanese writers and film directors have provided graphic semi-fictional accounts and eye witness reportage of the barbarous acts of Japan’s soldiers in China, and these have attracted a
wide audience apparently unwilling to be persuaded by the more anodyne right-wing versions of Japan’s history. Hartley also points to the way in which dominant representations of Japanese identity and culture have been problematised in a television programme dealing with Japan’s historical actions in Korea and contemporary treatment of Koreans in Japan.

At the heart of the history dispute is undoubtedly a strong sense of national pride, particularly in Japan. But the dispute’s longevity and increasingly frequent eruptions tells us more about what is happening in the region today than what the history dispute’s various protagonists claim was or was not occurring more than half a century ago. Japan and China’s increasingly antagonistic behaviour over the history problem is, in effect, the by-product of how the Chinese and recent Japanese governments have chosen to deal with both their respective domestic political problems and their competing foreign policy objectives. These two sets of issues are, as Michael Heazle argues, closely linked. According to Heazle, Sino–Japanese relations are best characterised in terms of ‘hot’ economic relations and ‘cold’ political relations, which raises the question of how long such a relationship can last. He argues that although the outlook for China–Japan relations is not a positive one, the economic benefits of the current relationship are important enough to both countries to prevent the political relationship from deteriorating to the point where the economic relationship could be seriously damaged, excluding acts of gross provocation by either government or a third party such as North Korea, Taiwan, or the US. In this analysis, the areas of concern fuelling the current ‘hot–cold’ dynamic are portrayed as three key dimensions of the overall China–Japan relationship: nationalism, security, and economic interdependence and growth. The argument Heazle presents stresses the importance of the interplay between each of these dimensions, and also the extent to which their inter-related nature will make any improvement in political relations elusive at best, and unlikely at worst.

Focusing on the broader security-related aspects of Sino–Japanese relations, Joseph Cheng and Jian Yang both emphasise the importance for China of overcoming its political problems with Japan. They also point to the challenges faced by Japan in its handling of the history issue, and to the need for China to ease fears over its regional and global intentions by further developing its ‘soft power’ credentials. Jian Yang sees the concerns of the Chinese as being rooted in their deep distrust of the Japanese. Chinese perceptions of Japan are, according to Yang, dominated by the historical legacy of Japanese imperialism and occupation. It is not surprising, then, that Japan’s significant military capabilities and its increasing activism in its alliance with the US have, from a Chinese perspective, done much to keep
memories of Japan’s expansionist past relevant to contemporary perspectives of what Japan represents today. The Chinese are aware of the importance of a stable relationship with Japan to China’s strategy of enhancing its comprehensive national power; however, they either find it hard to move beyond the history issue or insist that the fundamental cause of conflict is Japan’s reluctance to accept the rise of China. This internal tension is clearly at odds with pragmatic assessments within the CCP of the need to prevent external issues from complicating China’s economic and social development. As Joseph Cheng notes in his analysis of China’s diplomatic strategy, in the early 1990s it was clear that Chinese leaders wanted to maintain a peaceful international environment in which to concentrate on China’s modernisation. They considered that international competition in the coming decades would be on the basis of ‘comprehensive national power’. China’s foreign policy framework, however, has been an evolving one, responding to emerging opportunities and setbacks. In contrast to the 1950s and 1960s, China’s ‘soft power’ remains limited today (see Michael Wesley in Chapter 11 for an alternative assessment of Chinese soft power). This is perhaps most conspicuous in China’s diplomatic competition with Taiwan, and in terms of the benefits accruing from its foreign aid programmes. While trying to secure recognition as a major power, China has yet to clearly inform the world in credible terms of the purpose and nature of its current and longer-term objectives.

Japan’s most immediate security threat is North Korea’s development of long-range missiles and its nuclear weapons programme. However, this represents, in comparison to the tensions between China and Japan, a relatively straightforward issue; for it represents a ‘clear and present danger’ to Japan, and perceptions of it are widely shared in the region and beyond. None of the governments involved in the six-party negotiations support North Korea acquiring a nuclear capability, and all strongly support a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. Japanese and Chinese mutual threat perceptions are, on the other hand, more elusive in nature, based as they are on estimations of what one government believes the other government is planning well into the future.

While the North Korean threat may be more direct (and, quite possibly relatively short term), it is tangible and understood by the Chinese and Japanese governments within the broader context of the Northeast Asian security environment, including their own relationship. Subsequently, the opportunity exists for China and Japan to improve relations through cooperation over the North Korean issue in much the same way that US–China relations benefited from China facilitating a multilateral approach to North Korea’s nuclear posturing. Therefore, short of the very unlikely event of Japanese or US military intervention in North Korea, or a North
Korean attack on either South Korea or Japan, the six-party framework represents a valuable opportunity for lessening the political tensions between Japan and China on the one hand, and China and the US on the other. Indeed, cooperation between China, Japan and the US is proving essential in keeping North Korea participating in the six-party discussions; success or failure in dealing with the North Korean problem on a multilateral basis will significantly shape China and Japan’s respective perceptions of the role the US intends to, or should, play in Northeast Asian security.

In contrast to North Korea, China and its future intentions represent a far more complicated challenge to Japanese and US policy makers, due not only to the greatly expanded role China now plays in the international community, but also because of the complex nature of China and Japan’s converging and conflicting relations, and their own relationships with the US. Security-related issues – including military expansion, territorial disputes and incursions, and competition for energy supplies – are the most conspicuous sources of friction between the two Asian powers. But these sources of tension should be seen as manifestations of the mounting mutual suspicion over each nation’s long-term objectives in the region. This characterisation of the current situation is supported by Japan describing China in late 2004 as ‘a strong influence on the security in this region’ and stating the need to ‘remain attentive to its future course’.9 This statement has only served to reinforce the PRC’s long-held belief that it is the target of the Japan–US alliance and, therefore, considered a threat by both governments. It also raises the question of why the Japanese government chose to further aggravate an already strained relationship by explicitly naming China, alongside North Korea, as a potential security threat.

Japan’s security anxieties over China’s current and future influence is, however, out of step with a broader regional trend over the last decade towards perceiving China in terms of the economic opportunities and stability its modernisation presents. China is not perceived regionally as the destabilising and expansionist competitor that Tokyo and Washington policy hawks regard as the inevitable outcome of a richer and more developed China. Indeed, the relationship between China and Japan is proceeding in a context in which the perceptions and actions of their regional neighbours are becoming increasingly significant to the trajectory of Sino–Japanese relations and the manner in which it is managed by the two countries. This reminds us that, in any assessment of Sino–Japanese relations, it is important to incorporate consideration of the East and Southeast Asian regional context, and the interactions between states in this region; for this network of interactions has had a significant impact on the bilateral relations of the two countries and will continue to do so.
The competition between China and Japan for regional influence is both fuelled and constrained by this network of interactions, which include relatively formal multilateral institutions, bilateral relationships and informal contacts. The necessity for China and Japan to cooperate on at least some issues of mutual concern does, as Xia Liping reminds us in Chapter 3, lessen the impact of the very real irritants that have dogged their relationship. Coming from a senior Chinese specialist on foreign affairs, Xia’s rather upbeat assessment of the role of multilateral institutions in encouraging cooperation between the two countries provides an interesting contrast to other more gloomy prognoses of Sino–Japanese relations. In contrast, Michael Wesley in Chapter 11 assesses China and Japan’s increasingly competitive regional relations, and notes the advantage that China has gained over Japan through its projection of soft power influence in the region, particularly among the ASEAN countries. Wesley concludes:

1. that because China and Japan’s bilateral tensions are structurally driven, they are likely to defy resolution for the foreseeable future, despite any political progress made on contemporary disagreements; and
2. that because the state of China–Japan relations has long determined the prospects for regional cooperation in Asia, the dysfunctional nature of the relationship will therefore continue to undermine the development of greater association and integration in the Asia–Pacific.

One significant trend in existing regional interaction is the way in which South Korea is responding to the altered circumstances created by the end of the Cold War, the emergence of China as a regional power, the strengthening of nationalist sentiment in Japan, and the increased rivalry between China and Japan for regional leadership. The very different regional context that now confronts South Korea suggests the imperative need for a fundamental reformulation of the premises underpinning its foreign policy. As David Hundt argues in Chapter 12, South Korea is attempting to move beyond the Cold War lens through which it had previously observed and reacted to the region and the world. However, like Japan, South Korea is finding it difficult to reposition itself within the context of its alliance with the US, particularly as the US is keen to use South Korea and Japan as counterweights to growing Chinese power. Nevertheless, South Korea has found increasing points of convergence between its interests and those of China, which has given it some scope to move beyond its Cold War position. China’s economic reform process and its rapid economic growth have brought the two countries much closer together economically. Both countries also have an interest in preventing North Korea destabilising the region through its nuclear posturing; and both countries have unresolved historical issues with Japan. However, there are issues on which South Korea and Japan do need to
cooperate; the most important of these is the North Korean issue. It is certainly not in Japan’s long-term interests to antagonise South Korea through a maladroit handling of the history issue, which is the experience of the recent past, and which has only served to push South Korea closer to China. One of the challenges facing the new Japanese Prime Minister is to bring about an attitudinal shift in Japan that would have the effect of lowering the temperature on the history issue on all sides. It remains to be seen whether Shinzo Abe will be able to achieve this, given his nationalist credentials; but the way in which he responds to South Korean historical sensitivities will constitute a significant influence on the path Sino-Japanese relations follows in the near future.

As well as the influence of the regional context on Sino–Japanese relations, there is also the influence of globalisation on Chinese and Japanese perceptions of the world and their relative positions within it. As Nick Knight argues in Chapter 4, the dominant Chinese perspective of globalisation incorporates several dichotomies that reinforce Chinese resentment of Japan. These dichotomies are those between developed and developing countries, and between capitalist and socialist countries. In each of these dichotomies, China places itself in opposition to Japan: Japan is developed, and China is developing; Japan is capitalist, and China is socialist. China particularly resents the way in which the developed countries have constructed a global economic system that favours developed countries at the expense of developing countries. This resentment is heightened in the case of Japan, which, China feels, has impeded China’s development through its past aggression and current economically exploitative policies towards China. Globalisation will nevertheless eventually work to the benefit of China, which claims to be a socialist nation; the inherent contradictions of capitalist globalisation will lead to the economic decline of capitalist nations such as Japan, and the eventual victory of socialism on a global scale.

The persistence of such ideological perceptions underlines the point that the foreign policy dimensions of the Sino-Japanese relationship must be perceived in the context of the history of the interaction between the two nations, and the way in which this interaction has been constructed on both sides in nationalist or other ideological forms. We thus accept the need to consider the impact of popular perceptions on China and Japan’s foreign policy, and the way in which these perceptions have given rise to a dynamic of competitive victim-hood, which in turn manifests itself in concerns over the role of history in establishing guilt, status and dignity. Perceptions of cultural superiority and inferiority are likewise not far below the surface in much of the nationalist discourse on both sides of the relationship. These in turn feed into, and are used to justify, competition for leadership – political and economic as well as cultural – within the Asian region.
Most importantly, this book commences from the assumption that the future relationship between China and Japan will be organically linked to the relationship’s past. The present state of relations between the two nations gives only modest confidence that either is able to leave the past behind and establish a *modus vivendi* that accentuates the interest they share in maintaining a stable, prosperous and cooperative Northeast Asian region. But does constantly looking to the past and reviving memories of historical injuries and slights ensure that the relationship is headed nowhere but towards a ‘future past’? One can only hope that the more optimistic contributors to this book are correct in suggesting that the willingness of the two nations to participate in a greater number of multilateral regional forums will serve to lower the temperature of a relationship that, in 2005 at least, had become a prisoner of the past.
NOTES


2. EcoWeek, 19 January 2004, p. 3. China, for its part, is diversifying its trade. Japan last year lost its status as China’s largest trading partner, a position it has held for most of the last 20 years, to the EU. Japan is now China’s third largest trading partner behind the EU and the US, but remains China’s largest source of imports. ‘EU becomes China’s largest trade partner’, People’s Daily Online, 7 January 2005, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-01/07/content_406961.htm.


4. See, for example, the collection of documents dating from 1950 to 1960 in Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs (ed.) (1960), Oppose the Revival of Japanese Militarism (A Selection of Important Documents and Commentaries), Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

5. The Yasukuni Shrine was built in 1869 to honour soldiers and civilians who died in the Boshin civil war. It now stands to honour Japan’s more than 2.5 million war dead and includes more than 1000 Japanese tried as war criminals by the allies during World War II. Fourteen Class A war criminals, including wartime military leader and Prime Minister Hideki Tojo, were secretly enshrined at Yasukuni in the late 1970s, adding to the controversy of prime ministerial visits to the shrine. Former Japanese Premier Yasuhiro Nakasone provoked further condemnation from Japan’s neighbours in 1985 by becoming the first Japanese Prime Minister to make an official visit to Yasukuni; this visit marked the last of Nakasone’s visits in either a personal or official capacity.
