A Multivariate Model of Police Deviance: Examining the Nature of Corruption, Crime, and Misconduct

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ABSTRACT

The current study aimed to explore the multivariate nature of police deviance in order to identify a descriptive model of the features of behaviour that could potentially inform approaches to prevention. Fifty cases were coded from law reports to extract variables of deviant behaviour. These were analysed descriptively to obtain frequencies and then statistically using Multidimensional Scalogram Analysis to explore the relationships between the variables. A three-way model similar to Punch’s (2000) definition incorporating Police Crime, Noble Cause Misconduct and Corruption was identified, with Police Crime being the most frequent. This typically involved Constables committing proactive single criminal offences alone for personal gain. The findings are discussed in terms of explanations for the behaviour and also prevention strategies such as increasing police accountability, (awareness of) consequences and transformational leadership.

Keywords: Police corruption, Multidimensional Scalogram Analysis, Police misconduct
The prevalence of Police deviance is a much debated statistic and one that is often rife with problems. While some researchers suggest that ‘corruption’ is endemic to Police culture across the globe (e.g. Punch, 2000), others such as Miller (2003) argue that incidents are rare. Son & Rome (2004) suggest, from survey results, that corruption estimates depend upon the nature of the behaviour and how it is defined, as well as the sources surveyed. Indeed, the very nature of the behaviour means a likelihood of secrecy of those involved, even if they have already been exposed as ‘corrupt’ (Miller, 2003). Further, those researchers who do try to uncover and explore corruption often disagree on their definitional terms, i.e. what behaviour constitutes corruption, making comparisons of their results difficult.

Despite such problems, incidents of police deviance do surface with even minor misconduct having serious negative impacts both within the force and between police and the public (HMIC, 1999). Some examples of high profile incidents of police corruption in the UK were identified by Newburn (1999) and involved the suppression of evidence, the beating of suspects, tampering with confessional evidence and perjury. These types of offences occurred in cases such as the Birmingham Six (in which six people were convicted in 1975 of bombing 2 pubs in Birmingham with the convictions overturned in 1991) and the Carl Bridgewater affair (in which several people were convicted in 1978 of murdering a 13 year old boy with the convictions overturned in 1997). In both cases the accused were eventually acquitted and released from prison due to revelations of police corruption.
The current study aims to explore the nature of police deviance using a multivariate perspective, investigating what it entails and what sort of officers it involves. This will inform definitions of police corruption, as well as the identification of reasons for the continued presence of police corruption, in order to suggest the most effective prevention strategies.

What is corruption and who does it involve?

In order to assess the reasons behind an officer’s involvement in police corruption, it is first important to establish what it entails and who it involves. Roebuck and Barker (1974) offered a broad definition of police corruption as any form of ‘deviant, dishonest, improper, unethical or criminal behaviour by a police officer’. Kleinig (1996) offered a similar description but incorporated an indication of why officers commit corruption, suggesting: “Police officers act corruptly when, in exercising or failing to exercise their authority, they act with the primary intention of furthering private or departmental/divisional advantage” (p.166). Further, Skogan and Meares (2004) suggested that types of corruption can be divided according to the intention. Corruption may be carried out for ‘personal gain’, including the sale of inside information and bribery. However, Corruption may also involve ‘organisational gain’ (also known as ‘noble cause’ corruption), which is carried out to secure convictions. This is what Klockars (1985) describes as the use of ‘dirty means’ to achieve ‘legitimate ends’ and terms the ‘Dirty Harry Problem’.

Numerous types of corruption have been identified. Roebuck and Barker (1974) offered a typology of police corruption that was later added to by Punch in 1985. The completed typology consisted of 9 different types of corruption;
- Corruption of Authority (When an officer receives something due to their position but is not actually breaking the law),
- ‘Kickbacks’ (When an officer receives things for referring business to others),
- Opportunistic Theft (Stealing from arrestees),
- ‘Shakedowns’ (When an officer accepts a bribe in return for not following through a criminal violation),
- Protection of Illegal Activity (police protection of illegal activity which allows it to continue),
- ‘The Fix’ (Undermining criminal investigations),
- Direct Criminal Activities (when a police officer commits an actual crime),
- Internal Payoffs (privileges within the police force are bartered with e.g. shifts, holidays),
- ‘Flaking’ or ‘Padding’ (planting or adding to evidence).

When Punch reviewed the typology again in 2000 he suggested that it was missing certain aspects such as extreme violence, manipulating evidence, sexual harassment, racism and direct involvement in drug dealing. The broad range of behaviours identified as being corrupt suggests that, when investigating causes, it is important to look for the involvement of multiple factors. This allows identification not only of the most frequently occurring factors of corruption but, more importantly, how these factors combine. Indeed, the present paper seeks to explore and uncover these ‘combinations’ of factors that shape police corruption, in order to allow a more targeted, yet complex, approach to prevention and response.

Due to the large amount of behaviours listed by Punch (2000), he suggested that when studying police corruption it may prove more useful to use the broad heading of ‘police deviance’ under which lies three subsections; Corruption – to take
something against your duty as exchange for money or gifts from an external corruptor; Misconduct – breaking internal rules and procedures, and; Police Crime – when officers break the law in serious ways such as using excessive violence.

In addition to attempts at defining the main types of corruption, distinctions have been made between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ corruption. For example, Miller (2003) identifies internally networked corruption, involving illegal acts within a police department between members of the police force, while also acknowledging the role of others who are external to the police force, for example illegal acts between one or more police officers and members of the public. Dividing corruption into these categories has implications for identifying possible reasons for an officer's involvement. Internally, reasons may include aspects of group dynamics such as peer pressure or leadership influence. When corruption is external, involvement may be due to reasons such as the influence of family, friends or criminals or simply having the opportunity to commit corruption. Indeed, Skogan and Meares (2004) suggested that corruption could be ‘proactive’, where the officers seek the means to engage in corrupt behaviour, or ‘reactive’, where the officer is receptive to offers of bribes. While these two categories may suggest that the officer had the primary intention of committing corruption, not all deviance can necessarily be considered in this way.

Why do officers commit police deviance?

Previous studies have attempted to define the reasons behind police corruption. An early theory proposed that corruption was committed by so called ‘bad apples’, that is, corrupt individuals committing corruption for personal gain. However, Punch (2000) addresses the possibility that corruption is due to group behaviour that is rooted within established practices in the police force into which
officers have to be initiated. Both ideas suggest the initial involvement of officers who set out to commit corruption, either for personal gain or with respect to involving other, ‘clean’, officers in bad practices. This has implications for prevention. If corruption is due to bad apples, the removal of such officers should remedy the problem. However, Punch’s suggestion addresses the fact that the problem extends to group behaviour, which may initially start with a few individuals but, as more and more officers become involved in the practices, the learnt behaviours would need to be addressed rather than simply removing corrupt officers.

Whilst some studies only focus on investigating one specific cause, Porter (2005) provided a review that summarised several factors of corruption into two underlying themes: Organisational factors and Social factors. Organisational factors include organisational culture, particularly an emphasis on performance and clear-up rates, policy/rules, leadership, opportunities such as undercover work and informant handling and also ineffective investigation/consequences.

Opportunity is well documented as a factor or cause of corruption. A 1998 American report submitted by the General Accounting Office, which studied drug related police corruption, stated that police enforcing laws against all forms of vice were open to opportunities for corruption. Both Dunnighan and Norris (1998) and Moran (2005) also provided support for the factor of ‘opportunity’. Dunnighan and Norris (1998) reported that the majority of officers see rule bending as an essential component of running informers. Moran (2005) stated that opportunities for corruption are continuously provided in certain areas of policing due to context. He proposed that the specific context of certain activities, combined with the policing of those activities and the development of criminal groups, historically provides for the development of certain forms of police corruption.
The Social factors reviewed by Porter (2005) include social culture, for example the social customs among officers that encourage solidarity and discourage reporting fellow officers, as well as colleague influence and external influence. Howitt (2002) discusses the factor of colleague influence. He identified the possibility that corrupt practices could be handed on by serving officers to new recruits. The introduction of new officers involves ‘on the job’ training with experienced officers. Howitt suggested that more experienced officers may employ practices that are unacceptable and these may be passed on to new recruits. Therefore, corrupt behaviour in new police officers may have been learnt from colleagues.

Porter’s (2005) review provides a detailed overview of the possible causes for the continuance of corruption and has different implications for prevention than those mentioned above. She suggests that reasons for corruption are rooted in various aspects of the police force, therefore, rather than removing individuals, it may be more productive to focus on changing the environment in which they operate and the ways in which certain police functions are managed and implemented. Porter suggested that implementing changes in the areas mentioned could be effective in preventing police corruption. These changes included strategies such as; visible leadership, encouraging the reporting of corruption and stricter procedures for work prone to opportunities for corruption.

The current study aims to explore the features of police deviance from a multivariate perspective. First, the features outlined above will be investigated in terms of their frequency of occurrence in cases of police deviance, for example, examining which aspects of corruption occur most frequently in order to suggest possible reasons for its occurrence. The paper will then examine the relationships between the features in order to produce a multivariate model of the nature of police
deviance in order to inform current definitions of ‘corruption’ as well as prevention strategies. While previous studies have highlighted particular features, around which they have drawn ‘typologies’, none have used multivariate statistical approaches to confirm the combination, or separation, of features into these subtypes. The present study will use a Multi-Dimensional Scaling technique that, despite increased popularity in a variety of areas (e.g., Morrison, 1990; Sabbagh, Cohen, and Levy, 2003), including criminal behaviour (e.g. Wilson, 2000), has not been adopted in the area of Police Corruption.

METHOD

Data Collection

A total of 50 cases of corruption were collected from an electronic UK law database that archives full text summary transcripts of court cases (i.e. a narrative summary of the details of the case: the circumstances, the parties involved and their behaviour). The cases selected are a random sample, involving a range of Police Forces across England. The corruption highlighted in the cases occurred between 1969 and 2005, although 80% occurred post-1990. In order to explore all possible types of corruption, Roebuck and Barker’s (1974) wide definition of corruption was adopted to select cases. This meant that “any form of deviant, dishonest, improper, unethical or criminal behaviour by a police officer” was included in the sample. The database used allows case searches by key terms as well as specific party names. For the present study, the sample cases were selected by typing in corruption related key terms. Terms specific to particular types of corruption (such as ‘drug corruption’) were not used as these may have produced a bias in the sample of cases returned.
Thus, to provide an overview of all the types of corruption present, broad terms such
as ‘police corruption’, ‘police misconduct’, ‘police officers’, ‘police deviance’ and ‘police incidents’ were used. While such terms can provide many ‘hits’ in the database, not all were relevant (for example the term “police officers” does not specify any form of deviant behaviour) and so combinations of search terms were used, as well as simply reading through the returned cases and identifying those that were relevant. This method was used until a sample of 50 relevant and sufficiently detailed cases was reached. The searches returned records in date order (with those most recent cases appearing first in the list). This explains the bias in cases towards the more recent years, noted above.

Advantages and Disadvantages of the Data Source

The data source accessed for the current study does have its constraints. For example, cases identified are those that have come to the attention of the criminal justice system, either for prosecution of the officers involved in misconduct, or as grounds for appeal against the conviction of an offender (for example, where the reliability of the case evidence can be questioned due to the involvement of ‘corrupt’ individuals, or from some ‘mis-use’ of process such as non-compliance with interviewing procedures). Whilst this may provide a rather select sample of cases, it does provide a reliable source of information as the details outlined in the court report are those that have been accepted as fact by the judge and jury. Indeed, the information will have had to be scrutinised by a number of different professionals and will have been collected from a variety of sources in order to make the case. This is in contrast to data collection that relies on information from one source (for example reports of the investigator or investigative team, self reports of those involved), which
may be subject to forms of self-serving biases (in order to present a convincing case, or to downplay one’s own guilt) that could influence the information presented.

Given the sensitive nature of the behaviour under study, many traditional forms of data collection are likely to be either impossible or, at the very least, problematic. For example, self report interviews and surveys are unlikely to uncover anything but the least serious behaviour (Skogan & Meares, 2004), while data collected by anti-corruption units would first require clearance to access the information. If such clearance was sought, the information required would be either too sensitive for research purposes, where cases are open and ongoing, or would still likely suffer from the same select sample of cases that have been identified by the courts (cases that have been identified with a reasonable level of proof to accept the information on misconduct activities is reliable and true).

Social research always has its criticisms, but these are often outweighed by the lack of viable alternatives for studying social phenomena in ecologically valid ways, the importance of the topics and the consequences for not carrying out research in these areas. Thus, while it is recognised that the current sample has its limitations, this research will provide an important contribution that benefits from the level of attention given to the information (data) in order to present the facts in court and then in their archived form. Previous studies have drawn upon law reports as a data source to explore psychological and behavioural components of crimes, such as group rape and group robbery (Porter & Alison (2006a; 2006b). These studies provide further discussion and defence of this data source.

Data Coding
The 50 cases were content analysed to extract variables that describe the nature of corruption. Features and behaviours of corruption were identified and higher order variables were constructed for the coding dictionary, including 5 features (Type of Corruption, Nature of Corruption, Duration of Offence, Officer Type, Cause of Corruption), 7 outcomes and 5 Offence Behaviour variables. The variables were then tested for inter-rater reliability by comparing the ratings of two independent coders on the same cases. The two coders were in agreement on 99% of the judgments (Cohen’s Kappa = .93, p< .001).

Data Analysis

Descriptive

The data were analysed to establish which features of corruption are most and least frequent. This analysis included the types of corruption (noble cause or personal gain); whether corruption was most frequently Internal (committed between members of the force), External (between members/a member of the force and the public) or Lone (committed by an individual and did not involve either other members of the police force or members of the public); Proactive (actively seeking out corruption), Reactive (reacting to offers to commit corruption) or Situational response (in which behaviour was influenced by the situation); Ongoing or a Single Offence, and; whether officers involved were constables or higher ranked. Cases were also examined in terms of the outcome of the deviant behaviour being uncovered, for example whether and how it affected a case against an offender, and whether the officer(s) involved received any kind of discipline/punishment.

Multivariate Statistics: Multidimensional Scalogram Analysis (MSA)
In order to investigate the multivariate nature of corruption, the relationships between the variables were explored. Multidimensional Scalogram Analysis (MSA), developed from the work of Guttman and Lingoes (Lingoes, 1973), is a non-metric Multidimensional Scaling technique. Since it is non-metric, rather than parametric, it is particularly suited to potentially ‘noisy’ real-world data.

[Insert figure 1 about here]

MSA can be used to statistically compare cases with respect to their similarities on a number of variables simultaneously. Profiles are created for each sample case (of corruption) with respect to the variables of interest. In the present study these were the Nature of behaviour, the Duration of the behaviour, the Officer Rank involved, the Cause of the behaviour and the Type of corruption. The potential relationships between these features can be expressed as a structural hypothesis through a mapping sentence (Shye, Elizur & Hoffman, 1994), which is a concise way of specifying the research domain and its definitional system. The mapping sentence for the present study is offered in figure 1. Here it was used to demonstrate how each of the facet elements (levels of each variable) can combine within a “common range” of the ‘type’ of offence.

Each variable had between 2 and 3 levels, which were coded numerically, as shown in Figure 1. For MSA, these codes do not have to be on a continuum or indicate any sort of underlying order to the data levels. Thus, this technique is particularly appropriate for the current variables. The profiles are then represented geometrically as points in space so that the more similar two individuals’ profiles, the closer they are together. Thus, in the present study, the closer two points were in the
output, the more similar were the cases of corruption that they represent (with respect to the variables chosen for this study). Where two or more cases exhibited the same features, those cases were represented by the same point in the plot.

The analysis resulted in one main plot, showing the profile points, and also an item plot for each of the 5 variables that showed how each of the profile points (cases) scored on that variable. Each item plot displayed the same configuration of points (cases) as the main plot, but additionally showed how those cases scored on that variable. These item plots were then partitioned into regions that contained the same variable score. These regions were then compared to see how scores on one variable related to scores on each of the other variables. Since meaningful partitions could be made, the main MSA plot was then divided into regions that represent, in this study, different types of corruption, as evidenced by their similarities and differences on the 5 input variables.

MSA, therefore, has particular strengths for the purpose of the current study. First, it allowed comparison of cases of corruption on a number of features simultaneously, thus depicting how cases can be differentiated when all of these variables are taken into account, rather than examining cases by each feature separately. Such analysis will help in the construction of more statistically robust ‘typologies’. Second, MSA also showed how these features relate to one another, thus building up statistical relationships between features, indicating potential processes that may be of relevance. Such processes may be helpful in inferring potential causes or prevention strategies. For further discussion of MSA see Guttman & Greenbaum (1998), and for further examples of its use see Ginges & Cairns (2000) and Wilson & Canter (1993).
Chi-square

The themes, or types, of corruption derived from the MSA were further verified through chi-square analysis, assessing the statistical significance and power of any differences in the frequencies of defining features for cases assigned to the different themes. Further, Chi-square was used to examine any trends in the outcome of cases across the identified ‘types’ to see if outcome is linked to type of corruption.

RESULTS

Descriptive

What does corruption involve?

Nature of Behaviour. Figure 2 shows the frequency of internal corruption (corruption that was committed between members of the force), external corruption (corruption that occurs between members/a member of the force and the public) and lone corruption (corruption that was committed by an individual and did not involve either other members of the police force or members of the public). Internal corruption occurred in 23 of the cases (46%) while 22 incidents were lone offences that did not involve any other person (44%). Only five of the cases involved external corruption (10%).

Duration of Behaviour. Figure 2 shows the frequency of corruption cases that were single offences or ongoing. Ongoing Corruption was present in 27 of the cases (54%) and Single Offence Corruption was present in 23 cases (46%).

Who does corruption involve?

Ranks of Officers Involved in Corruption. Figure 2 shows the frequencies of high rank officers and constables involved. High rank officers (those officers with
superiority to constables) were involved in 20 of the 50 cases (40%) whilst Constables were involved in 17 cases (34%). In only four cases (8%) were both Constables and high rank officers involved together. The position of the officers was not known in 9 cases (18%).

Why does corruption occur?

_Cause of Behaviour._ Three types of behaviour emerged from the data – proactive (actively seeking out corruption), reactive behaviour (reacting to offers to commit corruption) and situational response (in which behaviour was influenced by the situation). Figure 2 shows that the largest amount of corruption involved a response to a situation (for example, ignoring/removing evidence), which was seen in 27 cases (54%). Proactive corruption (for example, offering information in exchange for money) was present in 18 cases (36%) and Reactive corruption (for example accepting a bribe) was only present in five of the cases (10%).

_Types of Corruption._ The cases were analysed as to whether they were Noble Cause Corruption, which consisted of the type ‘Corruption in Order to Obtain a Conviction’ or Personal Gain, which included the other types of corruption in the coding dictionary that did not have the interests of the police force and the public in mind. These were Bribery, Harassment, Neglect, Traffic Offences, Actual Crime and Informant Related Corruption. Noble Cause Corruption occurred in 16 cases (32%) whereas personal gain corruption occurred in 34 cases (68%).

_Outcome of the cases_

Data on the outcome of the cases was available for 41 of the 50 cases and 6 cases featured more than one outcome. Thirteen cases resulted in imprisonment of the officers involved. In 10 of the cases the corruption resulted in a conviction of a criminal being quashed due to the conviction becoming unsafe. Eight cases resulted in
 convicted criminals being granted leave to appeal against their convictions as again their convictions had become unsafe due to the involvement of corrupt officers. Eight cases resulted in damages being awarded, in four cases the officer(s) involved retired or had their employment terminated and in three cases they were suspended. Only 1 case resulted in a fine for the officer.

Multidimensional Scalogram Analysis

The 50 cases were coded with respect to the 5 variables of Nature of Behaviour, the Duration of Behaviour, Rank of Officer involved, the Cause of Behaviour and Type of Corruption. The resulting profiles of the 50 corruption cases across the five variables were analysed with the MSA program of the Hebrew University Data Analysis Package (HUDAP). A two-dimensional MSA solution with coefficient of contiguity 0.996 (indicating that the solution is a very good representation of the actual relationships between the variables) was produced (Figure 3). The dispersion of points across the main plot shows little homogeneity in the profiles, indicating differentiation in the corruption cases with respect to the features explored.

[Insert Figure 3 about here]

[Insert figure 4 about here]

In order to understand the representation in terms of similarities and differences between the cases, the variable item plots are partitioned and compared for similarities in the regions formed. In this way, the main plot in figure 3 can be interpreted, and the multivariate nature of the data can be explored, through the relationships between all the variables.
The five item plots are depicted in figure 4. The partitions represent the
distinction between cases in terms of the levels of each variable. Items 2 (Duration)
and 3 (Officer Rank) partition similarly, showing constables were most likely to
commit single acts (cases on the right hand side of the partition) while cases that
involve higher ranking officers were most likely to involve ongoing corrupt behaviour
(left side of the partition).

The remaining items all show some overlap in their partitions. The overlap
between the variables in the bottom right corner of the plot show that those cases that
involve Noble Cause corruption (item 5) are also likely to be Internal between police
officers (item 1) and in response to a particular situation (item 4). In contrast, those
cases that appear in the remainder of the plot involve personal gain (item 5). These
cases can then be external and reactive (shown in the overlap of the bottom left corner
of items 1 and 4, respectively), or lone officers who are proactive (shown in the
overlap of the top right corner of items 1 and 4, respectively).

When all the partitions are taken together and considered on the main plot, 3
general themes of corruption emerge (figure 3); Type A cases involve lone constables
who proactively engage in single acts of corruption for personal gain. Type B cases
involve internally networked officers who engage in acts of noble cause corruption in
response to specific situations. Type C cases involve high rank officers who engage in
corruption over a period of time and in reaction to an external source for personal
gain.

These differences are also supported through \( \chi^2 \) analyses. First, chi square was
employed to compare noble cause and personal gain corruption with regard to Type of
Behaviour. Proactive and Reactive corruption were combined as they both suggest
some form of intent and are suggested by the MSA to differentiate between Personal
Gain and Noble Cause corruption. In support of the distinction between Type B and both Types A and C, Table 1 shows that noble cause corruption is significantly more likely to be in response to a situation whereas personal gain corruption is significantly more likely to involve some intent. $\chi^2 = 10.63, df = 1, p < 0.001$ (effect size = 0.46). Noble cause corruption is also most likely to be internal while personal gain corruption is not $\chi^2 = 4.9, df = 1, p < 0.05$ (effect size = 0.31). In support of the differentiation between Types A and C, table 2 shows that single offences are most likely to involve constables while ongoing offences are more likely to involve high ranking officers $\chi^2 = 9.75, df = 1, p < 0.01$ (effect size = 0.51).

The 3 way thematic typology will now be used to explore the extent to which the 50 cases can be classified into a particular theme. Cases were classified as Type B if they involved noble cause rather than personal gain (i.e. scored ‘2’ on item 5). This classifies the cases on the fundamental thematic differentiation. Cases were classified as either Type A or Type C based upon the number of variables of each Type that were present. For example, a case that involved a lone constable who proactively engaged in a single act of corruption for personal gain shows the presence of all (5 out of 5) of the Type A variables and none of the Type C variables. Thus, it would be classified as Type A. Where cases showed the presence of variables from both Types, the decision was made based on which Type had the highest number of variables present. Using these classification criteria, 21 cases are classified as Type A, 16 cases are classified as Type B, nine cases are classified as Type C and only four cases are
unclassifiable (being personal gain but having equal numbers of variables in both Type A and C).

However, it is recognised that this criteria of differentiating between Type A and Type C is particularly relaxed and that more stringent classification criteria could be used based on the size of the difference between the number of variables present from each type. For example, the maximum difference observed was four variables, that is, a case having four more variables of one type than another. The most frequent difference in the number of variables of each type for the cases was, however, a difference of one. If cases are classified on the basis of having a difference of one or more (as has been done in the present study), then 88% (30 out of 34) of the personal gain corruption cases are classifiable into either Type A or Type C. The percentage of classifiable cases then drops as the cut off level (amount of difference that needs to be observed) increases; stipulating a difference of 2 or more variables allowed 59% of cases to be classified; a difference of 3 or more allowed 42% of cases to be classified and, finally specifying a difference of 4 variables allowed only 18% (6 out of 34) of cases to be classified.

[Insert table 3 about here]

Table 3 shows the distribution of specific offence categories for each of the classified types of corruption. Type A offences were likely to involve an abuse of process or position (for example perverting the course of justice or neglecting to intervene in the committal of a crime) and/or a criminal act by an officer (for example assault, sexual harassment, driving under the influence). Type A is, therefore, labelled ‘Police Crime’. To a somewhat lesser extent, Type A offences also included
organisation/job related behaviour such as discrimination and/or improper dealings with informants. Type B offences were most likely to be evidence related (for example, ignoring, planting or removing evidence in order to secure a conviction) and somewhat less likely to involve an abuse of process (for example, conducting interviews without the presence of a solicitor or, in the case of minors, the presence of an adult). Type B is, therefore, labelled ‘Noble Cause Misconduct’. Type C offences involved an Abuse of process, police crime and/or organisation/job related behaviour, but were more likely than the other types to involve some sort of bribe. Type C is, therefore, labelled ‘Corruption’. Unfortunately, despite collapsing categories of offence behaviour, the frequencies still remain somewhat low, preventing any statistical validation of comparisons.

[Insert table 4 about here]

Finally, table 4 shows the outcomes of the cases in terms of whether the deviant behaviour affected the criminal case, for example a conviction being quashed or appeal granted, and whether the officer(s) involved were affected, for example receiving a fine, suspension, dismissal or prison sentence. Cases involving noble cause misconduct (Type B) tended to be more likely to affect the criminal case ($\chi^2 = 15.57$, $df = 2$, $p<0.001$, effect size = 0.51), showing the potential consequences of the behaviour can be the opposite of those intended. However, cases involving corruption (Type C) tended to more likely to affect the officer(s) involved ($\chi^2 = 16.28$, $df = 2$, $p<0.001$, effect size = 0.51), showing that these perhaps more serious forms of police deviance did tend to attract punishment.
DISCUSSION

This study aimed to provide an empirical, multivariate exploration of the nature of police deviance in order to understand the different forms that it can take. Examination of the frequencies of the case variables showed that personal gain corruption occurred more often than noble cause corruption. The data also showed that corruption was almost equally likely to be an internal or lone offence but was rarely external and was most likely to be in response to a situation as opposed to proactive or reactive. There were slightly more cases involving high rank officers than there were constables, and almost equal amounts of ongoing and single offences. Finally, although the most frequent outcome of the cases was imprisonment it still had a low occurrence.

Punch’s (2000) three-way definition of ‘police deviance’ was supported through multivariate analysis. MSA was interpreted to produce three themes of case variables that were then used to compare the specific nature of offence behaviour. Type A, termed ‘Police Crime’, involved Constables committing proactive, single offences, such as assault and harassment, alone and for personal gain. Type B, termed ‘Noble Cause Misconduct’, involved internally networked officers committing acts of misconduct in response to a situation in order to secure a conviction, for example manipulating evidence. Type C, termed ‘Corruption’, involved high rank officers committing offences over an ongoing period of time, typically in reaction to an external source and for personal gain, for example accepting bribes. Type A, ‘Police Crime’, was the most common among the sample cases while Type C, ‘Corruption’, was the least common.

The content analysis of features of the cases also highlighted some aspects that have previously been neglected by researchers. For example, when examining the
nature of the corruption in terms of the internal/external distinction, it was found that
cases did not always involve other officers (the case was neither internal nor external)
but simply involved one individual acting alone. This generated the variable level
‘Lone’ to be explored in relation to the other features of the cases and suggested that
police deviance is not always due to direct social dynamics or external pressure.

Type A ‘Police Crime’ was associated with individual officers. Indeed, Miller
(2003) also reported that organised, networked corruption is rare and that lone
offences are most common in the UK. According to Miller, however, such behaviour
was most likely to involve information leaking, for example obtaining information for
personal purposes, but also passing information to friends/family, leaks to the media
and deliberate leaks to offenders. In the present study, however, these latter offences,
while differentiated from internally networked behaviour, have been classed as
external, which was actually found to be the least common.

In the present study, Police Crime also incorporates police brutality, racism
and harassment. Such behaviour is particularly poignant in the recent UK climate
where several high profile incidents have led to criticisms of the police and major
reform of procedures (examples include, the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, Macpherson,
1999; The BBC Television documentary ‘The Secret Policeman’, Broadcast in
October 2003; The shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes in July 2005; The armed raid
and arrest of brothers Mohammed Abdulkahar and Abul Koyair for suspected
terrorism in June 2006).

In The US, the Christopher Commission Report, conducted in 1991, stated that
“There is a significant number of officers in the LAPD who repetitively use excessive
force against the public and persistently ignore the written guidelines of the
department regarding force,” (Los Angeles: The Christopher Commission report
The ‘bad apples’ approach has gained support from police departments in explaining such incidents, as well as the individuals who commit such acts (Lersch and Mieczkowski, 2005). Indeed, the present study does show that such incidents are likely to involve officers committing such acts alone. However, the approach assumes that the removal of “problem” officers would lead to a dramatic decrease in incidents of brutality. It, therefore, fails to consider that even when individuals who are known to use excessive force are removed, further incidents still occur.

In the present study, Police Crime was shown to most likely involve Constables proactively engaging in offences for some sort of personal gain. The fact that these are lower ranking officers who are deliberately seeking out opportunities may suggest that, rather than removal from the force, such officers are in need of better leadership from higher ranking officers in order to set a good example and communicate the rules and procedures more effectively. For example, Mastrofski (2004) highlights transformational leadership as potentially effective, although he states that little research has been conducted on this topic in the area of policing. Girodo (1998) did find evidence for transformational leadership among police managers but found it to be the least likely used style, with a Machiavellian style used the most often, although this did depend somewhat on the specific duties of the manager. Transformational leadership implies a personal transformation in followers, encouraging following of the leader’s principles and rules due to internalisation and belief in them, rather than through expectation of reward or fear of consequences. Police management may benefit greatly from adoption of these principles, as outlined in organisational psychology.

Type B, Noble Cause Misconduct, was identified to involve internal corruption between officers, including both constables and higher ranks, in order to
secure a conviction. While Skogan and Meares (2004) identified categories of proactive and reactive corruption, the current study found that the two categories did not cover all types of corruption and, therefore, suggested a third category, ‘situation response’, where rather than actively seeking or responding to offers of corruption the offence occurred as an outcome of being faced with a certain situation. This idea is similar to the ‘grass eaters’ noted by the Knapp Commission (1972) as engaging in ‘petty’ corruption as part of the job, often through expectancy to do so from other officers (but who, in Knapp’s distinction could also reactively accept gratuities or proactively solicit payments or ‘kickbacks’). These were distinct from ‘meat eaters’ who proactively sought out more serious forms of corruption. In the present study, Noble cause corruption was significantly more likely to be due to situation response, for example, where police had caught a suspect and then pressured him/her into a confession. In contrast, personal gain corruption was more likely to be due to either proactive or reactive corruption, that is, officers did not just respond to being able to commit corruption they actively sought to engage in the behaviour.

The high frequency of situation response behaviour demonstrates that corruption is not simply due to a desire to commit this type of behaviour. In many of the cases the officers were faced with a situation and then decided to commit the corrupt act rather than actively seeking or responding to corruption. There are a number of factors that could potentially influence such decisions. First, it seems that officers are responding to an opportunity and that this frequently involves manipulating evidence as well as breaking interviewing procedure. Perhaps officers working in these areas should be made particularly aware of the temptations to break the rules and the consequences of doing so. Second, the officers are engaging in misconduct for organisational rather than personal gain. Perhaps the argument of a
Noble Cause helps to convince a network of officers to engage in behaviour that they know is against the rules. Indeed, that the officers are engaging in such misconduct together, internally, suggests that they may be influencing each other, either consciously through overt peer pressure or unconsciously by providing social support for each other’s actions. Such strong social forces, or ‘groupthink’ (Janis, 1972), in tightly cohesive groups are a well-researched group phenomena. Groupthink is particularly likely under conditions of high stress, where groups believe in their own morality, feel a unanimity or high cohesiveness and where there is an absence of external audit. Such conditions are particularly relevant to Police officers who are under pressure to solve crimes, are in a position of monitoring and judging society, and have been identified as having a strong cohesive culture (Fleming & Lafferty, 2000; Sherman, 1985). While some of these conditions are inevitable or difficult to change, at least in the short term, there is a move to increasing external audit of Police behaviour, both in the UK with the introduction of the Independent Police Complaints Commission (brought in under the Police Reform Act, 2002) and in the US and Australia through the use of Citizen Oversight Panels and Agencies, respectively, to investigate (or review evidence from internal investigations of) complaints or allegations of corruption and/or misconduct. Whilst such systems are not faultless (such as strained relations and mistrust of each others’ procedures and intent), they play an important role in highlighting Police accountability and, if organised effectively, can actually help facilitate relations between the Police and the public (Finn, 2000).

The final theme of cases, Type C was labelled ‘Corruption’ as it most closely resembles Punch’s (2000) definition of Corruption as doing something against the officer’s duty in exchange for money or gifts from an external corruptor. Cases in this
theme typically involved high rank officers reacting to bribes from external sources over a period of time. Encouragingly, this theme showed the fewest cases in the present sample, which may indicate that external factors such as family or offender influence and financial gain were not prominent in the sample of cases. However, caution must be shown in that this low frequency could indicate the difficulty of uncovering such corrupt practices and bringing them to the courts.

Implications

The findings have interesting implications regarding the current literature on causes of corruption. Personal gain corruption is perhaps the more serious problem as not only was it more common in the present sample than noble cause corruption but is mostly committed by individuals who have actively sought to engage in corruption rather than succumbing to temptation. Therefore, perhaps the ‘bad apple’ theory cannot yet be dismissed. The results also showed that external corruption was not a common factor, with most individuals committing corruption without external influence. Therefore, removing these individuals may solve the problem. However, a more important issue is, perhaps, preventing these occurrences in a proactive way rather than responding to them after they have occurred.

Drawing on Porter’s (2005) suggestions, the results indicate that anti-corruption strategies would benefit from targeting the opportunities open to Police officers for corruption so that it would be increasingly difficult for so called ‘bad apples’ to engage in deviant behaviour, as well as addressing the ineffectiveness of the investigation process and consequences of deviance, which were also identified by Leader (2002). In the current sample only 13 cases resulted in imprisonment and 4 in the officer having to leave the force. Further, while officers engaged in corruption
were somewhat likely to receive some sort of discipline or punishment, very few of those engaged in crime and misconduct saw similar consequences. If punishment was harsher, or more likely, it may discourage officers to engage in deviant behaviour. In contrast, Quinton (2003) highlighted that UK officers particularly welcomed the introduction of written warnings. These are perhaps most welcome where officers are new to the force and are less certain of rules and procedures. New officers may be more susceptible to learning bad practice from other officers and so engage in misconduct without realising. Here, early warnings will flag up the seriousness of the behaviour to the officers involved, serving to educate them to correct practice and allowing them the chance to correct their behaviour in the future. Further, they provide a written record of the behaviour so that the officer can be monitored in the future in case of continued misconduct. Indeed, a managerial approach to complaints and (minor) misconduct, with emphasis on remedial rather than punitive action, has been advocated in Australia (see Fisher, 2003), as have early warning systems to highlight consistent problems (Bassett & Prenzler, 2002).

Finally, the fact that many high rank officers seem to be involved in the cases, particularly those involving bribes, needs to be addressed. Not only are officers of high rank most likely to be in a position of power that can affect the cases they are involved in, but they may also set the example to other officers that corrupt practices are acceptable. Indeed, role models have been shown to be a powerful source of social influence (Bandura, 1971), particularly where observers are unsure of the situation and how they should act, and where the model is perceived to hold a high status (Bandura, Ross & Ross, 1963). Miller (2003) suggested that officers can take (or seek out) opportunities to gain financially from their positions when they feel let down by their job, such as constantly being passed over for promotion, or feeling dissatisfied.
with their work. This suggests a need for performance monitoring leading to personal development programs to help motivate and reward staff in their work. Once again, elements of transformational leadership such as individualised consideration/attention and intellectual stimulation may be particularly relevant here, supporting its adoption within the Police.

While factors were assigned to the cases to give an overall picture of the reasons behind the corruption, the factors that were identified did not take into account individual differences. For example, while many officers are put in similar situations, not all commit corruption. Further research could, therefore, investigate the thought processes that occur when people commit crimes. For example, it may be due to a cost–benefit analysis. In many of the cases it seemed that, in the risk of committing the corruption the benefits outweighed the costs. For example, imprisonment was only seen in 13 of the 50 cases of corruption. Therefore, research could investigate police’s perceptions of various cost–benefit scenarios to explore their understanding of the punishments for various types of corruption. Indeed, Klockars, et al. (2000) assessed US police officers’ support for disciplinary procedures for different types of corruption and, whilst they found that officers’ support for discipline did increase with their perception of seriousness of behaviour, their actual perception of seriousness for particular types of activity was somewhat surprising.

Further research might also consider targeting prevention strategies in different ways. For example, as internal networks are more likely to commit noble cause corruption, research could explore the group dynamics behind this. Although some officers may find the decision to commit this kind of corruption easy, others may be involved simply due to group dynamics such as peer pressure and a desire to
conform. Therefore, prevention could be two fold – first, for those who are involved simply for the desire to obtain a conviction, prevention strategies could involve reassessing the performance culture of the police force. For example, rather than assessing the effectiveness of Police Forces through clear-up rates, more attention could be paid to their levels of integrity. Second, for those who are involved due to group dynamics, the use of support networks could be introduced, such as anonymous phone lines to report such offences so that they can resist being involved in this sort of activity without jeopardising their position within the force and within their department. Therefore, research within the force looking at perceptions of group dynamics could be very insightful in relation to these sorts of prevention strategies and with their implementation there should be fewer perceived obligations to commit this sort of corruption.

While individual causal factors (such as personality, or background characteristics) have been somewhat downplayed by recent accounts of corruption, such as Porter (2005), the themes identified by the current study may offer a more systematic method for exploring such aspects. For example, while it may prove difficult to find associations between individual characteristics and police deviance taken as a whole phenomenon, more specific analysis of the characteristics associated with each of the themes identified here may prove more fruitful.

Whilst it is recognised that the study is limited somewhat by its relatively small and select sample, it is still argued that the analysis offers a conceptually useful way of examining police deviance that finds support from previous studies. Indeed, as Glassner & Carpenter, (1985) point out, “the representativeness of a sample of active offenders can never be determined conclusively because the parameters of the population are impossible to estimate” (cited in Jacobs & Wright, 1999, p.152).
It is recognised that the data has its limitations. As the data were coded from transcripts of cases that had gone through the courts, only incidents that resulted either directly in a conviction or affected the outcome of another case were available for inclusion in the sample. Other incidents that did not fit either of these criteria were not on the database, thus limiting the amount of data available. However, given the nature of police deviance and the difficulties that have been identified by researchers in attempting to study it (Miller, 2003; Skogan & Meares, 2004), the present sample provides a new methodology that offers the facts of real world cases that have been accepted in court as true. This, therefore, overcomes some of the problems inherent in self-report survey research.

The present methodology provides a clear view of three broad types of police deviance occurring in the UK, allowing the reader to gain an insight into the behaviours that underlie corruption and the importance of understanding them in relation to context. It provides insight regarding the people and processes that are involved in different forms of police deviance and, further, makes a link between them. This will enable researchers to explore causes of police deviance in greater detail and identifies where prevention strategies would be most useful.
References


Table 1: Differences between noble cause and personal gain corruption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Noble Cause</th>
<th>Personal Gain</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proactive/Reactive</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.63</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation Response</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Y</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.90</td>
<td>&lt;.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal N</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Differences between single and ongoing offences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Single</th>
<th>Ongoing</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High rank</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4: Frequency of offence types across each Type of corruption.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offence Type</th>
<th>Type A (Police Crime)</th>
<th>Type B (Noble Cause Misconduct)</th>
<th>Type C (Corruption)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal Gain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abuse of process/position</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime by police</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization/job related misconduct</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bribe</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noble Cause</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noble cause evidence related</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noble cause abuse of process</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>46*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*4 cases unclassified
Table 5: Outcome of cases by type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Type B</th>
<th>Type C</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A (Police Crime)</td>
<td>(Noble Cause Misconduct)</td>
<td>(Corruption)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer affected</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% 37%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(fined, suspended, sacked prison)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case affected</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% 42%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(conviction quashed/appeal granted)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% 4%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N Frequency 17 15 2 2 16.28 P<.001

N Frequency 4 1 7

N Frequency 19 4 6 2 15.57 P<.001
Figure Captions

Figure 1: Mapping sentence

Figure 2: Percentage distribution of the features of corruption (n=50)

Figure 3: Outcome of the cases

Figure 4: Main MSA plot showing the frequencies of each profile and partitioning of themes

Figure 5: MSA item plots
1.

Whether a case (x) of Police deviance involves;

**Who**
- 1. Constable
- 2. High Rank
- 3. Both

in a **When**
- 1. Single Offence
- 2. Series Offence

that is **With**
- 1. Internal
- 2. External
- 3. Lone

**Why**
- 1. Reactive
- 2. Proactive
- 3. Situation response

for **For**
- 1. Personal gain
- 2. Noble cause

determines **Range**

Qualitative type of offence
3.

TYPE C
Corruption

TYPE A
Police Crime

TYPE B
Noble Cause
Misconduct
4.

Item 1: Nature (1=internal, 2=external, 3=lone)  

Item 2: Duration (1=single, 2=ongoing)

Item 3: Officer (1=constable, 2=high rank, 3=both)  

Item 4: Cause (1=reactive, 2=proactive, 3=situation response)

Item 5: Type (1=personal gain, 2=noble cause)