Organising Sport at the Olympic Games: 
the Case of Sydney 2000

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ABSTRACT

Organising the Olympic Games is a highly complex management task that involves many individuals and stakeholder groups. In 2000, Australia’s largest city, Sydney, staged the Summer Olympic Games. The agency given primary responsibility for the staging of these Games was the Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG). Two additional organisations also played a significant role in the organisation of the Sydney Games. These two organisations were the Australian Olympic Committee (AOC) and the New South Wales (NSW) Government.

This doctoral research investigated the part played by the AOC, as the host national Olympic committee (NOC), in the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. The study examined the AOC’s involvement in the establishment of an independent Olympic agency that was called the SOCOG Sports Commission (SSC). The research explored the impact of the SSC on the organisation and management of the SOCOG Sport Program at the Sydney Games, which was managed by a SOCOG functional area known as the SOCOG Sport Program. The study investigated how the organisational power relations maintained by the AOC, through the formation of the SSC, influenced and shaped the management of the SOCOG Sport Program, and whether as a result of this involvement the organisation of sport received a high priority within SOCOG.

The analysis of organisational power relations is a central feature of this research. The interdependent and fluid organisational network, involving SOCOG, the AOC, and the NSW Government as the financial underwriter of the Games, and the resultant formation of the SSC, is analysed using Elias’s concept of human figurations. Rather than considering organisational situations and developments in static terms, Eliasian process sociology argues that the place of organisations cannot be separated from the broader social and historical contexts in which they operate (Elias, 1994; Newton & Smith, 2002).
From an Eliasian perspective, the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games was the result not only of recent developments but also of countless social and organisational figurations that developed over many years prior to Sydney winning the bid to stage the Games in 2000. In this regard, the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games was the result of both planned and the unplanned consequences of Olympic organising over which no one individual had total control.

In attempting to address the specific research questions, a multi-methodological approach was employed. This approach involved collecting and analysing data from three main sources. The analysis was informed by organisational practices that were observed by the researcher, as a SOCOG Sport Program employee, from October 1998 to December 2000. Data were also collected from both internal SOCOG documents and related external documents. In addition, 35 interviews were conducted with former SOCOG officials and managers, who had responsibility for organising and managing the SOCOG Sport Program.

The findings from this research suggest that the AOC played an important role in the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. The involvement of the AOC in the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program was shaped by two key dimensions: firstly, the organisational knowledge and networks of the AOC; and secondly, the organisational power of the AOC. The sport experience and Olympic networks of the AOC influenced the SOCOG strategy of organising the ‘athletes’ Games’. The organisational power relations maintained by the AOC throughout the Olympic planning process placed it in a position where it was able to establish an autonomous decision-making authority within SOCOG known as the SSC, which had carriage of all sport-related and sport-specific decisions for the Sydney Games. However, even with the considerable power the AOC maintained within SOCOG, it was still interdependent on key Olympic stakeholders, such as the NSW Government, in order to deliver the ‘athletes’ Games’.
In conclusion, the researcher conducted a study that will make a strong contribution to the sport management body of knowledge, specifically as it relates to the body of knowledge for staging mega-sport events, such as the Olympic Games. The research has management implications for the IOC and for future host NOCs, particularly in relation to OCOG organisational design and governance. In the past, only a small amount of research has been conducted on the role of the host NOC in the staging of the Olympic Games. This research has started to fill this gap.
STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY

I declare that this work has not previously been submitted for a degree or diploma in any university. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the thesis itself.

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Stephen Michael Frawley    Date
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<tr>
<td>AOC</td>
<td>Australian Olympic Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IF</td>
<td>International sports federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>International Olympic Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NF</td>
<td>National sports federation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOC</td>
<td>National Olympic Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCA</td>
<td>Olympic Coordination Authority</td>
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<td>OCOG</td>
<td>Organising Committee for the Olympic Games</td>
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<tr>
<td>ORTA</td>
<td>Olympic Roads and Transport Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOBO</td>
<td>Sydney Olympic Broadcasting Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOG</td>
<td>Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games</td>
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<td>SSC</td>
<td>SOCOG Sports Commission</td>
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PUBLICATIONS

Book Chapter

Refereed Journal Article

Refereed Conference Abstracts and Presentations


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Now, where are those golf clubs?
DEDICATION

For Tara and Alanna
CHAPTER ONE: THESIS
AIMS, PURPOSE AND
CONTEXT
1.1 Introduction

The Summer Olympic Games are held every four years and are considered one of the world’s most significant sport events (Lucas, 1992). Cities from all parts of the world place a bid to the event’s governing body, the International Olympic Committee (IOC), for the right to stage the next Olympic Games (Toohey & Veal, 2001). The Modern Olympic Games were founded by Baron Pierre de Coubertin, with the first ever Summer Olympics held in Athens in 1896 (Guttmann, 2002). Since this time the Summer Olympic Games have been staged across a number of continents (MacAlloon, 1981).

Through hosting a global mega-sport event like the Olympic Games, cities seek to accrue a range of benefits (Baade & Matheson, 2002). The main advantages often sought by bidding cities through hosting the Olympics include: increased economic activity arising from international tourism, infrastructure development and related financial investment (Barney, Wenn & Martyn, 2002; Preuss, 2000); the chance to position or re-brand a city or nation (Hall, 1996, 2001, 2006); the ability to generate national pride and identity derived from staging a successful Games (Tomlinson, 2005; Toohey & Veal, 2007); and helping the national team achieve better results by competing on familiar territory, leading to further positive outcomes such as increased national pride (Bloomfield, 2003; Cashman, 2006).

While the benefits of hosting an Olympic Games at first seem attractive, the staging of the event requires detailed planning and multifarious organising across local, national and international platforms (Guttmann, 2002; Searle, 2002). The cost of failure, both financially and politically, can therefore be significant (Booth, 1999, 2002; Little, 1999). The complexity of the Games is highlighted by the number of groups and organisations that become involved and engaged (Jennings & Sambrook, 2000; Young & Wamsley, 2005). Some of these groups and organisations that play a part in staging an Olympic Games include: the international sports federations, who are the peak governing bodies
for each sport represented at the Games and have responsibility for the conduct of the Olympic sport competition at the Summer and Winter Olympic Games; the National Olympic Committees (NOCs); the Organising Committees for the Olympic Games (OCOGs) (Chappelet & Bayle, 2005); the media and broadcasters of the Games (Jackson & McPhail, 1989; Kidd, 1989; Lenskyj, 1999; Rowe, 1999, 2000; Whitson, 1998); the sponsors of the Olympic Movement (Brown, 2000, 2002; Burton, 2003); the local, state and national governments that support the staging of the Olympics in their countries (Houlihan, 2005; Whitson & Macintosh, 1996); and, importantly, the athletes (Toohey, 1990).

In the year 2000, the City of Sydney staged the Games of the XXVII Olympiad. At the Closing Ceremony, these Games were described by the IOC President Juan Samaranch to be the “best ever” (Toohey, 2001). The agency given responsibility for the staging of these Games was the Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG). An additional organisation that played a significant part in the formation of SOCOG, and throughout its existence, was the Australian Olympic Committee (AOC). The AOC, as the host NOC, was central in both the bidding phase for the Sydney Olympics and the subsequent implementation (Booth, 2005; Booth & Tatz, 1994; Jobling, 1994, 2000). The involvement of the AOC in the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games is central to this research. (In this context, drawing on Weihrich, Cannice and Koontz (2010), organisation is defined as both the formal structure of roles and the informal networks of interpersonal relationships that develop when people associate with each other). Specifically, the study examines the power relations of the AOC within SOCOG, and how this power shaped the management of the SOCOG Sport Program at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. (Drawing on Weihrich et al. (2010, p. 4) management is defined as “the process of designing and maintaining an environment in which individuals, working together, in groups efficiently accomplish selected aims”).
The chapter begins by outlining the study, including its aims, its purpose and the historical and social context of the research. Furthermore, in order to familiarise the reader with the thesis structure, a brief overview of each chapter is provided.

1.2 Aims

The focus of this research was to investigate the role of the AOC in the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. It examined the AOC’s involvement in the establishment and implementation of a powerful Olympic entity called the SOCOG Sports Commission (SSC). The SSC was formed in 1996 with formal authority for the management of sport at the Sydney Games through the functional area called the SOCOG Sport Program. The research explored the impact (i.e. effect) the SSC had on the management and organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program and whether this involvement resulted in sport being a high priority for SOCOG. To achieve this two research aims were established. First, to conduct an in-depth empirical study that provides insight into how power relations operate within an organisation charged with the responsibility of staging an Olympic Games. Specifically, the study explored how organisational autonomy develops and is shaped by social networks of power relations and historical interdependencies. As Chapter Three explains, organisational power relations emerge from social historical processes that are interconnected and dynamic over time (Clegg & Hardy, 1996; Dopson, 1997). In this regard, the notions of organisational structure and individual agency cannot be viewed as separate concepts but rather as historically constructed and interlinked (Elias, 1994; Newton & Smith, 2002). A thorough empirical study of the development of organisational autonomy in an Olympic context will make a contribution to the knowledge of organisation studies, specifically the study of organisational power, one that has often been neglected in the broader management literature (Clegg, Pitsis, Rura-Polley & Marosszeky, 2002).
The second aim of this research was to conduct a study that respects an intellectual tradition which is often ignored by mainstream management researchers (Clegg, Courpasson & Phillips, 2006). Rather than offer a positivistic “snapshot” approach, this study is influenced and draws upon the wider social and historical processes that take place both within and outside of the boundaries of the organisations being examined. In alignment with Flyvbjerg (2001), this study is not necessarily focused on establishing how things should be but rather examining how things were. To achieve these aims the study is focused on one NOC and one Olympic Games. By focusing the research on a single case greater attention is given to understanding organisational development at a micro level (Flyvbjerg, 2006).

1.3 Purpose

The main purpose of this thesis is to highlight the value of studying organisational interdependencies that develop over time and consequently influence and shape the management of a mega-sport event, such as the Olympic Games. The work of Norbert Elias significantly informs this research. Elias’s research, which has largely been ignored by mainstream management writers, can nevertheless offer significant value to those studying organisations (Clegg et al., 2006; Newton, 2001). The historical sociological approach of Elias, known as process sociology, presents a nuanced distinction and variation to the study of organisations, and is one that is often missed by those who conduct short-term focussed management studies without overlaying reference to the broader social and historical contextual conditions at hand (van Iterson, Mastenbroek, Newton & Smith, 2002). The study therefore draws on the wider social and historical context in explaining the organisational developments that occurred at a micro level within SOCOG.
1.3.1 Entwined Organisational Processes

The central feature of Elias’s work, when applied to the analysis of organisations, is that it assists researchers in determining the interconnected objectives and actions of various internal and external organisational actors (Newton, 2004). An Eliasian approach attempts to tease out the complex and entwined organisational processes that may not be readily apparent. The approach can also help organisational researchers overcome a common problem faced in both sociology and organisation studies, that of understanding the influence of human agency and social structure (van Iterson et al., 2002). Roudometof and Robertson (1995) have argued that the significance of Elias’s work is its potential to highlight the broader macro-level developments whilst also being attuned to the shifts and dynamics occurring at the micro level of analysis.

An Eliasian theoretical perspective also takes into account that human action is consciously directed towards the successful accomplishment of particular goals or plans and that such human action involves not only cognitive but also emotive elements (Jarvie & Maguire, 1994). According to Dopson (1997), “humans are thinking and feeling beings” that interdependently develop their own “pattern of intentions, preferences and desires” (p. 104). However, as Elias (1994) clearly stipulated, the outcome of social (or organisational) action cannot be explained via individual intentions, preferences or planning alone. Social and organisational processes are often the result of a complex interweaving of the goal-directed activities of many individuals and groups, producing outcomes that are not specifically chosen or designed (Dopson, 2005).

Organisational developments, therefore, often involve unplanned and unforeseen consequences (van Iterson et al., 2002). Elias (1987) referred to these unplanned consequences as “blind social processes” (p. 99). In support of this contention, Mennell (1989) suggests that the knowledge people have of
their own place within their social and organisational networks “is virtually always imperfect, incomplete and inadequate” (p. 258). Moreover, strategies selected by people are often based on inadequate knowledge that can produce consequences which cannot fully be understood in advance (Mennell, 1989).

Accordingly, for this thesis, the researcher has selected an organisation (SOCOG) that had a short life cycle of approximately seven years, but was shaped by a number of other organisations with lengthier histories and traditions. This study centres on the management of the SOCOG Sport Program. It not only investigates the interdependent relations of this program with other internal and external organisations and entities, but also analyses how these relationships were shaped by both the intended and unintended consequences of organising the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games.

1.4 The Study

This thesis examined the role played by the AOC, in the formation and operation of SOCOG. The analysis specifically centres on the role of the AOC in the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. Senior managers who were responsible for the organisation and management of the SOCOG Sport Program were interviewed for this study in order to gain knowledge on how the intended actions of the AOC shaped the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games.

The organisational power that the AOC maintained within SOCOG is central to the research and is highlighted, specifically, through the formation of an agency within SOCOG, known as the SOCOG Sports Commission (SSC). The formation, establishment and influence of the autonomous SSC are investigated primarily through interviews conducted with SOCOG Sport Program managers and the interrogation of internal SOCOG documents. This approach allowed the researcher to consider how the Sydney Olympic figuration developed over time between the AOC, SOCOG and the New South
Wales (NSW) Government, in its function as the financial underwriter of the Games (NSW Government, 2002). The dynamic and fluid power relations that characterised the interdependent connections between these entities and the resultant impact on the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program are analysed thoroughly using an Eliasian processual theoretical framework.

In order to achieve the aims of this study the following research questions were designed and investigated.

*Research Question 1: How did the involvement of a host National Olympic Committee in the organisation of an Olympic Games influence the management of the Olympic Sport Program?*

*Research Question 1.1: What impact did the formation of the SOCOG Sports Commission have on the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games?*

*Research Question 1.2: How did the organisational power of the SOCOG Sport Program shape the management of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games?*

In addition to the data collected from interviews with former SOCOG Sport Program managers and the analysis of internal documents, the research is also informed through personal experience. The following section will explore the research context in greater detail.

### 1.5 Research Context

The premise for this study was conceived and influenced by organisational experience gained as a Sydney 2000 staff member. The researcher was employed by SOCOG and the Sydney 2000 Paralympic
Organising Committee (SPOC) from October 1998 to December 2000. The observations and experiences gained while working on both Games provided the inspiration and basis for this study. The researcher was a member of the SOCOG Sport Program, one of SOCOG’s largest organisational units. The role of the researcher within the organisation centred on sport competition planning and sport management for both Games. The position was designed specifically to ensure that the sport competition planning and the sport project management implemented for the Olympics were replicated for the Paralympics.

Through this position, over a two-year period the researcher observed the relationship the AOC had with SOCOG and the SOCOG Sport Program. During this time the researcher attended more than 300 Olympics-related meetings and was engaged regularly in both formal and informal discussions with many Olympic and Paralympic colleagues. Arising from this experience, the researcher made three particular observations. Firstly, the AOC possessed and utilised significant organisational power relations within SOCOG. Secondly, the influence and power relations that the AOC maintained within SOCOG impacted on how the SOCOG Sport Program was organised and managed. Thirdly, the SOCOG Sport Program appeared to be a relatively stable organisational unit with little internal tension or uncertainty, a characteristic that contrasted with some other organisational divisions within SOCOG.

This later observation was supported by a major Olympic agency restructure that took place in early 2000, prior to the commencement of the Games. The NSW Government statutory authority, the Olympic Coordination Authority (OCA), which had been formed to coordinate the building of Olympic venues, took control of the majority of SOCOG’s responsibilities. Through an Olympic agency restructure conducted by the NSW Government, the OCA, whose main concern up until this stage was venue planning and development, assumed authority and responsibility over most of SOCOG, with the significant exception of the SOCOG Sport Program, which remained under
the control of the SSC. The *Official Report of the Games of the XXVII Olympiad* explained this shift of control:

> To ensure accountability and to formalise arrangements, in August 2000 the appointment of the Director-General OCA to the position of Director-General of SOCOG provided clear authority to this position to manage all SOCOG staff and resources during the Games. The new position of Director-General SOCOG was intended to reinforce formal authority over SOCOG staff at Games time. (Toohey, 2001, p. 258)

In addition, as a result of this restructure a new agency with wide-ranging powers was constituted and made wholly responsible for the staging of the Sydney 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games, with the notable exception of the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program, which retained its mandate (Toohey, 2001). This newly created entity was named Sydney 2000.

### 1.5.1 Earlier Power Struggles

The strength of the AOC’s position within SOCOG can be traced back to an earlier contest for organisational control. This power struggle occurred during the lead up to the Sydney Games and involved the AOC and the NSW Government (Gordon, 2003; Publishing and Broadcasting Limited, 2001; Toohey, 2001). This disagreement would ultimately define and influence how the SOCOG Sport Program was organised and managed. The organisational power relations of the SOCOG Sport Program had its foundations back in the original negotiations that took place before the successful Olympic bid in 1993, between the then NSW Coalition Greiner Government and the AOC (Brabazon, 1999; Burroughs, 1999; Publishing and Broadcasting Limited, 2001). The contract terms and obligations that were determined in 1991 and 1993 enabled the AOC’s powerful position to be embedded within SOCOG, eventually resulting in the formation of the SSC (Toohey, 2001). The following
section explains in greater detail the specific role and legal authority of the AOC in the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games.

Table 1: Selected Olympic Stakeholders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder</th>
<th>Power within the Olympic Movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Host City / Host Government</td>
<td>“The official authority of the city and the NOC must guarantee that the Olympic Games will be organised to the satisfaction of and under the conditions required by the IOC” (IOC, 1997, p. 49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Olympic Committee (IOC)</td>
<td>The IOC is the “supreme authority of the Olympic Movement” (IOC, 1997, p. 10). Any individual or organisation that belongs to the Olympic Movement in any capacity “is bound by the provisions of the Olympic Charter and shall abide by the decisions of the IOC” (IOC, 1997, p. 10).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Sport Federations</td>
<td>The international sport federations have “responsibility for the technical control and direction of their sports at the Olympic Games” (IOC, 1997, p. 39).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Olympic Committees (NOC)</td>
<td>Under the Olympic Charter (1997, p. 40) an NOC has “exclusive powers for the representation” of the Olympic Movement within their country. The IOC also entrusts the host NOC with the duty of forming an OCOG (IOC, 1997).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (OCOG)</td>
<td>“The organisation of the Olympic Games is entrusted by the IOC to the NOC of the country of the host city as well as to the host city itself” (IOC, 1997, p. 51).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.5.2 The Role of the Host National Olympic Committee

The IOC, as the governing authority of the Olympic Movement, determines the roles and responsibilities for the various Olympic stakeholders and groups that are involved in the staging of the Games. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, these organisational groups include: the NOCs; the international sports federations; the sponsors; the athletes; the media; and the OCOGs. The different roles for each of these groups, as they relate to the celebration of the Olympic Games, are governed by the IOC, and codified in a document called the Olympic Charter. In terms of organising an Olympic Games, the Olympic Charter is reinforced through a further document called a Host City Contract. This contract is entered into by the host Olympic City and the IOC for each Olympic Games (IOC, 1993; Toohey & Veal, 2000).

The Olympic Charter is the codification of the fundamental principles, rules and bye-laws adopted by the IOC. It governs the organisation and operation of the Olympic Movement and stipulates the conditions for the celebrations of the Olympic Games. (IOC, 1997, p. 9)

In relation to the role of NOCs, the Olympic Charter stipulates they are required to “develop and protect the Olympic Movement in their respective countries” (1997, p. 40). NOCs are also required to “propagate the … principles of Olympism” at the national level and they “have the exclusive powers for the representation of their respective countries at the Olympic Games” (IOC, 1997, pp. 40–41). The Olympic Charter confers on NOCs the power and “authority to designate the city which may apply to organise” the Games in their respective countries (IOC, 1997, p. 41). Moreover, NOCs are also required to “work to maintain harmonious and cooperative relations with appropriate governmental bodies” (IOC, 1997, p. 41).
Accordingly, cities can only apply to stage an Olympic Games when they have gained the approval of their country’s NOC (IOC, 1997). The IOC entrusts the organisation of the Olympic Games both to the NOC of the host country and to the “host city”. The *Olympic Charter* states that “the NOC shall form, for that purpose, an Organising Committee which, from the time it is constituted, communicates directly with the IOC, from which it receives instructions” (IOC, 1997, p. 51). At that time the IOC also clearly stipulated that the financial underwriting and liabilities for staging an Olympics do not rest with them:

The NOC, the OCOG and the host city are jointly and severally liable for all commitments entered into individually or collectively concerning the organisation and staging of the Olympic Games, excluding the financial responsibility for the organisation and staging of such Games, which shall be entirely assumed jointly and severally by the host city and the OCOG, without prejudice to any liability of any other party, particularly as may result from any guarantee … The IOC shall have no financial responsibility whatsoever in respect thereof. (IOC, 1997, p. 52)

The *Olympic Charter* also stipulates the framework for establishing the membership of the OCOG Board (Baade & Matheson, 2002). The charter outlines that the OCOG Board shall include “the IOC member or members in the country; the President and Secretary General of the NOC; at least one member representing, and designated by, the host city” (IOC, 1997, p. 51). An OCOG Board may also include members of public authorities and “other leading figures” as defined by the Organising Committee (IOC, 1997, p. 51). Thus, host NOCs, while not the primary entity designated to organise an Olympic Games, are nevertheless critical stakeholders. Whilst the level of involvement of host NOCs, at past Olympic Games may have been mixed, it is
clear from the available evidence that in the case of the Sydney Olympic Games, the AOC was a central player (Gordon, 2003; Toohey, 2001).

In the *Official Report of the Games of the XXVII Olympiad*, the President of SOCOG and Olympic Minister for the NSW Government, Michael Knight, highlighted the importance of the AOC to the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. He stated that a major contributing factor to the success of the Games was the centrality of the AOC in its organisation. Knight commented:

> While many things contributed to the successful staging of the Olympic Games in Sydney, two things were fundamental to what has come to be called the "Sydney Model" for organising a Games. Firstly, the Government was central to the process. Not only did the Government of the State of New South Wales underwrite the Olympic Games financially, the public sector played the leading role in delivering the building program … Secondly, the Australian Olympic Committee was closely involved in the organising of the Games. The creation of an autonomous [SOCOG] Sports Commission, with strong AOC representation, which had direct control over preparations for the sporting competition and the management of the Athletes Village, was essential to Sydney fulfilling our commitment to put the athletes first. (Toohey, 2001, p. 97)

The following section will explore the history of the formation and development of the SSC.

**1.5.3 The Establishment of the SOCOG Sports Commission**

Not long after coming to power in 1995, the new NSW Labor Government closely examined the two existing Olympic contracts to which it was a signatory and was dissatisfied with the terms (Gordon, 2003). The
contracts had been entered into by the AOC and the previous NSW Liberal Government. However, according to the newly installed NSW Labor Government, the contracts contained negative financial consequences for the people of NSW (Burroughs, 1999; Cashman & Hughes, 1999; Gordon, 2003; Publishing and Broadcasting Limited, 2001). The first contract, the *Endorsement Contract*, was signed in 1991 by the AOC, the NSW Government and the City of Sydney (Brabazon, 1999). The second contract, the *Host City Contract*, was signed in 1993 by three parties, the AOC, the NSW Coalition Government and the City of Sydney (Brabazon, 1999).

The most contentious document was the Endorsement Contract, a contract which the IOC was not a signatory (Gordon, 2003). The Endorsement Contract maintained a clause that gave the AOC veto power over every item in the SOCOG budget (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 1999; Gordon, 2003). The NSW Labor Government Olympic Minister, Michael Knight, viewed the legal arrangements with the AOC as unbalanced and potentially untenable for two particular reasons (Brabazon, 1999). Firstly, it meant that the financial dealings of SOCOG and their general day-to-day operations were marred by operational uncertainty (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 1999). Secondly, the terms of the contract were asymmetrical and thus overly skewed in favour of the AOC (Brabazon, 1999). A clause in the Host City Contract, for instance, stated that all profits generated from the Games would be split between the AOC and the IOC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 1999; McGeoch & Korporaal, 1994). The AOC would receive 90% of any profits, while the remaining 10% would go to the IOC. As the NSW Government was underwriting the Games, understandably it was disturbed by the high level of financial risk it was assuming under these contracts (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 1999).

As a result of the Government’s dissatisfaction with the two contract clauses, Michael Knight began arguing publicly with the AOC President, John Coates, about the fairness and equity of the contractual arrangements
(Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 1999). After several months and a great deal of discussion, the matter was settled, resulting in a contractual “buyout” (Frawley & Toohey, 2005; Gordon, 2003; Publishing and Broadcasting Limited, 2001; Toohey, 2001), whereby the NSW Government agreed to pay the AOC approximately A$90 million at the completion of the Olympic Games (Brabazon, 1999; Gordon, 2003; Publishing and Broadcasting Limited, 2001).

The agreed settlement resulted in the AOC returning to the NSW Government budgetary control of SOCOG and the rights to any future SOCOG profits (Publishing and Broadcasting Limited, 2001). However, an additional element of the settlement that favoured the AOC was the establishment of a separate entity within SOCOG that was solely responsible for the planning and organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program (Toohey, 2001; SOCOG, 2000b). This separate entity, known as the SOCOG Sports Commission (SSC), was controlled by AOC personnel. The President of the AOC, John Coates, suggested to the Olympics Minister Michael Knight that a commission responsible for the organisation of Olympic sport, responsible for all SOCOG sport-specific and sport-related planning and management, was a requirement in any contractual settlement. Coates’ stated reason for forming this agency was as follows:

I was concerned that the SOCOG Board wasn’t giving any attention to sport … The sporting side wasn’t being reported on, there was no direction, people running the Games at that stage didn’t come from a sporting background … So, I said I wanted a sports commission of SOCOG established under my chairmanship, with AOC majority representation, and for it to be delegated the responsibilities for running sport, with the budget. He [Knight] understood that made good sense, and his first reaction was to say, “I want someone on the committee”. I said, “Well, Graham’s [Richardson] been Minister for
Sport”. Richardson became the Knight nominee. (Gordon, 2003, pp. 62–63)

The SOCOG Board carried the motion to establish the SSC on 5 June 1996, with only one board member, the City of Sydney Mayor Frank Sartor, dissenting (Toohey, 2001). The new agreement, while delivering financial and operational certainty to the NSW Government and SOCOG, nevertheless remained advantageous to the AOC. On the day that the new agreement was signed, Coates suggested it was the “most significant day in the history of the AOC” (Gordon, 2003, p. 64).

1.5.4 The SSC and SOCOG Sport Program Operations

Through the establishment of the SSC, members of the AOC gained control of the organisation charged with overseeing the management of the SOCOG Sport Program (Gordon, 2003). The SSC, rather than the SOCOG Board, had assumed responsibility for organising and managing all sport-related and sport-specific activities at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games (see Appendix 1). Within SOCOG, the SSC maintained authority for the management of a range of sport-specific organisational activity. This included responsibility for: sport competition (including test events and competition scheduling); sport policy and operations (including sports equipment and freight, sport publications and training venues); sport services (including sport entries and sport presentation); IF relations; NOC relations; and IOC relations (including the management of the IOC Coordination Commission) (SOCOG, 2000b).

The SSC also had oversight of sport-related functions managed by other SOCOG programs outside of the SOCOG Sport Program. Part of the SSC’s role was to ensure that the relevant non-sport SOCOG programs implemented the requirements of the SOCOG Sport Program in accordance with the AOC’s agreement with the NSW Government (Langton, 2000). Examples of these
programs and responsibilities include: human resources (with regard to sport competition volunteers); marketing (with regard to test events and sports equipment sponsorship); facilities (with regard to the field of play and training venues); villages (with regard to athletes, team officials and technical officials); medical (with regard to athletes and officials); transport (with regard to athletes and officials); accreditation (with regard to athletes and officials); accommodation (with regard to athletes, officials and test events); security (with regard to athletes and officials), ticketing (with regard to the scheduling of competition); technology (with regard to scoring, timing and results systems); broadcasting (with regard to the field of play and athlete press conferences); ceremonies (with regard to athletes); and Olympic family (with regard to language services and customs) (SOCOG, 2000b).

While previous OCOGs had managed to put in place specific and dedicated Sport Program sub-committees (for example, the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games), whose remit centred on the organisation of sport, few if any had a structure with such broad organisational powers and responsibilities as the SSC, with its authority enshrined in NSW legislation (Toohey, 2001). This point was confirmed by a senior SOCOG official interviewed as part of this study, who stated that the SSC had,

total power, because the [SOCOG] Sports Commission was an autonomous body having full control over all decisions relating to the organisation and conduct of [s]port and athletes under an agreed charter of responsibility. With the only exception being with the budget, and that the overall budget for [s]port had to be approved by the SOCOG Board. After that, the [SOCOG] Sports Commission had the right to use that budget as it wished without exceeding it, and it had total autonomy so I think it was a first in that regard. (Respondent 05)
The formation of the SSC and its impact on the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program at the Sydney Olympics is a central concern of the thesis. The following section provides a brief overview of how the thesis is structured.

### 1.6 Thesis Outline

The thesis is organised into six chapters. A summary of these chapters is presented in Table 1 (see below). Chapter One has introduced the study and outlined the broad context of the SOCOG Sport Program at the Sydney 2000 Olympics Games. Chapter Two reviews the mega-sport event literature, examining empirical studies of the Olympic Games and similar mega-sport events and exploring their external and internal organisational characteristics. Through this analysis the researcher attempts to identify gaps in the mega-sport event literature, specifically as it relates to the organisation of sport at the Olympic Games.

Chapter Three outlines the theoretical framework employed in this study, justifying and describing the selection of a processual analytical framework for the study. As noted above, the chosen approach is based on the work of sociologist Norbert Elias and is supported by more recent organisational research published by Stewart Clegg, Sue Dopson, Bent Flyvbjerg, Tim Newton, and Dennis Smith. The chapter is structured around three key sections. The first explores the development of process sociology. The second outlines the practice of process sociology. The third describes the application of process sociology in this study.

This theoretical framework provides a platform for understanding organisational change by combining the analysis of internal and external organisational influences within a wider social and historical context (van Iterson et al., 2002). Four key features of a process sociological approach are
utilised in the chapter. The first is the argument that the consequences of combined human activity often result in unintended or unplanned outcomes (Elias, 1994). Second, humans and their social world are viewed as an interdependent network of shifting power relations (van Krieken, 1998). Third, the longer-term historical processes of social development and change can be considered and utilised when conducting process sociology, as applied to the study of organisation studies (Newton, 2001). Fourth, the analysis of dynamic and fluid power relations is central to all social and organisational research (Clegg et al., 2006; Clegg, Hardy & Nord, 1996; Dopson, 2001; Newton & Smith, 2002; van Iterson et al., 2002).

Chapter Four outlines the research methodology chosen for the study. The study employs a qualitative case study approach. The advantages and disadvantages of utilising such an approach are discussed in detail. The data-collection methods undertaken for the study are outlined and explained. The approach selected for the data analysis is also provided. Furthermore, the appropriateness and effectiveness of conducting in-depth interviews, participant observation and the use of organisational documents will be highlighted and debated.

Chapter Five presents the findings emerging from the collected data. In this chapter, using the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter Three, a qualitative interpretation of the study results is applied. Finally, Chapter Six concludes the thesis, drawing on the data analysis presented in Chapter Five. This final chapter also examines the implications of the research for future Olympics organisers and host NOCs. The chapter outlines the researcher’s final reflections and thoughts on the study and how the results of the analysis answered the presented research questions. Drawing from the relevant conclusions emerging from the study, the chapter describes the main contribution made by the research. Finally, the chapter proposes an agenda for future Olympic sport organisation research.
As outlined earlier in this thesis, the study has some limitations. These limitations are discussed in the following section.
### Table 2: Research Objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Stage</th>
<th>Objectives of the Research Stage</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Chapter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stage I - Reviewing and Framing</strong></td>
<td>• To discuss and describe the Olympic Games as a mega-project&lt;br&gt;• To discuss and describe the empirical studies conducted into the Olympic Games&lt;br&gt;• To identify gaps in the Olympic and mega-sport event literature&lt;br&gt;• To clarify the aims and objectives of the research as developed from the mega-sport event literature</td>
<td>Review relevant literature</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of Literature</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical Framework</td>
<td>• To develop a specific theoretical framework for this study&lt;br&gt;• To explain the choice of a process sociological approach&lt;br&gt;• To discuss the power and organisations literature&lt;br&gt;• To outline how framework is applied to this study&lt;br&gt;• To clarify the aims and objectives of the research as developed from the theoretical framework</td>
<td>Examine relevant literature</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stage II - Research Methods</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>• To identify the most appropriate research design in order to achieve the research objectives&lt;br&gt;• To discuss the qualitative case study methodology selected for the study&lt;br&gt;• To explore the strengths and limits of the adopted research strategy&lt;br&gt;• To explain how the qualitative data will be analysed and verified</td>
<td>Examine relevant literature</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stage III - Data Analysis</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Analysis</td>
<td>• To present the primary data collected from the empirical research&lt;br&gt;• To describe the main themes that emerged from the presented data&lt;br&gt;• To describe and examine the emerging themes from the perspective of the selected theoretical framework</td>
<td>Interviews, documents and observations</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stage IV - Conclusions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Overall summary of research</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions and Implications</td>
<td>• To develop overall conclusions&lt;br&gt;• To reiterate notable research findings&lt;br&gt;• To describe potential areas for future research</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.7 Limitations

There are a number of limitations associated with this study. Firstly, there is a 30-year embargo on a large number of internal SOCOG documents (i.e. SOCOG Board minutes) imposed by the NSW Government. Secondly, there is a time lag associated with this study. The qualitative interviews were conducted following the completion of the Olympic Games, and not during or immediately after the Games. This time lag can generate problems with respondent memory and the ability to recall certain events (Veal, 2006). Thirdly, the researcher was personally involved in the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. Some management researchers may suggest that this is a negative feature of this study; however, others such as Flyvbjerg (2001) argue that this approach makes the research stronger and more meaningful. Each of these issues is discussed in further detail in Chapter Four.

1.7.1 Delimitations

The scope of this study was clearly focused on exploring the involvement of a host NOC in the organisation of an Olympic Games. It was not possible for this study to address the whole and total complexity bound up in the organisation of an Olympic Games. With greater resources and time the delimitations of the study could have been extended to explore the involvement of other stakeholders such as the IOC and the international sport federations. Exploration of the involvement of these stakeholders in the staging of the Olympic Games is a fertile area for future research. (While data was not collected directly from national or international sport federations for this study, it is noted in Chapter Four that a number of respondents that took part in this study maintained other Olympic Movement leadership roles with these organisations in addition to being affiliated with SOCOG. For instance, at the time of the Sydney Games six respondents maintained positions on international sport federations executive boards while four respondents held the position of president of a national sport federation).
1.8 Conclusion

The organisation and staging of an Olympic Games is a complex activity involving a large number of stakeholder groups and individuals. This thesis explores the role played by the AOC in the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. The study examines the impact of the formation of the SSC on the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program. The research also investigates the impact of the SSC on the organisation and management of the SOCOG Sport Program and examines whether the strong organisational power relations maintained by the AOC, through the establishment of the SSC, assisted the management of the SOCOG Sport Program and in effect made sport a higher priority than it might otherwise have been.

The analysis of the use of organisational power involving the AOC and the NSW Government is a central feature of this study. The dynamic and interdependent organisational network involving SOCOG, the AOC, and the NSW Government and the resultant formation of the SSC is viewed and analysed using Elias’s concept of social figurations. Rather than considering organisational situations and developments in static terms, Eliasian theory recognises that social–historical context is connected not only to the past but also the present (Elias, 1994). The organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games therefore was the result of both recent developments and countless social and organisational (Olympic) figurations that had been shaped over many years prior to Sydney’s successful bid to stage the Games in 2000. In this regard, when analysing the organisation of a mega-sport event like the Olympic Games, both the planned and unplanned organisational outcomes need to be examined.

In attempting to address the specific research questions, a multi-methodological approach was employed. The approach involved collecting data from three particular sources in order to inform the study. Firstly, data were collected and analysed from internal organisational documents as well as
primary and secondary external documentary sources. Secondly, the analysis was informed by organisational practices that were observed by the researcher as an organisational insider from 1998 through to 2001. Thirdly, the researcher conducted in-depth interviews with former SOCOG senior and middle managers responsible for organising the SOCOG Sport Program.

In summary, the researcher has conducted a study that attempts to make a valuable contribution to the sport organisation studies’ body of knowledge, specifically in relation to knowledge of staging mega-sport events like the Olympic Games. The research has management implications for the IOC and future host NOCs, particularly in relation to OCOG organisational design and governance. In the past, little research has been conducted on the role of the host NOC in the staging of the Olympic Games; this study attempts to start filling this gap.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to review the Olympic Games and mega-sport event literature. The review is especially concerned with research conducted into the staging and management of these types of events. The chapter describes and analyses the empirical studies that have been conducted into the organisation of the Olympic Games and related mega-sport events. Today, the Olympic literature, in particular, is extensive. Over the past three decades the growth in Olympic studies and Olympics-related research has grown substantially (Toohey & Veal, 2007). For instance, the Olympic Bibliography compiled by Veal and Toohey (2008) contains approximately 2000 Olympics-related references. Further, a search of Google Scholar in May 2009, using the term “Olympic Games” presented 77,000 references. In this context, the purpose of this chapter is not to review all these materials but to focus on the research that has been conducted that is tied to the organisation and management of the Olympic Games and mega-sport events.

To achieve this aim the chapter is divided into five sections. The first section is divided into two parts. The first part examines how mega-sport events have been defined while the second part examines the project features of a mega-sport event using the Olympic Games as the main example. The second section explores the transformation of the Olympic Games from being a European-centric occasion to a truly global mega-sport event. This section is presented in five distinct but interrelated parts. These five parts examine the following areas: the growth of the Olympic Games; the development of the Paralympic Games in alignment with the Olympic Games; the media coverage of the Olympic Games; the ambulatory feature of the Olympic Games; and the process of bidding to stage an Olympic Games.

The third section of the chapter explores the external consequences of hosting mega-sport events. This section explores studies conducted over the past three decades that have examined the social, economic and political
consequences of hosting an event such as the Olympic Games. The fourth section examines the role of stakeholders in the organisation of mega-sport events. Within this section the organisational literature on uncertainty and the roles of external forces is explored in the context of mega-sport events. This section also outlines the applicability of Eliasian organisational sociology when examining mega-sport event stakeholder power relations. The fifth section of the chapter explores studies that have been conducted into the internal organising characteristics of mega-sport events. Within this section recent studies are reviewed exploring mega-sport events from the perspective of organisational culture, project ownership, the intended and unintended consequences of strategic planning, risk management, knowledge management, and the organisational impact stakeholders have on the management of mega-sport events.

2.2 Defining Mega-Sport Events

Malfas, Theodoraki and Houlihan (2004) argue that mega-sport events are defined by two central characteristics. The first relates to the external organising features that shape mega-sport events. These include organisational aspects such as: the level of media attention generated by the event; the attractiveness of the event to international tourists; and the types of impacts that occur from hosting the event (Cashman, 2006; Jones, 2001; Malfas et al., 2004). The second characteristic centres on the internal organisational features of mega-sport events. This encompasses the elements that influence the overall complexity of the mega-sport event, for example, organising aspects such as the scope and scale of the event, the time-line and duration of the event, and the number of athletes and fans that are attracted to the event (Chappelet & Bayle, 2005; Malfas et al., 2004; Masterman, 2004; Sterken, 2006; Theodoraki, 2007).

Other mega-sport event researchers have also highlighted the internal and external characteristics that influence the organisation of these events.
Horne and Manzenreiter (2006), for instance, describe mega-sport events as events that are large enough in size and scale to impact national economies as well as having the ability to generate significant international media coverage. Likewise, Roche (2000) argues that mega-sport events are often “large-scale” and have “a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance” (p. 1), while Waitt (2001), drawing on the work of Harvey (1989), states that mega-sport events like “the Olympics … generate a euphoric mass consciousness through the excitement, civic achievement and party syndrome associated with the occasion” (p. 251).

2.2.1 The Olympic Games as a Project

The Olympic Games is not only a mega-sport event; it can also be considered a “mega-project”. Leonardsen (2007) states that “the modern Olympic Games have become an illustrative case for what have become known as the terms ‘mega event’ or ‘mega project’” (p. 11). To date, while the project-management literature and the event-management literature are viewed as largely separate and distinct academic fields, each with their own professional journals, more recently mega-sport event researchers have increasingly been informed by both categories of knowledge (Gold & Gold, 2008; Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006; Leonardsen, 2007). For this study, it is therefore important to examine both the event and project characteristics of mega-sport events in order to garner a deeper understanding of these temporary organisations.

Projects are often described in the following manner. Firstly, they are considered an organisational activity that has “a specific finite task” (Meredith & Mantel, 1989, p. 4). Secondly, projects are a “once only” activity established to achieve a clearly defined temporally-bound set of goals and objectives (Meredith & Mantel, 1989). Thirdly, projects are often “divided into subtasks that must be accomplished in order to achieve the project goals” (Meredith & Mantel, 1989, p. 4).
Lowendahl (1995), drawing on Packerdorff (1994), further argues that projects “are typically time constrained, resource constrained, oriented towards a specific and predefined goal, and involve a complex or interdependent set of activities” (p. 347). The organisation of an Olympic Games from this perspective can be considered a “typical project, in the sense that it is time-constrained (with an absolute and non-negotiable delivery date), resource constrained as to both total budget and number of employees, goal oriented, highly complex and cross functional” (Lowendahl, 1995, p. 348).

Lowendahl (1995) suggests that successful project organisation is highlighted by a number of management characteristics. These include: the clarity of direction and the leadership provided by the managers of the project; the establishment of performance measures and indicators; effective management that ensures the established measures are achieved; and, that the coordination of the project especially achieves the central indicators of timing, cost and quality. In relation to project timing, Meredith and Mantel (1989) argue that projects often operate in an organisational lifecycle that is shaped by their time-dependent characteristics. Most projects, for instance, have a starting phase, a growing phase, a declining phase and a termination phase (Meredith & Mantel, 1989).

In addition to the internal-management characteristics of projects, it is also important to note that their organisational lifecycle often unfolds interdependently with other organisations or institutions, many of whom continue to operate post project completion (van Iterson et al., 2002). For example, projects are often completed and managed under the auspices of a parent organisation, which may be responsible for managing a number of projects simultaneously (Meredith & Mantel, 1989). The IOC, as the parent and governing body of the Olympic Movement, for instance, at any one point in time is responsible for overseeing the organisation of multiple Olympic Games (Toohey & Veal, 2007). The complexity and challenges of managing
multiple projects at any one point in time is often fertile ground for organisational tensions to develop (Flyvbjerg, 1998). As outlined by Lowendahl (1995), projects are often characterised by “conflict over project resources and leadership roles when it comes to solving project problems” (p. 348).

In summary, the synthesising of the mega-sport event and the project-management literature suggests that mega-sport events are shaped and influenced by a range of internal and external organisational characteristics. These characteristics include external elements such as media exposure, tourism attraction and event impacts and legacies (i.e. social, economic and environmental). Internal organisational features include the size and scale of the event (i.e. number of athletes, fans, employees, etc.), the event duration, the available event resources, the goals and objectives of the event, the effectiveness and leadership of the event-management team, and the interdependence of the event organisers on other stakeholders.

These features and their relevance to the organisation of the Olympic Games are explored throughout this literature review. In order to provide further contextual detail, the next section of this chapter examines specifically the factors that have led to the growth of the Olympic Games over the past century, changing from a largely European-centric gathering into the mega-sport and global event it is today.

2.3 The Transformation of the Olympic Games

A key feature of the modern Olympic Games, since it was first staged in Athens in 1896, is that it has been staged in many different cities and nations around the world (Young & Wamsley, 2005). While the early Summer Olympic Games were staged between the continents of Europe and North America, the event has rarely been staged in the same continent consecutively (Toohey & Veal, 2007). This sharing of the Games across nations and
continents, especially over the past 50 years, is a key reason why the Games have become increasingly popular (Preuss, 2007). The Summer Olympics of 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008, for example, were all staged in different continents. In this way the Olympic Games can be described as an ambulatory mega-sport event in that they are continually moving from one global location and cultural context to another (Cashman, 2006; Roche, 2000; Toohey & Veal, 2000).

2.3.1 The Growth of the Olympic Games

The important work of Olympic historian Alan Guttmann (2002) suggests that the transformation of the Olympic Games from a sport event into a mega-sport event did not occur overnight. Rather, the event developed and changed at various speeds over time. For example, the early organisers of the Olympic Games did not always have access to or the ability to generate substantial financial resources. Consequently, a number of the early Olympics utilised existing stadia and infrastructure and in some cases were held in conjunction with other large-scale events, such as the World Fairs (Guttmann, 2002; Roche, 2000). In more recent years, however, as the Olympic Games have grown in size and scale, the task of managing the project has become much more challenging (Chappelet, 2002; Horne & Manrenreiter, 2004, 2006; Roche, 2000; Toohey & Veal, 2007).

The past three decades have witnessed an increase in not only the number of sports contested at the Games but also a significant increase in the number of participating athletes (Toohey & Veal, 2000, 2007). For example, the organisers of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games provided facilities and services for more than 10,000 athletes, who competed across 28 sports for 300 gold medals (SOCOG, 2000b; Toohey, 2001). In comparison, the 1896 Athens Olympic Games consisted of 241 (male) athletes who competed across nine sports for 43 Gold Medals (IOC, 2008). Table 2 (see below) illustrates the rate
of growth of the Olympics between the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games and
the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games.

Table 3: The Growth of the Summer Olympic Games (1984-2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Olympics</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Athletes</th>
<th>Sports</th>
<th>Medal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>6797</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>8465</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>9367</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>10320</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>10651</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Theodoraki, Malfas & Houlihan (2005, p. 85)

2.3.2 The Olympic and Paralympic Games

A more recent factor that has influenced the size and scale of organising
and hosting the Games, as well as the increasing complexity of the task faced
by Olympic host cities, is the responsibility for organising both the Olympic
and Paralympic Games (Cashman & Darcy, 2008). Since 1988, the Olympic
Games and the Paralympic Games have been staged together with the
Paralympics, which start approximately ten days after the Olympic Closing
Ceremony (Toohey, 2001). This dual mega-sport event organisation has been
strengthened in recent years, with the IOC and the International Paralympic
Committee (IPC) signing an agreement to continue their alliance (Cashman &
Darcy, 2008).

As a result of the dual event organisation, Olympic organisers now
provide facilities and venues that have the capacity to service both mega-
events. The organisers are required to provide approximately 28 Olympic sport
competition venues, while also ensuring that approximately 18 Paralympic
sports can be staged either in the venues built for the Olympics or in additional
and specifically designed Paralympic facilities (Cashman & Darcy, 2008).
Apart from the sport competition venues, a range of non-sport facilities needs
to be provided for both Games, including infrastructure such as the Athletes Village, the Officials Village, the Media Village, the Main Press Centre and the Broadcasting Centre (Toohey, 2001).

2.3.3 The Olympic Games and Media Exposure

Another concomitant feature that highlights the growth of the Olympic Games and mega-sport events is the area of media coverage. In recent years media coverage has been increasingly researched (Rowe, 1999; Whannel, 2005). Evidence of the “mass” global interest in an event like the Olympic Games is highlighted by the size of the international television audiences that consume the fortnight of international sport competition (Toohey & Veal, 2007; Whannel, 2005; Young & Wamsley, 2005). For example, the Athens 2004 Olympic Games attracted a television audience of approximately 3.9 billion people, making it one of the largest sport or non-sport events watched anywhere in the world in 2004 (IOC, 2005). In addition to the Olympic Games, other mega-sport events that have attracted large media audiences include the Football World Cup, the Rugby Union World Cup, the Cricket World Cup, the World Championships of Athletics, the World Swimming Championships, and larger regional competitions such as the Pan-American Games, the European Football Championships, the Asian Games and the Commonwealth Games (Horne & Manrenreiter, 2006).

With the increase in media interest in mega-sport events in recent years, partly as a consequence of the development and availability of new broadcast technologies, the flow of capital invested in such events, via sponsorship and media rights fees, has risen significantly (Maguire, 1999; Roche, 2000; Rowe, 1999; Solberg, 2007). Due to this investment and the corresponding media exposure, the “owners” of such mega-sport events have been placed under pressure to ensure the projects organised and delivered are professional and of a high standard (Cashman, 2006; Leonardsen, 2007). As illustrated by Leonardsen (2007), “the amount of investment as well as the international
media focus devoted to the Games has risen dramatically during the last 15–20 years, which, in turn, has generated a need for increased professionalisation” (p. 11).

2.3.4 The Quadrennial and Ambulatory Aspects of the Olympic Games

As outlined earlier in the chapter, another characteristic of the Olympic Games and other mega-sport events is that they are often staged in different nations and cities (Hall, 1992). More precisely, the history of the Modern Olympic Games (unlike the history of the Ancient Olympic Games) highlights the unique fact that no one nation has ever had the sole right to stage the event consecutively for a period of time (Toohey & Veal, 2007). Over the past three decades, newly established mega-sport events such as the Rugby Union World Cup and the Cricket World Cup have followed the Olympic and Football World Cup model and instituted ambulatory organisational hosting arrangements (Horne & Manrenreiter, 2006; Preuss & Solberg, 2006).

Gold and Gold (2008) argue that it is important for those with the organisational responsibility for such projects to understand the consequences of this ambulatory movement. While the movement of such events is likely to present different challenges to different host cities (Cashman, 2006), Halbwirth and Toohey (2001) suggest that key organisational lessons and planning knowledge can be transferred from one Olympic organiser to the next. Gold and Gold (2008) also argue that those with the management responsibility for such events “inevitably face a steep learning curve by virtue of having to assemble from scratch the teams required to bring the Games to fruition” (p. 303).

Thus, from an organisational perspective, the ambulatory nature of mega-sport events means that the majority of the personnel responsible for the management of such events change from event to event (Cashman, 2006; Toohey & Veal, 2007). This is in contrast to other large-scale sport events such
as the Wimbledon Tennis Open or the French Tennis Open, which are staged in the same location year after year. Sport events that have a static geographic home are likely to have an organisational advantage, in comparison to ambulatory mega-sport events, in that they tend to be managed by a central group of employees and contractors, which enables the event organising committee to “utilise well-established sets of practices” (Gold & Gold, 2008, p. 302). As a result, over time the organisers can build organisational capacity and effective processes and methods of operation, as well as establishing a knowledgeable workforce and volunteer network.

2.3.5 Bidding to Host the Olympic Games

Due to the international popularity of many ambulatory mega-sport events, the governing bodies who “own” these events usually require nations or cities to bid in order to gain the rights to host (Theodoraki, 2007). As outlined in Chapter One, the IOC, as the governing body with authority for the Olympic Games, has the responsibility for awarding the Games to bidding cities (Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006; Toohey & Veal, 2007). After the IOC has awarded the hosting rights, ostensibly the “primary responsibility for financing and organising the event rests with the host” (Gold & Gold, 2008, p. 302).

According to Masterman (2004), the notion of bidding to stage a mega-sport event is a relatively recent phenomenon. Prior to the staging of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games the term “bidding” was rarely used by the governing bodies of mega-sport events (Masterman, 2004). However, today the global competition to stage these events has become increasingly intense and political (Emery, 2002). Toohey and Veal (2007) suggest that the emergence of this competitive intensity can be traced back to the highly successful staging of the Los Angeles Games. These particular Games were the first mega-sport event to generate a “mega” profit of more than US$225 million (Preuss, 2000). This financial success was achieved through sound management and a low
business cost model, combined with the sale of significant sponsorship and television broadcast rights (Toohey & Veal, 2007).

The global interest in hosting mega-sport events in recent years is evidenced by the cities that have placed bids to stage the Olympic Games. For instance, over the past two decades, Athens, Atlanta, Beijing, London, Sydney and Vancouver have all submitted and won bids to host the Olympic Games. Conversely, cities such as Madrid, New York, Paris and Toronto have bid unsuccessfully to stage the Games. Waitt (2001) suggests that to understand the increasing interest shown by governments and corporations in mega-sport events it is important to examine the wider and interdependent global context. From this perspective, it is important to note that since the 1980s global capitalism has gathered speed, bringing about dramatic change throughout the world, especially in parts of Europe and Asia (Maguire, 1999; Waitt, 2001). Entwined in this commercial growth has been the emergence of mass information and communication technologies (Rowe, 1999). These new technologies have enabled global corporations, through sport sponsorship and advertising, to expand their businesses into many growing international marketplaces (Maguire, 1999; Rowe, 1999).

In light of this media interest, Booth (2005) argues that one of the main political responses governments seek from hosting mega-sport events is recognition. Through such an approach governments can use the event to generate publicity as a method of reinforcing their political values and ambitions, whether they are domestically or internationally motivated (Cashman & Hughes, 1999; Young & Wamsley, 2005). It is also worth noting that the social benefits often sought from hosting a mega-sport event can be difficult to untangle from the broader political motivations of the host government (Horne & Manzenreiter, 2002, 2006). For example, the social benefits regularly noted by the promoters of mega-sport events state that they have the ability to boost civic pride and increase sport participation opportunities (Cashman, 2006; Toohey & Veal, 2007).
From an economic standpoint, the benefits sought by those bidding to stage mega-sport events often include economic development, employment creation, and the exporting of goods and services, including international tourism (Ingerson, 2001; Preuss, 2000). Progressively, the economic rationale provided by governments for investing in such mega-sport events has centred more heavily on the concept of destination marketing (Funk, Toohey & Bruun, 2007; Waitt, 1999, 2001). Roche (1994, 1999) in particular suggests that many governments have attempted to utilise these occasions to drive a variety of local infrastructure developments, predominantly in order to increase tourism arrivals and therefore tourism revenues (thus, projects such as the upgrade or construction of new airports and rapid transit systems are completed).

2.4 The Consequences of Hosting Mega-Sport Events

Apart from examining the rationale behind why cities and nations bid to stage mega-sport events, a considerable stream of research has explored the consequences and resulting impacts that derive from hosting such events (Cashman, Toohey, Darcy, Symons & Stewart, 2004). For example, Lesjo (2000) argues that hosting the Olympic Games can create “considerable turbulence” (p. 282) for the host community. Hiller, commenting on the 1988 Calgary Winter Olympic Games, stated that “landmark events are seldom embraced as ‘windows of opportunity’ without opposition” (1990, p. 120). Over the past quarter of a century, an ever-broadening range of studies has explored the economic, social, political and environmental consequences of hosting the Olympic Games (Cashman et al., 2004; Fuller & Clinch, 2000; Hiller, 2000; Kemp, 2002).

Numerous studies focussing on the economic impact and legacy of staging the Olympic Games have been undertaken, for example, those conducted by Pyo, Cook and Howell (1988), Hiller (1989), Hughes (1993), Kang and Perdue (1994), Miguelez and Carrasquer (1995), Brunet (1995), Hall
and Hodges (1998), Beaty (1999), Stevens and Bevan (1999), Preuss (2000, 2005), Gratton and Henry (2001) and Whitson and Horne (2006). A number of these studies have outlined the negative economic impacts associated with hosting an Olympic Games. Pyo, Cook and Howell (1988) and Kang and Perdue (1994) found that tourism demand does not automatically increase as a consequence of hosting the Olympics. Furthermore, the economic consequences associated with the rise in housing and rental costs in Olympic cities have been examined by Hall and Hodges (1998) and Beaty (1999). In addition, Whitson and Horne (2006), drawing on the example of Montreal and the 1976 Olympic Games, highlighted how economic forecasts often overestimate the prospective benefits, while underestimating the potential downside risks in hosting an Olympic Games.

Other studies have discussed the positive economic consequences associated with hosting an Olympic Games (De Moragas & Botela, 1995). Studies examining the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games by Miguelez and Carrasquer (1995) found that employment increased (albeit temporary employment) as a result of hosting the Games. Likewise, Brunet (1995) commented on the Barcelona Games, stating that the rate of unemployment in Barcelona fell from 18.4% to 9.6% during the period of the Games preparations. More recent research on the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games, completed by Stevens and Bevan (1999), found that the City of Atlanta increased its tourism activity as a consequence of hosting the Games. (A summary of the findings from these economic studies is provided below in Table 3).
Table 4: Economic Impact Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author/s</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Summary of findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pyo, Cook &amp; Howell</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>The overall tourism impact of hosting the Olympic Games from the years 1964 to 1984 was negative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiller</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>The study claimed that the Calgary 1988 Winter Olympic Games organisers made overly positive predictions of the economic impact of hosting the Games.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hughes</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Staging an Olympic Games in a city with high unemployment and little infrastructure is likely to be more economically beneficial than for a city with low unemployment and existing infrastructure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miguelez &amp; Carrasquer</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>The staging of the 1992 Olympic Games generated employment growth for the City of Barcelona. However, most of the jobs created were temporary positions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunet</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Between 1986 and 1992, the rate of unemployment in Barcelona fell from 18.4% to 9.6%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hall &amp; Hodges</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Hosting the Olympic Games can impact local housing markets. Using the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games as a case study, the authors suggest that governments often compulsory acquire land for the building of Games infrastructure, thus placing upward pressure on local rental and housing markets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beaty</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Approximately 15,000 public housing residents were evicted from their Atlanta homes to make way for Olympic infrastructure. The research also argued that public funds, amounting to approximately US$350 million, were diverted from low-income public housing and low-income social services to Olympic-related projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stevens &amp; Bevan</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Hosting the 1996 Olympic Games generated increased tourism activity for the City of Atlanta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preuss</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>The economic impact of staging an Olympic Games is often determined by the broader economic cycle. For instance, cities that stage a Games at a time when they have economic weaknesses often do better than those cities that stage the Games at a time of economic strength.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gratton &amp; Henry</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Not enough research has been undertaken that investigates the final and intermediate economic inputs and outputs that result from hosting mega-sport events.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whitson &amp; Horne</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Since the staging of the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games, there has been a significant gap between the forecasts and the actual economic impacts of hosting mega-sport events.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Research on the social consequences of hosting the Olympic Games has been conducted by Ritchie (1984), Kidd (1992), Cox, Darcy and Bounds (1994), Truno (1995), De Guevara, Coller and Romani (1995), Essex and Chalkley (1998), Cox (1999), Stevens and Bevan (1999), Hooper (2001), and Madrigal, Bee and LaBarge (2005). Many of these studies report on the positive elements and impacts that have resulted from hosting the Olympic Games. For example, research conducted by Hooper (2001), Ritchie (1984) and Truno (1995) has claimed that hosting an Olympic Games can lead to increased sport participation. A study by Kidd (1992) argued that despite the financial problems of the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games, the event still produced positive social outcomes for the host community.

Results of research by De Guevara et al. (1995) and Madrigal et al. (2005) displayed the positive benefits that extensive media coverage of the Olympics brings to a host city. Essex and Chalkley (1998) and Stevens and Bevan (2001) argue that staging mega-sport events can boost the civic pride of the host population. From a negative perspective, however, research conducted by Cox et al. (1994) highlighted the negative consequences for low-cost housing as a result of hosting an Olympic Games. An overview of each of these studies is presented below in Table 4.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author/s</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Summary of findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ritchie</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Hosting an Olympic Games can increase community interest in sport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidd</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>The hosting of the 1976 Olympic Games had positive social consequences for the people of Montreal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox, Darcy &amp; Bounds</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Approximately 400 homeless people were “supervised” and “controlled” by local authorities during the staging of the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truno</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Female sport participation increased in Spain, from 35% in 1989 to 45% in 1995. The author argues that extensive media coverage of outdoor and sport activities over the period of preparations for the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games may have contributed to this participation increase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Guevara, Coller &amp; Romani</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>The media coverage of the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games highlighted the positive features of Catalonia culture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essex &amp; Chalkley</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Hosting mega-sport events can boost regional communities as well as generating community spirit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stevens &amp; Bevan</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Hosting the 1996 Olympic Games generated significant civic pride for the people of Atlanta. Ninety-three percent of people surveyed stated that the Games were a positive for their community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hooper</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Increased sport participation can be generated through the hosting of mega-sport events.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrigal, Bee &amp; LaBarge</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Drawing on research conducted across 11 nations, the authors argue that the Olympic Games were most associated with friendship, cultural diversity, participation and fair competition.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In contrast to some of the social-impact research mentioned above, a number of socio-political studies are highly critical of the Games and the Olympic Movement more generally. In recent years, studies from a socio-political perspective have been completed by Hall (1987, 1994), Harvey (1989), Simson and Jennings (1992), Kidd (1992), Hoberman (1995), Cochrane and Peck (1996); Dunn and McGuirk (1999), Lenskyj (2000, 2004), Gruneau (2002), Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter (2003), Houlihan (2005) and Horne (2007). Of these studies, the work of Hall (1987, 1994), Cochrane and Peck (1996), Dunn and McGuirk (1999), Lenskyj (1996, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2004) Gruneau (2002), Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter (2003) and Horne (2007) specifically outline the problematic nature of government involvement in the Olympic Games and other mega-sport events. Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) and Horne (2007) note that democratic processes are often pushed aside in order to ensure that the mega-sport event infrastructure can be built without fully accountable and transparent planning and approval processes in place. In this regard, the work of Kidd (1992) is important in that it highlights how the failed 1996 Olympic bid developed by the City of Toronto emphasised the role of transparent and inclusive community consultation processes. An overview of these research findings can be viewed below in Table 5.
Table 6: Socio-Political Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author/s</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Summary of findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harvey</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Particularly in the America, state and local governments have become increasingly involved in the bidding and staging of mega-sport events, while central government has taken a more passive role.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simson &amp; Jennings</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>The authors examine corrupt activity within the International Olympic Committee and the Olympic Movement more generally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidd</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Kidd argued that while the Toronto bid to stage the 1996 Games was unsuccessful, a number of IOC members commented on the inclusive and transparent public process undertaken by the bid team. The author suggests that considering the significant impacts that result from hosting an Olympic Games, that future bids should be encouraged to adopt Toronto’s approach. Not doing so “would be to risk the continuing spectre of protesters at the time of the Games and the very legitimacy of the Olympic project’s humanitarian mission” (p. 77).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hall</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Commenting on the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, Hall argued that the host (NSW) Government promised a transparent Olympic planning process but in fact “closed down” public scrutiny and debate. Hall stated that “media scrutiny of the costs of hosting the event or the voicing of negative opinions of the Games was subject to harsh criticism from the Government and from members of the bidding team. People who were against the Games were regarded as unpatriotic and unAustralian, while the only community consultation was in the form of opinion polls” (p. 161).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoberman</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>The study examined the undemocratic governance structure of the International Olympic Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochrane &amp; Peck</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>The authors explored how the local politics surrounding the City of Manchester and its ambitions to stage the Olympic Games became enmeshed in local business strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunn &amp; McGuirk</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>The NSW Government created a range of governance structures that enabled greater non-government involvement in the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lenskyj</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Lenskyj outlined the negative consequences that can arise from hosting an Olympic Games. For instance, because of the time-related pressures faced by organisers to have venues constructed, often the usual development processes and applications are bypassed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gruneau</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Politicians and media owners often look firstly to the interests of developers, property owners and the middle classes as the central players of city planning when hosting mega-sport events. Moreover, community resistance to such events is often downplayed or ignored by those with power.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In summary, the above literature outlines the range of potential positive and negative outcomes of hosting an Olympic Games. As outlined by Gratton and Henry (2001) and Preuss (2000), more research is required in order to fully understand the entire economic consequences that result from hosting an Olympic Games or mega-sport event. To date, the evidence suggests that hosting an Olympic Games is unlikely to result in a substantial financial return, at least, on the initial investments made by host governments and host communities (Preuss, 2000). With regard to the social and social-political consequences of hosting an Olympic Games, the strongest theme emerging from the research is that many Olympic Games have been held without a great deal of transparency or accountability. According to Horne (2007), ironically this appears to be the case particularly when mega-sport events are funded largely through the state and taxpayer revenues. As outlined by the exhaustive work of Flyvbjerg et al. (2003), often the costs of mega-projects are underestimated, while the benefits are over estimated, leading to project approval and the protection of the private promoters of such projects. The following section of the literature review will focus on prior studies examining the internal organisational characteristics of mega-sport events.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius &amp; Rothengatter</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>The private promoters of the mega-projects consistently and systematically mislead governments in order to get project approval.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lenskyj</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Lenskyj argues that mega-sport event-related news is often controlled by the event organisers through a form of “manufactured consent”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horne</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Greater attention and critical questioning is required from governments when examining the likely staging of mega-sporting events. Drawing on the work of Flyvbjerg et al. (2003), Horne suggests that detailed and independent social and economic impact assessments need to be undertaken so that the relevant local communities can make informed decisions about their support or opposition to the staging of such events.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.5 Mega-Sport Events and Organisational Stakeholders

In order to manage and mitigate the potential internal and external organisational tensions faced by those in charge of mega-sport events, event organisers often spend a great deal of their time seeking the support of a diverse range of stakeholders (Parent, 2005, 2008; Parent & Deephouse, 2007). Similarly, the mega-sport event literature (Parent, 2005, 2008; Parent & Seguin, 2007; Theodoraki, 2007; Westerbeek, Smith, Turner, Emery, Green & van Leeuwen, 2005) and the project-management literature (Engwall, 2003; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003) illustrate that organisational stakeholders are a vital resource for the organisers of such activities. Event stakeholders in this context are described by Westerbeek et al. (2005) as “any person or group that will be interested in, affected by, or is a necessary participant in the project” (p. 253).

Mega-sport event stakeholders, therefore, are not only those individuals or groups who have the responsibility for organising an event; “government, local retailers, tourism businesses, environmental groups, local residents and sport organisations are all stakeholders … each of these groups is likely to have a stake in the economic, environmental and social impacts of … an event” (Westerbeek et al., 2005, p. 254). Furthermore, Freeman (1984) one of the first researchers to develop stakeholder theory, posits that organisational stakeholders can be classified as either formal or informal stakeholders. Formal mega-sport event stakeholders, for instance, might include funding agencies like governments or event sponsors, while informal stakeholders are often groups such as communities or businesses that are indirectly impacted by the hosting of a mega-sport event in their city or region (Reid, 2007; Westerbeek et al., 2005).

In order to successfully organise a mega-sport event, an intricate combination of stakeholders is often required to work together to achieve the stated goals of the event (Parent, 2005, 2008). Mega-sport event organisers, for instance, can spend many millions of dollars developing plans for the
construction of venues and associated infrastructure (Toohey, 2001; Webb, 2001). The implementation of such plans often involves many organisations, who are contracted to provide a range of products and services for these venues (i.e. architectural services, technology providers, catering and waste management, etc.). This planning process can be highly complex, often requiring the intense management of many stakeholders and associated organisational networks (Henry & Theodoraki, 2002; Parent, 2005, 2008; Webb, 2001).

2.5.1 Mega-Sport Events and Organisational Uncertainty

In addition to the influence stakeholders can have on the organisation of a mega-sport event, these events are also likely to be shaped by the external environment, which is often unpredictable and fast changing (van Iterson et al., 2002). The influence and impact of the external environment on organisations has been a central problem for management scholars (Newton & Smith, 2002). However, from the tradition of organisation and project-management studies, research into mega-sport events has become more attuned to the role of the external environment (Leonardsen, 2007). For the past fifty years, in regard to organisational studies, a significant amount of research has been undertaken exploring the consequences of external organisational factors on the management of a variety of institutions, organisations and projects (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967; Woodward, 1965). As a result of this research, Engwall (2003) suggests that few organisational researchers today would dispute that the internal operations of organisations and projects are often shaped by external elements that are beyond their control.

A number of important studies have been conducted that have examined the impact of the external environment on organisations. The seminal work of Thompson (1967) showed that organisations are greatly influenced by the uncertainty generated through external operating environments. The research of Woodward (1965) exhibited how organisations
are shaped by both the internal and external complexity of the environments in which the organisations operate. The often-cited work of Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) similarly demonstrated that the rate of organisational development is reliant as much on external environmental factors as internal organising conditions. Likewise, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), drawing on the work of Max Weber, found that authority allocation as well as external resource dependency shape a firm’s internal organising capability. From an institutional perspective, Scott and Meyer (1994) highlighted how externally and internally interdependent factors like social values, norms, history and traditions shape the performance of organisations.

In a similar but possibly more nuanced perspective to the work of institutional and resource dependency theorists, leading sociologists such as Elias (1994), Bourdieu (1984), Granovetter (1985) and Fligstein (2001) argued that the separation of the internal and external organising environment is not as clear cut as some would think. Rather, these two concepts are actually intertwined, developing their interdependence over time. The influential economic sociology of Mark Granovetter (1985) has outlined, for instance, that organisational networks and economic action are socially and historically embedded and thus interdependently enmeshed with one another.

2.5.2 An Eliasian View of Stakeholders and Organisational Uncertainty

Mega-sport event stakeholders can be described as individuals or groups of individuals who may or may not be part of a formal organisation that at any one point in time have different interests, needs, wants, expectations and agendas (Allen, O’Toole, McDonnell & Harris, 2005). Drawing on the work of Norbert Elias (1994), recent organisational research utilising a figural perspective argues that stakeholder groups are in fact a collection of interdependent people (Dopson, 1997, 2001, 2005; Newton, 2001, 2004; van Iterson et al., 2002). According to Elias (1994), in order to understand social and institutional development more fully, organisational researchers need to
examine how social networks are shaped by their historical interdependence and through asymmetrical and dynamic power relations (Newton & Smith, 2002).

Eliasian theorists also argued that social groups, whether they are classified as organisations or stakeholders, are also influenced and impacted by the unplanned consequences of human action (Elias, 1994; Newton, 1999). For instance, organisational research conducted by Lesjo (2000) on the 1994 Lillehammer Winter Olympic Games drew on the work of Elias and found that Olympic planning had unforeseen consequences for the Olympic organisers, resulting in Olympic plans that varied significantly from those originally proposed in the bid documents. From the Eliasian perspective, organisations and stakeholder groups cannot “possess” power but rather maintain power balances with other organisations or individuals (Newton & Smith, 2002; van Iterson et al., 2002). Organisational power is viewed as a fluid and dynamic concept, not one that is either fixed or static (Clegg et al., 2006; Dopson, 2005; Flyvbjerg, 1998; Newton, 2001; Newton & Smith, 2002, van Iterson et al., 2002).

Parent (2005), whilst not referring to the work of Elias directly, expressed a similar view, arguing that when analysing the actions of mega-sport event stakeholders, one must consider the dynamic and temporal framework in which the examined organisation sits. In that case, “stakeholder expectations, needs and interests may vary over time” (Parent, 2005, p. 73). Mega-sport event stakeholders, therefore, whilst not “possessing” power, can maintain asymmetrical power relations that enable them to influence the course of an event’s preparation and organisation (Lesjo, 2000). Accordingly, mega-sport event stakeholders, in turn, can be influenced by the interdependent actions of other event stakeholders. Thus, mega-sport event stakeholders, as groups of individual people, are shaped and moulded by their mutual interdependence.
Such conceptual matters, particularly the use of Eliasian process sociology by organisational researchers, are explored further in Chapter Three. The next section of this chapter will explore the studies that have examined internal organisational aspects of the Olympic Games and similar mega-sport events.

2.6 Mega-Sport Events and Internal Organisational Research

In addition to the research that examines the external consequences of hosting a mega-sport event, there is a small but growing body of research investigating the internal operations and management of mega-sport events. The next section of this chapter explores this internally focused body of work. These studies not only address the organisation of the Olympic Games but also other mega-sport events, such as the Pan American Games and the Commonwealth Games. The review of this stream of literature will start by broadly discussing the studies that have been completed and highlighting the relevant findings. Some studies that have greater relevance for this research will be examined in greater detail. Gaps in the literature are highlighted in the final part of this chapter.

In recent years, organisational research into the staging of mega-sport events has addressed a range of theoretical areas. For example, research has been conducted on the organisational culture of mega-sport events (McDonald, 1991), event ownership and authority structures of mega-sport events (Lowendahl, 1995), the value of strategic management and planning for mega-sport events (Bramwell, 1997; Chappelet & Bayle, 2005; Theodoraki, 2007), the unintended consequences of mega-sport event planning (Lesjo, 2000), the impact of government involvement with the organisation of mega-sport events (Andranovich, Burbank & Heying, 2001; Toohey & Veal, 2007), risk-management strategies and the staging of mega-sport events (Dobson & Sinnamon, 2001; Minis & Tsamboulas, 2008; Stamatakis, Gargalianos, Aftinos & Nassis, 2003; Toohey & Taylor, 2005, 2008), knowledge-
management processes and the Olympic Games (Halbwirth & Toohey, 2001), mega-sport event organisational development and structuring (Malfas, 2003; Westerbeek et al., 2005), and, mega-sport event stakeholders and the effectiveness of mega-sport event organising committees (Parent, 2005, 2008; Parent & Deephouse, 2007; Parent & Seguin, 2007).

This body of work is explored in detail starting with McDonald’s (1991) research on the organisational culture of an Olympic organising committee. A further overview of each of these studies is also available in Table 6, at the end of this section.

2.6.1 Mega-Sport Events and Organisational Culture

One of the few studies to be completed on the organisational cultural practices of an OCOG was conducted by McDonald (1991) on the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games. This study has been regularly cited not only in Olympic studies but also in organisation and management studies. In the influential *Handbook of Organisation Studies*, the authors of the organisational culture chapter, Martin, Frost and O’Neill (2006), use McDonald’s paper as an exemplar integration case study. An integration approach to organisational change highlights how cultural change can take place across a whole organisation (Martin, Frost & O’Neill, 2006). From this perspective, management attempts to replace “old” practices with new ones with the consequences often for the interim period being shifting power relations, organisational ambiguity and conflict (Greenwood & Hinings, 1988).

McDonald’s (1991) research was based on ethnographic data and examined how posters, uniforms, slogans, strong leadership, rituals and a high level of work commitment to the Olympic Games created a sense of anticipation and enthusiasm for the Olympic workforce. The result was a strong and unique organisational culture that projected excellence (McDonald, 1991). Moreover, McDonald (1991) argued that the organisational culture was
an important factor in the success of the Los Angeles Games, which are regarded as the most commercially successful Games ever staged (Preuss, 2000).

2.6.2 Mega-Sport Events and Project Ownership

From the perspective of project management, Lowendahl’s (1995) research into the organisation of the 1994 Lillehammer Winter Olympic Games found that the effectiveness of the Games organisation was clearly shaped by the relationship between the IOC as the parent organisation and the OCOG as the project-management agency. Accordingly, Lowendahl (1995) found that the level of project embeddedness determined the closeness of the fit between the project team and the parent organisation. In this way, the closeness and fit of the parent organisation and the project agencies were explored through the organisational goals and objectives established by those agencies and how they related to each other (Lowendahl, 1995).

The research suggested that while it is usual in many projects for the parent organisation to establish the project goals and objectives, Lowendahl (1995) highlighted that for the Olympic Games it is somewhat different. She noted that for many standard projects the parent organisation determines the organisational structure employed, the resources devoted to each functional area, the control mechanisms and risk-management strategies employed, and the evaluation procedures that are adopted. Lowendahl (1995) argued, however, that by winning the right to stage the Olympic Games from the IOC, the successful bid team commits the host NOC, the host city, and the relevant host state and/or national governments to the Olympic project (Lowendahl, 1995).

In this case it is not only the owners of the event that may have different goals and objectives, but also the key stakeholders that invest heavily in the mega-sport event. Governments, for example, may have the primary aim
of generating economic growth through the creation of tourism visitation and future destination marketing strategies or demand-side economic activity through advancing major infrastructure projects (Preuss, 2000). The host OCOG and its employees may seek to be part of an exciting project and for the Games to be considered the “best ever” (Lowendahl, 1995). The IOC, as the parent organisation, seeks to grow its brand in order to generate increased future sponsorship and broadcasting revenues (Payne, 2006).

Based on the Lillehammer Olympic research, Lowendahl argued that “the fact that there were three owners with very different objectives as well as numerous other stakeholders, made it impossible for any one owner to dictate their own objectives, routines, evaluation criteria … exclusively” (1995, p. 353). While Lowendahl (1995) examined the impact and complexity of project ownership when managing an Olympic Games, other researchers have explored the planning characteristics that shape the organisation of such mega-sport events.

2.6.3 Mega-Sport Events and Organisational Planning

Mega-sport event research by Bramwell (1997) and Theodoraki (2007) has explored the value and importance of strategic management and planning for event-management outcomes. Using a processual approach to strategic planning, Bramwell conducted a study into the organisation of the 1991 World Student Games. Bramwell’s research offered a number of findings that are relevant to the organisers of mega-sport events. Firstly, a “too limited use of formal strategic planning may hinder [mega-sport event] decision making” (Bramwell, 1997, p. 173). Secondly, research and monitoring are required prior to and after the staging of a mega-sport event (Bramwell, 1997). Thirdly, mega-sport event planning should be a participatory process, one that involves stakeholders in order to build political legitimacy of the event organisers (Bramwell, 1997). Fourth, it is important for mega-sport event organisers to consider the longer-term perspective (Bramwell, 1997).
The work of Theodoraki (2007) outlines how planning and organisational parameters shape the formation of a modern OCOG. Theodoraki (2007) draws on the work of Mintzberg (1979) to highlight how OCOGs shift their job specialisation from one that is predominantly a functional structure in the early years of event planning to one that becomes purely a venue-related structure. For instance, in the early stages of an OCOG’s formation, “senior staff … develop their broad areas, for example, finance, marketing, IOC and Government relations. As these areas become more established and new staff are appointed specialisation increases horizontally to reflect the various levels of responsibility” (Theodoraki, 2007, p. 166). The increasing specialisation of an OCOG as it nears the start of the Games therefore results in many OCOG staff shifting from their functional position at the OCOG headquarters to positions at Olympic venues, therefore highlighting the shift from a planning phase to an operational venue-based phase (Theodoraki, 2007).

2.6.4 Mega-Sport Events and the Unintended Consequences of Planning

The work of Lesjo (2000) draws on Eliasian process sociology to examine how the ideas and plans put in place by an Olympic bid committee “change radically” (p. 292) due to unplanned and unforeseen circumstances when actually organising the mega-sport event. Based on the 1994 Lillehammer Olympic Games, Lesjo’s research explores why this event became known for its environmental characteristics. Lesjo (2000) suggests, for instance, that the image of these Olympics as the “Green Games” (p. 293), while an important representation, was not actually part of the original bid plan. However, an “unanticipated conjecture of symbolic politics and realpolitik produced Lillehammer’s eventual image as an environmentally friendly city. A key aspect of constructing this ‘green’ profile was the cooptation of the environment movement” (Lesjo, 2000, p. 293).
Lesjo’s research highlighted a number of possibilities as to why and to what extent the unplanned and unintended consequences developed in the organisation of these Games. For example, Lesjo argued that the event timing is one consideration. As event planning can take place over more than a decade, from bid to staging, new information becomes available and organisational standards can change (Lesjo, 2000). Drawing on Hill (1992, 1996), Lesjo argued that the increasing size and scale of the Olympic Games entwines “the bidders and hosts in unanticipated and complex figurations that they seldom understand” (p. 292). Lesjo’s research also highlights the importance of the fluid and dynamic nature of stakeholder power relations. Lesjo (2000) suggested that in an Olympic organisational context the “dynamic power relations among the interdependent actors are crucial” (p. 292).

Following the ideas of Elias (1978), Lesjo argued that the more democratic the mega-sport event organisation is, the more complex and difficult it becomes to anticipate organisational outcomes. Again, according to Lesjo (2000) Olympic organisation at the 1994 Games was “complicated by unplanned and unintended consequences, as well as the strategic actions of powerful players who change their original plans or have to negotiate compromises with subaltern groups” (p. 292). Lesjo (2000) further argued that other elements such as the weather cannot be entirely anticipated or even controlled by the best Olympic planners. Good weather at an Olympic Games, or at any mega-sport event, not only enhances the spectator and athlete experience, it also allows the media to transmit images of the host city that are favourable and attractive. However, poor weather is not the only risk faced by the organisers of mega-sport events; other risks have also been explored by sport event researchers.

2.6.5 Mega-Sport Events and Risk Management

The studies described in this section explore the organisational uncertainty that shapes the organisation of mega-sport events. Conducted over
the past two decades, these studies display the usefulness of risk-management strategies in countering uncertainty. The work of Dobson and Sinnamon (2001) explores the benefits of employing a crisis-management framework called Failure Mode Effects Analyses (FEMA). The authors use the example of the 1998 Kuala Lumpur Commonwealth Games and the 1999 Rugby World Cup to highlight how the FEMA system can be utilised to minimise logistical and operational risks often faced by mega-sport events (Dobson & Sinnamon, 2001).

Stamatakis, Gargalianos, Afthinos and Nassis (2003) used the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games as a case study to explore the effectiveness of mega-sport event contingency planning. This research suggests that despite the success of the Sydney Olympics, greater venue-related contingency planning could have been undertaken (Stamatakis et al., 2003). The authors argue that future Olympic organisers should take note and conduct increased contingency planning in order to mitigate event risks. A similar study conducted by Minis and Tsamboulas (2008) explored transport planning at the Athens 2004 Olympic Games. This study found that the scenario planning employed by the Athens organisers was effective and minimised a range of potential organisational problems (Minis & Tsamboulas, 2008).

Toohey and Taylor (2005) also conducted research into the Athens 2004 Olympics Games. Their work explored spectator perceptions of security and safety at the Games. A survey of 277 Olympic spectators found that 21% of the sample considered not attending the Athens Games due to security fears. Nearly a quarter of those surveyed (24%) stated that they did not feel safe whilst being a spectator at these Olympic Games. Spectators from France, Germany, Greece and Ireland felt that the high level of security detracted from their Games experience, while conversely fans from China, Korea and Japan stated that the extensive Olympic security actually enhanced their Games experience. The research also found that men more so than women were distracted by the high level of security at the Athens Games (Toohey & Taylor,
This research concluded that cultural context and gender shaped the way people perceived the security measures provided at the Athens Olympics.

In a later paper, Toohey and Taylor (2008) further argued that the organisers of mega-sport events like the Olympic Games need to ensure that they manage the risk perceptions of their events, by working in a collective manner with the event stakeholders (including the athletes; the media and broadcasters; the suppliers of event goods and services; government; and other involved organisations). In doing so, the event organisers should promote the enjoyable elements of the event in order for the event legacy to be regarded as positive and beneficial (Toohey & Taylor, 2008).

2.6.6 Mega-Sport Events and Knowledge Management

Halbwirth and Toohey (2001) examined the effectiveness of the knowledge-management processes employed by the organisers of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. The authors draw on their work experience inside SOCOG to highlight the strength and weaknesses of the processes employed in managing SOCOG’s knowledge resources. While the economic benefits of knowledge management are difficult to calculate, there are some indicators that mega-sport event organisers can employ to gauge the benefits of utilising it effectively (Halbwirth & Toohey, 2001). These include: the extent of resource growth that is attached to the event; the growth in knowledge content (i.e. documents, archives, etc.); whether the project or event is reliant on a number of people as opposed to just one or two key individuals; and, finally, whether the knowledge management implemented actually results in a financial return (Halbwirth & Toohey, 2001).

In relation to this last point, the authors highlight that SOCOG managed to sell its knowledge-management property back to the IOC. Importantly, Halbwirth and Toohey (2001), noted that the success of the knowledge management processes at SOCOG were underpinned and “championed by
senior executives and led by knowledge management professionals who had a clear vision of contributing to the organisational objectives of staging a successful Games” (p. 107). Furthermore, they argued that “adequate resources, an effective technology infrastructure and a knowledge-friendly culture supported the [knowledge-management] project” (Halbwirth & Toohey, 2001, p. 107). This last sentence indicates the importance of having strong management within mega-sport event organising committees to drive the investment in knowledge management, which reinforces the influence of internal capabilities that shape the organisation of mega-sport events. However, it is also important to examine how the external environment, especially the role of stakeholders, can also influence the internal management of such events.

2.6.7 Mega-Sport Events and Organisational Stakeholders

Some of the most in-depth mega-sport event research conducted in recent years has been undertaken by Parent (2005, 2008), Parent and Deephouse (2007), and Parent and Seguin (2007). The focus of this work has largely centred on mega-sport event stakeholders and the way they shape and are shaped by mega-sport event organising committees. For instance, Parent (2005, 2008) and Parent and Deephouse (2007) conducted research on the 1999 Pan American Games and the 2001 Jeux de la Francophonie. Based on interviews with senior mega-sport event managers associated with these two events, the authors found that the literature on event structure and evolution, as outlined by Getz (1993) and Hall (1992), was not accurately reflected in the organisation of the two mega-sport events. The interviewed managers stated that the organising modes were more often shaped by emerging issues and strategies rather than by formal organisational structures (Parent, 2005).

Parent and Seguin (2007) explored stakeholder involvement in the organisation of the 2005 World Swimming Championships. This particular study utilised stakeholder theory in order to understand the management
difficulties that were faced by the organising committee of the event. Parent and Seguin found that “a lack of formal financial commitments, power congruence between partners and the persuasive politics, communication, proper human resource management procedures, and proper due diligence emerged as the critical combination of factors” (2007, p. 187), resulting in organisational failure.

Malfas (2003), when examining the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, similarly established that the events stakeholders influenced and shaped the organisation of SOCOG and thus the Games. Malfas’ (2003) work also highlighted the critical events that created organisational change for SOCOG. Some of the main organisational events listed by Malfas (2003) included: the observation of the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games by SOCOG’s senior management; the appointment of the NSW Minister for the Olympics and Paralympic Games, Michael Knight, to the position of SOCOG President; and lastly, the shift of SOCOG’s organisation control to the Main Operations Centre in May 2000.

Not unlike the findings that emerged from Lowendahl’s (1995) research, Malfas (2003) argued that although the IOC as the parent organisation has final responsibility for the Olympic project, it delegates a great deal of its work to the relevant OCOGs. This delegation can create a weak organisational model because often the OCOG itself is highly dependent on government and other commercial institutions in order to deliver an Olympic Games (Malfas, 2003). As a result of this limited involvement by the IOC, as the parent organisation of the mega-sport event project, the loose organisational model provides opportunities for stronger stakeholders to strategically maximise their interests (Malfas, 2003).
Table 7: Organisational Research into Mega-Sport Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author/s</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Summary of findings</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>McDonald</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>This study explored how organisational symbols, slogans and leadership resulted in a strong Olympic organising work culture at the Los Angeles 1984 Olympic Games.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lowendahl</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Lowendahl’s research on the 1994 Lillehammer Winter Olympic Games highlighted the complex nature of event ownership for those involved in the organisation of an Olympic Games. Because the host organising committee was not strongly embedded within the parent organisation (i.e. the IOC), emergent tasks and structures, in addition to informal authority, appeared to be critical features that shaped the organisation of these Olympics.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bramwell</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>The study reinforced the importance of maintaining a long-term perspective when undertaking planning for events such as the Olympic Games.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesjo</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Drawing on theoretical approaches outlined by Elias (1994) and Flyvbjerg (1998), the author studied the 1994 Lillehammer Winter Olympic Games and found “that some of the most important aspects connected to mega-sport events like the Olympics are due not only to ‘rational’ planning processes but also to how the attendant conflicts and compromises among interests groups lead to unintended outcomes” (p. 282).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andranovich, Burbank &amp; Heysing</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>This study explored the politics of hosting the 1984, 1996 and 2002 Olympic Games in America. From an organisational perspective, the study found that compared to the 1984 Olympics, the Federal Government was more involved in funding the 1996 and 2002 Games, resulting in greater organisational conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dobson &amp; Sinnamon</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>The authors discuss the benefits of employing risk-management strategies when organising mega-sport events. They suggest that the crisis-management technique, termed Failure Mode and Effects Analyses (FEMA), should be employed by event organisers. By doing this, organisers can minimise the logistical and operational problems often faced by mega-sport events.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halbwirth &amp; Toohey</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>This study analysed the knowledge-management (KM) processes employed at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. The authors found that these KM processes can assist OCOGs to manage accurate information while growing as an organisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malfas</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Malfas found that in order to fully understand the development of the organisation responsible for the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, SOCOG, a “multiple syntheses of its organisational dimensions” was required to capture the “different points of its operational life, and consequently … [the] multiple organisational formations” (p. 212).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Author(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stamatakis, Gargalianos, Afthinos &amp; Nassis</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>The study examined the contingency planning employed at the Sydney Olympics. The authors found that despite the success of these Olympics, greater venue-related contingency planning should be undertaken by future OCOGs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Based on interviews conducted with senior mega-sport event managers, the author found that the literature on event structure and evolution, as outlined by Getz (1993) and Hall (1992), did not directly reflect the organisation of the 1999 Pan American Games and 2001 Francophile Games. The managers highlighted that working modes were more often shaped by issues and strategies rather than by formal organisational structure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toohey &amp; Taylor</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Spectators at the Athens 2004 Olympic Games were surveyed on their perception of the security measures employed by the Olympic organisers. The study found that five management practices can be employed to enhance the Olympic spectator experience. This included: visibility; resilience; communication; restraint; and minimalism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theodoraki</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>The author examines the organisational life cycles that OCOGs experience. Moreover, the pressures and influences that shape the structure and processes of OCOG management are explored.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent &amp; Deephouse</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>This study explored stakeholder identification and prioritization by managers at two mega-sport events that were staged in Canada. The study supported the “positive relationship between number of stakeholder attributes and perceived stakeholder salience” (p. 1). The authors also found that the hierarchical level and the role of event managers have “direct and moderating effects on stakeholder identification and perceived salience”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent &amp; Seguin</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Drawing on stakeholder theory, the study examined the management difficulties faced by organisers of the 2005 World Swimming Championships. The authors found that “a lack of formal financial commitments, power congruence between partners and the persuasive politics, communication, proper human resource management procedures, and proper due diligence emerged as the critical combination of factors” (p. 187) that resulted in organisational failure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minis &amp; Tsamboulas</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>This study explored the effectiveness of scenario planning employed by the Athens 2004 Olympic Games organisers. The research found that the transport scenario planning employed at the Games was successful in minimising potential organisational problems.</td>
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</table>
While these studies are not the only studies that examine the Olympic Games or similar mega-sport events, they are the studies that have predominantly focused on how such events are managed and organised.

2.7 Conclusion and Synthesis

This chapter sought to review the Olympic Games and mega-sport event literature. Empirical studies of the organisation of the Olympic Games and related mega-sport events were described and examined. The first section analysed how mega-sport events are defined and addressed the project features that shape the organisation of the Olympic Games. The second section continued with a focus on the Olympic Games and in particular how this event has been transformed from a European-focused event in the late 1800s to the international, highly regarded mega-sport event it is today.

The third section explored the literature examining the external consequences of hosting mega-sport events like the Olympic Games. This section paid close attention to the research conducted over the past three decades investigating the social, economic and political consequences of hosting mega-sport events. The fourth section discussed the role of stakeholders in shaping the organisation of mega-sport events. This section focused specifically on the organisational studies literature that examined the influence of uncertainty and external forces on organisational performance in a mega-sport event context.

The final section of the chapter explored mega-sport event and Olympic Games literature investigating the internal organisational characteristics of organising such events. This section explored the limited but growing research that has examined a variety of organisational themes, including: organisational culture and Olympic organising committees; the influence of project ownership on the organisation of the Olympic Games; the intended and unintended
consequences of mega-sport event planning; risk management and Olympic organising; knowledge management and Olympic organising; and, lastly, the organisational impact stakeholders can have on the management of mega-sport events, including the Olympic Games.

In synthesis, the chapter outlined the factors that shape institutional involvement in the hosting of mega-sport events such as the Olympic Games. While the literature highlights numerous examples of the negative consequences that cities and nations face when staging mega-sport events, governments from all over the world, of all persuasions, are still placing bids with organisations such as the IOC to host their events (Cashman, 2006). These governments seek to host events like the Olympic Games not just because of the potential economic benefits they may bring but also for the geo-political and social prestige that surrounds such celebrations (Guttmann, 2002). The international demand to host the Olympic Games places the IOC in a very powerful position to leverage the event not only to potential bidding cities but also to broadcasters, sponsors and sports consumers (Horne, 2007). In this way, the IOC is a cartel-like organisation in that both of the Olympic Games are unique events with a strong history, which maintains a high barrier of entry for host cities (Toohey & Veal, 2007). One of the main beneficiaries of this organisational power is the NOCs, especially the ones situated in countries that are capable of hosting an Olympic Games.

This was the position the AOC managed to obtain, in association with the NSW Government, by being part of the team that won the right in 1993, to host the Olympic Games in Sydney, Australia. The AOC used its monopoly position as the IOC’s representative in Australia to design two contracts that gave it substantial and asymmetrical power with one of its event partners, the NSW Government. To date, with the exception of the work of Parent (2005) and Lesjo (2000), few studies have been completed that have explored the issue of organisational power and how it shapes the management of mega-sport events. It is this particular gap in the literature that this study explores; that is,
how the organisational power of a host NOC shaped the organisation of an Olympic Games and in particular the organisation of the Olympic Sport Program.

The following chapter will examine how the selected theoretical framework, in respect to this literature review, was developed in order to answer the research questions presented by this study.
CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
3.1 Introduction

Frisby (2005) noted that researching the Olympic Games can provide insights for organisation and management studies, arguing that “this involves questioning taken-for-granted knowledge and examining the complex relationships between local forms of domination and the broader contexts in which they are situated” (Frisby, 2005, p. 7). Frisby went on to say that the analysis of a mega-sport event like the Olympic Games “requires an understanding of how material and economic arrangements are enforced by contracts and reward systems” (2005, p. 7). With these points in mind, a theoretical perspective that can be used to explain the development of such power relations, in the context of a mega-sport event such as the Olympic Games, is process sociology.

Although the process sociology of Norbert Elias is not generally associated with organisation or management studies, in recent years the perspective has been used increasingly by organisational and management researchers (Dopson, 2005; Newton, 2001; van Iterson et al., 2002). A key feature of Elias’s work, when adopted by organisational theorists is that managing organisations “involve[s] the interweaving of the actions and intentions of large numbers of people who are bound together in complex webs of interdependencies, an essential element of which is unstable balances of power” (Dopson, 2005, p. 1126). While individual intentions and actions impact the progress of organisations the complex nature of such organising and the high numbers of people and stakeholder groups involved in a project as large as the Olympic Games suggests that it is highly unlikely that any one individual or a single stakeholder group can control such organisational processes (Dopson, 2005).

An inevitable consequence of such organisational complexity is that organisational outcomes develop that were not planned for by any single individual (Newton, 2001). The unintended consequences of managing are,
therefore, a central aspect of Eliasian organisational analysis. This approach differs a great deal from traditional management theory, which has argued that “managers, if appropriately trained, can effectively control developments within their own organisations” (Dopson, 2005, p. 1126). From an Eliasian perspective, it is argued that for even the most capable individuals, the magnitude, scale and complexity of large organisations “limits the ability of even the best managers to control such processes” (Dopson, 2005, p. 1126).

In acknowledgement of the complexities that not only shape the functioning of societies but also organisations, Elias (1994) promoted the view that social researchers need to consider social “processes”. That is, social and organisational researchers need to examine and emphasise how social relations develop and change over time (Newton & Smith, 2002). As Bloyce and Murphy (2008) have argued, Eliasian analysis centres on investigating how dynamic and complex human figurations, and the power relations that shape them, shift and move over time.

The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to outline how process sociology, as a theoretical approach, has been employed for this study. In order to achieve this aim, the chapter is divided into four sections. The first section outlines the rationale for selecting process sociology as the chosen theoretical approach. This section is divided into two parts. The first part provides a contextual background to the work of Norbert Elias. The second part justifies the selection and use of process sociology for this study, outlining the features of process sociology, and is divided into six parts. Five of these parts explore the central features of process sociology, while the last part examines, in further detail, the power in organisations literature that is used in this framework to complement Elias’s approach. The third section outlines specifically how process sociology is applied in the research, drawing support from previous organisational studies that have also adopted a similar approach. The fourth and final section of the chapter outlines the criticism that has been presented on process sociology in recent years.
3.2 The Theoretical Approach to this Thesis


The utility of Elias’s work, according to Newton and Smith (2002), is that it “weaves together, within a single framework, a focus on networks [Elias calls them ‘figurations’], a concern for power, control and resistance, a deep interest in culture, language and knowledge, a preoccupation with processes of social change, a strong interest in identity, the self and emotionality” (p. viii). Some of the more salient organisational research that has used process sociology includes: De Swaan’s study of the welfare state (1988); Dopson’s research into the British health system (1997, 2001, 2005); Mastenbroek’s (1987) investigation into management consultancy techniques and practices; Newton’s examination of power and subjectivity in organisations (1999, 2001, 2004); and Waddington’s study of the campaign for medical registration in Britain (1984). Encapsulating this growth in 2001, the international journal *Organization* devoted an issue to Eliasian approaches to organisational studies.
Newton and Smith (2002) suggest that the work of Elias is important to
management and organisation studies because

his work brings together in one ‘take’ the nexus of power,
emotion, subjectivity, conflict and control and shows
how they undergo long-term transformations. He moves
quickly and skilfully between these different perspectives,
giving the reader a dynamic, multi-dimensional picture. In
this way, Elias explores what are conventionally seen as
the political, the cultural, the economic and the
psychological, and in so doing, his work mounts a continued
attack on the ‘divides’ between the ‘social’ and the
‘biological’, ‘nature’ and ‘society’, ‘micro’ and ‘macro’,
‘agency’ and ‘structure’. (p. ix)

In alignment with this viewpoint, Dopson (2005) argues that Elias’s
approach, when utilised from an organisational perspective, seeks to
understand how social and organisational processes develop and change over
time, and in order to achieve this it is important to be aware of oneself “as a
human being among other human beings, and that one has to recognise what
are often conceptualised as reified ‘social forces’” (p. 1128). Social structures
such as organisations, therefore, cannot be viewed as things that exist “apart”
from the people that they contain. Rather, organisations are configurations of
people that produce outcomes as the result of the interweaving of numerous
and countless individual but interdependent acts (van Iterson et al., 2002). This
observation led Eliasian researchers Dunning and Sheard (1976) to observe
that organisations themselves as specific entities do not set goals and
objectives, but rather the people within organisations as members of a group
themselves can only agree to establish organisational goals and objectives. As
outlined by Newton and Smith (2002), the historical work of Elias on the
French Royal Courts in addition to British naval bureaucracies established that
it was difficult to see a “sharp distinction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’
organisations” (p. xii). Rather, Elias’s historical research explored how human configurations shaped such organisations across those boundaries.

To date, a common thread across a great number of Eliasian organisational studies has been the focus on how historical interdependencies shape and influence current organisational life (van Iterson et al., 2002). To understand the work of Elias and the influences that shaped his thinking, the following section will provide a brief historical overview of his rise to sociological prominence.

### 3.2.1 Norbert Elias (1897-1990)

In 1935, Elias moved to London from Germany, having previously worked as an assistant to the highly regarded sociologist, Karl Mannheim (Newton, 2001; van Krieken, 1998). In this position Elias worked in the same building as members of the renowned Frankfurt School (Newton, 2001). However, it was not until much later that Elias started to make his own mark in academic life. Despite writing his most influential work, *The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners*, in 1939, Elias did not obtain his first full-time academic position until he was 57 years of age, when he accepted a lectureship in the Sociology Department at Leicester University (van Krieken, 1998). According to van Krieken (1998), this late start to his academic career was largely the result of Elias “being Jewish as well as a foreigner … an almost insurmountable barrier” (p. 22).

In 1990, Elias died at the age of 93, but his work has a significant impact in a range of disciplines many years after his death (van Krieken, 1998). Newton (2001) has argued that even though *The Civilizing Process* was published before the Second World War, Elias’s international reputation did not gather much momentum until he retired from his academic position at Leicester University in 1962 (Newton, 2001). For instance, while Elias was predominantly a sociological and historical researcher, in the last twenty years
his work has been cited increasingly by organisation and management scholars, though this field was not primarily part of his research agenda (Newton, 2001; van Iterson et al., 2002; van Krieken, 1998).

However, in the late stages of his career, Elias started to gain some praise and acknowledgement from his contemporaries, including the likes of Zygmunt Bauman, Lewis Coser and Pierre Bourdieu (Dunning, 2005; Newton, 2001; van Iterson et al., 2002; van Krieken, 1998). Moreover, according to Dunning (2005), Bourdieu is one of the “few major sociologists who admitted a debt to Elias” (p. 171). In 1992, two years after Elias’s death, former Leicester University colleague Anthony Giddens (1992) remarked that Elias’s work was “an extraordinary achievement” (p. 389). In 1977, the City of Frankfurt awarded Elias the Theodor Adorno prize, and in 1990 he received the Premio Europeo Amalfi Prize (van Krieken, 1998). As such recognition became more frequent, so did international citations of Elias’s work. According to Smith (2000), from the mid 1990s the rate of citation increased dramatically. In 2007, a Google Scholar search conducted by this researcher accounted for more than 14,000 references to publications written by Elias.

Such broad recognition from sociologists begs the question of why the work of Elias has been largely ignored by management and organisation studies researchers. Newton (2001) and van Krieken (1998) present three possibilities. Firstly, The Civilizing Process was not published in English until 1978, with the second volume published in 1982. Secondly, Elias’s work was not readily available in other European languages. For example, a paperback edition of The Civilising Process was not published in Germany until 1976. And while Michel Foucault translated one of Elias’s books (The Loneliness of Dying) into French, the translation was never published. Thirdly, Newton (2001) suggests that changes in sociology over three decades also played a part; “not just the waning of the functionalist spirit, but also the slow attrition of former disciplinary divisions, such as between sociology and history” (p. 460).
Newton (2001) further argues that the recent attention that Elias’s work has received has partly been due to his focus on the relationship between social processes and subjectivity and the obvious parallels between Elias and Foucault. Elias and Foucault in this context present very similar positions, in that as social theorists they have the ability to “inform our understanding of our emotion, our persona and our *habitus* while situating them within a societal and global context” (Newton, 2001, p. 460). Aside from Foucault, the work of Elias is also similar to that of Bruno Latour. Latour’s actor-network theory has been used often by both social and organisational researchers when exploring organisational change within interdependent networks (Law, 1994; Newton, 1999). Actor-network theory, like process sociology, views social change through the prism of agency and interdependent networks (Newton, 2001). Both perspectives view social change and development as fluid and flowing processes where social relations are entwined and interconnected; in other words, a networked agency (Newton, 2001).

### 3.2.2 Justifying a Process Perspective

In advancing the use of process sociology, Elias promoted the value of interdisciplinary research links, especially between the disciplines of sociology and history (Abrams, 1982; Elias, 1994; Jarvie & Maguire, 1994; Mandalios, 1996; Murphy et al., 2002). In *The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners*, Elias (1978a, 1994) argued that analysis of social experience without history is empty and ambiguous. In the present study, the central components of process sociology are utilised, with particular emphasis on how power relations shape and influence the development of social and organisational “figurations”.

Elias conceptualised figurations as structures of mutually oriented and dependent people who operate within historically produced interdependency networks (Elias, 1994; Maguire et al., 2002). Elias (1994) depicts figurations as being dynamic or “in process”, thus continually changing. Figurations are in
process because the balance of power between people is continually in flux, and thus power is not a static relation (Elias, 1994). Because power imbalances between individuals and groups change and develop over time, often as a result of conflict, the nature of social structures and systems is therefore fluid and dynamic: not stable and fixed (Dopson, 2001; Elias, 1982, 1983, 1997; Murphy et al., 2002; Soeters & van Iterson, 2002; van Krieken, 1998).

To illustrate the argument of historical interdependency, Elias used a metaphor to highlight how people forget their own interdependent histories. The following Elias (1992) quotation centres on a group of people moving up through a tower:

The first generation got as far as the fifth storey, the second reached the seventh, the third the tenth. In the course of time their descendants attained the hundredth storey. Then the stairs gave way. The people established themselves on the hundredth storey. With the passage of time they forgot that their ancestors had ever lived on lower floors and how they had arrived at the hundredth floor. They saw the world and themselves from the perspective of the hundredth floor, without knowing how people had arrived there. They even regarded the ideas they formed from the perspective of their floor as universal human ideas. (p. 135)

The main point outlined by Elias is that the current ideas or strategies of a society or group are not necessarily of their own creation, they are part of a broader interconnected and interdependent network, one that has been woven together historically (Newton, 2001; van Iterson et al., 2002).

Thus, the emphasis on historical development in process sociology assists the examination of interdependent networks, specifically, in terms of
how they evolve and change over time through figurations derived from a combination of social, organisational and political structures (Elias, 1994; van Krieken, 1998; van Iterson et al., 2002; van Vree, 2002). Elias (1994) believed that this historically focussed approach was necessary in order to deeply understand any social phenomena being studied and that a longer-term duration needed to be considered in social science research, rather than only a “snapshot” or short-term perspective. Moreover, Elias (1994) argued that the notion of *long duree* (the longer term) explained why interdependency networks frame the “underlying regularities by which people … are bound over and over again to particular patterns of conduct and very specific functional chains” (p. 489).

It is therefore argued that researchers who study organisation should not neglect to analyse longer-term processes when attempting to understand current organisational relations and practice (Goudsblom, 1977; Newton, 2004). Instead, a central concern should be attempting to understand the “temporal development … focusing on interdependency networks … At the heart of this concept is an emphasis that human life is deeply social and that this sociality works through interdependency networks that operate across vast stretches of time” (Newton, 2001, p. 468). Despite the centrality of a temporal approach, Elias (1991) acknowledged that such a long-term or multi-generational perspective can be problematic because critical human events often take place over relatively brief periods of time. These events then become a key or principal reference point for groups and individuals (Elias, 1991, 1994).

Following Elias’s lead, an understanding of related historical developments is important to this study in order to provide a contextual understanding for decisions taken or strategies designed by the relevant Olympic-related organisations in the relatively later stages of the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. The following section will discuss the key features of process sociology.
3.3 Features of Process Sociology

The idea of interdependence provides a number of features that distinguish process sociology from many other approaches in management and organisation studies. A process sociological approach claims that humans are interdependent through the social figurations and networks that they form with other people over time (Elias, 1994; van Krieken, 1998). Elias’s (1994) concept of social figurations reflects the “underlying regularities by which people in a certain society are bound over and over again to particular patterns of conduct and very specific functional chains, for example as knights and bondsmen, kings and state officials, bourgeois and nobles” (p. 489). Elias (1994) commented that humans can only be understood through the examination of their social interdependencies. Rather than only viewing people as possessing an autonomous identity, Elias argued that humans are social to their very core and that people exist in and through their relations with others, developing a socially constructed habitus, or second nature (van Krieken, 1998). For Elias (1994), social, political and organisational interdependencies are forever changing and fluid. Such change may at times be quick while at other times it may be slower and more enduring (Elias, 1994).

3.3.1 Habitus

The concept of habitus, which has largely been attributed to French social theorist Pierre Bourdieu—though Dunning (2005) has argued that Marcel Mauss was the first French scholar to use the term, refers to the way people and their personalities are shaped and moulded through their life-long social interactions (Mennell, 1989; van Krieken, 1998; Wacquant, 2005). Elias also used the term well before Bourdieu in his first book Über den prozess der zivilisation, which was first published in 1939, in German (Dunning, 2005). Here, Elias proposed that the process of social development is linked to the process of psychological development and that changes in personality
structures or habits accompany and underpin social changes (Elias, 1994; Goudsblom, 1977).

Interconnected with the changing social *habitus* of people over time, process sociology highlights that social networks or figurations are not static entities but are actually continually flowing or moving (Mennell, 1989; van Krieken, 1998). Therefore, social or organisational figurations cannot be totally isolated, as they are always in a process of change and undergoing processes of different orders; some quick, some slow, others more enduring (Elias, 1994; Jarvie & Maguire, 1994; van Krieken, 1998). While social life is comprised of people who engage in intended actions, the outcomes from the combination of interweaving of countless human activity often results in unintended or unanticipated consequences (Dopson, 2001). As Elias noted himself, “underlying all intended interactions of human beings is their unintended interdependence” (1969, p. 143, quoted in Newton, 1999, p. 417). The task, therefore, of the social or organisational researcher is to examine and attempt to explain the mechanics of intended human activity whilst being attuned to the important unintended patterns that result and develop from this action over time (Newton, 2004; van Iterson et al., 2002).

### 3.3.2 Human Relations and the Centrality of Power

A further central feature of process sociology is the analysis of power relations as a central feature of all human interaction (Goudsblom, 1987; van Krieken, 1998). Elias (1978b) stated that power was “a structural characteristic … of all human relationships” (p. 74). Additionally, he suggested that social development and social experience should be viewed in terms of flowing relations rather than static positions or states (Elias, 1994). Elias commented that power should not be viewed as a “substance” that people or groups can possess, but rather power can be examined through the prism of human relations that are interconnected, ever changing and fluid (Dopson, 2005).
Further, Elias commented that power relations are never totally or entirely one sided. He argued that power is not just “property possessed by particular individuals and groups” but is a feature of all human activity (Murphy et al., 2002, p. 93). Accordingly, a process sociological approach conceives power relations as double sided (Dopson, 2001; van Iterson et al., 2002). In other words, the power relations between groups in a society or in an organisation are never totally permanent but rather fluid and dynamic (Dopson, 2001; Murphy et al., 2002; van Krieken, 1998). Thus, an Eliasian approach to the analysis of social development and action views power relations as a “complex interweaving of interdependencies amongst people” (Newton, 1999, p. 420).

3.3.3 Intended and Unintended Consequences of Human Action

When viewing social or organisational life from the perspective of a networked agency, it is important to understand that “no single individual or group can ‘determine history’ since their intentions and actions are always likely to be affected by others on whom they are dependent” (Newton, 2001, p. 469). Managers and politicians, for example, who are involved in a mega-project such as the Olympic Games, will often have their ambitions dampened because social and organisational development represents the “interweaving of countless individual interests and intentions” (Elias, 1994, p. 389).

Organisational outcomes (especially large organisations) are therefore shaped by the interconnected performance of many individuals, where “something comes into being that was planned and intended by none of these individuals, yet has emerged nevertheless from their intentions and actions” (Elias, 1994, p. 389). Organising a large project, for example, is often shaped not only by what was intended but by “the interweaving of many ‘players’, none of whom can easily predict the actions of others in diverse networks” (Newton, 2001, p. 469). For the stakeholders of organisations, this means it is very difficult to predict the actions of other stakeholders (such as government,
suppliers, or competitors) (Newton, 2001). As outlined by management theorist Karl Weick (1969), “interdependence is the crucial element from which a theory of organisation is built, interacts rather than acts are the crucial observables” (p. 330). Because “organising involves control, influence, and authority,” analysis of organisations must consider the complexity of social interactions over time rather than just single acts (Weick, 1969, p. 330).

Elias (1982) also acknowledged that within every social network some individuals or groups are likely to have greater functions and authority than others. The individuals or groups most central to a chain of interdependence will be the most relied upon (Dopson, 2005). It then follows that at certain times key individuals or groups are likely to have stronger power relations than others (Dopson, 2001; van Iterson et al., 2002). In this study, those senior individuals within SOCOG and the AOC who made the decisions which impacted the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program are considered to be in this category, and as such are central to this investigation.

### 3.3.4 Agency and Structure

Elias (1994) also argued that by examining the component parts of social units, rather than only the agency of individuals, social researchers can shine a light on the key characteristics that make up these units. Rather than only dissecting and studying component parts of a composite unit in isolation, Elias (1994) outlined that social researchers can examine the integration of the parts that make these social or organising units. By doing this, one can seek the degree or level of interdependence between organising units and assess the outcomes of their intended actions (Dopson, 1997, 2001; Newton, 2001; van Iterson et al., 2002). For this investigation, through the exploration of the component parts that formed the Sydney Olympic figuration, the researcher has attempted to examine the bonds that developed and formed over time, in order to achieve a deeper contextual understanding of SOCOG’s development and performance. In support of this approach, Elias (1978b) advocated that:
A study of the configuration of the unit parts, or, in other words, the structure of the composite unit, becomes a study in its own right … the figurations of interdependent human beings cannot be explained if one studies human beings singly. In many cases the opposite procedure is advisable—one can understand many aspects of the behaviour or actions of individual people only if one sets out from the study of the patterns of their interdependence, the structure of their societies, in short from the figurations they form with each other. (p. 720)

The relationships that people form and the resulting interdependencies between them are a key aspect of processual analysis (Elias, 1994; Newton & Smith, 2002; van Krieken, 1998). For Elias (1994), the study of social figurations should not only examine the relations people have with one another, in person, but also how people are impacted by those they do not actually know or ever physically interact with. While social relations can be viewed simply in terms of face-to-face contact, social and organisational relationships need to examine the broader and wider context of social global networks and the effects of these relations on the social or organising unit being studied (Dopson, 2001, 2005; Newton, 2001; Newton & Smith, 2002).

According to Hernes (2002), Elias’s approach to the interaction between social structure and individual human action is useful for the analysis of organisational development and change. It seems fruitful that when searching for deeper understanding and knowledge of the nexus between society and individual agency, both concepts are viewed as being interconnected and “perpetually in a state of transformation” (Hernes, 2002, p. 99). The main element of this assumption is that whilst human development is formed by the social structures in which people are embedded, they take “part in (re) forming the structure in turn” (Hernes, 2002, p. 99).
For many years sociologists have attempted to address the problematic nature of the individual versus society (van Krieken, 1998). However, according to Elias (1994), few social researchers have managed to break away from the dichotomy of analysing these concepts separately. For example, Mennell (1989) has argued that while Max Weber (1948, 1976, 1978) was fully aware that individuals were steeped in the social, he nevertheless believed in the “absolute individual” as the true social reality. Furthermore, according to Dopson (1997), Emile Durkheim struggled with aspects of the homo clausus assumption; that of people being isolated as static individuals.

Consequently, the central organising concept of process sociology is the development of mutually oriented relations with dependent people over time (Elias, 1978b). People and their social experience are dependent on many others (Elias, 1982). When combined, the dependent relations of people form complex webs or networks that are represented, for example, in social institutions like families, schools, clubs, universities, towns, nations and organisations (Elias, 1978b). Central to these interdependent networks is power, particularly shifting power relations between people over time (Newton, 1999). The following section will examine in greater detail the importance of power relations in this research.

3.3.5 Power Balances

As outlined earlier in this chapter, Elias’s concept of figurations is centred on the concept of power imbalances. In other words, people are interdependent but that does not mean that they are necessarily equally interdependent. According to Mennell (1989), the more extensive the web of interdependence, the more probable it will be that those who have a great deal of power, if rational, will be constrained by ambivalence: with the knowledge that the uninhibited pursuit of power will possibly jeopardise the very links that they have developed within the web on which they depend. Therefore, it is
important to recognise that even the most powerful individuals are interdependent to some degree on those that are less powerful (Mennell, 1989).

A figurational approach is of value, then, when attempting to analyse how human objectives and organisational activity become interconnected over time. Elias used simplified sporting and game analogies as a way of trying to understand multifaceted social processes (Dopson, 1997, 2001; van Krieken, 1998). He argued that outcomes derived through the intricate interweaving of different goal-seeking individuals or groups will almost certainly involve some outcomes that no one player or group intended (Dopson, 1997, 2001; van Krieken, 1998). For instance, a simple game between two people may include a stronger player and a weaker player. The stronger player can constrain the actions of the weaker player and limit their options to move. However, the weaker player does have some control over the stronger player. For instance, in planning their moves the stronger player must to some degree take into account the weaker player’s actions (Dopson, 1997, 2001).

Where the power ratios are significantly different, the stronger player can control the course of the activity not only by winning but also by determining the manner of the success and the possible time taken to achieve a victory (Dopson, 2001, 2005). Through a very simple game analogy such as this, Elias (1994) argued that we are able to view the course of the game in terms of the aims and plans of the stronger player. When considering a slightly more complex combination, where two people have roughly the same ability or roughly equal power, the differential between the players decreases (Elias, 1978b). The ability of one player to force the other into a move is reduced. As the power balance between the two participants becomes more equal, there is a concomitant reduction in the possible outcome of the game (Dopson, 2005). As Elias explained (1978b):

The more the game comes to resemble a social process, the less it comes to resemble the implementation of an individual
plan. In other words, to the extent that the inequality in the strengths of the two players diminishes, there will result from the interweaving of moves of two individual people a game process which neither of them has planned. (p. 82)

In large organisational settings the power relations are far more complex than the examples discussed above. Particularly in large project-based operations, the power relations include multi-level combinations of stakeholders, not all of whom compete directly with one another (van Iterson et al., 2002). Strategic decisions can be made by politicians, senior managers, stakeholder delegates, union representatives or committees. Thus, there may be a range of entities competing for power; entities that may have different agendas and objectives (Dopson, 2005; Newton, 2001). As the number of stakeholders increases and the power differences between them diminish, the course of the “organisational game” becomes more unpredictable, and often beyond the ability of a single stakeholder group to control (Dopson, 1997, 2001; van Krieken, 1998).

3.3.6 Organisational Power and Rationality

In addition to Elias, the analysis of power relations can profitably draw on other power and organisation theorists, such as the work of Flyvbjerg (1998, 2001, 2004) and Clegg et al. (2006). Flyvbjerg’s work is based on the analysis of planning and organisational power relations that shape the management of large infrastructure projects involving government and non-government agencies. According to Flyvbjerg (2004), there cannot be an adequate understanding of organisational project planning or organising without viewing it from within the context of power. He notes: “rationality without power spells irrelevance” (Flyvbjerg, 2004, p. 292).

As highlighted previously, this thesis examines the AOC’s relationship with SOCOG. In particular, the study seeks to understand how the power
relations maintained by the AOC within SOCOG shaped the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program. Moreover, the research examines how power relations changed and developed over the course of the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympics Games. In line with both Flyvbjerg (1998, 2001, 2004) and Clegg et al. (2006), this study examines organisational power from a pragmatic position. In order to discover the pragmatic and ever-changing development of power relations within organisations, Clegg et al. (2006) suggest that the work of Flyvbjerg presents a well considered and nuanced approach to organisation studies. Flyvbjerg’s (1998, 2001, 2004) work draws on the ideas of a number of key social theorists; these include Max Weber, Niccolo Machiavelli, Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, Robert Putnam and Robert Dahl (Flyvbjerg, 1998).

Flyvbjerg (2001), for instance, cites the work of Dahl (1961) when suggesting that project and management researchers should examine those who govern and those who have strong power relations when trying to understand how organisations operate. Drawing on Foucault (1977), Flyvbjerg (1998, 2001) posits that social researchers should also ask: what are the governmental rationalities that operate when those who do have power actually use their power? The contextual focus for Flyvbjerg (1998, 2001) is not only on how power is exercised, but also the values supporting it. Miller and Wilson (2006) support this perspective, arguing that:

In this way individuals create their own networks of power through their ongoing interactions and relationships, and their acceptance of prevailing codes of normalcy that shape such interactions. Thus power defines reality … In this interpretation, rationality is context dependent, though the greater the power, the less likely the rationality (Flyvbjerg, 1998); a conclusion that has obvious import for organisational decision-making. (p. 473)
To make knowledge a powerful organisational resource, decision makers require both information and expertise (Miller & Wilson, 2006). However, if, as Flyvbjerg (1998) argues, knowledge and power are interdependent, Miller and Wilson (2006) suggest that “power shapes the social construction of knowledge, defining what counts as knowledge and rationality” (p. 473). Knowledge and power are therefore both generated as people interact (Stacey, 2003). Such an approach to examining organisational power then highlights the political “games” and moves that are made by individuals as part of a networked agency (Flyvbjerg, 2001; Miller & Wilson, 2006; Newton, 1999). As outlined by Miller and Wilson (2006) power relations can be viewed as dynamic as their “true nature” is often “not fully recognised, even by those involved” (p. 4).


The former perspective indicates that decision making within organisations involves the resolving of power struggles between varying parties that may have conflicting interests or agendas. In this respect, “situations of disharmony are an expected but usually reconcilable by-product of organisational structure” (Miller & Wilson, 2006, p. 474). For the latter perspective, however, decisions made by organisations are not always shaped
by the obvious internal players but at times by powerful groups that are part of a wider global network (Miller & Wilson, 2006; van Iterson et al., 2002). For this study, the latter critical approach to evaluating power in organisations has been selected. The study therefore is not only interested in what occurred within SOCOG but also how external stakeholders and the interdependent social environmental conditions shaped the context of how management was performed.

In summary, following the establishment of guidelines by Flyvbjerg (2004) in association with theoretical underpinnings from Elias’s work (1994), power is conceptualised through a number of elements. Power can be positive and productive as well as negative and restrictive (Flyvbjerg, 2004). Power is not an entity that can be possessed but is a characteristic of all human relationships (Elias, 1994). Power is dynamic in that it circulates and develops within interdependent networks via tactics, strategies, strengths and weaknesses (Clegg, 1989). Power and knowledge are inseparable from each other analytically: power can produce knowledge and knowledge can produce power (Flyvbjerg, 2004). A critical question arises regarding how power is exercised by those who maintain asymmetrical power relations in organisations (Clegg et al., 2006; Flyvbjerg, 2001). From this perspective, it is not only important to understand how power is used but also the values that underpin and support it (Flyvbjerg, 2004). This last point builds on the work of Elias (1994) and Foucault (1981), who argued that the power dynamics of specific practices should be a key concern for any analysis of power relations.

3.4 Process Sociology and the Organisation of Sydney 2000

As outlined earlier in this chapter, although the use of process sociology to date has been moderate, when compared to other management perspectives, this approach can be a useful framework for researching organisational development and change (De Swann, 1988; Dopson, 1997, 2001, 2005; Dunning & Sheard, 1976, 1979; Mastenbroek, 1987; Newton, 1999, 2001,
According to Newton (2001), one of the main advantages of Elias’s work is the emphasis he places on the asymmetrical or unbalanced interdependencies that develop both within and outside of organisations.

From an Eliasian perspective, analysing the management and, in traditional terms, ‘diffusion’ of organisational knowledge does not just need to attend to the relation of subjects to discourse, but to the interdependency networks in which management discourse develops and is deployed, and the frequently asymmetrical form of such networks. (Newton, 2001, p. 475)

For instance, an organisation with an extended history, like the AOC, is the result of a range of complex social processes that have evolved over time. Like many organisations, it has benefited as well as suffered from what Merton (1936) termed the unanticipated consequences of purposive social actions. The organisational development of the AOC, for example, has been influenced by a range of longer-term social processes. According to De Swann (1990):

Human beings may not be aware of the figuration of which they are a part, of the nature of prevailing interdependencies, and therefore may ignore or misunderstand the results of their actions. It is because of these unintended consequences of human actions that developments may occur as a ‘blind process’. (p. 7)

In addition to examining the unforeseen consequences that shaped the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, this research sought to analyse SOCOG as a social structure that is not separate from the people who work within it. An Eliasian analysis of the development of SOCOG and its implementation of its Sport Program at the Olympic Games highlights the
dynamic web of social relations that developed over time and that shaped the organisation. According to Newton (2001), when exploring such organisational development and change, it is important for the researcher to be continually attuned to the interdependency networks “in which the practices of management … are developed and deployed” (p. 474).

Moreover, inside project organisations such as Olympic organising committees, the deployment of resources and the creation of strategies takes place within “asymmetrical interdependencies where, by virtue of their location within a hierarchy” certain actors or managers have greater power relations than others (Newton, 2001, p. 474). The emphasis for this study, therefore, in adopting an Eliasian perspective, is the examination of how asymmetrical interdependencies developed over time between critical stakeholders such as the AOC and the NSW Government (Dopson, 2005; Newton, 2001, 2004; Smith, 2002). In this respect, Olympic organising committee management practices and routines are the result of changing and developing interdependency networks and shifting power relations over time (Newton, 2004).

Furthermore, these organisational networks are not viewed as separate from the social life of the people who make up the organisation being researched (van Iterson et al., 2002). In support of this view, Dunning and Sheard (1976) argue that organisations are:

Configurations of interdependent humans who have been socialised into the norms and values of a given culture, and perhaps into those of a given specific sub-culture. Moreover, the personnel, at least in complex societies, have multiple memberships and hence, very often, conflicting allegiances. They also tend to be subjected to conflicting pressures. As a result, no organisation can ever be insulated from the wider society within which it is set. Organisations, that is to say, do
not have impermeable boundaries. Even ‘total institutions’ are not completely closed, but have relations of various kinds with the outside world. (p. 35)

In summary, and as outlined earlier in the chapter, an Eliasian approach notes that figurations are complex networks of social relationships that are more wide-ranging than just face-to-face relationships (van Iterson et al., 2002). Government ministers, for example, may have a far greater influence on our lives than many people with whom we meet regularly. While it is clear that the organisations being examined in this study (such as the AOC) had considerable power in shaping the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympics Games, the work of Elias reminds organisational researchers not to fall into the trap of assuming that such organisations wield absolute power (van Krieken, 1998). Even the most highly powered mega-sport event stakeholders, in attempting to achieve their objectives, are often mediated by others, whether or not the participants are aware of this (Clegg et al., 2006; Dopson, 2005; Lukes, 1974, 1986).

A processual analytical approach highlights the futility in searching for single causes when attempting to explain complex social or organisational phenomena (Clegg et al., 2006; van Krieken, 1998). Eliasian organisational theorists believe that single causes are too simplistic for complex structures (Newton, 2001). While single causes may have an inherent attraction to some organisational researchers, the great weakness is that single causes are incomplete and unlikely to account for the unintended consequences that shape and influence how organisations develop over time (Clegg et al., 2006; Flyvbjerg, 1998; Newton & Smith, 2002). According to Dopson (1997):

In order to understand social processes, it is not sufficient to focus upon individuals or on the subjective perceptions of individuals. We need to focus on the emerging network of relationships which involves both the intended and unintended
consequences of human action. If it were possible to understand social development solely in terms of the motives and meanings of individuals, then there would be no need for a sociological perspective for we would simply have to talk to the participants about their intentions. It is the unintended consequences or outcomes flowing from complex human interactions which make a sociological perspective imperative. (p. 56)

While the use of an Eliasian framework has notable strengths for this study, it is also important to note its weaknesses. The next section of this chapter will discuss criticisms levelled against process sociology.

3.5 Critique of Process Sociology

While process sociology has its proponents, in recent times it has been criticised by Curtis (1986), Horne and Jary (1987), Hargreaves (1992; 1994), and Layder (1994). For example, Curtis (1986) argued that few sociologists will see anything very new in Elias’s thoughts on society, stating his book *What is Sociology* “is often old wine in a new bottle … Much of it is fairly standard fare in sociology” (1978b, p. 59). Accordingly, critiques of process sociology can be placed into three general categories. The first criticism levelled at process sociology is that it does not represent a distinctive perspective within sociology (van Krieken, 1998). Secondly, some critics have commented that process sociology is in fact a form of functionalism (Dopson, 1997). And thirdly, process sociology has been criticised for not embracing feminist theory and perspectives (Liston, 2007). These three areas will be discussed below.

Horne and Jary (1987) have commented that the completed work of process sociologists in the area of sport has not resulted from any new perspective but “simply from the raising of classical sociological questions and
from recourse to conventional sociological ‘best practice’ in an area where these had hitherto been conspicuously absent” (p. 87). Horne and Jary (1987) also argue that there is little difference between the concept of figuration, presented by Elias, and the more traditional sociological concepts of “pattern” and “situation” (Coakley & Dunning, 2002). Rojek (1992), on the other hand, dismisses this suggestion and argues that pattern and situation both have static connotations and that neither of them conveys “the mobile, unfinished qualities of human relations as unequivocally as the concept of figuration” (p. 15).

Building on this rebuttal, Murphy et al. (2002) argue that figurations are different to pattern and situation because they reject the use of fixed dichotomies. Rather, process sociology attempts to analyse and capture the malleable and fluid nature of human relations (Dunning, 1992). Murphy et al. (2002) likewise contend that terms such as “structures” and “systems” reflect an inertness that Elias particularly tried to avoid. While Elias often used the word “function”, Murphy et al. (2002) argue that this should not act to define process sociology as functionalist. For example, Arnason (1987) has noted that while Elias’s concept of power has been unfavourably compared to that of functional theorists, such as Talcott Parsons, this comparison is not valid because Elias did not promote power as a static system but rather one that was dynamic and flowing. As outlined above, Elias’s concept of power is more closely aligned to that of Foucault, in that both believed the concept of power is relational (Newton, 1999). Furthermore, Elias (1978b) himself was critical of the structural functionalist approach suggesting that the notion of functionalism contains a degree of “value judgement”. Elias (1978b) stated:

The concept of ‘function’ as it has been used ... especially by ‘structural-functionalist’ theorists, is not only based on an inadequate analysis of the subject matter to which it relates, but also contains an inappropriate value judgement which, moreover, is made explicit in neither interpretation nor use. The inappropriateness of evaluation is due to the fact that they
tend – unintentionally – to use the terms for those tasks performed by one part of the society which are ‘good’ for the ‘whole’ because they contribute to the preservation and integrity of the existing social system. Human activities which either fail or appear to fail to do that are therefore branded as ‘dysfunctional’. It is plain that at this point social beliefs have become mixed up in scientific theory. (p. 77)

Process sociology has at times been criticised for its lack of application to feminist research. Jennifer Hargreaves (1992), for instance, has noted that process sociologists have been silent on issues of gender and women in sport: “Elias ignores the traditions of women in sport and also the ways in which women, however unobviously, were integral to dominantly male cultures” (p. 163). Murphy et al. (2002) concede there has been a lack of gender-based studies by Eliasian scholars, but argue that there is nothing prohibiting the study of gender from a process sociological perspective (Murphy et al., 2002). These particular arguments have been examined in detail by Colwell (1999) and Liston (2007). For example, Liston (2007) recently conducted a study comparing the different approaches to studying gender relations taken by process sociologists and feminist researchers. Liston (2007) found that the most significant variation between the two approaches was how they addressed the enabling and constraining conditions of gender relations.

According to Liston (2007), “feminists define their main purpose as theorising about gender relations in patriarchal societies while figurationalists claim to be less ideologically committed” (p. 637). However, Liston (2007) concedes that there is a lack of empirical research conducted on gender-related issues from a process sociological perspective.

In particular, there are no empirically informed discussions about a resolution (or, at the very least, a dissolution) of the tension between the two approaches concerning the roles of
values in research and the involvement–detachment balance … The greatest advancements in the fund of scientific knowledge about gender relations in sport have been made by research that is theoretically-driven and empirically-oriented. (pp. 637–638)

While the work of Elias has been subject to a great deal of debate and critique over the past three decades, it has nevertheless provided a strong framework for this study.

3.6 Conclusion and Synthesis

The interdependent and dynamic relations that developed between key Sydney 2000 Olympic stakeholders (such as the NSW Government, SOCOG and the AOC) over the course of the Games preparations provided the theoretical rationale for selecting Elias’s process sociology as the framework for this research. Process sociology, with its focus on power relations, was selected by the researcher because it can assist the broader aim of the study of outlining how a mega-sport event organisation such as SOCOG was shaped by a range of interdependent power relations. Organisational theorists such as Clegg et al. (2006) and Flyvbjerg (1998, 2001) have suggested that to date scholars in management research have generally adopted a narrow perspective when exploring the study of power relations in organisations and that broader approaches are required.

Hardy and Clegg (1996), for instance, have argued that a large portion of organisational research has centred on the use of authority to overcome conflict, brought about by the illegitimate, rather than the legitimate, exercise of power. They contend that management research has often examined power relations from a negative angle, specifically in terms of conflict situations. Both Elias (1994) and Flyvbjerg (2004) argue, however, that power should not
only be viewed in negative terms but that power is relational. A process sociological framework, therefore, places power at the heart of all human relationships, whether they are inside or outside of organisations. An Eliasian approach to analysing organisations is interested in how power relations between interdependent individuals and stakeholder groups develop and change over time, rather than only looking at the illegitimate use of power (Hardy & Clegg, 1996). It is this temporal aspect that provides the foundation for the selection of process sociology as an appropriate template for exploring Olympic organising.

In synthesis, process sociology as developed by Norbert Elias places importance on interdisciplinary research links, especially between the disciplines of sociology and history (Elias, 1978b). Elias (1994) has argued that social or organisational analysis without history is vague and ambiguous. Another central feature of process sociology revolves around the concept of human figurations. Elias conceptualised “figurations” as structures of dependent and mutually oriented people who are part of a historically produced interdependent network (van Iterson et al., 2002). Figurations involving people representing stakeholder groups are thus always dynamic and in “process” because organisations consist of people who have relations with other people; relations that are continually changing and developing over time (Dopson, 2005).

The notion of social and organisational interdependence relies on a number of features that distinguish a process as sociological (Newton & Smith 2002). Firstly, the approach theorises that humans are interdependent through the figurations and networks they form with other people over time. Secondly, these figurations are continually in flux, or in the process of change, undergoing processes of different orders; some quick, some slow, others more enduring. Thirdly, over time, developments take place in figurations that are generally unplanned or unforeseen. As noted by Elias, “underlying all intended interactions of human beings is their unintended interdependence” (cited in
Fourthly, a process sociological approach places power relations and social interactions at the centre of its analysis. Power from this perspective is not viewed as “a substance or property possessed by particular individuals and groups, but as a characteristic of all human relationships” (Murphy et al., 2002).

It is also important to note that while Eliasian researchers view power as a feature of all human relationships, they also posit that within every social or organisational figuration some individuals have more central functions than others, and thus are relied upon more heavily (Dopson, 2005). In this regard, power relations are often asymmetrical. The asymmetrical nature of power relations is especially important when exploring how organisations develop and change. The work of Clegg et al. (2006) and Flyvbjerg (1998, 2001) is used in this regard for this study to complement the Eliasian framework. Flyvbjerg (2004), for example, argues that there cannot be an adequate understanding of planning or organising without viewing it from within the context of values and power, noting, “rationality without power spells irrelevance” (p. 292). In alignment with Elias, Flyvbjerg and Clegg, this study investigates the outcomes of the AOC’s power relations with SOCOG and examines how these relations changed and developed over the course of the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games.

The following chapter discusses the methodology employed for this study in order to investigate the stated research questions.
CHAPTER FOUR:
METHODOLOGY
4.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the methodological approach employed for this study. The process sociological theoretical approach adopted for this research has shaped and influenced the study design. A processual approach to organisational analysis encourages researchers to collect data from a variety of sources (Bloyce, 2004; Langley, 1999; Maguire, 1995; Pettigrew, 1997). In addressing the central research questions the theoretical framework guided the development of the key themes that emerged from the data collection. Therefore, in order to answer the stated research questions outlined by this study, a multi-method qualitative methodology was employed.

The chapter is divided into three separate but interdependent sections. The first section examines and justifies the selection of a multi-methodological research approach. The second section discusses the three main data-collection methods employed for the study. This section is divided into three sub-sections, with each sub-section examining the various methods employed, starting with insider research followed by qualitative interviews and then document analysis. The third and final section explores the qualitative data analysis methods used to analyse the collected qualitative data. This final section discusses how the data were coded, how the key themes emerged and how these themes were developed by the researcher in order to answer the stated research questions.

4.2 A Multi-Methodological Approach

In attempting to address the stated research questions, this study used a multi-methodological approach. The study is empirical in that it is based on a process of data collection, data interpretation and data analysis (Veal, 1997). Three particular types of qualitative data were utilised in this study. First, the study was shaped by the experiences and observations of the researcher as an organisational insider between October 1998 and December 2000, when the
researcher worked in the SOCOG Sport Program. Over this period the researcher witnessed and took part in some of the organisational practices (i.e. regular organisational activities and routines), which are examined in this study. Second, in-depth interviews were conducted with former SOCOG Sport Program organisational staff. Third, internal organisational documents and external primary and secondary historical sources were examined and analysed. The value for the study in analysing such documents was twofold. First, the documents provided organisational context. Second, they provided supporting evidence to the collected interview data and the observations made by the researcher.

Through the use of these methods the researcher has investigated the research questions through the provision of a variety of data sources. Moreover, through the linking of historical and sociological methodology via the combination of multiple data sources, the research design was triangulated (Denzin, 1989). From this position, it was decided early on in the research process that the SOCOG Sport Program managers, as the key personnel charged with the responsibility of organising and managing the Olympic sport competition at the Games, had significant knowledge and insight for this study. The views of these managers were necessary particularly to help build a detailed understanding of the role, impact and power of the AOC as an interdependent stakeholder involved in the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games.

The following section will discuss the research questions. First the main research question will be outlined, followed by the two subsidiary research questions.

4.2.1 Research Questions

The central research question for this study addressed the organisational impact of the AOC on the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program at the
Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. Specifically, this question sought to explore the organisational power relations exercised by the AOC within SOCOG.

*Research Question 1: How did the involvement of a host National Olympic Committee in the organisation of an Olympic Games influence the management of the Olympic Sport Program?*

Through this research question, the study attempted to achieve the main aims of the study, as outlined in Chapter One. The first aim of the study is to conduct an in-depth analysis of power relations that shaped the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. In order to fully address this first research aim, two further research questions were created (*Research Question 1.1 and Research Question 1.2*). These additional research questions explored in more detail the factors that shaped the AOC’s involvement with the SOCOG Sport Program.

*Research Question 1.1: What impact did the formation of the SOCOG Sports Commission have on the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games?*

*Research Question 1.2: How did the organisational power of the SOCOG Sport Program shape the management of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games?*

The main objective of *Research Question 1.1* was to explore how the formation of the SSC impacted the organisation and management of the SOCOG Sport Program. As outlined in Chapter One, through the formation of the SSC, the AOC maintained legal authority within SOCOG. Understanding the organisational impact of the SSC within SOCOG was not only a central feature in attempting to answer *Research Question 1.1* but also in answering the overarching and main research question, *Research Question 1*. The key
objective of Research Question 1.2 was to identify how the actual power relations maintained by the SSC shaped the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program. This particular question was also interested in how the power relations of the SSC and its members’ organisational knowledge and networks influenced the way the SOCOG Sport Program was organised and managed at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games.

In order to answer the research questions outlined above, the following data were collected and analysed. First, qualitative data were sourced from SOCOG managers who were directly involved in the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program. Second, qualitative data were sourced through insider observations made by the researcher between 1998 and 2000. These observations were further supported by the analysis of internal SOCOG Sport Program documents. Third, and in addition to the internal SOCOG documents mentioned above, primary and secondary historical sources that were available to the researcher were collected and analysed. Documents such as the Official Report of the Games of the XXVII Olympiad, the AOC official histories written by Harry Gordon, AOC and SOCOG annual reports, print and radio news sources, television documentaries and NSW Parliament Hansard all provided data and evidence for the study. A more thorough account of the data collected and their analysis is outlined in a later section of this chapter.

4.2.2 A Qualitative Focus on Practice

In alignment with the work of Pentland and Feldman (2005), this research is focused particularly on investigating organisational practice. The analysis of the AOC’s involvement in the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games is centred on understanding power relations, specifically how these relations shaped the Olympic planning environment. The study examined organisational practice in its concrete form in an attempt to avoid “some specific grand narrative view of how things ‘should’ be” (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p.
114). The aim, therefore, of the study was not to present an „idealistic” view of organisational practice, but rather one that is „pragmatic” (Clegg et al., 2006).

Due to this focus on organisational practice, a qualitative approach was selected for the study. Qualitative research is an appropriate and important tool when attempting to understand social or organisational actions (Bourdieu, 1990, Gratton & Jones, 2004; Silverman, 1995b). Specifically, a qualitative approach is useful when the researcher is attempting to explore key assumptions and judgements that take place around social or organisational activity (Creswell, 1998; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Silverman, 1995b, 2004).

Qualitative research is also considered a valuable method for exploring new research areas (Flyvbjerg, 2001). It can provide rich and detailed data that quantitative research often cannot (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Silverman, 2006). Qualitative methodology can be flexible and can assist the researcher when trying to understand dynamic or unintended events (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Moreover, in line with Elias (1994) and Flyvbjerg (2001), qualitative methods attempt to achieve a deeper and temporal understanding of a participant’s social or organisational world.

A key aim of qualitative research in organisational studies is to evaluate the status of social or organisational issues and the effects they can have on particular communities or groups (Sarantakos, 1998). For instance, Flyvbjerg (2001) suggests that organisational researchers should „consciously expose themselves to reactions from their surroundings—both positive and negative” to try to derive benefit from „the learning effect which is built into this strategy. In this way, the … researcher becomes a part of the phenomenon studied” (p. 132).

Another feature of qualitative research is its ability to gain an understanding of how critical events unfold and occur in a natural setting (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Silverman, 2004; Veal, 2006). According to
Maguire (1998), the task of the researcher “is to trace and analyse the significance which specific events have in time and their conjunction with other events. In doing so, the researcher must come to terms with both the particular events which he/she documents and interpret the place which such events have in the phenomena under investigation” (p. 192). In this regard, when attempting to research the activities and practices in an organisational setting, qualitative methodologies can assist the researcher in gaining a holistic and contextual perspective (Sarantakos, 1998; Silverman, 2004).

Qualitative tools, such as insider research or participant observation, can therefore assist the researcher in revealing the complexity and depth of social and organisational interactions (Silverman, 2005; Veal, 2006). It is for this reason that the approach has been selected for this study (Miles & Huberman, 1994). In addition, the selection of a qualitative approach informs and is informed by the selected theoretical framework (Bloyce, 2004). The processual analytical approach adopted for this study highlights the importance of developing an understanding of the contextual social and historical foundations that shape how organisations develop and evolve (Maguire, 1995).

According to Flyvbjerg (2001), for both contemporary and historical social research, it is important to anchor the empirical study in a social (or organisational) context in order to overcome the problem of research relevance. Furthermore, Flyvbjerg (2001) argues that for contemporary organisational studies the researcher should attempt to get close to the phenomenon or group being studied during data collection “and remain close during the phases of data analysis, feedback and publication of results” (p. 132). The importance of understanding the organisational context and organisational culture of SOCOG further influenced the selection of qualitative methodology for this research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Gratton & Jones, 2004; Veal, 2006).

A further aspect of qualitative research methodologies is the flexibility it can offer the researcher (Bryman, 2004; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Gratton &
Jones, 2004). The value of a qualitative approach is that it can assist the researcher in attempting to ‘capture’ dynamic and fluid social or organisational processes (Bloyce, 2004; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Silverman, 2005). Having methodological flexibility was an important attribute of this study. For example, while it was intended that all the in-depth interviews for the study would be conducted in person, circumstances outside the control of the researcher meant that in a small number of instances a different approach was required. Due to resource constraints and the fact that some interview participants lived either outside of Australia or in another Australian state, in-person interviews were replaced with telephone interviews and electronic interviews. Each of these interview methods are discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

### 4.2.3 Explaining Organisational Phenomena

Sarantakos (1998) suggests that a qualitative approach is appropriate for research that describes or explains a particular organisational situation or social phenomenon. This study sought to explore social and organisational processes that developed over time in the staging of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. Explanatory research, such as this study, seeks to analyse the interconnected relations that developed and changed over a particular period of time, with the express aim of advancing knowledge and building theory (Bloyce, 2004; Sarantakos, 1998; Silverman, 2004).

One effective way of studying organisations, according to Stake (2005), is through the case-study approach. Stake (2005) and Yin (1989) both suggest that the case-study method can be described as the study of a phenomenon within its natural context, where the borders between the phenomenon and its context are not always necessarily clear. Flyvbjerg (2001), drawing on the work of Geertz (1973), supports this perspective, arguing that social science and organisational studies can benefit from the development of research exemplars, in the vein of deeply informed and richly described organisational
Flyvbjerg (2001) argues that case studies assist researchers in building a “practical rationality”. Through the development of case studies, “practical rationality … is best understood through cases—experienced or narrated—just as judgement is best cultivated and communicated via the exposition of cases” (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 136).

Flyvbjerg (2001) further argues that undertaking case studies does not preclude theory development: “a focus on concrete cases does not exclude the attempts at empirical generalisations typical of much social and political science. Such generalisations are perfectly compatible with cases” (p. 136). A case-study approach was used because it enabled the researcher to focus on the “detailed workings of the relationships and social processes” of the organisations being investigated (Denscombe, 1998, p. 85). The case-study approach therefore seeks to understand the organisational environment and context within which the activity occurs (Eisenhardt, 1989; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Silverman, 2004). An organisational case-study approach, therefore, strives to gain a holistic understanding of the social and historical processes at play within a specific cultural framework in order to examine the “interrelated activities engaged in by the [interdependent] actors” that are part of the organisational context (Tellis, 1997b, p. 4). For this organisational study in alignment with a case-study approach, a holistic study of the SOCOG Sport Program was undertaken and the views of the managers within this organisation are regarded as important by the researcher (Tellis, 1997a).

4.2.3.1 Advantages of Case Studies

According to Boje (1995, 2001) a well-designed and written case study avoids the reductionist and often positivistic approach of quantitative methods. Flyvbjerg (2001, p. 70) further suggests that well-designed and -written case studies can provide “concrete, practical, context-dependent knowledge” that is often missing from a significant section of organisational and management studies and that they have the potential to advance a discipline.
The balance between case studies and large samples is currently biased in favour of the latter in social science, so biased that it puts case studies at a disadvantage within most disciplines. In this connection, it is worth repeating the insight that a discipline without a large number of thoroughly executed case studies is a discipline without systematic production of exemplars and that a discipline without exemplars in an ineffective one. In social science, especially in those branches which find themselves to be weak, more good case studies could help remedy this situation. (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 87)

The advantages of conducting qualitative case studies are numerous (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Firstly, conducting case studies can assist the grounding of social processes in their natural social or organisational arena (Eisenhardt, 1989; McCormick, 1996; Stake, 2005). Secondly, a case-study approach allows for the discovery of unexpected findings to emerge, allowing the researcher to refine their research objectives as they move through their project (Stake, 2005). Thirdly, the case-study approach allows the researcher to take into account the historical development of organisational processes as they took place or to examine them as they develop over the longer term (Bloyce, 2004; Eisenhardt, 1989). For example, well-written organisational case studies draw on historical sources that may help the researcher explain and understand the contemporary interdependent actions that were at play when critical events occurred (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Fourthly, a case-study approach allows the researcher to test and refine theory development (Eisenhardt, 1989; Flyvbjerg, 2001, 2006; Stake, 2005).

Very little empirical organisational case-study research has been conducted on the organisation of the Olympic Games, specifically, that looks at the processes of organising and managing the Olympic Sport Program (Frawley & Toohey, 2005). However, one of the main aims of this study is to
contribute to the sport-management knowledge base by providing a rich and
detailed Olympic case study that forms a foundation for future Olympic
organisational research.

In summary, the case-study approach employed for this research was
useful particularly when considering the complexity of the mega-sport event
that was examined (Bloyce, 2004; Eisenhardt, 1989; Stake, 2005). While case-
study research and qualitative methodologies have a number of strengths, no
research approach is without its weaknesses (van Krieken, Smith, Habibis,
McDonald, Haralambos & Holborn, 2000). The next section will explore the
weaknesses of qualitative research methodologies.

4.2.4 Limitations of Qualitative Methodologies

While the conduct of qualitative research has many positive aspects, a
range of limitations associated with should also be considered (Silverman,
2005; Veal, 2006). These limitations can include issues relating to research
reactivity, objectivity, validity and generalisability (Bryman, 1999; Denzin &
Lincoln, 1994; Sarantakos, 1998). Reactivity can be defined as how the
research subjects react to the research being conducted and the research
instrument being used by the investigator (Bryman, 1999). Thus, reactivity
refers to the awareness one has when participating in a research study and how
the subject’s behaviour is shaped and influenced because of this knowledge
(Bryman, 1999). For example, some participants may feel inhibited or
antagonised by the research project and hence may not wish to answer
questions candidly. Moreover, due to this uncertainty or lack of trust, the
research participant may manage the impression that they wish to project to the
researcher (Miles & Huberman, 1994). For instance, a research participant may
deliberately seek to influence the investigator to perceive them in an overly
positive light (Silverman, 1995a). To mitigate these concerns, the research
participants were clearly informed about the content of the interview prior to it
being conducted and all agreed to be interviewed. The participants were also
informed that their identity would remain anonymous and protected at all
times.

The second key criticism of qualitative methods relates to the concept of objectivity. Objectivity is an important and desirable aspect of social and organisational research; however, many theorists argue that it is impossible to fully achieve (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). Objectivity is a problematic factor for qualitative researchers for three key reasons. Firstly, the researcher brings their own interdependent embedded values, ideas and history to any research project in which they are involved (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Further, any organisational researcher comes to a project from a particular social perspective shaped by their gender, age, race, culture and ethnicity (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). Secondly, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the investigator to detach themselves from their research. This may also be the case because often in qualitative research the investigator has direct contact with the research respondents and may even have personal connections to those who are being researched (Veal, 2006). Thirdly, analysing qualitative data is inherently interpretative (Sarantakos, 1998). The researcher plays a key role in the collection of data and often is required to interact socially with the respondent, thus making the researcher interdependent with the broader process, potentially shaping the ideas and experiences of the respondent as well as their own (Bryman & Burgess, 1999). For the above reasons, it is clear that objectivity is difficult to achieve in qualitative research.

Despite the socially interdependent nature of the relationship between researcher and participant and its potential impact on research objectivity, Maguire (1995) believes there are positive consequences emerging from this nexus:

As social actors, researchers cannot cease to take part. In fact, their very participation and involvement is itself one of the conditions for comprehending the problem they try to solve.
as scientists. Unlike the natural scientist who, in studying the behaviour of enzymes or galaxies, does not have to know what it feels like to be one of its constituent parts, developmental historians must, if they are to understand the interdependencies that bind people together, probe from the inside how human beings experience such existence. They must, therefore, be both relatively involved and detached to grasp the basic experience of social life. It is a question of balance. The process sociologist must be able to stand back and become the developmental historian as observer and interpreter. (p. 13)

Both Rojek (1985) and Hargreaves (1992) also argue that researcher detachment from the conducted study is difficult to sustain. According to Rojek (1985), the attempt to be detached from one’s own personal history is implausible without specific guidelines for how this should be achieved. Because the researcher was heavily involved in the SOCOG Sport Program, this makes any state of detachment, if not impossible, then highly unlikely. However, the researcher has attempted to be reflexive when interpreting the collected research data, taking into account the level of involvement that was sustained over a two-year working period (Amis & Silk, 2005; Edwards, 1999; Skinner & Edwards, 2005). Furthermore, Elias (1978b) and Maguire (1995) have pointed out that the researcher’s social involvement in the research process can assist his/her understanding of those individuals within the organisational or social figuration that is being examined.

Sarantakos (1998) suggests that an alternative to objectivity is “emphatic neutrality”. This involves the researcher attempting to be as neutral as possible while recognising that any direct contact with respondents undermines the possibility of total objectivity. This particular view resonates well with the work of Elias, in that people create their social worlds rather than discover them (Bloyce, 2004). A processual theoretical approach posits that
social reality is interdependent on the interweaving of people and their actions (Elias, 1994). According to Bloyce (2004), “Elias rejected the orthodox consideration of subjectivity/objectivity as a means of understanding the social world. Instead, he preferred to think in terms of explanations with varying degrees of adequacy” (p. 147). From this perspective, while processual analysis treats single causes suspiciously, it is more interested in understanding how multiple causes over time shape organisations (Bloyce, 2004).

The results of qualitative research have often been criticised because its findings are not as easily verified as those of quantitative research (Bryman, 1999). Despite this point, Sarantakos (1998) argues that qualitative data can be tested and validated. For instance, findings from one qualitative study can be shown to support the research findings from other qualitative studies (Flyvbjerg, 2001). This is known as cumulative validity. Findings can be re-confirmed by re-entering the field and then collecting additional evidence. This process can validate the original findings and is often referred to as communicative validity (Sarantakos, 1998). Through the triangulation of a study methodology, the findings can be validated from multiple perspectives (Patton, 1990). Flyvbjerg (2001) also adds:

As regards validity … [social] research is based on interpretation and is open for testing in relation to other interpretations and other research. But one interpretation is not just as good as another, which would be the case for relativism. Every interpretation must be built upon claims of validity, and the procedures ensuring validity are as demanding for … [social] research as for any other activity in the social and political sciences … If a better interpretation demonstrates the previous interpretation to be “merely” interpretation, this new interpretation remains valid until another, still better interpretation is produced which can
reduce the previous interpretation to “merely” interpretation.
(pp. 130–131)

In a similar manner, Hall and Rist (1999) suggest that the “key to good qualitative research is methodological triangulation. Triangulation is like using a three-legged stool. Remove one leg, and the stool is much less reliable” (p. 295). For this study, the qualitative methodology employed included insider research (participant observation), in-depth interviews and document analysis. Through this multi-method research perspective, combining a variety of data-collection sources, the researcher has a strong “basis for drawing conclusions with strong validity” (Hall & Rist, 1999, p. 295). The use of a range of data sources can provide a deeper and richer understanding, which may not be possible through the use of a single approach (LeCompte & Preissle, 1993).

Another important concern for qualitative researchers is the issue of generalisation. It is often unrealistic for a qualitative researcher with limited funds to gather data from every potential member of a particular study population (Veal, 2006). Because of this problem, the selection of a representative sample can be an important research strategy. The more representative the research sample, the more likely the findings can be generalised (Veal, 2006). Sarantakos (1998) makes a number of recommendations that can assist in making a study sample more representative. Firstly, through theoretical sampling the interviewing of non-representative respondents can be minimised. Secondly, increasing the number of subjects involved in a study can assist to produce more generalisable findings (Veal, 2006). Thirdly, data saturation can assist the process of achieving validity (Ticehurst & Veal, 1999). According to Gratton and Jones (2004), saturation occurs in that stage of the research when “further data collection will not provide any different information from that you already have” (p. 153).

In summary, the above discussion highlights the ease with which qualitative research can be impacted by the researcher and the influence they
can have on the study’s respondents. Therefore, it is vital for the qualitative researcher to acknowledge their “authorial self as intrusive but indispensable to the research process” (Skinner & Edwards, 2005, p. 417). The following section of this chapter will now examine in detail the first qualitative method used for the study, that of insider research.

4.3 Insider Research

As highlighted earlier, this study has been shaped and influenced by the researcher’s experience in the organisation under examination. Therefore, the study is partly ethnographic in that the researcher has been a part of the research setting and has lived and experienced the research environment (Flyvbjerg, 2001). “Insider research” is a term used widely to describe this type of research (Coghlan, 2003). In recent times insider research has been undertaken more frequently by organisational researchers (Coghlan, 2003). According to Dandelion (1997), insider research can be described as research undertaken on a group by a current or former member of the group that is being examined.

Organising an event like the Olympic Games produces knowledge, and this knowledge generation in turn provides an opportunity for organisational development and learning (DiBella, 2001). The value of insider research as a method, therefore, is that it can be used to explore the deeper elements of organisational culture, action and knowledge by providing a close view of organisational practices and routines (Flyvbjerg, 1998). According to Coghlan (2003):

Insider research is valuable because it draws on the experiences of practitioners as complete members of the organisations and so makes a distinctive contribution to the development of knowledge about organisations. We are all insiders in many systems – our own families, communities,
organisations and associations. As members we play active roles in the development of these systems, e.g. in child rearing, or in enabling the organisation to function and fulfil its goals. (p. 452)

4.3.1 Types of Insider Research

Dandelion (1997) suggests there are four distinct types of insider research. The first type is called ‘overt insider to the context’. This occurs when a researcher may be required to change their identity in order to be able to negotiate their way into the sub-group being studied (Shaffir, 1974). The second type of insider research is called ‘overt insider to the group’. This is when a researcher is studying a group in which they are an established member; for example, this would occur when an individual is researching their own sporting club (Heilman, 1976). The third type of insider research is called ‘covert insider to the context’. This occurs when the researcher, before starting the study, may have some knowledge of the group being examined but the researcher’s knowledge will also develop and increase as the study develops (Hobbs, 1989). The fourth type of insider research is called ‘covert insider to the group’. This is when a researcher conducts a study on a group or organisation in which they were formerly a member (Holdaway, 1982). This fourth type, ‘covert insider to the group’, fits with this particular study. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the researcher started observing the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program as a staff member between 1998 and 2000.

4.3.2 Insider Research and this Study

According to Coghlan (2003), research conducted by insiders “is characterised by the researcher being immersed experientially in the situation” (p. 456). As such, insider researchers are able to use the knowledge and understanding they have of the organisation, rather than constructing a second-
order ‘reconstituted understanding’ (Coghlan, 2003, p. 456). Insider researchers are also advantaged in that they have a detailed knowledge and familiarity of an organisation’s everyday operation and life (Coghlan, 2003). Second, if the researcher has managed to gain knowledge about and trust of the members of the organisation being examined, this may lead to the researcher having greater access to data and informants (Dandelion, 1997). Moreover, insider researchers:

know, at least implicitly, the everyday jargon; they know the legitimate and taboo phenomena of what can be talked about and what cannot; they know what occupies colleagues’ minds; they know how the informal organisation works and who to turn to for information and gossip; they know all the critical events and what they mean within the organisation, and they are able to see beyond objectives that are merely window dressing. (Coghlan, 2003, p. 456)

For this study, the initial research idea developed soon after the completion of the Sydney Games. An outcome of the successful staging of the Games, and in particular the sport competition, the researcher wanted to explore this success. Through the researchers work in the integrated SOCOG and SPOC Sport Programs, the operation and management of the SSC was observed on a regular basis. Due to this experience gained inside the organisation the researcher developed an interest in the role played by the AOC, in the Sydney Games and especially its relationship to the management of SOCOG and the SSC. It is unlikely, therefore, that this specific study would have been conceived without the experience gained by the researcher within the SOCOG. Without this insider experience and organisational knowledge, the researcher would not have had the opportunity to develop the internal network that allowed for an extensive collection of organisational data (Coghlan & Shani, 2008).
Furthermore, as a Sydney 2000 staff member who worked within the SOCOG Sport Program, this researcher was able to gain significant access to middle and senior SOCOG managers. It is estimated that over the two-year period of employment, the researcher attended more than 300 meetings that related to the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program. Many of these meeting were attended by senior SOCOG officials, such as the Deputy Chief Executive Officer of SOCOG and the General Managers of the SOCOG Sport Division and Venue Management Division, respectively. Table 7 (below) outlines in further detail the number of meetings and organisational activities attended over the course of the preparations for the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games.

Table 8: Insider Research Experience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data type</th>
<th>Organisational meetings attended (1998 - 2001)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organisational experiences within SOCOG</td>
<td>Project Officer - Sport Competition (1998 - 2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participation in weekly Sport Competition Management Meetings (approximately 100 meetings attended between November 1998 and December 2000).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participation in weekly Venue Precinct Planning and Venue Team Meetings (approximately 150 meetings attended between November 1998 and December 2000).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participation in monthly Olympic and Paralympic Sport Division Meetings (approximately 30 meetings attended between November 1998 and December 2000).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participation in Event Control Group and Test Event Planning Meetings (approximately 20 meetings attended between November 1998 and August 2000).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participation in SOCOG Workforce Meetings (approximately 20 meetings attended between November 1998 and December 2000).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participation in yearly meetings and briefings with international sporting federations (approximately 30 meetings attended between November 1998 and December 2000).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participation in yearly meetings and briefings with national Olympic committees and national Paralympic committees (approximately 40 meetings attended between November 1998 and December 2000).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Therefore, having a high level of familiarity with SOCOG was a considerable advantage for the researcher. Due to this organisational experience, the researcher was also familiar with the internal SOCOG operational structure and its management jargon (Coghlan, 2003). This knowledge assisted the researcher in comprehending the broader organisational practices that developed over the course of the Games preparations. Furthermore, the detailed organisational knowledge developed over the employment period by the researcher shaped how the research questions were developed, the organisational matters that were viewed as critical to the study, and how replies to interview questions were treated in the context of further qualitative probing, in order to extract as much meaningful data as possible (Poll, 1962).

Aside from assisting the development of the research questions, the internal knowledge of SOCOG and its operations and procedures also assisted the researcher in knowing which individuals should be questioned and interviewed for the study. Over the course of the preparations for the Sydney Olympics, SOCOG had more than 3000 full-time staff work within it, over its seven-year history (SOCOG, 2000a). Thus, through attending weekly SOCOG Sport Program Competition Management meetings, the researcher was able to watch how organisational relationships changed and developed at critical periods of the Olympic planning process. (It is also worth noting that while the researcher was a member of the SOCOG Sport Program, he had limited direct involvement with the AOC on a day-to-day basis. This organisational relationship was predominantly managed by the General Manager of the SOCOG Sport Program).

Through attending such meetings, the researcher developed an understanding of the internal workforce politics. Via this process the researcher was able nominate the key and most relevant managers for this study so that the collection of data was focused and targeted (Gratton & Jones, 2004). This process also ensured that a wide range of internal Sport Program managers
were interviewed, some of whom held divergent and / or critical perspectives of SOCOG management. At all times the researcher attempted to embrace Flyvbjerg’s (2001) call for polyphonic voices to be heard when conducting qualitative social science.

As outlined earlier in this chapter, trust is an important aspect of insider research. Gaining trust over a two-year period among SOCOG work colleagues allowed the researcher to collect interview data in a relatively quick manner. Second, the level of trust the researcher developed and maintained with former Olympic and Paralympic colleagues facilitated the gathering of deep and rich data that may have been difficult for an outsider to achieve (Coghlan, 2003; Veal, 2006). In support of these points, Dandelion (1997) argues that insider researchers can gain a research advantage particularly “where personal involvement and mutual familiarity help build an attitude of trust towards a researcher” (p. 58).

Whilst having considerable advantages, insider research also has a number of disadvantages. Firstly, being “too close” to the data may result in the researcher making assumptions and therefore not probing certain areas as deeply as an outside researcher might (Coghlan, 2003). For instance, to an insider researcher the answer to a question may seem obvious, while an outsider may expose the response to an alternate probe (Coghlan, 2003). Knowing too much, therefore, may at times be a disadvantage, as an insider researcher may miss a subtle point that an outsider may pick up quite quickly. As an example, an insider may take for granted the daily practices of an organisation, whilst an outsider may find these same practices strange, unusual, peculiar or important and worth further investigation (Dandelion, 1997). Secondly, tensions and difficulties may develop between those conducting the insider research and those being observed (Ramirez & Bartunek, 1989). In relation to this research, SOCOG as the organisation being studied had a relatively short life span, and as the interview data were collected after the organisation had ceased operating, no tensions arose between the researcher
and those providing the data. In fact, all the subjects who agreed to participate in the research did so in a very friendly and accommodating manner.

### 4.4 In-Depth Interviews

The second qualitative method of data collection employed for this study was semi-structured in-depth interviews. The value of conducting in-depth interviews as part of a qualitative case research methodology is that it can assist the researcher to elicit viewpoints and experiences from a particular group of respondents (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Veal, 2006). The approach was selected because, as Gillham (2000) suggests, conducting in-depth interviews facilitates rich communication. Moreover, in-depth interviews enable the research participants to describe their experiences and ideas in their own words (Gratton & Jones, 2004).

Semi-structured in-depth interviews also allow the researcher to collect unexpected data that may emerge as respondents emphasise points that are important to them and may not have been considered by the interviewer (Gratton & Jones, 2004). Furthermore, when in-depth interviews are conducted in person, they can permit the interviewer to develop a level of trust with the respondent that may enable the respondent to feel more secure in providing difficult-to-obtain data (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Patton, 1990). These factors were important to this study because rich and detailed organisational data were sought from former SOCOG managers about their organisational experiences.

The in-depth interviews conducted for this study employed a semi-structured technique, rather than one that was structured or unstructured. Kvale (1996) defines the semi-structured interview as a way of obtaining “descriptions of the life world of the interviewee with respect to interpreting the meaning of the described phenomena” (pp. 5–6). The semi-structured approach was seen as the most appropriate format for the study because the
researcher had a list of questions that required answering. Additionally, the approach allowed the researcher to further probe the respondent descriptions in order to elicit further detail at relevant times. This approach is in contrast to a structured interview method, which is more like conducting a “questionnaire where the questions are read out by the researcher, who also notes the responses” (Gratton & Jones, 2004, p. 141). Conversely, in an unstructured interview method, the researcher has a general idea of the topics to be covered but often the respondent actually determines the direction of the interview (Gratton & Jones, 2004). The danger with this approach, however, is that the interview data can often lack focus due to the free nature of the discussion (Gratton & Jones, 2004).

The rationale for the researcher in using a semi-structured approach was based on two specific concerns. Firstly, a semi-structured approach is flexible and based on open-ended questions. The method allows the investigator to probe certain responses to extract further detail, in addition to allowing the respondents to determine how long and how detailed their responses are (Fontana & Frey, 1994, 2005). Secondly, the flexible nature of a semi-structured approach is helpful when the researcher has limited experience in this area (Kvale, 1996; Silverman, 1995a). According to Byrne (2004) semi-structured and open-ended questions “are likely to get a more considered response than closed questions and therefore provide better access to interviewees’ views, interpretation of events, understandings, experiences and opinions” (p. 182). In addition to selecting the style of interview method, another important aspect of the qualitative research was the selection of interview respondents (Veal, 2006). The following section will discuss and examine this selection process.

4.4.1 Subject Selection—Who, How, When, Where and Why

The subject-selection process for this research was based on the principle of theoretical sampling. According to Minichiello, Aroni, Timewell &
Alexander (1995), theoretical sampling involves the deliberate selection of individuals within a certain population. This particular selection method involves selecting a small number of targeted representatives in order to provide insight to a specific case. A total of 35 SOCOG managers and officials were interviewed for this study. The semi-structured in-depth interviews with this selected sample population took place over two periods. The majority of the interviews (n. 25) were conducted starting in March 2002 and finishing in July 2003. A second round of interviews (n. 10) were conducted in 2009, starting in March and finishing in July. The researcher decided to conduct this last round of interviews for two reasons. Firstly, after reviewing the initial data set, the researcher decided it would be worthwhile to increase the overall depth of the data collected for the study. Secondly, all the interview respondents selected for the last round of interviews had either worked directly for another OCOG post Sydney 2000 or had consulted to one or a number of OCOGs and/or cities staging the Olympic Games post Sydney 2000. This additional experience provided these respondents with further knowledge that, in turn, could inform the study.

The primary population for this study comprised people who worked as managers in the SOCOG Sport Program (see Table 8 for additional detail). The subjects included SOCOG Sport Commission representatives, SOCOG General Managers, SOCOG Program Managers and SOCOG Sport Competition Managers. SOCOG employed a competition manager for each of the 28 Olympic sports represented at the Sydney Games. Apart from the competition managers, additional SOCOG officials such as SOCOG General Managers, SOCOG Program Managers and SOCOG Sports Commission representatives were interviewed as part of the study. These managers and representatives, in particular, were selected to be part of the study as they were central to the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program at the Sydney Games. On average, the respondents interviewed had worked for SOCOG for a period of four years. Of the 35 respondents, five were female, while the remaining 30 respondents
were male. Two of the respondents interviewed had also maintained paid positions within the AOC, while another three had experience as board members on the AOC Executive Committee.

Table 9: Interview Subjects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positions Held by Interview Population</th>
<th>Additional Positions Held by Interview Respondents at the Time of the Staging of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thirty-five interviews were conducted with SOCOG officials. These officials held the following positions:</td>
<td>Five SOCOG officials interviewed for this study also maintained positions on international sport federation boards at the time of the Sydney Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOG President and NSW Government Olympic Minister (1)</td>
<td>One SOCOG Manager interviewed for the study who started at SOCOG in 1997 left the organisation in 1999 to work as a Manager of Sport for the IOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOC President, SOCOG Vice-President, and SSC Chairperson (1)</td>
<td>Two SOCOG officials interviewed also held paid positions with the AOC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOC Secretary-General, SOCOG Board Member and SSC representative (1)</td>
<td>SOCOG Deputy CEO and SSC representative (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOG Sport Program - General Manager (1)</td>
<td>SOCOG Sport Program - Program Managers (5) (within this group two managers between 1996 and 2000 also maintained the position of Corporate Secretary for the SSC, while another manager spent the last year of the Games preparations working for the IOC as their Manager of Sport Competition)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| SOCOG Sport Program - Competition Managers (25) (included in the number are five managers who also held the position of SOCOG Venue Manager at Games time) | }
The respondents were contacted by e-mail and asked if they would like to participate in the study. The e-mail stated the aims of the research as well as the importance placed by the researcher on participant confidentiality. Twenty-two of the thirty-five respondents agreed to participate in face-to-face interviews. Most of these 22 respondents lived in Sydney, the same city where the researcher was based. These respondents were given the option of being interviewed at a setting of their choice. Most respondents chose their place of work or a café nearby their workplace or home. Other respondents preferred to be interviewed at their home. The average time taken to complete the 22 face-to-face interviews was one hour. The shortest interview was 45 minutes in length, while the longest went for more than two hours. Each interview was tape recorded, after firstly seeking approval from the respondent, and afterwards transcribed verbatim.

For the 13 respondents residing in other states of Australia or who were located outside of Australia, seven agreed to be interviewed over the telephone. A time suitable for each respondent was established for the phone interview to take place. The telephone interviews took an average of 40 minutes to complete. The shortest phone interview was 30 minutes, while the longest went for one hour. Like the face-to-face interviews, each phone interview was recorded with the approval of the respondent and then transcribed afterwards. According to Gratton and Jones (2004), interviewing by phone is an appropriate method, especially when the respondents “are geographically dispersed” (p. 152). The main disadvantage, however, in utilising telephone technology to conduct interviews for this study, when compared to the face-to-face method, was that the researcher was unable “to observe non-verbal reactions” to the questions asked (Gratton & Jones, 2004, p. 152).

The remaining six respondents, who were mostly based in Europe, stated to the respondent that they preferred to answer the research questions via e-mail. The researcher sent the six respondents the research questions and on
receipt of the responses, if further information or clarification was required, the researcher sent further e-mails seeking additional responses. Morgan and Symon (2004) argue that electronic interviews can be a useful tool for organisational researchers, “particularly where e-mail is an accepted form of communication” (p. 31). One advantage of electronic interviews is that they can provide a respondent with more time to consider a response to a question than a face-to-face or phone interview (Morgan & Symon, 2004). The main disadvantage for this interview method, however, is that it cannot pick up the verbal or non-verbal cues that a face-to-face interview can achieve (Cassell & Symon, 2004).

4.4.2 Ethical Considerations

With a significant component of this research centring on interviews, it was important to address any ethical concerns that may arise. The study design, including the implementation of the semi-structured in-depth interviews, was approved by the Griffith University Human Research Ethics Committee. Three particular ethical concerns were addressed. Firstly, every attempt was made to limit the possibility of causing distress to the respondents during the conduct of the interviews. Overall, the in-depth interviews were well received by the participants, with no problems noted or any negative feedback. Secondly, the confidentiality of the subjects was paramount. All of the interview transcripts were coded with a randomly selected number between 1 and 35, representing the number assigned to each participant. These codes were stored separately to the interview tapes. Thirdly, the research was conducted in a manner that would not disrupt or waste the time of the participants. Ultimately, however, this factor was not a concern to the respondents, as they were more than happy to devote their time to this research project.
4.4.3 Pilot Interview

In February 2002, in the early stages of the research project, a pilot list of interview questions was verified by Associate Professor Richard Cashman of the University of New South Wales (UNSW). (Professor Cashman was selected because the researcher worked with him on an Olympic study project while completing a Masters of Arts degree at UNSW.) In March 2002, a pilot interview was conducted with a former SOCOG manager. The main objective of the pilot was to test the interview questions and particularly the format of the questions. The pilot interview was recorded and transcribed verbatim. This interview took 45 minutes and additional diary notes were taken throughout. The pilot was considered successful, based on the primary considerations of the time taken to progress through the questions and the interview format. In this regard, the transition of the questions was evaluated, with minor changes made for subsequent interviews.

In the main, the interview questions centred on the role of the AOC and the effectiveness of the SSC in the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program. Questions were also asked regarding how the various Olympic stakeholders, such as the international sports federations and the national sports federations, shaped and influenced the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program. Furthermore, probing questions were utilised to enable the interviewer to seek more detailed information on particular answers or when a new stream of information emerged of which the interviewer was unaware. For example, in one case the interviewer was informed by a response outlining the assistance a manager received from a senior government official in organising their Olympic sport. This particular response took the interviewer down an interview path that was unexpected but was rich in important data, relating to the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. Table 9 (see below) outlines the semi-structured interview guide utilised for the study as well as the probing questions that were asked where required.
### Table 10: Semi-Structured Interview Guide

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question number</th>
<th>Semi-structured interview questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Q1.             | How did you view the involvement of the AOC in the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program?  
Probing question: With this question the respondents often mentioned the role of the SSC in the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. The answers also often outlined whether they saw this involvement as a positive or negative feature for the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program at the Sydney Games. |
| Q2.             | What impact did the SOCOG Sports Commission have on the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games?  
Probing question: On most occasions, the respondents outlined whether they viewed the SSC as a positive or negative initiative. When they did not, a follow-up question probed them on this aspect. |
| Q3.             | Did the SOCOG Sports Commission make any decisions that impacted your particular Olympic sport?  
Probing question: On many occasions the responses to question 1 also addressed this question. Any probing questions that developed out of this question were contextual to the individual sports that each respondent represented. For example, the managers interviewed, who had responsibility for the Beach Volleyball competition, were probed on why there sport was the only Olympic sport at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games not to have an official test event. |
| Q4.             | What were the main policies and strategies devised by the SOCOG Sports Commission that impacted the organisation of your specific sport at the Games?  
Probing question: Sometimes the answers given by respondents in question 3 also covered the core concern of this question. Otherwise, where relevant further contextual detail was probed from respondents. For example, one respondent discussed an unintended planning problem at the Olympic Equestrian Venue. The problem centred on a poor soil sub-base foundation that became dangerous for the horses and their footing, in the main arena at the venue. The problem only came to hand very late in the Olympic planning and was brought about mainly due to a period of heavy rain. The interviewer therefore asked probing questions relating to whom within SOCOG or the SSC was able to assist to resolve this issue. |
| Q5.             | How did your specific International Sporting Federation view the establishment and operation of the SOCOG Sports Commission?  
Probing question: If not addressed in the answer to question 5, the respondents were asked how involved the IF for their particular Olympic sport was in the organisation of Games. |
| Q6. | How did your specific National Sporting Federation view the establishment and operation of the SOCOG Sports Commission? Probing question: In addition to questions on the role of the international sports federations, the respondents were asked to elaborate on the role of the national federations in the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program. These questions were asked in the context that most of the managers interviewed were closely associated with their sports national federation. As outlined above, some were members of their national federation Board of Directors. |
| Q7. | Did you think there were any weaknesses in how the SOCOG Sport Program was organised? Probing question: Depending on the context of the response, further probing sought further detail on the weaknesses outlined. |
| Q8. | What did you think were the strengths in how the SOCOG Sport Program was organised? Probing question: Depending on the context of the response, further detail was sought on the strengths outlined in the initial answer. |
| Q9. | What were the issues that caused you the most problems as a manager in the SOCOG Sport Program? Probing question: Depending on the context of the response, probing sought additional detail on the issues outlined. |
| Q10. | Are there any other comments you would like to make about the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program at the Sydney Olympics? |

In addition to the semi-structured in-depth interviews and insider research data, as outlined above, collected for this study, organisational and related documents were a further source of data.

### 4.5 Document Analysis

Historical documentation is of importance to this study. According to Hall and Rist (1999), the analysis of documents “can provide a wealth of information” for researchers, for instance, “businesses keep records, organisations keep records, and governments keep records” (p. 302). Furthermore, as suggested by Bernard (1995), “human behaviour often leaves traces, and the study of those traces can tell us a lot” (p. 332). Document
analysis is the examination of these documentary traces that are left behind (Hall & Rist, 1999). The analysis of documents for this study centres on organisational data selected from SOCOG internal reports, SOCOG and AOC annual reports, official post-Olympic reports and official AOC and SOCOG historical sources. The key themes, strategies, values and messages to emerge from the documentary sources that have relevance to this research have been examined in detail and thoroughly analysed.

The historical sources examined for the study assisted the researcher in providing additional organisational context and detail. As outlined in Chapter One, the analysis of organisational development is an important feature of the study and fits closely with the selected processual analytical framework (van Krieken et al., 2000). These documentary sources, like other forms of qualitative data (i.e. interview data), may be unreliable at times, in addition to being open to different interpretations (van Krieken et al., 2000). Historical sources can also be subjective and reflective of the ideologies of those who have produced them interdependently (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). Even when considering these issues, primary historical and secondary historical sources reveal the perspectives of their authors, adding another dynamic element to organisational analysis. van Krieken et al. (2000) further argue that “whatever the problems of historical research, without using historical documents sociologists would be confined to producing a rather static view of social life” (p. 617).

4.5.1 Assessing Historical Sources

Not all documents or sources are of equal quality or detail. Some documents may “have more credibility and trustworthiness than … others” (Hall & Rist, 1999, p. 302). In addressing these issues, Scott (1990) has provided a list of guidelines that can be used when attempting to assess the value of historical sources. These guidelines were applied to the documents
that informed this research and include four main themes: authenticity; credibility; representativeness; and meaning (Scott, 1990). van Krieken et al. (2000) also suggest that a reliable and authentic document is one that does not have missing pages or misprints. A copy of an original should mean it is reliable and thus without errors of transcription. If there are missing pages or sections within documents, this can detract from its reliability and validity (Scott, 1990). For this study, few documents had missing sections and were generally intact.

Another point outlined by Scott (1990) refers to authorship. This is particularly relevant, as the SOCOG internal organisational documents examined were not only authentic but were also attributed to the individuals who actually wrote them. This point is supported by Lewis-Beck, Bryman and Liao (2003), who argue that it is often the case with organisational documents that the question of authorship is unclear. In the case of this research, many of the SOCOG documents that were read by the researcher had been reviewed by many internal executives and managers before being approved at the time of their distribution within the organisation.

Scott (1990) suggests that a credible document is one that is sincere and accurate. In sincerely written documents, the author/s believed in what was produced and published (Lewis-Beck et al., 2003). This may not always be the case, for example, when an author attempts to deliberately deceive a reader. While a sincerely written and generally accurate document may be diminished as the result of unintended errors or language translation (Lewis-Beck et al., 2003), errors in documents may also be due to the account being written some time after the event, when one’s memory may be less clear or where the interpreter mistakes the translation or meaning of the text being examined (Lewis-beck et al., 2003; Scott, 1990). As the researcher was an organisational insider and had access to a great number of the organisational documents used in the study, and because these documents were mostly primary rather than
secondary historical documents, they are regarded to be of a credible nature (Lewis-Beck et al., 2003). However, the researcher is also aware and understands that a researcher can never be totally certain (Hall & Rist, 1999), as outlined by Lewis-Beck et al. (2003):

Even a document that has been sincerely produced may be inaccurate. To assess the accuracy of a report, it is necessary to look at the conditions under which it was complied and, in particular, how close the author was to the events reported. Accuracy is generally held to be the greatest in primary sources—first-hand accounts—because these are felt to minimise any loss of accuracy due to lapses of memory, inadequate records, or ignorance. (p. 283)

The use of historical sources can at times be selective in that not all documents become available to a researcher or actually survive an organisation’s history in order to be analysed (Scott, 1990). Some documents may not survive for a variety of reasons, including theft, destruction or misadventure. In other instances, documents may be withheld from researchers. For instance, a number of SOCOG documents that could have been useful for this study, such as SOCOG Board minutes, have been withheld from the public domain by the NSW Government for a period of 30 years. This is a limitation for this study.

Another factor that needs to be considered when examining documents is how they are interpreted. Being able to understand the “meaning” of a document and the context in which it was written is important for an organisational researcher (Scott, 1990). For instance, some documents may have been written in a different language or were written by hand in a manner that makes it difficult or near impossible to comprehend. For this study, with the researcher having a detailed and inside knowledge of the organisation being
examined, determining the meaning of the documents reviewed was not a significant concern. Further, all the documents reviewed and analysed were written in English, and secondly, the organisational jargon and context were familiar to the researcher because of their working history within SOCOG.

The documents reviewed for this study helped verify and augment the responses of the interviewed research participants (Veal, 2006). This process involved examining the content of SOCOG documents, relevant annual reports, internal meeting minutes, newspaper articles and radio and television program transcripts. The process was undertaken to inform and to provide further evidence to determine the themes that emerged from the interview data (Veal, 2006). Additionally, these documents provided support to the observations made by the researcher as an organisational insider (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998).

The document analysis included an examination of related web-based documents, citing where appropriate articles that commented on the planning of the Sydney Olympics. For instance, the University of Technology, Sydney, library’s electronic journal database Supersearch was utilised, as was the search engine Google and Google Scholar. A range of other academic and news source databases were searched, including: Sportsdiscus; Factivia; Newsbank; Academic Search Elite; and, EBSCO Business Premier. Some of the general search terms used early in the research process included terms such as: “Sydney 2000 Olympic Games”; “Australian Olympic Committee”; “International Olympic Committee”; and “Olympic Co-ordination Authority”.

The key documents obtained for the analysis and which assisted the study in order to provide organisational context included: the Official Report of the Games of the XXVII Olympiad (2001); the SOCOG Sport Division Operational Plan (1999); the SOCOG Sport Division Milestone Plan (1998–2000); newspaper articles and special reports from the Sydney Morning Herald, the Daily Telegraph, the Financial Review, The Australian and The Age (1988–

Table 10 (see below) outlines the list of key documents that were obtained, read and reviewed for the study.

Table 11: Documents Examined

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document Type</th>
<th>Document Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Official documents</td>
<td>SOCOG documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Official Report of the Games of the XXVII Olympiad (Toohey, 2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- SOCOG Sport Division Milestone Reports (1998-2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- SOCOG Sport Division Operational Plan (1998-2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- SOCOG Sport Division Meeting Reports (1998-2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- SOCOG Event Control Group Meeting Reports (1998-2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Manual for Candidate Cities for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (2001)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Media reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>The Sydney Morning Herald</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Daily Telegraph</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Financial Review</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Age</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Various international news sources</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Radio program transcripts and audio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>ABC Radio National (Sports Factor)</em></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Television program transcripts and video</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Channel Nine (Sunday Program)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>ABC Television (Four Corners)</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.6 Qualitative Data Analysis

Gratton and Jones (2004) suggest there is no single accepted way of analysing qualitative data in social research. For this study, the qualitative data were analysed in an iterative manner, moving back and forth between the data set and the emergent theoretical structure arguments (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Pratt, Rockmann & Kaufmann, 2006). The following section will discuss the process and methods employed in the analysis of qualitative data for this study.

Miles and Huberman (1994) argue that qualitative data analysis should consist of three main steps. The first step they suggest is data reduction. In this stage the range of data used by the researcher was organised and reduced. Data that were not relevant were put aside, while summaries of relevant data were completed and coding of the data conducted (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The second step, according to Miles and Huberman (1994), is the display of data. During this stage the researcher started to examine and draw conclusions from the range of data collected. As part of this stage, the researcher started to display relevant data in the forms of tables and charts in order to highlight emerging themes and ideas (Miles & Huberman, 1994). This particular process was ongoing throughout the data-analysis phase of the research. The third step
outlined by Miles and Huberman (1994) is conclusion verification. In this stage, the analysis of the data leads to conclusions being developed regarding the outlined research questions. The initial results that emerged from the first wave of interview data (collected in 2002 and 2003) were checked and verified and compared with the second wave of interview data (collected in 2009).

In attempting to answer the research questions the collected data needed to be analysed thoroughly and systematically (Veal, 2006). The process involved identifying the key themes that emerged from the analysed data. The process of condensing the collected data into a manageable form was conducted while recognising that it was important for the researcher not to diminish the organisational context in which the data were collected (Punch, 2001). In order to achieve this aim, the collected qualitative data were carefully read and re-read a number of times, with manual notes kept to highlight important sections or quotes.

The collected data were analysed in order to identify the key themes and categories to emerge from the analysis. Gratton and Jones (2004) suggest that the process of data analysis should involve a number of readings of the data so as to determine the meaning and relationships of particular words and concepts. Data analysis also enables the investigator to sort through a significant amount of content in a systematic manner (Stemler, 2001). This process was initially conducted manually. The researcher felt that it was important to get ‘close’ to the data in the beginning so as to build an understanding of the emergent themes before undertaking more technical computer-based analysis (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). After completing the manual data analysis, a second round of analysis was undertaken using the NVivo computer software system. For both the manual and the NVivo computer-based analysis, the first stage involved identifying the central themes and ideas to emerge from the collected data.
4.6.1 Coding the Data

A key aspect of managing qualitative data is the process of data coding. Data coding is a process of managing data through their placement into thematic ‘baskets’ or categories. According to Gratton and Jones (2004), “each code is effectively a category or ‘bin’ into which a piece of data is placed” (p. 219). This research coding at an early stage of data analysis provided a basic structure and form for the collected information. Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest that codes are like tags or section units of meaning and, depending on the research objectives, they can be assigned to words, phrases, sentences or even paragraphs. Gratton and Jones (2004) also suggest that data validity is an important consideration in determining codes for qualitative data. They argue that codes: “should be valid, that is they should accurately reflect what is being researched, they should be mutually exclusive, in that codes should be distinct, with no overlap, and they should be exhaustive, that is all relevant data should fit into a code” (Gratton & Jones, 2004, p. 219).

The following steps outline the process of data coding that took place for this study. These steps followed the process as outlined by Miles and Huberman (1994). This process consisted of three interrelated stages. The first stage involved developing the provisional data categories and the related first-order codes. The second stage involved the development of theoretical categories based on the formation of the first-order codes. The final stage in the data-coding process employed for this study combined the theoretical categories into broader aggregated theoretical dimensions. The following section will now discuss these three stages in more detail.

Stage 1: Provisional categories and first-order codes

The researcher commenced the data-coding process by reading all the interview transcripts in full. After each transcript was read a number of times, the researcher started identifying statements made by the respondents that connected to research questions that were being addressed. This process is
known as the open coding phase (Gratton & Jones, 2004). Here the researcher examined the data carefully, looking for key statements that related to the research questions. During this stage the researcher drew on common statements from the qualitative data to create provisional categories, which became the first-order codes (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Pratt et al., 2006). Following this process, the highlighted statements were assigned to the relevant codes.

This process was initially completed manually, in order for the researcher to get a ‘feel’ for the qualitative data (Charmaz, 2006; Gratton & Jones, 2004). After the researcher felt satisfied with the manual analysis, and upon feedback from the researcher’s supervisors, a second round of coding took place, utilising the NVivo software package. A key strength in using the NVivo computer system was that it allowed the researcher to refine the first-order coding categories developed in the manual coding process. Through the use of the NVivo data-management system, the provisional coding structure was able to be modified quickly and accurately (Richards, 2008). This was achieved because NVivo gave the researcher the ability to quickly search for key words and themes across more than 100,000 words of qualitative data (Richards, 2008). When compared to the manual process undertaken by the researcher, NVivo proved to be a very efficient research tool.

Following the modification of the first-order codes, which was completed using NVivo, the data were reviewed and re-read a number of times to see how they fitted each of the created categories. When the researcher felt the data did not fit well with a coded category, that code was revised or merged (Gratton & Jones, 2004). While the researcher coordinated and designed the data-coding process from start to finish, advice was sought regularly from the research supervisors in order to identify any potential overlapping codes.
Stage 2: Theoretical coding categories and second-order themes

After completing the development of the first-order codes, the researcher began integrating these codes into theoretical categories. These categories are termed second-order themes, as they are only formed after the combining of first-order codes. Not unlike the first data-analysis stage, as the second-order themes were developed, the researcher returned to the data to determine whether these codes fitted the emergent theoretical abstractions (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Pratt et al., 2006). When the researcher found inconsistencies in the theoretical coding, the coding categories were modified accordingly. For instance, this occurred when a code was found to contain minimal data in comparison to the other theoretical codes.

Within this stage of the analysis, the researcher was able to compare and contrast theoretically the ideas and cases that emerged from the qualitative data (Gratton & Jones, 2004). For instance, through this process the categories started to become more abstract, moving from an open coding process to an axial coding process (Locke, 2001; Pratt et al., 2006). As outlined by Charmaz (2006), “axial coding relates categories to sub-categories, specifies the properties and dimensions of a category and reassembles the data you have fractured during initial coding to give coherence to the emerging analysis” (p. 60). In this stage the codes developed in the first step were used by the researcher when re-reading the data, seeking statements that fitted into newly created sub-categories. This process allowed for additional codes to be created when new data were obtained later in the research process (Gratton & Jones, 2004).

Stage 3: Aggregating the theoretical categories

After the second-order themes were created and confirmed in stage two, the researcher then examined these categories to observe how they connected with one and another. Connecting second-order themes together resulted in the formation of two aggregated theoretical dimensions. The purpose of this approach was to build a more coherent theoretical picture (Charmaz, 2006;
Locke, 2001). The process went through a number of iterations, which involved taking into account feedback from the supervisors of the study, until the emergent themes were sufficiently connected, in a manner that the researcher and the research supervisors were satisfied reflected and addressed the stated research questions (Locke, 2001). Thus, during this stage the researcher looked for further and more detailed patterns and explanations to emerge from the data. Questions that were asked in this stage included:

- Can some codes be combined to form a more general but stronger code?

- Does there seem to be a link or relationship between code X and code Y?

In this final stage the raw data were read again in order to identify additional examples illustrating the analysis or assisting the explanation of the aggregated theoretical dimensions. For instance, within the coded categories the researcher looked for examples to help describe situations that were of interest to the study and its objectives. In this stage the researcher again looked for data that appeared contradictory to the broader analysis (Gratton & Jones, 2004). Therefore, in order to build a strong and holistic study, the researcher sought statements within the data that either confirmed or refuted the research aims (Gratton & Jones, 2004). Figure 4.1 presents, in a summary form, the process that developed the first-order codes, the second-order themes and the aggregated theoretical dimensions. As outlined in the next chapter, the aggregated theoretical dimensions are the central theoretical codes that best explain how the AOC influenced the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games.
Table 12: Coding and Theoretical Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aggregated Theoretical Categories</th>
<th>Second-Order Themes</th>
<th>First-Order Codes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organisational Knowledge and Networks</strong></td>
<td>Experience and Knowledge</td>
<td>Olympic Expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Olympic Vision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Leveraging Olympic Knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organisational Power</strong></td>
<td>Networks and Relations</td>
<td>Organisational Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Organisational Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Organisational Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Authority</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Legitimacy of the SSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Complexity of Olympic Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Autonomy and Interdependence</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Decision-Making Autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Resource Autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Policy Decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Organisational Interdependence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In summary, coding was undertaken to highlight the emerging themes and to facilitate analysis of approximately 100,000 words of interview transcripts. The use of NVivo assisted the researcher to import and analyse these large data files, easing the “laborious process of coding and analysing” the collected information (Veal, 2006, p. 213). The NVivo program also assisted the researcher to confirm the manually developed codes and themes by cross-checking the thematic relationships and patterns that developed from the qualitative data. The researcher acknowledged that using qualitative software such as NVivo makes the analytical process more efficient than manual processes (Veal, 2006).

Where necessary, the researcher was able to quickly refer to the data for further and timely analysis (Veal, 2006). The researcher was also aware that qualitative analysis that is over reliant on mechanistic software can be problematic (Dey, 1993). As outlined earlier in the chapter, because of these factors the researcher coded the data manually in the first instance, as through spending time manually reviewing the qualitative data output for organisational and social context, the finer detail can be scanned; this is something that can be easily lost through the use of computer analysis (Gratton & Jones, 2004). In support of these points, Krane, Anderson and Stean (1997) argue that computer-driven analysis is not necessarily superior to manual analysis but does allow the data to be examined in different ways.

4.7 Conclusion

In conclusion, this study employed a multiple qualitative research methodology. Through this broad approach the researcher attempted to ‘take out an insurance policy on the accuracy of the answer to the research question’ (Hall & Rist, 1999, p. 303). Such multiple-methodologies do not necessarily mean more research is better, but rather that a more integrated and coordinated approach can mitigate the risk of uneven research outcomes. This strategy of
organisational research triangulation is based on the proposition that different approaches can add to the certainty of the study and the questions that it has attempted to answer (Hall & Rist, 1999). Through the use of a variety of qualitative methods, the researcher has attempted to increase the accuracy and reliability of the research findings. In sum, this chapter discussed the procedures used to explore the outlined research questions. The research design was explained and justified, outlining the selection of subjects, the data-collection procedures, and the treatment of the collected data. Chapter Five will outline and discuss the data analysis.
CHAPTER FIVE: DATA ANALYSIS
5.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to present, analyse and discuss the research findings. The study addressed the following central research question: *How did the involvement of a host National Olympic Committee in the organisation of an Olympic Games influence the management of the Olympic Sport Program?* In order to answer this research question two subsidiary questions were presented. These questions addressed the following areas: *What impact did the SOCOG Sports Commission have on the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games?* and *How did the organisational power of the SOCOG Sport Program shape the management of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games?*

Data were collected from 35 SOCOG officials and managers. The majority of these officials interviewed for the study had direct involvement and responsibility for the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. Furthermore, in order to address the three main research questions, data were also collected from organisational and public documents and participant observations made by the researcher as a former SOCOG Sport Program staff member.

The data presented and analysed in this chapter illustrate the organisational power relations of the AOC, as evidenced through the establishment of the SOCOG Sports Commission (SSC), and in relation to the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. The data analysis explores the influence of the AOC within SOCOG, and consequently the impact that the formation of the SSC had on the SOCOG Sport Program.

As outlined in the previous chapter, the data analysis was undertaken in three stages. The data-analysis process proceeded iteratively, with the first stage being more open ended and fluid compared to the subsequent stages. For
the purpose of clarity, the following section explains in detail how the first-order codes, second-order themes and aggregated theoretical dimensions emerged from the data analysis.

**Stage One: Creating First-Order Codes**

The data analysis commenced with a reading and re-reading of the interview transcripts. As the research aim was to understand how the involvement of the AOC in the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games influenced the management of the SOCOG Sport Program, common statements found in the respondents’ interview transcripts were identified. In this open coding stage, the identification of common statements and ideas assisted the creation of the first-order codes (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Through this process similar statements were highlighted and assigned to a first-order code. For example, many respondents noted the importance of the AOC’s experience in Olympic administration and the impact this experience had on the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program at the Sydney Games. As a result, a first-order code called *Olympic Expertise* was created and statements regarding this were grouped into this code.

In order to get a better ‘feel’ for the data, this process was initially undertaken manually (Gratton & Jones, 2004). At the completion of the manual analysis, a second analysis was commenced. This analysis employed the *NVivo* qualitative data-management computer software. Using *NVivo* a more thorough understanding of the data across the identified first-order codes was achieved. Through this detailed analysis and external validation (i.e. supervisor feedback), the first-order codes that were considered to overlap conceptually were modified and consolidated. For example, at the completion of the manual coding there was one first-order code identified that captured data relating to ‘AOC strategy’ and another relating to the ‘AOC’s vision’ for the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. Based on *NVivo* analysis and supervisor feedback, it was decided that one first-order code called *Olympic Vision* more cogently encompassed the sentiments of both codes.
At the conclusion of this data-analysis stage, a total of 12 first-order codes were confirmed (see Table 12). These were: *Olympic Expertise; Olympic Vision; Leveraging Olympic Knowledge; Organisational Trust; Organisational Relations; Organisational Conflict; The Legitimacy of the SSC; The Complexity of Olympic Planning; Decision-Making Authority; Resource Autonomy; Policy Decisions; and Organisational Interdependence.* The saturation of responses for each interview participant and the 12 first-order codes can be viewed in Table 12. Each of these 12 first-order codes will be examined in this chapter.

**Stage Two: Emergent Second-Order Themes**

Following the development of the first-order codes, the second stage of the data analysis consisted of the integration of the first-order codes into theoretical categories. Throughout this chapter and following the work of Pratt et al. (2006), these theoretical categories are referred to as second-order themes. In a similar approach to the first stage of the data analysis, as theoretical categories were developed in the second stage, the researcher returned to the data to examine how the emergent second-order themes connected theoretically. When inconsistencies were observed in the formation of the second-order theme categories, modifications were undertaken to ensure that the analysis was coherent, especially in the context of the central research questions.

As part of this second stage of data analysis, theoretical ideas emerging from the qualitative data were examined from the perspective of the process sociological framework employed for this study. As result, the second stage of data analysis involved creating second-order themes that were more abstract than the first-order codes. This stage, therefore, involved moving from open coding to axial coding (Locke, 2001). As outlined by Charmaz (2006), axial coding is the process of reassembling data that has been “fractured during initial coding to give coherence to the emerging analysis” (p. 60). Through this
process four second-order themes emerged from the second stage of the data analysis: *Experience and Knowledge; Networks and Relations; Authority;* and *Autonomy and Interdependence.* The second-order themes and their relationship to the first-order codes can be viewed in Figure 1 and Table 12. Each of these second-order themes and first-order codes that provide their foundation are explained in detail in the remaining sections of this chapter.

*Stage Three: Aggregated Theoretical Dimensions*

The final stage of the data analysis involved aggregating the four second-order themes in order to build a streamlined and coherent theoretical perspective. This process involved exploration of the theoretical links of the second-order themes and examining how the emergent themes connected to the central research question and the guiding theoretical framework. This process involved a number of iterations and involved discussions with external experts.

At the completion of this data-analysis process, two aggregated theoretical dimensions emerged from the four second-order codes. These were: *Organisational Knowledge and Networks* and *Organisational Power.* *Organisational Knowledge and Networks,* the first theoretical dimension, consists of two of the second-order themes: *Experience and Knowledge and Networks and Relations.* The second aggregated theoretical dimension, *Organisational Power,* consists of the other two second-order themes: *Authority and Autonomy and Interdependence.* The relationship between the two aggregated theoretical dimensions and the second-order themes are reflected in Figure 1 (see below).

Due to the depth of data presented, this chapter has been divided into two parts. The first part, termed Part A, presents, analyses and discusses the data contained within the first aggregated theoretical dimension, while Part B presents, analyses and discusses the data for the second aggregated theoretical dimension. Both Part A and Part B conclude with a theoretical discussion
drawing upon the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter Three. The chapter starts by presenting the *Organisational Knowledge and Networks* aggregated theoretical dimension.
Figure 1: Aggregated Theoretical Dimensions and Second-Order Themes

Research Questions

RQ1: How did the involvement of a host National Olympic Committee in the organisation of an Olympic Games influence the management of the Olympic Sport Program?

RQ1.1: What impact did the formation of the SOCOG Sports Commission have on the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games?

RQ1.2: How did the organisational power of the SOCOG Sport Program shape the management of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games?

Stage One

First-Order Codes

Olympic Expertise
Olympic Vision
Leveraging Olympic Knowledge
Organisational Trust
Organisational Relations
Organisational Conflict

Stage Two

Second-Order Themes

5.2.1 Experience and Knowledge
5.2.2 Networks and Relations

Stage Three

Second-Order Themes

5.3.1 Authority
5.3.2 Autonomy and Interdependence

Aggregated Dimension 1
5.2 Organisational Knowledge and Networks

Aggregated Dimension 2
5.3 Organisational Power

Research Context

The organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympics Games and the agreement between two critical stakeholders, the AOC and the NSW Government, to establish the SOCOG Sports Commission in 1996.
Table 13: Aggregated Theoretical Dimensions 1 and 2

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5.2 Part A. Organisational Knowledge and Networks

The first aggregated theoretical dimension that developed from the data analysis is termed *Organisational Knowledge and Networks*. This dimension consists of two interrelated second-order themes. The second-order themes will be discussed in the following order, *Experience and Knowledge* and *Networks and Relations*. The *Experience and Knowledge* theme derived from the respondents' views of the AOC and whether they believed its SSC representatives influenced the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program. The second theme, *Networks and Relations*, addresses how the organisational networks of the AOC impacted and shaped the management of the SOCOG Sport Program, SOCOG, and the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games more generally.

A summary of the first-order data categories that emerged from the analysis is given in Table 13 (see below). The data saturation of the first-order data codes and their connection to the second-order themes can be viewed in Table 14 (see below). Following the discussion of the data, a theoretical analysis is presented. This analysis examines the first aggregated theoretical dimension in the context of the selected process sociological framework.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aggregated Theoretical Dimension</th>
<th>Second-Order Themes</th>
<th>First-Order Codes and Summary of Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Organisational Knowledge and Networks | Experience and Knowledge | **Olympic Expertise**  
- The AOC and its SSC representatives were people with extensive Olympic experience and knowledge. These individuals also had a history of involvement in the organisation of international and Australian sport  
- In contrast to the experience of the AOC, it was noted that OCOG Boards often consist of people who do not have a great deal of Olympic or sports administration knowledge  

**Olympic Vision**  
- The establishment and implementation of the SSC brought the athletes and sport to the forefront of SOCOG  
- As result of the formation of the SSC, the SOCOG Sport Program had the capacity to organise an Olympic Games as per the AOC’s vision  

**Leveraging Olympic Knowledge**  
- The AOC used its Olympic experience and knowledge to gain a powerful position in the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games  
- As a result of its power relations with the NSW Government, not only did the AOC secure its financial legacy, it also gained an agreement to establish the SSC |
| Networks and Relations | Organisational Trust | - The members of the SOCOG Sport Program had a high level of trust in the AOC and its representatives appointed to the SSC  
- The AOC leadership and its SSC representatives also expressed trust in the managers that were appointed to organise the SOCOG Sport Program |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisational Relations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- The network relationship between the leadership of the AOC and the NSW Government developed over time from a low level of trust to a functioning partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The internal network relations between the senior managers of the SOCOG Sport Program and the SOCOG Venue Management Program were strong and trusting</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The AOC and SSC leadership and the senior managers of the SOCOG Sport Program placed importance on developing positive relations with each of the 28 Olympic international sport federations</td>
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<thead>
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<th>Organisational Conflict</th>
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<td>- While the majority of the respondents were very supportive of the SSC and its operation, some respondents suggested that on occasions it made decisions that went beyond its brief</td>
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<td>- It was noted that the SSC could have been more diverse in its representation</td>
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<td>Second-Order Themes</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.2.1 Experience and Knowledge</td>
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<td>Olympic Expertise</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leveraging Olympic Knowledge</td>
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<td>5.2.2 Networks and Relations</td>
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<td>Organisational Trust</td>
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<td>Organisational Relations</td>
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<td>Organisational Conflict</td>
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5.2.1 Experience and Knowledge

The Experience and Knowledge second-order theme analysed and discussed in this section consists of three first-order categories. The first category explores the Olympic expertise of the AOC and the second category explains the AOC’s Olympic vision, specifically examining the AOC’s focus of organising an Olympic Games centred on the athletes. The third category explores how the AOC leveraged its Olympic experience and knowledge for its own advantage.

Olympic Expertise

The SSC representatives included: the President and the Secretary General of the AOC (John Coates and Craig McLatchey); the most senior Australian IOC member (Kevan Gosper) and two representatives from the SOCOG Board (Graham Richardson and Graham Lovett); and SOCOG Deputy CEO (Jim Sloman). Four of these six representatives appointed to the SSC had experience as members of the AOC Executive Board (Coates, McLatchey, Gosper and Lovett). The majority of the SSC representatives had therefore been involved with the AOC at one point in time (Gordon, 1994, 2003; SOCOG, 2000c). This close connection to the AOC was regarded as a positive feature of the SSC governance structure by those interviewed for this study. With their lengthy involvement in the Olympic Movement and their deep political and sport network ties, the SSC members were noted by interviewees as being well known and respected by the SOCOG managers who had responsibility for the organisation of the 28 Olympic sports at the Sydney Games.

The respondents believed that the AOC, and its appointed SSC officials not only held powerful positions within Australian sport but were also highly knowledgeable about the Olympic Movement. Respondent 05, for example, stated the members of the SSC “had significant sporting experience”, including one “being the former Australian Government Minister
for Sport”. The sentiment expressed in the interview data was that the individuals representing the AOC within SOCOG through their membership of the SSC were respected because they understood and knew the international sport system. The following respondent quotes reflect this sentiment. Respondent 24 stated that “the strong influence … of Jeff [AOC, SSC and SOCOG official] in general Games planning and Larry [AOC, SSC and SOCOG official] on the SSC, in particular, … maintained a high level of focus” on the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program throughout the Games cycle. According to Respondent 17, the SSC was “very valuable … [it] had good representatives … unique people … sporting people”. Likewise, Respondent 30 stated that the AOC leadership and its SSC representatives:

> were really important … all of the dealings I had with them, and there were quite a few, with different people, I thought that they were a really, really good organisation. Everybody seemed to be on the same page saying the same thing. And if you are dealing with any of their three or four top people, they are pretty high-quality people, that didn’t put too many feet wrong. So I think, I think they probably played a really, a really, big role and for the Olympics … they did a fantastic job. (Respondent 30)

With the extensive Olympic and sport experience of the AOC, respondents argued that through its SSC representatives the AOC had an understanding of the Olympic Games that placed the athletes and sport as a priority when planning the Sydney Olympics. It was observed, for instance, early in the researcher’s tenure within the SOCOG Sport Program, that the organisation placed an emphasis on providing quality services and facilities for the athletes. The aim, as stated by the AOC and its SSC representatives, was to provide the athletes with the best opportunity to perform at a high level at the Games (Gordon, 2003; SOCOG, 2000c; Toohey, 2001). The collected data suggest that the majority of the people involved in the management of
SOCOG Sport Program also strongly believed in this athlete-centred vision. This vision was created by the AOC leadership and implemented through the SSC.

Without people like Bill [SOCOG Sport Program official] and Jeff [AOC, SSC and SOCOG official] and Larry [AOC, SSC and SOCOG official] … pushing the athlete and the Sport [SOCOG Sport Program] side of it, I am sure the [28 Olympic] sports would not have had the facilities for the athletes, for the spectators, and the whole lot that we had. They [the SSC] made sure for me that … SOCOG didn’t lose focus on what the hell it was there for, which was the sport and the athletes. (Respondent 06)

Similarly, Respondent 32 argued that:

The benefit of the [SOCOG] Sports Commission was that you had people on it led by Jeff [AOC, SSC and SOCOG official] … who had a very clear understanding of the delivery of client requirements, focused on particular athletes, national Olympic committees, teams, teams officials, technical officials and the actual technical conduct of the event. So it allowed for a very high level of focus on things that made the event successful as related to the actual technical implementation, from an athlete and other constituent points of view. (Respondent 32)

In addition to the comments outlined above, Respondent 25 stated that the senior AOC officials, through the operation of the SSC, utilised their Olympic knowledge and their sport-management capability to ensure that they protected the AOC’s investment in the Sydney Games.
Overall, the AOC’s involvement and influence was positive, primarily due to the leadership that came from the AOC’s involvement. Jeff and Larry [AOC, SSC and SOCOG officials] provided very positive leadership, evaluation and feedback and generally kept the best interests of SOCOG in their crosshairs. There is no doubt that they had a significant investment to protect … but my sense is that they balanced it very well. This may not be the case in all countries due to the leadership and experience of the people involved from the hosting NOC.

It was noted by some respondents that historically OCOG Boards tend to have few members with sport or event-management backgrounds (i.e. Respondent 05; Respondent 25). In the case of SOCOG, from 1993 through to 2000, 31 directors were appointed to the 15-member SOCOG Board (Gordon, 2003; SOCOG 1997, 1999; Toohey, 2001). Sixteen of these directors were either politicians (Ian Armstrong, Sallyanne Atkinson, Bruce Baird, John Brown, John Fahey, Nick Greiner, Chris Hartcher, Michael Knight, Robert Maher, Ron Philips, Graham Richardson, and Frank Sartor) or had organisational links to Australian political parties (Simon Balderstone [political advisor], Anna Booth [union official], Sandy Hollway [bureaucrat] and John Valder [political party official]). Five directors were business people (John Iliffe, Kerry Packer, Gary Pemberton, Imelda Roche and Brian Sherman), while one director had a background in arts and media administration (Donald McDonald). Only nine directors had backgrounds in sport administration or event organisation (John Coates, Phil Coles, Perry Crosswhite, Kevan Gosper, Mal Hemmerling, Marjorie Jackson-Nelson, Graham Lovett, Rod McGeoch and Craig McLatchey).
In light of the number of SOCOG Board members who were either politicians or businesspeople, respondents suggested that having individuals within SOCOG with the necessary experience and authority and who believed in the AOC’s vision of hosting an Olympic Games focused on the athletes, resulted in the AOC’s vision being driven by action as well as discourse. As outlined by Respondent 05:

Sport [the OCOG Sport Program] tends to be forgotten [at the OCOG Board level] because there is not time and, secondly, often because of the composition of the [OCOG] Board … [it] is not necessarily made up with people with sport expertise.

This sentiment was also reflected by an Olympic official who held powerful positions on the AOC and SOCOG Boards and who was a member of the SSC when it first formed through to the completion of the Games. The quote below is notable in that it outlines a perspective that early in SOCOG’s existence the AOC did not have faith in the SOCOG Board to deliver the Sydney 2000 Olympics Games, that it was not focused enough on the sport or the athletes but rather preoccupied with revenue generation and related marketing matters.

[In] the early years of SOCOG, establishing and worrying about income, television, marketing were the big-ticket things the [SOCOG] Board was most concerned about and I was starting to worry a bit … there was just not enough attention being given to the sporting side … (Respondent 35)

The point made above was also supported by one long-serving SOCOG official, who stated that the formation of the SSC was part of the AOC President’s “long-term strategy, I think Jeff [AOC, SSC and SOCOG official] was genuinely concerned about Sport [the SOCOG Sport Program] getting lost
at the Board level” (Respondent 15). Another long-serving member of SOCOG stated that before the creation of the SSC, in 1996:

You could see the way the organisation seemed to be heading, Sport [the SOCOG Sport Program] was sort of a non-event, in the end I think it was critical the Commission [SSC] was there … it was set up to make sure that Sport [the SOCOG Sport Program] had priority. (Respondent 27)

The vision of protecting the interests of the athletes and sport and ensuring the delivery of quality sports equipment and facilities were central to the SSC’s formation and subsequent operations. According to a SOCOG Board member, “the agreed mandate of the [SOCOG] Sports Commission was always followed and it took its decisions according to its terms of reference and its responsibilities” (Respondent 32).

While the AOC was clear on its vision and the benefits it sought from the establishment of the SSC, the NSW Government was less sure that it would prove to be of value to SOCOG. A senior Olympic official for the NSW Government, for instance, stated that while he agreed to establish the SSC, at the time he didn’t appreciate how important the agency would be for the organisation of the Games (Respondent 34). Respondent 34 stated:

At the time I did the deal with Jeff [AOC, SSC and SOCOG official] I didn’t understand what the Sports Commission involved … It was part of the deal, to get peace, to buy out the [AOC] veto, to settle everything down … Jeff basically wanted the payout and the establishment of the Sports Commission … I frankly did those things as part of the deal without really understanding how important they were. I am now very, very pleased I did that deal because it was terrific in terms of the
arrangement of the Games, and it was very central to making so much of the sports stuff work.

Olympic Vision

As discussed in the category above, the interviewees’ perspective was that AOC was influential in ensuring that the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program centred on making the Sydney Olympics the ‘athletes’ Games’. This point was reiterated by a number of the respondents, who noted that the AOC had a clear vision that underpinned its involvement in the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. For instance, a senior AOC, SSC and SOCOG official noted:

As well as wanting to make sure we took this one opportunity to get a legacy for the [Australian] Olympic Committee and Olympic Sport, I also said I was very worried about just where Sport [SOCOG Sport Program] is heading in this. If we [the AOC] are going to give up certain controls we had over the [SOCOG] Board and vetoes we had, we do need to ensure that the Sport [SOCOG Sport Program] is going to be properly addressed. We are the organisation that is going to be around afterwards, we are the individuals who are going to be around afterwards, it is our reputation and Mark [senior NSW Government official] understood that immediately and embraced it. So we agreed that … there would be a SOCOG Sports Commission and that I would chair it, the other AOC representatives … would be on it. (Respondent 35)

Importantly, it was noted that the AOC’s Olympic vision had been established gradually over time and did not just emerge after the successful Olympic bid to stage the 2000 Games (Respondent 05; Respondent 35). It was clearly stated during the bidding phase and remained constant throughout the Games organisation. This strategy and commitment that the AOC offered the IOC when bidding for the 2000 Games included the central argument that
Sydney would present an Olympic Games first and foremost for the athletes (Gordon, 2003; Toohey, 2001). The strategy of organising an ‘athletes Games’ was not only embraced by the AOC and the SOCOG Sport Program, but it was a key theme for the whole Sydney 2000 experience. For example, in the foreword to the *Official Report of the XXVII Olympiad*, Olympic Minister Michael Knight stated:

> Last September and October, Sydney 2000 had the opportunity to honour our bid commitment to deliver ‘the athletes’ Games’. We began our efforts with one fundamental premise: it is the athletes who are the stars of the show and their needs must come first. Of course we like to think that we looked after the needs of other important constituencies, like spectators, the Australian public, officials, sponsors, broadcasters and the broader Olympic Movement. But the athletes were our priority. (Toohey, 2001, p. 3)

Knight also stated that while there were many factors that contributed to the successful management of the Sydney Olympics, “two things were fundamental to what has come to be called the ‘Sydney Model’ for organising a Games” (Toohey, 2001, p. 3). The first element centred on the involvement of the NSW Government in providing the human and financial resources required to plan and build the Olympic Games infrastructure, while the second element referred to the involvement of the AOC (Toohey, 2001).

The Australian Olympic Committee was closely involved in the organising of the Games. The creation of an autonomous Sports Commission, with strong AOC representation, which had direct control over preparations for the sporting competition and the management of the athletes’ village, was essential to Sydney fulfilling our commitment to put the athletes first. (p. 3)
The focus on providing a quality experience for the athletes specifically in planning the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games can be traced back to the early stages of the Sydney bid. In his book, *The Bid: How Australia Won the 2000 Olympics*, former Sydney bid Chief Executive Officer Rod McGeoch stated that when developing the strategic plan for the bid “a number of sessions … with a white board” were conducted (McGeoch & Korporaal, 1994, p. 49). These strategy sessions took place in September 1991 and involved McGeoch and three AOC members, John Coates, Phil Coles and Peter Montgomery (McGeoch & Korporaal, 1994).

Coates at this time had been recently elected as President of the AOC, Coles was an IOC member and a member of the AOC Executive, while Montgomery, an Olympian and former Australian Water Polo Captain, was also a member of the IOC’s Athletes’ Commission and the AOC Executive. The result of the strategic planning was an Olympic bid plan based on four key elements: “1. World-class and convenient facilities; 2. a demonstrable capacity for Sydney to manage and host the Games; 3. an exciting and caring plan to take care of the Olympic Family (athletes, officials and the media); 4. a hospitality plan for the members of the IOC and other VIPs during the Games” (McGeoch & Korporaal, 1994, p. 49). The later establishment of the SSC provided the AOC with the opportunity to achieve their athlete-centred vision. Gordon (2003), the official historian for the AOC, stated that the SSC had the:

challenging task … to transform the label ‘athletes’ Games’ from an enticing phrase into reality. Coates had pledged seven years before, when Sydney was awarded the Games, that this would happen, with ‘every athlete offered the best opportunity ever to excel’. Under the chairmanship of Coates and the management of Bob Elphinston, the [SOCOG Sports] Commission oversaw innovations that promised to set benchmarks for future Olympics. (p. 162)
In a number of meetings observed within SOCOG, between the years 1998 to 2000, SOCOG Sport Program managers and officials stated that any plans designed by non-sport functional areas that had consequences for Olympic athletes needed to be approved by the SSC before they could be implemented. SOCOG Sport Program managers would often ask their non-sport functional “how does this decision impact the athletes?” According to Respondent 22, through the formation of the SSC the AOC:

Continually reminded people that this is a sporting event … that sport was the ‘sacred cow’ and so it should have been because it was a sporting event and I think a lot of places allow merchandising, the marketing, the television and all of the hype of the Games to take over. And I think Jeff [AOC, SSC and SOCOG official] was a constant reminder to everyone that this is a sporting event and the ‘great sport in great venues’ was the theme and he didn’t allow that to die.

Because of the AOC’s independence within SOCOG, through the work of the SSC, athlete and sport-centred decisions were shaped not only by financial considerations. Rather, SSC decisions were based upon providing a quality sport competition environment that enabled the athletes to perform at their best level. Respondent 19 commented, for example, that the SOCOG Sport Program procured high-quality sports equipment without facing opposition from other SOCOG program areas, which may have had more restrictive budgets:

the quality of the sports equipment was top notch. We didn’t choose a supplier that was run of the mill. All we wanted was the best we could at the best possible rate. You felt you could do that without being criticised by somebody else in SOCOG. (Respondent 19)
With a vision of providing a quality Olympic experience for the athletes, the SSC became involved in Olympic planning matters beyond the field of play. This included areas such as transportation to and from Olympic venues and the Olympic Village. As outlined by a senior SOCOG manager:

The SSC had a tremendous impact on SOCOG. Being as it was chaired by Jeff [AOC, SCC and SOCOG official], it carried significant weight within the organisation and ensured Sport [the SOCOG Sport Program] was kept in the focus of the overall [Olympic] planning of the [SOCOG] organisation. (Respondent 25)

In support of this argument, another respondent suggested that the SSC enabled the SOCOG Sport Program to make informed sport decisions which “brought Sport [the SOCOG Sport Program] to the forefront” of SOCOG (Respondent 02). Another respondent commented that making difficult decisions was an important aspect of the SSC’s role within SOCOG: “I thought that they [the SSC] provided … a focus on sport … They made some ‘hard’ decisions” (Respondent 03). This point was supported by Respondent 24, who argued that the SSC not only guaranteed that SOCOG maintained a strong focus on the SOCOG Sport Program but also on sport-related planning across SOCOG more generally:

Sport [the SOCOG Sport Program] had a clear and protected decision-making body within the SOCOG governance structure. This ensured the idea of Sydney 2000 being an ‘athletes’ Games’ was reflected in the decision-making processes and Sport [the SOCOG Sport Program] was a focal point throughout the Games planning. (Respondent 24)
The capability of the AOC, through the formation of the SSC, to protect the interests of the SOCOG Sport Program was reinforced by Respondent 10, who argued that “the principle of safeguarding Sport [the SOCOG Sport Program] is very important in the Games with so many other interest groups around that exert pressure”. Furthermore, Respondent 16 argued that a body such as the SSC was necessary because it was able to “move everything through that needed to be” in the context of Olympic sport planning and sport-related event organisation. Likewise, Respondent 27 suggested that the SSC was an important initiative: “it had to be there and then there were the issues we faced along the way, without it [the SSC] being there we wouldn’t have got things done”.

The majority of the SOCOG officials and managers that were interviewed commented that the formation of the SSC was a positive feature of SOCOG, one that greatly assisted the organising of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games (see Table 15 below). Only two respondents commented critically on the establishment and operations of the SSC. These criticisms related to AOC representatives on the SSC delving in SOCOG matters that were beyond its brief, and that the make-up of the SSC did not reflect the diversity of the Olympic Movement. These negative viewpoints are discussed in detail in the following second-order theme, Organisational Power: Olympic Autonomy and Interdependence. The majority of the comments made by the respondents regarding the SSC, however, were positive. Words commonly used included: positive; major; important; and significant. The descriptive data outlined in Table 15 suggests how the managers working within the SOCOG Sport Program rationalised the SSC and its capacity to achieve the AOC’s strategic vision.

In summary, mostly positive views were expressed by the SOCOG Sport Program managers regarding the AOC’s vision. The findings outline that through the establishment and subsequent operation of the SCC, the AOC
provided a clear direction for SOCOG, centred on organising the Olympics with the athletes and the sport at its heart.

Table 16: The Impact of the SSC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>“A major impact - a very positive force”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>“Supportive - pushed through important decisions”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>“Focus on sport”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>“Significant impact”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>“Very influential ... dealt with the major issues”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>“Vital in ensuring there was a strong focus on sport”</td>
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<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>“A great thing”</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>“Quite valid”</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>“Major impact, fairly critical”</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>“Particularly important - managed all requirements”</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>“Most important initiative”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>“Very important, it had a major bearing”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>“Vital ... given ... that sport is ... the last thing that happens”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>“It was probably the key ... it was a positive”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>“Very valuable”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>“Very important, especially when the CEO changed”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>“Huge weight”</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Leveraging Olympic Knowledge

In similar terms to the views outlined in the above category, some respondents believed that one of the key advantages of the establishment of the SSC was that the SOCOG Sport Program was managed by those who knew and understood sport. As Respondent 12 argued, the decisions made by the SSC were being made by those who had “the most sports experience” and not by “novices per se”. This point on novices is reflected well in how the AOC utilised its Olympic experience and position to extract an advantageous deal from the NSW Government. For example, a NSW Government Olympic official believed the AOC leadership maximised the value of its Olympic contractual rights (Respondent 34). This point was contrasted with the inexperience of the NSW Government, especially after it changed hands in 1995 (Respondent 34).

Jeff [AOC, SSC and SOCOG official] is probably the best politician in the country … he always knows how to play these things. And Jeff was extraordinarily difficult to negotiate with because when you thought you had him, in a negotiation, he would pull out a new document, the existence of which you didn’t know, and so he had endorsement contracts and riders, and there was a secret agreement he made with the Fahey and Greiner Governments [the previous NSW Government] that had never been published, and it wasn’t on the files that we had, it was buried somewhere in the Premier’s office … Because he is a lawyer and part because it was ‘his’ [the AOC’s] money, but the normal arrangement under a Host City Contract is that 90% of any profit goes to the host NOC … So what Jeff did, he had an arrangement of where 90% of it went [to the AOC] and one of his various documents he got it set up that any changes to the bid expenditure had to be approved by the AOC.
Now Jeff knew that the actual expenditure on the Games, both the revenue and the expenditure, would far exceed the bid [documents] because it does everywhere, because television rights increase, all sorts of revenue things increase, let alone on the expenditure side. But he had a contractual arrangement that any change to the bid expenditure, actual expenditure over and above the bid had to be approved by him as President of the AOC, because it affected his [AOC] profit.

So there was notionally a profit in the bid and what Jeff would say is “well if you spend another A$50 million dollars and made a A$1 dollar profit, well all my profit has gone, so I have to have some control” but he also knew that this was very powerful control as the expenditures and the revenues escalated. (Respondent 34)

The senior NSW Government official further stated that the AOC waited for the right opportunity to maximise its chances of getting the best possible deal. The AOC deal was struck with the NSW Government at a time when the Government itself was newly formed, inexperienced, and had a recently appointed Minister for the Olympics. Moreover, the timing was in the lead-up period to the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games, when the Australian community was looking forward to Australia’s performance at these Games with excitement. According to Respondent 34, the AOC leadership:

Took the occasion in the lead up to the Atlanta Olympics when there was a new Government, a new Minister who hadn’t been involved in the bid, very inexperienced in the ways of Olympic politics and Jeff [AOC, SSC and SOCOG official] took that opportunity to force the pace. And what he did in terms of forcing the pace, he went into a meeting of the SOCOG Board and said … “you know, look … you cannot do anything at this
meeting without my say so because you all owe me a fiduciary duty”, Jack [SOCOG President at the time] went to the meeting and said “well, look I am not going to chair the meeting I am going to hand it over to Vice-President … because my hands are tied”.

Jeff gave them an indemnity of sorts for decisions made at that meeting “he basically said I won’t sue anyone for any decisions made today”. And he gave that waiver at a few meetings, then Jack quit [as SOCOG President]. So you had a new inexperienced [SOCOG] President, a new inexperienced Minister, the country was very excited in the lead up to the Atlanta Olympics and Jeff thought this is the time to provoke the conflict and what the bugger did, he made it clear that at the next meeting he would no longer give a waiver … at the next meeting he wouldn’t give a waiver so that would just totally paralyse SOCOG and any decision-making.

It is important to note that from a historical perspective, and in order to get a fuller understanding of the processes that influenced the power relations of the AOC and the NSW Government, the AOC’s Olympic knowledge had been shaped by its involvement with two previous unsuccessful Olympic bids (Respondent 35). As mentioned in Chapter One, the AOC gained a great deal of Olympic planning and management expertise based upon these two bids made with the cities of Brisbane and Melbourne, to stage the 1992 Olympic Games and the 1996 Olympic Games, respectively (Gordon, 1994, 2003; Respondent 35). While both bids failed, the experience provided the AOC with some organisational lessons that it used to leverage its position with the NSW Government for the later 2000 bid. According to a respondent who had held a senior position with the 1992 Brisbane Olympic Games bid, the AOC learnt a great deal from the two failed bids.
Contractually, what happened … I was the CEO of the Brisbane bid and the IOC wasn’t as refined with its *Host City Contract* … the AOC had endorsed Brisbane and then just as we were heading off to Lausanne, I had been working on a company [structure] that would be the organising committee for the *Host City Contract* [if the Brisbane bid was to be successful] … [The *Host City Contract*] says that you will establish an organising committee within so many weeks or months.

So I prepared a company … it was an AOC company and built around that was to be a total underwriting by government and an indemnity for everything it did … But then when we knew more … So then when we ran a competition for the 1996 and subsequently 2000 bids, we said you will bid on the basis that if you win, it will be this company, the AOC’s … it was called the Olympic organising committee. And so, yes we learnt from that and that had us one step ahead of the game. They [the NSW Government] could only bid on our terms. (Respondent 35)

The organisational experience and knowledge gained from the failed Brisbane and Melbourne Olympic bids provided the AOC with an advantage when dealing with the NSW Government. An interdependent feature of the AOC’s experience and knowledge that developed over time was its Olympic networks and relations. The second-order theme, *Networks and Relations*, addresses this component to emerge from the collected data.

### 5.2.2 Networks and Relations

The *Networks and Relations* second-order theme discussed in this section comprises three interconnected categories. The first category outlines the reported trust that the SOCOG Sport Program managers had for the AOC leadership. The second category presents data explaining how the
organisational relations between central Olympic stakeholders changed and
developed over the course of the preparations for the Games. The third
category outlines data highlighting some negative views relating to the direct
involvement of the AOC, in the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program.

Organisational Trust

The AOC and NSW Government agreement to create the SSC provided the SOCOG Sport Program with a powerful and innovative agency. The formation of the SSC allowed the SOCOG Sport Program to resolve many sport-based issues with a reduced need to negotiate with the broader SOCOG bureaucracy, one that was increasingly dealing with critical organisational matters (i.e. such as raising revenue and marketing the Games). Respondent 19, for example, stated that the SSC proved to be a strong supporter when the SOCOG Sport Program encountered difficult issues that needed to be resolved; “for the [SOCOG Sport Program] competition managers … we knew there was a supporter out there for us. If something was not going quite right we could go through … the [SOCOG] Sports Commission”.

In a similar vein, Respondent 16 suggested that the AOC, through its SSC representatives, was able to “facilitate” action when particular decisions needed to be “moved through” SOCOG. Supporting this perspective, Respondent 11 argued that the SSC contained “several heavy hitters amongst its hierarchy” enabling it to resolve issues that were faced by the SOCOG Sport Program, while, Respondent 14 stated: “The people that were involved in the AOC and the [SOCOG] Sports Commission were appointed because they … could make those decisions or at least influence those decisions”.

The SOCOG Sport Program managers interviewed for this study had a high level of trust in the AOC and its SSC representatives.
The members of the [SOCOG] Sports Commission understood sport … a few of the SOCOG Board [members] didn’t … They were more interested in the dollar … Whereas, for Jeff [AOC, SSC and SOCOG official] in particular the dollar wasn’t part of it. If you had a genuine case it happened, and it happened … much quicker. (Respondent 09)

The interview data suggest that the SSC representatives listened freely to the issues of the SOCOG Sport Program. For instance, Respondent 08 stated that the SSC “was very supportive and understood … what we wanted”, while Respondent 21 stated:

You had some key people; Jeff, Larry [AOC, SSC and SOCOG officials] and others involved in sport … Gary [AOC official] and obviously supported by Bill [SOCOG Sport Program official] and … if nothing [else] … you got a forum to present your case and hearing … so you had a friend, someone on your side. (Respondent 21)

The trust not only emerged through a shared vision of organising an athlete-focused Olympic Games but also through the long-term relations that had developed over many years. The researcher observed that the power relations between the AOC, its SSC representatives, and the senior management of the SOCOG Sport Program were generally collaborative. In support of this point, a respondent who was an AOC official and a member of the SOCOG Board and the SSC stated that the SSC trusted the quality of the management and staff that worked within the SOCOG Sport Program.

The competency of not just the [SOCOG] Competition Managers, but people involved in competition policy, sport services was very high and they were engaged very early … and their ability to not only deliver what they specifically had
to as it relates to the sport responsibilities but then to inform and influence, coordinate the support services around them was very effective … there is a range of competencies but overall it was very strong. (Respondent 32)

The quality of the relationships that developed over many years within this Olympic network was important in shaping how the AOC involved itself in the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games and especially in relation to the Sport Program. Respondent 03 commented that the Olympic networks and relations that the SSC representatives had with Olympic stakeholders, such as the IOC, the international sport federations, the NSW Government and other related groups, was critical to the successful organisation of the Games. In support of this point, Respondent 14 stated that the AOC and its SSC representatives were selected because “they had the connections”.

Organisational Relations

The development over time of strong organisational networks and trusting relationships between SOCOG management in critical functional areas was regarded as crucial to the overall success of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. The most prominent example of this was the working relationship between the Olympic Minister and the AOC President. As outlined earlier in this chapter, the relationship originally was shaped by the public disagreement between the NSW Government and the AOC regarding the terms of the Olympic contracts. However, post the settlement of their contractual differences, both parties started to work together in the best interests of the Olympic preparations. According to Respondent 34:

The relationship with Jeff [AOC, SSC and SOCOG official] and the AOC really strengthened after the deals were done. Then we went off to the Atlanta Games and Jeff was terrific to me at the Atlanta Games. He did a lot of things to help me out and he was very pleasantly surprised to find out that I actually
wanted to go to the sport and not the cocktail parties. And we found a lot of common ground sitting in our shorts and t-shirts in the sweltering sun out at the hockey in the preliminaries and both dodging the formal cocktail parties in the evening to go to the swimming instead and we then made a number of changes [to the Sydney Games planning based on those experiences].

Likewise, a senior AOC official involved in negotiations with the NSW Government stated that even though the relationship started poorly it became more trusting. Other organisational changes developed from that trust as the Games neared.

So things got very acrimonious, [with Jeff, an AOC, SSC and SOCOG official] beating up on me in public, and this was when Paul [former Australian Government Minister and SSC official] organised the infamous ‘Knight of the Long Prawns’ dinner, and we sorted the arrangement and Jeff [AOC, SSC and SOCOG official] sold the [AOC’s] veto for A$90 million …

Now, Jeff and I didn’t know each other. We were both mates with Paul, which helped. And we both became very good friends both during and subsequent to the Games. But, once Jeff got his deal that secured his legacy then his interests were in making the Games work at two levels. Making them work generally and secondly, particularly, making the sport work to fulfil his bid commitment, which was central in his consciousness to run the ‘athletes’ Games’. And so, as part of that deal, we established the Sports Commission. (Respondent 34)

In support of the observations presented above, Respondent 35 stated it was important for his position as a member of the AOC leadership that he had
a strong working relationship with the NSW Government official after they settled their contractual differences.

Respondents indicated that this relationship was critical, in that it provided collaborative leadership and a pathway for SOCOG and the NSW Government agencies involved in the Games planning, such as OCA and ORTA to work together. As outlined by an AOC official:

I knew, and he knew, that he and I had to work together, and the organisations would work together, the two bodies [the AOC and the NSW Government], they had to and he knew that the Olympic Movement had something to offer. (Respondent 35).

In further support of the observations made above, a former SOCOG Board member stated:

I think that the simple issue is the relationship between Jeff [AOC, SSC and SOCOG official] and Mark [NSW Government Olympic official] was critical. Both did an excellent job and both, in their own inimitable style, led from the front and formed a partnership, which drove different elements of the event and I think without that partnership it would have been more difficult to achieve the outcome that was achieved. (Respondent 32)

In addition to the relationship between the AOC and the NSW Government, other forms of organisational relations that were regarded as important to the success of the Sydney Games were the internal functional area relationships. It was observed that the relationship between the leadership of the SOCOG Sport Program and the SOCOG Venue Management Program was especially strong. According to one respondent, the close working relationship
that developed between the General Manager of the Venue Management Program and the General Manager of the SOCOG Sport Program significantly enhanced the management of sport at the Games (Respondent 05). Further, another respondent who held a very senior management position within SOCOG and was also a member of the SSC argued that the close working relationship between the two functional areas was instrumental in ensuring a successful Olympic Games (Respondent 31). He had learned the importance of maintaining strong functional area working relationships while observing the organisation of the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games.

Barry [SOCOG senior manager], Terry [senior SOCOG Venue Management official] and I got appointed, we started the same day, we were all employed by Mark [NSW Government Olympic official] after … he had taken over [in a high-level position on the SOCOG Board] … he decided he was putting in a new management team. Soon after that we went on a trip … to Barcelona and Atlanta and we talked to the Lillehammer guys … Basically we were trying to find out what worked and what didn’t work and a couple of the big messages were … for example, in Atlanta they were quite different to Barcelona. In Atlanta they had a venue boss and they had a sport boss and they didn’t talk to each other and that reflected right down into the structure of each of the venues. (Respondent 31)

The importance of the relationship between SOCOG Venue Management and SOCOG Sport Program was reiterated by Respondent 28, who observed many SSC meetings involving the senior managers from both these programs. The following quote outlines some of the factors that shaped this relationship between the two functional areas:

And they did clearly agree to agree and agree to work with each other, and I think that relationship was really important
… I do think that both of them really brought an awful lot to the table and yeah they did work together very well and they made their teams work together as well too. (Respondent 28)

The importance of the SOCOG Venue Management and the SOCOG Sport Program working closely together was made clear to the researcher on a number of occasions between 1998 and 2000 by a range of senior SOCOG Sport Program managers in both formal and informal settings. It was argued that this relationship needed to be strong because in Olympic planning there has been a tendency for the OCOG Sport Program and the OCOG Venue Management Program to compete. This competition can arise because both functional areas spend a great deal of their time working on overlapping management issues.

In addition to the organisational value created by maintaining strong internal relations within SOCOG, the importance of the AOC’s external relations to the successful organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program was commented upon by the respondents. With specific reference to the leadership of the AOC and the senior management of the SOCOG Sport Program, Respondent 17 highlighted the importance of developing strong Olympic organisational networks, particularly with the international sport federations. This viewpoint is highlighted in the following quote:

It was … recognised that athletics [IAAF] and volleyball [FIVB] … presidents were the more difficult in their demands for their sports than some of the other sports … they [the FIVB] were considered to be one of the more difficult, and relationships were particularly important. Now, I … had established a small relationship with the international federation [FIVB] because I sat on a [FIVB] Management Commission, but I think the relationship with Bill [SOCOG Sport Program official] built with all the international
federations was absolutely exceptional. He was always seen to be their ally but yet he never gave away things … that couldn’t be delivered.

But I think behind the scenes with the FIVB, Jeff [AOC, SSC and SOCOG official] … part of his mandate [was] to make sure he became a very close friend of the FIVB President. He was on personal speaking terms … at any time the Federation President wanted to ring … he felt that he could do that. (Respondent 14)

Therefore, in addition to the AOC’s formal authority within SOCOG, its strong international sport network, especially with the leadership of the 28 Olympic international sports federations, resulted in a range of informal but effective power relations that were utilised for the benefit of SOCOG’s Olympic planning. As outlined by a senior SOCOG manager, “the relationships that Bill [senior SOCOG Sport Program official] fostered particularly with the international federations were critical and we spent a lot of time with them and we didn’t have any complaining, we addressed all their issues” (Respondent 35).

A further factor that shaped the development of strong network relations with the international sports federations was the recruitment of the SOCOG Sport Program managers. The people recruited by the SSC to organise and manage the SOCOG Sport Program had existing relationships with the national and international sport governing bodies. (As noted in Table 8, provided earlier in Chapter Four, five SOCOG Sport Program managers interviewed for this study were also members of an international sport federation executive board at the time of the Sydney Games). According to a senior Olympic official responsible for recruiting SOCOG Sport Program managers, the individuals were chosen not only because of their experience in organising sport competitions and events but also based on their ability to
communicate, liaise and co-operate with their respective international federation (Respondent 05). As outlined by Respondent 05:

If you do not have people who have the respect of the international federations then it will be very, very difficult to achieve anything. And it is more important that they have the respect and stature with the international federations than with the national federations in the case of the Olympics … From the [SOCOG] President down to the [SOCOG] Vice-President to the [SOCOG] CEO down to the SOCOG General Managers … down to the [SOCOG] competition managers. They all had a role in liaising with and working with the international federations.

Organisational Conflict

While the majority of the respondents were positive about the networks and relationships they had maintained within SOCOG and with Olympic organisational stakeholders, a small number of negative views were expressed. Respondent 23, a very experienced manager within the SOCOG Sport Program who held senior board positions with an international sport federation and a national sport federation, outlined the difficulties he had with some members of the AOC and SSC leadership.

I had a bit of a problem with the [SOCOG] Sports Commission. With some of the people on it, and one of the people on it I had trouble with—and when I say trouble with, I wasn’t fighting with them—was Jeff [AOC, SSC and SOCOG official] because Jeff … and I know Jeff as well as anybody … but Jeff, Jeff is a very, very good administrator, tremendous, a tremendous administrator. And the AOC wouldn’t be anywhere near as good as it is, and the Olympic Games would not have been as good without him either. But he delves into
too many other things and with Jeff whether you are on the Executive Board of the AOC or whatever, you are doing, you have got to agree with Jeff most of the time, because Jeff is very clever. If you get offside with Jeff, you are rat f…ed, you are in big-time trouble. And I was never offside with him but I think I could have been if I wasn’t careful because I didn’t agree with some of the things he did. (Respondent 23)

A similar viewpoint was expressed by Respondent 31, who stated that at times the AOC leadership became involved in matters that were really beyond their remit. Likewise, a former SOCOG Board member stated that at times the operations of the SSC generated conflict with the SOCOG Board; “it caused tensions at times between the broader SOCOG Board … simply because there were times that decisions were taken by the [SOCOG] Sport Commission which the Board felt it would like to have input to” (Respondent 32). One of those decisions centred on the SSC’s appointment of the Mayor for the Olympic Village:

I remember the [SOCOG] Board got very upset when Jeff [AOC, SSC and SOCOG official] selected Paul [former Australian Government Minister and SSC official] to become the Mayor of the Olympic Village. It was probably a point—quite a big point of friction—between the [SOCOG] Board and Jeff. Because he said it was his right under the Sports Commission [charter]. So Jeff was a bit of a law unto himself, you know Jeff, I mean he is a powerful figure and if he has the f…ing power he will use it and he sort of overstepped the mark a few times. (Respondent 31)

While very few respondents had any major issues with how the SSC operated, some respondents stated that other individuals outside of the SSC were influential in helping them to get outcomes they sought. For example,
Respondent 23 suggested that the people who assisted them with their Olympic sport in getting the required resources, in order to organise a quality competition at the Games, were a NSW Government official and a senior SOCOG Sport Program official. Respondent 23 commented that “as strange as it may seem … Mark [NSW Government Olympic official] … not because he was any great sports person, but my association with him” helped get important things achieved for the Olympic competition. However, it should be noted that the things that this NSW Government Olympic official was able to assist Respondent 23 in achieving were predominantly venue specific and mostly beyond the scope and remit of the SSC. For instance, a purpose-built sporting venue, originally set down for Sydney Olympic Park, was later moved to a favourable suburban location due to this intervention.

In my own sport, if I had trouble, I went directly to Mark [NSW Government Olympic official]. Where Bill [senior SOCOG Sport Program official] couldn’t handle it, Mark could, and he gave directions. And I virtually ran [the mentioned sport] … with his assistance. (Respondent 23)

In addition to the venue-related support provided by the NSW Government Olympic official, Respondent 23 stated that on the SOCOG Sport Program side, “above all, the saviour was Bill [senior SOCOG Sport Program official]. Bill was the key bloke behind the Sydney Games … a lot of people don’t realise what a major part he played”. Respondent 23 further commented that when the SSC “often” ventured into territory “away from where they should be”, Bill “would bring them back”.

In support of this point, Respondent 20 believed that the SSC needed to be more independent. He viewed the SSC as being too closely tied to the AOC. For instance, Respondent 20 stated that many of the SSC members were either on the AOC Executive Board or closely linked to those that were. (This is also the point precisely made by many of the respondents, who rationalised the
impact of the SSC as a positive influence for the SOCOG Sport Program). Respondents 20 and 10 reflected that more independent voices would have been more advantageous and that the SSC did not adequately represent the lesser-known Australian Olympic sports (i.e. Table Tennis) with the same vigour as the stronger sports (i.e. Aquatics):

The [SOCOG] Sports Commission kept the focus on Sport [the SOCOG Sport Program], but too much focus was on the larger sports. Table tennis shared the same venue with hockey and taekwondo. In my opinion hockey was treated better than table tennis and taekwondo. The [SOCOG] Sports Commission seemed to focus on the gold medals. (Respondent 20)

While the majority of the respondents expressed a high level of satisfaction with the composition of the SSC, Respondent 20 stated that the SSC needed to be more representational in its construction; “too many people from the AOC were on the [SOCOG] Sports Commission” and it needed to have more “independent” representation. For instance, the SSC membership was all male. This was surprising considering the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games comprised both male and female athletes in near equal numbers. Moreover, in recent years the IOC has placed a great deal of importance on gender equity and inclusion (Toohey & Veal, 2007).

In addition to the lack of female representation on the SSC, it was observed that another key stakeholder group was noticeably absent. Even though the SSC through the SOCOG Sport Program was largely responsible for organising and implementing the Paralympic Sport Program at the Sydney 2000 Paralympic Games, neither the Australian Paralympic Committee nor the Sydney Paralympic Organising Committee had any formal representation on the SSC.
Despite these network tensions, the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program was mostly marked by network cooperation and trust. These stakeholder relations and their importance to the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games are discussed in the next section, drawing on the theoretical framework that informs the research.

5.2.3 Discussion

The theoretical framework adopted for this study places an emphasis on how human figurations develop and change over time. From this perspective, SOCOG as an organisation is not regarded “as if it were a thing or a person”; rather “it is closer to experience to think of an organisation as the patterning of peoples’ interactions with each other” (Stacey, 2003, p. 325). Therefore, when considering the case of the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, it is important to note that the individuals in roles that represented the interests of the AOC had a long history of involvement in the Olympic Movement and international and national sport. This was viewed as a critical point of difference by those working within the SOCOG Sport Program.

The development of what could be judged as an Olympic network figuration in Australia, over time, meant that the AOC, the SSC and the SOCOG Sport Program officials, as a group, became closely connected. The AOC and its leadership, for instance, had lengthy and established relations with not only the managers they recruited, via the SSC, to organise the SOCOG Sport Program, but also with senior officials from the IOC and the international sport federations. This discussion of the Organisational Knowledge and Networks aggregated theoretical dimension is presented in two sections, following the pattern established by the two second-order themes that were outlined above in Part A of this chapter.
Experience and Knowledge

The personal and professional relationships of the central officials involved with the AOC, the SSC and the SOCOG Sport Program spanned more than two decades. It is argued that this Olympic network figuration, with its deeply-formed ties, played a substantial role in shaping the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. From within this context, a vital feature of process sociology is the concern for the ‘person’, the ‘self’ and the ‘individual’ as they develop—not in isolation, but interdependently with others over time (Elias, 1994). The analysis of an organisation such as SOCOG cannot be divorced from the historical character or habitus of those who worked within it (Dopson, 2001, 2005; Newton & Smith, 2001). Through this perspective, it is important for organisational analysis to keep in mind that the members of entities, such as the AOC, the SSC and the SOCOG Sport Program, have been formed and shaped by their experiences not only within the Olympic Movement but also from the wider environment outside this specific network configuration.

From an Eliasian perspective, the people involved in the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games are not viewed as separate or isolated individuals: they are interdependent (Elias, 1994). Various Olympic and sport-related positions were occupied by senior members of the AOC, the SSC and the SOCOG Sport Program. This representation shows the multi-dimensional nature of organisational interests and agendas that had the potential to influence the operation of the SSC, and as a consequence the SOCOG Sport Program. For instance, some representatives of the AOC, the SSC, and the SOCOG Sport Program maintained a variety of sport-related positions, including: membership of the IOC; membership of international sport federation executive boards; membership of the Australian Olympic Committee Executive Board; and membership of various national and state sport federation executive committees in Australia. Importantly, sport experience was evenly spread across the SOCOG Sport Program with both higher profile and lower profile sports containing staff with Olympic Games
and international experience. Sports such as Table Tennis and Fencing, both considered minority sports in Australia, had senior international sport federation officials as part of the SOCOG Sport Program management team. The development over time of a multiplex Olympic and sport network configuration consequently made the AOC and its sport representatives in SOCOG an interconnected and highly experienced group. As stated by Respondent 32, the advantage for the AOC was that its SSC representatives were people

who had a very clear understanding of the delivery of client requirements, focused on particularly athletes, national Olympic committees, teams, team officials, technical officials and the actual technical conduct of the event. So it allowed for a very high level of focus on things that made the event successful as related to the actual technical implementation, from an athlete and other constituent point of view.

In addition to their Olympic and sport networks, the AOC leadership developed extensive national and state political connections over a number of years. These connections covered both the conservative and progressive elements of Australian politics (Gordon, 2003). The Patron of the AOC at the time of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games was the Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, a Liberal Party politician (AOC, 2001). Notably, one of the appointees to the SSC, Graham Richardson, was a close associate of both the AOC President John Coates and the Olympic Minister Michael Knight (Gordon, 2003). Richardson, a former Minister for Sport in the Australian Government, was a central Labor Party strategist and powerbroker (Gordon, 2003). Other SSC representatives also had a history of involvement, over many years, with politicians and political parties of various persuasions, particularly in matters relating to the funding of Australian elite sport (Bloomfield, 2003; Gordon, 1994).
In attempting to understand the experience and knowledge of the AOC, and the impact it had on the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program, a focus on the “historicity” and “interdependence” of the Olympic sport figuration is informative. Elias (1994) and van Krieken (1998), for instance, argue that a historically focused approach is a necessary precursor to understand fully how social or organisational groups develop over time. Elias (1994) suggested that when examining organisational groups from the perspective of the longer term it highlights how people are “bound over and over” to particular patterns of behaviour and conduct. For the findings of this study is important to note the variety of experience that many of the individuals involved in the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program maintained. For instance, in addition to the experience of the AOC leadership within the Olympic Movement, 10 of the SOCOG Sport Program managers, who were responsible for organising the 28 sports at the Sydney Games, were former Olympians (six of these former Olympians were interviewed for this study). Another six maintained executive board positions with international sport federations at the time of the Games.

Within this organisational context, the knowledge and experience of the AOC leadership also shaped the power relations of the Olympic sport network configuration. Drawing on the work of Mead (1934), Stacey (2003) argues that knowledge is generated as people interact. Through such interaction, “coherent patterns of meaning, of knowledge, are perpetually iterated. These continually emerging patterns take thematic forms, both narrative and propositional, both conscious and unconscious and they organise the experience of being together” (p. 329). As knowledge emerges through such thematic patterning, habits are formed, as the result of continual human interaction (Stacey, 2003). Over time, however, habits are always open to transformation and change (Dopson, 1997). According to Elias (1994), power is also an important factor in knowledge creation. Human relationships, whether they take place within or outside of organisations, are at any one
point in time constrained or enabled. “For Elias, all human relating imposes constraints on those relating, while at the same time enabling those relating to do what they could not otherwise have done … power is enabling constraints between people” (Stacey, 2003, p. 329). Power is therefore a characteristic of human relating, a pattern of interaction rather than an object or a thing that can be possessed (Dopson, 2001; Newton, 2002).

Knowledge and power are interdependent concepts (Flyvbjerg, 1998). Foucault (1977), for example, argues that “power and knowledge directly imply one another” and that “there is no power relation without the creative constitution of a field of knowledge” (p. 27). While the power relations of the AOC are discussed in detail in the second aggregated theoretical dimension, it is important to acknowledge here that conceptually both elements are entwined. The knowledge and experience of the Olympic Movement maintained therefore by both the AOC and the SOCOG Sport Program was a central component that influenced the AOC’s power relations in the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. In alignment with Elias (1994) and Flyvbjerg (1998), knowledge, experience, *habitus*, power and rationality are fused through different interdependent organisational actors, all of whom operate according to various rationalities. The sentiment evident in the interview data and through observations made between 1998 and 2000 was that the individuals representing the AOC, through the SSC, had an in-depth knowledge and understanding of Olympic and international sport. This experience was perceived as important within SOCOG because, as a number of the respondents noted, OCOG Boards tend to have few members with Olympic or sport-management expertise (i.e. Respondent 05; Respondent 25). As stated by Respondent 05, “Sport [the OCOG Sport Program] tends to be forgotten [at the OCOG Board level] because there is not time and, secondly, often because of the composition of the [OCOG] Board … is not necessarily made up with people with sport expertise”.

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The AOC believed strongly in a vision of organising an Olympic Games that was centred on the athletes (Gordon, 2003; SOCOG, 2000c; Toohey, 2001). As suggested by a number of respondents interviewed for this study, the AOC’s Olympic vision was considered an important factor in understanding the broader success of the Sydney Olympics. Nonaka and Toyama (2005), for instance, have argued that for organisations to maximise their performance they require a workforce that not only has knowledge and expertise but one that also embraces the established corporate vision. A workforce that does not believe in its organisation’s vision “is little more than empty words. For knowledge to be created and justified based on the firm’s knowledge vision, the firm needs a concrete concept, goal, or action standard to connect the vision with the knowledge creating process of dialogues and practices” (p. 424). Having people who believed in the vision of hosting an ‘athletes’ Games’ with the necessary authority and power meant the AOC’s objectives were driven by action and intent, not only words or mission statements. As outlined by Respondent 35:

I was very worried about just where Sport [the SOCOG Sport Program] is heading in this. If we [the AOC] are going to give up certain controls we had over the [SOCOG] Board and vetoes we had, we do need to ensure that the Sport [SOCOG Sport Program] is going to be properly addressed … So we agreed … there would be a SOCOG Sports Commission.

The SOCOG Sport Program at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games was therefore a beneficiary of the historical character of the Olympic sport network figuration and its members, who were central in its organisation. According to Flyvbjerg (2001), to achieve the highest level of performance in many organisational fields, workforce experience is one of the most critical elements. The collected data suggest that the leadership of the AOC was able to utilise the knowledge gained from past involvement in the Olympic Movement to take advantage of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games and at the
same time improve the Games’ sports delivery. As such, the leadership of the AOC and the members of the Olympic sport figuration maintained a high level of knowledge, understanding and involvement with the organisation of the Olympic Games. A key outcome of the AOC’s Olympic knowledge and experience was its ability to leverage its Olympic position with other critical stakeholders, such as the NSW Government. As suggested by Fligstein (2001), experienced and skilled organisational actors develop a detailed understanding of the “ambiguities and certainties of the field and work off them. They have a sense of what is possible and impossible. If the situation provides opportunities that are unplanned but might result in some gain, the skilled actor will grab them” (p. 114).

In summary, the collected data provided in the Experience and Knowledge second-order theme demonstrated that the leadership of the AOC was able to use the experience gained through its involvement in the Olympic Movement to the advantage of the AOC and SOCOG in the organisation of the Sydney Games. The AOC’s Olympic expertise enabled it to successfully leverage its Olympic position. Apart from assisting SOCOG to organise a successful Olympic Games, the AOC leadership also secured a substantial financial legacy. Importantly, the knowledge and expertise exhibited by the AOC did not develop or emerge over a short period of time. As outlined above, it was shaped by the Olympic networks and relations it had developed over time. This characteristic will be addressed in the discussion of the following second-order theme.

Networks and Relations

A process sociological analysis of organisational networks suggests that institutional and organisational identity develops over time and through “generations rather than as self-contained, timeless and autonomous” (van Krieken, 1997, p. 445). For Elias (1994), people are “bound over and over again to particular patterns of conduct and very specific functional chains” (p. 489). From this perspective, organisations can therefore be described as
“patterns of communicative interaction between interdependent individuals” (Stacey, 2003, p. 329). The Olympic network configuration that shaped the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games did not emerge fully when SOCOG was formed; it developed over many years, prior to the successful Sydney bid. As outlined by Dopson (2001) and Newton and Smith (2002), organisational networks are interdependent and not created in a vacuum. The networks maintained by the AOC and its appointed SSC representatives were developed in the context of changing social, cultural, political and economic conditions.

The formation of the SSC provided the AOC and SOCOG with an innovative networked agency with the capability to manage all sport-specific and sport-related facets of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. A central feature of the operation of the SSC was the trust it maintained with both internal and external Olympic stakeholders. According to the Eliasian organisational research of Smith (2002), creative knowledge networks tend to exhibit high levels of trust and commitment. “An organisation (or society) may be labelled a creative network insofar as trust, co-operation and mutual concern provide the framework for all or most of its relationships and activities” (Smith, 2002, p. 51). The evidence obtained from this study suggests that the AOC and NSW Government agreement to create the SSC provided the SOCOG Sport Program with an innovative and knowledge-based Olympic network (Smith, 2002). As alluded to by Respondent 21, with the AOC and the composition of the SSC, this meant “you had some key people, Jeff, Larry [AOC, SSC and SOCOG officials] and others involved in sport … Gary [AOC official] and obviously supported by Bill [SOCOG Sport Program official] and … you got a forum to present your case and hearing … so you had a friend, someone on your side”.

Through the SSC, the SOCOG Sport Program had the capacity to efficiently resolve SOCOG’s sport-specific and sport-related organisational issues. The establishment of the SSC reduced the bureaucratic pathway faced
by the Sport Program within SOCOG (Respondent 05). A further consequence of the creation of the SSC was that it freed the SOCOG Board from a major element of Olympic organisation: the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program. This outcome was especially important in that over the final years of the Olympic preparations, SOCOG increasingly had to deal with critical, non-sport organisational matters, such as raising revenue and marketing the Games. These financial matters came to the fore especially in 1998 and 1999, when SOCOG sponsorship projections had to be revised down due to the unforeseen Asian financial crisis (Toohey, 2001).

The data presented in the Network and Relations second-order theme also provide evidence that the SOCOG Sport Program managers had a high level of trust in the AOC and its SSC representatives. Trust, according to Lane and Bachman (1996), is a critical variable in explaining the nature and quality of organisational relations. The study of trust as a central component of power relations within organisations has gathered importance in recent times (Gastelaars, 2002; Gutek, 1995; Lyon, 2006). The Eliasian organisational research of Gastelaars (2002), for instance, argues that trust is a central feature of organisational co-operation and that trust and co-operation interplay and therefore are conceptually interconnected. Trust can be conceptualised as having confidence, belief and faith in other individuals despite the potential for risk or uncertainty (Lyon, 2006).

According to Lyon (2006), organisational trust and co-operation can ensure agreed rules are adhered to and that organisational authority can be utilised to enforce those rules and regulations when required. The concepts of trust and organisational control are rarely static; rather, these concepts are often fluid and contextual (Reed, 2001). From this perspective, the boundaries that shape our understanding of organisational control and trust are often blurred through trade-offs made between central stakeholders, such as those of the AOC and the NSW Government. Such trade-offs or shifting power relations shape and influence organisational developments, often resulting in unforeseen
or unintended management outcomes (van Iterson et al., 2002). (The changing and dynamic power relations that characterised the relationship between the AOC and the NSW Government are explored in more detail in Part B of this chapter).

The trust individuals have in each other is also an indicator of management performance and becomes an important feature of the development of long-term inter- and intra-organisational relations (Gastelaars, 2002). The researcher’s observations of the SOCOG Sport Program were that as an organisational unit the managers and staff of this functional area exhibited high levels of trust in both the AOC and SSC leadership. The analysis of the interview data highlighted that the AOC and its SSC representatives, rather than being just part of a hierarchy, were readily available; they listened to and dealt with the issues presented to them by the staff of SOCOG Sport Program.

The trust in the AOC exhibited by members of the SOCOG Sport Program did not just emerge through the long-term relations that had developed over a number of years, but also through the vision promoted by the AOC leadership of organising the Sydney Olympics for the athletes and for sport. As mentioned earlier in this theme, it was observed by the researcher that the power relations between the AOC, its SSC representatives, and the senior management of the SOCOG Sport Program were characterised by cooperation and support. In this manner, and as outlined by Gastelaars (2002), the utility and strength of strong and trusting organisational networks is that it can produce “a shared need for continuous, immediate and mutual exchange of information” (p. 77).

The development of strong organisational networks and relations between the AOC, SOCOG and the NSW Government, therefore, provided a solid foundation for internal and external organisational co-operation. As already noted in this chapter, power relations are the basis and a precondition
of trust (Bachmann, 2001). Whilst the AOC, through the SSC, had formal power and authority within SOCOG, its strong network, especially with the senior representatives of the IOC and the 28 Olympic international sports federations, also meant it maintained a strong degree of informal power relations across the Olympic Movement. Respondent 35 argued, for instance, that it was important that the senior AOC and SSC officials developed strong relations with each of the presidents of the international sports federations, to ensure cooperation in the planning of the SOCOG Sport Program. In addition, Respondent 14 suggested that “behind the scenes with the FIVB, Jeff [AOC, SSC and SOCOG official] … part of his mandate [was] to make sure he became a very close friend of the FIVB President”.

Apart from the development of strong network relations with the international sports federations, the recruitment of the SOCOG Sport Program managers by the SSC was largely based on pre-existing Olympic sport networks. According to a senior Olympic respondent, SOCOG Sport Program managers were hired not only because of their experience in organising sport competitions but also based on their ability to communicate and co-operate with their respective international sport federations (Respondent 05). As outlined by Bachmann (2001) and Lyon (2006), organisational trust and cooperation are interdependent characteristics. Managers with the ability to communicate effectively and build relations with international sport federations were therefore considered an important component of the establishment of the SOCOG Sport Program. As argued by Respondent 05, a senior Olympic official, it was important for the key people involved in the organisation and the implementation the SOCOG Sport Program to have the respect of the international sport federations. Without respect and trust it would have been “very, very difficult to achieve anything” (Respondent 05).

While the majority of the respondents interviewed for this study were positive about the network relations maintained by the AOC within SOCOG, a small number expressed some negative views. As outlined by Elias (1994), all
relations between people are power relations. The majority of relations observed within SOCOG by the researcher were positive but it would be unusual for an organisation, especially one the size of SOCOG, not to experience some organisational conflict. Essentially, organisational conflict emerges through the patterning of human relations (Elias, 1994). As outlined by Stacey (2003):

> In relating to each other we are always constraining each other. I cannot sustain a relationship with anyone if I do exactly as I please. At the same time, however, in relating to each other we are enabling each other. That is what power is, namely relational processes of enabling and constraining at the same time. (p. 487)

It was noted by one respondent, for instance, that they did not trust some of the people on the SSC (Respondent 23). The respondent outlined that the people who assisted him the most with his Olympic sport preparations were not part of the SSC, but included a NSW Government official and a senior SOCOG Sport Program manager. Respondent 23 commented that “as strange as it may seem … Mark [NSW Government Olympic official] … not because he was any great sports person, but my association with him” helped achieved outcomes for the planning of the Olympic sport. Interestingly, the organisational issues with which the NSW Government official was able to assist Respondent 23 were mainly venue specific and to a large extent beyond the scope and remit of the SSC. From this perspective, the organisational relations within the SOCOG Sport Program were influenced by relational processes that were either resource enabling or resource constraining.

In summary, it is argued that overall the SOCOG Sport Program espoused a great deal of trust in the AOC and its leadership. After initially disagreeing on the terms outlined in the two central Olympic contracts, the AOC itself was able to build a strong relationship with the NSW Government.
From the ‘Knight of the Long Prawns’ onward, in the Games preparations the management of the SOCOG Sport Program was influenced mostly by cooperative Olympic stakeholder relations. By managing the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program at the Sydney Games, through the establishment of the SCC the AOC protected both its interests and the interests of the athletes. The organisational power of the AOC, as a major Olympic stakeholder, was leveraged to achieve its Olympic vision and organisational objectives. It is this notion of organisational power relations that this chapter will now discuss.

5.3 Part B. Organisational Power

Part B of this chapter presents the second aggregated theoretical dimension, Organisational Power. This aggregated dimension consists of two second-order themes. The first is termed Authority, while the second is Autonomy and Interdependence. Although the two second-order themes are explained separately, the categorisation of the data is not always completely distinct. Rather, the concepts presented are often interconnected to and interdependent of one another. Table 16 (see below) summarises these themes and the presented data discussed in this section. The level of data saturation of each first-order code and second-order theme can also be viewed in Table 17 (see below).

The theoretical dimension presented in this part of the chapter presents evidence of how the AOC’s organisational power influenced the organisation of the Sport Program at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. The legal authority maintained by the AOC throughout its involvement in the Games preparations provided the AOC with the opportunity to leverage its position with the NSW Government and SOCOG. This power enabled the AOC to broker a deal with the NSW Government, which led to the establishment of the SSC. As an autonomous agency the SSC had the power to organise and manage all sport-specific and sport-related activities within SOCOG.
While the AOC, through the establishment of the SSC, maintained autonomous decision-making authority within SOCOG, it was still interdependent on other Olympic stakeholders, especially the NSW Government, the international sport federations and the IOC. In order to deliver a high-quality Olympic Games for the athletes, the AOC on its own did not have either the human or financial resources to achieve this aim. It needed the support of the NSW Government, the international sport federations, the IOC and other related stakeholders to organise and manage the Games effectively. The following section of this chapter will address these points.

Table 17: Aggregated Theoretical Dimension 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aggregated Theoretical Dimension</th>
<th>Second-Order Themes</th>
<th>First-Order Codes and Summary of Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organisational Power</td>
<td>Authority</td>
<td><em>The Legitimacy of the SSC</em></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- The formation of the SSC enabled the AOC to control a central element of the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games</td>
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<td>- With its authority enshrined in legislation, the SSC maintained significant power relations within SOCOG</td>
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<td>- The authority maintained by the SSC, within SOCOG, enabled it to make sport-specific and sport-related decisions</td>
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*The Complexity of Olympic Planning*

- Due to the formation of the SSC, the SOCOG Board no longer had responsibility for the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program
- As a consequence of the SSC’s authority, rather than spending valuable time making sport-specific decisions, the SOCOG Board was able to focus its decision-making on the critical Olympic organising issues such as raising revenue and reducing costs
### Autonomy and Interdependence

**Decision-Making Autonomy**
- As an autonomous agency, the SSC reduced the amount of organisational bureaucracy faced by the Sport Program within SOCOG

**Resource Autonomy**
- The resource autonomy of the SSC enabled the SOCOG Sport Program to organise 28 Olympic sport competitions that satisfied the central objective of the AOC: delivering the ‘athletes’ Games’

**Policy Decisions**
- Planning the SOCOG Sport Program was a complex exercise
- Between 1996 and 2001, the SSC made 540 sport-specific and sport-related decisions

**Organisational Interdependence**
- While the SSC maintained significant autonomy within SOCOG, it was still reliant on resources provided by other Olympic stakeholders, especially the NSW Government. Thus, a level of organisational interdependence still existed
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<th>Row Number</th>
<th>First-Order Codes</th>
<th>Second-Order Themes: Aggregated Dimension 2</th>
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Table 18: First-Order Codes and Second-Order Themes: Aggregated Dimension 2
5.3.1 Authority

The second-order theme discussed in this section, Authority, is subdivided into two categories. The first outlines evidence of the legitimacy of the SSC within SOCOG, while the second outlines how the participants explained the decision-making authority of the SSC and it assisted SOCOG in managing the complexity of Olympic planning more effectively.

The Legitimacy of the SSC

As mentioned in Chapter One, the SSC was formed as a result of contract renegotiations between the AOC and the NSW Government. The AOC’s power in relation to the staging of the Sydney Olympics was constituted in NSW Parliament Legislation. As such, it had legitimate authority within SOCOG to organise and implement the SOCOG Sport Program. According to Respondent 12, the authority and legitimacy of the SSC allowed it to make important decisions in a timely manner: “[I]t was cutting back on the pathway you needed to go through to get things done, decisions made”. Furthermore, the ability of the SSC to make quick decisions was often juxtaposed by respondents with what ‘might have been’ if these decisions were left to the SOCOG Board. “If there had not been a SOCOG Sports Commission … it just would have taken so long to get decisions out of the Board” (Respondent 09). As a result of its authority within SOCOG, through the SSC the AOC could make sport-related decisions even though the SOCOG Board may have expressed a preference for a different position or policy. As outlined by Respondent 33,

The reasons for the formation of the [SOCOG] Sports Commission were essentially about the AOC retaining control of the key element of the Games, i.e. the sport … The AOC had a significant role in the functioning of the Sports Commission and the Sports Commission had an integral role in SOCOG’s delivery of the Games by establishing sports
policy which was consistent with the AOC’s focus on the athletes and Olympic principles.

From a similar perspective, Respondent 09 commented that if critical Sport decisions were left to the SOCOG Board, they “could have taken months” to be made, mainly because of the large number of financial and political matters the Board needed to progress. Such a decision-making capability was a key strength of the SSC (Respondent 05); the decisions the SSC made could not be overturned by the SOCOG Board and SSC “decisions were made for Sport [SOCOG Sport Program] and not the bloody SOCOG Board” (Respondent 09). Respondent 13, for instance, observed:

what it did do [the SSC], it gave us a focal point, to give us what was truthful when we were dealing with the [NSW] Government, because it was so political [the Games] … now if we hadn’t of [sic] had the [SOCOG] Sports Commission, and especially Jeff [AOC, SSC and SOCOG official], then we would have never had [sic] got the truth.

The interview participants noted that the perceived value of the SSC, through the organisational authority it maintained within SOCOG, was based on the premise that the decisions it made were independent of the SOCOG Board and were unable to be overturned by the Board. As the power of the AOC was embedded in legislation passed by the NSW Parliament, the SSC was not regarded as another ‘mere’ committee (Respondent 05). According to this senior SOCOG official:

the difference with the Sydney model [of having the SSC] was that it was actually enshrined in legislation and it had quite significant powers. In fact, it had total power because the SSC was an autonomous body having full control over all decisions
relating to the organisation and conduct of sport and athletes under an agreed charter of responsibility, with the only exception being with the budget and that the overall budget for Sport [SOCOG Sport Program] had to be approved by the SOCOG Board. After that the SSC had the right to use that budget as it wished, without exceeding it. (Respondent 05)

The creation of the SSC thus ensured that there was a reduced requirement for the senior managers within the SOCOG Sport Program to rely only on their skills of persuasion and informal networks to get favourable decisions from the SOCOG Board. The extent of the power relations maintained by the AOC power in the organisation of the Sydney Games is described by Respondent 31:

Jeff [AOC, SSC and SOCOG official] had an enormous amount of power under the original agreement … and he kept vetoing, when Jack [former SOCOG President] was the Chairman. So a deal got done. Jack left as Chairman, basically, because nothing could ever get done. You know, Jeff had all the power and he used it … He became … Senior Vice-President of SOCOG, but he became Chairman of the Sports Commission but had the power of the SOCOG Board delegated to him on all things related to the athletes … and NOCs … The Village became part of it as well. So that worked very well …

So Jeff was absolutely paramount in sort of ensuring the athletes got number one priority, in the whole bloody thing, and he did a very good job of that to the extent that a big issue like buses going to [athlete] training, where ORTA were trying to save money, were saying we will send the bus with the team, once it has dropped the team at training it will disappear and
we will send another one back to pick it up. Jeff said ‘get f...ed’, the bus will go with the team and it will stay with the team, right. So they [the SSC] won all those sort of battles, which were about service levels, and it played a very good role and it was a really good way of dealing with the IOC … the international sports federations and the NOCs.

For the SOCOG Board, an unforeseen outcome and benefit of the establishment of the SSC was that it no longer had authority for the SOCOG Sport Program. The consequences of losing this authority are outlined in the next section.

The Complexity of Olympic Planning

An important point made by the respondents interviewed for this study was that the SSC, with its authority to make timely decisions, was very effective in the complex nature of project planning for an Olympic Games. Respondent 12, for instance, suggested the SSC had a:

major impact … it had the authority of the organising committee, so if sports had things that they wanted to get done, as long as the [SOCOG] Sports Commission was happy with it, you were going to get it done, so I thought that was fairly critical … it was cutting back on the pathway you needed to go through to get things done, decisions made.

Likewise, Respondent 29 stated that the SSC had decision-making authority over everything that impacted athletes, from sports equipment procurement to the quality of amenities in the village. Their role was particularly important in championing the needs of athletes. An example is the procurement of sports equipment. The agenda of the [SOCOG]
Procurement Program was to accept the lowest bid for any tender, regardless of technical quality. Whereas, through the Sports Equipment working group of the Sports Commission, we were able to ensure that technical quality was the priority driver of tendering decisions.

Respondent 16 noted that the Sport Program within an OCOG is often disadvantaged because of the timing of its growth within the Olympic planning cycle. For example, large Olympic project planning program areas such as venue development and construction are very costly and start early in the Olympic planning cycle. This means that they have access to resources and can create a strong power base early in Olympic planning. This is in contrast to sport-related planning, which grows in scope and staffing considerably late in the organisational process and intensifies as the start of the sport competition nears (Respondent 16).

A similar observation was made by the researcher when developing the SOCOG Sport Program Milestone Planning Reports with a colleague in late 1998 and early 1999. These reports listed the major milestones that needed to be achieved across SOCOG functional areas that had operational roles in planning and delivering Olympic venues. The milestone reports highlighted that a considerable portion of SOCOG Sport Program planning was undertaken in the years 1999 and 2000, as some other Olympic program areas like Venue Management and Technology already were in the later stages of their Olympic planning cycle. These programs required large numbers of staff early in the planning process. In comparison, the SOCOG Sport Program was highly dependent on paid and volunteer staff later in the planning cycle. This required the utilisation of significant staff numbers in the last 12 to 18 months before the Games, when pressure was high (Respondent 16).

If [the SOCOG Sport Program] is not taken into consideration and given the importance that it does have, because it is a
sporting event … and have the people in a position of authority, power … early on, I think Sport [SOCOG Sport Program] … would be, you know, it would be tougher for the people within the sport to deliver it, at the end because of the … the nature of … the timing of it … You see some functional areas are very big and very operative. Whereas sport tends to … work with a small staff and build and you have a lot more staff numbers at the time of the Games, whereas other [program] areas don’t necessarily do that … that is why it is so important to have it there [the SSC]. (Respondent 16)

Due to this planning and organisational context, the authority of the SSC became increasingly important. According to Respondent 16, without the SSC it would have been much more difficult and “tougher for the people within the [SOCOG] Sport Program to deliver it”. Additionally, Respondent 07 stated that without the authority of the SSC, the SOCOG Sport Program would have been a “pretty low priority” for SOCOG. Respondent 14 stated that the SSC “took control of decision-making, the turnaround on decision-making was immediate or as near immediate as it could be”. The power relations of the SSC, both formal and informal, assisted the AOC in getting the required co-operation from a range of Olympic stakeholders.

I … strongly believe without that high level of representation and the firepower that [the SOCOG] Sports Commission had … [the] Sport [SOCOG Sport Program] would have had a lesser profile within SOCOG than it did have. The very strong presence of the [SOCOG] Sports Commission and the AOC were vital in ensuring there was a strong focus on sport [the SOCOG Sport Program]. (Respondent 07)
Other factors were mentioned by the respondents that supported the point that the creation of the SSC enabled SOCOG to deal with a range of critical issues that developed outside of the Sport Program. Respondent 15, for instance, suggested that the SSC was especially important when considering the pressure SOCOG faced from unforeseen events. One example was the Asian financial crisis, which took place in 1997 and 1998 (Respondent 15). This financial crisis was an unplanned event and one that was certainly beyond the control of the SOCOG Board, and had a significant impact on SOCOG’s ability to raise funds (Toohey, 2001; Respondent 31). In 1998, for example, the SOCOG Board sharply revised downwards its sponsorship revenue forecasts principally because of this unforeseen event (SOCOG, 1999). This point is supported by the *Official Report for the XXVII Olympiad*, which states that in 1998 and 1999 SOCOG’s financial position diminished: “proposed expenditure was increasing and revenue projections were not being achieved, partly because of factors such as the Asian economic crisis” (Toohey, 2001, p. 31).

It was also noted by a respondent that OCOGs that have strong Sport Programs benefit from the knowledge that they provide to other parts of the organisation (Respondent 25). In this way, organisational knowledge shared by an experienced Sport Program can assist other OCOG functional areas in dealing with complex sport-related planning issues. Importantly, the OCOG Sport Program needs to generate sustainable expectations, and its organisational power should not be used to generate resources that are wasteful and unnecessary. “The [Olympic] Sport Program leadership must manage their own clients”—international federations, competition managers—expectations and ensure that the requirements for the Games are in line with actual needs and not wish lists that waste planning time” (Respondent 25). This respondent, when interviewed in 2009, stated that he had been “involved in every [Olympic] Games since Atlanta” and from this experience had learnt that:

OCOGs must have strong but balanced leadership as it relates to Sport [OCOG Sport Program] and the Games. When it isn’t
strong the rest of the organisation actually suffers from the lack of good information on what is needed for the Games, i.e. sports, to be successful. All of the other departments in the OCOG need good information and requirements from the [Olympic] Sport Program to succeed in their planning. This being said, the Sport Program must be balanced also …

Being ... the ‘athletes’ Games’, the SSC had a strong hand in ensuring that theme remained a priority in the decision-making process. If a strong body like the SSC didn’t exist, one would question where the priorities of Sport [Program] would fall within the OCOG. (Respondent 25)

The legitimised decision-making authority of the SSC within SOCOG, therefore, provided the AOC with the capacity to achieve its central organisational objectives as they related to the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. Even with its authority within SOCOG, the AOC was still reliant on other Olympic stakeholders in order for it to achieve the planned vision. The next section explores both the AOC’s autonomy and interdependence within SOCOG.

5.3.2 Autonomy and Interdependence

The Autonomy and Interdependence second-order theme that emerged from the data analysis is outlined in this section. It is divided into four first-order categories: decision-making autonomy; resource autonomy; policy decisions; and organisational interdependence.

Decision-Making Autonomy

As mentioned in the previous Authority second-order theme, the formation of the SSC, as an independent organising unit, with sport-
management expertise, resulted in SOCOG being better able to deal with greater complexity in a timely manner. While the SSC was dependent on a range of internal and external stakeholders in managing the delivery of the SOCOG Sport Program at the Games, nevertheless it had a significant amount of organisational autonomy and control. The autonomy of the SSC was regarded as an important organisational feature by those interviewed for this study. The data highlighted that the SSC had both decision-making power and the ability to allocate resources (Respondent 31; Respondent 35).

According to Respondent 15, the formation of the SSC “was probably the most important initiative from a sport point of view … to focus all the attention on things that were related to athletes … like the [Olympic] Village, transport and all things like that”. While Respondent 32, a SOCOG Board member, noted the uniqueness of the SSC autonomy, “Given its mandate, brief and its unusual and relative autonomy in terms of not just recommending to the Board of SOCOG but in a discrete range of areas taking decisions and implementing policy, it had I think a very substantial impact”. The autonomy of the SSC ensured that on the whole decisions made by SOCOG were in the best interests of the SOCOG Sport Program, and thus of the athletes (Respondent 15). As outlined earlier,

The SSC was an autonomous body having full control over all decisions relating to the organisation and conduct of sport and athletes, under an agreed charter of responsibility. With the only exception being with the budget, and that the overall budget for sport had to be approved by the SOCOG Board. After that, the SSC had the right to use that budget as it wished without exceeding it, and it had totally autonomy. (Respondent 05)

As an autonomous organisational unit within SOCOG, the SSC representatives were able to allocate resources to the SOCOG Sport Program,
in a manner that suited its Olympic objectives (Respondent 05). As argued by Respondent 29,

The SOCOG Sports Commission was the champion of sport both within the organising committee, with other stakeholders, i.e. government, and the IOC … It gave this important client group an internal champion that other clients did not have … As the Sports Commission met very regularly, it meant there was constant oversight, policy direction and monitoring of all preparations for sport.

The power of the autonomous SSC allowed the AOC to implement strong decision-making power within SOCOG, power backed with financial and human-resource capital (Respondent 05). The rest of SOCOG had little choice but to take notice of the SSC and the SOCOG Sport Program. As one respondent recalled about an incident soon after the establishment of the SSC, “When going to meetings with SOCOG Finance, I had to take a copy of the [SSC] legislation, they didn’t believe me, I showed it to them, ‘this is our financial status’. They were stunned” (Respondent 04).

The priority given to the SOCOG Sport Program in Sydney was contrasted by some respondents with the priority of the Sport Program at the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games. The majority of the SOCOG Sport Program competition managers interviewed for this study attended the 1996 Games as SOCOG observers. In many interviews and informal discussions between this researcher and SOCOG managers between 1998 and 2000, the point was often made that the Atlanta Organising Committee did not view its Sport Program as a high priority:

And the parallel there was Atlanta. I don’t think they had a SSC or similar body, and we all heard the problems they had
in trying to put Sport [SOCOG Sport Program] on a high priority to do their role. (Respondent 18)

This innovative governance design of the SSC enabled it to ‘sidestep’ a traditional bureaucratic ‘roadblock’—that of the SOCOG Board. According to one long-serving SOCOG respondent, who also spent time as the corporate secretary of the SSC,

The [SOCOG] Sports Commission … was very effective in managing the Sport [the SOCOG Sport Program] side of things. The [SOCOG] Board was a very diverse one, there was a fair amount of politics and much of it was in the press, in relation to decisions from all areas. Marketing in particular was one of the tension points and I think having the SOCOG Sports Commission looking after sport took that largely out of Board consideration. I think it freed the Board up to focus on other things and it meant that the people with the expertise in sport and the true love and knowledge of sport and the long and deep involvement with the IOC were able to focus on sport, and it meant that the SOCOG Sports Commission was also able to be involved in several levels of the management of Sport [SOCOG Sport Program]. (Respondent 28)

The establishment of the SSC made the SOCOG Sport Program less bound by bureaucracy compared to other parts of SOCOG (Respondent 07). As a consequence, decisions made by the SSC were undertaken in a timely fashion (Respondent 07). The organisational efficiency gained from this structure ensured that the SOCOG Sport Program “wasn’t as bureaucratic as other parts of SOCOG” (Respondent 16).
Resource Autonomy

The respondents interviewed for this study argued that without the presence of the SCC, the SOCOG Sport Program would have been dominated within SOCOG by high revenue-earning organisational sub-units such as marketing, ticketing and broadcasting (Respondent 09). The decisions taken by the SSC not only took into account financial factors but also the consequences such decisions would have for the quality of athlete services and performance (Respondent 05; Respondent 35). The resource autonomy of the SSC therefore ensured that the best possible sports equipment and facilities were provided for the athletes at the Sydney Games. Citing the installation of expensive lights for the field of play for the Olympic Badminton competition, Respondent 09 stated:

I had problems with the lighting I wanted [for the sport of Badminton]. It was something I was always told by the SOCOG Sports Commission would happen. I had my doubts at times whether it would, but it did happen, and it did cost a lot of money.

Likewise, Respondent 11 commented that the important decisions made by the SSC for the Sailing competition concerned approving the purchase of expensive equipment such as marshalling boats. Respondent 11 argued that without the SSC’s backing the boats for the technical officials would have been of a lesser quality. The fact that the agreed SSC budget could not be changed or tampered with by either the SOCOG Board or by the NSW Government allowed the SSC to achieve its objectives in relation to equipment purchasing.

The budget for the SSC was nearly A$60 million greater than the original Sport Program budget developed at the time of the bid in 1993 (see Table 18). Interestingly, however, and as outlined by Respondent 35 earlier in this chapter, the SSC was able to work well within this budget while at the same time meeting the overall needs of the SOCOG Sport Program. The
savings found by the SSC resulted in approximately A$30 million less being spent on the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program than was allocated in the revised 1997 Games budget (SOCOG, 2000c). Details of the SSC budget are provided below in Table 18.

Table 19: SSC Budget

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<td>24.5</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOC Relations &amp; Protocol</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language Services</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doping Control</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Services</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOC Services</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports Equipment</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Grants</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.9</td>
<td>158.0</td>
<td>128.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SOCOG (2000c, p. 61)

Another aspect of the SSC’s resource power was that it provided the SOCOG Sport Program with organisational certainty. Respondent 09, when referring to the installation of expensive sports equipment at a competition venue, stated: “If it had to happen, it happened”. Respondent 06 supported this contention, arguing that without the SSC “we would have been much more dominated by financial issues”.

In a further example, Respondent 19 commented on how quickly the SSC reacted to a poor purchasing decision made by the SOCOG Logistics Division. This decision had the potential to result in an embarrassment for both the International Tennis Federation (ITF) and the SOCOG Sport Program (Respondent 19). As part of a broader sponsorship and procurement strategy, the SOCOG Logistics Program had sourced office furniture for all Olympic
work spaces at the Olympic competition venues. As part of this arrangement a large cardboard manufacturing firm won the tender to provide furniture and fittings at all Olympic venues. Respondent 19 outlined (in a humorous manner) how the President and other ITF hierarchy were to be provided with cardboard desks for their Olympic offices rather than more traditional furniture. Respondent 19 described how they were given

little … student desks [made from recycled cardboard] for the President of the International Tennis Federation, in this huge room upstairs [at the Olympic Tennis Centre] … I remember my [SOCOG] Logistics Manager saying, ‘that’s what you are getting’. One phone call and two days later, everything was changed over ... there was an immediate response and I thought that was very, very, helpful to me.

Although the examples above highlight how the SSC was able to protect the resource base of the SOCOG Sport Program, there were occasions when resource decisions were made by other Olympic stakeholders (beyond the control of the SSC) that negatively impacted the SOCOG Sport Program. For instance, Respondent 26, who was responsible for the baseball competition, recalled “getting a phone call on a weekend” a year before the Sydney Games, to be told by a NSW Government Olympic official that “there was no money left … we need to cut A$5 million from the venue budget for the Baseball Stadium at Blacktown” (Respondent 26). This budget reduction resulted in the original venue design, which consisted of having a modern “dug-out plan for the athletes”, to be “modified and dramatically reduced”, impacting on the venue quality for both the athletes and the Olympic Baseball officials (Respondent 26).

Policy Decisions

The SSC’s authority, within SOCOG, provided it with the organisational freedom to make timely decisions for the benefit of the SOCOG
Sport Program. As a consequence of this management autonomy, between 1996 and 2000 the SSC made 540 policy decisions (SOCOG, 2000c). Analysis of the SSC register showed that of the 540 decisions made, approximately 100 different decision themes were addressed by the SSC (SOCOG, 2000c). A breakdown of the decision themes (as defined by the SSC) and the number of decisions made by the SSC can be viewed in Table 19 (see below).

Table 20: SSC Decision Themes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SSC Decision Themes</th>
<th>Number of Decisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NOC Services</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villages</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSC Operational Procedures</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Football</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports Equipment</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test Events</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aquatics</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volleyball (Beach)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports Presentation and Publications</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venues</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doping Control</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freight</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Polo</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympic Family</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport Competition Program</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseball</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport Competition Schedule</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sailing</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accreditation</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Program</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern Pentathlon</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympic Family Visits</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASOIF</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Technical Officials Training</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ticketing</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANOC</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homebush Bay Names Committee</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate Card</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennis</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video-boards</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Camp and Youth Programs</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athlete Numbers</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chefs De Mission Seminar</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport Entries</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IF Liaison</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marathon and Walk Course Design</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opening Ceremony</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sydney Marathon - Test Event</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Delegate Per Diems</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volleyball (Indoor)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athlete Home-Stay Program</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athletics</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basketball</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command, Control and Communications (C3)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Federation Congress</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logo Use</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Reforecast</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Rights</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Services</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rushcutter's Bay Sailing Shore Base</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shooting</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slalom Canoe</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOG Sport Division</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport Pictograms</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports Production</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sydney Olympic Park</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triathlon</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venue Management</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrestling</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remains of the Games</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archery</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attaché Program</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catering</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceremonies</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleaning and Waste Management</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darling Harbour</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change to the start of daylight saving</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Envoy Program</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equestrian</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Olympic Committees</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fencing</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAISF</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Games Model</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generic Competition Venue Operation Plans</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitality Venues - NOCs</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host / Hostess Program</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>InfoTech</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interstate Football Concept of Operations</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Of the 540 decisions made by the SSC, 74 (13.7%) decisions were made in 1996, 165 (30.6%) decisions were made in 1997, 112 (20.7%) decisions were made in 1998, 124 (22.9%) decisions were made in 1999, and 65 (12%) decisions were made in 2000. This spread of decisions between 1996 and 2000 is captured in Table 20 (see below).

Table 21: SSC Decisions 1996-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision Category</th>
<th>Number of Decisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jewish Community Representations</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Operations Centre - Concept of Operations</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Events at Games Time</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mascots</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOC Olympic Family and NOC Services</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sydney 2000 Observer Program</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Officials</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel Grants - NOCs</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Velodrome</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victory Ceremonies</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Youth Games</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Decisions</td>
<td>540</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from SOCOG (2000c, pp. 79-109)
The total number of decisions made and the wide range of areas addressed emphasise the impact of the SSC. An example of the type of decisions made by the SSC is shown in Table 21 (see below). This table outlines the decisions made at the first SSC meeting held on 10 September 1996 (SOCOG, 2000c). This meeting was one of 44 that the SSC held between September 1996 and November 2000 (SOCOG, 2000c). The policy decisions made at this meeting provide an insight into the emphasis the SSC placed on athlete and sport requirements at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games.

Table 22: SSC Decisions at Meeting 1 (10/09/1996)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision Number</th>
<th>Decision Theme</th>
<th>Decision Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>Football</td>
<td>Endorsed establishment of Football Technical Advisory Committee to be convened by SOCOG Sport Competition Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>Football</td>
<td>Women’s matches to be played as double-headers with men’s matches in preliminary rounds. For medal rounds, women’s matches to be played as stand-alone double-headers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>Football</td>
<td>Perth (Western Australia) to be excluded as a possible Olympic Football venue. Western Australian Events to be advised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>Hospitality (NOCs)</td>
<td>Utilise Sydney Convention Centre and Licensed Club industry on assistance to NOCs wishing to establish “hospitality” facilities in Sydney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>Sailing</td>
<td>Sydney will be the venue for the Olympic Sailing Regatta with Rushcutters Bay as the shore base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>SOCOG Sport Program</td>
<td>SSC to be consulted on future senior Sport Program staff appointments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>Sport Competition Program</td>
<td>Advise IOC Co-ordination Commission of SOCOG concerns on impact on sports/venue planning if IOC decision on final 2000 Sport Program is delayed beyond December 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>SSC Operational Procedures</td>
<td>Minutes to be kept of all meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>SSC Operational Procedures</td>
<td>Policy register to be instituted, in which SSC decisions would be recorded and updated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>75.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>SSC Operational Procedures</strong></td>
<td>Facilities and Villages to be standing items on agenda for future SSC meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>75.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>SSC Operational Procedures</strong></td>
<td>SOCOG’s Facilities Manager and other relevant staff to attend Commission meetings as reported to provide briefings and reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>75.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>SSC Operational Procedures</strong></td>
<td>SSC papers and agenda to be tabled at SOCOG Board Meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>85.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>Tennis</strong></td>
<td>Resolve official ball for Tennis with ITF as a priority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>86.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>Test Events</strong></td>
<td>Concurred in agreed principles for Test Events, with the addition of the following:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Test Events to be conducted under supervision of international federation technical delegates but using Olympic rules;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Team sports, particularly International Invitations, should be restricted to 4 men’s and 4 women’s, including the Australian Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>86.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>Test Events</strong></td>
<td>Review budget and athlete numbers for all Test Events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>86.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>Test Events</strong></td>
<td>Lock in Australian Sports Commission financial support for Test Event program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>86.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>Test Events</strong></td>
<td>Establish interest of SOCOG Marketing Division in Test Events, and determine policy on restrictions that will apply where Test Events “piggy-back” on to existing events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>94.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>Venues</strong></td>
<td>Commission to have input into all decisions affecting location of sports facilities and venues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>100.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>Village</strong></td>
<td>Determine policy on “soft opening” for Sydney Village for possible announcement at ANOC General Assembly in Cancun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>100.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>Village</strong></td>
<td>Conduct survey of NOCs prior to and at Cancun to determine “first cut” athlete/official numbers for Sydney and Village arrival dates</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While the SSC was an autonomous agency within SOCOG, it still relied on other Olympic stakeholders external to SOCOG in order to implement its ambitious plans for the SOCOG Sport Program. The decisions made by the SSC at their first meeting in 1996 (as presented in Table 21 above) are indicative of some of the organisational areas where the SSC was interdependent on other Olympic stakeholders, in particular, the NSW Government and its agencies and the international sport federations. The following category examines this organisational interdependence.

Organisational Interdependence

From the formation of the SSC onward, the SSC was affected by decision making of organisational stakeholders that were interdependent. For example, in order to organise the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games the AOC required the NSW Government to commit to staging the Games, and secondly to agree to contractual terms that were weighted in the AOC’s favour (Respondent 34). As the agreed financial underwriter of the Games, over time the NSW Government made a number of changes to the way its Games responsibilities were organised. The following section outlines how the changes made over time by the NSW Government, and agreed to by the AOC, resulted in the creation of the ‘Sydney organising model’. As stated previously in the chapter, this model came about by a process of evolving; it was not the intended planning model devised at the beginning of the Games planning.

Originally, the Sydney bid documents stated the Games would be organised by an organising committee that was to be controlled entirely by the AOC through a private company structure (Respondent 34; Respondent 35). It was intended that “the AOC would be the sole shareholder of a company incorporated to run the Games and it would appoint all of the directors” (Respondent 34). The bid plan was for the NSW Government to provide some Olympic services and infrastructure, but otherwise it would take a back seat to the AOC (Respondent 34). According to Respondent 34, the NSW Government “was to provide a range of services and procure the necessary infrastructure
This situation changed in September 1993, when Sydney won the bid. At this time the NSW Government negotiated with the AOC a change to the administrative arrangements; “the organising committee—SOCOG—became a statutory authority created by special legislation in the NSW Parliament” (Respondent 34). According to a senior AOC official, this decision was made because the AOC realised even at that early stage in Games planning that the NSW Government, as the underwriter of the Games, was entitled to a greater say on the SOCOG Board: “We [the AOC] didn’t have the ability to do that [organise the Games], we needed the Government, and then it did evolve after, it evolved in my mind. I knew what I wanted, I waited for the opportunity and I took it” (Respondent 35).

The AOC, through this particular structural change, negotiated a marketing agreement with the NSW Government that resulted in the AOC receiving A$60 million in exchange for the AOC’s marketing rights, which then went to SOCOG for the period 1996–2000 (Respondent 34; Respondent 35). This change started the shift in the overall control for the Games, from the AOC to the NSW Government. This shift culminated in the ‘Knight of the Long Prawns’ negotiation, which not only resulted in the establishment of the SSC but also confirmed the central place of the NSW Government in the organisation of the Games. Respondent 34 stated that as a result of this change, “the NSW Government went from zero control to appointing seven of the 15 directors and also having a veto over the choice of CEO”.

With the NSW Government’s increased involvement in the Games organisation, it restructured its own departments, integrating them into the planning of the Olympics. According to Respondent 34, the original arrangement “was cumbersome … involving five authorities and four ministers. Following the March 1995 election, there was a change of
Government in New South Wales. The incoming Government … streamlined the administrative arrangements on the Government side”. A single Minister for the Olympics and Paralympics was appointed and the five authorities had their responsibilities merged into one organisation that became known as the Olympic Coordination Authority.

Following the Atlanta 1996 Olympic Games, further changes were made to the structure of Olympic planning. A new statutory body was established for all Olympic-related transport. This agency was called the Olympic Roads and Transport Authority (ORTA) and was the responsibility of the Minister for the Olympics and Paralympics. ORTA was responsible for all Olympic-related ground transport, including road, rail and ferry. The extensive role of the NSW Government in the organisation of the Sydney Games was outlined further by Respondent 34: “It was the State Government which underwrote the cost of the Games, passed almost all of the necessary legislation, undertook the construction program, provided security and ran the transport for the Sydney Olympics”.

The structure of the Sydney Games therefore evolved in a manner that was not intended originally. The development of SOCOG as an organisation was often the result of unforeseen or unplanned events. This point is supported by Respondent 34, who stated the “administrative structure for the Sydney Olympic Games evolved over time. The actual arrangements at the time of the Games in September 2000 were radically different to those foreshadowed at the time of the bid in 1991”.

In addition to its interdependence with the NSW Government, a number of important SSC decisions were interlinked and dependent on the agreement of the IOC and the international sports federations. Three significant decisions taken by the SSC particularly illustrate this organisational interdependence. Notwithstanding the authority of the SSC within SOCOG, these examples show that the SSC worked collaboratively with a range of Olympic
stakeholders in order to implement the AOC’s vision of staging the ‘athletes’ Games’. Because of their importance to the staging of the Sport Program at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, these are included as case studies to illustrate how the AOC and its agency the SSC were organisationally interdependent. The SSC decisions discussed below include: the SSC decision to play beach volleyball at Bondi Beach; the SSC decision to support the inclusion of women’s water polo in the SOCOG Sport Program; and the SSC decision to support FIFA’s request to start the football competition two days before the Games were ‘officially’ opened.

*Beach Volleyball*

On 10 December 1996, at its fourth meeting the SSC (SSC Decision 17.1) decided “as a fundamental principle, the Beach Volleyball competition should be staged on a beach” (SOCOG, 2000c, p. 81). In the context of Olympic planning, this particular decision was taken relatively late in the planning cycle. This was largely due to beach volleyball not being part of the original plan for the 2000 Games, as outlined in the Sydney Bid documents (SOBL, 1993). While beach volleyball was a demonstration sport at the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games, it was not confirmed as a full medal Olympic sport until after the Sydney bid. Following the successful staging of beach volleyball at the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games, the SSC, the FIVB and the IOC all supported its inclusion in the Sydney 2000 competition schedule (Respondent 14).

The main organisational issue for SOCOG, the SSC and the NSW Government regarding the inclusion of beach volleyball was selecting the location for the competition venue (Respondent 05). As part of the venue-selection process, SOCOG and OCA sought expression of interests from Sydney’s beachside councils to determine which locations wanted to host the competition (SOCOG, 2000c). In 1997, Bondi Beach was selected as the preferred location (SOCOG, 2000c). In accordance with this selection, the SSC meeting minutes on 11 June 1997 (SSC Decision 17.8) stated that “the
Minister for the Olympics be requested to announce the choice of Bondi” (SOCOG, 2000c, p. 81). At the same meeting, the SSC also decided (SSC Decision 17.10) that “there should be one 10,000 seat court at Bondi Beach” (SOCOG, 2000c, p. 81).

The decision to stage the competition at Bondi was not without incident. In particular, it caused significant concern for a collection of local environmental groups (Lenskyj, 2002; Toohey, 2001). These groups argued that the project was too large for the site and it was likely to irreparably damage the beach environment (Respondent 06). Due to this resistance and as the Games neared, SOCOG and the NSW Government were under pressure to stage the Beach Volleyball competition elsewhere (Respondent 14). The environmental campaigners were of the view that the competition should be played at a less environmentally sensitive venue. They suggested, for instance, that the sport could be played at an established sports stadium facility (Respondent 05).

Despite the intensity of political pressure applied to SOCOG, the SSC and the NSW Government, the beach volleyball competition remained at Bondi Beach (Respondent 05), a decision strongly supported by the FIVB. Respondent 14 commented that the FIVB was adamant that the sport should be played on the beach. This was in the face of suggestions by some members of the NSW Government that an easy solution would be to stage the event at an established football stadium (Respondent 14). The FIVB, however, viewed the spectacular location and the international renown of Bondi Beach as a significant advantage for their sport and it was argued that staging the competition at Bondi would attract additional media attention and assist the FIVB’s efforts to broaden the international appeal of Beach Volleyball (Respondent 05).
**Water Polo**

On 13 August 1997, the SSC made the following decision (SSC Decision Number 104.6): “Recommend to the SOCOG Board that Women’s Water Polo be included on the 2000 program within the FINA quota” (SOCOG, 2000c, p. 108). According to Respondent 16, the decision by the SSC to support the inclusion of Women’s Water Polo was the a critical one that had a significant impact on the organisation of the Olympic Aquatics Program: “Women’s water polo, the eight-day swimming program, synchronised diving coming onto the program … that was all facilitated by the SSC … the people on the SSC, to move that through … FINA, the IOC and SOCOG”. Respondent 05 also commented that without the SSC driving these types of decisions, it may have been easy for the SOCOG Board to deny such requests on the grounds of inadequate resources:

The introduction of women’s water polo and the introduction of additional women’s events may not have got through [without the SSC], not because the [SOCOG] Board was opposed to women’s events, but seemingly thinking it was going to increase the costs. And reality showed what a good decision it was to add women’s water polo, extra women’s [events] in diving, extra women’s events in shooting. (Respondent 05)

While the SSC played an important part in driving this decision and similar decisions, it was still interdependent on stakeholders such as FINA and the IOC to achieve its outcomes. Without the agreement of these stakeholders, such decisions may not have been taken (Respondent 05). Furthermore, it is important to note the role of the Australian Water Polo fraternity, specifically members of the Australian women’s team, in pressuring the powerful Olympic stakeholders. According to Respondent 16, without their intense lobbying, such a decision may not have been agreed to by FINA. As outlined by Respondent 22:
The women had been campaigning for some time to get into the Games, they even took the extraordinary action of bursting in on the highest-level meeting of FINA in their swimming costumes … the television people loved that! So that got them some international exposure for the campaign, to get the women in. So, on that basis … the IOC to a certain extent, were railroaded, forced into a corner.

**Football**

Like the beach volleyball competition, the organisation of Olympic football at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games was a complex undertaking. The main difficulty faced by SOCOG was that, unlike the other Olympic sports, football was not only staged in Sydney, but also across a number of other Australian cities such as Adelaide, Brisbane, Canberra and Melbourne (SOCOG, 2000b). This resulted in Olympic football being played across five different legal and governmental jurisdictions. A further factor that distinguished the football competition from all the other Olympic sports at the Sydney Games was that the men’s competition started on 13 September, two days before the Games officially opened. On 11 July 1997, the SSC made the decision (SSC Decision 33.6) to: “agree to FIFA’s request that the Olympic Football Tournament begin early, on the following basis: commence on 13 September 2000, in the interstate cities only; endorsed Competition Schedule dated 25th June 1997; and, IOC Executive Board be asked to approve FIFA request at its meeting in September 1997” (SOCOG, 2000c, p. 85).

Two respondents who had responsibility for Olympic football at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games provided the example as an illustration of how the SSC worked closely together with the powerful international football federation, Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), to achieve their mutual objectives (Respondent 05; Respondent 21). Their decision to play the first game of the football competition before the Opening
Ceremony at the Sydney Games was controversial (Respondent 05; Respondent 21). As a result of this decision, the opening Olympic football match would be the first official event for the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. What made this decision even more unusual was that the match was held in Melbourne and not Sydney. According to Respondent 21, the SSC decision confused some of SOCOG’s non-sport officials:

I think football had one the longest list of [SSC] papers, of additions and action points. And I think up until the last few months … every single SSC [meeting] minutes or agendas had something to do with football. Certainly, there was the issue of starting [the competition] early—that is, starting two days before the Opening Ceremony—it was a major one.

The rationale for this decision was based on the tight schedule planned for the men’s Olympic football competition (Respondent 05). FIFA suggested to the SSC that the athletes playing in the men’s competition required greater rest periods between matches than was available in the original competition schedule (Respondent 21). According to FIFA, this additional rest time could only be achieved satisfactorily by starting the competition two days before the Olympic Opening Ceremony.

These three examples suggest that despite the SSC’s sport-specific and sport-related power within SOCOG, it continually needed to work closely with other stakeholders such as the international sports federations, the IOC and the NSW Government. In the case of beach volleyball, despite substantial political pressure to move the competition to a less environmentally sensitive venue, the SSC, SOCOG, the NSW Government and the FIVB all agreed to stage the event at Bondi Beach. The SSC supported the inclusion of women’s water polo in the Sydney 2000 Olympic Program, but without the agreement of FINA and the IOC this decision would not have been possible. The SSC also supported
FIFA’s suggestion to start the football competition two days before the Olympic Opening Ceremony.

The findings presented in Part B of this chapter have outlined how the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games was influenced by the organisational authority, autonomy and interdependence of the host NOC. These findings are discussed in the next section, drawing on the literature that informs the study.

5.3.3 Discussion

The AOC’s authority within SOCOG, as expressed through the formation of the SSC, had significant consequences for the organisation of the Sport Program at the Sydney Games. The SSC maintained authority and institutional legitimacy within SOCOG for the organisation of the Sport Program. The SSC had the power to make sport-specific and sport-related decisions within SOCOG. Giddens (1969) defines authority as “the institutionalised legitimation which underlies power” (p. 260) and, as outlined by van Krieken et al (2000), “authority is that form of domination which is treated as legitimate—that is right and just—and therefore obeyed on that basis” (p. 93). Eliasian management researcher Marriott (2008) supports this conception, arguing that formal authority legitimates power through relational approval, as people accept that a person and/or group of people (i.e. organisations) have the right to rule and it is their duty and responsibility to obey. The following discussion is divided into two sections, following the pattern established by the two second-order themes outlined above in Part B of this chapter.

Authority

In attempting to understand the authority and legitimacy of the SSC within SOCOG, an examination of the AOC’s organisational power is required. The work of Clegg (1989) is particularly informative in this regard, especially
when exploring how the AOC’s Olympic organising power influenced and shaped the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program. Clegg (1989) offers a useful template for examining and explaining organisational power relations. Clegg’s (1989) model argues that organisational power flows through three interdependent but overlapping circuits. The circuit analogy is used by Clegg (1989) to reinforce the relational and dynamic nature of power in organisations. Clegg’s (1989) organisational power model consists of three particular circuits. These are called episodic, dispositional and facilitative circuits of power. According to Bathelt and Taylor (2002), the episodic circuit examines ‘power as agency’; the dispositional circuit examines ‘power as relationships’; and the facilitative circuit examines ‘power as discipline’ (p. 95). The following analysis will explore each of these organisational power characteristics in the context of the data presented in Part B of this chapter.

The first circuit of power outlined by Clegg (1989), the episodic circuit, concentrates on the causal characteristics that shape organisational power relations. In this first stage, the standing conditions that shape and influence power relations need to be understood (Clegg, 1989; Clegg et al., 2006). A range of power characteristics need to be considered in this circuit (Davenport & Leitch, 2005); drawing on the work of Clegg (1989), Bathelt and Taylor (2002) suggest that in this stage the agential nature of power requires consideration. For instance, discovering who controls organisational resources and the nature of those resources: Are they human, financial, technological or informational resources? In this stage, positional power and therefore organisational authority also need to be considered (Bathelt & Taylor, 2002). Using this perspective, Marriott (2008) has stated that formal authority in organisations is shaped by the contest for control of organisational resources: “control over resources is another form of power, as is control over knowledge and information”. Furthermore, “organisational structures, rules, regulations and procedures, viewed as rational instruments, are seen as reflections of a struggle for political [and organisational] control” (pp. 69–70). Formal authority is therefore shaped by the interdependence of both human agency and
historically constituted social structures as they develop and change over time (Elias, 2000; Flyvbjerg, 1998; Stacey, 2007).

The establishment of the SSC was a direct outcome of the resolution of a dispute between the AOC and the NSW Government. The SSC was not a standard committee, with little formal power or authority; it was a legitimate Olympic agency, with distinct power within SOCOG and the capacity to make binding sport-specific and sport-related decisions. The formation of the SSC was dependent on the agency of the AOC; however, it was not the AOC’s agency alone that created the SSC. The authority of the AOC within SOCOG, and the establishment and operation of the SCC, were interdependent on both social and organisational structures and human agency. The formal authority of the AOC was institutionally interdependent, firstly on the governance of the IOC (as the event owner of the Olympic Games) and secondly on the NSW legal and political structures. These governance structures formed the foundation of the AOC’s organisational power within SOCOG.

Dispositional power is the second circuit of power outlined by Clegg (1989). Dispositional power refers to the rules that govern organisations and their membership. Dispositional power works through the creation of rules and regulations that are required to be followed if one is to remain a member of an organisation or institution. In this stage the power of influence, the power of status and the membership that they afford shape and influence power relations (Bathelt & Taylor, 2002). For example, as a bidding NOC for the 2000 Olympic Games, the AOC accepted the rules and regulations established by the IOC through its Olympic Charter. Likewise, the NSW Government, as the other central party to the bid, not only had to agree to the rules and regulations established by the IOC but was also committed to the rules and regulations established by the IOC’s representative in Australia, the AOC. This power was particularly expressed through the Endorsement Contract between the AOC and the NSW Government signed in 1991 (Gordon, 2003; Toohey, 2001). Dispositional power is therefore focused upon social and organisational
structures such as rules, regulations and legislation. From an Eliasian perspective, these social structures are never entirely fixed; rather, they are relational and dynamic, changing when people and/or groups of people agree for them to be changed or modified (Stacey, 2007).

Facilitative power is the third circuit of Clegg’s (1989) theory of organisational power. In this circuit, the positive and strategic aspects of power relations are outlined. Here collective effort combines to produce positive organisational outcomes (Clegg et al., 2006). Clegg (1989) draws on the work of Foucault (1981, 1984), suggesting that organisational power relations are influenced through strategy development and technical innovation. Organisational power relations in this stage can be viewed as more than ‘power as relationships’, as outlined in the second circuit of power (Bathelt & Taylor, 2002). Rather, this circuit addresses an organisation’s ability to exploit resources in new and novel ways in order to obtain a competitive advantage (Porter, 1985). According to Clegg (1989), in this stage “standing conditions no longer stand. Rule fixing, meaning and memberships are changed … potent uncertainty and dynamism [are introduced] into power relations” (p. 236).

As a result of the formation and implementation of the SSC, the SOCOG Board no longer maintained responsibility or authority for the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program. Due to this decision between the two stakeholders, authority for the SOCOG Sport Program was transferred to the SSC. A central (and unintended) consequence of the decision to transfer authority for the Sport Program from the SOCOG Board to the SSC was that the SOCOG Board was no longer required to devote time to making decisions regarding an important part of the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. Instead the SOCOG Board was able to focus more on other strategic organising areas (Respondent 05; Respondent 35) that tend to take up a great deal of time and energy for an OCOG board, such as the generation of revenue and the containment of expenditure (Respondent 05; Respondent 34; Respondent 35). Due to its decision-making and resource power, the SSC
provided the SOCOG Sport Program with organisational autonomy within SOCOG. An important consequence of this autonomy was that between 1996 and 2000 the SSC made 540 sport-specific and sport-related decisions. However, even though the SSC had substantial autonomy within SOCOG, its power was not absolute; rather, it was relational and interdependent (Stacey, 2007).

Another outcome resulting from the creation of the SSC was that it ensured there was a reduced requirement for the senior managers within the SOCOG Sport Program to use “smooth words or clever communication … softer tools of persuasion” (Clegg et al., 2006, p. 84) in order to obtain favourable sport-based decisions from the SOCOG Board. The power relations of the AOC through the establishment of the SSC were constituted in law, ensuring organisational legitimacy (Respondent 05). As has been alluded to earlier in this discussion, the power relations that can be exerted by a strong organisational program or sub-unit (e.g., the SOCOG Sport Program) are interdependent on the available resources at a certain point in time (Dopson, 1997; Lyon, 2006; Newton, 2001). This point was reinforced by one respondent, who suggested that the Sport Program within an OCOG is often disadvantaged because of its place within the Olympic planning cycle (Respondent 16). In contrast to some large Olympic planning areas (such as venue and facility development), sport-related planning grows in scope and staffing later in the event-planning process and intensifies as the competition nears. The authority of the SSC, in this organisational context, reflected a rationalisation that the SOCOG Sport Program benefited from the AOC maintaining significant power relations within SOCOG.

According to Clegg et al. (2006), “all forms of organisation are forms of organisation of social relations. All social relations involve power relations. Power is evident in relations not only of ownership and control but also of structuration and design” (p. 89). On one hand the establishment of the SSC reflected the level of authority and control the AOC maintained within
SOCOG, but on the other hand it also highlighted the interdependent relationship it had with the NSW Government. As discussed in Part A of this chapter, these relations were shaped by both power and knowledge. The AOC, as the host NOC, not only maintained institutional power, as formulated by the Olympic Charter, but it also began with and maintained substantial Olympic knowledge and expertise.

The formation of the SSC allowed the AOC to use and maximise its knowledge and experience within SOCOG. Knowledge and experience in this manner, according to Clegg (2003), can play a “key role in extending, limiting, and otherwise shaping” (p. 536) organisational property rights. Through the formation and implementation of the SSC, the AOC shaped its own Olympic future as well as the future experiences of its constituents, the Olympic athletes the AOC stated it was there to serve and be ‘governed’ by. As outlined by Dahl (1961), power researchers need to develop an understanding of organisations by asking the question: “Who governs?” Furthermore, Putnam (1976) has commented that insofar as organisational decisions matter, so too do organisational decision makers. Having people with power who knew the Olympic Movement and who made decisions in the best interests of the athletes was regarded as a critical feature of the SSC and the Sydney Olympics by those who worked in and managed the SOCOG Sport Program.

The AOC’s institutional power within SOCOG, and especially its ability through the SSC to make sport-specific and sport-related decisions from 1996 onward, was central to maintaining its Olympic authority within SOCOG. The members of the SSC had the capacity to make sport-specific and sport-related decisions, which was viewed as important, in that without the SSC, members of the SOCOG Board would not only have had the power to make sport-specific and sport-related decisions, but also the power to defer or not to make decisions at all. As outlined by Lukes (1974), power relations in organisations are not only shaped by decisions that are made by a board, in this case the SOCOG Board, but also by ‘decisions’ that are not made. An OCOG
Board without a great deal of sport or Olympic knowledge can avoid making decisions, which then impacts on the organisation of the Sport Program, as well as leaving sport matters off the agenda all together.

In summary, the establishment of the SSC enabled SOCOG to deal more effectively with the complexity of the Games organisation, specifically its management of the Sport Program. The SSC took away from the Board its authority for the SOCOG Sport Program. As a result, the legitimacy of the SSC, within SOCOG, provided the AOC with a forum and the resource capability to achieve its stated vision of organising an Olympic Games for the athletes. The AOC’s authority within SOCOG, after the creation of the SSC, therefore provided the SOCOG Sport Program with a high degree of organisational autonomy. This autonomy, however, was not without limitations: The AOC’s power was interdependent. The following discussion addresses this balance.

*Autonomy and Interdependence*

When attempting to understand the autonomy and interdependence of an organisation such as SOCOG, it is important to remember that it, like any organisation, it can be viewed as a dynamic configuration of social networks and relations (Mowles, 2010; Newton, 2001, 2002; Stacey, 2005, 2007; van Iterson et al., 2002). In this manner, organisational figurations can be viewed as a series of interdependent networks that change and develop over time (Newton, 2001; Stokvis, 2002). According to Stokvis (2002), in such interdependent organisational networks “every economic actor, always, is dependent on many other people and every economic act can be influenced by this dependency” (p. 87).

This point is also central to the concept developed by Granovetter (1995) that the nature of economic and organisational action is embedded in social relations. Likewise, and as outlined by Stokvis (2002), “Interdependence always involves power. Every relation of interdependence is characterised by a
certain balance of power between the people, organisations or societies involved, that changes with the relation itself” (p. 87). While the role of power is often more obvious in competitive organisational relationships it is still present in co-operative alliances (Clegg et al., 2006; Stokvis, 2002). The role of power in organisations, of course, does not mean that organisational actors (i.e. staff or management) cannot make decisions based upon rational thought (Stokvis, 2002). However, the most central calculations undertaken by organisational actors are influenced by “the power balances in their relation with others” (Stokvis, 2002, p. 87). Therefore strategic action in organisations is continually shaped by ever-changing power balances between organisational actors (Stacey, 2003). As outlined by Stokvis (2002), to understand organisational development, “one has to study the power balances” that organisational actors confront (Stokvis, 2002, p. 87).

Another feature of interdependence, as outlined by Elias (1994), is that social and organisational action is regularly influenced by unforeseen or unplanned events. Here, it is important to note that whilst the AOC leadership had a clear vision of how the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games should proceed when the Sydney won the right to stage the Games, over time the organisational structure of SOCOG evolved in ways that were unforeseen and unplanned. As outlined by two senior Olympic officials who were at the centre of Olympic decision making, the formation of the SSC emerged through conflict and negotiation and was never part of the original Olympic plans (Respondent 34; Respondent 35). The complex nature of the Olympic-planning network figuration and its interdependent power relationships resulted in continually changing patterns of power between individuals and stakeholder groups as they competed and cooperated in order to achieve their stated objectives (Mowles, 2010; van Iterson et al., 2001).

Thus, the formation of the SSC in 1996 would have been almost impossible to predict in 1993, when Olympic planning commenced for the Sydney Games (Respondent 34; Respondent 35). As outlined by Mowles
(2010), organisations are not necessarily “systems with boundaries … rather they emerge on a continuous basis from the many, many interactions of individual employees of which no one, not even the chief executive, is in overall control” (pp. 6–7). The goals and plans of the two principal Olympic stakeholders, the AOC and the NSW Government, therefore became increasingly intertwined as the preparations for the Games progressed and developed. As outlined by Elias (2000):

The goals, plans and actions of individual people constantly intertwine with those of others. But this intertwining of the actions and plans of many people … is itself not planned. It cannot be understood in terms of plans and purposeful intentions of individuals, nor in terms which, though not directly purposive, are modelled on teleological modes of thinking. We are here concerned with processes, compulsions and regularities of a relatively autonomous kind. (p. 543)

As suggested above, and in alignment with Stokvis (2002) and Elias (1994), the formation of the SSC involved decision making by interdependent organisational actors. In order to organise the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, the AOC required the willingness of the NSW Government: firstly, to be interested in committing to the staging of a bid; and, secondly, to agree to contractual terms regarding how the Games were to be staged. These were determined by the AOC and the IOC, via the terms stated in the Endorsement Contract and the Host City Contract (Respondent 34). The contractual relations and positioning that established the balance of power between the AOC and the NSW Government was therefore fluid and never totally fixed. While the power relations between these two stakeholders started in an aggressive and tense manner, over time it developed into a partnership, enabling the achievement of their stated goals.
Without the collaboration and cooperation of the NSW Government, after the ‘Knight of the Long Prawns’ settlement, the position and legacy of the AOC at the completion of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games may have been significantly different to what was actually achieved. The value of the AOC and the NSW Government forming closer stakeholder relations as the Games preparations developed fits with Elias’s (2000) view that when individuals and groups work closely together, the unforeseen consequences of social and organisational action can be mollified. Elias (2000), for instance, suggests that “the coexistence of people, the intertwining of intentions and plans, the bonds they place on each other, all these, far from destroying individuality, provide the medium in which it can develop” (p. 543).

While the AOC’s involvement in the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games was shaped by interdependence and unforeseen and unplanned events that occurred over time, it was also shaped by its institutional power. The institutional characteristics of the Olympic Movement, in particular, placed the AOC in a strong bargaining position while negotiating with the NSW Government. The interdependent power relations of the AOC, established through its Olympic contracts with the NSW Government, provided it with the opportunity to strategically leverage its position and build a post-Games legacy. From this perspective, the importance of organisational power to the strategic development and positioning of the AOC within SOCOG becomes evident. As outlined by Clegg, Carter and Kornberger (2004), “power is central to organisational life and underpins the strategy-making process. Understanding strategy necessitates an engagement with power and politics” (p. 25).

Clegg et al., (2004) also argue that when analysing the strategic development and operations of an organisational entity (such as the SSC), the ever-changing politics cannot be ignored. Thus, for the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, through the formation of the SSC, the AOC had a mandate within SOCOG. This mandate included the power to make all sport-management,
sport-policy and sport-operational decisions pertaining to the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games (Respondent 05; Respondent 35). As an autonomous organisational unit, the SSC, through its representatives, maintained organisational authority to allocate resources to the SOCOG Sport Program, in a manner that suited its Olympic vision and objectives (Respondent 05; Respondent 31). According to Respondent 35 and Gordon (2003), the AOC’s central vision was the organisation of an Olympic Games centred on the athletes.

The autonomous organisational design of the SSC enabled the SOCOG Sport Program to ‘sidestep’ traditional bureaucratic roadblocks provided by OCOG Boards (Respondent 09). When it came to sport matters, the autonomy of the SSC effectively made the SOCOG Board redundant. Additionally, the formation of the SSC allowed the SOCOG Board to focus its attention on other organising matters, such as revenue generation and cost control. The establishment of the SSC provided the SOCOG Sport Program with an organisational conduit or, as termed by Clegg (1989), a circuit within a power relation. In this instance the AOC’s establishment of the SSC provided a circuit which the SOCOG Sport Program could bypass, minimising the opportunity for organisational conflict (Clegg, 1989). As suggested by Clegg et al. (2006), “organisations are political because they entail hostile relationships and often … antagonisms between their diverse constituencies” (p. 353).

A clear example of the level of hostility that was avoided by the SOCOG Sport Program as a result of the formation of the SSC was presented by the work of OCA in the later stages of the Games preparations. As outlined in this chapter and Chapter One, approximately one year before the start of the Games Opening Ceremony, OCA took control of all SOCOG activity with the exception of the SSC and SOBO (Gordon, 2003; Respondent 34; Toohey, 2001). SOBO was an independent Olympic agency with broadcast responsibilities for the Sydney Games (Toohey, 2001). As a consequence of
this decision, almost all SOCOG program areas often reported to two organisations, rather than one.

In contrast to the dramatic organisational change that shaped the non-sport side of SOCOG (as evidenced by the OCA taking control of the majority of SOCOG’s operations in early 2000), the SSC, and as a consequence the SOCOG Sport Program, was marked by its stability (Respondent 05). Between 1998 and 2000, the researcher observed that there were very few staff changes in the SOCOG Sport Program over that time and that staff morale within the program remained high despite the internal changes. This stability was also reflected in the fact that the SSC was making a large number of sport-specific and sport-related decisions. As alluded to earlier in this chapter, over the four-year period between 1996 and 2000, the SSC met 44 times and made a total of 540 decisions (SOCOG, 2000c).

The stability and efficiency of the SSC organising structure allowed the management of the SOCOG Sport Program to progress important athlete-related initiatives when required (Respondent 07). As an organising unit, the SSC can be seen to fit closely with Weber’s (1976) definition of a clearly developed bureaucracy, with rules and regulations, a hierarchy of authority and role specialisation. However, as outlined by Respondent 07, the SSC “wasn’t as bureaucratic as other parts of SOCOG”. Rather, the SSC ensured that the SOCOG Sport Program was good at “getting things done quickly” (Respondent 22).

The resource autonomy of the SSC was another important feature of its operations, providing the managers of the SOCOG Sport Program with a degree of organisational confidence and certainty (Respondent 05; Respondent 35). The SSC’s budget was agreed to by the AOC and the NSW Government when it was established in 1996 and could only be changed with the consent of both parties (Respondent 34; Respondent 35). This resource certainty gave the SOCOG Sport Program confidence that sport-related expenditure would be
maintained at a level sufficient to implement the highest-quality Olympic Games for the athletes and for the sport. Respondent 09 provided a telling example, when referring to the installation of expensive sports equipment at a competition venue, stating: “If it had to happen, it happened”. Respondent 06 argued that without the SSC “we [the SOCOG Sport Program] would have been much more dominated by financial issues”.

Importantly, the resources available to the SOCOG Sport Program as a result of the establishment of the SSC did not emerge from an historical vacuum; they were shaped by the power relations that developed over time between the various Olympic stakeholders, especially the AOC and the NSW Government. From this perspective, not only did the AOC, through the formation of the SSC, have formal power and authority for the Sport Program within SOCOG, it also had the knowledge and expertise to action its power. As outlined by Clegg et al. (2006), the possession of resources alone is not enough “to deliver power over and above that formally authorised; one also needs to have an explicit knowledge of context” (p. 128).

Although it maintained significant autonomy and control, the SSC was still dependent on other Olympic stakeholder and groups (Respondent 34). For instance, it was observed that the SOCOG Sport Program was heavily dependent on OCA, which was responsible for developing all Olympic venues and facilities (Toohey, 2001). As many of the Olympic sports in Sydney were hosted in newly planned and constructed venues, the role of OCA was vital to the success of the Games (Respondent 34). However, OCA was also dependent on the SSC and the SOCOG Sport Program (Respondent 05), which provided OCA with detailed technical advice on sport-specific design elements for newly constructed sport facilities. In this way, the OCA and the SSC were interdependent entities.

The interdependence of the AOC and the NSW Government and their respective Olympic agencies fits with the findings of research conducted by
Mastenbroek (2000b) on modern organisations. Mastenbroek (2000b), writing from an Eliasian perspective, suggests that dynamic modern organisations are shaped increasingly by “stronger interdependence … as well as more autonomy” (p. 181). The interdependence of an organisation like SOCOG is characterised by the fact that it was reliant upon thousands of individuals and many organised networks in order to deliver a modern Olympic Games. The complexity and interdependence of the Olympics has increased dramatically over the past half century (Maguire, 1999; Young & Wamsley, 2005). Not only do the Games rely upon the IOC, the athletes, the NOCs, and the organisers, but also the sponsors, the media, broadcasters and governments (Cashman, 2006; Malfas et al., 2003; Toohey & Veal, 2007).

In addition to stronger interdependence, modern organisations are shaped by increasing autonomy (Mastenbroek, 2000a, 2000b). As can be viewed by the establishment of the SSC as an independent organising agency within SOCOG, such organisational autonomy, according to Mastenbroek (2002b), has emerged at a greater rate in recent years. This greater organisational autonomy has resulted in the establishment of distinct internal divisions or business units within organisations that play an ever-increasing decentralised role in steering and directing their larger entities (Mastenbroek, 2002b). Thus, while the AOC did not have total power over the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games it undeniably played a significant part in shaping the management of the SOCOG Sport Program.

In summary, the aggregated theoretical dimension presented in Part B of this chapter outlined the view that the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program and SOCOG generally benefited from the establishment of the SSC. The SSC’s decision-making and resource autonomy resulted in more than 540 sport policy decisions being made. While the SSC maintained organisational autonomy within SOCOG, both it and the SOCOG Sport Program were still interdependent on a variety of Olympic stakeholders, such as the NSW Government and the international sports federations. Without the cooperation
and input of the interdependent Olympic stakeholders in the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, the AOC would not have been able to deliver the ‘athletes’ Games’.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter presented the results that emerged from the research. The analysis attempted to answer the three research questions that formed the basis for the study. The first and overarching question examined in this chapter was: *How did the involvement of a host National Olympic Committee in the organisation of the Olympic Games influence the management of the Olympic Sport Program?* In order to answer this research question, two complementary questions were also addressed: *What impact did the SOCOG Sports Commission have on the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games?* and *How did the organisational power of the SOCOG Sport Program shape the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games?*

The data collected and analysed for this study highlighted the organisational power that the AOC, through the establishment of the SSC, maintained within SOCOG. Through the formation of the SSC, the AOC—the host NOC for the Sydney Olympic Games—effectively controlled the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program. The control of the AOC within SOCOG was constituted legally, both in contract and also through legislation by a statute of NSW Parliament (Brabazon, 1999; Gordon, 2003; Respondent 34; Respondent 35; Toohey, 2001).

The respondents interviewed for this research argued that the implementation of the SSC gave it significant autonomy and authority within SOCOG. The power that the SSC, and by proxy the SOCOG Sport Program, maintained within SOCOG allowed it to maximise its Olympic expertise and experience. The organisational power of the SSC provided the SOCOG Sport
Program with the necessary resources and capacity to drive the AOC’s vision of organising an Olympic Games centred first and foremost on the athletes (Gordon, 2003).

The chapter presented the analysed data in two separate but interconnected theoretical dimensions. These two theoretical dimensions and their resultant second-order themes emerged from the data analysis, which utilised both manual and automated methodologies (as specified in Chapter Four). The first theoretical dimension, discussed in Part A of the chapter, explored how the organisational knowledge and networks of the AOC shaped and influenced the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games.

The second theoretical dimension, discussed in Part B of the chapter, outlined the impact of the AOC’s organisational power within SOCOG and on the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. This theoretical dimension showed that the formation of the autonomous SSC enabled the SOCOG Sport Program to secure important sport-related decisions quickly. The dimension also showed, however, that the AOC and its Olympic agency the SSC, whilst autonomous, were still interdependent on key Olympic stakeholders, such as the NSW Government, in order to implement its strategy of staging the ‘athletes’ Games’.

The results presented in this chapter are discussed in further detail in the next chapter. Chapter Six concludes the thesis by reiterating the findings in relation to the central research questions, by stating the contribution to knowledge and by advocating worthwhile areas for future research.
CHAPTER SIX:  
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
6.1 Introduction

In order to achieve the stated research aims, this study focused on the involvement of a host NOC in the organisation of the Sport Program at a Summer Olympic Games. The research examined how the organisational relations between two central Olympic stakeholders, the Australian Olympic Committee (AOC) and the New South Wales (NSW) Government, developed and impacted the management of the SOCOG Sport Program at the Sydney 2000 Games. The study found that the SOCOG Sport Program was shaped by the AOC’s pre-existing organisational knowledge and networks, which it used to expand its organisational power within SOCOG and to position the organisation for the future once the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games were completed. A consequence of an improvement in the changing and fluid relations between the AOC and the NSW Government was the establishment of the independent SOCOG agency that became known as the SOCOG Sports Commission (SSC). The SSC had responsibility for sport-related and sport-specific planning and management within SOCOG. While it was an autonomous agency, its membership was dominated by the AOC.

The research also found that power, as a central characteristic of all human and organisational relations, was central to the organisational processes that led to the substantial changes encountered by SOCOG during the Olympic preparations. An understanding of the interdependent and dynamic nature of organisational power relations, as portrayed in this study, can consequently inform future Olympic and mega-sport event organisers. This is especially applicable where the organisation of a mega-sport event, such as the Olympic Games, involves numerous formal and informal relations between various stakeholders.

The findings presented in Chapter Five demonstrated that the AOC’s influence within SOCOG was shaped by two central dimensions: the organisational knowledge and networks developed and maintained by the
AOC; and the AOC’s organisational power. This chapter discusses the research conclusions in the context of the employed process sociological framework. The discussion focuses on how the research advanced academic knowledge and understanding regarding the organisation of a mega-sport event such as the Olympic Games. This section is followed by a discussion of the thesis contribution to the mega-sport event body of knowledge. The final section of the chapter examines potential areas for future research.

6.2 Conclusions

The organisation responsible for managing a mega-sport event, such as the Olympic Games, develops interdependently over time. The organisation cannot be viewed as self-contained or a timeless entity; rather, in line with Elias (1994), it consists of people who are bound to repeating particular patterns of social interaction. The management of a mega-sport event is also shaped by the interconnected development over time of institutional and structural arrangements (i.e. the Host City Contract) and through the action of individual agents, especially those whose roles involve power and who represent stakeholder groups (i.e. the President of a host NOC). Mega-sport event organising structures are therefore never totally fixed with any single agent or stakeholder group having total power or control, but remain fluid and dynamic entities, continually changing. Hence, the organisation of a mega-sport event can be viewed as a ‘shifting figuration’, where individual agents and organisational structures constantly evolve, as Dopson also noted, together as a “product of interwoven interdependency ties” (2005, p. 1141).

The management of a mega-sport event is influenced by the experience and knowledge of an event’s leadership. The habitus of individual office holders and their interdependence to the stakeholder organisations they represent shape the organisation of a mega-sport event. The evidence presented in this case showed that the experience and knowledge retained by the AOC leadership and its SSC representatives did not develop in isolation, rather it
was influenced by the longer-term development of the AOC and its membership of the Olympic Movement. Importantly, the management of a mega-sport event is not only formed by the experience and knowledge of individuals and the stakeholder groups they represent, but also by their interdependence with one another.

This interdependence occurs because the development of a mega-sport event organisation does not take place independently it evolves through the patterning of interactions of people situated within and outside of its organisational boundaries (Stacey, 2003). When considering the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program it must be noted that the individuals who represented the interests of the AOC not only had a lengthy history of involvement in the Olympic Movement but they were also highly experienced in the administration of national and international sport federations. This Olympic and sport administration experience provided legitimacy and was viewed as a crucial point of difference by those who worked in the Sport Program at SOCOG. In a number of cases the relationships that were maintained by the senior officials involved with the AOC, the SSC and the SOCOG Sport Program spanned over two decades. The development of these relations resulted in the formation of an Olympic network figuration that was deeply tied and formed.

A host NOC that has strong organisational power relations within an OCOG can maximise its experience and knowledge in order to leverage its own position and to gain a competitive advantage. For instance, the AOC believed the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games needed to be athlete centred and it was able to achieve this goal (Gordon, 2003; SOCOG, 2000c; Toohey, 2001). For the AOC, having people who believed strongly in the organisation’s vision resulted in its goals and objectives being driven by both knowledge and enthusiasm.
The knowledge and experience of members of the host NOC interdependently shape power relations with the central stakeholders involved in a mega-sport event’s organisation. As stated by Flyvbjerg (1998) while drawing on Foucault (1977), the concepts of “power and knowledge directly imply one another” (Flyvbjerg, 1998, p. 27). For the AOC, the knowledge and experience they sustained of the Olympic Movement and international sport was a central feature of its power relations. For instance, the AOC’s experience in Olympic bidding enabled it to successfully leverage its contractual position with the NSW Government (Gordon, 2003). Apart from assisting SOCOG to organise a successful Olympic Games in 2000, the AOC also secured a financial legacy for itself of approximately A$90 million (Gordon, 2003; Toohey, 2001).

In addition to the development of knowledge and experience, organisers of mega-sport events need to be aware of the importance of cultivating internal and external organisational trust. As outlined above, mega-sport event organisation will be shaped by a range of stakeholder relations, some of which are long term and enduring, while others will be new and undeveloped. It is critical therefore that central stakeholders place importance on developing strong and trusting relations throughout an event organising committee, as organisational trust is a critical variable in explaining organisational effectiveness (Lane & Bachmann, 1996; Smith, 2002). Higher levels of organisational trust can lead to greater cooperation, increased flow of information and the development of more evenly balanced organisational power relations (Bachmann, 2001; Gutek, 2002). This study demonstrated that the organisation of the Sport Program at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games was shaped by positive and trusting organisational relations.

Future host NOCs and mega-sport event organisers should also consider the organisational value of establishing a dedicated sport-related commission or agency, similar to the SSC, with decision-making authority and financial autonomy. The advantages of establishing autonomous sport-
dedicated commissions within mega-sport events organising committees include providing budget certainty and the capacity for prompt decision-making. The establishment and protection of a Sport Program budget, early in the preparations for an Olympic Games, is useful, as the Sport Program is traditionally staffed later in the Olympic-planning cycle, when compared to other large program areas such as OCOG Marketing and OCOG Venue Management. This means that a substantial amount of Sport Program expenditure occurs in the last two years of Games preparations which is at a time when Olympic budgets are likely to face cuts due to lower than expected revenue generation from areas such as OCOG Marketing (i.e. sponsorship and ticketing sales). Thus, mega-sport events that follow the ‘Sydney model’ of establishing an SSC styled agency, with financial autonomy, can protect its budget to ensure that an OCOG delivers agreed athlete services.

The implementation of a SSC type agency can provide the Sport Program of an Olympic Games (or similar mega-sport event) with the autonomy to make quick sport-related decisions. This is especially important when considering the number of stakeholders involved in the staging and production of a mega-sport event. Specifically, in the case of the Olympic Games, a Sport Commission with representatives appointed by a host NOC, who are experienced in the organisation of Olympic and international sport, can provide the host NOC with a forum that ensures sport planning is a central rather than a secondary consideration for the OCOG Board. This is important because the implementation of an SSC type agency means that decisions that impact a Sport Program are made in a timely manner rather than being delayed or not made until the OCOG Board meets.

A structure such as the ‘Sydney model’ gives a host NOC a position in the Games-management structure, allowing it the opportunity to provide strong leadership across sport and non-sport OCOG program areas. The establishment of a sport-specific agency with decision-making powers and financial autonomy also results in the mega-sport event organising committee board
having fewer decisions to make and gives it more time to spend on areas that traditionally take up a great deal of effort, such as revenue raising and cost cutting. As outlined in this study, between 1996 and 2000, the SSC made 540 sport decisions. Many of these decisions had a direct and positive impact on the quality and standard of services provided to athletes and their NOCs, both at the sport competition venues and the Olympic Village.

In sum, the organisation of a Sport Program at an Olympic Games or other mega-sport event can benefit from a host NOC’s pre-existing organisational power and knowledge. The establishment of a dedicated SSC agency can provide a Sport Program with decision-making authority and financial autonomy. It also benefits the host NOC to implement an Olympics that is focused on the athletes.

6.3 Thesis Contribution

This study makes an important contribution to the sport event management knowledge base by addressing an identified gap in the literature. Over recent years this knowledge base has expanded our understanding of how sport events of various sizes are managed from an operational perspective, however few completed studies have developed what Parent identified as the “underlying processes and mechanisms” that influence and shape the management of such sport events (2005, p. 150). Parent (2005), particularly, has argued that greater focus is required on examining organisational power relations and their impact over time on the management of sport events. Because in attempting to address this gap, it was found that through the involvement of the AOC in the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, the management of the SOCOG Sport Program was shaped by the interconnected elements of organisational knowledge and organisational power. In alignment with Foucault (1977) and Flyvbjerg (1998), the case illustrates the view that power and knowledge are interdependent, in that you
cannot have one without the other. As outlined by Foucault, power not only produces knowledge but “power and knowledge directly imply one another” (1977, p. 27). For the managers of mega-sport events this means that they need to be attuned to how stakeholder power relations can change and develop over the life of an organising committee and the impact such change can have on their ability to implement their event plans.

Furthermore, while the SOCOG Sport Program, which was structured and operationalised through the SSC, had a high degree of organisational authority and autonomy within SOCOG, it was still interdependent on external Olympic stakeholders. Due to this interdependence the SOCOG Sport Program was not immune from bureaucratic challenges: challenges amplified by the time constraints framing the organisation of a mega-sport event such as the Olympic Games. Amongst other stakeholders, the SOCOG Sport Program was particularly dependent on the major financial underwriter of the Games, the NSW Government. In addition to its financial contribution, the NSW Government was responsible for the provision and construction of Olympic sport venues, Olympic transport and Olympic security. The SSC and the SOCOG Sport Program were also dependent on the knowledge and resources provided by Olympic stakeholders, such as the 28 international sports federations. The case of Olympic Beach Volleyball at Bondi Beach, which was discussed in Chapter Five, provided an example of the interdependence of the SOCOG Sport Program, with both the NSW Government and the FIVB having important responsibilities in the organisation and implementation of the sport at the Sydney Games. For managers of mega-sport events this means that no matter how strong the power relations are of a key stakeholder (i.e. a host NOC) their involvement in the organisation of an event will be shaped by its interdependence with other stakeholder groups.

A further contribution made by this research concerns the usefulness and applicability of a process sociological framework in exploring the organisation of an Olympic Games and other mega-sport events. With the
exception of Lesjo (2000), such a framework has rarely been utilised in Olympic organisational studies. The framework highlighted the importance of examining the role of the AOC from a historically and contextually situated perspective to understand the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. The approach was beneficial in that it exposed the longer-term power relations that changed and developed over time, involving key stakeholders such as the AOC and the NSW Government. For example, over the course of Olympic preparations, the interdependent figuration that linked the AOC and the NSW Government was dynamic and fluid. The power relations that shaped this figuration were neither fixed nor static. The development of SOCOG as the organisation primarily responsible for the management of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games was interdependent on the pre-history of both the AOC and the NSW Government. In alignment with the work of Elias (1994), the intended strategies of both the AOC and the NSW Government produced unplanned consequences that impacted not only on the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program, but also on the Olympic Games more generally. The establishment of the SSC is a clear example of this and underscores how SOCOG evolved over time as an organisation. For the managers of mega-sport events it is therefore important that they view their organisation’s development as fluid or dynamic rather than in static terms.

From a practical perspective the study makes a contribution to the mega-sport event literature, as it provides empirical evidence of the crucial role that can be played by a host NOC in the organisation of a successful Olympic Games. To the researcher’s knowledge, this is the first empirical study to be conducted that has explored the place of a host NOC in the organisation of an OCOG Sport Program. Specifically, the key findings of this study found that the AOC played a central and critical role in the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, specifically but not limited to the formation and operation of the SSC as an autonomous Olympic agency within SOCOG. The SSC maintained operational and financial autonomy with SOCOG, an outcome that provided the AOC with substantial organisational power relations within
SOCOG. In summary, the case of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games showed how:

1. The role of the host NOC became embedded within the OCOG;

2. The host NOC was fully engaged and involved in the organisation of the Games from their inception;

3. The host NOC had direct authority for the organisation of the OCOG Sport Program;

4. The host NOC’s work within the OCOG directly related to its vision of organising a Games for the athletes;

5. The host NOC worked closely and in partnership with key Olympic stakeholders in order to achieve its vision; and

6. The host NOC leveraged its position with the NSW Government to achieve a financial legacy of approximately A$90 million.

Thus, the AOC’s involvement benefitted itself through a significant financial gain and through its entrenched Olympic roles. While an OCOG is a transient organisation the host NOC is ongoing. Opportunities provided by hosting an Olympic Games are rare and must be taken advantage of by host NOCs to assist their financial future and sustainability. Because of its prior knowledge and its organisational power relations the AOC not only generated positive outcomes for itself but also for SOCOG and the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games.

**6.4 Future Research**

As a consequence of this study, three areas are identified for future research. Firstly, the study of host NOC / OCOG relationships at the Olympic
Games from a longitudinal perspective would be worthwhile. The similarities and differences that have shaped this relationship at past and future Olympic Games could be explored. In particular, research could investigate various strategies employed by NOCs to leverage benefits for their organisations after the staging of an Olympic Games. Secondly, research could be conducted that investigates the relationships host NOCs develop with other OCOG program areas, for example, in areas such as OCOG Marketing and OCOG Venue Management. Thirdly, future studies could explore Olympic and mega-sport event knowledge-transfer processes, especially from host NOCs to future host NOCs. These three areas will now be discussed in turn.

As this study examined the single case of the AOC as the host NOC involved in the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, the findings that emerged from the research are highly contextual. In order to build a greater understanding of host NOC involvement in the organisation of an Olympic Games, further research needs to be completed across different Olympic Games. Future research should consider investigating Games that have already been staged. This longitudinal analysis could provide important data on the influence of culture in the organisation of the Olympic Games and the benefit of having strong and experienced NOCs. This research could also examine the involvement of other central Olympic stakeholder such as the IOC and the international sport federations in the management of the Sport Program at past and future Games. This analysis should explore not only the impact of the cultural context with regard to the organisation of the Summer Olympic Games, but also the Winter Olympic Games.

Through the analysis of multiple Olympic Games, the findings from this study can be further developed, extended and refined. Such research could explore how host NOCs design their organisational priorities and strategies when they are involved in the organisation of an Olympic Games. A longitudinal approach to researching Olympic organisation, therefore, would add a great deal to the existing mega-sport event body of knowledge. This
longer-term research perspective also fits well with the approach outlined by Eliasian organisational theorists. Researchers such as Newton (2001) and Dopson (2001, 2005), for instance, recommend that management researchers should spend more time considering the broader historical context when analysing organisational development and change. They argue that such an approach provides management researchers with a fuller understanding of the organisational interdependencies that shape stakeholder involvement and performance. Ultimately, this means that host NOCs as a vital stakeholder of the Olympic Games, can achieve a deeper understanding of how they can best position themselves in order to achieve their organisation’s vision and objectives.

A second area worth exploring through future research is the role played by host NOCs in other parts of an OCOG outside the Sport Program. There is scope for researchers to explore, for instance, the role of the AOC in the planning and organisation of the Athletes and Officials Village at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. As outlined in this thesis, the AOC, through the SSC, not only managed the SOCOG Sport Program but also played a prominent role in Olympic Village planning. Further research is required to understand the full impact the AOC had in this area of Olympic planning. Research into how host NOCs work with OCOG Marketing departments to leverage their Olympic Games association is also worth investigation. For example, to date, little research has explored how previous host NOCs have attempted to exploit the potential marketing advantage gained from the hosting of an Olympic Games (Morgan, 2006).

A third vital area that should be considered for future research is the area of knowledge transfer. Mega-sport event and Olympic Games researchers should focus on it and how host NOCs transfer the knowledge they gain from their Olympic involvement to future host NOCs. Every time an Olympic Games is staged, whether they are Summer or Winter Games, a host NOC has been involved in the process as a key stakeholder. To date, however, little
research has been conducted that has examined the effectiveness of this knowledge transfer. While researchers such as Halbwirth and Toohey (2001) have examined the knowledge-management processes of an OCOG and how these processes can assist an OCOG as it grows, no studies have explored the place of the host NOC in these or similar processes. Future research, therefore, should investigate how host NOCs pass on information from one another and how what impact this knowledge sharing has on Olympic organising processes. By undertaking research such as this a greater understanding of Olympic organisation will be achieved and the improvements can be developed and implemented for the management of future Games.

6.5 Summary

The organisation of the Sydney Games was a complex task involving a range of stakeholder groups. The purpose of this study was to explore a central aspect of the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, in particular, the role played by a host NOC as a central Olympic stakeholder. Specifically, the research investigated how the involvement of the AOC, in the management of the Sydney Games, influenced the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program. A central focus of the study was the organisational power relations maintained by the AOC within SOCOG, through the SSC, and how this power influenced the management of the SOCOG Sport Program. To address the research problem, a process sociological framework was employed. This perspective was adopted because it seeks to understand how humans and organisations develop interdependently over time (Elias, 1994; Newton, 2001). The framework is useful because it highlights the complex nature and duree of human relationships and how these relations influence the management of organisations (Dopson, 2001).

Over the seven years of Games preparations, the Sydney 2000 organising network, which consisted primarily of SOCOG, the AOC and the NSW Government (and its agencies such as the OCA and ORTA), was subject
to a range of changes. The research found that the development of SOCOG as an organisation was fluid and dynamic. From this perspective, the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games evolved and developed through the intermingling of countless social and organisational interactions between individuals over many years, starting before the successful Sydney bid and continuing through the period of the Games preparations. The organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games was the result of both planned and unforeseen consequences, over which no single person or organisation had total control.

In summary, the AOC played a critical role in the organisation of the SOCOG Sport Program at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. The involvement of the AOC in the management of the SOCOG Sport Program was shaped by two key dimensions: firstly, the existing organisational knowledge and networks of the AOC; and secondly, the organisational power of the AOC. The sport-related knowledge and expertise and the Olympic networks of the AOC influenced SOCOG’s strategy (and the bid promise) of organising an Olympics for the athletes. The power relations maintained by the AOC throughout the Olympic planning process enabled it, with the agreement of the NSW Government, to establish the SSC as the autonomous decision-making authority within SOCOG that had carriage of all sport-related and sport-specific decision making. However, even with such power relations within SOCOG, the AOC was still interdependent on other Olympic stakeholders such as the NSW Government for it to successfully implement its vision of organising the ‘athletes’ Games’.
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APPENDIX 1
SOCOG Organisation Chart