SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THE THEORY OF THE SUBJECT:
THE DISCURSIVE POLITICS OF PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORIES

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ABSTRACT

For the disciplines grouped under the sign of 'the Humanities' the category of the subject has been and, for most, remains the more or less stable site in which the various investigations and reconstitutions of philosophy around the problems of 'truth value' and the 'meaning of meaning' are undertaken, and to which these adjacent disciplines have recourse for their theoretical foundations.

In the last decade the critical reformulation of the category of the subject through the articulation of psychoanalytic theory, structuralist linguistics, and Marxist theory of ideology, has shifted it from a stable foundational site of knowledges to the problematic effect and conditions of power and knowledge practices. For the readership of journals such as Screen, Ciné-Tracts and Yale French Studies, a quite particular knowledge of 'the subject', drawing on the work of the psychoanalyst Lacan, was made primary to an understanding of the production and consumption of texts occurring within a network of power relations.

While this shift in the category of the subject will engage our attention it does not exhaust the work of the thesis. The argument of the thesis is that despite its multiple transformations in classical epistemologies, Marxist epistemologies and psychoanalytic theories, a 'theory of the subject' maintains a philosophical anthro-
pologism as the basis of all our enterprises. That is, it brings into force an imperative that all knowledge functions to extend our understanding of 'the human', and that it is only when referred to this domain that knowledges achieve their truth-value. Emerging within a particular organization of knowledge around the themes of truth and liberation (that the value of knowledges resides in their truth, that truth is essential and free and that, in turn, truth frees), this anthropologism returns questions relating to the production and consumption of texts (e.g., how to transform current writing and reading practices) and questions relating to wider political strategies, to the correlates of those themes - consciousness-raising, the liberation of essences or rehearsal of origins, the endorsement of a general theory of repression; in short, it returns political questions to the available specifications of what is seen as their fundamental reference point - the subject. Theories of the (individual or social) subject impose on all our questions and analyses the same homogenizing teleology, which is unacceptable to a materialist critical practice which seeks to attend to historically shifting, institutionally differentiated power and knowledge relations.

Accordingly, the thesis provides the conditions for a different account of the effect of 'subjectivity'. The argument is targeted at the Lacanian theory of the subject which has been read, following Althusser's essays, as clarifying the ideological nature of the subject by demon-
strating the mechanism of its formation. The theory re-routes Freudian psychoanalysis through Saussurian linguistics. This corresponds with other current theories of the centrality of language to 'the human' (Ricoeur's phenomenology, Kristeva's semiology).

This thesis argues that theories of language as a unitary system generated from primary mechanisms in which the subject is founded may provide detours for, but ultimately further support this anthropological teleology. This teleology is challenged by a reformulation of the theories of language which promise to unravel the unity of the subject, but fail. This reformulation is provided in the Foucauldian problematic's concept of discourse.

This specification of discourse removes the term from the philosophical dichotomy 'ideal-real' in which the historical material 'events' of language are treated as the contextual correlates of a text that is formed from general rules located interior to the text. Challenging accounts of the production of language articulated on a hierarchization of 'ideal' (consciousness, general grammar) and 'real' sites (social moment of enunciation, experience of language), the concept of a discourse runs counter to expressivist theories of language and general theories of representation.

An analysis of the discursive formations of the Lacanian texts and the forms of their appropriation into other discourses is thus relieved from the task of consid-
erating them in terms of the fidelity of their representations (of the psyche, male/female desires, apparatuses of cognition, etc.) to a general order of 'truth'.

Instead, analysis can be redirected to the discursive relations in which these objects (psyche, desire) emerge and which constitute an apparatus of truth that governs what we are able and not able to say about consciousness, the unconscious, reading and writing practices, the formation of society and of families, and so on. An analysis of the Lacanian texts in terms of their discursive mechanisms and which also demonstrates their position in a larger discursive ensemble, has the limited aim of providing a different reading of the conditions of production and consumption of this apparatus of truth from those readings of psychoanalytic theory as the true, or mistaken, recognition of the subject.
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This work has never previously been submitted for a degree or diploma in any University. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the thesis itself.

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C.A. Greenfield
This thesis concerns a number of specifications of the subject, among them that circulated in what I shall call the 'discursive politics of psychoanalytic theories'. In this thesis, 'politics' is understood not as confined to the domain of party politics, but as variably coextensive with the diversity of social relations as they are formed in the mesh of historically differentiated power and knowledge relations. The term directs analysis towards sites of struggle, and here, towards specific struggles over forms of knowledge of the subject and its effects. This area of contestation has recently shifted ground. It is largely due to the reworking of psychoanalytic theory which in the last decade has been extended into the areas of film study, literary theory and theories of ideology that the 'question of the subject' has come under investigation in other than philosophy departments and with increasing relevance for theoretical work concerning the form of political and economic calculations.

However, if one of the effects of this reworking of psychoanalytic theory has been to insist on the non-immediacy, through the materiality of the unconscious and its structuring in language, of the subject's knowledge of itself, thus questioning the self-evidence of the subject, then it must also be recognized that our reading of
psychoanalytic theory cannot be conducted as an immediate approach to a self-evident body of knowledge.

This is reflected in the structure of the thesis, in which psychoanalytic theory is 'central but relative' and does not form the explicit object of critique until Chapter 3. It is central because around psychoanalytic theory there have clustered a body of arguments on the limits and structurings of the subject's knowledge of itself and its capacity to produce and reproduce other knowledges and power relations - i.e., political forms - and it is to these arguments and their concerns that the thesis addresses itself. It is relative because psychoanalytic theory never emerges 'alone' in an absolute or pure form; it is relative because psychoanalysis is treated as neither the successful nor failed explanation of the subject upon which we should provide commentary, but in terms of the reading and writing practices in which psychoanalytic theory emerges. To treat psychoanalysis in this fashion requires consideration of not only the specific reading and writing practices involved, but of the strategies and relations in which those practices were formed, and of the increasingly contested question of how, in any case, reading and writing practices are to be specified; i.e., whether the terms of their specification are to be sought in aesthetic criteria, the criteria of the irreducibly 'human' (experience, imagination, creativity), linguistic criteria, various epistemological criteria, or the criteria of some materialism.
The argument of the thesis is that the reading of theory (or any text) is not the more or less straightforward application of mind to the objectified products of another mind, but the activation of the complex, non-unified and shifting determinations in which specific reading and writing practices are formed. Whether we are to look to one of the theories of language, to sociological accounts or elsewhere for the form of these 'material determinations' is the work of Chapter 1.

Chapter 2 delineates the principal strategies and relations involved in the formation of the reading and writing practices in which psychoanalytic theory emerges. Psychoanalytic theory gains its meanings from its place in a network of relations. This is not a network in the structuralist sense: it is organized by no internal logic. Its elaboration therefore cannot be given in a general formula but requires an amount of specification and detail which cannot, as with a general formula of structure, be subsumed under the task of providing a methodology for understanding psychoanalytic theory. Chapter 2 outlines a body of information and argument which gives the conditions for producing a critical reading of psychoanalytic theory - where critique is not simply the listing of strengths and weaknesses but the attempt to 'tell a different story' through active rewriting. Chapter 2 - a long chapter - allows us to place psychoanalytic theory in a different network of relations which is as important in
its own right as the altered approach it allows us to psychoanalytic theory.

The point of this preface is to signal how a critique of psychoanalytic theory which does 'tell a different story' must necessarily produce a significant part of its argument in terms that are not those of psychoanalytic theory nor those of a methodology whose only value is determined by the effect of its presentation of psychoanalytic theory. Chapters 1 and 2 are therefore concerned with a reworking of 'the subject' whose parameters are not inscribed by the horizons of psychoanalytic knowledge nor its value circumscribed by the light it throws on these horizons, but which is, precisely because of this, invaluable in reassessing the conditions of psychoanalytic theory. It is subsequent to this 'wider' questioning of 'the subject' that Chapter 3 can focus on psychoanalytic theory, the discontinuous but crucially intersecting readings that have claimed various political implications for this theory, and lastly, a consideration of its politicality as the concomitant not of a general epistemology, but of a specific technology.
CHAPTER 1

Introduction: On Readers, Readerships and Reading Practices.
This introduction will be used to address several remarks to the question of the available readership for a thesis on the theory of the subject and the discursive politics of psychoanalytic theories. These remarks will not be exhaustive. In part they serve to put on the agenda a few of the concerns that will occupy us throughout this work. But they also provide a means of giving some visibility to the decisions undertaken in the course of writing this thesis.

I: Contestations

To ask the question of available readership it is necessary to consider firstly what is meant by a 'readership' and under what conditions, according to what presuppositions, and within which problematics we can think about readerships. For example, within the terms of the traditional literary criticism of which secondary school and higher education English studies have been largely representative for the last half century - i.e., under the conditions in which most of us have learnt 'to read' - a 'readership' is synonymous with a 'reader', and the reader is a figure without specificity. When mentioned at all, he falls completely in the shadow of the writer and his activities: "... the reader must sit down alone and struggle with the writer." To the limited degree that the question of reading is made visible in this criticism it is held that we approach literature "... not with any
elaborate apparatus. Principles and systems may suit other forms of art, but they cannot be applicable here ... [here] it will be this man-to-man business ..."²

But the literary field is not without its internal divisions. Formalist theories argue that if 'literature' is a term with any specificity, and if literary studies are to have any authority beyond assertion, then it must be because of the systematicity, or the formal and linguistic properties, of literary texts. If literary texts are understood like this rather than as the more or less unregulated expressions of writers' consciousnesses or as reflections or mediations of reality, then the set of values that literary critics operate, man-to-man, to make their "subjective, censorious verdict"³ can be replaced by syntactic and morphologic research to define the nature of, and perhaps extract the intrinsic values from, a literary work. These values are intrinsic in the sense that they are derived from the logico-grammatical models that, for the Russian formalists and to an extent for the Anglo-American new critics, are understood as determining the formal properties of language. Reading, within this view of language, is understood as the registration of these formal properties. Formalism marks the insertion of logico-grammatical models into the erstwhile humanist domain of literary studies, thereby displacing traditional normative grammars constructed according to pedagogic strategy and the experience of language-users. By contrast logico-grammatical models (formal or generative grammars) do not systematize experiences of language 'after the
event'; but present, within a technical logic based on mathematical principles, the conditions that generate linguistic structure and make these experiences possible.

Thus in formalist theories language-users (both readers and writers) cannot be thought of as individuals engaged in the human business of making sense, but as bearers of a set of technically rather than experientially derived functions of language. 'Readers', in so far as this term means individuals possessing irreducibly human capabilities (consciousness, experience, feeling), cannot be thought as originating or foundational elements in formalist theory. Actual readers figure in relation to formal grammars only as the point of effectivity of the grammar which represents the possibility of an actual experience of language. Reading, in this formalist problematic, remains an essentially undifferentiated practice, a setting in operation of the rules from which all instances of language are derived. Within formalism the site of reading is only, it is commonly argued, ideally defined by the exclusive criteria of a grammar claimed to be universal.

The charge of idealism is put to formalism by focusing on a domain of experience as the essential domain to which formal grammars must reveal their relation. And formalism itself, though constructing its position in part by breaking with traditional grammar's relation to the historical experience of language-users and thus obtaining for formal grammars an autonomous domain of authority,
nevertheless argues a (reversed) relation of possibility between formal grammars and the domain of experience. A phenomenological critique challenges this conditional relation in which experience is alleged to be an effect of a grammar, citing the failure of formalism to account for the changing reception or personal experience of texts. Formalism, it is claimed in this critique, neither breaks with the traditional concept of the subject formed prior to language nor provides an account of the insertion of texts into historical contexts via the mediation of specific, historically placed subjects. Ricoeur asks:

How does an autonomous system of signs, postulated without a speaking subject, enter into operations, evolve towards new states, or lend itself to usage and to history? Can a system exist anywhere but in the act of speech? Is it anything other than a cross-section of a living operation? Is language anything more than a system, that is potential but never completely actual, burdened by latent changes, apt for a subjective and intersubjective history?5

Formalism simply ignores the question of the subject being posed here (except to deny it) and in doing so is said to be 'closed' to experience. In place of this conditional relation phenomenology posits an essential, simultaneous, developing and interdependent relation between a subject's experience and formal grammars.

The attack on formalism in the name of the experiencing reader has been undertaken in recent literary theory, or reader-response criticism.6 This criticism, in which the reader has become a site of systematic investigation, is characterized by the phenomenological assumption of the simultaneity and interdependence of the subject and object
of knowledge. To consider the text without the reader, or to consider the reader and the text as finished or formed before their 'encounter' is, in this view, to misrecognize both entities and to miss the work of reading which brings both into being.

In short, and to repeat myself, to consider the utterances apart from the consciousness receiving it is to risk missing a great deal of what is going on. It is a risk which analysis in terms of 'doings and happenings' works to minimize.  

What does an analysis of doings and happenings run by a current phenomenology look like?

Whatever the size of the unit [sentence, paragraph, novel], the focus of the method remains the reader's experience of it, and the mechanism of the method is the magic question, 'what does this - - - do?'

The method ... (1) ... refuses to answer or even ask the question, what is this work about; (2) it yields an analysis not of formal features, but of the developing responses of the reader in relation to the words as they succeed one another in time; (3) the result will be a description of the structure of response which may have an oblique or even ... a contrasting relationship to the structure of the work as a thing in itself.

This analysis does not ignore the internal features and relationships of a text, but it does deny their autonomy and the primacy of their logic. The syntacto-logical relationships of a sentence will not then, as in a formalist analysis, determine its meaning: meaning becomes instead the event of the dynamic unfolding of relations in an exchange between (amongst other things) these differentiated structures and the "mental life of the reader."

This mental life is a variety of operations - "the formulation of complete thoughts, the performing (and
regretting) of acts of judgement, the following and making of logical sequences";\textsuperscript{11} it is the capabilities for a "kaleidoscope of perspectives, preintentions, recollections";\textsuperscript{12} and it is the register of and response to "every linguistic experience [which] is affecting and pressuring."\textsuperscript{13} This life is in an endless process, better, a hermeneutic spiral of 'becoming' in which each experience adds to and shifts the amalgam of possible responses to the next linguistic experience. The conditions of this 'becoming' are the phenomenological concepts of space and time - the space and time of the subject moving in language.

But what does this imply for a representation of the work of reading? In the 'ideal freedom' of its 'becoming', the reader is continuously present in time for the unfolding in time of the text:

... when we put a book down, we forget that while we were reading, it was moving (pages turning, lines receding into the past) and forget too that we were moving with it.\textsuperscript{14}

This forgetting is taken as the hallmark or principle of a criticism that takes the text in itself as its object - "it transforms a temporal experience into a spatial one."\textsuperscript{15}

For a criticism sensitive to the reader's responses it is rather a question of remembering. The 'time of reading' is not simply the time measured by the divisions on a clock-face, but the time of affective participation; it is time relative to empirical states of consciousness - to the collective phenomenon 'memory' which projects,
recollects, is always 'becoming' as its store of past responses is reshaped by new encounters with linguistic phenomena. This amalgam of psychological processes caught up in the structures of the text is the figure of a reader given in reader-response criticism.

The productive difficulties of this 'remembering' of the spiral of 'becoming' in which knowledge and knower are articulated are seen by the reader-response theorists as opening up literary criticism to different knowledges and so investigating the foundations of a critical reading operation.

It is true that the moment we try to understand literary works in relation to readers we take on troubles which do not arise so long as we look only at the works themselves. For not only is it always more difficult to understand or even talk intelligibly about a process or an interaction than about an object, but a concern with readers seems to lead us into matters of psychology and sociology which we would prefer not to regard as our province.

In other words, if we are to attend to readers and to readers' responses to texts then it is incumbent on us to determine the precise constitution and functioning of readers by recourse to the disciplines of psychology, sociology and, as current articulations testify, psychoanalysis. In fact, it is not this directive of reader-response criticism but the precise constitution and functioning of the articulations of different knowledges in which the object or process 'reading' is opened up to representation and analysis which will occupy us.
II: Epistemological Claims

For I will argue here that the directive to investigate readers is a directive to ask questions whose answers have already been determined. Whatever knowledges are called on to 'shed light on' the reader can only support and extend or be demonstrated irrelevant to a prior conclusion because in the logic of this argument these knowledges are called up by an acceptance of the reader as an existential fact. They are harnessed to a particular concept of knowledge where the relation of the conscious subject to the object is one of experience. We are given the phenomenological assumption as a tool to read with, but in fact it is what we are always reading for:

Herein lies the dialectical structure of reading. The need to decipher gives us the chance to formulate our own deciphering capacity - i.e., we bring to the fore an element of our being of which we are not directly conscious.¹⁹

But what is the priority of this 'perpetually becoming reader' pulling texts into the flux of experience and the 'event of meaning'? In fact this 'reader' clearly does something other than introduce philosophical, psychological and sociological knowledges to literary criticism; the figure of 'the reader' as existential and knowable in these disciplines is constructed by the adjacency of these knowledges in what could be termed the discourse of reader-response criticism. The 'obviousness'²⁰ of this very human reader, its reality, is an effect of an accepted organization of knowledge.
If the field of philosophical, social and psychical experience posed to the text in this discourse is not thought of as determined by any prior ontology but as the effect of a specific and shifting configuration of knowledges then there is no necessity for reading, formulated as the activation of a set of techniques, always to be described as an historical, formal or closed structure needing to be supplemented by and opened up to the domain of experience. That is, the phenomenological critique of formalism need not be thought of as definitive. If our concepts of knowledge and language, or to be more precise, of the complex interrelations of signs which we can call 'representations', are not thought of as mirroring the constitution of some universal human reader then the particular phenomenological form of representation - the mutual construction of subject and object - cannot stand for a general field of representation or a generally applicable representational form: it is a single representational form, holding no dictate over the form of other possible representations.

In the phenomenological form of representation the text produces the condition of its own reading in the following way. The work of the aesthetic text resists any given subject. It always moves, in its "turns and twists" and "unwritten aspects" which draw the reader into play, towards the production of a new subjectivity - the condition of its reading.
We have already questioned the primacy of this evolving subjectivity as the prior condition for reading and suggested that it may be more appropriately described as the effect of a certain ordering of concepts. Now we can ask how else we might formulate the conditions of a reading or, as it is the same question, the particular criteria for what counts as a text if this representational form is not taken as defining a general problem of representation, and further, if the criteria laid down in formalist theory need not be posed in the dichotomy of structures 'closed' or 'open' to experience. This reformulation entails relegating the philosophical argument of idealism by not repeating the claim of formal linguistics concerning generative grammar's status as an a priori structure: we need not think of a generative grammar as the knowledge or structure necessary for recognition or representation.

In order to do this we must first locate the mechanism or mechanisms that both allow a phenomenological critique to provide a single general description of the problem of representation and that transform the technically derived representations of linguistic structures gathered in a grammar into representations of the knowledge necessary for linguistic structures.

It has already been suggested that the particular subjectivity that reader-response criticism presumes is an effect of an accepted organization of knowledge: likewise it is the effective presence of epistemological claims
that underpin the claims of formal grammar. It follows
that it is the activation of these epistemological claims
in the linguistic analyses of both formal grammars and
reader-response criticism that requires analysis as it is
these claims, which, so far, have defined the field in
which the conditions of reading have been able to be
thought. It should be stated that this is also the case in
Marxist accounts of literary criticism or reading.

Briefly, this epistemological field provides for the
organization of particular knowledges (e.g., a knowledge
of parsing procedures) under a theory of knowledge in
terms of a relation of consciousness in which the subject
of knowledge (or knowledge process) corresponds to, or
assimilates, the object of knowledge. Particular know-
ledges are thus brought under the criteria of the general
division in which the concept of knowledge is founded and
the necessary knowledge relation in which the two distinct
ontological realms ('thought' and 'being') are assim-
ilated. In other words, an epistemological relation forms
both the 'basic concepts' from which all others are
logically derived and the knowledge relation which all
subsequent forms of relation must mirror.

The epistemological base of reader-response criticism
is clear from its explicit formulation of the subject of
knowledge or experience as the condition for a knowledge,
or experience, of texts. In a classical Marxist account
textual production and consumption are the functions of
consciousness explained in terms of its origin in social
being. Lukácsian criticism, in which literature is located within the superstructure as a more or less refracted expression of a particular historical form of economic activities or base, is an instance of this explanatory schema.

In the Althusserian account of reading, which comes closest to displacing this epistemological discourse, superstructural forms (political and ideological discourses, of which literature would be an instance) are argued to be 'relatively autonomous', that is, they are not thought of as expressive of a real economic base or social totality recovered in a subject's consciousness but as having their own specific effectivity. A discourse is treated not as an ideal expression but as the material determination of a problematic (or structure) of a discourse - a set of material elements organized to provide the horizon of concepts. In Althusser's concept of 'symptomatic reading', the limits of a discourse are formulated according to the principle that what a discourse cannot 'know' or reproduce is its own structure or activity. The division between a discourse and its problematic (as that which determines what is to count as knowledge and thus the discourse) that permits this formulation, establishes a reader in a relation of knowledge to the problematic which exceeds the criteria provided by the problematic. Thus a zone of consciousness is maintained as the meta-criterion for a problematic and a knowledge, or science, can allegedly be formulated in advance of its problematic.
Formal grammar transforms its work from that of the adequate representation of linguistic structures into an epistemological enterprise by posing its interests within a division of the linguistic field into 'the ideal' (competence, speaker-listener's intuition) and 'the actual' (performance). The demonstration that a generative grammar makes no appeal to the actual cognition of the subject—i.e., that a generative grammar can generate linguistic structure without relying on a subject's consciousness of the relations involved (we do not need to know how '2 x 2 = 4' in order to produce '4'; we iterate the rule '2 x 2' and it is the iteration of the rule that produces the knowledge-effect '4')—is taken to mean, in this division into ideal and actual domains, that generative grammar represents an ideal realm of the possibility of language. This ideal realm is thus given as the condition for actual representations or experience of language. This maintains the concept of the subject's actual experience of language and puts the grammar in a definite relation of possibility to it. The general division between mind and being is thus repeated in formal linguistics within the divisions ideal/actual: within this locus the grammar emerges as a representation of the knowledge process necessary for the knowledge of being. But the grammar only functions as an epistemological relation if its condition is given as the epistemological structure ideal/actual, that is, a structure in which an allegedly essential hierarchy of knowledges can be ranged.
This epistemological structure has a number of other common designations - the oppositions deep structure/surface structure (Chomsky, Greimas), competence/performance (Chomsky), langue/parole (Saussure), structure/experience, and the Marxist divisions of base/superstructure. The notion of surface structure, performance or parole etc., maintains the subject at the level of perception and experience, while deep structure, competence or langue demarcate a separate zone for a theory of the ideal subject, or for the subject's determinant conditions. This separate zone allows the subject to be represented as ahistorical, a sort of ideally zero subject. Representations of the ahistoricity of the subject make possible the unstable configuration of knowledges called structuralism which depend on a strategy of supplementing ahistorical functional structures with an experiencing subject in a phenomenological circle of self-construction.

By mobilizing the argument that a language can make infinite use of finite means, the categories of the ideal and the actual and the corresponding oppositions deep and surface structures, competence and performance etc., allow the massing of a number of different forms of representation as derived from one general form. But here we would want to ask, what are the conditions of these categories that allow such a unification? These categories are not given to us in an ontology available to our immediate recognition: we have to look to their elaboration in various texts such as Chomsky's *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*. 
Taking the associated examples of deep structure and competence, we find in Chomsky's discussion of generative grammar firstly, that he has difficulty in justifying the concepts, secondly, that most of the evidence for deep structure or competence is pulled from linguistic performance (which is treated as a self-evident and immediate category), and thirdly, that the remainder comes from the circular procedure of calling on that which he is seeking to specify to specify itself.

Like most facts of interest and importance, this [the speaker-hearer's competence or knowledge of the language] is neither presented for direct observation nor extractable from data by inductive procedures of any known sort. Clearly, the actual data of linguistic performance will provide much evidence ...

It is important to bear in mind that when an operational procedure [for obtaining significant information about linguistic intuition] is proposed, it must be tested for adequacy ... by measuring it against the standard provided by the tacit knowledge that it attempts to specify and describe. 27

As well as its circularity, the last formulation proposes a standard that we can only have access to in the form of linguistic performance. So far the burden of proof for the 'existence' of competence or deep structure rests on linguistic performance or surface structure. Which leads us to ask, if 'tacit knowledge' is only available to us through its effects then what useful sense can 'tacit' have? As Wittgenstein suggests, using the example of 'intuiting' the time:

The idea of the intangibility of that mental state in estimating the time is of the greatest importance. Why is it intangible? Isn't it because we refuse to count what is tangible about our state as part of the specific state which we are postulating? 29
What 'tangibles' is Chomsky failing to consider? He tells us that "no adequate formalizable techniques are known for obtaining reliable information concerning the facts of [underlying] linguistic structure." But he also tells us

A deep structure is a generalized Phrase-marker underlying some well-formed surface structure. Thus the basic notion defined by a transformational grammar is: deep structure $M'$ underlies well-formed surface structure $M$. The notion 'deep structure' itself is derivative from this.

The base rules and the transformational rules set certain conditions that must be met for a structure to qualify as the deep structure expressing the semantic content of some well-formed sentence.

The base and transformational rules, the techniques of grammatical notation, writing of Phrase-markers, normalization of sentences and surface structures are the adequate formalizable techniques that produce, not 'information about' deep structure, but produce deep structures and their derivation. The 'evidence for' deep structure is the production of deep structure in the 'performance' of the linguistic theoretician. Deep structure is not simply 'contextualized' in the work of the linguistic theoretician; it exists nowhere but in the procedures s/he follows.

Now, this is perfectly good evidence for deep structure as that which is derived from the basic notion defined by a transformational grammar. It is not evidence for deep structure conceived as something - i.e., the speaker-hearer's knowledge of his language - that a transformational grammar expresses. In other words, the conditions of the category deep structure lie within the
'performance', or techniques, of linguistics as part of the notational scheme operated by that linguistics. These techniques, while adequately producing deep structures, are not evidence of the "mental reality underlying actual behaviour" that this linguistic theory is concerned to discover.

Without doubting the operation of 'deep structure' as a functioning component of generative grammar, there is no reason to accept deep structure as indicating an ontologically different zone from, and underwriting, surface structure. Or similarly, to imagine that 'competence' in any way precedes 'performance'. And it is the production of the ontologically different zone of knowledge or competence, which is allegedly generative of performance, that allows (at least in one form) the unification and generalization of linguistic performance or, to avoid working within this dichotomy, of what would be better called linguistic practices. This unification and generalization of linguistic practices is brought into force in considerations of the object or process of reading at the point at which a subject is claimed as the necessary knowledge support of language (a minimal competence) through whose singularity all texts must be referred.

The preceding consideration of the status of deep structure is made to indicate a line of argument that would break with any of the general divisions activated by the repetition of an epistemological discourse that traps all analysis of language in an essentialism of one kind or
another (i.e., reader-response criticism in the essentialism of the subject open to experience, formalism in the essentialism of a language derived from universal, a priori rules.) My argument is akin to and draws on Michel Foucault's re-ordering of historical analysis and his plan "... to eliminate ill-considered oppositions" that limit all historical forms to the replay of a few fundamental differences (e.g., the 'regressive' and the 'adaptive', the 'inert' and the 'living'). When the distinctions thought/language, truth/history, word/writing, words/things are abandoned and language is no longer conceived as the exterior body to the "agile interiority of thought" then the history of 'things said' or statements can begin.

This task presupposes that the field of statements is not described as a 'translation' of operations or processes that take place elsewhere (in men's thought, in their consciousness or unconscious, in the sphere of transcendental constitutions); but that it is accepted, in its empirical modesty, as the locus of particular events, regularities, relationships, modifications and systematic transformations; in short, that it is treated not as the result or trace of something else, but as a practical domain that is autonomous (although dependent), and which can be described at its own level (although it must be articulated on something other than itself).

When statements are no longer referred, through the category of performance or surface structure or experience, to the more fundamental opening or difference of tacit knowledge or deep structure, then the differences, regularities and shifting distributions of statements are not treated as the surface vagaries of form, but are available to analysis as the determinate features of a field possessing its own historical particularity and
which cannot be unified, a priori, by epistemological claims. The history of things said is undertaken at the level of statements in their occurrence as an event in the systematic form of exteriority "that may be paradoxical since it refers to no adverse form of interiority." That is, the statement is not located on one level that is the necessary effect of, or the expression of, another level (e.g., of content or intuition), but is located at a site which is constituted within an ensemble of discursive and non-discursive relations which are characterized by no 'inside' or 'outside'.

At this point, and having already used the term 'discourse' to mark a discontinuity between epistemology's account of itself and the account we have made in terms of its 'discursive mechanisms', some further remarks on 'discourse', 'the statement' and 'the non-discursive' as integral to the Foucauldian problematic's resiting of questions concerning 'language' are appropriate.

The term 'discourse' marks a break with the concept of the internal normativity or structure of knowledge practices, and that of the expressive or representative function of language. A discourse can be described as a systematic ordering of concepts. That systematic ordering is not secured or explained by any general order of discourse — be it conceived as discourse's reference to and representation of a pre-discursive real, or discourse's enactment of invariable and universal rules or linguistic deep structures. In other words, discourses are
not open to the explanatory, supplementary or critical agency of other discourses through the continuity of a species-genus relation of all discourses to a theory of discourse. They are repeated in their discontinuities and specificities. Any contiguity of these discontinuous discourses is not of the order of a synthesizing consciousness or recognition but of a shared repetition of an ordering of concepts.

In turn, the ordering of concepts does not form the basis, according to a horizon of ideality, of a grouping of sentences, or an arrangement of propositions or of speech acts; a discourse is not composed of linguistic units, logical units or performative utterances each matched with a stable meaning, but of statements, and concepts and objects emerge in the 'correlative space' of the statement. The statement is not an elementary unity: it cannot be defined as a unit of a linguistic type (superior to the phenomenon of the word, inferior to the text); but ... [as] an enunciative function that involve[s] various units (these may sometimes be sentences, sometimes propositions; but they are sometimes made up of fragments of sentences, series or tables of signs, a set of propositions or equivalent formulations); and, instead of giving a 'meaning' to these units, this function relates them to a field of objects; instead of providing them with a subject, it opens up for them a number of possible subjective positions; instead of fixing their limits, it places them in a domain of coordination and coexistence; instead of determining their identity, it places them in a space in which they are used and repeated.39

A discursive formation or discourse can be better defined then as the group or family of statements that belong to a single formation, that share an associated
field or domain of coexistence with other statements. The group of statements or discursive formation is also determined in its relation to non-discursive formations (e.g., institutions, political events, economic practices and processes). The relation of the discursive to the non-discursive is not that between two discrete and homogeneous levels; the non-discursive is not the interior or exterior of a group of statements, to be regarded as the motivating force behind discourse or that which is expressed in it. This is "... because there is nothing specifically social which is constituted outside the discursive." 40 A discursive formation is always in specific forms of articulation with the non-discursive formations which provide its horizons, yet these horizons are not the limits of a pre-discursive real, for those horizons are always discursively organized. In other words, one thing we are not concerned with in analyses of discursive formations is the question of origins and finalities.

Lastly, in this brief outline, a relation should be noted between the term 'discourse' and a term that will figure in later sections - 'training'.

'Training' will be used in concord with the term 'discourse' to indicate a move away from the idea of a subject or a consciousness which recognizes what is knowledge, to a consideration of the operations involved when writers, readers, critics, etc., repeat the discursive conditions of particular knowledge effects.
The Foucauldian problematic provides us with a field in which to analyse statements - their unities, meanings, effects - free of the epistemological claims that organize these statements as a mirror of a general conception of knowledge and prescribe the possible forms of 'being'. In the Foucauldian problematic the meanings, unities and effects of discourses cannot be read off from an epistemology. Knowledges can never be recalled to a single, general form of knowledge. An epistemological discourse is a set of statements whose effects do not flow from their true representation of ontological realms of thought and being; rather their particular effects - among them the division of the field of knowledge into the 'logical' and the 'concrete', or the 'ideal' and the 'actual' - are produced by the repetition of the particular organization of statements called 'epistemology'. Thus, when we say "we know x", this statement cannot be interpreted as expressing, fundamentally, another level of operations which is the assimilation of one ontological realm by a different ontological realm. Saying 'we know x' means we have repeated the specific rules or the regularized set of statements that have as their correlate 'x'. It means we have repeated the set of technical procedures required to produce the knowledge-effect 'x'.

Within an epistemological framework, 'reading' is necessarily formulated as logically derived from the process of assimilation of, or correspondence to, the concrete by a consciousness. In this framework, 'reading' must be thought of as a form of recognition that is gained
by retracing the steps of consciousness marked out in writing. As such, reading has the teleological function of recovering the form of consciousness (transcendental or empirical subject, grammar, a priori structure) at work in the writing and the recognitions already provided for by this consciousness. Within this schema, true and insightful readings will finally return us the ontological figures that are the alleged conditions of our recognitions. Readings pursued within different epistemologies will yield different ontological figures. Traditional literary critical readings predicated on an epistemology in which the space of the subject is occupied by a transcendental consciousness will provide, implicitly or explicitly, the figure of the creative author to whose perception the world is given through a self-constituted and unitary consciousness.

Reader-response criticism, explicitly phenomenological and centred on a consciousness evolving in the experience and simultaneous unfolding of linguistic structure, will discover a unique, because historical, individual as both the goal and the condition of readings. Here the 'time of reading' is treated as more than the recurrence of the 'time of writing', but the teleology is nonetheless maintained by the concept of the relation of a consciousness to its object.

In a Marxist literary criticism, where the place of the epistemological subject is occupied by different class consciousnesses, the reading of a text will be the recog-
nition of the historical and material conditions of which consciousness is held to be an effect, and these are formulated in the overdetermining form of an economic base, or its determination in the 'last instance'.

Readings in a formalist problematic, where the knowledge process is represented by a grammar, will ultimately yield the ideal speaker-hearer's competence or intuition - the condition that confirms the form of the grammar. The zero-subject of formal grammar is still a site which can be used to claim an existence for the grammar in excess of the techniques of the linguistics in which it operates.

Readings pursued within different epistemologies will yield different ontological figures as the conditions of the texts whose origins these readings purportedly trace. Do we take this to mean that these differences are the result of misrecognitions or 'failed' knowledge relations between a consciousness and its object, in this case, the form of knowledge. If so, we are left with the unresolvable and fruitless contentions of 'better and lesser minds' (or better and lesser grammars, or economic organization, or whatever-forms of consciousness). And in such a ranking of metalanguages, 'reading', at least as a plural if not properly differentiated practice, disappears into a common register in which the specificity of readings is marked only as their proportionate 'truth' or 'falsity'.

It is just such a history and its over-generalizing, homogenizing effects that the Foucauldian problematic allows us to avoid repeating. When discourses are not
thought of as expressing or representing a knowledge relation (or a failed knowledge relation) between a subject of knowledge or knowledge process and its object, then 'reading' cannot be thought of as mining a set of statements in order to recognize the knowledge relations of which the statements are held to be a trace. Readings will cease to reveal their epistemological foundations when 'reading' is no longer formulated epistemologically. 'Reading', as the repetition of a regularized distribution of statements, does not stand in a species-genus relation to 'knowing'. As a set of practices it occupies no ontological realm separate from the statements whose iteration it consists of. Reading does not consist of a thought process necessary for an object to be read: it is not accompanied by vision - "When I obey a rule, I do not choose. I obey the rule blindly." Reading is the quite technical repetition of statements at their own level and in their particular dispersion (their differences that articulate them upon other statements) that produces definite knowledge-effects. In other words, in the Foucauldian problematic, reading is not predicated upon a subject; it is not conceived as the relation between a subject, or reader, and a text. Therefore, a 'readership' is not defined as the space of a reader qua subject of knowledge (or subject of language as Signifier in the psychoanalytic 'subversion'), but as a space occupied by available and discontinuous, heterogeneous discursive forms. The reader is the bearer of these discursive forms according to various and changing institutional trainings conferring specific competences.
III: Discursive Unities

We can now say that to consider the question of the available readership for this thesis means to consider the available discursive forms that function as the thesis' conditions of intelligibility. The importance of this distinction from how a readership might otherwise be conceived - as the embodiment of a synthesizing gaze of the human, or the realization of an inexorable telos of a grammar that represents intuitive knowledge - lies in its stipulation that the thesis is not intelligible within the conditions of an explicit or implicit anthropologism. That is, the thesis does not strive to make sense of linguistics, literary forms, pedagogies etc., by relating them to the domain of 'the human' as that which determines the true meaning of 'subsidiary' knowledges, but rather to intervene in the practices which conduct the production of truths along these lines.

Of course, this stipulation cannot determine the forms of intelligibility this thesis will take in all future readings (although this introduction, in relation to which the stipulation stands as a slogan, is clearly designed to form a particular readership by repeating the conditions of intelligibility in which it has read its pertinent texts and its own enterprise). This is precisely because there is no single general relation, for example a knowledge relation or a general problematic of representation, that links the conditions of production of a text to its conditions of consumption and from which the latter
could be read off the former. As the reading and repetition of certain discourses, even if perhaps shifting their relations slightly, this text (and any text) is not the record of an 'origin' under whose shadow future readings fall. "Discourse must not be referred to the distant presence of the origin, but treated as and when it occurs." As a reading - an ordered set of statements within a determinate ensemble of discursive and non-discursive relations - and not an object of knowledge to be taken or mis-taken by the subject of knowledge, the consumption of 'the text' or 'book' is not a question of a stable unity being understood rightly or wrongly or differently by subsequent readers.

The book is not simply the object that one holds in one's hands; and it cannot remain within the little parallelepiped that contains it: its unity is variable and relative. As soon as one questions that unity, it loses its self-evidence; it indicates itself, constructs itself, only on the basis of a complex field of discourse. When we say 's/he has understood/misunderstood x' we cannot be talking about a person's correct or incorrect perception of an object; we are indicating shifts in that complex field of discourse, to be treated as and when they occur.

But to return to that stipulation, (and to determine from its consequences the object or objects of this thesis and in what sense it has objects), what is the postulate under which anthropologism arranges our thought? Foucault has described it as the empirico-transcendental doublet that is 'man'.

"43

"44
... a being such that knowledge will be attained in him of what renders all knowledge possible.⁴⁵

All empirical knowledge, provided it concerns man, can serve as a possible philosophical field in which the foundation of knowledge, the definition of its limits, and, in the end, the truth of all truth must be discoverable. The anthropological configuration of modern philosophy consists in doubling over dogmatism, in dividing it into two different levels each lending support to and limiting the other: the pre-critical analysis of what man is in his essence becomes the analytic of everything that can, in general, be presented to man's experience.⁴⁶

The general implications of this configuration for the field of questions surrounding 'the text' have been drawn in the consideration of the epistemological relations inscribed in accounts of representation. Now we can detail some of the anthropological constraints in which our reading and writing practices are formed — constraints, because they limit us to a single field of questions and objects whose decision is always comprised in the sameness of the figure of man.

The anthropological configuration sets up conditions of intelligibility for a text that are organized in part by the relations deployed by the concept of the author or 'author-function',⁴⁷ in part by the relations deployed by the concept of the book or text; in part by the relations deployed in commentary; in part by the relations deployed in the unquestioned unities of disciplines; and in part by the relations established by all the themes that multiply the theme of continuity — tradition, spirit, influence, development, origin, oeuvre. These concepts and themes intersect and reinforce each other: they form an ensemble of reading and writing practices — a particular reading and writing apparatus.
The criteria for the attribution of texts which characterize modern literary criticism (and which are derived from the Christian tradition of valuing a text according to the holiness of its author) define 'the author' as an historical figure in which a series of events converge; as a standard level of quality; as a stylistic uniformity; and as a field of conceptual coherence. This 'historical figure and conceptual field' functions, in widely disseminated practices of criticism and reading, as a unifying principle for organizing experience, consciousness and writing as an expressive form. As Barthes details:

... the Author, when believed in, is always conceived of as the past of his own book: book and author stand automatically on a single line divided into a before and an after. The Author is thought to nourish the book, which is to say that he exists before it, thinks, suffers, lives for it, is in the same relation of antecedence to his work as a father to his child."

The author-subject functions as the singular and whole relation of intelligibility between a field of reality and experience and a field of language. It is at the site of the unifying synthesis of these unquestioned domains - field of subjectivity, field of reality, field of language - that a subject position is regularized in which to write and to read.

From this position what is read and what is written takes the form of commentary. Commentary treats language as the trace of a knowing subject and of its perception of an object. Articulating the field of subjectivity, the field of reality and the field of language, commentary
questions texts as to their fidelity to their dual origins - to the thought or the consciousness that has stirred them, and to the true dimensions of the object that they describe. What does the text say and does it say what its author intended it to say? Has the object been fully revealed in it? Commentary, even if it is full of praise for the text, always (in order to exist) finds it has failed; there is always a remainder left unexpressed and unrevealed by the text because it is the nature of language in this psychologistic interpretation to be just a trace of the real and the human. It is in order to complete the restoration of the thought and the object which language is never 'up to' that commentary must continue. In commentary, the visionary rights of an author to the truth hidden beneath language are once again instated.

The regularization of this writing and reading modality is further accommodated in the concept of the text as a self-evident unity (see p.27) in the field of language conceived as a natural entity, and in the concept of the discipline as a set of knowledge and language organized this time not by the author, but generically, according to it object. In this account of the organization of knowledge, a discipline unifies reading and writing practices according to the object or objects that it is their function to express. Any transformations or contradictions within the discipline or shifts in its relation to other knowledges do not call into question the unity of the discipline or the ontological status of its object, but
are accounted for by the themes of development, evolution and influence. Other breaks are made invisible by settling them in the grand flow of tradition, or the spirit of an age, maintaining the continuities necessary for 'the essential' in man to be everywhere and always at work.

So far we have given an account of how the constraints of an anthropology operate in our writing and reading practices, but it does not tell us how these practices are formed. They are not the necessary outcome of 'the essential' in man. The organization of these allegedly self-evident unities - field of subjectivity (author, character, reader), field of reality (world, objects), field of language/representation (book, commentary, discipline) - does not occur in these fields or sites, that is, they are not self-evident. These 'sites' are the discursive objects of particular trainings. The regularization of a reading modality according to the general categories of text, context, authorship and which positions a text as an image of the world and an expression of an authorial or collective consciousness occurs neither in 'the world' organized as various sites (text, authorship, etc.,) of 'being', nor in 'the text' according to a finite set of linguistic rules governing all possible subject-object relations, nor in a phenomenological time of reading or realization of the text where a subject emerges from the negotiation of the structures of the text. This regularization occurs within the discursive practices of modern literary criticism whose strategies are activated in recent and current school curricula as
the expected and repeated way of reading not only literary
texts, but those of the other disciplines of the curricula
grouped around the integrative point of the English course
— with, it is worth noting, the effect of the aestheticization
of otherwise didactic texts. In other words, the
mechanism of reader identification with the author as
subject and as the only enunciative modality possible is
the result of a systematic education producing a moral
anthropology. By the repetition of questions, exercises
(e.g., writing character-sketches) and exam structures, a
systematic reading is produced of character as moral
character (as opposed to the object 'character' in 18th
century reading practices which is treated as an element
of 'scene' and in terms of its appropriateness to tech-
nical canons and norms such as the dramatic unities of
time, place and action), and of an author as a moral
subject to be probed for a moral vision.

The role of the name of the author is dictated by the
practices of commentary and attribution, which are not
formed around the 'nature' of language as the inadequate
expression of a knowing subject and whose business it is to
supplement, but in trainings in an accepted hierarchization
of texts and their strategic and multiple
repetition. For example, commentary on a literary text
would consist of an organization of statements describing
the text which privileged a set of statements on the
author's biography, experiences, experiences writing the
book, and the author's relation to an authorial canon — in
other words the mobilization of a number of texts. The
reading of the author as moral subject also depends on the humanist division of language in which language is given an expressive inside and a mimetic or reflective outside. This allows an architecture of statements in which the text emerges as the mediator of an expressed personal or moral vision of the author and a reflected history. The production of the reader in an identification with the author and character as moral subjects is made possible by the common moral ground for reader, author and character which was historically secured by the insertion of a particular set of practices for studying literature into the educational apparatus that emerged in England in the 19th century. This apparatus, or body of discursive and non-discursive practices, was calculated to produce a popular education which would improve the 'moral stock' of the population, a "formal system of education which would support the framework of cultural relations appropriate to a fully national organism." Within this apparatus the study of English language and literature was "contracted to provide a common heritage, to act as the source of a common system of values, to embody universal human characteristics." Doyle tells us that:

... the earliest instruction in the English language and literature was provided at University College, London from the 1820s. This - despite the new title - was similar to eighteenth-century Scottish Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. What was perhaps new, though, was an emphasis upon the use of literature as a vehicle for moral instruction, and as a liberal counterweight to the principles of pure utilitarianism upon which the new London foundation was based.

Proceeding according to the imperative which Arnold voiced as the need to extricate the 'best self', literary
studies linked a rhetoric of dramatic characterization to the techniques associated with the construction and interrogation of a moral self, which previously had been, in the main, attached to church ritual, though gradually disseminated in the forms of the diary and autobiography. With their linkage, a common surface was provided for the formation of fictional characters, the moral character of the author, and of the student.\textsuperscript{55}

Just as it can be argued that the way in which the author-function and commentary organize reading and writing practices is not determined by the formal structure of a text or a phenomenology of enunciation, but by a systematic training, so it can be argued that a discipline is not formed and maintained through a descriptive or exploratory relation to a pre-discursive ontology but by the systematic organization of statements and their place within a non-discursive formation (providing, for example, the institutional certification of agents able to occupy and activate the enunciative modalities within a particular disciplinary discourse). "Disciplines constitute a system of control in the production of discourse, fixing its limits through the action of an identity taking the form of a permanent reactivation of the rules."\textsuperscript{56} The continuity of the object on which a discipline 'founds' itself is maintained through the regular repetition of an associated field of statements and the discursive objects that can emerge in the correlative field of those statements. Historical shifts in, for example, the discipline of literary studies can be understood as shifts in the
field of statements that provide the criteria for what is to count as 'literature' - e.g., the shift from its place within the discourses of philology and classical studies as an object of 'abstract' scholarship to its emergence within a discursive structure aligning, in the late nineteenth century, the policing of the poor, the production of moral character, and the extension of a national culture in a strategy of popular education.

The mobile principles of the author-function, the practices of commentary and the structure of disciplines all function to unify discourses in regular general formations that, by placing them under the sign of an individual or collective consciousness or making them apparently complicit with a pre-discursive ordering of the world, obscure the "eventiality" and the materiality of discourses. It is the reproduction of these discursive unities that this thesis seeks to avoid (while not ignoring their production in other discourses) in specifying reading as something other than a function of a subject's perception, but as rather consisting in the eventiality and materiality of a set of historical discursive forms.

This is not a claim about the value of this thesis or the 'truth' of its conditions of production, but a statement about the organization of this introduction. It is set against the context of a certain practice of scholarship in the human sciences where introductions habitually expound the interests of the author, or introduce the work according to the lineaments of a central figure or object
treated in the text, or situate it in relation to a history of ideas or a history of man.

It is also a statement about the objects of analysis in this thesis. This thesis is concerned with the category of the subject in its several representations: - as it is theorized as the more, or less, implicit epistemological mechanism of readings of texts; - as it is presented in philosophical knowledges (transcendental, phenomenological and material), and in the theoretical and technical knowledge of psychoanalysis that 'subverts' the 'subject of philosophy': - as the explicitly problematized site for the political calculations of work concerned with the possibility of subjects bringing specific transformational practices (which would include reading practices) to bear on existing social relations.

A focus of this work is provided by the Lacanian texts - Écrits, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, The Language Of The Self, "The Insistence of the Letter in the Unconscious", "Of Structure as an Inmixing of an otherness prerequisite to any subject whatever", "The Mirror-Phase as Formative of the function of the I", "Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet", "A Lacanian Psychosis: Interview by Jacques Lacan"58 - without these being accorded the integrity of an oeuvre, be this defined by the author 'Jacques Lacan' or the discipline of psychoanalysis. Here we will not treat the statements written and distributed under the signature 'Jacques Lacan' as the remarks of a 'real subject' or a subject of
knowledge to be probed for its intentions or its mental rigour. The author-effect 'Jacques Lacan' marks the activation of a particular set of reading practices. As for the discipline describing the formation of, and the production of, the psyche, it must be stated that this thesis is not 'on psychoanalysis'. The Lacanian texts are central but relative to an enterprise which takes for its analysis not the objects 'the Lacanian texts', 'psychoanalysis', 'the Lacanian subject', 'the unconscious', but certain of the reading and writing practices in which they have emerged. The same may be repeated for a group of texts adjacent to the Lacanian project - i.e., that operate a series of borrowings from Lacanian theory in the areas of film, literary and cultural studies and social theory. These texts, like the Lacanian texts and like the category of the subject, are the discursive objects of the thesis. What makes all these texts particularly appropriate to the analytics of this thesis is that they themselves are engaged in providing accounts of reading practices.

That the objects of this thesis are discursive objects begins to point to the sense of the phrase 'the discursive politics of psychoanalytic theories'. A few more remarks can be made about this. To talk of the discursive politics of psychoanalytic theories is to delimit notions of the political to specific practices, in this case, discursive practices and the effects in the domain of the social to which they are linked. It is to direct analysis to the particular organization of statements and discursive formations in which psychoanalytic
theory is formed and which regulates what is to be known and spoken of. Therefore, the concept of 'discursive politics' marks an analysis that is concerned with the production of the truths by which people govern themselves and others. 'Discursive politics' finds its place within the concept of a 'micropolitics', which in turn shifts the concept of politics from that of party politics to the deployment of power relations, and then analyses that deployment not in the familiar terms of a sovereign will imposing its orders and restrictions from above, but in terms of 'regimes of practices' that operate in no single or essential hierarchical order but at every point in the social domain.

To analyse 'regimes of practices' means to analyse programmes of conduct which have both prescriptive effects regarding what is to be done (effects of 'jurisdiction') and codifying effects regarding what is to be known (effects of 'veridiction').

To conclude and to restate one or two of the working strategies for the chapters to come - it has been made clear that we are not searching in recent psychoanalytic theories for a better understanding or a clearer formulation of the principles that animate the individual (or collective) subject.

Given this introduction, however, what are we to do with the Lacanian texts? If truth is not an external arbiter of our practices, but produced within them, then an analysis of the Lacanian texts as extending and renewing an apparatus of truth already forming our institutions and speech (an apparatus that will be considered at
length in the next chapter), is not to be conducted in terms of judging these texts wrong or right, but must focus on the workings of this apparatus and its extensions. If we are not discovering a truth represented in these texts but considering how truths (and falsehoods) are made possible by the practices in which these texts emerge, then it is not our job to ask what the texts 'really' say, to discover their failures or the faults in 'Lacan's' view of things. Explication and commentary have only limited roles here – as undertakings played out not against overarching unities (knowledge, reason, intuition) but within specific discursive formations. For example, the Freudian unconscious is to be explained not as the discovered object of a scientific exploration of a psychical region – an empirical fact waiting for science – but as a recognition-effect within the criteria marking the Freudian problematic. Beyond these criteria for recognition the Freudian unconscious is not visible. We cannot pursue it beyond this problematic in the hope that a different glimpse of 'the unconscious' will provide the basis for a more searching commentary. Further comment can only consist in repeating the Freudian problematic: to repeat a discourse is to repeat a discourse; it is not to re-present it in a meta-discourse and with the added legacy of its origin or the 'never-said' that escaped the discourse at its birth.

What the analysis will focus on is the work we do, the operations we carry out, in order to read these texts and in order to repeat them. This analysis is a descrip-
tion of a training and a consideration of some of its effects. In this respect, it is an attempt to provide not simply a commentary on current theories of the subject but to produce a critique—that is, an attempt to give a different account of the conditions of circulation of psychoanalytic theories from those which are commonly repeated (e.g., that psychoanalytic theories correspond to the existential fact of the subject; that they are responses to the challenges the unconscious throws up in the form of that which escapes 'reason'; that they bear repeating because of their contribution to our definition of 'the human' as the capacity to produce symbols and thereby weave relations beyond the material facts of our existence).
NOTES


2. Ibid., p.30.


4. Chomsky calls attention to this 'absence' in formalist theory when he states: "... a generative grammar as it stands is no more a model of the speaker than it is a model of the hearer. Rather, as has been repeatedly emphasized, it can be regarded only as a characterization of the intrinsic tacit knowledge or competence that underlies actual performance." N. Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (M.I.T. Press, Massachusetts, 1973), p.140. However, the category of competence allows for the reintroduction of a subject with a set of fundamental, pre-social characteristics.


6. For a useful review of several of the strands of this criticism see S. Mailloux, "Reader-Response Criticism?", Genre, 10 (Fall 1977), pp.413-431.


8. Ibid., p.398.

9. Ibid., p.399.


11. Ibid., p.400.


13. Fish, op. cit., p.390.


15. Loc. cit.
16. The concept of time-as-experience - popularized in the literary technique 'stream of consciousness' - was formulated by Henri Bergson - in opposition to the mechanistic and intellectualist thinking of Cartesian rationalism and its treatment of time as an adjunct of space. A realization of the radical incommensurability of space and time, argued Bergson, revealed the importance of introspection in the study of consciousness as experienced continuity: "There is one reality, at least, which we all seize from within, by intuition and not by simple analysis. It is our own personality in its flowing through time - our self which endures. We may sympathize intellectually with nothing else, but we certainly sympathize with our own selves." H. Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, T.E. Hulme trans., (London, Macmillan & Co., 1913), p.8.


18. The list to be made is large - see Chapter 3, Part III. Here, a few indications can be given. The American journal Visible Language, which describes itself as "The research journal concerned with all that is involved in our being literate", carried a special issue, 'Freud and Visible Language', Vol.XIV, No.3 (1980). Yale French Studies, No.55/56 (1977), was titled 'Literature and Psychoanalysis. The Question of Reading: Otherwise'. And in "The Unbinding Process", New Literary History, Vol.XII, No.1 (Autumn 1980), pp.11-39, André Green writes, "Reading and writing, in terms of psychoanalysis, are not primary processes, but complex activities acquired relatively late" p.22, and continues to describe the sublimated partial drive (scopophilia) that is patent in the act of reading. Reading is also given another register akin to Derrida's 'deconstruction', which here corresponds to the particular status or competency of the analyst or critic: "The analyst does not 'read' (lire) the text, he 'unbinds' (délié) it. He breaks open the secondar- ity in order to retrieve, upstream from the binding process, the state of bondlessness (déliaison) which the binding process has covered up." p.19.


20. Fish presents this 'fact of common sense' in the following way; "No one would argue that the act of reading can take place in the absence of someone who reads - how can you tell the dance from the dancer?", Fish op. cit., p.383. However the concept and construction of 'common sense' bears some examination. Geoffrey Nowell Smith locates the historical emergence of the concept of common sense with that of the individual as the embodiment of all mankind. "The original concept of common sense was based on the belief that there exists an understanding of the world which is 'common' in the sense of natural to every-
body... There is in fact no such thing as an universal common sense, valid at all times and places. Not only does the content of popular beliefs change, if only slowly, but the concept that we have that these popular beliefs somehow make up 'common sense' is itself a recent development and one which has also changed its form in the course of the last two centuries. What we now believe about common sense, where it begins and ends and how it stands in relation to other forms of thinking, is in fact a product of a particular class ideology of the 18th century." G. Nowell Smith, "Common Sense" in Radical Philosophy, No.7 (1974), pp.15-16, this citation p.16.

21. This is the sense of the title of Fish's Self-Consuming Artifacts.

22. Iser, op. cit., p.51. The formulation of 'unwritten aspects' in texts is an interesting and central move in these arguments. The supposition of absence is used to make a space for the reader: "If one sees the mountain, then of course one can no longer imagine it, and so the act of picturing the mountain presupposes its absence... the written part of the text gives us the knowledge, but it is the unwritten part that gives us the opportunity to picture things; indeed without the elements of indeterminacy, the gaps in the text, we should not be able to use our imagination." ibid., p.58. The essential and productive activity of consciousness allegedly resists translation into specifiable operations and we are confronted with a residue that we can only always apprehend as issuing from a void, or, out of itself. There are notable similarities here with the logic of psychoanalytic theory, e.g., the formulation of desire as lack, and in Lacanian theory the 'abyss' of the bar separating signifier from signified that makes every stable formation or identity a product of an imaginary crossing of that gap. Further, this produces in Iser's argument a relegation of filmic texts in favour of literature. Filmic texts are seen as confining the reader to physical perception. This is a hierarchy not all criticism concerned with readers would endorse (e.g., Metz's work on film language), but it is a hierarchy familiarly repeated in arguments over the decline of literacy and the bankruptcy of 'mass media' based on the figure of a passive television viewer.


24. "A grammar of a language purports to be a description of the ideal speaker-hearer's intrinsic competence. If the grammar is, furthermore, perfectly explicit - in other words, if it does not rely on the intelligence of the understanding reader but rather provides an explicit analysis of his contribution - we may... call it a generative grammar." Chomsky, op. cit., p.4.
25. Here, 'competence' can be thought of as the finite set of rules which can be infinitely utilized in 'performance'. Chomsky notes that: "In fact, a real understanding of how a language can (in Humboldt's words) 'make infinite use of finite means' has developed only within the last thirty years, in the course of studies in the foundations of mathematics." Chomsky, op. cit., p.8. This he takes as the removal of the last barrier to the full-scale study of generative grammars, and not, as this new adjacency of mathematics and linguistics can be read, as the production of the conditions of possibility for a universal or generative grammar.

26. Ibid., p.18.
27. Ibid., p.19.
30. Ibid., p.138.
31. Ibid., p.140.
32. Ibid., p.4.
34. Ibid., p.18.
35. 'Things said' are the discourses, susceptible to their own rules of formation and transformation, that a society produces along with - i.e., in determinate relationships to - all else that it may produce.
37. Ibid., p121.
38. 'Discourse' is a contested category. Colin MacCabe notes that 'discourse' has been used to replace 'speech' and 'intention' as well as being constructed in opposition to the Saussurian concept of 'parole'. See C. MacCabe, "The discursive and the ideological in film. Notes on the conditions of political intervention", Screen, Vol.19, No.4 (1978/9), pp.29-43. M. Pécheux, for example, displaces the langue/parole division with 'linguistic base/discursive processes'. See R. Woods, "Discourse Analysis: the work of Michel Pécheux", Ideology and Consciousness, No.2 (Autumn 1977), pp.57-79.
The use of the term in the Foucauldian problematic is discontinuous with its use in linguistics (or attached to a 'linguistic base'), but corresponds to its use in the work of Hindess and Hirst. "Throughout this text we refer to theory as theoretical discourse. Why do we use this term? Theoretical discourse we shall define as the construction of problems for analysis and solutions to them by means of concepts. Concepts are deployed in ordered successions to produce these effects. This order is the order created by the practice of theoretical work itself: it is guaranteed by no necessary 'logic' or 'dialectic' nor by any necessary mechanism of correspondence with the real itself. Theoretical work proceeds by constant problematisations and reconstructions. Theories exist only as discourses - as concepts in definite orders of succession producing definite effects (posing, criticising, solving problems) - as a result of that order. Theoretical discourse, like discourse in general, speaking and writing, is an unlimited process. Classically, in epistemologies, theories have an appropriate form of order in which their relation to the real is revealed. They appropriate, correspond to or are falsified by the real. The limits of nature set their limits. Theory ultimately represents and is limited by the order of the real itself. In empiricist epistemologies, for example, theories take the form of categories translatable into definite observation statements. Our conception of discourse cannot be so limited." B. Hindess and P.Q. Hirst, Mode of Production And Social Formation (London, Macmillan, 1977), pp.7-8.


41. Deleuze makes this point when he discusses the relations between a science and a knowledge: "... a discursive multiplicity, formation or practice never reduces to a science. Science only implies certain thresholds beyond which statements attain 'epistemologization', a 'scientificness' or even a 'formalization'. But ... a science never absorbs the formation in which it is constituted ... At the very most, a science orients a discursive formation, systematizes or formalizes certain of its regions, and runs the risk of receiving from it an ideological function which one would be mistaken to believe linked to simple scientific imperfection." C. Deleuze, "A New Archivist", S. Muecke trans., in Local Consumption, Series 2/3 (August 1982), pp.215-230, this citation pp.226-7.

42. L. Wittgenstein, op. cit., para. 219.

43. M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p.25.
44. Ibid., p.23.


46. Ibid., p.341.

47. This term is derived from Foucault's specification of the author as a function within discourses as opposed to a familiar notion of the author standing outside and before discourse. See M. Foucault, "What is an Author?" in M. Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, D.F. Bouchard ed. & intro., (N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1980), pp.113-138.

48. R. Barthes, "The Death of the Author", in R. Barthes, Image Music Text, S. Heath trans., (Glasgow, Fontana/Collins, 1979), pp.142-149, this citation p.145. It may be added that the effectivity of the author-function does not depend on a 'belief' on the part of a reader, but a training in a particular reading practice.

49. On the 'lack' of language - "to comment is to admit by definition an excess of the signified over the signifier." M. Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic (London, Tavistock, 1976), p.xvi.

50. For an excellent discussion of the non-discursive elements of this apparatus of popular education as well as of "... the discursive structure of ... [a] notion of a principle of conduct, which was a central condition of formation of the analysis of the moral state of the population, [and] was central to the formulation of the pedagogy of the popular schools too", see K. Jones & K. Williamson, "The Birth of the Schoolroom. A Study of the transformation in the discursive conditions of English popular education in the first-half of the Nineteenth Century" in I & C, No.6 (Autumn 1979), p.59-110, this citation p.77.


52. H. Goulden & J. Hartley, "Nor should such Topics as Homosexuality, Masturbation, Frigidity, Premature Ejaculation or the Menopause be Regarded as Unmentionable" in LTP, No.1 (1982), pp.4-20, this citation p.7.


55. I owe this example to two lectures given by Ian Hunter in the Forms of Communication main study, Griffith University, 1981.


57. Namely, that discourses demand attention as and when they occur at the point of their effectivity. 'Eventuality' or 'eventalisation' means "First of all, a breach of self-evidence. It means making visible a singularity at places where there is a temptation to invoke a historical constant, an immediate anthropological trait, or an obviousness which imposes itself uniformly on all ... Secondly, eventalisation means - rediscovering the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays of forces, strategies and so on which at a given moment establish what subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal and necessary. In this sense one is indeed effecting a sort of multiplication or pluralisation of causes." M. Foucault, "Questions of Method", Ideology and Consciousness, No.8 (Spring 1981), pp.3-14, this citation p.6.


59. 'The social' is a particular sector, a hybrid domain of recent emergence. It is "... a sector comprising specific institutions and an entire body of qualified personnel."


60. M. Foucault, "Questions of Method", p.5.
CHAPTER 2

Accounts and Constructions of the Subject
... the idea of 'the person', the idea of the 'self' (moi). Everyone thinks it natural, precise in the heart of his consciousness, completely serviceable in the heart of the morality deduced from it. It is a matter of replacing this naive view of its history and of its present value with a more precise one.¹

I: Specifications of 'Currency' and 'Genealogy'

In the preceding chapter the objects of this thesis were introduced as discursive ones. That is to say, the various specifications of the subject (as constitutive, as phenomenologically 'reconstituted', as effect, as textual mechanism, and as problematic category for interventionist politics), the psychoanalytic theories, and the Lacanian texts are to be treated within the discursive formations that make them possible. To this the further dimensions of their currency and their genealogy may be added — in other words, a specification of those discursive formations.

Accordingly, this chapter will document some of the conditions of emergence of the current theory of the subject (i.e., philosophical discourses, the discourses of the clinical sciences, theological debates). Again, this will not be an exhaustive documentation. Such a piece of work is beyond the scope and resources of this thesis, which are primarily the close readings of a modest number of texts, and not those of a panoramic study.² In any case, this 'documenting' is for the limited purpose of dismantling the self-evidence of the subject as an existential fact and as a category of knowledge with which a
reading of the Lacanian texts may otherwise start. For it is on this 'self-evidence' that the Lacanian texts are predicated, which is to say that the Lacanian texts take the subject as having an internal logic — in whatever way an interiority is constructed — which they then proceed to both problematize and explain. In other words, the subject (as starting point for the Lacanian texts) is treated as an entity that is self-reflexive in the sense that it traces its own intelligibility within itself, to its own origins, in accordance with its own causality. This subject is held to turn in upon itself in a move that asserts its interiority, its density, its authority and autonomy. With the formation of the subject, "... the visible order ... is ... only a superficial glitter above an abyss." It is this abyss and its invisible contents that psychoanalysis sets to work to bring to light.

However, in the reading of the Lacanian texts constructed in this thesis the subject enjoys no self-evidence to be unmade by probing the depths of its internal constitution. It will be studied in the 'exteriority' (see p.19) of the discourses in which it emerges, which is to say that these discourses have no interior or centre, no necessary and separate locus in which are laid down the laws of formation of all discourses and from which the subject can take its form as a necessary and separate entity. This reading concerns itself with the self-evidence of the subject only insofar as some of these discourses are discourses of self-evidence.
Let me return to the specifications of currency and genealogy. The currency of the discursive objects of this thesis will be discussed in the following chapter, but it is appropriate to state here that their currency is precisely the point from which this analysis takes its impetus. For while it was established in the introduction how the Lacanian texts would be treated, little indication was given why these texts, rather than some other, had been chosen for analysis. The one possible rationale mentioned — the addition of psychoanalysis to the disciplines of psychology and sociology as the resources available to reader-response criticism in its project of attending to readers by determining their precise constitution and functioning (see p.7) — was ruled out as a strategy for this thesis by the demonstration of the project's circularity and of its predication on a particular organization of knowledges which this thesis challenges.

The currency of the discursive objects of the thesis is of a different order from this rationale and indeed its adequacy as a starting point for a thesis may reasonably be expected to be questioned — given the threshold at which thesis topics in the area of knowledge relations commonly emerge, that is, their demonstrated pertinence to general epistemological concerns. It may be argued that a starting-point would be better found by asking 'why is psychoanalytic theory current? why is a discourse on the subject "in fashion"?', in which case an essential questing human nature, or a certain 'modern mentality'
perhaps attributed to an originating socio-economic context or perhaps to a general evolutionary movement, could be offered in answer. For example, the argument of D.H. Lawrence's *Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious* attributes the influence of psychoanalysis not to an evolutionary, but something more akin to a devolutionary movement. "Ideas mentally derived"⁴ - that is, ideas not springing from the "true, pristine unconscious"⁵ which, Lawrence states, is spontaneously born of the fusion of the procreative male nucleus with the nucleus of the female germ and is thus centred beneath the navel - are like "stone[s] wedged in a delicate machine."⁶ In man's continuing quest for freedom and autonomy from his natural environment, "... the mind [has become] author and director of life [a condition which is] anathema"⁷ to the true (Lawrentian) unconscious, and sex has accordingly devolved to a mental object - allowing psychoanalysis' purchase on our lives.

In this, and in other, less poetic, instances,⁸ it may be argued that the currency, or current value, of the discursive objects of this thesis is an effect of their expression of a domain of value that is determined elsewhere, whether in a register of eternal forms (such as that invoked to justify courses on, for example, Plato and Aristotle), or in our attainment of some evolutionary point in our consciousness, or in the socio-economic formations of which that consciousness is held to be an effect.
This argument can be located in the practice Wittgenstein describes and for which he suggests an alternative when he says:

There is a kind of general disease of thinking which always looks for (and finds) what would be called a mental state from which all our acts spring as from a reservoir. Thus one says, 'The fashion changes because the taste of people changes'. The taste is the mental reservoir. But if a tailor today designs a cut of dress different from that which he designed a year ago, can't what is called his change of taste have consisted, partly or wholly, in doing just this? Similariy, the currency of a discursive object, its current value, can be formulated as consisting in its place and circulation in the fields of discourse, without recourse to a metaphysical reservoir of values. Discursive objects, or the statements in which they are formed, are caught up in a discursive ensemble in particular ways: they are repeated, borrowed, exchanged; they may, for example, be adapted as metaphors in one discourse, inscribed as absences in another, and taken as principles of coherence in another; in their various mobilizations they may link previously discontinuous knowledges and transform the relations between others. They have, in Foucault's words:

A value that is not defined by their truth, that is not gauged by the presence of a secret content; but which characterizes their place, their capacity for circulation and exchange, their possibility of transformation, not only in the economy of discourse, but, more generally, in the administration of scarce resources. Thus the value of statements is formulated not in relation to the richness of a reservoir (conceived as a mental state or as a 'body' of language) of possible or
virtual statements, but according to a principle of rarity which limits analysis to what is said and what has been said, to statements which do not, through their plethora of possible meanings, express a totality, but which comprise through the specific forms of accumulation according to which they are conserved, transmitted and repeated, a limited system of presences. The value of a statement comes from the limited number of things that can, at any time, be said according to the particular system or 'stock' of statements. Its value, therefore, derives from its place in the particular stock of statements. This principle of rarity shifts analysis of a discourse from the endless task of interpretation. The analysis of a discourse is not the production of meanings but the delimitation and detailing of the particular resources (statements) marshalled in their various relations.

It is according to this formulation of mobile and relative value that the acknowledgement of the currency of certain specifications of the subject, psychoanalytic theories and the Lacanian texts as the starting point of this present analysis can be read. And from that it can be made clear that these discursive objects have not been chosen from any thought that our knowledge of social relations must pass through psychoanalysis' 'logic of desire' - or even that we must have a theory of that innate mystery 'desire'. Any such 'thought' is not (the property of) the subject animating analysis, but itself an object of analysis.
The currencies of these discursive objects will be detailed in the beginning of the subsequent chapter. First, however, we will pursue Brecht's injunction to 'make evident the self-evident' by considering the genealogy of the subject - or to be more accurate, to consider how a 'genealogy' might differ from a history of philosophy of the subject.

And this is what I would call genealogy ... a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects, etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history.¹²

What is important about a genealogical analysis is that, unlike a history which instates between events a prescribed set of relations (causality, influence, development) that are the legacy of a search for origins or a positing of ends, and whose essential lesson is thus a general continuity against which specific changes are able to be recognized and assimilated into an evolutionary pattern (and the anthropological figure of man assured he is still the subject and centre of history), genealogy searches out the heterogeneous, multiple and mobile relations between statements, discourses, domains of objects, non-discursive formations, that cannot be deduced from any general theory of history, and cannot be used to affirm any but the local truths made possible by those relations. A genealogy does not search out a value or meaning in the past beyond the mobile and relative form of value described vis-à-vis the currency of present dis-
courses, objects etc.; to write a genealogy is to recirculate past currencies.

One could say that genealogy directs us to the discontinuities in the accumulation of knowledges and practices, but it is clear this description simply marks the negative work to be waged against History's relentless, though not uniform, production of continuities: it marks "a denunciation of all the mystifications of history predicated on the names of progress of consciousness and the future of reason."13 'Discontinuity' does not name the species of relations produced in genealogy as well as it does genealogy's break with the practice of applying universally and axiomatically a number of general and invariant relations, such as seeing in all changes the triumph or failure of the human spirit or mind.

For those for whom the term 'discontinuity' raises the spectre of an atomized, irrational world in which the twin figures of the Same and the Other could no longer stabilize identities, it should be said that to speak of discontinuities is not to argue for the complete absence of relations amongst statements and events. It is to mark the specificity and materiality of discursive relations and relations between discursive and non-discursive formations. It is not therefore a question of an absence of relations, but, for example, that a relation of absence between a statement and a discursive formation would not exist axiomatically, but only through a positive distance which would be measured in the space of rarity.14 Similar-
ly, to talk of discontinuities is to mark the fact that no formation is simply the model of another; the notion of model can only name a particular relation and not a general rule. In this way, such dualisms as the Same/Other opposition — and indeed the continuity/discontinuity opposition — become irrelevant as general imperatives.

To stake out the direction of a genealogical re-writing of a history of the subject is to stress from the outset that in the subject there is no nub of truth that we are slowly drawing closer to, and that the notion of continuity investing the modern 'common-sense' understanding of the subject or self is an object for analysis and not its impeccable attribute. The truth of the subject varies, is relative to a demonstrable set of discursive and non-discursive techniques, and did not always exist.

Nevertheless, in a genealogy we are not talking of revealing a false history or of naming the subject a fiction, but of determining the conditions of possibility of a relative and effective truth repeated in a statement such as this:

The centrality of questions about man is easy to understand, for it is he who asks the questions; preoccupation with oneself is a familiar human trait.
conditions of possibility of this statement - a 'common sense' statement - we can rehearse the family of statements from which this statement derives its intelligibility and the discursive strategies which give this discursive formation a universal applicability and general authority on the subject. What follows is not an attempt to do justice to a philosophical tradition but a brief scanning of the account of the subject that is commonly available and regularly repeated, and of some knowledges that can be said to be discontinuous with this account and can be used to question the basis on which this account is said to achieve its status as a common sense.

II: Philosophical Accounts of the Subject

The subject, as a category of knowledge established by the demonstration in the cogito of the immediate self-consciousness of the individual which makes possible objective knowledge about the world - that is, the subject as both the known object of its own introspection and simultaneously the principle which makes such knowledge possible - is repeatedly presented as the effort of 'the father of modern philosophy', Descartes. But this acknowledgement is teamed with the statement that "... the concept of the self has been termed one of the persistent problems in philosophy". The Cartesian subject is duly inscribed as the outcome of a persistence with the precise constitution or location of the individual human being and as a starting point that has been taken up and further refined in later philosophies.
Descartes' cogito is only one of the summits— even if the highest— of a chain of cogitos which constitute the reflective tradition. In this chain, in this tradition, each expression of the cogito reinterprets the preceding one. Thus one can speak of a Socratic cogito ("Look after your soul"), an Augustinian cogito (the "inner" man distinct from the flux of "external" things and "higher" truths), a Cartesian cogito— of course, a Kantian cogito ("the I think must be able to accompany all my representations"). The Fichtean "Self"... and the "egology" that Husserl attempted to graft onto phenomenology belong to this line.17

What distinguishes the Cartesian cogito amongst this chain of cogitos is that it formulates for the first time the auto-constitution of the subject. The 'cogito ergo sum' does not so much comprise a self-image as mark the very act of constructing a self-image. It is in the self-knowledge of its own thinking process that the subject is said to come into being, as the a-critical point from which criticism proceeds: the Archimedean point around which the world turns. Descartes, with his new philosophy of mind, made epistemology the centre of philosophy.

Previously, the sense of the individual or person was founded not internally, but in relation to common organizations or a commonweal. That is, it was not an action or property of the single human being that earned him the status of 'person'; that status was dependent upon the recognition of institutions. Marcel Mauss' essay, "A Category of the Human Mind: The Notion of Person, the Notion of 'Self'"18 provides a list. In the sense of the Pueblo Indians the 'person' is an organizational fact within a clan— a name, the right to a role in the ceremonial, and the right to a ritual mask. Somewhat
similarly, within the structure of Chinese culture a 'person's' individuality is

... his ming, his name ... But at the same time it has removed from individuality all the character of a perpetual, indivisible being. The name, the ming, is a collective noun, it is something that has come from elsewhere. 19

For the Romans, within the reorganization of the civil state in which all the plebeian members of the gentes acquired full civil rights, 'person' is a fundamental legal fact. It is fundamental in the sense that it designated men invested with a specific status, and not simply the bearer of a persona or mask within the organization of a family, clan or ceremonial. Investment with a persona, or the "true nature of the individual" was a matter of legal recognition: "... the slave was excluded from it. Servus non habet personam. He has no personality. He does not own his body; he has no ancestors, no name, no cognomen, no goods of his own." 20

From the second century BC, for the Romans and Greeks, the 'person' figures not only as a legal fact but emerges within an ethical discourse. "From a primitive sense of accessory, 'he who saw with' - συνοιδή - of witness, the sense has shifted to that of 'the consciousness of good and evil'." 21 A 'person' is now understood as a moral fact. But as moral fact, a 'person' was not the modern psychological concept of person; for example, 'a moral person' was not exclusively mapped onto the form of an individual human subject.
The notion of 'moral person' (personne morale) had become so clear ... that from the first years AD, and even earlier in Rome, throughout the Empire it was imposed on all the fictional personalities which we in France still call by that name: personne morale or legal entity: corporations, religious foundations, etc., which have become 'persons'.

It is within Christian religious discourse and practices that 'person' emerges as more than an organizational fact, and as more than a man invested with a legal and moral status. The arguments in the church over the nature of the divinity, the nature of the soul (whether the individual soul is a substance or supported by a substance ... whether it is one and indivisible or divisible and separable; whether it is free, the absolute source of actions, or determined and implicated by other destinies, by a predestination) and over the nature of the church itself, and their resolution in the proclamation of 'Unitas in tres personas, una persona in duas naturas', made possible the notion of 'the person' as 'one'; as rational, indivisible, individual substance - a metaphysical entity.

It is from the basis of this concept of a metaphysical entity - of a finite, non-material being - that Descartes defines the self as 'une chose qui pense'. "It is not only the mental operation which is posited but also a mental substance." The self is an object, a substance to be known, but, crucially, it is constituted as such not by the recognition of the clan, church or state, but by its own activity of recognition - by its self-awareness.

Descartes ... den[ies] that his knowledge of his existence depends upon any logically prior principle but that it constitutes one of those clear and
distinct ideas to which we instinctively give credence: "elle paraît si évidente à l'entendement, qu'il ne se saurait empêcher de la croire." The belief in one's own existence is therefore founded on a type of intuitive knowledge which admits of no analysis whatever. 25

This indubitable knowledge of self precedes even the idea of God; the approach to God is accomplished through attention to the self. This taking up and restructuring of theological discourse marks the secularization of the religious that was part of the demythologization of the Enlightenment: "Impulse as such is as mythic as superstition; to serve the god not postulated by the self is as idiotic as drunkenness." 26

The question to be considered at this point concerns the relation of the Cartesian self - as a philosophical fact (its isolation of the subject in its constitution by internal reference, its introduction of subjectivism, its constitution of the world as object) - to the forms of the person as organizational fact, legal fact, moral fact. Was 'the subject' of modern philosophy always a potential within the various forms of 'the person', to be won by the dogged reinterpretations and questioning of philosophers? Was the subject, or self, or individual that people for the last two centuries have so easily 'known' themselves to be a constant promise in the human being? Certainly this is how a certain philosophical tradition, as a discourse unified by the 'persistence' of its problems or questions, presents itself.
Our concern is with the particular philosophical discourse that marked the emergence of the narrative of such a transhistorical subject. This is a discourse that presents its relation to the subject as that of an expressive relation to the ultimate reality of which philosophy is claimed to be the study.

This particular philosophical discourse is important because the history of the subject, or of theories of the subject, is commonly given philosophically. By this I mean that the subject is given a metaphysical history, the laws of which are essentially laid down in a particular transcendental philosophy, such that non-metaphysical accounts of forms of individuation chronologically prior to the emergence of the subject (indicated in the remarks on 'the person' as a shifting object relative to the organization of the clan, to legal discourses etc.,) can be taken as merely evidence for the achievement of this transcendental philosophy ('the persistence of the problem'), and specific philosophies can be hierarchized under it, so that the Fichtean 'self' reinterprets - finds the true meaning of - the Socratic 'Look after your soul'. This history relies on the assumption that philosophy expresses a universal form, the subject.

More directly, this expressive relation is important to us because the psychoanalytic texts we will examine in Chapter 3 position their work on the subject as a sub-version of the philosophical question of the subject. In part, therefore, they take up the terrain of philosophy.
The constitution of this terrain is relevant to the psychoanalytic project.

The relation of philosophical knowledges to the subject is also important because it directs us to consider the relation of the discipline of philosophy to other knowledges. It is by reading its relation to the subject as expressive that a philosophical knowledge presumes the authority to reconstitute other knowledges by deflecting them towards man's subjectivity.

Let us now consider the object on which the alleged authority of the discipline of philosophy is constructed: the definition and status of 'ultimate reality'.

The discipline of philosophy traces its privileged position in relation to other knowledges by its foundation in a division between knowledge and belief. In taking for its object ultimate reality, philosophy concerns itself with the relationship between eternal and unchanging entities as the only entities about which it is possible to have 'knowledge', as distinct from mere 'belief' or 'opinion'. To apprehend the true nature of reality is also to know what everything is for - to understand purposes. Philosophy is a privileged discourse by virtue of its object, whose nature is such that philosophy is able to comment on the purpose, place and importance of all other discourses. This privilege of philosophy was guaranteed by its organization in the medieval university as the study to which the other seven liberal arts were taken as introductory.
In the 18th century the object of philosophy was transformed and it is this shift in the Western philosophical tradition that marks our concern with philosophy. Gramsci tells us that:

Until classical German philosophy, philosophy was conceived as a receptive [implying the certainty of an external world which is absolutely immutable], or at the most an ordering activity, i.e. as knowledge of a mechanism that functioned objectively outside man. Classical German philosophy introduced the concept of "creativity" of thought ... 29

The concept of creativity constructed the grounds on which philosophy argued its status as the 'first science' in the 18th century. Every other branch of enquiry, as a creation of the human mind, was now to be thought of as dependent for its foundations upon the science of human nature. It is this identification of the human mind and human nature as that ultimate reality which could be known philosophically that marks the emergence of the subject as an auto-constitutive fact in a philosophical discourse, and the basis of the modern figure of 'the human' and 'man'.

As has been noted, this construction of the subject was made possible in the Cartesian formulation. The re-casting of the Aristotelian-Thomistic system's amalgams of matter and forms into the clear distinction between two substances - subject and object, mind and matter - produced a field of investigation (the 'inner' world of the human mind) separate from the 'outer' world investigated in physics.
However, it is with the concept of the constitutive subject of Kant's transcendental philosophy that philosophical discourse constructed 'ultimate reality' as simultaneously philosophy's internal principle, from which it could function as a 'meta-discourse' or, better, 'infra-discourse'. This correspondence between the vision of philosophy and the object of its vision is the cornerstone of the critical method that Kant adopted against the dogmatisms of past centuries and in which he made,

... a call to reason to undertake anew the most difficult of all its tasks, namely, that of self-knowledge, and to institute a tribunal which will assure to reason its lawful claims, and dismiss all groundless pretensions, not by despotic decrees, but in accordance with its own eternal and unalterable laws. This tribunal is no other than the critique of pure reason. 30

Kant's philosophy is that knowledge which undertakes, and claims to achieve, the task of becoming transparent to itself. The 'eternal and unalterable laws of reason' on which this 'self-reflection' is made possible, are laid down in the primordial category of consciousness, the constitutive subject. While the Cartesian subject is a substance, the Kantian subject is a pure or empty category, a bare consciousness which accompanies all concepts. "The self ... according to the methodical extirpation of all natural residues because they are mythological, must no longer be either body or blood, or soul, or even the natural I ..." 31 The Kantian 'I think' designates not an intuition about a substance, or how I appear to myself, but the synthetic unity of apperception. As for this category, 32 or noumenal self, "... in as much
as it is noumenon, nothing happens in it; there can be no change requiring dynamical determination in time, and therefore no causal dependence upon appearances". 33 This independent and free subject, outside time, is the alleged ultimate condition of experience. Kantian philosophy describes how what is given to the senses belongs to our experience (to what we can be aware of, or to the intelligible world) by virtue of the constitutive role of the subject in conceptualizing and shaping the contents of the sensible world.

In an account of the constitutive subject ... the a priori conditions of experience (be they necessary and universal or historically and psychologically variable) make possible the conceptualisation that underlies all contingent judgements of experience. The constitutive activity of the subject does not generate what the contingent features of experience are. But it does, according to the theory, lay down the conditions under which such features can be understood, under which they can come to be a part of experience ... The concept of a constitutive subject hangs together, therefore, with the concept of an organising activity that alone is responsible for the intelligibility of experience. 34

With the 'constitutive subject' the figure of 'man' is properly established. "Man appeared to become fully man only when he settled in advance upon the forms through which he would encounter the things in the world." 35 Man, as metaphysical entity, as a pure form, emerges in advance of and ordering his historical conditions.

A problem emerges for this concept: if this is the case - if the constitutive subject is an eternal category and man has always had the capacity to construct his own experience and history (i.e., if 'man' has always existed) how is sense to be made of a history of enslavement to
religious superstition (in contrast to Protestantism's enlightened code of moral conduct)\textsuperscript{36} and of man's previous subordination to the demands made by the external world (in comparison to the apparent autonomy won by the scientific, economic and political revolutions)? How is life before the 18th century, before the Enlightenment, before 'man', to be explained?

Kant counters this difficulty in terms of a passage between immaturity and maturity:

\textit{Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance of another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another. The motto of enlightenment is therefore: \textit{Sapere aude!} Have courage to use your own understanding!}\textsuperscript{37}

Man's immaturity and maturity map on to the division of empirical and noumenal selves that is central to the Kantian schema.\textsuperscript{38} It is through this division that historical method is rewritten in Kantian philosophy. The noumenal self is at once the eternal subject and object of philosophy - the first category of its reasoning activity and the object of 'the most difficult of its duties ... self-knowledge'. The phenomenal self is the noumenal self in its empirical character, and "... to this extent it could be nothing more than a part of the world of sense, and its effects, like all other appearances, must be the inevitable outcome of nature."\textsuperscript{39} The phenomenal self is therefore the object of history, or, as Kant describes it, "of history proper, that of empirical composition".\textsuperscript{40} This
specification of history as an empirical undertaking makes sense in the light of the last of the nine propositions listed in Kant's "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose", which outlines a strategy for supplementing this 'limited' enterprise:

A philosophical attempt to work out a universal history of the world in accordance with a plan of nature aimed at a perfect civil union of mankind, must be regarded as possible and even as capable of furthering the purpose of nature itself. It is admittedly a strange and at first sight absurd proposition to write a history according to an idea of how world events must develop if they are to confirm certain rational ends; it would seem that only a novel could result from such premises ... it is a notion of what a philosophical mind, well acquainted with history, might be able to attempt from a different angle.¹¹

This proposition marks the construction of a particular philosophy of history or the conception of history as philosophy. The effect of this amalgamation is to constitute history as dictated in the pure form of the subject, to add to what is conceptualized as a simple fact-gathering exercise a sovereign subject and universal method. The effect is, as stated by Adorno, that "thinking as an intratemporal, motivated, progressive motion is the microcosmic equivalent of the macrocosmic motion of history that was internalized in the structure of thinking." ¹²

In this way, a history which does not accord with the universal form of the human is transformed by producing in history an interiority and density which is man. What a 'philosophical mind' administers in history is the location of the conceptual universal of 'personality' —
the subject as pure reason – as an immanence of the will in all empirical persons. Narrative history – once an 'absurd proposition' and now the 'natural' form of history – proceeds according to the expression of a will and of a moral teleology, because the relation between the phenomenal and noumenal self is formulated in terms of a moral subject possessed of a will able to transfer itself from the sensible world of phenomena to the intelligible world of noumena. Hence the exhortation, 'Sapere aude'. It is in this structural bi-polarity of transcendental and empirical selves that accounts of the subject of knowledge or experience are made. It is this structure which has formed all subsequent accounts of character as swung between the terms of freedom and determination, of thought and the limits of thought.

The key to the transcendence of the empirical events documented in 'history proper' is immanent in the empirical self.

In the modern era, enlightenment separated the notions of harmony and fulfillment from their hypostatization in the religious Beyond, and, in the form of systematization, transferred them as criteria to human aspiration.43

History becomes the narrative of human aspiration which, in the form of the system (given in the pure subject) remains always the same. The subject strips thought of its historic dimension, which it equates with superstition (i.e., whatever cannot be deduced from the subject), and constructs a history in which it is the sovereign principle, as well as the object.
In a Kantian epistemology, the constitutive subject orders, or functions as the principle of coherence in, the discourses on the subject constituted \textit{qua} phenomenon. Thus, in a history of philosophy, or narrative history, the constitutive subject is found even in its empirical absence, as that which has yet to come into being. Further, Kant's "Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View" inscribes the form of the subject as the measure of the world:

... because man is his own final end. - So an understanding of man in terms of his species, as an earthly being endowed with reason, especially deserves to be called \textit{knowledge of the world}, even though man is only one of the creatures in the world."

The absence of the subject, as the universal form of knowledge, is made un-thinkable. An anthropological principle is found at the centre of all enterprises. Installed in the historical enterprise, it shows us that the subject has always been. It is as the account of a transcendent principle that the account of the subject becomes 'self-evident'. A history of the subject is naturalized when subject and object of the account are one, when, to iterate a previous quote, the subject is 'transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness through the course of history'.

Against this idealist systematization of knowledge that turns on the concept of the constitutive subject, the most insistent challenge has been the attempt to posit, against the primacy of method, a modern ontology. One example is Heidegger's formulation of the concept of 'Being'.
Heidegger's critique of the concept of the constitutive subject takes its cue from the naturalization of history in Kant's philosophy. Arguing that there can be no isolated acts of understanding, that meaning can never inhere in a noumenal form but can only be apprehended as something, Heidegger states that understanding is always dependent upon a prior context and thus insists on the historicity, or 'facticity' of the subject of knowledge. That is, the subject is a subject only in so far as it is always 'thrown' into a context that exists prior to it. Far from constituting its own history, the subject has no choice but to passively accept its historicity - its place in the philosophical truths relative to the historical epoch. It is this placement, or 'thrownness' that constitutes the subject's relation to Being, that is, the unity of the subject's background beliefs, or context. For Heidegger, the subject who remains aware of this wholeness, despite the fragmentary nature of particular experiences, is the authentic subject. The authenticity of this subject is not of the same order as the constitutive subject's freedom: it is precisely what in Kantian philosophy would be its 'unfreedom', or its constitution by necessity. The authentic subject is not formed through its investment by the eternal laws of pure reason and reason's self-critical limits, but by an understanding of man's finitude, the limits placed on thought by being, or knowing the limits of knowing.

However, Heidegger's concept of Being - the unity of the subject's background beliefs - rests on the Hegelian
formulation of history as naturally composed of epochs, each of which puts into practice a single basic concept of man and world. Heidegger's philosophy therefore shifts the determinant of experience from the constitutive subject as the form of pure reason to another unity, Being, which, if not constituted by thought, nevertheless functions as meaning for a consciousness which is fully expressed in the authentic subject. The notion of the authentic subject is a putting back into wholeness of the historicized subject in the awareness of the unity in which the subject's consciousness discovers itself and organizes a unity not of its transcendent powers but of its immanent conditions. The authentic subject is a limited totality.

Heidegger's existentialism, with Sartre's humanist existentialism, Husserlian phenomenology, and Ricoeur's more recent phenomenology which maps a 'reflective philosophy' on to the current strategies of structuralism and psychoanalysis, belongs to modern philosophy's attempt to break with the conceptual fetishism of academic philosophy, and to its rejection of Kantian dualism as the core of the idealism of mainstream Western philosophy since Descartes. Basically, the attempt rests on replacing the primacy of epistemology with that of ontology.

But while the empirical subject and the objective conditions that form the subject are given priority by these later philosophies, they maintain the same terrain as the Kantian system. This is because the finitude of the subject is first laid out in the Kantian schema in the
formal separation of the empirical self from the transcendental ego. Thus, "contemporary thought, believing that it has escaped [positivism] since the end of the 19th century, has merely rediscovered little by little that which made it possible." Both idealism and phenomenology-existentialism are philosophies of the subject rather than of the object, the distinction being that while the idealist philosophy posits man as a thinking subject, existentialism begins from man's total 'being-in-the-world' and phenomenology begins from the subject as a phenomenon linked not to a noumenal reality, but constituted in the structural interrelatedness of the single moments or aspects of Being, 'aimed' at the subject as meaning for the subject.

In both of the latter philosophies consciousness, in the form of the authentic subject, is a goal to be attained, and not the given of pure reason that allegedly organizes idealist philosophy. "What was origin becomes task or goal." In other words, the 'freedom' of the subject that is guaranteed by consciousness has to be won. In existential terminology the 'I think' has to be evolved from the 'I act' which is prior to and includes the 'I think'. Freedom consists in the subject's becoming conscious of the extent of its unfreedom — or its facticity, its finitude, its historicity or its alienation from its possibilities — rather than of the self-critical limits of reason. 'Becoming' replaces the 'progress' that is the triumph of Kant's pure self of untrammeled moral decision. In the concept of progress the constitutive
subject exercises its sovereign powers over the objective world; in the concept of becoming, the authentic subject finds itself in its endless exploration of the object world for the traces of meaning which indicate the presence of the subject, even in its absence and at its limits (cf. the production of a reading subjectivity, p.9). Ricoeur formulates this exploration as "the desire to be and the effort to be which constitute us" describing again the phenomenological circle in which the subject, or its desire, assists at its own birth. This is in part a repetition of the principle of 'will' at the heart of the constitutive subject which effects the transition from phenomenal to noumenal self, but while the constitutive subject exercises its will as a transcendence of being in reason, the phenomenological or authentic subject tracks down its desire - its self, or the principle of its consciousness - in all the forms of being that constitute its conditions as a limited totality.

The modern *cogito* (and this is why it is not so much the discovery of an evident truth as a ceaseless task constantly to be undertaken afresh) must traverse, duplicate, and reactivate in an explicit form the articulation of thought on everything within it, around it, and beneath it which is not thought, yet which is nevertheless not foreign to thought, in the sense of an irreducible, an insuperable exteriority. In this form, the cogito will not therefore be the sudden and illuminating discovery that all thought is thought, but the constantly renewed interrogation as to how thought can reside elsewhere than here, and yet so very close to itself; how it can be in the forms of non-thinking.

In the modern ontologies a traditional relation between subject and object - thought animating being, a transcendental unity of apperception producing an entire
world order - is re-articulated as a dialectic such that the subject is no longer first principle. Nevertheless, the unity and singularity of the subject retains its force, and the subject-object division is repeated; thought is unified in the form of the subject and being is unified by its singular reference point, the subject. Modern philosophy has not abandoned the primacy of the subject in concerning itself with its limits. The modern subject, in all those knowledges which have shared philosophy's conceptual field, is constructed according to the principle of its immanence in those other 'natures' (radical historicity, language, the instincts) which constitute the limits and provide the conditions of subjectivity and whose persistent advance has made what in the Enlightenment was a transcendent and visible truth into a truth hidden 'at the heart of things' which must be painstakingly recovered.

III: The Genealogy of the Individual

This account of the subject and its developments, of its historically variant and philosophically contested forms, has provided the contours of the category of the subject that has operated as the unifying theme and alleged mechanism of discovery of the human sciences. This is evident, for example, in the dominant aesthetic theory to which Marx responded and whose currency persists - that is, the

... widely espoused theories which make art a harmonious, contemplative 'organic' unity at rest within itself or in an equilibrium of purely internal
tensions: a Kantian 'free play' of the imagination transcending historical struggles. 49

Philosophy is said to provide the foundations for the humanities. That is, it provides the form, the epistemological underpinning, for all those sciences that take for their study the representations that human beings make of their activities. In accounting for the subject philosophyformulates who is speaking as well as the ultimate intelligibility of the objects and practices which are represented, and this formulation is taken as equally appropriate for all those knowledges.

What this account rests upon is a notion of philosophical vision: the idea that philosophy is in an expressive relation to a universal, if historically mediated, form of the subject. What this notion of vision obscures is that a philosophy is a specific discursive practice. Vision, or consciousness, is the hinge of philosophies of the subject which cannot admit of 'insuperable exteriorities' (such as discursive practices) to the principle of consciousness. In Volosinov's formulation, "consciousness has become the asylum ignorantiae for all philosophical constructs. It has been made the place where all unresolved problems, all objectively irreducible residues are stored away." 50 Adorno names some of these 'residues' when he writes:

Philosophy rests on the texts it criticizes ... In its dependence - patent or latent - on texts, philosophy admits its linguistic nature which the ideal of the method leads it to deny ... Like tradition, this nature had been tabooed in recent philosophical history, as rhetoric. 51
Both these statements make the general point of attending to the material conditions of philosophy. When we say a philosophy is a specific discursive practice we pursue this attention. However to say that a philosophy is a specific discursive practice repeats neither the picture of language as a residue nor the concept of 'linguistic nature' or 'textuality' which may be read as the first step to treating a philosophy as a text to be supplemented by its proper context, or tradition. To treat a philosophy in this way would be to produce a hierarchy of 'inauthentic' and 'authentic' philosophies. Like the 'authentic subject', an 'authentic philosophy' would be defined by the degree of its self-reflection - its awareness of what constituted its 'self'. It would be a philosophy that took into account its own context or textuality, that could include the conditions of its 'relative autonomy' within its own instance, and therefore would require no further supplementation.

To treat a philosophy as a discourse however, is not preparatory to constructing a hierarchy of authentic and inauthentic, or scientific and ideological discourses. The point of labouring the specificity of the concept 'discourse' is precisely to avoid repeating the available and problematic formulations of 'knowledge'. A discourse, unlike a knowledge in relation to belief, or a science to an ideology, is not constituted by its 'self-reflexivity', by its awareness of its own practice or its consciousness of its method. A discourse is not constituted by virtue of a 'self' - which could be conceived as a logical or
linguistic system - or a nature, or a consciousness. A discourse has no natural centre, origin or goal on which a hierarchy can be built and prescriptions made as to particular discourses' relations to other discursive and non-discursive ensembles. It should be said with regard to the argument of this thesis that a theory of discourse is not this disavowed centre.

To say then that the notion of vision which is central to philosophy obscures the fact that philosophies are specific discursive practices is not to indict philosophy for a lack of self-reflection: it is not to say - look, what philosophy has missed seeing is its true self, that its nature is dependent on its history, or that it is essentially discursive. Firstly, because 'the discursive' does not double as a self, or essence, or homogeneous method, structure or system, and secondly, because philosophy misses nothing. A critique of a philosophy does not consist of a commentary on its 'failures'. In what sense can it be said to have 'failed'? To imagine that it does is to repeat Althusser's mistake of differentiating between a discourse and its structure (problematic) which a discourse can then 'miss' or 'fail to see'. The problem with this differentiation is the conditions that must be posited in order to produce it, that is, the extremely problematic 'subject-less discourse of science' which can see the problematic and which is defined by its being free of the ideological subject which, Althusser argues, figures in every practice. (See p.12 and p.181.) This subject-less discourse of science returns us to the notion
of a site (if not the authentic, autonomous or constitutive subject) from which the totality of practices can be grasped, that is, a site outside practices.

In other words, to say that the notion of vision obscures the fact that philosophy is a specific discursive practice is not to produce a symptomatic reading as outlined in the Althusserian project: it is to do nothing more than mark a different reading of philosophy from the familiar and dominant one repeated so far. To read philosophy as the accumulation, circulation and transformation of a particular field of statements rather than as the progress of, and self-examination of, a universal and necessary category of consciousness is to tie the subject of philosophy and surrounding concepts of noumenality, intuition, creativity, authenticity and alienation to the operations of specific philosophical discourses. It is only in considering the discursive specificity of the subject of knowledge that what is presented as a universal subject can be given an other than circular history and can be described as other than a self-evident presence; this is possible because genealogy - the study of the accumulations, circulations and transformations of discourses and their non-discursive relations - is not governed, as history has come to be, by the notion of subject and the method that follows from it.

When we state that the Cartesian subject, the constitutive subject, the authentic subject and the phenomenological subject are the discursive objects of particular
discursive practices, we are distinguishing their conditions of possibility from those of a philosopher—subject's recognition, distinguishing them, that is, from the naming of a universal, ultimate reality that pre-exists the techniques in which they emerge. This is to argue that a philosophy is not in an expressive relation to the subject but constitutes the subject of knowledge as the correlate of the family of statements that make up a particular philosophical discourse. The "universal subject", whether formulated as transcendental or immanent to its historical variations, is a specific object within a determinate practice. It follows that if a philosophical discourse does not express the ultimate reality on which it bases its 'authority', then its relations to other discourses and to non-discursive formations cannot be sought in the form of that ultimate and singular reality, the subject. Forms of intelligibility cannot be unified in the statement that they all possess meaning for a subject.

By considering philosophies as discourses which construct, but do not express epistemologies and ontologies, other discourses need not be thought of as exemplifying philosophical truths, but as determinate practices with no necessary relation to philosophical discourses. A philosophical discourse is related to other discourses not as their foundation or infrastructure guaranteed by its alleged emergence as the superior form of recognition within a singular division of knowledge/belief. Philosophical discourses' relations to other discourses are of the order of a shared circulation of statements, for example,
the statement that has functioned as a principle of coherence for the human sciences and whose form we shall give here as the Kantian cogito - the I think must be able to accompany all my representations. This shared repetition of statements cannot be read back into a common vision of 'ultimate reality', but is maintained through various mechanisms, one of which is the routine practice of pedagogy. For instance, as we outlined previously (p.33), with the emergence in the 19th century of an apparatus of popular education according to a social policy of schooling calculated to improve the moral stock of the population, a rhetoric of dramatic characterization was married to techniques of moral interrogation in the form of systematic exercises, examinations, and the writing of diaries. Through this 'literization of the moral' a training in philosophical concepts as they form the basis of Western morality was made integral to the production of subjects bearing literary competences and readerships.

Statements about the universal form of knowledge are maintained through determinate, describable practices. They are not the expression of the indubitable point from which all knowledge must proceed. The account of the subject - which may be rewritten as the construction of a specific subject, the subject of knowledge - does not exhaust the multiple and calculated techniques of individualization, not because the inexhaustible unity subscribed to the subject in philosophy is to be found in another site, or configuration of sites, but because there is no such thing as the subject as a universal entity, but only
subjects: relative to particular discursive and non-discursive practices. At this point we can repeat Paul Hirst's example of the legal subject, which exists only relative to legal recognition and is not an automatic corollary of the subject of knowledge nor necessarily a human subject (e.g., the legal subject may be a public body, a trust or publishing company). Hirst says of legal or economic subjects, "They are not consciousnesses but they are subjects, nevertheless. Subjects in the sense of agents." As agents, subjects are the bearers of specific competences and statuses - the effect of institutional trainings and certifications - which enable them to produce forms of calculation which are not reducible to the subjective faculties (e.g., 'intention' or 'will') provided for in the account of the philosophical subject. It is not a question of disclaiming the reality, or the determinate effects in the social, of the philosophical subject, but of stating that the philosophical subject, or subject of knowledge, is an effect emerging within specific conditions and therefore does not represent the conditions of other subjects.

Another way of saying this is that the subject as the effect of discursive and non-discursive apparatuses is not equivalent to a notion of the subject as symptom from which can be read off a general set of underlying conditions or a causal nexus in which all other subjects are formed. A general theory of the subject as effect (viz., psychoanalytic theory) is as problematic as a general theory of the subject as autonomous, or as relatively
autonomous. The subject of knowledge as an effect is not the expression of a more fundamental unity (such as the Heideggerian subject's relation to Being or the Lacanian subject's relation to that unity of presence and absence, language) but is a particular instrumentality, the bearer of specific techniques, for example, the enunciative modality of the knowing subject is a site from which can be deployed an apparatus for the attribution of statements out of their eventuality (see note 57, Chapter I) to an origin - be it consciousness, generative grammar, or pre-discursive real.

It is in an analysis that has shifted from the level of model to that of instrumentation that the conditions of possibility of a genealogy of the subject are to be found. The work of Michel Foucault in *Discipline and Punish*, *The History of Sexuality, Vol. I* and *The Birth of the Clinic*, constitutes such a genealogy, and the potentialities of these studies is further drawn out in Jacques Donzelot's *The Policing of Families.*

This genealogy of the subject is perhaps better said to be inscribed within a genealogy of the individual. The point here is of the relation between the two terms, 'the subject' and 'the individual'. Foucault's work is not a case of making good in the 'genealogical individual' what was wrong in the formulation of the philosophical subject. The relation between the two terms in a genealogy is discontinuous with their relation in a philosophy.
In a philosophical account, or a history of the subject, 'the subject' functions as a model from which we can derive all other forms of individual existence. In so far as someone is accorded the status of 'individual', they are also a 'subject'. The principle of every individual is a mechanism (the synthetic activity of consciousness) of knowledge or experience, and the subject is simply the model of this mechanism in its ideal, or self-reflexive, form.

In a genealogy the subject of knowledge is treated as one form of individuation among others, marked by its specific capacities, but not derived from an essential form of 'the individual'. An individual is the formalization of a number of instrumentalities, but cannot be thought of as a universal form because none of these instrumentalities derive from an epistemologically or ontologically prior category such as consciousness or Being. They are the correlate of unauthored and shifting practices. The subject of knowledge is simply the name for the formalization of a specific instrumentality, as the bearer of techniques of self-examination mobilized in various confessional and self-reflective practices.

The unauthored and shifting practices in which the individual as a 'new political anatomy' emerged throughout the 17th and 18th centuries are described by Foucault as:

... a multiplicity of often minor processes, of different origin and scattered location, which overlap, repeat, or imitate one another, support one another, distinguish themselves from one another according to their domain of application, converge
and gradually produce the blue-print of a general method. They were at work in secondary education at a very early date, later in primary schools; they slowly invested the space of the hospital; and, in a few decades, they restructured the military organization. They sometimes circulated very rapidly from one point to another (between the army and the technical schools or secondary schools), sometimes slowly and discreetly (the insidious militarization of the large workshops). 54

These processes constituted an administration of bodies through the detailed regulation of place, time and movement, and it is in this regulation — the investing with disciplines of supervised, serialized bodies (i.e., bodies individuated and ordered in a series), that the 'individual', in the form we recognize today, was 'invented'. Some of these processes can be listed here.

Central to the regulation of place was the principle of partitioning, or elementary location, that began to order architectural practices. This principle — more flexible and productive than an earlier principle of the general 'enclosure' of heterogeneous groups — produced spatial arrangements that separated bodies into a series of individual and systematic locations and gave them a corresponding visibility. A disciplinary architecture provided buildings that made possible a knowledge of how and where to locate individuals, which were defined by their place in a series or system of which they were the interchangeable elements. The ideal example of such design is, as Foucault sets out, Bentham's panopticon: the prison construction in which a central tower houses the unseen authority to which every occupant of the single, back-lit cells in the perimeter structure is at all times visible.
The same principles of design which married a partitioning of bodies with an architecture of supervision were to be found in the changing construction of the workplace, such that, "spread out in a perfectly legible way over the whole series of individual bodies, the workforce may be analysed in individual units"; as well as in the rigorously spaced arrangement of dormitory beds (that allowed the policing of children's sexuality); the construction of toilets in which the occupant's head and sometimes feet remain visible, and the layout of classrooms which facilitated a pedagogics producing knowable, disciplined and systematically differentiated individuals:

The organization of a serial space was one of the great technical mutations of elementary education. It made it possible to supersede the traditional system (a pupil working for a few minutes with the master, while the rest of the heterogeneous group remained idle and unattended). By assigning individual places it made possible the supervision of each individual and the simultaneous work of all. It organized a new economy of the time of apprenticeship. It made the educational space function like a learning machine, but also as a machine for supervising, hierarchizing, rewarding.

Coupled with and made possible by this detailed assignment of supervised, serialized space was an equally detailed economy of movement. For the soldier on parade and the student at his desk there developed exhaustive descriptions of the successive components - positions, directions and articulations of limbs in relation to each other and to any necessary apparatus - into which acts such as marching, rifle-handling, writing were divided. So that, for example, the capacity to write was the accumulated effect of a supervised training in a gymnastics of
Foucault quotes from La Salle's *Conduite des écoles chrétiennes*:

The pupils must always 'hold their bodies erect, somewhat turned and free on the left side, slightly inclined, so that, with the elbow placed on the table, the chin can be rested upon the hand, unless this were to interfere with the view; the left leg must be somewhat more forward under the table than the right. A distance of two fingers must be left between the body and the table; for not only does one write with more alertness but nothing is more harmful to the health than to acquire the habit of pressing one's stomach against the table; the part of the left arm from the elbow to the hand must be placed on the table. The right arm must be at a distance from the body of about three fingers and be about five fingers from the table, on which it must rest lightly. The teacher will place the pupils in the posture that they should maintain when writing, and will correct it either by sign or otherwise, when they change this position'.

The point of quoting at length from this discourse on pedagogy is to demonstrate the technical, calculated, multiple and detailed instructions activated to produce, in an economy of bodies, a capacity which is more commonly thought of as an ability assuredly learnt, but essentially derived from a foundational and natural competence (consciousness) to perform such a task as writing. On the contrary, these instructions animate only the materials between which they organize and articulate precise relations; torso and limbs, body and desk, hands and eyes, fingers and implement, implement and paper.

The regulation of time was not simply invested in the form of the time-table as the general framework for an activity (as, for example, the legendary Napoleonic vision of the synchronicity of classrooms across the empire), but in anatomo-chronological schema of behaviour like La-
Salle's which fused movements of bodies into rhythms with specified durations. The regulation of time in the practice of disciplinary power was accomplished at the level at which time penetrated trained, or exercised, bodies. The 'exercise' depended for its effectiveness on its deployment in a temporal series (i.e., time divided into exact periods, differentiated according to the activities to be performed in each period, arranged in successions, meticulously directed—in short, organized into profitable durations). The effectiveness of the exercise was the production of "the natural body, the bearer of forces and the seat of duration". More precisely,

Exercise is that technique by which one imposes on the body tasks that are both repetitive and different, but always graduated. By bending behaviour towards a terminal state, exercise makes possible a perpetual characterization of the individual either in relation to this term, in relation to other individuals, or in relation to a type of itinerary.

This regulation of time, place and movement which Foucault has called the disciplines, invests bodies with a technology of power that makes them useful, both as individuals, but also at the level of groups or classes of individuals because the characterization of the individual is accomplished within the ordering of a given multiplicity. They are useful to the degree that the serialization of successive activities, accomplished by the serialization of space, makes it possible to accumulate time and activity in the form of the individual where it can be re-discovered, "totalized and usable in a final result". This 'docile' or disciplined body is not the body
of a slave, to be appropriated, nor the body of the servant, caught in a crudely differentiated and non-analytical relation of general domination, but a body with technically determined capacities whose subjection increases not as it is deprived of its powers but according to the increase in its skills.

The individual produced in this technology of power is also knowable, and has a meaning that is determined in a network of knowledge relations made possible by the operation of a power that no longer relies on the visibility of the body of authority in ceremony (the king and court), but on the continuous visibility to itself of the governed population in the form of individual bodies subjected to a constant surveillance of their locations, gestures and activities. Foucault calls this the "reversal of the political axis of individualization". This reversal meant that lives - the everyday lives of everybody - which had previously fallen beneath the threshold of description, were now constituted, according to their complete investment with the multiple techniques of disciplinary power, as available objects of knowledge. The 'individual' is no longer defined in procedures of an 'ascending' individualization (ceremonies, commemorative accounts, ancestral genealogies), by his memorability or heroic deeds or his status as one who possesses power: the category of the individual is now occupied by the calculable, measurable body of which knowledge is gathered through routine practices of observation and organized in the techniques of an apparatus of disciplinary writing.
(registration, filing, compilation of columns and tables) in which each individual constitutes a 'case' and is referred to a series of norms.

The individual is no longer the wielder of a centralized power but the instrument of a dispersed technology. The individual is not to be thought of as an entity, but as the formalization of multiple and differentiated relations between a body and a social utility. As such it is the locus of a "'new micro-physics' of power", that is, the target of a complex field of relations of force constituted in the constant attention to the minute details of everyday and unextraordinary life. The power that enforced its jurisdiction through ceremony, the spectacle of the scaffold and the decree was gradually overtaken by a power whose tactics were not the deprival of life but its administration; whose object of calculation was not the exercising or withholding of punishment of the juridical subject by death or incarceration, but the construction of a multiplicity of points for the deployment of normalizing judgement, that is, for the observation and regulation of the distances between bodies in the factory, the classroom, the parade ground, the hospital, the dormitory; the relations into which it was possible for them to enter with other individuals, activities, itineraries; the movements and the behaviour it was possible for them to perform. This normalizing judgement, like the punitive power it replaced, was and is not exhaustively realized, but its operation is none the less effective. Foucault concludes that "from such trifles, no doubt, the man of modern humanism was born".
This administration of bodies (which is conducted at both the level of the body of the individual and of the body of the species, i.e., of the population) forms a technology of power which differs significantly from the activity of the homogeneous and repressive power that marked an earlier social organization and which provided the model of power that has dominated its analysis in Western societies from the Middle Ages to the present day. As we have indicated, this historically prior form of power (operative, e.g., in a feudal system) can be formulated in terms of a juridico-discursive model, that is, that the central point of power is the enunciation of the law and the operation of taboos and deduction (the seizure of things, time, bodies and life) through the activation of the binary system of the licit and the illicit, the permitted and the forbidden. Power, in this model, operates through the singular mechanism of the law and the enforcement of its scarce resources (these being the imposition of lacks and limits), and has as its only effect, obedience.

The administration of individual bodies or of life—what Foucault has called an 'anatomo-politics' at the level of the disciplined individual and on the scale of the population, a 'bio-power'—that emerged in the 17th and 18th centuries comprises mechanisms of power irreducible to the representation of law. In relation to the multiple practices forming the disciplines, legislative power is only one point in "the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly
engender states of power ... always local and unstable". In other words, after about the 17th century and despite the still current formulation of power it became no longer appropriate to think of power as centralized and repressive, but as dispersed and productive. Power is not a strength or property of a person, institution or structure from which it is meted out to disobedient subjects as punishment; it is the name attributed to the multiplicity of force relations that are not imposed from above, but deployed throughout, immanent to, and productive of the formations of a social order.

As immanent to the formations of a social order, power relations are immanent to the forms of intelligibility of that order. But we should not think of this immanence in terms of a base of power and a superstructure of knowledge. This would be to simply reverse philosophy's account of knowledge as occupying a separate and more fundamental field from power which, as the routinely absented category in philosophy, is conceived as a corollary of the contingent and ephemeral world of politics that philosophy goes beyond (to ultimate reality) even if, as in Plato's writings, it is in order to establish the foundations of politics. Power is recognized only as that which enslaves and incarcerates, silences and binds: truth, the province and object of philosophy, is by nature free. In philosophical discourse, power and knowledge are of different orders, and if they are related, it is only through an intervening agency such as the law conceived as the repository of truths composing a natural
order and deviation from which, as error, activates a punitive power.

Genealogical analysis directs us to the deployment of a different type of power relations that are not merely punitive or negative but productive, and to a formulation of knowledge as not the expression of a universal realm of truth but as the effect of certain conditions or differential relations which we can call knowledge-relations. Formulated in this way 'power' and 'knowledge' are not to be imagined as two discrete orders or natures but as the correlated effects of relations between bodies, techniques, architectures, discourses and so on. Foucault writes:

Relations of power are not in a position of exteriority with respect to other types of relationships (economic processes, knowledge relationships, sexual relations), but are immanent in the latter; they are the immediate effects of the divisions, inequalities, and disequilibriums which occur in the latter, and conversely they are the internal conditions of these differentiations; relations of power are not in superstructural positions, with merely a role of prohibition or accompaniment; they have a directly productive role, wherever they come into play.

What a genealogical analysis allows us to say then is that the individual is a strategic, correlative element of particular power and knowledge relations. In the individual, power relations and knowledge relations share a common locus of deployment: the individual is both produced in this deployment and functions as the mobile and institutionally differentiated instrument of these power-knowledge relations. This is the sense of Foucault's
description of the formation of the individual through the disciplines as the 'invention' of a new political anatomy.

Where this double constitution of the individual is most clearly demonstrated is in the techniques of the examination and the confessional. The examination is placed, according to Foucault, at the heart of the procedures of discipline. I shall mention two examples here.

The examination was made a permanent factor of the class-room. It combined, in a ritual of power and an establishment of truth, an exchange of knowledge from teacher to student with an extraction from the pupil of a knowledge destined for the teacher. The particular modality of power deployed in the technique of the examination is not calculated to merely ensure the transmission of a knowledge that has already been completed but to build up as well a specific knowledge of the individual under examination. The utility of this knowledge is as the basis for the student's continuing 'administration' or characterization, and for the certification that will determine the student's placement in other/adjacent institutions. Further, this knowledge, compiled with other 'cases' in the apparatus of disciplinary writing that accompanied the examination ("the accumulation of documents, their seriation, the organization of comparative fields making it possible to classify, to form categories, to determine averages, to fix norms"), is productive of new domains of knowledge, for example, the psychology of 'the pupil'. The technology of power deployed in the disciplines is made the principle of a knowledge of man.
The examination was also central to the developments and 'discoveries' that changed the form of medical knowledge and practice at the end of the 18th century. It was the shift from the hospital as a general enclosure of the sick and the poor, managed by religious staff, and to which a doctor made brief and irregular visits of inspection, to the organization of the hospital as an 'examining apparatus' — that is, an apparatus with an internal hierarchy of doctors and nurses which placed the patient in a position of almost perpetual examination — that transformed the status of the patient from that of an external fact of a disease to the positive status of 'the sick body'. This shift marks the change from a classificatory medicine, or a medicine of the species, to the clinical medicine with which we are familiar today.

This new structure is indicated — but not, of course, exhausted — by the minute but decisive change, whereby the question: 'What is the matter with you?', with which the eighteenth century dialogue between doctor and patient began (a dialogue possessing its own grammar and style), was replaced by that other question: 'Where does it hurt?', in which we recognize the operation of the clinic and the principle of its entire discourse. 67

The point is that while the history of medicine is given as the result of advances at the level of medical consciousness, clinical medicine can also, and more precisely, be said to be the effect of the deployment of techniques such as the examination, the transcription of symptoms, the characterization of collective facts, the calculation of the gaps between individuals, and their distribution in a given population.
Our argument is that, as in the case of the medical, the human sciences, or sciences of the individual (of which medicine is an important instance), are not given their mandate in the subject of knowledge which philosophy is concerned to represent but in the multiple procedures of administration and surveillance of bodies and the capitalization of this 'observation through duration' in the painstaking techniques of measurement, registration, notation, comparison, categorization, filing. Not at the level of consciousness, but in the "subjection of those who are perceived as objects and the objectification of those who are subjected" do the human sciences find their origin.

IV: The Confessional Subject

This laborious examination of the conditions of a familiar history of ideas and the construction in its place of a genealogy of the rules and techniques of the administration of bodies, populations, activities, spaces - in short, of power-knowledge relations - allows us to say this: the subject is not the self-evident outcome of man's sudden discovery in the 17th century of his own thinking process. The subject, as simultaneously the subject and object of knowledge, is also formed in that other major technique of the double constitution of the individual in power-knowledge relations, the confession. The confession is a particular type of the examination: a ritual of discourse unfolding within a power relationship in which the speaking subject is also the subject of the
statement. The Cartesian and Kantian discourses can be read as formed in essentially the same techniques of self-interrogation and representation of one's soul as those developed in the Christian pastoral and gradually extended over the domain of the social as a management of souls coextensive with the disciplinary management of bodies.

Foucault argues that this extension is facilitated by the passage of power from the ecclesiastical to the medical register, which occurs first within the church where the confession, increasingly codified, shifts from being an instrument of juridical forms of law—of infliction and of penalty—to constituting a series of mechanisms designed to correct and to cure, in short, to perform a medical function.

To expand: the technique of confession has its origins in the Christian ritual of penitence, or more specifically, the development of tariffed penitence and its alignment to a juridical and penal model. Initially, penitence had been a status entered into, usually by those near death, for the remission of sins, and involved no formal avowal. It was only when penitence was tariffed, that is, when its form shifted from that of a general status to that of particular satisfactions prescribed and imposed according to the particular sins for which they were atonements (in the manner that a juridical and penal code tariffed punishments to crimes), that the avowal entered the ritual of penitence. As an enunciation of the
penitent's 'fault' the avowal enabled the priest to determine the correct satisfaction required, but had no other positive effect. But between the 8th and 10th centuries the avowal, the nucleus of the confession, became an increasingly difficult task to perform and gradually assumed part of the function of the satisfaction, and not simply the method of its prescription. By the 19th century the ritual of the laic confession occupied the space of the satisfaction. To confess was no longer to facilitate an essentially juridical and penal system, but contained within itself the function of a liberation, the removal of sin and error, the healing of the soul. The priest had become not simply judge, but also doctor. A shift, not destined by any teleological determination of the confessional form or the relation between the religious and the medical domains, but resulting from historically specific and heterogeneous conditions (e.g., an historical relation of exchange between the organization of a juridical and penal code and the organization of a theology that allowed a borrowing from one to the other) had occurred in the conditions under which a particular statement about oneself could emerge and in its effects. By the 12th and 13th centuries this changing function was recognized by the inscription of the confession within a sacramental theology of penitence. 7

The passage of power to the medical domain proper centred on the church's inability to manage the phenomenon of possession which, in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, appeared where Christianization had driven the mechanism
of power and control – the discursive obligation, or confession – into the very body of the individual.

This intensification or interiorization of Christianization was produced, within the upper layers of the Christian population in the seminaries, colleges and convents, in the practices of the direction of conscience, which was essentially the confession to which had been added the rules of exclusivity and exhaustivity. These made the self-examination coextensive with the totality of existence (rather than an obligation necessitated by a sinful action), and, by the injunction that the confession must be made only to the priest, a relation of strict authority. The field of intervention and the object of knowledge of 'spiritual direction' was the 'flesh' – the 'floating' notion of carnality detached from the materiality of the body. Possession was the invasion of the flesh, a substitution of the body of the devil for the body of the possessed, a penetration which is to be distinguished from the exchange or pact between witch and devil. The effect was the body as the seat of convulsions, produced by the soul's resistance to the invasion of the flesh.

Against this phenomenon of possession the church adopted two strategies. The first was to add to the direction of conscience and the practice of confession the rule of discretion, in an attempt to erect within the technology of the government of souls safeguards against the incitement of convulsions in the body. A rhetoric was imposed on the general rules of the exclusive avowal that
was directed towards satisfying both the demand that everything be said in carefully regulated statements, and that the least possible be said. Thus a detailed regularization of discourse determining the 'good' confession (i.e., that interrogation be made thorough by establishing differentiated categories such as perfect and imperfect sodomy, by elicitation of the penitent's exact thoughts at the time of the action, specifications of parts of the body and reasons for their use, etc.) was joined with certain attenuations of this coded 'exhaustivity' (e.g., the addition of the grill in the confessional window, that the priest must be in shadow, that he must avoid looking at child penitents or young women, that the detailed description of sins be reserved for second and later confessions). This rhetoric of avowal of everything that concerned the flesh constituted a coding of sexuality, and is closely related to the Jesuitical method of insinuation, the production and use of a relative silence concerning 'sex'.

The second strategy was the expulsion of the convulsive as an object for ecclesiastical discourse into the domain of the medical, where it figures as the hysteric. By this annexation of 'the flesh' and its coding in the anatomy of the body as the nervous system, medicine established its authority and base in the order of sexuality.  

This transferral of a discourse of sexuality or sins of 'the flesh' into the medical domain accounts for the centrality of the medical in the new mode of power emer-
ging in the 18th century which Foucault has described as bio-power: "at the juncture of the 'body' and the 'population', sex became a crucial target of a power organized around the management of life rather than the menace of death." The concept of a 'population', which coincided with and shifted the more amorphous notion of 'the people', was a knowable phenomenon with a specifiable fertility, birth rate, death rate, state of health, life expectancy etc. Constituted as an economic and political problem to be inserted into systems of utility, the 'population' provided a domain in which the sexual conduct of individuals could be administered as a public potential - that is, normalized (through its alignment with familial, medical, pedagogic apparatuses) rather than condemned and outlawed if licentious or debauched. In this management of sexuality (which is not the representation or expression of sex thought of as a natural object or condition, but the correlate of the discursive practices whose function it is to produce the truth of that fictional point of power-pleasure-knowledge, sex), a juridical coding of illegal sexuality makes way for a medical coding of perverse sexualities which then have a positive role to play in the production and policing of a normal sexuality of the couple.

Sexuality - as a specific field of truth - was historically caught up in the form of the confession through the concept of the flesh. Medicine, psychiatry and a pedagogy which evolved as a disciplinary support of the church's direction of conscience, provided this confes-
sional practice with a scientific discursivity, combining techniques of free association and recollection with those of the questionnaire and hypnosis, and adding to it 1) the examination of the body within a set of decipherable symptoms; 2) the postulate of a general and diffuse causality (whereby sex, in the 19th century, is found in the etiology of nearly all disease - the bad habits of children, apoplexies of the elderly, nervous complaints, the degeneration of the race); 3) the principle of latency (that sex operates in the recesses of the body and the mind where it is inaccessible to observation; that it is not simply what the penitent wishes to hide, but what is hidden from the patient and which thus necessitates force, or the difficult confession to extract it); 4) the rule of interpretation (that sex, hidden from the confessing subject, could only reach its truth in the listener who assimilated and recorded it and whose function was no longer to judge, forgive or direct but inscribed within a hermeneutics); 5) the imperative of medicalization (that sexuality was no longer accountable in terms of sin and transgression, but of the normal and the pathological, and that it operated as "a surface of repercussion for other ailments, but also the focus of a specific nosography, that of instincts, tendencies, images, pleasure, and conduct ... sex would derive its meaning and its necessity from medical interventions"). The confession is therefore placed at the heart of an entire battery of listening techniques and inducements to speak which multiply its meanings and multiply the locations to which its effects can be referred.
The point of rehearsing the gradual freeing of the form of the confession from juridical models, first within the church and then in its transplantation to the medical domain, is to indicate how the confessional practices – reinscribed within the discursivities of the clinical sciences (biology, medicine, psychiatry, psychology) as well as those of demography, ethics and pedagogy – and in its function within a general and exhaustive deployment of sexuality as a maximization of collective and individual forces, became one of the most highly valued and most dispersed techniques for producing truth in our societies: how it became central to the procedures of individualization by power, and a seemingly 'natural' impulse linked to both forms of pleasure and the promise of the liberation that comes with telling the truth. To know oneself was made preparatory and prior to all other knowledges.

To rehearse the shifting function of the confession is to stress that this impulse to tell is not in fact an effect of our natural desires and constitution or the unforced outcome of the constant pressure of a latent and central truth within us, but the effect of a centuries-old and carefully policed injunction to know and to speak of that which has been made to stand as the repository of our truth, a medicalized soul, our sex. If self-reflection and revelation are seen as natural – if preoccupation with oneself can be described as "a familiar human trait" – it is because the conditions for the production of these power-knowledge relations have been loosed from the model.
of power which still informs our ideas of co-option and force. So that, as Foucault points out:

One confesses in public and in private, to one's parents, one's educators, one's doctor, to those one loves; one admits to oneself, in pleasure and in pain, things it would be impossible to tell to anyone else, the things people write books about. One confesses - or is forced to confess ... The most defenseless tenderness and the bloodiest of powers have a similar need of confession. Western man has become a confessing animal.

Whence a metamorphosis in literature: we have passed from a pleasure to be recounted and heard, centering on the heroic or marvellous narration of 'trials' of bravery or sainthood, to a literature ordered according to the infinite task of extracting from the depths of oneself, in between the words, a truth which the very form of the confession holds out like a shimmering image. Whence too this new way of philosophizing: seeking the fundamental relation to the true, not simply in oneself - in some forgotten knowledge, or in a certain primal trace - but in the self-examination that yields, through a multitude of fleeting impressions, the basic certainties of consciousness.%

Out of a dispersed apparatus of practical self-interrogation an awareness of a singular and self-originating consciousness is produced. This returns us to our earlier remark about the Cartesian and Kantian discourses: that they - as, respectively, interrogations of the substantial soul and of the doctrine of the single, substantial soul - are intelligible within the techniques of self-examination that made the penitent soul present to itself in the construction of a continuous and unified life history.

These techniques and the rules for the production and recording of a life history are clearly set out in the Book of the Spiritual Exercises, in which Ignatius Loyola, the founder of the Jesuit order, established detailed
instructions for the direction of conscience;

... the Exercises is carefully planned so that every impulse of the excercitant shall conform to a definite psychological system ... The conscience likewise has to be disciplined and governed by the help of the mechanical rules, and to this end Ignatius prescribes the use of a written system of control. The excercitant has from day to day to mark with points on a schedule the sins he has committed, and the comparison between the rows of dots at the beginning of the exercise and the rows, shortened as much as possible, at a later stage shows the progress made in the rooting out of sinful habits and tendencies. 

The autobiographical construction of Descartes' philosophical system is a descriptive rewriting of the moral book-keeping of the Jesuit examen particulare. Consider Descartes' introduction to his Third Meditation:

I shall now close my eyes, stop my ears, withdraw all my senses, I shall even efface from my thinking all images of corporeal things; or since that can hardly be done, I shall at least view them as empty and false. In this manner, holding converse only with myself and closely examining my nature, I shall endeavour to obtain, little by little, better and more familiar knowledge of myself. 

Descartes was trained at the Jesuit college of La Flèche, and, while his doctrine on method heralded a science free of ecclesiastical authority, its affinities with Jesuit thought are stronger than its departures. In Article 50 in Les Passions de l'amé Descartes encapsulates the heart of the Jesuit teaching of free will that is opposed by the Jansenist doctrine of grace: "That there is no soul so feeble as not to be able, if rightly directed, to acquire an absolute power over its passions." 

In redrawing the relations between mind and body Descartes displaced the Aristotelian thesis that the
proper activity of intellect - conceived as a capacity - was the study of the nature of physical bodies. The Cartesian doctrine of the corporeal imagination of the embodied self rests on a definition of mind as the seat not only of intellectual meditation but also of volition, emotion, pain, pleasure, mental images and sensations - a concept of a total mind-body equipment (ingenium) or soul. Descartes can thus reformulate the proper activity of mind as the study of its own contents. In his organic localization of the soul ("My view is that this gland [the pineal] is the principal seat of the soul, and the place in which all our thought are formed"), and his emphasis on mental hygiene,

(the mind is so dependent on the temper and disposition of the bodily organs that if any means can ever be found to render men wiser and more capable than they have hitherto been, I believe that it is in the science of medicine that the means must be sought),

Descartes places the soul under the aegis of a psychophysiological, or medical, discourse.

The domain that Kant proposes for his observations is similarly inscribed in a rhetoric of self-examination: "I have to deal with nothing save reason itself and its pure thinking; and to obtain complete knowledge of these, there is no need to go far afield, since I come upon them in my own self". But Kant's interrogation of the soul (the thinking 'I') is of the soul conceived as a representation and thus breaks with the Cartesian doctrine of an immediate, intuitive self-knowledge synonymous with self-consciousness. "I have no knowledge of myself as I am but
merely as I appear to myself. The consciousness of self is thus very far from being a knowledge of the self". Kant introduces the limiting fact of the subject's appearance, its representation, its empirical character, and, because that renders the transcendental sphere unknowable, its mortality. In other words, the self-critical limits that Kant places on knowledge removes the doctrine of the single, substantial and immortal soul from the sphere of rational enquiry: the existence of an immortal soul can be neither proved nor doubted.

The critique of pure reason completes the annexation of reason from the sphere of religion. This annexation corresponds to Kant's argument against the ontological, cosmological and physico-theological proofs for God's existence and his insistence on the autonomy of morality as determined by imperative laws of reason inherent in all subjects. Kant's writings establish the veracity of self-knowledge as an activity fully removed from the confessional examination of conscience which to Kant is intolerable because it subjects reason to a principle beyond its limits - a supreme intelligence represented by the confessor. Self-examination is no longer performed in obedience to the church but as an ethical obligation to oneself and to the moral progress of the species.
The relation between modern Western philosophy and the theological arguments of the Reformation is familiar ground. They are linked in a common domain of contested truths - the nature of God, the composition of the soul, the structure of the universe, the possibility of free will. What I have attempted to make visible is a quite different formulation of their relations by considering the specific productivity of the changing techniques in which both organized this domain of truth whose locus and effect was successively the flesh, the penitent, the soul, the thinking 'I', the subject. The point is to reconsider the determinations on the philosophical discourses that have been so persistently read as providing us with the perception of the subject as the certain faculty of knowledge. It is to reformulate this 'perception' (the alleged effect of this faculty) as rather the effect of an apparatus of statements whose function it is to produce an interior and a priori domain of truth, whatever the specifications of that domain. In other words, the deployment of confessional practices and their spread from the Christian pastoral to the clinical sciences demonstrates that it is not out of a well of consciousness that the subject emerges into its own light, but in determinate techniques which cannot be divorced from the disciplinary power-knowledge relations producing the visible, calculable individual, or from the apparatus of a bio-power producing and administering the population. With this reformulation, we have the conditions to take up, in the place of philosophy's claim to be the foundation of the
human sciences, another statement. This is Foucault's claim concerning "the fundamental place of medicine in the over-all architecture of the human sciences": that "it is closer than any of them to the anthropological structure that sustains them all". In the place of the subject of knowledge and the faculty of consciousness we should better seek the conditions of the human sciences in the techniques of the clinical sciences — those examinations, interpretative and recording procedures, comparative techniques, formation of categories, determination of averages, projection of norms, construction of questionnaires, lists and files that are routinely bypassed as the useful but incidental tools of analysis whose real object is the rational and irrational working of the human mind as it produces the representations, accounts and meanings of itself, its body, its language, history, politics, institutions and economy.

One final point: to say that the individual and the subject are the effects of disciplinary techniques and their codification and dispersal through the clinical sciences is not to conjure up a vision of repressed bodies. The political formation of the individual as the site of power-knowledge relations does not exist on a continuum with a universally existing individuality or humanity that, in comparison with its modern form, had previously enjoyed a pastoral liberty, the communality of a relatively undifferentiated society and a form of knowledge uncontaminated by power. Such a picture is the specific production of a certain organization of discour-
ses around a number of historical changes unified as the transition from 'feudal modes of production' to 'capitalist modes of production'. An instance of this organization of discourses is the function of the 'Industrial Revolution' as given in secondary school curricula. Unified as the simultaneous effect of the invention of large-scale machinery, 'capitalism' or 'modern society' is easily mobilized within a moral discourse of a machine age destroying an earlier moral individuality. Articulations of this discourse are evident in the readings produced in secondary schools and English departments of 'Dickens', 'Lawrence' or 'Hardy', which teach us that traditional society had a moral integrity and a social identity which in the modern age is falling apart.

By identifying the increase in large-scale machinery in the 19th century as the determining factor of capitalist relations of production and ignoring developments in the 18th century such as the creation and disciplining of a labour force, the spatialization of work places and formation of the capacity to manage large factories, the formation of accounting techniques, the utilization of forms of credit, the formation of managing clerks - developments which provided a complex network of relations in which mechanization was involved from the outset - such a discourse accounts for the individual under 'capitalism' in terms of the compromised integrity of an idealized pre-industrial pastoral individual. In attending to the emergence of elements of this complex and slowly forming network of relations a different account can be made of
the individual, as that 'political anatomy' produced concurrent with, and immanent to, the forces that are commonly held to threaten a philosophically or literary produced individuality presented to us within a history of ideas.
NOTES


2. Regarding the resources of this thesis: it has been suggested that a peculiarity and difficulty with this type of work is that it attempts the synthesis of the method of a semiotics – close textual analysis – with the 'sweeping historical perspective' of a Foucauldian analysis in its efforts to demonstrate the conditions of emergence of readings as not simply textual. This characterization of an uneasy relation between a micro-analysis and a sketchy macroanalysis can no doubt be easily made to produce the gaps and weaknesses in the thesis. However, the Foucauldian reworking of theories of language in the concept of discourse and the subsequent reworking of the unity, time and place of the 'text' as the site of reading calls into question these divisions of analysis. The thesis is an attempt to argue some of these shifts in relation to various work on subversions of the subject as an organizing principle.


6. Ibid., p.115.

7. Ibid., p.127.

8. For example, Sherry Turkle's Psychoanalytic Politics (N.Y., Basic Books, 1978) which, while delivering some interesting accounts of the phenomenon of 'Lacanianism', is an ethnographic study constructed on an alleged expressive relation between psychoanalytic theory and the political health of French society.


10. M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p.120.


14. I have adapted this from Deleuze's description of relations of contradiction, *op. cit.*, p.216. A relation of absence does not express the failure of a subject to apprehend what is present at an ontological level, nor the ability of a subject to apprehend what is inappropriate to a discursive formation: it is the effective restructuring of an economy of statements. A relation of absence, as well as of presence (for they are not the natural obverse of each other in an eternal dichotomy) is the effect of historical, material (i.e., 'positive') accumulations and transformations of statements.


18. M. Mauss, *op. cit.*, pp.59-94. I wish to thank Jeffrey Minson for bringing this article to my attention. Since writing this chapter I have been able to read "Concepts of Person and Repertoires of Conduct" in Paul Hirst & Penny Woolley, *Social Relations and Human Attributes* (London, Tavistock, 1982), pp.118-130, which, very lucidly and also using Mauss and Foucault's work on confessional practices, makes similar arguments to those of this chapter. Of Mauss' essay Hirst makes this observation which bears repeating: "Mauss, it is true, treats of the development of the concept of person as the career of an 'idea', but this is primarily due to compression of argument rather than to any methodological commitments. Mauss is a loyal Durkheimian to the extent that he believes collective representations are always inscribed in and effective as social relations, practices, and rules." p.120.


28. The seven liberal arts were comprised in the trivium (grammar, logic and rhetoric) and the quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy).


32. The term 'category' designates, in Kant's schema, the eternal form in which historical concepts are possible.

33. Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, p.469.

34. C. Larmore, op. cit., p.110.

35. Ibid., p.109.

36. Protestantism is said to have had its philosophical expression in Kant's writing because of the self-critical limits Kant placed on knowledge and his insistence on the primacy of the ethical - exemplified in the argument that the existence of God could only be posited from its accordance with the moral laws that ensured good conduct on earth.


Briefly, the noumenal self appears to be related, one to one, with the empirical self. But the noumenal self
is also either one and the same as the transcendental ego or the seat of the transcendental faculty. Now the transcendental ego (or transcendental unity of apperception) is the locus of the activity of synthesis which is the imposition of certain categories, already in the mind, on objects. The entire world order, both natural objects and the perceiving empirical self, is produced in this synthetic activity. So the relation between the transcendental ego and the particularity of the noumenal self (established in its one to one relation to the empirical self) is problematic. As Wolff argues, "The truth of the matter is that Kant never adequately faced this problem of many minds, as we may dub it. In the Critique he managed to ignore the issue by vacillating between a psychological and an epistemological interpretation of the theory of the categories. When he was hard at work analyzing the origins of unified consciousness, he gave a thoroughly psychologistic account of the synthesizing activities of the transcendental mind, but as soon as he was done, he retreated to the more cautious position that he was merely exploring the epistemological grounds of our knowledge claims. The result is that we are invited to draw from Kant's theory the extremely powerful conclusions which are entailed by his psychological doctrine of synthesis while at the same time we are spared the painful recognition of its manifest drawbacks." (pp.13-14).


40. I. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose" in Kant's Political Writings, pp.41-53, this citation p.53.

41. Ibid., pp.51-53.


44. I. Kant, Anthropology From A Pragmatic Point Of View, M.J. Gregor trans., (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), p.3.


47. Ibid., p.266.


55. Ibid., p.145.

56. Ibid., p.147.

57. Ibid., p.152.

58. Ibid., p.155.


60. Ibid., p.160.

61. Ibid., p.192.

62. Ibid., p.139.

63. Ibid., p.141.


65. Ibid., p.94.


69. My description of this passage is taken from notes of Foucault's 1975 Lectures on the A-normals given at the College de France on "From 'the Flesh' to 'the Body' - how sexuality passes from ecclesiastical to medical/somatised register."
70. "In 1215 the sacrament of penance received the authorization of the fourth Lateran Council and was made obligatory at least once a year at Easter on all mature Christians in Western Christendom." Encyclopaedia Brittanica, 1974, Vol.16, p.117.

71. "By midcentury [17th] the Jesuits had 14,000 pupils under instruction in Paris alone; and their colleges (not including universities) all over the land numbered 612." Encyclopaedia Brittanica, 1974, Vol.6, p.350.

72. Foucault again differs, as he points out (Lecture notes), from accepted medical history which traces medicine's discovery of its domain of diseases of sexual origin to an extension of the traditional considerations of Greek and medieval medicine about the uterus and pain.

73. M. Foucault, History of Sexuality, p.147.

74. On the status of 'sex' and 'sexuality':

"We must not make the mistake of thinking that sex is an autonomous agency which secondarily produces manifold effects of sexuality over the entire length of its surface of contact with power. On the contrary, sex is the most speculative, most ideal, and most internal element in a deployment of sexuality organized by power in its grip on bodies and their materiality, their forces, energies, sensations, and pleasures." Ibid., p.155.

And, "sex - in fact, an imaginary point determined by the deployment of sexuality". Ibid., p.155.

And, "We must not place sex on the side of reality, and sexuality on that of confused ideas and illusions; sexuality is a very real historical formation; it is what gave rise to the notion of sex, as a speculative element necessary to its operation. We must not think that by saying yes to sex, one says no to power; on the contrary, one tracks along the course laid out by the general deployment of sexuality." Ibid., p.157.

75. Ibid., p.67. The specifications of this scientific discursivity are taken from pp.65-67.

76. Ibid., pp.59-60, my emphasis.


79. See the argument concerning Descartes' relations to the Jesuit order, R. Fülöp-Miller, op. cit., pp.123-125.

80. Descartes' Philosophical Writings, p.304.

82. *Descartes' Philosophical Writings*, p.152.


84. Ibid., p.169.

CHAPTER 3

The Psychoanalytic Subversion: The Subject of Desire and of Language
The genealogy of the individual presented in Chapter 2 reformulates the philosophical determinations commonly given of the subject. Our work in this section is to consider the much wider currency of a different reformulation of the subject of knowledge: the transformation of the philosophy or psychology of consciousness in psychoanalytic theory.

I shall proceed by presenting a brief account of Freudian theory in relation to the philosophies considered in section II of Chapter 2, and then noting a number of readings of this theory as documenting important lines in the extra-clinical implications and enlistings of psychoanalytic theory. Among these readings of Freudian theory, and demanding considerable detail, is its Lacanian reworking and the articulation of this restatement of psychical realities with a materialist theory of ideology.

Despite the discontinuities that can be drawn amongst these readings, my argument in this chapter is that they are more appropriately treated as differentiated restatements of a common discursive field of subjectivity that can be relocated within the genealogy of the individual outlined in Chapter 2.

A different reading of the most recent restatement of this discursive field, the Lacanian texts, may then proceed according to the delimitation, presented in Chapter 1, of the conditions of reading practices and the conditions in which a readership is produced. Therefore,
what the final section of this chapter will focus on is the work we do, the operations we carry out, in order to read these texts and in order to repeat them. Such a focus can provide a description of a training and some of its plausibility effects that situate these texts not as a model of truth, but as an integral part of a technology producing a certain reality.

I: The Decentring of Consciousness

Freud's discovery that "men fall ill because of memories"\(^1\) rests on a conception of the psyche that challenged previous formulations of mind. These, in contrast to the reorganization of biology in terms of the Darwinian doctrine of a radical natural necessity, had maintained a resolute idealism. As Volosinov states:

Only the psyche, governed by perspicacious consciousness, remained as the last refuge for the concepts of purposiveness, harmony, and so on, that had been expelled from all other fields. The psychical stood as the realm of harmony and order in opposition to the natural and elemental.\(^2\)

Freud's break with this concept of a calm mental existence consisted of formulating mind as a dynamic and conflictual economy based on the instincts and in terms of a revised topography of the conscious, preconscious and unconscious. Previously the psychical had been almost uniformly identified with consciousness. Where the unconscious had been conceptualized, for example in the work of Charcot, Freud's predecessor, it was as an "absolutely predetermined and stable addendum to mental life."\(^3\) The following rehearsal of Freud's reconceptualization of the importance
and functioning of the conscious and unconscious, while by no means comprehensive of Freud's theory, demonstrates why psychoanalysis was so widely accepted as a break with prevailing philosophies and psychologies, and why it was characterized as the "unexpected and unwanted child of Western thought." 4

Since Descartes' reformulation of the proper activity of mind as the study of its own contents (see p.107) and Kant's inflection of this as the study of those contents as representations, consciousness had been formulated as consisting in a complex and continuous process of conceptualizing input (i.e., seeking an identity between one thought and another) not only from without (real perceptions) but from within the organism. It is the subject's capacity to conceptualize input from within itself (intentions, emotions, desires, painful and pleasurable recollections) that constitutes its capacity for self-knowledge and thus its status as 'subject' (auto-constitutive subject of knowledge). What Freud's theory of the unconscious did was to isolate another domain of mental functioning which did not just weakly echo the activity of consciousness but which fundamentally relativized the autonomy of consciousness in its representation of the 'subject's' internal realities. That is, it fundamentally questioned those internal realities as the property of a subject of knowledge. As Hirst and Woolley put it, Freud's concept of the unconscious "cannot be accommodated as a hidden resource of consciousness, potentially subject to its recall and dominion". 5
Freud's formulation of the previously unrecognized dimensions of the unconscious were made in the course of work on symptom-formation in psychic disorders, on dreams and on parapraxies (i.e., forgetting, slips of the tongue, misreading, slips of the pen, bungled actions, mislaying — failures of those acts usually successfully performed by the subject). The work on dreams and parapraxes (in *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*) was particularly important in establishing the role of the unconscious because it demonstrated that the insistence of unconscious mental processes was not simply an aberration from consciousness to be found in the mentally ill, but a constitutive function in normal mental activity. Parapraxes and dreams, like psycho-neurotic symptoms, were shown to be not the in-significant absences of consciousness, but the site of specific meanings invisible prior to the theory of the unconscious because they mark the compromise-formations resulting from the conflicting energy flows within a dynamic psychical economy. The study of parapraxes and dreams not only organized a new domain of meaning ("before Freud these marginal phenomena of everyday life had never been seen as connected or brought together under one heading") but demanded that the meaning of 'consciousness' be altered. If parapraxes and dreams respectively occur and can be recalled in waking thought, and if they are not non-sense, the absence of consciousness or a pathological aberration but can be shown to have a determinate meaning, though one which is not given to consciousness, then consciousness must be rethought as intimately
bound up with a body of criteria whose logic is not that of conceptualization.

Freud's initial project was to provide a clear physiological basis to mental functioning; however, unable to establish such a connection, he utilized the concept of 'instinct' which he defined as "lying on the frontier between the mental and the physical". Before the subject consciously and willingly posits itself it has, according to Freud, been placed in being already at the instinctual level. The anteriority of instinct in relation to awareness and volition signifies the anteriority of the ontic plane to the reflective plane, the priority of I am to I think. However this is not to impute a simple mind-body dualism or a naive biologism. What it entails is that consciousness, as foundational and transparent of the subject's essence, is displaced by a necessary exegesis of meaning, which must be conducted according to an interpretative system based on the relations inhering between the somatic and the psychical, and within a non-unified and dynamic psychical apparatus.

To understand these relations which inform psychoanalytic technique, Freud's use of the concept 'instinct' must be made clear. 'Instinct' or 'drive' (a "dynamic process consisting in a pressure ... which directs the organism towards an aim") whilst positing certain phylegenetic elements of behaviour (see p.129) is, for Freud, a relatively undetermined motive force or energy. Similarly, the aim of the instinct (the discharge of unpleasur-
able pressure or tension) and the **object** associated with the achievement of its aim are variable and contingent: "... in itself an instinct is without quality, and, so far as mental life is concerned, is only to be regarded as a measure of the demand made upon the mind for work." The source of an instinct is to be found in organic phenomena with a build up of energy or 'endosomatic excitations'; while the aim and object are established in the psychical apparatus which performs the work of transforming that quantity of energy by attaching it to signs - either perceptual-identities or thought-identities. This qualification of quantities of energy (i.e., assigning qualities to energy) sets up associative links, within the psychical, between various somatic excitations and, to varying degree, stabilizes this energy. (The variation is in accord with the different processes and topographies of the psychical apparatus, to which we will return shortly.)

Freud's theory rests therefore on the notion of a psychical representative of a physiological force, where the relation between these two is non-transparent, "neither parallelistic nor causal". That is, the psychical representative cannot be 'read off' as the direct expression of an instinct as 'in itself an instinct is without quality'; the psychical is governed by its own mechanisms and specific laws. Nevertheless, psychical energy remains in the service of somatic forces as the apparatus of their 'cathexis' or discharge. To understand the relation between psyche and soma Laplanche and Pontalis employ an analogy with the relation between a
mandator and his delegate:

... though in principle he is nothing more than the proxy of his mandator, the delegate in such cases enters in practice into a new system of relationships which is liable to change his perspective and cause him to depart from the directives he has been given.\textsuperscript{12}

So far we have spoken of the division and the relatively undetermined but inexorable relations between the psyche and the soma as the condition for Freud's theory of mind. Within the domain of the psychical the relations and divisions cohere between the unconscious, the conscious and the preconscious. The contents of the preconscious are knowledges and memories which are not given to immediate consciousness but, being separated from the unconscious by a censorship function which divides the psyche into the unconscious and the preconscious-conscious, are in principle accessible to the conscious and could pass over into it.

The unconscious is that domain constituted as separate from the preconscious-conscious by an initial repression. Repression occurs when the particular psychical representative to which an instinct has cathected (i.e., the object or image of the object associated with the pleasurable discharge of endosomatic energy at a particular stage of development) is denied entry to the preconscious-conscious because the satisfaction of the instinct by that object would result in real harm to the bio-psychological organism. The desire, stemming from endosomatic excitations and their registration in the psyche, is denied entry by the defence mechanisms of the pre-
conscious-conscious, whose motive is to preserve the equilibrium of the organism by blocking the satisfaction of this particularly cathected instinct which, though pleasurable in itself would, according to the contents of the conscious derived from the conditions of the external world, provoke displeasure because of the requirements of reality. The defence mechanisms guard the organism from being governed by its imaginary perceptions (e.g., the infant's unity with the mother) when they would conflict with the requirements of reality, or the real perceptions of the conscious organism (e.g., the father's prohibitive presence). In order to preserve the equilibrium and integrity of the organism the force of the desire in the unconscious must be balanced by an equal force opposing it from the preconscious-conscious: this is established through an anti-cathexis, or counter-cathexis, in which the energy previously cathected to a particular unpleasurable idea (say the father's presence) is withdrawn by the preconscious system and cathected to an idea, set of ideas or attitudes which takes the place in the conscious that would otherwise become occupied by the unconscious desire. It is in this way that the psychical apparatus is regulated by the interaction of the pleasure principle and the reality principle.

Now it is this interaction that is at work in the formation of psycho-neurotic symptoms, dreams and paraphrases. It is in these formations that the conflict of the principles governing the psychical system and the conflict of the associated agencies (ego, id, super-ego) are acces-
sible to the psychoanalytic technique as the appearance of the unconscious in the conscious. But the unconscious can never appear directly in the conscious because of the censorship function or defence mechanisms regulated by the reality principle and which operate as a bar between the two domains. The only way that the unconscious wish can be actualized is by the transference of its intensity or energy, via the mechanisms of the primary process (the mental functioning specific to the unconscious), to an idea already present in the preconscious. This is possible because the energy cathected from the source of the instincts into a psychical representative relegated to the unconscious remains relatively 'free': the unconscious 'idea' - an image stemming from the child's imaginary perceptions - is primarily the bearer of a quantity of intensity of energy rather than its qualification. However when an idea is permanently cathected by an instinct and relegated to the unconscious, 'fixation' occurs. Transference cannot proceed and the repeated blocking of the actualization of desire or discharge of tension that would otherwise occur in transference results in the formation of neuroses. Thus the job of analysis is to establish or facilitate a transference by retracing the path of the cathexis.

Transference proceeds according to the mechanisms of the primary process which in dreams accounts for the

... constant sliding of meaning. The mechanisms which are in operation here, according to Freud, are displacement, on the one hand, whereby an often apparently insignificant idea comes to be invested with all the psychical value, depth of meaning and
intensity originally attributed to another one; and, on the other hand, condensation, a process which enables all the meanings in several chains of association to converge on a single idea standing at their point of intersection.\textsuperscript{13}

A further mechanism of the primary process - called the considerations of representability - ties effects of meaning in a relation of substitutability for the primal scene, which is modified according to the mechanisms of condensation, displacement and elaboration. In the primal scene, the child witnesses the sexual relation of its mother and father, which sets in place the Oedipal complex. (That the 'primal scene' has an established place in a mechanism of the primary process, i.e., that it is held to be a common factor in childhood development, is accounted for by Freud's inclusion within the contents of the unconscious not only what is repressed in the course of an individual's history, but phylogenetic contents, i.e., pre-individual schemata that inform the subject's infantile sexual experience. This inclusion derives of course from the concept of 'instinct': however 'relatively undetermined' the aim and object of an instinct may be, the notion of instinct retains in some residual measure the sense of a behaviour pertaining to all individual members of a single species. This universalism is perhaps clear and unremarkable - we all eat: what is to be remarked upon is the formulation of a 'universal behaviour' as the relative condition for the fundamental psychical formations that orient us as subjects. But this shall occupy us later.)
Through these mechanisms of the primary process unconscious wishes are recathedex, to the contents of the preconscious that are known, in relation to their function in dreams, as 'the day's residues'. These are particularly serviceable as objects of transference because

By selecting these residues the dream deceives the censorship. Under the cover of their insignificant aspect, repressed contents are able to find expression. 14

This recathexis of unconscious material is further modified by a secondary revision - alternately termed 'elaboration' or 'considerations of intelligibility'. This operation of the secondary process (the mental functioning of the preconscious-conscious) is directed at establishing thought-identities in place of the perceptual-identities of the primary process. Perceptual-identities are formed when the considerations of representability direct displacement and condensation towards pictorial substitutes as these allow the most immediate discharge of energy and satisfaction of the instinct. In contrast the secondary process is directed towards the postponement of satisfaction, the stabilization and binding of energy, the neutralization of the instincts to the degree that they have taken a form at variance with the requirements of reality. Secondary revision works on the results of displacement, 15 condensation and considerations of representability in order to fashion a comprehensible dream, rather than one which just bears the marks of the force of the unconscious wishes it masks. "Thinking must concern itself with the connecting paths between ideas, without being led astray by the intensities of those ideas." 16
Now our general point was to consider Freud's reworking of the 'unconscious' and the 'conscious'. Conceptualization, as in the instance of secondary revision which "is to be seen at work especially when the subject is getting near to a waking state, and a fortiori when he comes to recount his dream", modifies or qualifies a quantity of cathected instinctual energy, or unconscious desire: it inhibits the regulatory power of the pleasure principle. As such, consciousness, the continual and complex process of conceptualization, is talked of as 'mastering' the instinctual. But in fact the conscious is governed by the unconscious precisely in its relation of 'mastery' of the unconscious. For that mastery takes the form of censorship and censorship, though it directs and decreases the motility of the cathected instinctual energy which forms the desire, by doing so ultimately provides the unconscious desire with a path to fulfilment (the dream). Conceptualization, in this representation, is an effect of the need to regulate the entry of unconscious forces into the conscious, the need to mediate between instinct and environment, and this censorship is set in play by a wish or desire. Consciousness and its economy rides on the back of the unconscious. So Freud can conclude:

It is essential to abandon the overvaluation of the property of being conscious before it becomes possible to form any correct view of the origin of what is mental ... the unconscious must be assumed to be the general basis of psychical life. The unconscious is the larger sphere, which includes within it the smaller sphere of the conscious. Everything conscious has an unconscious preliminary stage; whereas what is unconscious may remain at
that stage and nevertheless claim to be regarded as having the full value of a psychical process. The unconscious is the true psychical reality; in its innermost nature it is as much unknown to us as the reality of the external world, and it is as incompletely presented by the data of consciousness as is the external world by the communications of our sense organs.

By demonstrating that the unconscious is the 'true psychical reality' Freud's theory replaces the conscious subject, as principle of its own intelligibility and of the intelligibility of the products of consciousness, with a psychical apparatus whose mechanisms transform relations of force—ultimately instinctual in origin—into effects of meaning. That meaning is an effect of relations of force is the sense in which psychoanalysis can claim its status as a certain kind of materialism, for, within psychoanalytic theory, "the term 'material' ... stress[es] an essential aspect of the products originating in the unconscious—namely, their alien quality as far as the conscious subject is concerned".

A subject's speech or thought no longer functions as the subject's immediate proof of itself or expresses unproblematically that subject's intentions or memories but, as a collection of effects of meaning, will be deciphered in a psychoanalytic reading through the logic of desire as expressing relations of force according to the mechanisms of the primary and secondary processes. Crucially, psychoanalytic theory places between the knowing subject and its representations of itself a logic alien to the philosophically conceived knowledge-process. This logic displaces or rather decentres consciousness as
the primary or sole condition of our self-knowledge or self-representations — our basis as subjects. It decentres the subject of knowledge in favour of the subject of desire. To quote Lacan, "... *desidero* is the Freudian *cogito*."

This decentring has been treated as a new and more complete recognition of 'the subject' deriving from a new recognition of its conditions. That is, the theorization of the unconscious as a condition bearing on men's representations of themselves and their world, more fundamental than consciousness, has been almost uniformly accepted as opening up a hitherto unexplored or misunderstood domain of knowledge. It is within this general acceptance of psychoanalytic theory as explanatory or expressive of a new domain of psychical reality that the theory has had divergent currencies. In the next two sections we can list some of these.

**II: Currency of Psychoanalysis as explanation of psychical reality**

One early reading of the potential of psychoanalytic theory was in terms of its alleged structural analogy with dialectical materialism. With its introduction of a biological base for consciousness and an insistence on the dynamic or historical character of the psyche, psychoanalysis constitutes a discourse which has been hailed as breaking with 'homo psychologicus' as Marxism had broken with 'homo oeconomicus': it stresses, contrary to philosophical, psychological and political representations of
the harmonious functioning of the components within the whole, the antagonisms which threaten the whole with dissolution. As such it was recognized, for example by Wilhelm Reich, as an important supplement to revolutionary politics. In 1929 Reich was arguing the value of psychoanalytic theory within the Austrian Communist Party, stating in his Dialectical Materialism and Psychoanalysis which was published in that year that,

although "only a socialist economy can provide a basis for the free development of intellect and sexuality", none the less, psychoanalysis can and must play a revolutionary role in the sphere of child education "as a psychological basis for socialist education." 24

And, as Andrew Collier points out in "Lacan, psychoanalysis and the left", in the early years of state communism,

Freud's colleague Sando Ferenczi became the first ever professor of psychoanalysis under the short-lived communist government of Hungary in 1919; Trotsky and some other leading Bolsheviks [sic] defended psychoanalysis in Russia.

The early attempts at a Freudo-Marxist synthesis were discredited with the rapid spread of psychoanalysis within the U.S.A. and its integration into the medical institution. By the 1940s the Soviet and the national communist parties' position on psychoanalysis had been determined as a denunciation of a reactionary ideology which, by readjusting people to the realities of life under 'capitalism', shored up a bourgeois society. The official reading of psychoanalysis was that it individualized and idealized what Marx had argued to be properly social and material relations: "Society does not consist of individ-
uals, 'but expresses the sum of interrelations, the relations within which these individuals stand.' It accomplished this by rehabilitating "the units of political analysis ... [in] their archaic dichotomous form - the irreducible One and his equally irreducible opposite number, the Many."  

Non-Marxist, predominantly American, commentaries on the extra-clinical implications of psychoanalytic theory found its value to lie in the conditions it provides for just such a 'rehabilitation' or renewed justification of a mode of political analysis in which the 'individual' and 'society' are opposed such that political events and calculations are reduced to their alleged philosophical 'foundations'. The reinstatement of these 'archaic dichotomous forms' is produced in readings of 'Freud' as falling firmly within a philosophical tradition. An exemplary reading of this type is Philipp Rieff's *Freud: The Mind of the Moralist* which explicitly instates the alleged conditions for the regular absence of significant political analysis. Freudianism, argues Rieff, gives us something that, unlike political knowledges, we cannot doubt; ... where we now discount Marxism as idealism and ideology, as well as in its larger claims to being a universal science of society, we cannot do the same with Freudianism; even when we deny that it provides a master key to all social and ethical behaviour, we cannot disavow the magnitude of Freud's insight into what he termed 'human concerns'.  

And, through its theoretical insights and therapeutic stratagems,
Freudianism closes off the long-established quarrel of Western man with his own spirit. It marks the archaism of the classical legacy of political man, for the new man must live beyond reason - reason having proved no adequate guide to his safe conduct through the meaningless experience of life ... Finally, psychoanalysis marks the exhaustion of the liberal legacy represented historically in economic man, for now men must live with the knowledge that their dreams are by function optimistic and cannot be fulfilled. Aware at last that he is chronically ill, psychological man may nevertheless end the ancient quest of his predecessors for a healing doctrine. His experience with the latest one, Freud's, may finally teach him that every cure must expose him to new illness.29

The value of psychoanalysis is presented as instructing us in a modest but significant freedom: a freedom from the misguided optimisms and by nature inappropriate stratagems of all political forms and calculations. Reading Freud within the Stoic tradition, Rieff produces a quite explicit formulation of psychoanalysis' relations to politics. Psychoanalysis' currency as an expression of a foundational, though hard won existential truth - that is, that man is chronically ill - revivifies a cultural pessimism and its blanket interpretation of what it conceives as 'the political'.

An important instance of this articulation is found in H.D. Lasswell's formulations of a psychodynamic personality theory for political science, which are presented in texts such as World Politics and Personal Insecurity (1963) and Psychopathology and Politics (1930). This psychoanalytically informed political science produces, for example, analyses of the appeal values of Marxist symbolism which rest on the proposition that,
... the whole of political science ... may be conceived ... as the study of the extremely intricate ways in which 'private motives', arising in private lives and elaborated frequently into wholly unrealistic fantasies and reveries, become more or less unconsciously and irrationally displaced onto 'public causes' and political and military crusades, and then adorned (after the fact) with sanctifying and moralistic rationalizations ... 30

Such an analysis provides us with the popular critique of Marxism as the product of a racially insecure Jew externalizing his psychological weaknesses on to the environment. 31

Marx and Engels brought together an imposing systematic body of material to justify the treatment of the existing order as threatened with imminent doom ... This picture of the reigning social order facilitates the projection by each individual of the weak, devalued aspects of the self upon the environment. Schematically this projecting process may be stated so: 'I am weak but I want to be strong; the environment is really weak since it is ephemeral; it will be reformed to realize my wishes.' This lingual sequence does not unroll itself as a consecutive conscious process; but the psychoanalytic procedure is capable of revealing this structure ... 32

Lasswell's work presents itself as functioning in the service of a representative democracy conceived as 'preventative politics', which presumably denotes a function analogous to psychical censorship which must regulate, at the best, unrealistic desires and, at the worst, dangerous instincts. This work is mentioned here because Lasswell's texts are widely used in behaviouralist political science departments and political biography courses. Its method of substituting for its alleged political object a psychoanalytic domain of criteria is therefore well circulated. This substitution proceeds on the assumption that political science and psychoanalysis are expressions of two facets of the same reality - 'the subject' or 'the human', - and on the principle that psychoanalysis theorizes the
'true' or foundational psychical reality.

This assumption of the status and function of psychoanalytic theory is the same as that in works such as Reuben Fine's *A History of Psychoanalysis* (1979), which are perhaps more familiar in that they systematically omit mention of the politicality of psychoanalysis (the power-knowledge relations in which it is formed and which it reproduces). In this history Fine underlines the dominant currency of psychoanalysis as a fundamentally humanist theory, where 'humanism' is, in Andrew Collier's words, "the theory that interposes autonomous human subjects between the history that makes us and the history that we make." Fine reaffirms psychoanalysis as the unifying inheritor of the universal truth of 'the human' stating, "psychoanalysis is in a position to integrate everything that is known about mankind into one unified science. The barriers between the disciplines must fall. There is only one science of mankind." Similarly, Ricoeur, whose project includes the re-equipping of a Catholic theology with an 'up to date' theory of subjectivity, writes, "what is at stake is the possibility of a philosophical anthropology which can take up the dialectic between consciousness and unconsciousness".

As mentioned earlier, by the 1940s the official communist position on psychoanalysis was that it was incompatible with dialectical materialism. There have been two major Marxist critiques of this position. Both rest on the argument that the implications of Freud's theory have been
misrecognized, but both present quite distinct accounts of its 'correctly read' potential.

Chronologically, the first of the two critiques issued from the work of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, established in Germany in 1923, although it was not until after Max Horkheimer's appointment as Director in 1930 that the Institute began to incorporate work on psychoanalytic theory into its programme. The analyses of the Frankfurt School are still current in the journal Telos, and its position is usefully rehearsed there in R. Jacoby's "Negative Psychoanalysis and Marxism: Towards an Objective Theory of Subjectivity".  

Jacoby argues that "... vulgar mechanical Marxism" can perceive psychoanalysis only in terms of the psychologism that is indeed its function within bourgeois society because of that Marxism's own sociologism - that is, "the reduction of individual concepts to a dessicated notion of history and society". Vulgar Marxism's mistake is allegedly to misrecognize psychologism as the real theoretical implication of Freud's work and thus deny psychoanalysis any other role. By contrast, the critical social theory of the Frankfurt School argues that both psychologism and sociologism (which have led 'the bourgeois' to accept psychoanalysis and 'the socialist' to reject it) are misrecognitions and the result of popularizations of psychoanalytic theory and its incorporation into institutionalized medical practice. "Both flatten-out a society-individual antagonism" of which critical social
theory recognizes Freud's psychoanalytic theory to be a true expression. Thus, "the weak link in Marxism was the strong link in bourgeois society: subjectivity". Without an adequate theory of subjectivity Western Marxism is unable to account for or struggle against the "perpetuation of an obsolete social system: to be analyzed is why a revolutionary subject does not act or appear".

From this, critical social theory argues for the necessity of a philosophical subjective dimension to revolutionary theory and strategy, and for the importance of psychoanalytic theory in contributing to the critique of ideology, which is conceived as a manipulation attributable not to 'Beautiful Lies' but to the inversion of real circumstances 'as in a camera obscura' that must result from the historical life-process of men. Historical materialism explains this inversion in terms of the alienation and reification of men's productive capacities under the economic authority of class-society. Psychoanalytic theory is held to supplement this explanation of the historical life-process by attending to "the full mediations of the blind economic authority as it determined the institutional and personal relations within society." The pivotal point of these mediations is embodied in the father as simultaneously a psychical representative of sexual instincts for the child and as a wage-earner - that is, a reflection of economic authority which is an inversion of essential human needs and capacities - and hence a dehumanized subject. The unconscious wishes of the child
are thus harnessed to a figure of dehumanized authority, and its character established through the repetitions of this cathexis (achieved in the Oedipal complex) that the initial satisfying cathexis facilitates. This 'character' enables the child and later adult to passively submit to conditions within the family and class-society as a whole, which would otherwise provoke revolt. While these conditions may be conceptualized 'for what they are' (repressive of the individual's human needs and nature) they are perceived (according to the perceptual-identities sought in the primary process) in terms of the intensities of the desires of which, through the displacements of the internal censorship-function, they are the masked fulfilment. Thus the experience of repression is bound, though distorted, to the force of unconscious desires. As Fromm puts it:

"Psychoanalysis can show that man's ideologies are the products of certain wishes, instinctual drives, interests, and needs, which themselves, in large measure, unconsciously find expression as rationalisations, i.e., as ideologies." 43

The elaboration of the critique of ideology in terms of a psychical censorship-function (of which the 'super-ego' is the major agency) has connections with Lasswell's use of psychoanalytic theory in the service of 'preventative politics'. For Lasswell, censorship is seen at the service of reason and reality, as the mechanism by which man's pre-social instincts are sublimated to allow the institution and maintenance of a harmonious social contract based on rational decision. For the Frankfurt School censorship is at the service of the irrational and
the unjust, as the mechanism which manipulates the natural instincts of man to a complicity with a dehumanizing social system. For the Frankfurt School psychoanalysis, by explaining the censorship function, explains the absence of interventionist politics and, what emerges as the same thing, the absence of a true subjectivity. The first step towards the conditions necessary for a true subjectivity is the elucidation of the present alienation of individuals from these conditions. Jacoby says:

Today there is "no" subjectivity ... Before the individual can exist, before it can become an individual, it must recognize to what extent it does not yet exist. It must shed the illusion of the individual before becoming one. Subjectivity must be brought to objectivity so it can be realized. ... psychoanalysis refracted through Marxism ... turns negative, a study of remnants; it explores a subject whose subjectivity has been administered out of existence.

The remnants it studies compose the individual 'character', a form of dehumanization which is "a precipitation of the intersection of the individual psyche and society" and whose locus is the family in its authoritarian mode in class society.

That a non-Marxist psychologistic political science concerned to maintain a 'preventative politics' is, on the point of the individual's insertion in particular political formations, only differentiated by a simple inversion from a critical social theory concerned with 'interventionist politics' would presumably be claimed by the latter as a validation of its concept of ideology as a distortion of real conditions through the psychical apparatus theorized by psychoanalysis. However, the two
arguments are not related as a myth or ideology is to a philosophical truth, but in the common practice of reading psychoanalytic theory as expressive of human nature and psychical reality. The distinction between the two is that Lasswell understands human nature as a universal while the Frankfurt School differentiates between an essential human nature and its alienated form under the commodity relations of capitalist society. (Though the basis for the argued historical variations of a 'human nature' given in the Frankfurt's School's formulation of a 'historical materialist psychology' is problematic: see note 44.)

The Frankfurt School produces this differentiation by articulating psychoanalytic theory with the concept of a true, unpressed human nature which takes the form, in political considerations, of a currently absent revolutionary subject. It also puts the theory at the service of a political 'ontology' derived from this humanism: thus a social system which does not provide the conditions for the realization of this liberated human essence is 'obsolete' (p.140). Although unspoken in Jacoby's reference, what this obsolescence stands in relation to is nothing but the 'consciousness' of the Frankfurt School. The perpetuation of this 'obsolete social system' is thus accomplished by the reproduction of a false consciousness as the psychically mediated distortion of our true selves (creative capacities and sexual instincts) and the repression of any true apprehension of our current socio-political conditions which has its foundation in that distortion.
Psychoanalytic theory does not of its own produce the notion of 'false consciousness', except perhaps in relation to psychoanalytic 'truth' which is contained in the tracing and explanation of the mechanisms by which consciousness is a modification and distortion (or 'falsification') of unconscious desires; the theory does not differentiate between a true or false human nature because it proposes that process of modification as constitutive of 'the human'. Even if 'the true and the false' are thought in terms of 'the normal and the pathological', Freud is at pains to stress the radical similarity of the constitution of these conditions. It is when psychoanalytic theory is coupled with the Marxist humanism of the Frankfurt School in its ideology-critique that it functions to formulate the mechanisms of ideology as false consciousness.

III: Currency of Psychoanalysis as explanation of linguistic reality

The second Marxist critique of 'the Left's' dismissal of psychoanalysis as psychologistic also used Freud's theory to supplement a theory of ideology but, unlike the Frankfurt School, did not formulate ideology as 'false consciousness' nor put its critique of ideology at the service of a liberatory politics. This articulation of psychoanalytic theory and a structuralist, anti-humanist Marxism was initiated in Louis Althusser's article, "Freud and Lacan" (La Nouvelle Critique 1964, New Left Review 1969), in which he produced a reading of psychoanalytic theory which laid the grounds for it becoming "Of partic-
ular concern for all investigations into ideology"." Its value as an explication of the central mechanism of ideology was further established in Althusser's "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)". 

This reading of the work of Jacques Lacan, who had begun his work in the '30's "under the influence of Husserlian phenomenology and Heideggerian existentialism", into the domain of Marxist critique of ideology, became the basis for a body of work revising and developing theories of cultural production (especially film theory) in terms of its ideological function and conditions. Initially this work circulated mainly within France in publications such as Tel Quel and Cahiers du Cinema, but in the '70's gained a minor but significant currency in English speaking institutions via the translations and pursual of these reworkings in the journal Screen and in the work of some university centres and departments such as sections of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at Birmingham University. In the United States the work emerged mainly in the journals Yale French Studies, the shortlived Yale Italian Studies, camera obscura, Semiotext(e), and in Canada, Ciné-Tracts. Althusser's reading of Lacan also provided an articulation of psychoanalytic theory that made possible a reappraisal of an earlier feminism's (e.g., the work of Greer and Figes) outright dismissal of psychoanalysis on the grounds of the biological determinism by which psychoanalysis allegedly secured woman's oppression as her natural condition.
Juliet Mitchell's *Psychoanalysis and Feminism* (1975), by reproducing an Althusserian reading of the social formation (see p. 153) and thereby arguing a domain for the Lacanian theory of the cultural acquisition of sexual identity that was 'relatively autonomous' from the economic organization of women's oppression,

opened the way programmatically within a section of the Women's Movement for an inclusion of the categories of Freudian psychoanalysis in the investigation of the functioning of sexual ideology.\(^5\)

Other work within this articulation of feminism-psychoanalysis includes Kristeva's formulation of the bases for a Marxist-feminist aesthetic and political practice,\(^5\) and Irigaray's reworking of psychoanalytic theory in opposition to its inherent phallocentrism.\(^5\)

The above paragraph groups together a large number of theoretical writings with quite diverse concerns, objects and strategies. Their value is by no means determined solely by their particular articulations of psychoanalytic theory nor by their adherence to the Althusserian problematic. But insofar as they can support this common classification it is by the intersection of those concerns, objects and strategies within the overlapping theories of subjectivity, language and ideology, all of which are immanently and productively related in the reading of psychoanalytic theory produced in Althusser's "Freud and Lacan" and "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses". An examination of the argument presented in these essays as a theoretical condition\(^5\) for this diverse body of work can demonstrate this latest currency of psychoanalytic theory.
Like the Frankfurt School Althusser presents the history of psychoanalysis in terms of a "fantastic ideological exploitation whose object and victim psycho-analysis has been".\(^{57}\) But while the Frankfurt School located the 'true value' of psychoanalytic theory in its supplementation of the 'necessary' philosophical subjective dimension of its social theory, Althusser reads its value as inhering in its status as a *science*. That psychoanalysis is a science in its own right - a point which is often disputed - is claimed by Lacan and endorsed by Althusser on the grounds that it has "a *theory* and a *technique* (method) that makes possible the knowledge and transformation of its object in a specific *practice*",\(^ {58}\) and, beyond these structural criteria, has produced a new and distinct object, the unconscious. The specificity of the unconscious to its theory is important to the difference between the Frankfurt School and Althusser's anti-humanist Marxism. Althusser diagnoses the misrecognitions of psychoanalysis and its 'fall' into ideology as the incorporations of the unconscious into a biology, psychology and sociology that simply extend the domain of their objects. In so far as the Frankfurt School treats the unconscious as the expression of a further dimension of their philosophical concept of human nature its work represents a similar 'misrecognition' of psychoanalytic theory under the rubric of a humanist social theory whose ultimate reliance on the concept of an essential subject Althusser takes as a central object of critique.\(^ {59}\)
So the first condition for a scientific reading of Freudian theory is a rejection of the ideological consumption of psychoanalysis. This consists not simply of a rejection of the various forms of "bio-psycho-sociological revisionism", but also of the related emphasis on 'the cure' which is found in the ego-psychology, Gestalt-psychology and analysis of defences that have predominated in American psychoanalytic practices. Althusser tells us,

As in every authentically constituted science, the practice is not the absolute of the science but a theoretically subordinate moment ... analytical practice (the cure) ... does not contain the secrets of psycho-analysis.

These secrets, it is argued, are only accessible through the theory of psychoanalysis. (This insistence bears consequences which will become pertinent in our appraisal of the Althusserian project.)

The second condition is a work of epistemological elucidation made necessary by the imputation of Freud's own misrecognition of the unconscious. This misrecognition - where recognition is not the activity of an autonomous consciousness but determined by the available problematic (see p.12) - is a function of Freud having to borrow conceptual terminology from other knowledges to specify his new object. This terminology was a legacy of the philosophy, thermodynamic physics, political economy and biology current at the time. Thus the unconscious was thought by Freud as the registration of the biological organism's natural instincts through the principles of a thermodynamic physics, and situated as the foundational
condition of the traditional philosophically conceived knowledge-process within a dynamic and conflictual psychical economy. Freudian theory does not therefore dismantle the philosophical subject but finds its allegedly more fundamental condition in the field of natural instincts. What is problematized is only the facilitations of those instincts, and the origins of the contents of the knowledge-process, through a consideration of the structures of the psychical apparatus.

Therefore, to properly formulate the unconscious what is required, writes Althusser, is an elucidation of "the true epistemological relation between these [Freud's] concepts and their thought content". For Althusser, this is precisely what Lacan produces in a symptomatic reading of 'Freud', by formulating the underpinning linguistic theory that is present in the form of 'symptoms' in Freud's writings (e.g., the form of the parapraxes and the insistence on the contents of the unconscious consisting of signs and registrations, and in the pre-conscious, of word-presentations) but hidden by the problematics (biology etc.) in which Freud worked.

The value of Lacan's rereading of Freud is that it does not simply decentre the philosophical subject to the subject of desire (which can ultimately be traced to the domain of instincts), but, by articulating it on the field of language, dissolves it into a locus of effects. (In fact, it is through the reworking of the concept of desire on the basis of a structural analogy with language that
the subject is shown to be an effect.) While Freud demonstrated the subject as, in essence, alienated from itself, Lacan rewrote the subject as, in essence, alienation: that is, the subject is a site within language defined by the techniques of displacement that constitute language, rather than being defined by a distortion of its 'true' nature (the alienation or 'normalization' of its instincts). As such, Lacanian theory completed what Freud had begun - the shift of the subject from its place as a foundational condition in the field of consciousness. While Freud had argued a systemic schema of investigation of the underlying conditions of a subject's thoughts, Lacan transposed the investigation to the field of speech and the subject's constitution within that field. It was this achievement that made Lacan's account of the subject available to the Althusserian formulation of ideology.

The Althusserian formulation rejects the concept of ideology as 'false consciousness'. The concept of false consciousness rests on a theory of knowledge as a relation of consciousness in which a subject corresponds to, or experiences, an object. False consciousness is thus attributed to a subject/object disunity. This is said to be caused either by a defect in the subject of knowledge such that the subject falsely recognizes the real which is, in principle, knowable. For example, when a Freudian theory of consciousness is used to clarify the workings of ideology it uncovers the disruptive insistence of the unconscious in the cognitive capacities of the subject; external perceptions can be traced to the distorted
content of internal perceptions which have been suppressed. Or, false consciousness may be said to flow from the object of knowledge, which produces its own misrecognition in the subject by possessing or generating an 'appearance' which leaves its 'essence' impenetrable to the subject's recognition. In both these cases false consciousness is explained in terms of the failure of two philosophically conceived domains (subject and object of knowledge) to correspond.

However, in (pre-Althusserian) Marxist analyses false consciousness is explained as a distorted expression in consciousness of the material relations between a social subject and an object, where that object is social reality. The social subject does not occupy a philosophical space from which the world is present to its pre-given consciousness, but a determinate place in real social relations ascribed by those relations, that is, by the mode of production. The social or, more specifically, class subject's consciousness is an expression of its place in those real social relations which is necessarily distorted because of the contradictions that exist in those relations. It is distorted because, being an expression of the subject's location within those contradictions, consciousness can either represent only a partial 'view' of the whole system of production, and is therefore false because it fails to grasp that that 'view' only exists within the relations of the social totality, or it represents its particular conditions as the social totality, and thus falsely unifies (i.e., unifies only
ideally), under one class position, the real contradictions that continue to comprise the social totality.

While this second account of false consciousness does not rest on an assumption of the pre-ordained nature of the subject and object of knowledge but introduces a notion of history — of historical materialism — it maintains the concept of knowledge as the experience of a subject. The subject's consciousness is an effect of its experience of its position in the real (which is the totality of relations saturated by the commodity form of production), such that its ideology can be 'read off' from its class position.

Althusser critiques this concept of knowledge by re-defining consciousness — which had been thought as a pure expression of the subject's experience of its relation to its real conditions of existence (i.e., of its experience of its place in the social totality) — as consisting of representations (material ideas) which are determined by a specific problematic, that is, a set of material elements organized to provide the horizon of concepts. These representations are not an effect of a given subject's experience of the real but are what secure the subject in a determinate relation to its real conditions of existence: they have effects. These representations constitute an ideology because they secure the subject in an imaginary relation to its real conditions of existence, that is, a relation 'closed off' to the totality of the real conditions of existence. This 'imaginary' relation is not a
"false" relation because it does not have an origin in "Beautiful Lies" or a subject's imagination or phantasies, but designates a structure and its effects which do not simply mask but are constitutive of all social practices. As Hirst puts it, "Ideology ... is not illusion, it is not falsity, because how can something which has effects be false?" Ideology is a representation of the 'Imaginary', which is a stage in the formation of the concrete individual as a subject of knowledge - that is, one who believes s/he can directly experience or know the real.

Althusser describes this formation of the subject, the structure of all ideology, as the hailing or interpellation of concrete individuals as concrete subjects, and discusses the manifestation of this interpellation as the insertion of subjects into 'Ideological State Apparatuses'. These apparatuses are the real material institutions and practices in which are embodied the objective systematized representations of social relations, and are theorized within Althusser's re-working of the Marxist notion of 'society'. Traditionally, the social whole had been formulated as composed of a real, determinant infrastructure or economic base which was expressed in the superstructural instances of law, state and ideology. Althusser critiques this expressive relation of base to superstructure and the economism it produces by raising the question of the reproduction of the relations of production (class relations) which previously had been considered as issuing from the mode of production itself. He then argues that the reproduction of the relations of
production are in fact secured by the legal-political and ideological superstructure; that is, that these superstructural forms have an effectivity in their own right, or a relative autonomy from, and determinate effect on, the base, although in the last instance they are determined by the economic. The Ideological State Apparatuses are diverse realities,

- the religious ISA (the system of the different Churches),
- the educational ISA (the system of the different public and private 'Schools'),
- the family ISA,
- the legal ISA,
- the political ISA (the political system, including the different Parties),
- the trade-union ISA,
- the communications ISA (press, radio and television, etc.),
- the cultural ISA (Literature, the Arts, sports, etc.),

but are united by their common function: the reproduction of the relations of production, that is, of capitalist relations of exploitation. The theorization of the ISA's marks off Althusser's theory of ideology from Lukács' historicist conception and from the humanism of the Frankfurt School's ideology-critique. It secures a specific effectivity for ideologies, and demonstrates that they are legitimate sites of political struggle and not simply the epiphenomena of battles fought at a more 'fundamental' level. In other words, it marks Althusser's insistence that ideology has a material existence, that is, that the ideology of a subject

is material in that his ideas are his material actions inserted into material practices governed by
However, as well as arguing the function of interpellation as the insertion of subjects into specific ideologies, Althusser presents interpellation as the mechanism of ideology in general. "The existence of ideology and the hailing or interpellation of individuals as subjects are one and the same thing." Althusser describes the process of interpellation in terms of the positioning of individuals in a mirror-structure or 'Imaginary' - Lacanian terms - in which an individual's recognition (his form of consciousness) takes on the effect of subjectivity by recognizing itself in the hailing by, or in the reflection of, an autonomous, omniscient Subject which is imaginary because it only exists (as Subject) in the recognition of the subject. The effect of subjectivity can be described in terms of the ambiguity of the term: that it indicates both a state of subject-ion and an apparent Subject-hood or autonomy. Good subjects subject themselves. Althusser concludes,

the individual is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he shall submit freely to the commandments of the Subject, i.e., in order that he shall (freely) accept his subjection, i.e., in order that he shall make the gestures and actions of his subjection 'all by himself'. There are no subjects except by and for their subjection. That is why they 'work all by themselves'.

What should be noted here is that by borrowing the Lacanian concept of the Imaginary to make his account of interpellation, Althusser articulates the Lacanian account of the subject with his theory of ideology at the point of
that theory's formulation of the constitution of the subject as the pivot of all ideologies. It is this articulation - the Lacanian account's productivity for a general theory of ideology - that has been taken up and extended in adjacent work (pp.145).

Now the Althusserian account of the constitution of the subject by interpellation is schematic. However, even as it stands, the Althusserian account differs from the Lacanian account. It has been argued \(^7\) that Althusser's is a misreading of Lacanian theory and the adjacent work we have indicated has often proceeded by supplementing the Althusserian theory of ideology with correct Lacanian readings. Whether we treat Althusser's account of the formation of the subject as a misreading or not, the demonstrable differences between the two accounts raise some important questions about the terrain of investigation of both. To indicate these differences, an outline of the Lacanian account is necessary.

The Lacanian account of the formation of the subject, which is said to occur in language, begins at a point prior to the subject's actual articulation in language. It describes an anticipated moment of entry, a coming into being of an (apparent) fixed point of utterance (subject \textit{qua} subject) from a point of (apparent) absence of language (subject \textit{qua} \textit{infans}: 'infans' = without language). The account begins ('begins' in the sense of the yet-to-be subject's chronology) not at the point of the child's physical birth - the conventional moment in
genesis stories of a subject's irruption into 'Being' - but by describing a neo-natal state whose features have yet to be transformed into that immediacy. By this deferral 'Being', as an epistemological concept structuring man's experience, functions not as a premise which insists unaccountably in the social, but as a formation falling within the theory's jurisdiction.

For about the first year after its birth the 'infans' is not simply 'child' but 'le-corps-morcelé' - that is, the 'body in pieces'. This corresponds with Lacan's formulation of "a real specific prematurity of birth in man", a phenomenon he finds recognized by embryologists as a stage of body development called 'foetalization'.

During this period the infant is marked by its anatomical incompleteness, "a certain dehiscence at the heart of the organism, a primordial Discord betrayed by the signs of uneasiness and motor unco-ordination". As still foetus, with its body in fragments, the infant remains undifferentiated to itself; it cannot see itself; it 'is' an entity only for others. It lacks a space and an image of its own from which to initiate a relation between itself as individuated organism and its reality. So though already born into a social milieu, the infant remains exterior to the temporal, spatial, social dialectic. It suffers a double insufficiency of identity and social situation.

This lack is overcome by the advent of the mirror stage - a "startling spectacle" - when, held up to a
mirror, the infant assumes its specular image. Or when, without this aid, it takes the image of its mother or another child or person to be its own, anticipating from the total body form of the other the maturation of its own powers. Through the apparatus of the mirror/vision the infant's body is returned to it unitary and localized in time and space for the first time, and the infant - or what we can now call the specular I - takes itself to be that image or body. As Jacqueline Rose puts it, "the subject sees itself as a whole only by being placed elsewhere". By doing so, it has acceded to that state of immediacy or being-for-itself deferred by its 'premature' birth.

This state of immediacy, presence, or plenitude is also described as a dual relationship between mother and child, in which the object of the child's desire is to be the desired object of the mother. The child's desire is to be everything for the mother, to be the complement of her lack, that is, to be the phallus.

At this stage of 'primary narcissism', the subject as specular I, while able "to postulate objects of permanence and identity in the world", is not a subject in its own right. It has confused itself with the object of desire of the (m)other, and as that object (the mother's phallus) is lacking, the infans, in relation to the mother and father (he who has the object of the mother's desire) is a lack, a space between the parents. Irigaray formulates this in terms of the infans' designation as an 'it' in the dial-
ogue of the parents which proceeds in terms of 'you' and 'I/me'⁸⁰ - that is, as a being as yet without a name or identity, despite the infans' belief that it has found its identity in the other.

In other words, in relation to the relationship of the mother and father, to the family and, by extension, in relation to the general order of 'Culture' which could be described as an order formed by the organizing and administering of identities, the identity lived in the state of immediacy engendered by the mirror-phase is a fiction. The infant taking the image of itself or another to be its self is a mistaking. The image is not immediate to it but distanced, inverted (the mirror) and belonging to another (mother, another child).

Yet it is only in relation to the field of Culture or, as Lacan names it, the 'Symbolic' - the domain of the symbol, whose condition is that it is different from that which it represents - that the Imaginary can be said to be a fiction. For the mirror-phase has a truth in that it has effects: the child's identification with its image (albeit a misrecognition) establishes the form or trajectory of the Ideal-I or ego. "This form ... the Ideal-I ... situates the agency of the ego, before its social determination, in a fictional direction, which will always remain irreducible for the individual".⁸¹ Thus the misrecognition insists in the later development of the subject, as a real event in its proper domain and time - that is, in the Imaginary - and which has effects in the Symbolic even
though the misrecognition can only be rejoined there "asymptotically". The misrecognition cannot be fully regained in the Symbolic because of the subject's "discordance with his own reality", which is an effect of the splitting (Spaltung) in which the subject qua subject (subject of sense as opposed to subject of existence or ego) is actually produced. Lemaire concisely summarizes Lacan's concept:

The Spaltung (from the German Spalte = split) is the division of being revealed in psychoanalysis between the self, the innermost part of the psyche, and the subject of conscious discourse, behaviour, and culture.

This splitting marks the child's entry into the Symbolic. Prior to this it is registered there only through its parents: only the parents can represent the infans. The infans imagines it represents itself, but in fact misrepresents itself as the other. That this is a misrepresentation, and an effective misrepresentation is determined by the Imaginary's relative autonomy from, determinate effect on, but ultimate determination by, the Symbolic. The Imaginary is situated as a relatively autonomous stage within a symbolic matrix. In its autonomy the Imaginary produces in the subject qua ego a recognition of the ego's autonomy, presence, immediacy, auto-genesis; relative to the Symbolic, whatever is produced in the Imaginary is a misrecognition. It is in its relation to the Symbolic that the Imaginary provides the precondition for the alienation of the subject, which, it should be emphasized, is the condition of existence of the subject: the subject is "alienate[d] ... in the primary identification that forms the ego ideal".
The splitting of the subject⁷⁷ that results in the formation of the social I dates from the deflection of the specular I into the dimension of the Symbolic - the topography proper to language. It stands therefore as the moment of entry into language structured as mediate and as that which "should be articulated"⁸⁸ (we shall return to this later): it is the moment "that decisively tips the whole of human knowledge into mediatization".⁸⁹ This deflection of the maturation of the child occurs through the cultural mediation of the Oedipal conflict, which defines the end of the mirror phase. This conflict is a crystallization of the ambiguity of the infans position relative to the Imaginary and to the Symbolic. The initial stage of child-mother fusion laid down in the Imaginary is the precondition for the Oedipal drama. Into this one-to-one relation, the father, possessor of the phallus (not a biological organ, but "in the evanescence of its erection - the signifier par excellence of the impossible identity"),⁹⁰ introduces a third term. His intervention sunders the mother-child union: as the true possessor of the phallus the father deprives the mother of her Imaginary phallus (the infans) and deprives the infans of the object of its desire (to be the phallus). "His attitude ... could be translated as a double commandment: thou shalt not sleep with thy mother and, to the mother: thou shalt not reappropriate thy product".⁹¹ These interdictions mark the child's encounter with the force of heterogeneity, its introduction to the Law (in its cultural form of the prohibition of incest) and to the power mobilized by
representation (because these interdictions are only effective if the father has the signifier, and can represent himself in the field of desire). In other words, the father's power resides in his occupying the site of the Symbolic Father. The Symbolic Father need not be the child's biological father because "The father is present only through his law, which is speech, and only in so far as his Speech is recognized by the mother does it take on the value of Law." 92

If the father is not recognized by the mother as having this function, then the child will remain subjected to the mother, that is, will continue to be or to identify with the phallus. But a successful resolution of the Oedipal drama results in the child's identification with the father, as he who has the phallus. Through this identification the child passes from the register of 'being' to that of 'having', from Imaginary to Symbolic, from an inability to represent, name or correctly identify itself — precisely, an inability to grasp the function of naming — to having a substitute or representative of itself by which it is able to enter the circuit of linguistic and therefore social exchange.

But this liberation of the infans from its complete subjection to the mother, which is the birth of the subject in its own right or its 'humanization', and its simultaneous taking up of a place in the family and in culture, is only won by the child at the cost of losing its initial imaginary plenitude as the object of the mother's desire, that is, at the cost of a splitting or
separation from the lived experience of its desire, a separation which Lacan names a symbolic castration because its desire took the form of being the phallus.

When the Symbolic Father issues his interdictions and introduces a third term into the mother-child relation, he reveals the lack (castration) of the mother and thereby symbolically castrates the child, who has been the phallus to the mother. (That it is a symbolic castration should in no way be read as a dilution of its traumatic effect: the subject is only in the domain of the symbol.) The child is forced to assume his 'lack of being', and it is in this way that the child accepts the Law in the form of limitation. In other words, the child's shift from the register of 'being' to 'having' is also to the register of 'not having': the child as subject is s/he who has or does not have the phallus.

By identifying with the Symbolic Father — that is, by assuming that which 'stands for' the Father (presented variously as the 'Name of the Father', the 'paternal metaphor or his insignia, the phallus) — the child is able to name its desire and so to demand it. But as its desire has been established as a desire for union with the mother or, in other words, for the phallus, the child, by assuming the capacity to name its desire, loses the object of its desire through the price of symbolic castration that it must pay for that capacity. Thus the subject can only demand its desire at the cost of alienating its satisfaction, of seeing its object slip away in its naming. This
irreducibility of desire to demand is also its eternalization. The phallus, as the object of the child's desire, is pushed into the unconscious which is "neither being, nor non-being, but the unrealized". Lacan also writes, "In my reference to the unconscious, I am dealing with the relation ... to the phallus, in as much as it is lacking in the real that might be attained in the sexual goal." It is the fundamental non-realization or non-satisfaction of desire, the lack of the desired object, that maintains desire, and with it, maintains or 'infinitizes' the subject in a continual return from its alienation in the field of the other which is the condition of its appearance.

In the terms of desire, the alienation in the field of the other can be understood as constituted in the Imaginary in as much as the desire that the infans takes to be its own is actually the subjection of the infans to the desire, alienated in demand, of the (m)Other. The infans, far from being the subject and controller of its desire, exists as an object and a meaning for the other. It is only insofar as the desire of the child is separated from that of the other through, for instance, the splitting accomplished by the Oedipal complex (the assumption of the paternal metaphor and the loss of the desired object), that the subject is instituted in the gap opened up between the mother's desire and the child's existence as object of that desire. It is thus the subject's relation of lack to the object of that desire (which it has taken for its own) that sustains it in difference, that is, as subject.
As a result of the conditions of its formation the subject exists as a dialectic. On the one hand, "it is qua Other that he desires" and while this alienating but constitutive direction is followed the subject, in as much as it is meaning (desire for recognition of the Other) or object (desire for desire of the Other) for the Other, 'fades' as subject. This is the sense of the Lacanian formulation that in intersubjective relations "... desire ultimately seeks the annihilation of the other as an independent subject (or of oneself)." But because of the cultural mediatization that splits the subject off from the lasting achievement of the object of its desire, the subject reappears as that lack which it is, or which defines it as a site. Lacan describes this dialectic by saying that "when the subject appears somewhere as meaning, he is manifested elsewhere as 'fading', as disappearance". And, "There is no subject without, somewhere, aphanisis [disappearance] of the subject, and it is in this alienation, in this fundamental division, that the dialectic of the subject is established."

This is a statement of the essential division of the subject. This division is synonymous with the formation of the subject in the splitting that makes the subject appear as lack - that is, as 'wanting', or desiring.

The subject is therefore not to be looked for in 'the Real' because the Real, as defined by Lacan is "The lack of the lack". The subject is, on the contrary, formed by being forced to assume its 'lack of being' according to
the fundamental humanizing fact of the prohibition of the Imaginary plenitude, experienced in the subject's captation in the other, by the Law that separates Culture from Nature. Far from existing in the Real, "... the structure of the subject [is] discontinuity in the real", and exists in that which is defined by, and articulated on, a principle of discontinuity or division - the unconscious.

The unconscious "is situated at that point, where, between cause and that which it affects, there is always something wrong." This 'something wrong' is what marks and makes the subject. The subject is 'wounded' at its inception but this castration, of which it lives in ignorance, is the price of its humanity and the lack that allows its withdrawal from the Real to the domain of knowledge (true and false) that the Imaginary and the Symbolic represent. The price of humanity, or subjectivity, is therefore its essence: "all discourse has its effect through the unconscious".

It should be clear that, for Lacan, the unconscious is not an individual, intrapsychic entity but trans-individual:

The unconscious is that part of the concrete discourse [of the subject], in so far as it is trans-individual, that is not at the disposal of the subject in re-establishing the continuity of his conscious discourse.

It is not at the disposal of the subject because the division of the subject is not to be located within the subject (as if it were an entity with a divided interior): the subject as a locus of effects is formed in the
division designated by the term 'unconscious'. Though the unconscious is at times inscribed within the genesis of the subject as the lack of being instituted in the symbolic castration or primary repression of the lived experience of the child's desire, this 'genesis' is anchored as a moment in a structure pre-existing the subject by the fact that the structure of the unconscious has for its form the structure of that which presides from the start at the formation of that fictional lived experience, that is, the signifier.

In order to pursue Lacan's theory in terms of this structural differentiation of the unconscious from a field of instincts, which marks it off from Freudian theory, it is necessary to consider the signifier as the locus of the play of presence and absence in which the subject appears and fades, and in doing so, pursues its slender but stubborn existence.

Lacan views the unconscious as an object that was recognized by Freud, but better formulated by Saussurean linguistics; that is, that Freud's formulation of the unconscious as the field of instincts can be seen from the light of linguistics as a mis-recognition through the operation of the signifier. The attention to the signifier is introduced in the Lacanian emphasis on the analysand's speech as the proper object of analysis and on the correct analytic technique (or reading practice) appropriate to this object. A Lacanian analysis distinguishes itself from
the work of the American and British schools of psycho-
analysis and their characteristic analysis of defences
which, it is argued, mis-take their proper text - the
subject's speech - and the mechanisms vital to the
readings of that text. Lacan characterizes this mistake in
the following way:

if the psychoanalyst is not aware that this is how
the function of speech operates ... he will come to
analyse the subject's behaviour in order to find in
it what the subject is not saying.\textsuperscript{105}

The reading or analysis thus produced functions as a
formulaic gloss of the patient's speech which can serve as
premise for the normalizing cure.

In Lacanian terms this psychoanalysis has not "proper-
ly subverted"\textsuperscript{106} the question of the subject. That is, it
has not redirected that question through the signifier.
This is the "trick of the Freudian conversion"\textsuperscript{107} that Lacan
restores as central to psychoanalysis by asking,

Is the place that I occupy as the subject of a
signifier concentric or excentric, in relation to the
place I occupy as subject of the signified? - that
is the question.
It is not a question of knowing whether I speak of
myself in a way that conforms to what I am, but
rather of knowing whether I am the same as that of
which I speak.\textsuperscript{108}

In the Lacanian problematic it is not that the speech
expresses the subject, but that the subject is immanent to
its speech. This is not an immanence to speech as imme-
diate phenomena, a gesture of the subject. It is through
the agency of the signifier that the relation between
subject (site of an analysis) and speech (text) is made.
And it is through its presentation of the signifier as the condition of representation that the Lacanian problematic claims its truth-value. The principle of the Lacanian reading's immanence to its text, the guarantee of that reading's authority, is the knowledge of the signifier. It is through the agency of the signifier that Lacan subverts the philosophical figure of the subject.

The concept of the signifier is presented in the Lacanian texts as it is generated in the Saussurean notation or algorithm of signifier/signified, but with certain transformations that are conditional for Lacan's account of the subject.

Saussurean or structuralist linguistics orders speech acts into langue (the system of language) and parole (the individual acts of realization or manifestation of that system). Together, langue and parole make up the structure of language. The elements of that structure are signs, and the 'Saussurean revolution' consists in detaching the sign from its referent in the natural world (which includes the subject as a pre-constituted universal), so that the meaning of the sign is not bestowed on it as its content from the real world of natural objects. Instead, its meaning inheres only in the relations between it and all other signs that make up the structure of language. The meaning of the sign is no longer essential, but relational. Further, Saussure splits the sign internally into signifier (sound-image) and signified (concept). The linguistic signifier has no internal or natural link with the signified: the sign is constituted in the social
fixing of the appearance of a relation of equivalence between signifier and signified.

However, it is at this point of the social fixing of meaning – via the constitution of the sign and its relations with other signs, that is, its place in a signifying chain – that the limits of the value of structuralist theory for generating a theory of subjectivity capable of subverting the philosophical subject become apparent. As Tony Bennett has pointed out in *Formalism and Marxism*, because structuralism in its attendance to speech acts rests on an anthropological conception of man the communicator, it rests on a problematic of the exchange of messages. This problematic concentrates on the space between subjects, on the problems of understanding how messages are formed and read in that space; but it brackets out the subjects sending or receiving messages as essentially unproblematic and already constituted. (This is analogous to Freudian theory problematizing the facilitations of desires or instincts through the structures of the psychical apparatus, while maintaining the subject as an entity by simply shifting it from the level of consciousness to the allegedly more fundamental level of desire.) So the subject is retained in structuralist theory, in parenthesis, and it re-emerges covertly at the level of parole, that is, at the site of the individual acts of realization or manifestation of the system of language, at the site of the putting into place or speaking of language, of its 'historical moment'. That putting into place of meaning rests on the constitution of the
sign, the social fixing of the signifier to the signified and so this social fixing is in fact governed by the implicit retention of the subject.

This retention of a pre-constituted subject completely undercuts the force of Saussure's separation of the sign from its referent. Via the subject, the sign is once more tied to its referent as in a natural order. This relation between sign and referent also determines the relation internal to the sign, of signifier to signified such that it is no longer arbitrary (as Saussure stipulated) but mirrors the necessary and eternal relations that link the philosophic orders of a natural world and a language that is its idealized reflection.

What this underlying necessity of the internal and external relations of the sign means is that structuralist theory can give no account of change in meanings other than by appealing to the intervention of autonomous and wilful subjects. The point of demonstrating this crucial limit in structuralist theory is that it marks the point at which an articulation is made between a structuralist theory of linguistics and Lacanian psychoanalysis. Lacan addresses himself precisely to the problem of the constitution of the subject - the blind spot of structuralism - by drawing out the full implications of the Saussurean concept of the sign.

First, Lacan rewrites the sign as $\frac{S}{s}$ (signifier/signified), putting the stress on the signifier as the primary term, the unit of signification, and accentuating the bar
that separates signifier and signified to insist on the arbitrariness of their relation. What this arbitrariness means is that the signifier, in crossing the bar (i.e., in articulating with other signifiers in signifying chains to form the 'anchoring points' that we recognize as signifieds), is destined by no ready-made signified or concept and obeys no rule or structure of signification other than its own structure: in Lacan's words, "the structure of the signifier" is nothing other than "that it should be articulated". The signifier has no proper meaning, no proper content which bears on its trajectory. In other words, the signifier is just material; it has no sense. Nothing more can be said of it than that it forms in signifying chains, which Lacan describes as "rings of a necklace that is a ring in another necklace made of rings". When Lacan uses the term 'material', as Derrida points out,

'Material' does not imply the empirical materiality of the perceptible ... signifier ... but that which retains, first, a certain indivisibility ("that materiality is odd ... in many ways, the first of which is not to admit partition. Cut a letter in small pieces, and it remains the letter that it is - and this in a completely different sense than Gestalttheorie would account for with the dormant vitalism informing its notion of the whole"), and second, a certain locality.

This locality itself is non-empirical and non-ideal because it gives rise to what is not where it is: the signifier has no self-identical place. The signifier can be found only where it is not; it can only offer itself to recognition, indirectly, at the point of the signified. But the signified is nothing but a moment in the signifying chain when one signifier occults or masks another. The
signified is like a real illusion, an apparent institution of sense that can always be returned to the non-sense of the signifier. Meaning is always open to re-interpretation as an effect of the non-sense of the signifier.

Now, Lacan says that "Since Freud the unconscious has been a chain of signifiers",¹¹² that is, structured like a language. This is allegedly why Freud could recognize the mechanisms of displacement and condensation at work in the unconscious: Lacan presents them as analogous to the mechanisms of metonymy and metaphor at work in language. It is on the basis of this structural analogy of the unconscious and language that Lacan undertakes his redefinition of the subject. "Once the structure of language has been recognized in the unconscious," he asks, "what sort of subject can we conceive for it?"¹¹³ Well, once the unconscious has been recognized as a chain of signifiers, then the subject can be recognized as the effect of those anchoring points or signifieds that the signifying chain forms. In other words, the concept of the subject as a stable and unified and inherently meaningful point from which we organize a world of signifiers is actually an effect of signifiers, an effect of the non-meaningful material process of language.

This material process of language is elaborated through the topography introduced by the algorithm $\mathcal{S}$ and consists of two linguistic techniques conceived as active, internal principles of language. As has already been suggested, these are the principles of metaphor and
metonymy which form the two sides of "the effective field constituted by the signifier, so that meaning can emerge there". In metonymy, the part is taken for the whole: the signified is not present as an instance of speech and, except for its presence in the structure of language as a whole, it can be said to 'lack'. In other words, in metonymy, the bar between signifier and signified remains uncrossed. The connection between them lies "nowhere but in the signifier" - it is a 'word-to-word' connection.

In metaphor, where one word stands 'for' another in the structure of representation, one signifier is occulted or masked in the substitution of it with another signifier. It is this substitution of one signifier for another that is the condition of the passage across the bar from signifier to signified - the symptomatic passage that is the emergence of signification. The occulted or repressed signifier is said to fall to the rank of the signified (the substitutive signifier "refers the signifier that it has usurped elsewhere") and is the action in which an identity is constructed or represented. Specifically, the identity of the subject is secured in the function of the paternal metaphor, which operates in the moment of the subject's splitting and its assumption of the Symbolic Father's insignia, the phallus. Lacan elaborates the paternal metaphor according to the formula of the metaphor, or of signifying substitution:

\[
\frac{S}{S'} \cdot \frac{x}{y} \longrightarrow S\left(\begin{array}{l} \overline{I} \\ \overline{S} \end{array}\right)
\]
in which the capital Ss are signifiers, x the unknown signification and s the signified induced by the metaphor, which consists of the substitution in the signifying chain of S for S'. The elision of S', represented here by the bar through it, is the condition of the success of the metaphor. This applies equally to the metaphor of the Name-of-the-Father, that is, the metaphor that substitutes this Name in the place first symbolized by the operation of the absence of the mother.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name-of-the-Father</th>
<th>Desire of the Mother</th>
<th>Signified to the subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name-of-the-Father</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>Phallus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The subject's identity is thereby procured in the locus of the algorithm as the signified induced by the articulation of signifiers, the representation of an absence that has been repressed in the form of a presence (the object of desire).

To restate this complex definition: lest the subject be still mistaken as an essence 'waiting prior to language to be properly, if woundingly, represented by the symbol of desire the phallus — that is, waiting to be properly installed as meaning — it is imperative to recall that the function of metaphor (the structure of representation) is always underlain by that of metonymy, with its correspondent introduction of the function of lack. That is, the repressed signifier (signified) is only maintained by virtue of its word-to-word or metonymic connection, its place in the structure of language.

The creative spark of the metaphor does not spring from the presentation of two images, that is, of two signifiers equally actualized. It flashes between two signifiers one of which has taken the place of the other in the signifying chain, the occulted signifier remaining present through its (metonymic) connexion with the rest of the chain.
Thus metaphor, whose 'flashing' or crossing of the bar is "provisionally confus[ed] ... with the place of the subject", is given its foundation in metonymy. The technique of constitutive re-presentation of the place of the subject can be recalled to the metonymic structure,

the connexion between signifier and signifier that permits the elision in which the signifier installs the lack-of-being in the object relation, using the value of 'reference back' possessed by signification in order to invest it with the desire aimed at the very lack it supports.

In other words, the structure of re-presentation represents nothing more fundamental than its own conditions - the sliding of signifiers (the structure of language is 'that is should be articulated') or the metonymic chain Lacan designates as desire. It is this redirection of Lacanian psychoanalysis away from the consideration of the psychic representation of somatic contents to the study of the means of representation as what is at stake in the effect known as 'subjectivity' that makes the goal of analysis not the uncovering of fundamental meanings but "the introduction of the subject to the language of his desire", which "is a metonymy". And while analysis "has the effect of bringing out an irreducible signifier" - the phallus - this is not to institute in the place of the subject a primary meaning, but a primary signifier. That it is called primary is to indicate that it is pure non-sense; as we noted earlier the phallus is 'the signifier par excellence of the impossible identity'. In so far as psychoanalysis traces "to what signifier - to what irreducible, traumatic, non-
meaning - he is, as a subject, subjected", it discovers that the subject is non-sense - not the nonsense of a consciousness pegged back to the instinctual - but that non-being or lack where meaning flashes but whose truth is the discovery of its non-being. It is this complex dialectic between sense and non-sense, being and non-being, presence and absence that provide the basis for Lacan's descriptions of the subject: "'I' am in the place from which a voice is heard clamouring 'the universe is a defect in the purity of Non-Being'.'

Lacan's account of the formation of the subject makes clear that the subject does not pre-exist or in any way exceed the material conditions of its sociality - language. While Freudian theory retains a domain for the insistence of the essential subject of instincts which must be brought under the control of cultural conditions (the problematic regulation of the pleasure principle by the reality principle) Lacan's theorization of desire as distinct from both need and demand as that which is set in chain by the signifier is, as Wilden points out, an important and radical restatement in a structural terminology of the essentially genetic view of the subordination of the pleasure principle to the reality principle, since reality for the subject is literally re-presented by the signifier.

A central ambiguity in Freudian theory, the genesis of the reality principle, is resolved by reformulating the subject from a natural entity to be brought under the reality of social conditions, to a locus of effects which
have never existed apart from those social conditions - the networks of the signifier. It is this which makes the Lacanian subject appropriate to Althusser's materialist theory of ideology.

However, it can and has been argued that it is not the Lacanian subject that is used by Althusser in his account of interpellation, but simply the formation or identifications of the Imaginary. Heath writes,

Althusser acknowledges Lacanian psychoanalysis, a major factor in this work, but retains only the mirror-phase and the specularity of the imaginary - the imaginary of the individual - subject in ideology, the subject as the category of that ideological imaginary. The recognition that the Imaginary subject's auto-genesis and autonomy is a 'fiction' - that the Imaginary generates ideological effects - is only possible from the perspective of the subject's place within social relations. For Althusser, that the subject exists within social relations is established by the fact of its support, the 'concrete individual', whose existence in the real (social relations) is a given. It is only the entry into the Imaginary, or ideology, that requires theorization. Once this is accomplished there is no remainder of 'the individual' existing immediately in the real (despite its being apparently prior to the subject as its support) because, at the same time, "the individual is always-already a subject". In what Althusser dismisses as a device of argument (the paradoxical unity-disunity of subject and individual), social relations - the real - are at once given, and yet only re-cognized ideologically. This marks a difference
with the Lacanian texts, where the subject has no unity with 'the individual', and thus the specular subject's accession to the social at the site of the Symbolic must also be theorized.

Accordingly, while in "Freud and Lacan" Althusser establishes the significance of the Symbolic, in "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" only the concept of the Imaginary is (explicitly) retained. As Heath points out the effect of this is to maintain the individual-subject unity in Althusser's theory at the level of the ego or consciousness. What is not elaborated in Heath's article is that Althusser is not so much abandoning the Symbolic order but representing that site in the formation of the Ideological State Apparatuses according to his observation in "Freud and Lacan" that,

the Law of Culture [the Symbolic Order] which is first introduced as language and whose first form is language, is not exhausted by language; its content is the real kinship structures and the determinate ideological formations in which the persons inscribed in these structures live their functions.\(^{131}\)

Althusser elaborates the formal structure of the Symbolic in terms of Ideological State Apparatuses because he is locating ideology within a social totality. To retain the Symbolic as a formal level, governed by the radically arbitrary signifier, would be to disregard its determinate place within that totality. MacCabe addresses this, arguing that,

Althusser's positioning of the drama of the subject in the policeman's call for identity can be read as an effort to call into question the Lacanian concept of the signifier in so far as Lacan deduces the divided subject from the very fact of language
itself and where the actual sites of language use (the family, the school, the workplace) are merely unimportant variations with no effectivity inscribed in the theory. 132

But Althusser can only bring the universalism of the Lacanian concept of language into question by recalling it to another totality. While for Lacan the Symbolic is co-extensive with the social, for Althusser the Ideological State Apparatuses are an instance within the social totality and determined in the last instance by the economic real; hence the concrete individual, with needs that can be inserted into economic calculations, is the first and last support of the ideological subject. In order to stave off a formalism, language (or the material representations that form ideology), while given a relative autonomy, is tied to its perceived function of representing something outside itself—the economic real.

As Hirst has argued, the central problem with the Althusserian theory of ideology is that, despite advancing a materialist analysis beyond the notion of false consciousness, it formulates ideology in terms of representation. Althusser's insistence on the relative autonomy of the representations that comprise ideologies is a recognition of the effectivity of the means of representation, but this is undercut by the recalling of an end or origin (the last instance) as that which these representations allegedly function to reproduce. The question is, once the productivity of the means of representation has been acknowledged, from what site can this 'auto-existing' last instance of which the means of representation are ultimate-
ly effects, be brought into play? Althusser has argued against the subject as an origin of knowledge from which such an object of representation could be posited. Instead, the condition of this knowledge is the absence of the subject; that is, it is from the site of science, defined as a subject-less discourse, that ideology can be recognized as ideology in its closure from the totality and its determination in the last instance by the economic real. It is from science's openness (rendered in an epistemological break) to the social totality that ideology can be tied, as effect, to what it ultimately re-presents; the commodity form of production in a class society.

Now Althusser's stipulation of science as a subject-less discourse (because the subject is the alleged condition and effect of ideology) demands that science be a theoretically 'pure' knowledge. If "there is no practice except by and in an ideology" - that is, if all practice is defined by its subject - then theory must be conceived as separate from practice. (See the designation of practice as a theoretically-subordinate moment, p.148.)

But the concept of science as a theoretical discourse that has broken with the ideological closure inherent in practice returns us to the problems of Reading Capital (see p.12, and the question of the status of a critique which operates in terms of 'openness' or 'closure', p.10). Science emerges as a discourse in advance of its material conditions (which cannot be separated from its practice) or problematic. This division reinstates, against
Althusser's materialist rewriting of consciousness, an autonomous subject of vision: science is elevated to a position in an idealist epistemology.

Althusser maintains, in the last instance, the site of an epistemological subject that is able to theoretically express the economic. As Hirst points out, "'Representation'", the field in which Althusser formulates 'Ideology', "is a category which entails the classic subject/object structure of knowledge". The unifying conditions and premises of Althusser's theory of ideology - the Lacanian account of the formulation of the subject as a locus of effects produced in language organized under the singular term of the signifier, and the 'relative autonomy' of the ideological, that is, its position in a social totality, and the corresponding epistemological position from which that totality is articulated - all work against the Althusserian theory's capacity to account for specific 'ideological' social relations (i.e., without restating them in a functionalist relation to an economic base).

I do not want to argue that the Althusserian theory of ideology can be 'made good' by a correct reading of the Lacanian texts. The point of noting the discontinuities between the two is not to demonstrate by what measure Althusser falls short of the Lacanian insight into the construction of the subject, but rather to demonstrate the resistance of Lacanian theory to attempts to rework it within the framework of a materialist account of ideology.
If the telling critique of Althusserian theory is that it poses ideology in a problematic of representation, Lacanian theory occupies the same problematic. Despite the fact that the Lacanian theory of language formulates signification as the condition of all representation (that is, ties representation to linguistic techniques rather than realist contents), by unifying linguistic techniques under the singular form of the signifier it in effect produces a theory of representation the rival of any realism. While Lacan claims the materiality of the signifier as a central tenet of his theory, the signifier occupies the space in the theory of a fetishized object—that is, the alleged universal condition for all meaning and for the psychoanalytic truth that articulates all meaning and the position of the subject as the misrecognition of the materiality of the signifier. What effect does theorizing a universal condition of representation have? It has been read as an enabling basis for the explanation of the reproduction of ideological formations, in much the same way as it provides an explanation of the phenomenon of repetition which is central to the psychoanalytic economy. (The repetition compulsion "is seen, in the final analysis, as the expression of the most general character of the instincts, namely, their conservatism" or, for Lacan, an expression of the insistence of the chain of signifiers which belongs properly to the structure of the signifier itself—'that it should be articulated'.)
But, because repetition is formulated in terms of the retreat and return of an origin characteristic, Foucault argues, of modern thought, a psychoanalytically informed critique of ideology cannot pursue the specific institutional reproductions of power-knowledge relations but is condemned to the restatement of an origin. Admittedly, this origin is no longer conceived as the subject but as the conditions in which 'man' is always already articulated— for example, in Lacanian theory, the structure of language. But these conditions no more provide the starting point for a materialist analysis than does the figure of the constitutive subject, as they are treated as the origin for the subject. Consequently, it is always within the terms of its implications for subjectivity that language will be interrogated.

There is an alternative to this formulation of repetition which is at the heart of a general theory of the subject. It is the sense in which 'repetition' is used in Chapter I, which we can indicate here by recalling Wittgenstein's stipulation that when a rule is followed (certain steps repeated) it is followed 'blindly'. Wittgenstein's remarks on repetition are concerned to demonstrate that repetition, or recognition of 'the same' is not tantamount to the recognition or consciousness of an origin, but inscribed within the institutionally differing techniques of learning to apply the criteria 'the same'.

When we hear the diatonic scale we are inclined to say that after every seven notes the same note recurs, and, asked why we call it the same note again one might answer "Well, it's a c again". But this isn't the explanation I want, for I should ask
"What made one call it a c again?" And the answer to this would seem to be "Well, don't you hear that it's the same note only an octave higher?" - Here, too, we could imagine that a man had been taught our use of the word "the same" when applied to colours, lengths, directions, etc., and that we now played the diatonic scale for him and asked him whether he'd say that he heard the same notes again and again at certain intervals, and we could easily imagine several answers, in particular for instance, this, that he heard the same note alternately after every four or three notes (he calls the tonic, the dominant, and the octave the same note).  

Similarly, finding a primary signifier, or the structure of the signifier, over and over again, in a subject's speech is not finding the fundamental conditions or origin of that speech — it is not uncovering the conditions for its reproduction; it is applying a set of techniques to produce 'the signifier' at all levels of a text. The Lacanian texts and their "insight that language operates on a continuous misconstruction of its constitution; which misconstruction is the appearance of the subject" do not represent an origin, or universal condition: they are not the mandate for anything but the repetition of a certain psychoanalytic discourse and its iteration of a particular philosophical concept of 'the origin' in the form of a linguistics. To accept their claim to present a general theory of representation/signification would involve re-asserting as foundational an epistemological subject able to articulate 'language' presented as an object or fact with a definable nature, even if this ontology is in the minimalized form of a singular technique.

Such a reading of Lacanian theory proceeds by rejecting a division between psychoanalytic theory and the 'theoretically subordinate moment' of psychoanalytic
practice, and considering it instead as a specific dis-
course whose descriptions of the subject can be taken as
no more significant contribution to a knowledge of the
subject than the particular subject positions made avail-
able within the discourse. These subject positions, some
of which shall be enumerated in Section V, are unified
under the position of a subject of knowledge as the
analyst/linguist — he who 'knows the way it is with the
Word'. It may be countered that Lacan takes pains to tie
the analyst's capacities to a particular training. But
this does not diminish the objection that the subject-
position of the analyst in the Lacanian texts belies their
account of the subject of the signifier as displacing the
subject of knowledge. This is attested to by the extravag-
ance of the claims presented from this position:

The slightest alteration in the relation between man
and the signifier, in this case in the procedures of
exegesis, changes the whole course of history by
modifying the moorings that anchor his being.¹⁴⁰

The psychoanalytical training, as explanatory of the
(paranoic) structure of human knowledge, is presented as
foundational of all others. (Thus the projects for an
'interdisciplinarity' with psychoanalysis as its base: see
p.138.) The fact that the knowledge (of the signifier)
which is the alleged condition of all others is presented
as the effect of a training is simply in keeping with the
theory's relocation of an ontology from the domain of
entities to that of techniques. But attention to tech-
niques does not, in itself, constitute a materialist
analysis.
When we describe Lacanian theory as presenting the signifier as a fetishized technique, it is to indicate that it is presented as a technique which results in effects that are symptomatic (see pp.83). When the Lacanian theory rewrites the subject as effect, it instates it as symptom from which can be read off a general set of underlying conditions. The subversion of the philosophical subject through the 'defiles of the signifier' maintains the subject as a unitary locus of effects: the scope of its achievement is to substitute one constituting principle (the signifier) for another (consciousness). It shifts what was conceived as interior or essential to the subject (consciousness) to the level of misrecognition, and institutes the signifier as its properly recognized condition - interiorized within the new space defined by the algorithm. Psychoanalysis thus repeats the familiar philosophical division between knowledge and belief, or mis-knowledge (see p.64), situating this division within language.

Our critique of Lacanian theory centres on that theory's presentation of a general theory of language as the condition of its reformulation of the subject of knowledge. Our argument against a general theory of language, in whatever form it might take, has been dealt with at length in Chapter I, and cannot be dissociated from an argument with a general theory of the subject. Hence the Lacanian strategy of using one to subvert the other is misdirected from the outset. A general theory of language presupposes a general theory of the subject, and
a general theory of the subject maintains an account of the organization of knowledge, in terms of a philosophy of consciousness which is problematic in the extreme if we are seeking to specify, and specifically rework, the multiple and shifting material conditions in which we produce and consume knowledges and their effects.

Together, these remarks can be taken to conclude that the Lacanian theorization of the unconscious — and the Freudian formulation of which it is a reworking — does not present that break with the philosophy or psychology of consciousness which has been the alleged condition of its incorporation into the ideology-critique of the Frankfurt School and the Althusserian reformulation of ideology as a system of material representations, but rather, has functioned as a shifting restatement of that philosophy.

The point here is not to instate readings such as Lasswell's or Rieff's as 'closer to the mark' because they situate psychoanalysis within a philosophical tradition. These readings proceed on the assumption that this continuity occurs because the 'philosophical tradition' does, in fact, represent the boundaries of all knowledge practices. In any case, more important than these differences between the 'Right' and the 'Left', at least for our present considerations, is their common reading of psychoanalytic theory as expressive of psychical, ideological or linguistic reality — each functioning as the essential condition of the domain of 'the human'. This class of readings, whose widespread currency I have attempted to demonstrate by detailing the different sites and different political
positions in which it is produced (viz., the discontinuous but crucially intersecting readings presented in Sections I, II, III),\textsuperscript{13} presents psychoanalytic theory as a site for the epistemological subject; that is, it treats psychoanalytic theory as an explanation of the subject/ideology/linguistic basis of sociality. It treats psychoanalytic theory as establishing a relation of knowledge between a subject and the domain of 'the human' - a relation of knowledge which will provide either our openness to the totality of the social formation, or, in Rieff's terms, the freedom of the Stoics (see p.136). Knowing more about ourselves - even if this is now defined as knowing about our constitutive subjection to the unconscious or the signifier, that our meaning is tied to a fundamental relation of force - will enlighten and liberate.

Debate over the politicality of psychoanalysis has reemerged in the last decade largely due to work, such as that of the Screen project, which demonstrated the tactical usefulness of the Lacanian theory of desire (e.g., for challenging auteur/character based readings of film texts) and of a psychoanalytically informed account of power as representation,\textsuperscript{15} as well as some of its problems. Where this debate has taken for its criteria the adequacy of psychoanalysis' representation of the mechanisms and conditions of the subject's ideological nature (its constitutive alienation from foundational conditions, be they man's 'creative instincts' or the 'structure of language'), it can only present the politicality of psychoanalytic theory in terms of a truth - a picture of how
things are\textsuperscript{33} - to be taken up by a political position which can then claim to operate, thanks to this truth, free of its ideological blinkers. Most attempts to account for the political effectivity of psychoanalytic theory have been structured by a reading of psychoanalysis as telling us 'how things are', specifically, the truth of the subject.

My contention is that these accounts are misdirected. The politicality of psychoanalytic theory cannot be sought in what it can, or cannot, tell us about the 'human situation', but in the discursive technology it provides for shaping it.

IV: The Psychoanalytic Technology

We can produce a different account of psychoanalytic theory by returning to the statement that the theorization of the unconscious does not present a break from the philosophy of consciousness.

As well as a reading such as Rieff's which places Freudian theory firmly within the Stoic tradition, there is a statement of psychoanalysis' iteration of philosophical discourse which is not interested in validating psychoanalytic theory via an observation of its continuity with tradition, but in incorporating it within its materialist critique of a philosophy of consciousness. This is Volosinov's \textit{Freudianism: A Marxist Critique}, initially published in 1927.

Volosinov's reading of Freudian theory can be usefully contrasted to the Althusserian/Lacanian reading.
Althusser nominates as the accomplishment of Lacanian theory its elucidation of "the true epistemological relation between these concepts [which Freud was forced to borrow from current knowledges] and their thought content". This formulation instates a subject of knowledge or, in Althusserian terms, the (no less problematic) subject-less discourse of science, able to wrest the 'thought content' from concepts.

But what Volosinov attends to is not Freud's 'thought content' but precisely the concepts or constructs in which Freudian theory emerged. It is on these criteria that he constructs his critique:

Freudianism transferred into its constructs all the fundamental defects of the subjective psychology of the time ... Freudianism dogmatically appropriated the old categorization of mental phenomena - originating with J-C. Tetens - into Will (desires, drives), Feeling (emotions, affects) and Mind (sensations, presentations, thoughts). Volosinov's argument is that as theory cannot be separated from the material constructs in which it emerges, Freud's presentation of the unconscious is no more than a restatement of the domain of consciousness:

In the unconscious, too, we find desires, feelings, presentations. But these elements of psychical life, after all, exist only for consciousness ... [Freudianism] not only transfers elements of the conscious to the unconscious, it preserves fully intact in the unconscious the specific differences and logical distinctions of all these elements ... Let us turn attention to the operation of the censorship. Freud considers the censorship a 'mechanism' that operates completely unconsciously ... Yet, how delicately this 'unconscious mechanism' detects all the logical subtleties of thoughts and all the moral nuances of feelings! The censorship exhibits enormous ideological erudition and refinement; it makes purely logical, ethical, and aesthetic selections among experiences. Can this possibly be compatible with its unconscious, mechanical structure?
By demonstrating that Freud fails to effectively differentiate the conscious and the unconscious, Volosinov is not attempting to bolster the dominion of consciousness by pointing to its all-encompassing character. He is in sympathy with Freudianism's efforts to challenge the accepted truth of a harmonious psyche. What he questions is Freud's success in breaking with a 'perspicacious consciousness' by recalling the psyche to the post-Darwinian domain of 'nature':

... did Freud really succeed in detecting Nature in our psyche? Are the conflicts of the 'ego', 'id', and 'superego', the 'death instinct' and 'Eros' really the conflicts of elemental forces? Or are they perhaps only conflicts of motives in the individual human consciousness? 147

Freud's 'conscious' and 'unconscious' are ever at odds; between them prevail mutual hostility and incomprehension and the endeavour to deceive one another. Surely interrelations of this sort are only possible between two ideas, two ideological trends, two antagonistic persons, and not between two natural, material forces! Is it conceivable, for instance, that two natural forces engage in mutual deception or mutual nonrecognition? 148

Further, the tactic of presenting 'nature' as the condition of consciousness is undermined:

What we call the 'human psyche' and 'consciousness' reflects the dialectics of history to a much greater degree than the dialectics of nature. The nature that is present in them is nature already in economic and social refraction. 149

Rather than recalling consciousness to the foundational conditions of Nature located in the psyche in the form of the unconscious as the mechanical, elemental domain alien to consciousness, Volosinov formulates consciousness as "that commentary which every adult human being brings to bear on every instance of his behaviour", 150 and proposes
that the data of introspection which psychoanalysis brings to both consciousness and the unconscious be recognized as the data of speech. Volosinov then differentiates between 'inner' and 'outer' speech, which loosely correspond to the 'verbal reactions' recognized by psychoanalysts as 'the unconscious' and 'consciousness', but which do not repeat either the relations or the conditions of these psychoanalytic domains. That is, inner speech is not treated as the interiorized condition of outer speech, as the unconscious is of consciousness. "Inner speech is the same kind of product and expression of social intercourse as is outward speech." Its relation to outer speech is not contained in a natural hierarchy expressed in psychoanalytic knowledge, but is the socially produced and unstable set of relations between an unofficial and an official discourse. For Volosinov, the unconscious is simply an unofficial consciousness which, in turn, is not posed as an interiorized domain, discrete from social relations, or as the expression of the 'psyche': both are, as a series of utterances, "the product of the interaction between speakers and the product of the broader context of the whole complex social situation in which the utterance emerges".

Taking their lead from Volosinov's emphasis on utterances as the data of analysis, the translator and editors of the 1976 edition of *Freudianism* have presented it as an 'anticipation' of the Lacanian reading of Freudian theory. This coopts the Volosinov text to what it critiques: as one editor writes, "... Jacques Lacan ... revers[es] the
priority of Volosinov's enquiry, in looking at the social
domain as a linguistic entity, rather than at language as
a social phenomenon". But far from being defused as "an
admittedly 'popular' study" in need of Lacan's structur-
alist insight, Volosinov's critique of Freudianism can be
turned to Lacanian theory.

Volosinov's point that "the Freudian unconscious does
not fundamentally differ from consciousness; it is only
another form of consciousness, only an ideologically
different expression of it", holds good for the Lacanian
unconscious which, being 'structured like a language', can
be recognized in the very form of the signifier. The
signifier, which we are asked to accept as the condition
of consciousness, exists only for consciousness. We have
considered how a general theory of language based on the
fact of the signifier presupposes a subject of knowledge
in the place of the analyst. This is also demonstrable at
the site of the subject whose genesis the analyst artic-
ulates.

The human being's subjection to the signifier, its
entry into social relations, depends on the infans' captat-
ton in the Other by its recognition of itself where it is
not - a recognition which lays in place the fictional
trajectory of future cognition and thus the infans' subjec-
tivity. For this allegedly constitutive re-cognition of
the Other/otherness/the signifier to occur, a structure of
cognition or a cognitive capacity must already insist in
the infans. As Hirst puts it:
Recognition, the crucial moment of the constitution (activation) of the subject, presupposes a point of cognition prior to the recognition. Something must recognise that which it is to be.\(^1\)

The constitutive subject, albeit whittled down to a single point of (mis) cognition, persists.

As long as the constitution of the subject is formulated as the re-presentation of the signifier, or as the psychical representatives of the soma in the Freudian unconscious, it can do no more than repeat the problematic of representation and the subject/object structure of knowledge. Psychoanalysis' only challenge to the philosophy of consciousness is to stress the priority of the object in the knowledge process - a challenge analogous with Heidegger's existentialism, Sartre's humanist existentialism and Husserlian phenomenology in their attempt to replace the primacy of epistemology with that of an ontology. Lacanian theory iterates concepts central to these phenomenologies, often explicitly, at other times reworked through linguistics. (Anthony Wilden provides detailed commentary on these borrowings in *The Language Of The Self*, and it is instructive to read Lacan's formulation of 'the gaze' in *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis* adjacent to Sartre's section on 'The Look' in *Being and Nothingness*, Part 3, Chapter I.)

But, as was argued in Chapter 2 (p.73), such a challenge is contained within the philosophy of consciousness. The traditional relation between subject and object of idealist philosophy - thought animating being, a transcendental unity of apperception producing an entire world
order — is rearticulated in these modern ontologies as a
dialectic such that the subject is no longer first prin-
ciple. The specificity of Lacanian theory is to replace
Heidegger's 'Being' with the signifier as that which
places the subject, and constitutes the subject as a
place. The signifier, as both the principle of the impos-
sibility of identity and of repetition, whose articulation
is such that an identity coalesces out of the repeated
signification of the impossible identity, constitutes the
subject not as limit, as does the historicist ontology of
Being, but as absence. The Lacanian subject is defined by
its relation to its object as is any philosophical
subject: its only difference is that its relation is to a
'lost object'. The reflexive knowledge of the Cartesian
cogito — thought thinking itself — is overthrown, but the
redirection of the subject's knowledge of itself through
the defiles of the signifier does not deconstruct the
subject as the insistent point of all investigations. As
Foucault points out, 'man', the empirico-transcendental
doublet of philosophical anthropologism — "a being such
that knowledge will be attained in him of what renders all
knowledge possible" — will not be 'undone' by the dis-
ccovery of the unconscious:

As a matter of fact, the unconscious, and the forms
of the unthought in general, have not been the
reward granted to a positive knowledge of man. Man
and the unthought are, at the archaeological level,
contemporaries.

The unconscious is a restatement of what secures 'man' in
the field of knowledge.
From this wider perspective we can repeat Volosinov's more specific claim that consciousness and the unconscious are common; the exploration of the unconscious will not displace the problematic of consciousness but bind our formulation of knowledge-relations more closely to it. Thus, Lacan's explanation of the social domain as a linguistic entity to which the unconscious is analogous restates this problematic. It is Volosinov's treatment of language as a social phenomenon that points the way towards a materialist analysis.

Volosinov's treatment of language includes a consideration of elements that are discredited in the editor's preface: "It is a somewhat tenuous presentation, an admittedly 'popular' study ...". These elements exactly coincide with the point at which the Althusserian reading of Lacanian theory displaces questions concerning psychoanalytic practice to the wake of the theory. Volosinov demands that attention be paid to "the extremely complex social interrelationship between doctor and patient", and not simply in the interpersonal and, finally, intrasubjective terms of the transference.

The doctor ... endeavours to wrest confessions from the patient and to compel him to take the 'correct' point of view on his illness and its symptoms. Intertwining with all this are other factors ... And it is in the midst of this complex and very special social atmosphere that the verbal utterances are made - the patient's narratives and his statements in conversation with the doctor - utterances that Freud places squarely at the basis of his theory. Can we acknowledge these utterances as the expression of the patient's individual psyche? ... Elsewhere we have attempted to show that any product of the activity of human discourse - from the simplest utterance in everyday life to elaborate works of literary art - derives shape and meaning in
all its most essential aspects not from the subjective experiences of the speaker but from the social situation in which the utterance appears. 164

In considering the analytic session as a site of confessional practices Volosinov is arguing the need for a sociolinguistics against a linguistics. His analysis proceeds at the level of the utterance - that is, of the dialogic relations of speech to speech - in which the historical, social situation "enters into the utterance as an essential constitutive part of the structure of its import". 165 This attention to the utterance can be contrasted with Saussure's presentation of language as an ahistorical system (la langue) within which meaning is produced from the arbitrary relations between signifiers, but, while Saussurean linguistics demands critique, the relation Volosinov's sociolinguistics establishes between language and its historical, social conditions is also problematic. "Volosinov ... views the use of the word as part of a primarily class-based struggle for the terms in which reality is to be signified." 166 The problem here is not the location of 'the word' in struggle, but that the word's function in struggle is to reflect the conditions of that struggle - "the unity of the real conditions of life that generate a community of value judgements". 167

If, as its editors say, Freudianism's attempts at anchoring psychoanalytic theory in its constitutive practices (e.g., confession) are tenuous, it is not because of the direction it pursues, but because of the shortfall of a sociolinguistics - its (sociological) premise of the unity of the social real which utterances must represent.
The direction that Volosinov's reading of Freudian theory marks out - a) that psychoanalysis does not describe a break with a philosophy of consciousness and b) that to analyse this continuity we must consider the practices in which the consciousness is produced - is resumed in the work of Foucault, Donzelot, and of Castel. 168

In Chapters 1 and 2 the Foucauldian problematic (which Donzelot and Castel extend) was presented in some detail. Without repeating this in full, we can place psychoanalytic theory within this problematic and so produce a reading which treats psychoanalytic theory not as a model of truth but as a specific though widespread technology for producing a particular form of truth.

The Foucauldian specification of discourse (see p.19), critiques both the concept of a unity of 'language' (the object of linguistics) and that of a unity of the social real (the object of sociology), and so displaces the problematic alternatives of a linguistics or a sociology of language. In their place it provides the conditions for an analysis that has broken with the problematic of representation. Statements - the constitutive parts of discursive formations - represent neither the formal principles of the object 'language', nor the conditions of a 'social real'. Statements are productive.

Following Foucault, we can read psychoanalytic theory as a regularized series of statements which do not represent a more complete recognition of 'the subject' deriving from a new recognition of its conditions, but
which produce the objects of those recognitions, which in turn are nothing more than the iteration of the statements in which those objects — the subject, the unconscious, the signifier — emerge. Just as an awareness of a singular and self-originating consciousness is produced out of a dispersed apparatus of practical self-interrogation, so the unconscious does not exist apart from the discursive and non-discursive techniques of psychoanalysis, which, in large part, were developed in the scientization of confessional practices whose passage from the ecclesiastical to the medical domain we traced at length in Chapter 2.

In other words, the discourse of psychoanalysis is not representative or explanatory of subjectivity, forms of sexuality, psychical structures or energies, or of the conditions of human knowledge, of interpersonal/social relations, or structures of power: it is productive of these domains and objects and is thus part of what Foucault has described as the deployment of sexuality.

The deployment of sexuality is Foucault's designation of an historical formation organized around the speculative element of 'sex' (see note 169, Chapter 2) which became a crucial target of the form of power emerging in the 17th and 18th centuries around principles of the administration of bodies and life — a maximization of collective and individual forces — rather than their incarceration or termination. The deployment of sexuality, without completely supplanting the deployment of alliance ("a system of marriage, of fixation and development of kinship ties, of transmission of names and possessions"), helped to reduce
its importance. The configuration of power (and knowledge) relations was thereby significantly altered:

The deployment of alliance is built around a system of rules defining the permitted and the forbidden, the licit and the illicit, whereas the deployment of sexuality operates according to mobile, polymorphous, and contingent techniques of power.¹⁷⁰

Sexuality - as a specific field of truth - was historically caught up in the form of the confession through the concept of 'the flesh' that formed the point of investigation of the confessional technology of the Christian pastoral. A coding of sexuality, the production and use of a relative silence concerning 'sex',¹⁷¹ was constituted in the dual rules of the exhaustivity demanded of the confession - a rhetoric of avowal of everything that concerned the flesh - and of its discretion. The rule of discretion was an attempt to manage the phenomenon of possession; to erect within the technology of the government of souls safeguards against the incitement of convulsions in the body. When this attempt failed, the second strategy of the expulsion of the convulsive as an object for ecclesiastical discourse was employed. The convulsive passed into the domain of the medical as the hysteric. By this annexation of 'the flesh' and its coding in the anatomy of the body as the nervous system, medicine established its authority and base in the order of sexuality.

The basic technology of psychoanalysis emerged within the medical administration of sexuality, where the confessional practices in which 'sex' was produced were given a scientific discursivity (e.g., combining techniques of
free association and recollection with those of the questionnaire and hypnosis, see p.103). This technology took the form of a hermeneutics governed by the principles of latency (that sex operates in the recesses of the body and mind where it is inaccessible to observation and to the subject) and of a general and diffuse causality (that sex is to be found in the aetiology of all disorders), driven by the imperative of medicalization (that sexuality was the focus of a specific nosography) and which probed the interface of the psyche and the soma—a work reminiscent of the church's interrogation of the relation between the penitent's soul and his flesh.

For psychoanalysis, this interface is the unconscious, a domain constituted in and suspended between the speech or confessional capacities of the analysand and the expertise of the analyst, neither of which capacities correspond to an innate 'desire to tell' or to an innate cognition, but are the effect of institutional trainings. As Donzelot remarks of the psychoanalytic apparatus:

What is new and specifically effective is the establishing of a process of circularity between the two practices of expertise and confession … This circular displacement [of the a priori judgment of an expertise] eliminates worries about manipulation, since every formulation of a social judgment is associated with its possible calling back into question through the subject's participation. The individual's resistance to norms … is thus no longer anything but an internal resistance to a process whose outcome can be a greater wellbeing for him and for it. The resistance to norms becomes a resistance to analysis, a purely negative and blind blockage in the way of one's own welfare. The strength of relational technology lies precisely in the fact that it does not impose anything—neither new social norms nor old moral rules. On the contrary, it allows them to float in relation to one another until they find their equilibrium.
Donzelot's *The Policing of Families* documents the successful circulation and institutionalization of the psychoanalytic technology within France from the 1940s, which he designates as the chief component of the 'psy-complex' that is "central to the working of diverse modern educational, welfare and supervisory practices". Psychic analysis is thus accounted for in terms of the constitution and placement of 'the individual' in specific power-knowledge relations which operate a series of relays within the domain of the social, the most important of which, in terms of the production of social subjectivities, is that between the school and the family and the courts.

Though it emerges as a differentiation within the medical apparatus for the deployment of sexuality, psychoanalysis is introduced (at least in France) as a systematic and integral practice in the social domain through the problem of scholastic maladjustment. (Accordingly, and for the sake of brevity at this stage in the thesis, we shall consider here the relay between the family and the school.) The psychoanalytic technology, mobilized at the site of the school by organizations such as the Centre-médico-psycho-pédagogique, locates in the individual student a specific interior - a domain of 'unconscious mental representations' which are used to articulate the techniques and demands of the school with the relational conditions operative in the family. Donzelot tables a 'graphic' example of the production of the unconscious - the drawing of the family:
Take a child eight to twelve years old suffering from scholastic maladjustment. Give him a piece of paper, a black pencil, and some colored pencils. Ask him to draw his family ... You are already aware that in the case of a normal family, the figures are generally distributed in two horizontal rows, the higher ones (the parents) and the lower ones (the children), and that they are drawn symmetrically with their colors serving to mark their distinctive attributes, their serious or light polarity. Thus, if the child positions all the members of the family on a single line, you can already suspect that the family is poorly structured. If he leaves out this or that member, you have the sign of a relational difficulty with the person in question, which the child wants to resolve by symbolically rubbing him out ... 175

The analyst is a technician whose job it is to produce images according to quite specific criteria. These images, attributed to the subject through his participatory 'confession', are then mobilized as the conditions, constitutive of the individual's subjectivity, for intervention into the agency of the family as the point at which something has 'gone wrong' (Lacan's definition of the Freudian unconscious) with that subjectivity. An intervention without force, without blame, and which directs the family on how to take charge of itself: an intervention called up by the 'wanting-ness' of the subject and its sexuality, by the desires of the family, and which consists of conducting the reality of one social agency into the values of another. Psychoanalysis "permits an intervention which manipulates the gap between the family's performance and social norms by re-adjusting the objectives and outlook of family members". 176

Donzelot argues that it is this technology of the conversion into one another of the social norms within which the agency of the school forms individuals ("decid-
ing on their qualification so as to orient them socio-professionally")177 and the old moral values and behaviours that the traditional family imposed on its members ("according to rules that combined genealogical determination and the strategies of alliance")178 that accounts for "the enormous diffusion of psychoanalysis".179

By linking familial behaviour to the new social norms that were challenging the family system as the essential form of social organization, psychoanalysis, by allying itself with the "tactical displacement of the old powers of family, of its external powers",180 was able to produce the family in a new mode with a new relation to the social domain. This mode is precisely that of the unconscious—that is, of interior and constitutive dysfunction. Just as it interiorizes its techniques as the unconscious or psyche of the individual, psychoanalysis provides the techniques for an interiorization of the family in which it recentred itself on the refinement of internal ways of adjusting the parent-child and man-woman relationships. It was a question of rediscovering, on this private terrain, a specific power of the family, a vital hold on its members, a capacity for qualifying its children that it was in the process of losing on the public terrain ...181

It is in the forms of the family's qualifications of its members—the unbalances likely, if not inevitable, in a complex set of relations no longer simply inscribed in a set of moral values but also set on the knife-edge of the normal and the pathological—that psychoanalysis locates the dysfunctions that are then transferred, via their disturbance of the school's production of disciplined and
useful individuals, throughout the social domain. Psychoanalysis, whose function is relational normalization, operates on this condition of dysfunction within the family, which it instates there via the relays it operates between the family and the school, the family and the juvenile and divorce courts. The family is transformed from the natural space of moral behaviours directing the individual's circulation in society to "a horizon for individuals to conquer";\textsuperscript{182} the 'failures' of the family in an organization of the social domain in which the area of the 'extrafamilial' has outstripped that of the 'intrafamilial' are thus managed. At the same time, malfunctions in the public terrain are able to be returned to their alleged private conditions:

Its [psychoanalysis'] usefulness to institutions was discerned in its ability to justify and renovate the two major frames of reference of a social order that functioned on the basis of a maximum avoidance of political issues: the social norm as a reality principle and the family, its effacement and its privileges, as a value principle.\textsuperscript{183}

Castel's work emphasizes this effectivity of the psychoanalytic technology in his concept of 'psychanalysme', one of whose meanings is "what psychoanalysis costs us".\textsuperscript{184} At the point at which the family has suffered failures in its maintenance of a domain of the 'non-political', analysis operates "as a positive force of social and political neutralisation".\textsuperscript{185}

Castel locates this effectivity, which - organizing certain power-knowledge relations - is political, in the internal apparatus of psychoanalysis (what we have called,
in order to encompass psychoanalytic discourse and the non-discursive techniques and relations it mobilizes, the psychoanalytic technology). He thus demonstrates the redundancy of the arguments which would tie the effects of psychoanalysis to the different points of application of its politically 'neutral' theory, or to the political persuasion of its 'users'. Colin Gordon usefully summarizes the bases on which Castel analyses the political effectiveness of psychoanalysis:

The logic of psychanalysisme is defined by three interdependent theses: (1) the relation between psychoanalysis and its uses is never one of simple exteriority; (2) the pure analytical relation (between analyst and analysand) has immediate and specific social effects, which are never socially neutral: the convention which governs this relation has the effect of necessarily invalidating/disqualifying the impact of power in social relations; it operates as a principle of mis-knowledge (méconnaissance), or, in other terms, induces a blindness to power; (3) the interconnection of these first two theses "makes it possible to understand, from the interior of its apparatus, the privileged place occupied today by psychoanalysis within dominant ideologies and instruments of social power".

The principle of mis-knowledge and the 'blindness to power' that it induces reiterates the power-knowledge relations of the confession and its 'liberatory' establishment of truth. The promise of the subject's liberation and health by the recovery of a truth interior to, though hidden from, the subject, makes the psychoanalytic technology a mechanism par excellence of a form of power calculated on the maximization of usefulness of docile bodies. Far from the unconscious marking the 'unknownness' of the subject (see Freud quote p.132), psychoanalysis - constituting and placing 'the individual' as a strategic, correlative element of particular power-knowledge relat-
ions - is a differentiated extension of the disciplinary apparatus producing the visible, calculable individual. Inducing the subject to speak a 'common (psychoanalytic) sense', on its own behalf and in the service of lifting a repression, the subject's 'self' management is combined with an accumulation of knowledge destined for the psychoanalytic technology:

the subject contributes willy-nilly to the analytical edifice by furnishing the analyst both with the material for a case study, a contribution to the professional literature, and with the general means for development of the analyst's theoretical and practical knowledge. 187

The psychoanalytic technology mobilizes a productive and regulatory power whose relation to the knowledges psychoanalysis articulates is one of immanence. This is the point at which the politicality of psychoanalysis is located: the point at which the psychoanalytic technology produces an institutionally mobile and politically 'docile' qualification of the formation of 'the individual' as a political anatomy - that is, an instrument of power-knowledge relations which aestheticize (generalize, unify) the specific material conditions of political struggles.

This admittedly brief presentation of a relatively recent body of work relocates psychoanalytic theory from a model of the general and timeless figure of the subject to a specific historically formed technology producing a particular and current knowledge about our pleasures, reading and writing practices, families and general social
relations, which has determinate effects in the social. In marking this shift, which is not merely the attention to 'how a theory is put into practice', but situates the political dimensions of the theory or the practice at the site of its emergence as a discourse, the point is to signal a different currency from a repeated statement of the benefits, for analyses of the production and consumption of ideologies, of decentering the subject. As Colin Gordon concludes, citing Castel,

In 'de-centring' the subject, psychoanalysis has displaced the subject's functions, that is, carried them elsewhere and further. It has literally transported into the most 'personal' domain, the unconscious, the movement of dispossessing the subject of the problematic of power which humanism had orchestrated on the level of conscious subjectivity: this is the fundamental operation which it reiterates on all levels ...

A different currency is produced for psychoanalytic theory than as the 'subversion of the subject' by constituting it not as representing a knowledge that a reader comes to 'understand', but as a set of discursive techniques and relations in which a particular readership, a particular 'subjectivity' is produced. The psychoanalytic discourse constitutes the agents which read and repeat it as bearing specific capacities: it is a training in the reproduction of the power-knowledge relations organized in psychoanalytic discourse that produce a specific historical and political anatomy - the psychoanalytic subject.
V: 'Lacan' - The Plausibility Effects

This training in the reproduction of the power-knowledge relations organized in psychoanalytic discourse - what a reading of 'Lacan' is if it is not an apprehension of a truth the Lacanian texts express - can be specified in order for my argument not to fall foul of the accusation that I am simply pointing to what Lacan, in any case, claims: "my seminar [from which the texts are taken] ... was aimed at ... the training of psychoanalysts". By specifying some of the techniques that constitute this training we can demonstrate however, that it is not simply the analyst that is being produced (a knowledge) but also the object of that knowledge - the analysand, the psychoanalytic subject which is allegedly what secures the pertinence of the knowledge.

Clearly, this specification could be an enormous task: I plan simply to make an argument, to draw up the lines of such an analysis which is not in the (impossible) business of proving the Lacanian texts wrong, but of examining the techniques in which their plausibility as a general theory emerges.

In a number of the commentaries on the Lacanian texts the practice of reading those texts is presented in terms of remarks on the difficulty of Lacan's language or style - his 'dizzying' moves between poetic forms, mathematical formulae, and philosophical constructs. Readers are
described as 'outraged' by "the apparent randomness of this procedure".190

The question is, what does 'difficulty' stand for here? We can work from a classification of 'difficulty' presented by George Steiner:

Contingent difficulties aim to be looked up; modal difficulties challenge the inevitable parochialism of honest empathy; tactical difficulties endeavour to deepen our apprehension by dislocating and goading to new life the supine energies of word and grammar. Each of these three classes of difficulty is a part of the contract of ultimate or preponderant intelligibility between poet and reader, between text and meaning ... Ontological difficulties confront us with blank questions about the nature of human speech, about the status of significance, about the necessity and purpose of the construct which we have, with more or less rough and ready consensus, come to perceive as a poem.191

... ontological difficulty seems to point to a hypostasis of language, such as we find, precisely, in the philosophy of Heidegger. It is not so much the poet who speaks, but language itself: die Sprache spricht. The authentic, immensely rare, poem is one in which 'the Being of language' finds unimpeded lodging, in which the poet is not a persona, a subjectivity 'ruling over language', but an 'openness to', a supreme listener to, the genius of speech. The result of such openness is not so much a text, but an 'act', an eventuation of Being and literal 'coming into Being'.192

Steiner's account of ontological difficulty precisely formulates this characterization of reading the Lacanian texts: that the difficulty in following them is that they mime or gesture the truth they offer which is the Being of language: that the reader must submit to moves which, allegedly, "is the way an analysis unfolds ... how one learns language".193

The 'immensely rare' poem of which Steiner speaks - where 'the being of language' finds unimpeded lodging -
can be taken as the properly realized psychoanalytic subject, namely, the analyst, who "is specially inhabited by the word and 'is more made [by language] than others'". \(^{196}\)

And the psychoanalytic subject par excellence, Lacan, writes, "I am not a poet, but a poem. A poem that is being written, even if it looks like a subject." \(^{195}\)

In other words, the difficulty of the Lacanian texts, in this presentation, lies in the complexity of their object: to read 'Lacan' is to grasp the dimensions of the (existential) psychoanalytic subject, or - what inhabits it - 'language'.

It is from any such account of a phenomenological encounter with a mediated or directly gesturing ontological domain that I want to dissociate the work of reading the Lacanian texts. Reading the Lacanian texts involves securing relations between an array of statements whose currency is drawn from a number of discontinuous discursive formations. The difficulty in reading the Lacanian texts lies not in the complexity of their object, but in the range of knowledges and the mechanisms used to produce their object - 'a being such that knowledge will be attained in him of what renders all knowledge possible'. If we are to endorse any of Steiner's classification (given its problematic formulation of knowledge relations as a 'contract' between poet and reader), it would be that of 'contingent difficulties': a productive way of reading the Lacanian texts is with a dictionary of psychoanalysis, and preferably reference sources in phenomenology, the
Classics, literature, mathematics, optics, anthropology, physiology, psychology, sociology, communication theory, linguistics, poetics ... The Lacanian texts articulate a number of different discourses, borrowing statements of principle, specific examples, statements of position against which Lacanian theory defines itself. Their intersection is in the figure of the subject as a unitary locus of effects. Our question is to what does the subject owe its status as a unitary locus? How is this common intersection secured? What writing and reading techniques are activated to unify the range of instances in which 'the subject' is presented in the text: for example, the subject who knows the way it is with the function of speech/with the Word
the supposed knowing subject (le sujet supposé savoir)
the subject who believes
the subject who sees (the optical subject)
the subject who 'hath ears to hear'
the subject who desires
the subject who lacks
the subject who is in pieces (le-corps-morcelé)
the subject who is whole (the Other - at a certain point)
the subject who is (being)
the subject who has
the subject who is specifically excluded in all of the above (the subject who does not know, does not have)
the subject who reads poetry, etc.

If we are not dealing with a natural entity to be differentiated by its functions - and Lacan is not - how
does the subject emerge as a common object for all these knowledges, and make plausible the claim that the texts present a general theory which "can be held to have relevance in our attempts to understand any signifying practice"?¹⁹⁶

There are two major strategies in which the marker 'the subject' is animated in a process whereby the subject positions organized in each discourse are made to anticipate, found, motivate, coincide, dialectically support and interpret each other, such that they coalesce to form 'the psychoanalytic subject'. The first is a formalization of the grounds of psychoanalysis which establishes a unified universal domain in which all discourses allegedly emerge; the second is an anthropomorphization which localizes this unified domain so that we read all these discourses, under the aegis of the formal structure of language, through the site of the subject.

Psychoanalysis gives itself a unified transhistorical field, a common surface for the emergence of knowledges, in its presentation of language. Language is identified with the universal character of a signifying milieu in which everyone's perceptions, actions, lives, exist:

... language ... has the universal character of a language (langue) that would be understood in all other languages (langues), but, at the same time, since it is the language that seizes desire at the very moment in which it is humanized by making itself recognized, it is absolutely particular to the subject.¹⁹⁷

This is the case whatever is signified:
Even if it communicates nothing, the discourse represents the existence of communication; even if it denies the evidence, it affirms that speech constitutes truth; even if it is intended to deceive, the discourse speculates on faith in testimony. 196

In these formulations, language is autonomous and ahistoric, a formal, self-evident fact because it is anterior to any of the knowledges in which it may be particularized, or made evident. This repeats the articulation of language in the structural anthropology of Lévi-Strauss where language is synonymous with 'meaning' as an instantaneous and originary event:

Whatever the moment or circumstance of its appearance in some stage of animal life, language could only have come into being instantaneously. Things could not have come to be meaningful little by little ... this radical change has no counterpart within the domain of knowledge, which is developed slowly and progressively. In other words, at the moment when the entire universe, at once, became meaningful, it was not known any better for this, even if it is true that the appearance of language must have precipitated the rhythm of the development of knowledge. 199

This essential division between meaning and knowledge is imported into Lacan's concept of the Symbolic order (as the distinction between the symbolic function and the historical signifieds it induces), which is primarily derived from Lévi-Strauss' anthropology. It is repeated in Lacan's call for a formalization of psychoanalysis along the lines of "true science whose claims have been inscribed in a tradition beginning with Plato's Theaetetus" 200 - that is, for its grounding in the ultimate reality of the symbolic function as distinct from the inessential ephemera of positivist experiment and immed-
iate empirical detail. Similarly, the formal, self-evident nature of language is presented in its mathematicization; the location of "the laws of number - that is to say, the laws of the most refined of all symbols\textsuperscript{201} as immanent to the Symbolic order.

By rehearsing these discourses the Lacanian texts mobilize an account of a set of unified conditions of representation which positions the reader of these texts not in relation to their eventuality - that is, the particular statements and specific formations of the texts - but in relation to meaning-in-general, of which the Lacanian texts are specific forms. The Lacanian texts' challenge to their reader is that of understanding the activity of reading - where this is conceived as grasping anew his/her relation as a subject to meaning. A specific instance of this positioning of the reader is the Lacanian project's presentation of itself as the return to the literality of Freud's 'letter', that is, to the truth of psychoanalysis. By endorsing the concept of a return to an 'unread' (i.e., incorrectly read) but available set of texts - of the adequation of a problematic to the truth - the Lacanian problematic repeats a formation that maintains text and reading as distinct objects. This 'return to Freud' provides the Lacanian subversion of philosophy with its historical credentials - that is, the break with a philosophy of consciousness is posed as something which already exists to be recovered - while maintaining the actual site of the alleged break as 'masked' by the concepts Freud was forced to borrow from the knowledges
his theory was subverting. The division between text and reading marks the Lacanian problematic's continuity with other theories of reading that provide the criteria for adequate or inadequate representations of texts (see p.23). As with the presentation of the 'fact' of language this 'truth' of psychoanalysis elides the actual reading of the Lacanian texts to the site of the 'good reader' who can recognize their truth - "whoever hath ears to hear".

But the 'good reader', the reader for whom psychoanalytic theory is plausible, is not a subject with a certain perception (or gullibility), who stumbles onto the Lacanian texts by chance. The 'good reader' is a site constructed within the texts for agents, bearing institutionally produced reading practices that psychoanalytic theory iterates, to occupy. From this position, the 'fact' of language, which is the 'truth' of psychoanalysis, is visible.

What are the conditions of visibility of this fact? They are not the good reader for the good reader is coterminous with this fact. We must ask, what are the conditions of visibility or plausibility of the 'fact' of language and of its perception and of their division, and similarly of the division between texts and readings, between language and knowledge, between langue and langues, between the anteriority of language and the subject as an effect of this anteriority. It is on these divisions that psychoanalysis rests its claim as a knowledge able to designate belief or mis-knowledge, and erect a hierarchy of discourses in which linguistics, structural
anthropology, mathematics and poetics (i.e., where psycho-
analysis locates the symbolic function amongst 'first
principles') designate a truth mis-taken by psychology,
sociology or the 'commonsense' filtered down from a
philosophy of the subject. We shall consider and question
two instances of the presentation of the formal structure
of language as a foundational truth - that is, as an
object for (anterior to, divided off from) a recognition.

The first is the 'elucidation' of language via an
explanation of poetic function. The recognition of the
effects and conditions of metonymy ('the properly signifying function ... depicted in language') is given in the
Lacanian texts by citing a familiar training ('we learned
this name in some grammar of our childhood') and interpreting a line of poetry. The example 'thirty sails' is
given: the principle 'part standing for whole' explained
and the oscillating presence/absence of the missing word
'ship' commented on. From this instance metonymy is estab-
lished as "one side ... of the effective field constituted
by the signifier" - or as a property of language. In this
claim the signifiers are effectively taken to stand, not
for another occulted signifier which will signify some
designated 'whole', but for (the structure of) language.

But couldn't the reader object to this slippage from
the limited sphere of action of metonymy to the universal
domain of an ontological entity: say, 'that's just
poetry', and ask how metonymy, a poetic device, stands as
a property of a universal entity, language? Why should its
function be recognized as extending beyond the poetic
training in which it is produced? For example, another account of why 'wheels' means 'car' could be that the relation is produced according to the recognition techniques of a slang — and we need not claim for this shifting and informal training that occurs at specific historical and institutional junctures the authority of a function of the 'structure of language'.

What gives 'the poetic' jurisdiction over an account like that given for slang? It is certainly not the 'rights' of jurisdiction of a discourse — that one represents the conditions of representation and another falls on the side of an inessential effect of representation: it is a question of its materiality, of its strategic repetition. The presentation of poetic devices is made coterminous in the Lacanian texts with a discourse that presents language as an epistemological object to be specified in terms of its universal function, first principles, base units.

Consider this "reminder of first principles" in "The Function of Language in Psychoanalysis":

what defines any element whatever of a language as belonging to Language, is that, for all the users of this language, this element is distinguished as such in any given set made up of homologous elements. The result is that the particular effects of this element of Language are intimately linked to the existence of the set or whole, anterior to any possible liaison with any particular experience of the subject. Considering this last liaison to be exterior to any reference to the first, consists simply in denying in this element the function proper to Language ...

What is being defined is not an element (i.e., how it is differentiated from a mass), but under what conditions an
element belongs to Language. And that condition of possibility is, when it is distinguished in any given set made up of homologous elements. Now, a set made up of 'homologous elements' or 'a set of elements having the same relation' introduces the concept of structure: a reading can then be - an element is recognized as belonging to Language when it is seen in a structure.

Then, we are given that this has a result, which is that the particular effects of this element are intimately linked to the existence of the set or whole, anterior to any possible liaison with any particular experience of the subject. The 'first principle' of Language as structure is established. But hasn't this result taken the form of a proof? - the repetition of a statement? That is, the fact that an element of Language belongs to a structure has been given at the outset as the condition of possibility of the element's belonging to Language.

In other words, the 'first principles' of 'language' that guarantee it as the condition of possibility of all discourses cannot be demonstrated in the Lacanian texts as other than a repetition of the particular discourse of Saussurean linguistics (or, at other times, of foundational mathematics). It is this specific repetition that provides some of the conditions of visibility for the 'fact' of language. Others, and the conditions of plausibility of the perception of this fact (the plausibility of the 'good reader', or the subject position organized in the Lacanian texts), are given in the repetition of state-
ments with a wider institutional currency: statements of language as an epistemological object specified in terms of its relation to intersubjectivity, the community, culture. These repetitions form the second strategy mobilized in the Lacanian texts which I have termed the anthropomorphization of 'language'. Some examples follow.

The Lacanian texts, to establish the materiality of language, at times present it as body:

The Word is in fact a gift of Language, and Language is not immaterial. It is a subtle body, but body it is. Words are trapped in all the corporeal images which captivate the subject; they can make the hysteric pregnant, be identified with the object of penis-neid, represent the flood of urine of urethral ambition, or the retained faeces of avaricious jouissance. Sometimes, securing its resonance with Logos, it is psychologized: "the Imaginary intentions of the discourse", "a Word which has given up trying to 'make itself recognized'."

More frequently, the anthropomorphization of language (assigning it attributes commonly read as designating 'the human'), and to which the former techniques contribute, is the ascription to it, over and beyond its formal structure, of a certain nature or 'Being' displaced by shifting the site of speech (with that term's connotations of performance and immediacy) from man to language - a displacement achieved by the presentation of the 'fact' of the anteriority of language to the subject. This ascription of 'Being' is concomitant with the account of the 'existential' effects of language. It is the Being of language that invests our lives with their reality and directs their course:
The form in which language is expressed itself defines subjectivity. Language says: 'You will go here, and when you see this, you will turn off there'. In other words, it refers itself to the discourse of the other. As such it is enveloped in the highest function of speech, in as much as speech commits its author by investing the person to whom it is addressed with a new reality, as for example, when by a 'You are my wife', a subject marks himself with the seal of wedlock.  

What makes plausible the junction psychoanalysis secures between language as a formal abstract structure (which is its passport of universal authority) and 'everyday' subjectivity is instanciated in the fact that the key-signifier, the primary signifier to which the subject is (constitutively) subjected is presented as the phallus - a passage of identity, as Wilden notes, never clearly explained. In the central accounts of the constitution of the subject in language, the signifier is the phallus, specifying it as an object belonging to the domain of 'the human'. Certainly the phallus is not the penis, but it does not have to be - the signifier becomes present and then fades along the metonymic chain of desire. To borrow from Lacan, "How is it that nobody has ever thought of connecting this with ... the effect of an erection?" (This is not too crude a transposition. At that point, Lacan is writing of the anamorphic function of the gaze, which shares with the signifier the essential function of lack that underlies what the subject finds knowable or visible.)

This 'humanizing' of the identity of the signifier is central in the accounts of the constitution of the subject. To start with, by deferring the subject's birth
through the presentation of the embryologist's concept of a real specific prematurity of birth, psychoanalysis claims the formation of the subject's 'being' - in other accounts simultaneous with its birth - as falling within its jurisdiction. The *infans* achievement of 'Being' - as fiction - is thus made to coincide with the entry into the Imaginary which, though located within the symbolic matrix, is only 'relatively determined' by the structure of language. The subject passes from this Imaginary state of 'being' when he accedes - the moment of his humanization - to the Being of language in his entry into the Symbolic order. But the subject accedes to language only by language being specifically anthropomorphized. The Oedipus narrative, however much it is disclaimed as actually depicting the essential constitutive moment, is a significant support of the account of the generation of subjectivity. At some point in the account the signifier is necessarily the Symbolic Father and the phallus, in order that a mathematical description of sociality (the dual relation of the 'marks' that denote difference and permit combination, and the introduction of a ternary term lifting everything to a second degree of difference) be transcribed to a personalized account of intersubjectivity and its arrangement in a Culture that imposes on Nature a particular coding of sexual activity. (A similar personalization occurs in Irigaray's account of the *infans*, which positions it in relation to the *mother's* and *father's* dialogue, and, in the Lacanian mirror-phase, while we are told that the image of the motor-coordinated body from which the *infans* anticipates its own maturity may be the
child's own reflection, at certain retellings it is precisely the image of the mother's body.)

In the 'paternal metaphor', which is the successful resolution of the Oedipal complex, metaphor, a formal mechanism of language, is joined to a biography and interiorized in a life history of 'the child' (but also of the species). Metaphor produces not simply a poetic trope but a human identity. Again, language resonates with the concepts of logos and the 'flesh of the Word': the bestowing of the proper name begets the human being. Metaphor and metonymy sustain the subject in its everyday existence; they are not simply linguistic devices, impinging on the sphere of 'life' 'metaphorically' - where 'metaphorically' might designate a surface effect. To restate this, metaphor and metonymy are presented in the Lacanian texts as the real articulators of power and knowledge: the metaphor is a symptom and metonymy is desire - indeed, "man defies his very destiny when he derides the signifier". 214

A thumbnail sketch of the marrying of metaphor-metonymy with a biography is provided by recounting Lacan's exemplification of these mechanisms with the "well known line of Victor Hugo: His sheaf was neither miserly nor spiteful ...",215 in which we meet 'Booz' and learn the essentials of his character, physiology and history. When we are told that "it is between the signifier in the form of the proper name of a man and the signifier that metaphorically abolishes him that the poetic spark is
produced" we are witnessing the shift worked by metaphor from signifier to person: why has the signifier abolished 'him' and not simply 'a personal pronoun' — another signifier? If this seems overly pedantic, it is simply following the Lacanian presentation of metaphor, such that 'metaphorically abolishes' is not to be read as producing an appearance of abolition, but designates the mechanism which effects it. Language does not produce metaphors of repression: repression occurs in metaphor.

But the linkage of formal functions of language to biographies is more significantly located in the space of 'the child'. The Lacanian account of the constitution of the subject in language takes the particular form of how a child acquires speech or enters language once and for all — according to the trajectory of the biographic genre which traces a subject from birth to childhood to becoming, or not, a support of the social order. The activation of biographic reading and writing practices is a central point in the plausibility of the Lacanian texts' account of the subject as a unitary locus of effects. Because the account works on the child, or more precisely, on the infans (without language and therefore undifferentiated from its surroundings), the question of identity which the child acquires when it enters into language is organized along the axes of non-identity/identity. The category acts as a blank and unitary space that is decisively written on at a later stage; a blank space that is just a play of signifiers and an uncoordinated body which only later forms a decisive anchoring-point or
identity through the insistence of one signifier above all others, the phallus. This is a device in the Lacanian texts that organizes the story into a convincing account of opposites – absence/presence, non-sense/sense, material/meaning, non-identity/identity, undifferentiated need/sexed desire. It is this organization that allows the interiorization, or assignment of a unitary locus to, the division of essence and appearance accommodated in the Lacanian account of the formal structure of language.

Without the mobilization of these familiar reading and writing practices, which enable the Lacanian texts to draw on a readership with a wide institutional currency, language would not be 'seen' to have the effect of constituting the familiar individual (if divided) subject. Without the blank unitary space of 'the child' in which language, repeating its own originary event, creates a certain threshold of subjectivity, one could propose a different account of the organization of the site of the subject – for example, in terms of a number of differentiated 'presences', different senses, discontinuous identities according to the shifting and institutionally differentiated discursive and non-discursive practices in which identities and meanings are secured and through which a 'body' is deployed. In such an account there would be no place for a category of a foundational material on the side of non-sense, non-identity, the 'raw material' of subjectivity; material is always discursively organized in heterogeneous relations.
In the same way that the 'fact' of language is produced by the repetition of certain discursive formations, so is the 'subject as an effect of language' produced by the regulated intersection of those discursive formations and the iteration of discursive formations presenting what we are trained to read as an everyday, common sense representation of subjectivity - the subjectivity we are all familiar with from reading biographies in novels or newspapers or on television, and producing our own for teachers, families and employers.

The conditions of plausibility of the Lacanian texts - the conditions in which the figure of the psychoanalytic subject is plausible (i.e., the conditions in which we can 'recognize', read or repeat the criteria of the psychoanalytic subject) - are a set of discursive techniques which, as well as effecting new intersections between linguistics and other knowledges, activate already established readerships or reading practices in which are deployed the relations organized in, for example, biographical narratives and the 'common sense' filtered down from a philosophy of the subject (e.g., that human beings have a certain capacity for knowledge of essential truths). These relations form a machinery of interrogation, identification and repetition for reading a text as a common surface where the reader's character, the characters presented in the text, and the character of the author may communicate. In the Lacanian texts - through the formalization of language as a separate identity from the subject - this machinery can be supplemented by the 'character' of
language. It is only from language, or the subject position which can perceive the truth of language (or the good reader/the analyst/the properly realized psychoanalytic subject inhabited by language) that a man's biography or history, or the category of 'common sense' or the 'everyday' can be interrogated in the Lacanian texts. Biographies and 'common sense' are thus never questioned as to their material, institutional conditions, but as the 'fictions' or appearances of which psychoanalysis, "inhabiting fiction as the master of the house, as the law of the house and as the economy of fiction", must show the constitutive truth.

The psychoanalytic subject - the subject presented as a unitary locus of effects - is not formed 'in language'. Like other subjectivities, it is formed in an ensemble of discursive and non-discursive techniques. It is with reference to these material relations - for example, the didactic apparatuses we find in the classroom and the cinema for producing and consuming 'subjectivity' - that forms of intervention in a particular subjectivity must be calculated, and not on the Lacanian claim that:

the slightest alteration in the relation between man and the signifier ... changes the whole course of history by modifying the moorings that anchor his being.
NOTES


3. Ibid., p.29.


12. Ibid., p.365, footnote (β).

13. Ibid., p.339, emphasis added.


15. "Displacement is also to be observed in the secondary process, but here its range is limited and it only involves small quantities of energy." Ibid., p.122.


18. "Thought is after all nothing but a substitute for a hallucinatory wish ... nothing but a wish can set our mental apparatus at work." S. Freud, *op. cit.*, Vol. 5 (1953), p.567.


20. That is, not 'extreme materialism', which "asserts that the real world consists of material things, varying in their states and relations, and nothing else" (The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 5, p.179), as Freud maintains the 'relative autonomy' of consciousness from its material conditions. This places it, according to The Encyclopedia, as well as psychoanalysts such as W. Reich, in the same category as dialectical materialism.


31. A parallel observation is made regarding Freud's racial origins, but curiously the implications drawn for Marxism are not made for psychoanalysis. Marx's "activistic symbols of protest" are inappropriate antedotes to insecurity but, unaccountably, the products of another racial insecurity are preferable and taken to provide the conditions for a critique of the former: "the rearrangement of the environment at an accelerated rate as an escape from insecurity does not bring serenity, and possibly the broader sweep of historical development will pass through the present acute crises of activism to the devaluation of material rearrangements in favor of the internalization of fantasy." H.D. Lasswell, World Politics and Personal Insecurity (N.Y., The Free Press, 1963), pp.216-217.

32. Ibid., p.99.

33. A. Collier, op. cit., p.65.


37. Ibid., p.12.

38. Ibid., p.4.


40. Ibid., p.2.

41. Ibid., p.4.

42. P. Slater, op. cit., p.107.


44. This is, clearly, a simplification. What the 'irrational' and 'unjust' stand for here are the 'death-drive' of the organism (and the resultant behaviour – aggression, sadism and masochism) and the accompanying cruelties and injustices the satisfaction of this drive produces in society. The concept of the 'death-drive', which only features in Freud's post-1920 writings, was rejected by the Frankfurt School because to countenance a natural destructive instinct would invalidate their theory of class-society being founded
on the historical repression or distortion of man's creative capacities and instincts. If the death-drive is natural and not the distortion of sexual instincts (e.g., Fromm's relation of the phenomenon of fascism and impotence) the repression is not the barrier to be swept away to attain a class-less society, but the universal condition of any society.

However, while rejecting Freud's death-drive theory, critical social theory continued to use the concept of the super-ego as central to their theory of ideology, and, for Freud, the agency of the super-ego was derived from the death-drive. This failure to argue against, and implicit retention of, Freud's cultural pessimism has its concomitant in the Frankfurt School's failure to do more than explain the absence of a revolutionary class-consciousness. For a good discussion of the limitation of the Frankfurt School's 'historical materialist psychology' see P. Slater, op. cit., esp. pp.99-104.

45. R. Jacoby, op. cit., p.6.
46. Ibid., p.21.
47. Ibid., p.10.
48. For instances of these studies and arguments see H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization (Boston, Beacon Press, 1966), esp. pp.89-105.
   E. Zaretsky, Capitalism, The Family, & Personal Life (N.Y., Harper & Row, 1976). Zaretsky presents a more recent 'summary' of critical social theory's critique of subjectivity: "Until our own times all human relations were integrated with, and subordinated to, the imperatives of economic production ... But with the socialization of production a split opened between work and life, between the family and the economy, which has given rise to a new idea unrealizable under capitalism: that of human relations and human beings as an end in themselves. It is this idea that gives the family, and such institutions as romantic love or childhood, their unique modern character. As it currently prevails this idea is ideological ... the contemporary proletariat, having no private property to uphold, upholds the 'self' as an autonomous realm outside society. The idea of 'life-style' expresses this ideology. At the same time this ideology expresses a realistic possibility: that of a society in which the production of necessary goods is a subordinate part of social life and in which the purposes and character of labour are determined by the individual members of society. The ideal of a life no longer dominated by relations of production has an old and elitist history: it has been the province of philosophers, aristocrats, courtiers, mystics, and
then in the nineteenth century, artists and intellectuals. In contemporary society it has been achieved in a distorted and mangled form by the entire working class. Socialism will make possible the realization of that ideal on a democratic and universal basis." p.143.


52. "What she [the woman who seeks psychoanalytic guidance] actually discovers is that the conditions against which she chafes are sanctioned by a massive structure of data and theory which she can only adapt to for there is no hope of shifting it ... "Psychologists cannot fix the world so they fix women." "Basically it all comes down to the same fact; the Freudian system describes the status quo as a desideratum of the nineteenth-century middle class." G. Greer, The Female Eunuch (London, MacGibbon & Kee, 1971), p.90 & p.96.

"... in a society where all the material rewards did not go to those endowed with penises there would be no natural envy of that regalia. We know why blacks try to whiten their skins. But ... Freud himself is really convinced that women lack something, that there is something missing, rather like the psychoanalyst who reassures his patients with the words: 'Don't worry, you do not have an inferiority complex, you are inferior'." E. Figes, Patriarchal Attitudes. Women in Society (London, Faber and Faber, 1970), pp.144-5.


54. Kristeva constructs an account of the revolutionary potential inherent in 'signifying practice'. The conception of language as 'signifying practice' is opposed to the formalism of Saussurean linguistics and the static nature of the problematic of the sign presented in this linguistics by a signifying practice's "intrinsic belonging ... to the mode of production of the socio-economic ensemble" (a) and by its dialectical nature ... "We shall call signifying practice the setting in place and the cutting through or traversing of a system of signs". (b)
The dialectic forms between a fixing, positioning practice that, by limiting and unifying what can be signified, establishes the logical, syntactic structure of language—between this, designated as the symbolic (to be distinguished from its usage in Lacanian theory) and a process that runs at variance to this ordering, that contradicts it, unfixes, breaks up, opens language out into significances beyond the denotative: this is the semiotic (to be distinguished from its general usage as 'theory of signs'). The symbolic works at the level of the signifier/signified, is the functioning of language as communication or expenditure, and is that area privileged in theory as the system of language. The semiotic is registered as displacements (rhythm, alliteration, syntactic change) and supplements (gestures, graphemes, figures) to the system of language, and in Western society has been traditionally relegated to the marginal spaces of poetry, religious rites and texts, holiness, the feminine, madness, magic. This relegation occurs in a signifying practice which privileges the symbolic at the expense of the semiotic, and this privileging in turn occurs within and supports a mode of production that similarly favours the unifying instance that forms the state and family. One of the mechanisms by which it produces 'unifying instances' is the unified subject, which experiences its identity as an identity with a particular institution, or symbolic system.

The revolutionary potential of the semiotic (which precedes the symbolic, is repressed in its formation and yet can exceed the symbolic) is that its privileging in signifying practice is concomitant with putting the subject 'in process' (i.e., into the process or flux of the drives or soma) so that it "cuts across, at an angle as it were, the social institutions in which it had previously recognized itself", (c) and thus alters the social formation.

The subject is 'put into process' by three agencies: religion, psychoanalysis and avant-garde textual practice, of which only the last two offer a true recognition of language as practice, and the production of the unified subject as a fixing of that practice, and, it follows, a recognition of the conditions that must be promoted for an unpinning of the structure that secures social order. But while psychoanalytic discourse provides the correct cognition of the semiotic and, in fact, is a condition of Kristeva's discourse, psychoanalytic practice is argued to favour structure by helping the subject to suture a new identity that will allow it to function institutionally. So it falls to avant-garde textual practice to best articulate psychoanalytic truth and repeat the naming-function (analogous to Lacan's mirror-phase, see p.157) not as another and different fixing of identity, but "as the condition of an infinite semiotic traversing" (d).
Kristeva's project presents an idealist politics in which the true consciousness of the avant-garde can direct the liberation of a repressed essence. As with all theories of repression based on a concept of power as negative or non-productive, the weaponry of 'liberation' is paradoxical. It must call on that which requires liberating for the means to liberate. The repressed can apparently pull these means from the 'memory' of its original 'freedom' - the condition necessary for it to be described as the repressed rather than the effect of power. The status of 'memory' is akin to the status of the inscription of the semiotic in the symbolic, which is extremely problematic given the stipulation of the semiotic's 'otherness' in relation to the symbolic. The discrepancy between the semiotic's status as repressed by the symbolic and its potential to transform the social formation organized by the symbolic echoes the problematic relation of 'relative autonomy' between the Imaginary and the Symbolic in Lacanian theory (p.160) and between the political/ideological and the economic in Althusser's theory of the social formation (p.154).

Briefly, the problem with the concept of relative autonomy is that it rests on the dialectical principle of structural causality in which, while it is argued that no one instance of the structure can account for or reproduce/represent its totality because of the material specificity of each instance, access to the totality is resurrected in the designation of an over-determining instance. Thus an attempt to tie the non-unified instances of the social formation to their material conditions is undone by the maintenance of an idealist perspective of the totality - in Althusser's case, the perspective of science; in Kristeva's case, of the avant-garde; and in Lacan's case, of he who understands 'the way it is with the Word'.

This idealist perspective homogenizes what Kristeva presents as a materialist base for political calculations into a familiar account of an aesthetics of struggle. This and the logocentrism of Kristeva's theory confines its political potential to the setting up of an alternative canon of literary texts in which the semiotic and its alleged expression in 'marginal' texts is privileged.

J. Kristeva, "Signifying Practice and Mode of Production" in Edinburgh Magazine, No. 1 (1976), pp.67-75, (a), (b), (c), p.64 and (d), p.73.

55. Irigaray takes her argument for a rethinking of woman's cultural and social position in a phallocentric order from the biological formation of the erotogenic zones of woman. That a woman's sex is not 'one' - not a penis, and in rejection of Freud, not the absence of a penis - but two lips constantly in touch with each other, is alleged to be the register of her specificity. Paradoxically, this is held to be
a non-specificity in relation to the Western 'logic of the gaze' (said to be constituted in the scopic drives of voyeurism and exhibitionism) which constantly seeks the individuation of form: "Whence that mystery which she represents in a culture that claims to enumerate everything, to cipher everything by units. She is neither one nor two." (a) It is in this non-specificity of woman that the hope of a new theory of relations is embodied. For, "Woman enjoys something so close that she cannot possess it nor be possessed... Which calls into question every current economy." (b)

Irigaray resists endorsing any strategies which would lend force to this radical questioning. If we could reach "the beginnings of sexual life in the little girl" it would be only to find that "woman's desire would not speak the same language as man's, and it would have been buried [récouvert] by the logic which has dominated the west since the Greeks." (c)

To give voice to a desire that is before and outside our present language would, Irigaray suggests, be to lose it one more time in a simple reversal of, and final return to, phallocentrism. We are shown the truth and the desire of woman, and it is invisible in the prevailing logic of the gaze which is synonymous with western civilization.


56. This is not to argue that Althusser's writings were the exclusive theoretical condition. For example, the utilization of Barthes' development of a semiotics as the systematic investigation of the signifying practices of a culture is clear. However the importance of Althusser's advance in establishing the effectivity of the ideological within a restructured concept of the social formation cannot be underestimated. It allowed, for example, a critical film practice and critique to relocate the site of its political calculations from the overt political content or depiction of the 'real' which subjects would 'experience' to the internal specifications of the cinematic apparatus. (Of course, film theory could also draw here on Eisenstein's account of the inherently dialectical potential of filmic techniques such as montage.)


58. Ibid., p.184.

59. Althusser summarizes this reading in the following: "The most dangerous of these temptations [to reduce the unconscious] are those of philosophy (which gladly
reduces the whole of the psycho-analysis to the dual experience of the cure and thereby 'verifies' the themes of phenomenological intersubjectivity, of the existence-project, or more generally of personalism); of psychology which appropriates most of the categories of psycho-analysis as so many attributes of a 'subject' in which, manifestly, it sees no problem; finally, of sociology which comes to the aid of psychology by providing it with an objective content for the 'reality principle' (social and familial imperatives) which the 'subject' need only 'internalize' to be armed with a 'super-ego' and the corresponding categories." ibid., p.187, footnote 2.

60. Ibid., p.179.
61. Ibid., p.184.
62. Ibid., p.179.


64. Albeit 'history' conceived as a unifying teleological process.


66. "... there is no practice except by and in an ideology", ibid., p.159.
67. P. Hirst, op. cit., p.38.
68. "... there is no ideology except by the subject and for subjects", L. Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses", op. cit., p.159.

69. Ibid., pp.136-7.

70. In which ideology is "essentially a manifestation or emanation of the reification of commodities (which are all-pervading in advanced capitalist society), and therefore wholly determined in a reflectionist manner by the economy writ large". R. McDonough, "Ideology as False Consciousness: Lukács" in On Ideology, Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham, (London, Hutchinson, 1978), pp.33-44, this citation p.41.

71. L. Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses", op. cit., p.158.
72. Ibid., p.163.
73. Ibid., p.169.


75. J. Lacan, Écrits: A Selection, A. Sheridan trans., (London, Tavistock, 1977), p.4. The concept of an extended foetal period is used also by sociologists, and marks out for them the ontogenetic sphere of intercourse between the biological and the social: "... if one looks at the matter in terms of organismic development, it is possible to say that the foetal period in the human being extends through about the first year after birth. Important organismic developments, which in the animal are completed in the mother's body, take place in the human infant after its separation from the womb." P.L. Berger & T. Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1973), p.66.

77. Ibid., p.1.


79. Ibid., p.137.


82. Loc. cit.

83. Except in psychosis. But as psychosis is precisely a failure to enter the Symbolic or language, the misrecognition laid down in the Imaginary is not regained in the Symbolic; it is a case of the subject remaining tied to the Imaginary which it takes as real.

85. A. Lemaire, op. cit., p.67.

87. It is helpful to think of this 'splitting of the subject' in the following terms. 'Splitting' is the constitutive property of a subject, not a violence done to a previously whole subject. In so far as the
splitting is a violence it is done to the imaginary 'whole' of the specular I or ego.


89. Ibid., p.5.


91. A. Lemaire, op. cit., p.82.


94. Ibid., p.102, emphasis added.

95. The capitalizing of the Other designates that the subject's relation to an-other is never interpersonal, but that intersubjectivity is situated only in the domain of Otherness, because each subject is constituted in the structure of what is other to it - i.e., the unconscious, whose order is that of the signifier (thus Lacan says the unconscious is the discourse of, or from, the Other) - an alienating identification precociously realized in the mirror-phase when the infans specularly assumes its self as lying elsewhere, in the image. Thus in any dual relationship what is hidden is the third or median term of the Other or the unconscious. The 'ones' of the dual relationship are only 'one' through the locus of the Other/the unconscious/the structure of the signifier. That is, it is a 'oneness' split by Otherness, and it is only in this split that what (in ignorance of its constitution) the subject imagines to be a one-to-one relation can occur. "The relation of the subject to the Other is entirely produced in a process of gap." Ibid., p.206.


99. Ibid., p.221.

100. Ibid., p.ix.


104. Ibid., p.49.

105. Ibid., p.40, emphasis added.

106. Ibid., p.293.

107. Ibid., p.166.

108. Ibid., p.165.

109. Ibid., p.152, emphasis added.

110. Ibid., p.153.


113. Ibid., p.298.

114. Ibid., p.156.

115. Loc. cit.

116. Metaphor is "the symbolic displacement brought into play in the symptom", ibid., p.51.


119. Ibid., p.157.

120. Ibid., p.164.

121. Loc. cit.


125. Ibid., p.251.


128. This ambiguity concerns the relations of the pleasure principle and the reality principle. It is a question of whether we can talk of a distinct, material 'reality' exerting an independent influence on the psyche, or whether the reality principle that bears on the psyche cannot be distinguished from its psychical genesis.

Laplanche and Pontalis tell us that, "What psychoanalysis understands by 'access to reality' cannot be reduced either to the idea of a capacity to discriminate between the unreal and the real, or to the notion of phantasies and unconscious desires being put to the test on contact with an outside world which would indeed in that case be the sole authority." (a)

In other words, the 'real' is not simply given, and is not reflected as such in the psyche. This maintains the complexity and productivity of psychoanalytic theory: its refusal to countenance a predeterminism of the organism either at the level of instincts or of the environment. However the attempt to account for the genesis (or historical dimension) of psychical formations and to argue for the relative autonomy of psychical mechanisms (that they are not just reflections of biological or other realities external to the psyche) leads Freud to formulate at various points not simply a complex perspective on the psychical apparatus, but in places, a dual perspective. This applies to the concept of the 'ego', which is central to the question of the genesis of the reality principle because "psychoanalysis seeks to base the intervention of the reality principle on a particular type of instinctual energy said to be more specifically in the service of the ego." (b)

So that, in a first perspective, the ego "has been developed out of the id's cortical layer, which, through being adapted to the reception and exclusion of stimuli, is in direct contact with the external world (reality) ..." (c), while in a second perspective, the ego is formed by the precipitation in the psyche of images arising from the other person. Thus, "it becomes an internal formation originating from certain privileged perceptions which derive not from the external world in general, but specifically from the interhuman world." (d).

It is this second perspective that Lacan repeats by directing all forms of perception through the signifier (e.g., the relation, or split, between the eye and the gaze) (e), which structures the interhuman world.
(a) Laplanche & Pontalis, *op. cit.*, p.382.
(b) Ibid., p.379.
(d) Laplanche & Pontalis, *op. cit.*, p.142.

134. Ibid., p.159.
141. Clearly, a number of further readings could be presented in Section III. These readings, indicated on p.145, articulate the Lacanian informed theory of ideology with film and literary theory. For example, Metz's "The Imaginary Signifier" in *Screen*, Vol.16, no.2 (1975), pp.14-76, sets out an analysis of the cinema as signifier, and the film text as organized by a series of 'looks' (the scopic drives objectified in mirrors, lenses, camera apparatus) positioning actors, characters and viewers such that film viewing is structured as a system of voyeuristic pleasure, and film theory is the work of properly symbolizing the imaginary of visual pleasure. This use of semiotics and psychoanalysis for a political understanding and reading of film marked the Screen project from the mid '70's. (For an account of the Screen project, see T. O'Regan, "On Screen" in *media interventions* (1981), pp.44-62.)
Similarly, Jameson's "Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan: Marxism, Psychoanalytic Criticism, and the Problem of the Subject", in Yale French Studies, Nos.55/56 (1977), pp.338-395, examines the possible analysis of the literary object - presented as emerging in "a dialectic between individual desire and fantasy and the collective nature of language and reception" (p.342) - in terms of the Lacanian and allegedly materialist reformulation of this dialectic as the distinction between the Imaginary and the Symbolic. (For an account of some of the uses and some of the problems with a Lacanian informed literary criticism, see C. Greenfield, "Psychoanalysis And Literary Criticism" in Southern Review, Vol.14, No.3 (November 1981), pp.195-211, esp. pp.206-9.)

Not all of these readings have been uncritical of Lacanian theory. Heath's "Difference", in Screen, Vol.19, No.3 (1978), pp.51-112, is concerned to establish that "The constant limit of the theory is the phallus, the phallic function" (p.66). However, this criticism does not mark a break with psychoanalysis: Heath is quick to remark of this 'constant limit' - "but then the problem [of the representation of sexuality and woman], the debate, is precisely there" (p.66). The site of the (psychoanalytic) subject remained, despite criticism of Lacanian-Freudian psychoanalysis, as the necessary area of investigation for a critique of ideology.

Other critiques, for example the work of Deleuze and Guattari, which propose a break with psychoanalysis, present admirable formulations ("Interpretation and subjectivation are the two maladies of the modern world, which psychoanalysis hasn't invented, but for which it has found the perfectly appropriate technique of maintenance and propagation." G. Deleuze, "Four Propositions On Psychoanalysis" in Language, Sexuality & Subversion, P. Foss & M. Morris eds., (Sydney, Feral Publications, 1978), pp.135-140, this citation p.138), but they treat the Lacanian-Freudian theory of the unconscious and desire as a misrecognition and see their project as proposing a different account of the nature of the unconscious.

I have presented only a reading of the Althusserian and Lacanian texts in the body of the thesis, taking this reading to be conditional for the others indicated, and calculating the main work of this thesis to be the presentation of a different and oppositional currency of 'the subject', circulating in such publications as m/f and I & C.

This article is in response to L. Irigaray's "That Sex Which Is Not One", published in the same collection, pp.161-173, which presents the repression of woman in terms of her subjection to the 'logic of the gaze' which, as the principle of individuating representation, forms the coding of power in patriarchal society. Foss extends this account, arguing that in order to understand the exercise of power the effects of representation (or the constitutive 'entry into language') must be scrutinized - that is, the threshold of subjectivity, the structuring of desire, the passage into identity which is simultaneously understood as the entry into the social and the institutionalization of bodies.

For a critique of this account of 'interiorized' power, see C. Greenfield & T. O'Regan, "Problems with Post Freudo-Marxist analysis", op. cit.


146. Ibid., pp.69-70.

147. Ibid., p.76.

148. Ibid., p.77.

149. Ibid., p.83.

150. Ibid., p.85.

151. "Freud's construct remains within the confines of what a person himself can say about himself and his behavior on the basis of his own internal apprehension. Freud, to be sure, directs introspection along new pathways, makes it penetrate other levels of the psyche, but he does not relinquish introspection as the sole method of authenticating the reality of psychical events." Ibid., p.77.

152. Ibid., p.79.

153. We could also consider Wittgenstein's remarks on psychoanalysis which similarly refuse an interiorization of the unconscious. Analysis - the exploration or 'uncovering' of the unconscious - is therefore treated not as a key to a patient's behaviour, but as the site of a different discourse. If the analyst's discourse is accepted by his patients, "it makes certain ways of behaving and thinking natural for them. They have given up one way of thinking and adopted another." L. Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, C. Barrett ed., (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1970), p.45.
154. V.N. Volosinov, *op. cit.*, p.79.
155. Ibid., p.139.
156. Ibid., p.vii.
157. Ibid., p.85.
159. Designated by Lacan as 'objet petit a'.
161. Ibid., p.326.
163. Ibid., p.78.
164. Ibid., pp.78-9.
165. Ibid., p.100.
171. The concept of a relative silence about sex is used by Foucault to argue against the 'repressive hypothesis' of a general historical taboo on matters of sexuality. Foucault insists that "more important was the multiplication of discourses concerning sex in the field of exercise of power itself: an institutional incitement to speak about it", *ibid.*, p.18.
   Silences, where they existed, had a particular function within a policing of statements: e.g., the
protection of the strict authority of the confessional by the injunction that the confession be made only to the priest, thus setting up a zone of silence about matters of the flesh around this regular and regulated speech.

172. These capacities, not a natural characteristic of the subject, may vary. For example, "It often was made clear [in my conversations with students and liberal professionals] that being accepted as a patient by a well-known Lacanian can raise one's social and intellectual standing because it is taken to mean that you have the intellectual qualities that will allow the technique to work and that you are sufficiently interesting to interest an 'interesting' analyst." S. Turkle, op. cit., p.203. These 'intellectual qualities' might be demonstration of a highly trained literacy. See 'Mr. Primeau', the analysand in "A Lacanian Psychosis: Interview by Jacques Lacan" in Returning to Freud: Clinical Psychoanalysis in the School of Lacan, S. Schneiderman ed. & trans., (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1980), pp.19-41. Yet another psychoanalytic technique may require only a training in producing 'minimal' narratives, which is provided in the family, the school, the media.


175. J. Donzelot, op. cit., p.213.


177. J. Donzelot, op. cit., p.209.

178. Loc. cit.

179. Ibid., p.169. "... the analytic technique ... explode[d] into a multitude of fragments, clinging to the contours of nearly every institution ... A first piece of it can be found just outside the doors of the school, in a building that resembles the latter, but with classrooms that have been subdivided into little cubicles for listening to our first mental aberrations. It is what is known as a medico-psycho-pedagogical centre (C.M.P.P.). Other fragments are found in a discrete room of the divorce courts, in the services for the protection of mothers and children, in the birth-planning centers, and in the sex-education organizations. Perhaps the best known of these are marriage counselors, although they may have other names. You may find them by tuning in to their radio programs, where they open their arms to suffering and dissect personal problems at fixed hours for the edification of all listeners." Loc. cit.
180. Ibid., p.216.
181. Ibid., p.226.
182. Ibid., p.233.
183. Loc. cit.
185. Ibid., p.113.
186. Ibid., p.111.
187. Ibid., p.120.
188. Ibid., p.125.
192. Ibid., pp.45-6.
198. Ibid., p.43.
202. Ibid., p.44.
203. Ibid., p.156.

204. Loc. cit. On the point of psychoanalysis' references to our classroom trainings, Derrida points out "To describe [the typical, contradictory nature of a dream] ... to explain it as well, Freud needs an example, a literary illustration, what he calls an 'interesting testimony' which as it happens we 'possess'". J. Derrida, "The Purveyor of Truth" in Yale French Studies, No.52 (1975), pp.31-113, this citation p.35.


207. Loc. cit.

208. Ibid., p.64.

209. Ibid., p.12.

210. Ibid., pp.42-3.


215. Ibid., p.156.

216. Ibid., p.158, emphasis added.

217. J. Derrida, op. cit., p.46.

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, we can repeat three points.

Firstly, psychoanalytic theory, Freudian or Lacanian, does not constitute a break with the category of the subject as it is articulated in a philosophy of consciousness. A subversion of the subject as a problematic universalization and homogenization of knowledge relations cannot be undertaken on the grounds of another general condition (viz., the instincts, the unconscious, language presented as a formal system).

Secondly, this refusal of the claim that psychoanalytic theory can provide the basis of a materialist reading practice by demonstrating the subject as effect is not to reinstate the subject as a foundational category, but to take up a different direction for a critique of the subject. Rather than nominating the subject of knowledge (that is, one who believes s/he can directly experience or know the real) a fiction, or aligned in a fictional trajectory, the subject can be formulated as a discursively organized category extensively circulated through institutionally regulated trainings in reading and writing (and listening, speaking, viewing) practices - for example, the seminal literary trainings, underpinned by a usually unacknowledged philosophical discourse, which form the integrative point of other knowledges in school curricula. As such, the subject is a specification of the
historical formation of 'the individual' as a strategic correlative element of particular, shifting and institutionally differentiated power-knowledge relations.

Thirdly, if the subject is not posed as either the self-evident origin of knowledge relations, or an origin which has to be made visible; nor the point to which all knowledge relations are directed, then analysis can specify and specifically rework the multiple and shifting material conditions in which knowledge is produced and consumed.

To sum up, the problem of the subject is not to be inscribed in an eternal horizon of philosophical concerns. The category of the subject is an historical or genealogical category, and the value of analyses such as Foucault's, and what takes them beyond the critical function of psychoanalysis, is their demonstration of this. While psychoanalysis directs its questions to the subject as an epistemological category, a Foucauldian analysis questions the subject as an historically produced category for which psychoanalysis, amongst other knowledges, has been a crucial support. It then becomes a matter of which questions we ask, and in what order. We can either continue to ask, "How do we know?" and deflect all our subsequent questions through the machinery of the subject. Or we can begin to ask a much more dispersed set of questions about particular, historically produced knowledges, such as how they were made possible, what effects
they had, and by what relations they were linked and
separated - relations, for example, of the order of exper-
imental verification, logical validation, simple repetit-
ion, analogical confirmation, general principle, trans-
ferable model, higher authority, and so on, none of them
defined summarily before the fact, by the scant resources
or poverty of detail of a subject.

The point then is not to institute a criticism which
is content to demonstrate the fallacy of the subject in
every text, but a more productive, though limited, inter-
tervention in the reading and writing practices in which the
subject is produced as the plausible focal point of know-
ledge relations, whose autonomy is infringed by power
relations conceived as discrete from those relations of
knowledge. Such an intervention would be calculated to
dismantle the 'self-evidence' of the subject and to
produce quite specific readerships in which a text is not
produced and consumed as continuous with a single and
original determination (such as an author's consciousness,
unconscious, or the place in which the author and reader
are fixed in an ahistorical and universally authoritative
'language'), but as the correlative of the shifting and
divergent determinants that any one text may have, via the
specific and discontinuous techniques of reading and
writing which are deployed and activated in changing
institutional ensembles.

Hopefully, this thesis, by iterating and assembling a
number of formulations on the criteria of a materialist
analysis, contributes to the production of a different readership for psychoanalytic theory than one which finds it an adequate/inadequate representation of subjectivity or the domain of 'the human' and of all the practices currently grouped within that domain of reference.
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