Australian Muslims’ Conceptions of Integration

Abdi Mohamud Hersi

Master of Arts in International Studies

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

School of Humanities, Languages and Social Science

Griffith University

April 2015
Abstract

Currently, the scholarly literature does not address the possibility of the existence of a counter narrative of what integration might mean to the immigrant communities who are the subjects of the integration debate. In the case of Muslim immigrants in Australia, their perspectives on what integration means is absent from this debate. This study therefore attempts to examine the meanings of integration from the perspective of the Muslim people themselves. Over the course of 2010 and 2011, four focus group discussions were conducted with Muslims in the South East Queensland region of Australia. Concerning the issues of their integration into Australian society, Muslim participants were asked to define what integration means and also to state what activities and behaviours they would attach to the meaning of integration. Qualitative data analysis employing NVIVO software was used to categorise particular interpretations of integration into themes.

The study found that the meanings Muslims give to the term “integration” are by and large similar to those prevalent in the scholarly literature on integration. In general, Muslims ascribe to the term meanings relating to participation, belonging and contributing to the wider society. Noticeably, they conceptualise integration in socio-economic terms rather than in cultural terms. However, the study concludes that the meanings that integration has for Muslims are generally influenced by their faith. For example, Muslims expressly reject activities and behaviours they perceive to compromise their faith, and evidently make a distinction between integration and assimilation. Overall, this thesis argues that an understanding of how Muslims define integration may help policy makers, academics and settlement service providers appreciate how culture and faith influence the meanings that religiously and culturally diverse groups give to certain generally accepted terms, such as integration.

This thesis contributes new and unique knowledge to the general debate about migrant integration, specifically within the sphere of the integration of Muslim immigrants. The use of empirical data to investigate this important topic and the ways in which Muslims in Australia conceptualise integration highlights a significant dimension of integration. This study examines this concept in light of all of the interpretations of international migration expressed more broadly in the literature. This is a new approach, as an
examination of whether or not the broader interpretations of the concept match those within the Muslim community in Australia is absent in the extant literature. In using this approach, this thesis uncovers, through its extensive review of international migration literature, the fact that Muslim interpretations of integration are absent from the large body of citizenship, integration and multiculturalism literature. This research provides the first empirical study which examines how a single migrant group perceives and interprets the concept of integration.

This thesis draws upon research undertaken with Australian Muslims living in a variety of backgrounds in the South East Queensland region of Australia. It attempts to make an important contribution to the field of international migration, and the wider political discourses about the place of Islam and Muslims in Australia, by broadening the debates about integration from general conceptual discussions to a practical, policy relevant theory. In this regard, the thesis discusses the subject of Muslim migrant integration beyond mere definitional terms, instead adopting a more sensible and contextual framework by applying a plausible cognitive psychology theory of schema. This in-depth examination allows the researcher to tap into not only what Muslims perceive integration to mean, but also the cognitive processes they employ to come to an understanding of that meaning.
Statement of originality

This work has not previously been submitted for a degree or diploma in any university. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the thesis itself.

Signed: .................................................................

Abdi Hersi

April 2015
Contents

Abstract .........................................................................................................................i
Statement of originality ................................................................................................. iii
List of appendices ......................................................................................................... vii
List of tables .................................................................................................................. vii
List of figures ................................................................................................................ vii
Abbreviations ............................................................................................................... viii
Acknowledgements .........................................................................................................ix

Acknowledgement of published and unpublished papers included in this thesis.....x

Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1
  Statement of the problem “gap” in research ................................................................ 3
  Research scope and limitation .................................................................................... 4
  Rationale and significance ......................................................................................... 5
  Aims of the research .................................................................................................. 8
  Research questions ................................................................................................... 8
  Overview of research methodology .......................................................................... 8
  Theoretical and conceptual framework ..................................................................... 9
  Outline of the research—thesis plan ....................................................................... 13

Chapter 1. Migration, integration and the polarisation of the debate ......................17
  1.1. Introduction ................................................................................................ 17
  1.2. International migration levels ..................................................................... 17
  1.3. Polarisation of the debates about migration and integration ......................17

Chapter 2. Muslims in Australia: Context and Background .....................................25
  2.1. Introduction ................................................................................................ 25
  2.2. Early migration of Muslims to Australia..................................................... 25
  2.3. The social and economic situation of Muslims in Australia today ..........29
    2.3.1. Level of higher educational attainment ................................................. 32
    2.3.2. Labour market participation ................................................................. 35
    2.3.3. Occupational group and industry ......................................................... 39
    2.3.4. Average weekly income ..................................................................... 40
    2.3.5. Home ownership ................................................................................ 41
  2.4. The diversity of the Australian Muslim community ....................................45
  2.5. The debate about Islam and the West..........................................................50
  2.6. Key incidents and events which have impacted on relations between Islam and the West ..........................................................53
  2.7. Islam in the public sphere ............................................................................59
  2.8. A perceived lack of integration of Australian Muslims ......................... 62
  2.9. Conclusion .................................................................................................. 63
Chapter 3. Discourses Concerning Immigrant Integration: A Critical Review

3.1. Introduction ............................................................. 65
3.2. State discourses about integration ........................................... 68
3.3. Assimilation ................................................................................. 69
3.4. Citizenship and integration ..................................................... 72
3.5. Multiculturalism ........................................................................ 75
3.6. Academic discourses of integration .............................................. 78
3.7. Media discourses on integration ................................................ 83
3.8. Evolving Australian discourse on integration ......................... 89
3.9. Conclusion .................................................................................. 92

Chapter 4. Muslim Conceptions of Integration: Perceptions, Belief system and Practices

4.1. Introduction .............................................................................. 95
4.2. Diverse meanings of integration ................................................... 97
4.3. Indicators of immigrant integration .............................................. 100
4.4. Methodology ................................................................................ 102
4.5. Findings and discussion ............................................................... 108
4.6. Perceptions and suspicions .......................................................... 109
4.7. Belief system ................................................................................ 115
4.8. Practices – determinants of integration ........................................... 121
  4.8.1. Participation ........................................................................... 122
  4.8.2. Belonging and acceptance ......................................................... 126
4.9. Practices: barriers to integration ................................................... 129
  4.9.1. Institutional barriers to integration ............................................. 130
4.10. Individual barriers to integration .................................................. 139
  4.10.1. Self-imposed isolation – reflexivity and identity ....................... 139
  4.10.2. Lack of English language skill ................................................ 142
4.11. Conclusion ................................................................................ 145

Chapter 5. Muslim Cognitive Schemas of Integration

5.1. Introduction .............................................................................. 147
5.2. Application of the cognitive theory of schema ................................ 147
5.3. Methodology .............................................................................. 149
5.4. Findings and discussion ............................................................... 152
5.5. Schematic meanings of integration .............................................. 156
  5.5.1. Good citizen schema ................................................................. 157
  5.5.2. Flexible citizen schema ............................................................. 160
  5.5.3. Participatory citizen schema ....................................................... 164
  5.5.4. Respectful citizen schema ........................................................ 166
  5.5.5. Loyal citizen schema ................................................................. 168
5.6. Conclusion ................................................................................ 171

Chapter 6. Integrated Analysis and Discussion

6.1. Introduction .............................................................................. 173
6.2. The clash of integration frames ................................................................. 175

Chapter 7. Conclusion .................................................................................. 185

7.1. What does integration mean to Muslims in Australia? ...................... 186
7.2. What activities, behaviours, characteristics and values do Muslim people attach to the meaning of integration? ................................. 187
7.3. To what extent do Muslims define integration in a singular or pluralist form and in a cosmopolitan or universalistic fashion? .................. 188
7.4. Implications .............................................................................................. 191
7.5. Recommendations .................................................................................. 193
7.6. Research limitations .............................................................................. 195

References ..................................................................................................... 197
List of appendices

Appendix A  Griffith University Human Research Ethics Committee .............................................. 253
Appendix B  Invitation to Focus Groups ........................................................................................... 254
Appendix C  Schedule of Questions / Agenda: ................................................................................. 255
Appendix D  Information Sheet And Consent Form ................................................................. 257

List of tables

Table 2.1  Data tables generated from 2011 Census ....................................................................... 32
Table 2.2  Count of persons (excluding overseas visitors) by religious affiliation by highest educational attainment .............................................................................................................. 34
Table 2.3  Age profile of Australian Muslims and Non-Muslims seeking employment ............... 36
Table 2.4  Comparison of employment and unemployment between Australian Muslims and Non-Muslims, by age ........................................................................................................... 37
Table 2.5  Count of persons (excluding overseas visitors) by religious affiliation, by occupation, by industry. ................................................................. 40
Table 2.6  Average weekly income of the Muslim and non-Muslim population in Australia .......... 41
Table 2.7  Home ownership* by the Muslim and non-Muslim population in Australia .............. 44
Table 2.8  Religious affiliation in Australia .................................................................................... 45
Table 4.1  Focus groups and participants ...................................................................................... 105
Table 4.2  Participant country of origin ........................................................................................ 107
Table 4.3  Determinants of Integration ........................................................................................ 121
Table 4.4  Barriers to Integration ................................................................................................. 129
Table 5.1  Functional and cultural schemes of integration ............................................................ 152
Table 5.2  Volunteerism among Muslim and non-Muslim Australian citizens ................................ 159

List of figures

Figure 2.1  Selected religions – longer standing and recently arrived migrants .......................... 31
# Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>American Academy of Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABS</td>
<td>Australian Bureau of Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHURI</td>
<td>Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMEP</td>
<td>Adult Migrant English Language Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANES</td>
<td>American National Election Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>cognitive complexity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMEB</td>
<td>Commission on Multi Ethnic Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESA</td>
<td>Department of Economic and Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIAC</td>
<td>Department of Immigration and Citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIBP</td>
<td>Department of Immigration and Border Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIMA</td>
<td>Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>Good citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSS</td>
<td>General Social Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IS</td>
<td>Islamic State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPEX</td>
<td>Migrant Integration Policy Indicator Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Productive citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Respectful citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACC</td>
<td>Standard Classification of Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgements

In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious and the Most Merciful Alhamdulillah, all praises to Allah for the strengths and His blessing in completing this thesis.

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Associate Professor Halim Rane and Associate Professor Ian Woodward, my PhD research supervisors, for their patience guidance, enthusiastic encouragement and useful critiques of this research work. Halim and Ian, you have been very supportive throughout my PhD candidature years and at times went out of your way to provide me with much needed support. I cannot express enough thanks to both of you for your continued support, generosity and encouragement. You have been an inspiration to me and introduced to me into the world of academia and publications, and it is your own academic works and achievements that inspired me most. Without your supervision and constant help, this dissertation would not have been possible.

My completion of this project could not have been accomplished without the support of my family. My deepest thanks go to my caring, loving, and supportive wife, Meimuna. Your encouragement when times got rough are much appreciated and duly noted. Special thanks also go to my children, my daughter Hafsa and my sons Mohamed, Hamza and Adam, for their understanding and patience for the long hours of absence in my journey to complete my PhD thesis.

I would also like to extend my thanks to the School of Humanities, Languages and Social Science at Griffith University, The National Centre of Excellence for Islamic Studies, Griffith Centre for Cultural Research and the Key Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice and Governance for their help in offering me resources and a collegial environment in which to undertake my research.

Finally, I offer my sincere thanks for all participants from the Australian Muslim communities who have granted me permission to interview them in this study. Without your support, this project would not have been completed.

Thank you all again.
Acknowledgement of published and unpublished papers included in this thesis

All papers included are sole-authored by the student.

Section 9.1 of the Griffith University Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research (“Criteria for Authorship”), in accordance with Section 5 of the Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research, states:

To be named as an author, a researcher must have made a substantial scholarly contribution to the creative or scholarly work that constitutes the research output, and be able to take public responsibility for at least that part of the work they contributed. Attribution of authorship depends to some extent on the discipline and publisher policies, but in all cases, authorship must be based on substantial contributions in a combination of one or more of:

- conception and design of the research project
- analysis and interpretation of research data
- drafting or making significant parts of the creative or scholarly work or critically revising it so as to contribute significantly to the final output.

Section 9.3 of the Griffith University Code (“Responsibilities of Researchers”), in accordance with Section 5 of the Australian Code, states:

Researchers are expected to:

- Offer authorship to all people, including research trainees, who meet the criteria for authorship listed above, but only those people.
- Accept or decline offers of authorship promptly in writing.
- Include in the list of authors only those who have accepted authorship.
• Appoint one author to be the executive author to record authorship and manage correspondence about the work with the publisher and other interested parties.

• Acknowledge all those who have contributed to the research, facilities or materials but who do not qualify as authors, such as research assistants, technical staff, and advisors on cultural or community knowledge. Obtain written consent to name individuals.

Included in this thesis is a paper in Chapter 3, of which I am the sole author. Appropriate acknowledgement of those who contributed to the research but did not qualify as authors are included in this paper.

The bibliographic details (if published or accepted for publication)/status (if prepared or submitted for publication) for these papers are:

(Where a paper(s) has been published or accepted for publication, you must also include a statement regarding the copyright status of the paper(s).

Chapter 3:

(Signed) _______________________________ (Date)________________

Abdi Hersi

(Countersigned) _______________________________ (Date)________________

Supervisor: Associate Professor Halim Rane
Introduction

Integration is a subject that has prominence in the public and political discussions of migration, and is one which occasionally creates controversy in a number of countries and communities. Integration debates usually take place at the back of more polarised discussions about migration in general. Increasing levels of global mobility is posing a considerable challenge to nation–states in Europe, North America and Australia. In fact, it is claimed that, “Immigration and the subsequent integration of newcomers are the foremost challenges in European cities” (Crul, Schneider, & Lelie, 2012, p. 11). In Europe alone, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) stated that since the start of 2016, at least 170,000 migrants and refugees have arrived by sea (IOM, 2016). This increased influx of new migrants to Europe and other Western nations such as Australia is mainly originating from non-traditional sources of migration to these countries. As a result, these Western migrant resettling countries are experiencing heightened public anti-immigration sentiments and the emergence of assertive anti-immigration right wing political parties (Wodak & Boukala, 2015).

The integration of immigrants into their host societies continues to be a hotly debated topic around the world today. As a traditional migrant-receiving nation, Australia, even though it is advantaged by its remote geographical location, faces similar challenges of increasing numbers of boat arrivals seeking asylum (Phillips & Spinks, 2013). Recently, successive Australian governments have passed strict new immigration laws and have introduced harsh detention regimes for boat arrivals seeking asylum (Betts, 2001). Despite this, Australia and other Western immigrant resettling nations need to better understand the requirement of managing the enormous diversity in individuals and groups of immigrants already in their midst in order to build an economically prosperous and socially cohesive society.

Traditionally, concerns about immigrants and migration in general were primarily centred upon immigrants taking jobs that would otherwise be held by locals (Chomsky, 2007; Gilligan, 2008; Padilla, 1997). However, since the events of 11th September 2001, integration debate centres primarily on security and the threat faced by Western and European culture and values (Croucher, 2013; Humphrey, 2014; Husbands, 2014). It is during this later period that the world has seen ever-increasing numbers of
immigrants from culturally, linguistically and religiously diverse societies arriving, or attempting to arrive, into Europe, the United States and Australia. These new waves of multi faith, multi culture and multi nationality immigrants compel the governments of many of these countries to develop policies aimed at maintaining social cohesion. In essence, integrating new immigrants is seen as being integral to the realisation of a socially cohesive society (Dukes & Musterd, 2012; Fanning, 2011).

Amongst these diverse groups of immigrants who need to be successfully integrated into Australia and other Western democracies are immigrants of Muslim faith. In the recent past, public and political discourses about immigrant integration suggest that the Muslim communities in Australia, Europe and North America have problems integrating successfully into their newly adopted societies. It is argued that a crisis of assimilation was characterised in the integration Muslim immigrants in Europe (Peters & Besley, 2014). In Australia, Muslims are principally the subjects of debate concerning issues of integration into their host societies (Celermajer, 2007; Norris & Inglehart, 2012; Poynting, 2006; Saeed, 2003; Samani, 2007). Increasing migration from Islamic countries is asserted to have challenged the Western democratic paradigm (Zay, 2014). Muslim migration to Western countries is, in one way or another, consistently referred to as being the cause of the end of multiculturalism (Jackson, 2014; McGhee, 2008; Peters & Besley, 2014; Zay, 2014). The threat narrative about the Muslim presence in Europe and Australia is also weighing into the debate about immigrant integration and may be negatively influencing its meaning (Kivisto, 2013).

However, the vast majority of media and academic literature that sees the integration of Muslims into a host society as being challenging, misses the fact that Muslims in Australia are ethnically, nationally, culturally and denominationally diverse. Furthermore, despite the considerable debates about the integration of religiously and culturally diverse migrant groups, specifically Muslims in Australia, into the host societies, a clear definition of integration eludes researchers, governments and host communities. With no unambiguous definition of the concept of integration and what successful or unsuccessful integration is, it is premature to arrive at the conclusion that a certain group of immigrants (Muslims in this case) do not integrate. This thesis therefore attempts to bridge an apparent gap in the available academic literature of what integration means to Muslims in Australia.
Statement of the problem “gap” in research

The current scholarly literature acknowledges the existence of a number of models of immigrant integration such as multiculturalism, assimilation and acculturation, which have produced a host of divergent policy responses from immigrant receiving nations (Bertossi & Duyvendak, 2012; Modood, 2014). A significant volume of integration literature is also devoted to the social and cultural integration of particular groups (Ip, Inglis, & Wu, 1997; Khoo, Pookong, Dang, & Shu, 1994; Lu, Samaratunge, & Hartel, 2012). A great deal of research is also concerned mainly with attitudes towards multiculturalism and multicultural policy studies (Modood, 2014). This is a point that is acknowledged by Collins (2013) who argued that studies of immigrant integration are constrained by a focus on policy and institutional structures, rather than the outcomes and experiences immigrants face.

Studies of immigrant integration are also dominated by those who are concerned with the media’s role in interpreting integration (see Geibler & Pottker, 2009; Koopmans & Statham, 2010; Rane & Hersi, 2012; Roggeband & Vliegenthart, 2007) and those who examined what models of integration are adopted by particular nation states (Hunter & Boswell, 2014; Kilbride, 2014; Schmidtke & Zaslove, 2014). Previous research also extensively examined integration as a concept and theory (Brettell & Hollifield, 2014; Ruiz-Tagle, 2013; Saczuk, 2013). It is also important to acknowledge the existence of a number of works focusing on transnationalism, which examine integration as the interactions and sociability between the newcomer and members of the host society (Faist, 2015; Glick Schiller & Çağlar, 2015; Glick Schiller & Schmidt, 2015). A great deal of literature is disproportionately devoted to what constitutes successful integration and what the indicators of successful integration are (Ager & Strang, 2004; Ager, Strang, O’May & Garrner, 2002; Entzinger & Biezeveld, 2003; Lichter, Qian, & Tumin, 2015).

With the exception of Kortman’s work (2014), which was concerned with how a sample of Muslim organisations defined integration, Muslims’ conceptualisation of integration has been markedly under-researched. The purpose of this thesis is, therefore, to examine the concept of integration and its meaning through the eyes of Muslims in Australia. This investigation is partly inspired by the presence of the multiple meanings of integration adopted by nation states, and the disproportionate attention paid to how the
media and other actors of the processes of integration, such as policy documents, define the concept of integration. There are compelling reasons for gaining an understanding of Muslims’ conceptualisation of integration and it is important for policy makers to get an insight into how Muslims conceive integration, and whether or not their proposed policies of integration are cognisant with Muslims’ understandings. Taking inspiration from Collins’ (2013) argument explained above, this study departs from the focus on policy and institutional frameworks which reduces integration to a concept, and a model of incorporation adopted by a state. Instead, it attempts to initiate an approach that acknowledges that there may be variations in the ways in which different ethnic, cultural and religious groups interpret integration, and recognises that integration is a lived social experience involving complex subjective and objective levels.

This study is designed to fill the significant research gap concerning Muslim conceptualisations of integration. It is based on the premise that a line of inquiry, which examines how Muslims in Australia understand the concept of integration, can contribute to the debates and discussions of immigrant integration. It can potentially uncover an issue that remains unexplored in the literature thus far, which is how Muslims in Australia interpret the concept of integration. It specifically contests academic literature and current government policies, which advance a top down belief about how to integrate immigrants into the wider society, with no regard for how these policies are received by the immigrants themselves, or by members of the wider society. But in addition to its specific focus on Muslim conceptualisation of integration, this line of inquiry may set the scene for future research into this subject. For example, future studies may be able to shed light on the extent to which different layers of society, social institutions and groups are subscribing to perhaps different and contradictory definitions of integration.

Research scope and limitation

The thesis is limited in its scope and it specifically addresses Muslim conceptualisations of integration. But it acknowledges that a critical issue that needs to be examined is the extent to which meanings of integration are similar or different between different constituent actors in the process of integration. It understands that previous research has overlooked the extent to which communal opinions of the concept of integration, be it those of immigrants or the wider society, match with those of the state. It also
recognises that an examination is warranted into whether or not the textual interpretations of the term integration, which bureaucrats are bound to uphold by legal writ and conduct, differ from the ways in which Muslims perceive integration.

However, addressing these critical issues required conducting comparative multi actor (Muslim, media, state) research, which was certainly an ambitious objective for this thesis in its initial stages. In the early candidature milestone and after a thorough examination for confirmation of candidature, the student researcher was advised against a comparative study that encompassed all three actors’ conceptualisations of integration. The early candidature confirmation examination report strongly stated that such a comparative study would be beyond the scope of doctoral candidature. Consequently, whilst throughout its various chapters the thesis acknowledges different constituent actors (individual immigrants, the wider society and the state) and how they may define integration differently, it primarily focuses on Muslim immigrants’ conceptions of integration. It does not draw any comparative dimensions between these different actors of integration from its findings. In fact, in its conclusion chapter, the thesis highlights this aspect as a limitation to this study, one which could be addressed in future research.

**Rationale and significance**

This study sets out to make a meaningful contribution to the wider scholarly debates about migrant integration, specifically to the sphere of Muslim migrant integration. Integration is about acceptance and accommodating others, therefore it is important to examine the extent to which Australian Muslims feel accepted by members of the wider society. The importance of addressing this gap in the literature cannot be underestimated, as this is a study of everyday social actors’ perceptions of core national values such as belonging and social inclusion into the nation–state. It is essential to gain an understanding into how simple, everyday things are shaping feelings of social inclusion and belonging to the nation–state. The entire symbolic universe that exists in our suburbs, markets, schools and places where we come into contact with people on a routine basis orients us towards, or away from, others (Schaeffer, 2013; Zagefka & Brown, 2002).

Immigrant integration is an issue of concern to policy makers and the broader society because of its potential impact on the social harmony and cohesion of the nation (Hugo,
This is the case because Muslim immigrants play a vital role in our society and Australia prides itself as a country of immigration. Muslims are one of the largest groups of immigrants to settle in Australia and Islam is the fastest growing religion in Australia (Hassan, 2015). Policies surrounding the integration of Muslim immigrants are high on the agendas of a number of migrant receiving nations. A strong rationale in undertaking this thesis is the importance of understanding what integration means and the processes by which immigrants become integrated or not integrated into the wider society, and how that changes the host society and the individuals involved. It is extremely important that this immigrant integration be successful in order to create and maintain a harmonious and cohesive society. The presence of different forms of interpretation of integration currently available in the scholarly literature necessitates the importance of taking a fresh approach to the way in which we evaluate immigrant integration. One of these interpretations is assimilation, which Brubaker contended could mean a complete absorption into the wider society (Brubaker, 2001). Brubaker argued that terms such as, “Integration or adaptation and incorporation were preferred rather than assimilation in recent discussions” (Brubaker, 2001, p. 534).

At the core of the contemporary debates about migrant integration in Australia is the issue of Muslim integration. A number of researchers have found that Muslims in Australia face challenges relating to the wider society’s perception that their integration is problematic (Celermajer, 2007; Poynting, 2006; Saeed, 2003; Samani 2007). However, since the tragic events of 11th September 2001, Muslims in Australia have experienced and encountered increased difficulties in being completely integrated into the wider Australian community. The fact is that there is an implicit assumption on the part of some, including the media, that Muslims in Australia are not integrating or are unable to be integrated (Aly, 2007; Dunn, Klocker, & Salabay, 2007; Ho, 2007; Kabir, 2004; Poynting & Mason, 2007). For example, Celermajer (2007, p. 4) summed up these difficulties as follows:

A number of papers build on the already well documented fact that Muslim Australians have long experienced a range of challenges in fully accessing their place as Australian citizens due to a range of barriers associated with migration, language, education, recognition of qualifications, cultural differences and for many, the refugee experience. What is troubling,
however, is these recent studies' consistent finding that these barriers have been exacerbated in the post-September 11 environment (Celermajer, 2007, p. 4)

In light of the above discussion, a focus on how Muslim immigrants become incorporated into Australia is an important policy question for the government, and is an issue which deserves attention from researchers and academics. Equally essential is an examination of the extent to which international events, such as the events of 9/11 or the Cronulla riots, altered the attitudes of members of host societies towards accepting newcomers, or altered feelings of integration of Australian Muslims. As Poynting (2006, p. 85) explained, these riots took place in the affluent coastal suburb of Cronulla and he described the causes of these riots as follows:

The outbreak of mass racist violence against young men of ‘Middle Eastern appearance’ on Cronulla beach, Sydney, in December 2005 was the culmination of a campaign of populist incitement waged in the media and by the state. The battle to reclaim control of the beach for white Australia mirrored, it is suggested here, the battle that the Howard government has waged to reclaim control of the nation itself from asylum seekers and the Muslim/Middle Eastern ‘enemy’.

The thesis recognises the fact that integration is a complex process that has multiple actors and players:

1. the individual immigrant who makes the decision to migrate;

2. the host society that is made up of individuals and social institutions with collective values who receive these immigrants;

3. the state or government that makes the policy determinations and laws concerning who should migrate to that country and how they should be integrated;

4. the media who arguably have an influence on the public and political discussions of integration.
The complexity of the interactions between these various actors and their understandings of what integration means is not what this thesis intends to evaluate.

**Aims of the research**

The aims and objectives of this thesis are primarily to examine Muslims’ conceptualisations of integration. Assumptions can be made though that it is possible that other stakeholders (the host society, the media and the government) have their own meanings of integration. Future comparative studies may subsequently reveal the extent to which Muslims’ understanding of integration are aligned with the other three actors (the host society, the media, and the government) of immigrant integration, and the extent to which Muslims subscribe to similar or different, and perhaps contradictory, definitions of integration. Despite this limitation, this thesis aims to make a significant contribution to the field of immigrant integration by identifying how Muslims conceptualise integration. The findings may inform the public policy makers on an important part of this debate, which is that of Muslims’ interpretations of integration. The thesis intends to accomplish the above stated objectives by formulating the following three research questions.

**Research questions**

1. What does integration mean to Muslims in Australia?

2. What activities, behaviours, characteristics and values do Muslim people attach to the meaning of integration?

3. To what extent do Muslims define integration in a singular or pluralist form and in a cosmopolitan or universalistic fashion?

**Overview of research methodology**

The thesis develops an innovative approach to examine what integration means to Muslims in Australia. It employs dual methods to reach an understanding of what meanings of integration are advanced by Muslims in Australia. For example, in the first study, it relies on a series of focus group discussions conducted with Muslims in the
southeast Queensland region, whereas in the second study, it utilises in-depth interviews with members of the Muslim community in the southeast Queensland region, Australia.

Whilst the first study alone provides sufficient information about what meanings Muslims assign to the term integration, the thesis aims to go further than the definitional terms of integration and therefore employs the cognitive psychology theory of schema (Cerulo, 2002; DiMaggio, 1997; Spencer & Shinkevich, 2014) in order to understand the research participants’ cognitive interpretations of the concept. The application of this cognitive psychology theory of schema lends increased credibility to the research findings and complements the findings of the thematic analysis in the focus group discussions. The thesis also uses varied analytical approaches, including both qualitative and quantitative methods. One of the advantages of using mixed methods is the flexibility in using cultural knowledge and systematic/anecdotal field observations and qualitative observations in the interpretation of interview and survey results (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010). As there are two methods of study and analytical approaches utilised, the thesis incorporates these in each of the two empirical chapters 4 and 5, the research methodology section. However, the thesis does not claim that its findings are generalisable to the Muslim community in Australia and elsewhere, as subjectivity is an epistemological basis of qualitative research (Carter & Little, 2007).

**Theoretical and conceptual framework**

Integration is a subject of significant public discussion both in Australia and Europe. It is also a key policy objective of a number of states in order to resettle their new migrant groups in a way which allows them to become productive members of society. However, equally, integration is the subject of a significant level of controversy and disagreement both in Australia and in the rest of the world. In recent years, due to the revolution in transportation technology, the emergence of transnational economic institutions and the decreasing influence of national sovereignty, “Out-group contact through immigration has been a particular focus of attention” (Alexander, 2006, p. 412).

According to Hugo (2005) Traditionally migration has been the process by which different ethnic, language, cultural, and religious groups have come into contact and one of the most pressing challenges that international migration poses is not only its scale but also the diversity of groups moving from one cultural background into another.
The cohesiveness of these diverse groups of society is perhaps challenged by their relative perceptions of each other and the meanings they each attach to the noble cause of integrating the newcomer into the host society. In the contemporary academic literature, the term integration is conceived of and described differently by different actors in society.

The thesis develops a theoretical and conceptual framework in order to sufficiently understand the concept of immigrant integration and its relationship with other possible theories and concepts relating to immigrant integration. The development of this framework may support the findings of the thesis in the ways in which different knowledge areas, concepts and theories interact with the notion of immigrant integration. For this reason, the thesis recognises the importance of providing a theoretical and conceptual framework for the subject of integration, prior to carrying out detailed discussions about methodology and findings. Integration is a concept that transcends disciplines of sociology, philosophy and psychology and understandings of the theories and beliefs that inform the concept. An understanding of the theories relevant to this subject will enable the researcher to construct a meaningful theory from the research findings in later empirical chapters.

Within the broader field of international migration, there exists a host of relevant immigrant integration theories. In fact, numbers of scholars who have endeavoured to explore and theorise within the field of international migration have indeed discovered its interdisciplinary nature (Brettel & Hollifield, 2014) as it expands across various disciplines and is researched from different perspectives. Researchers from disciplines such as anthropology, demography, economics, geography, history, law, political science and sociology have all contributed to theories about international migration (Brettel & Hollifield, 2014). However, this thesis is primarily concerned with the phenomena of immigrant integration and therefore will limit its discussions to related theoretical and conceptual frameworks.

The integration of migrants has long been of concern to both immigrant sending countries and countries that receive and settle international immigrants. Whilst the sending countries’ concerns centre mainly around the “brain drain” effect (Beine, Docquier, & Rapoport, 2008), the receiving countries are generally concerned with the incorporation of new immigrants and the social cohesiveness of the whole society.
Of particular interest to this thesis are theories dealing with immigrants moving from their source countries to settle in the midst of their new host societies. For instance, sociologists researching international migration show interest in theorising the aspects of international migration which deal mainly with the dynamics of integrating minorities into the mainstream host societies (Croucher, 2013; Drzewiecka & Steyn, 2012). These include issues concerned with the interactions between the host communities and the newly arrived migrants. In these interactions, the parties generally comprise groups with reasonably diverse cultural, religious, ethnic and nationality differences. The initial contact between the migrants and the host communities, and what transpires afterwards, is an aspect of immigration that remains important for sociologists studying immigration, and some have developed theories around these interactions.

For instance, in studies of these aspects of immigrant integration, Robert Ezra Park’s theory of race and inter-group relations cannot be overlooked. Park has contributed significantly to the discipline of sociology and his legacy includes the four-stage cycle which human contact tends to move through: competition, conflict, accommodation and assimilation (Matthews, 1977, p. 161). Park explained that competition was an elementary process as it, “involves the contact of individuals unaware of one another, through the organising power of the market place”. He further clarified that conflict ensued between inter-groups simply because of increased communication and awareness of differences (Matthews, 1977, p. 161). However, theorists are also interested in what happens after initial contact and the processes of group formation. Amongst the sociological theories advanced in these areas include Gordon Allport’s theory of group formation (Allport, 1954). This renowned hypothesis states that the positive effects of intergroup contact occur only in situations marked by four conditions: “Equal status of the groups, common goal, inter-group cooperation and authority which supports the contact with established norms, and acceptance” (Allport, 1954, p. 261). A number of other scholars have further studied inter-group relations and the effect that contact has, either negative or positive. In advancing the scholarly work of intergroup contact theory, Escandell and Ceobanu (2009, p. 45) asserted, “One way to foster harmonious inter-group relations was through contact with foreigners in workplaces, schools or neighbourhoods”. Escandell and Ceobanu (2009, p. 48) revealed that, “Contact could lessen prejudice in racially and ethnically diverse settings where
communication and cooperation was a habit between members of an inter-group”. They concluded that contact between in-group members and foreigners could promote civic engagement, ease tensions, and engender more positive attitudes towards immigrants (Escandell & Ceobanu, 2009, p. 45).

The inter-group contact theory was further advanced by other scholars such as Brewer (1996) who took an interest in how to eliminate the basic features of negative inter-group schema. Brewer (1996, p. 293) proposed, “Three models that would alter the cognitive representation of an inter-group situation, namely de-categorisation, re-categorisation and sub categorisation”. The contributions of cognitive psychology scholars to intergroup contact theory are invaluable. It is understood however, that contact between groups means that some of these groups are naturally in more privileged positions than others. It is because of this reality that Herbert Blumer’s (1958) theory of group position becomes so important in discussions of migrant integration. In his writings about race prejudice, he explained how four types of feelings that were present in race prejudice in the dominant group (in-group) depended on a positional arrangement of the racial group. Blumer explained these four types of feelings as follows:

Feelings of superiority, the idea that the subordinate race is intrinsically different and alien, feeling of propriety claim to certain areas of privilege and fear and suspicion that the subordinate harbours designs on the prerogatives of the dominant race (Blumer, 1958, p. 4).

The concept of integration, however, is intrinsically linked to the increased tensions between native populations and their new immigrant groups, thus necessitating the development of a host of other theoretical frameworks. This makes theories such as social inclusion and social cohesion to be the primary aims and objectives of immigrant integration policies and programs. In fact, the peaceful co-existence and cohabitation of native populations and immigrant groups is key to the realisation of a socially inclusive and cohesive society. Social inclusion is understood to mean that people have “Access to the resources, opportunities and capabilities they need including access to services, training, employment, engagement with others and participation in local, cultural, civic and recreational activities; and have a voice to influence decisions that affect them” (Australian Social Inclusion Board, 2010, p. 15). The theory of social inclusion is very
broad and researchers link social inclusion to a number of aspects of immigrant integration. For example, in Sweden voting is seen as an important factor in social inclusion (Fanning, 2011), employment is also seen as important aspect of social inclusion (Cantillon, 2011), and so is education (Hosken, Land, Goldingay, Barnes, & Murphy, 2013). All of these aspects of social inclusion are also part of the debate and discussion about immigrant integration. As immigrants and their ethnic minorities face the challenges of adjusting to their new homes, their inclusion into all aspects of the receiving society is paramount.

Outline of the research—thesis plan

The introduction of the thesis explains the rationale for the study, how the research differs from previous studies, the purpose and scope and limitations of this research and the contributions the thesis makes to the body of knowledge in this field. The section concludes with a brief discussion about the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of immigrant integration. Specifically, this section introduces relevant theories mainly dealing with integration, including race relationship theory, social cohesion, social inclusion, contact theory and social capital theory.

Chapter One explains the polarised nature of the debates about international migration, and in particular, the subject of migrant integration. As a background to the core research question of integration, it highlights levels of international migrant movement and briefly explains reasons why migrants move from one place to another. It presents the general debates about migration, and more specifically, discusses integration both in Australia and overseas, while pointing out the prominence of the topic of immigration and integration in public and political discussions. This chapter asserts that the polarised debates of international migration are not independent from any conceptualisation of immigrant integration.

Chapter Two presents an overview of the Muslim community and deals mainly with the context and background of Muslims in Australia. A starting point in this thesis is an understanding of the Muslim community in Australia and its history and early settlement. This chapter addresses issues of the early migration of Muslims to Australia, recent trends in Muslim migration to Australia regarding population size and the composition of the Muslim migrant cohort. The thesis analyses Australian Bureau of
Statistics 2011 data on the Australian Census of Population to provide a context to the topic currently under study (Australian Bureau of Statistics [ABS], 2011). Australia takes a census of population every five years. Amongst a number of other factors/variables, the censuses report the number of persons reporting affiliation to a religion. Analysis of raw census data from the 2011 Census was carried out by using data on specially generated tabulations of Muslims and non-Muslims in the wider society. From this analysis, information was presented that gives a picture of the relative social and economic position of Muslims in Australia, as this relates to the degree of Muslim integration into Australian society. The chapter addresses issues such as increasing numbers of Muslims, including higher numbers of recent arrivals, highest educational attainment, weekly household income and labour market participation. The functional integration of migrants is understood to be easy to measure objectively by analysing and reflecting on readily available raw data such as that of the ABS Census data. Finally, the chapter discusses general debates about Islam and Western relations, events and incidents which have affected this relationship, including the events of 9/11, and how a body of literature has emerged from this which constructs Australian Muslims as a significant “other”.

Chapter Three reviews the broader available current literature on immigrant incorporation, citizenship and belonging. In realisation of how the events of 9/11 and the war on terror have significantly impacted on this field of study, this chapter departs from the traditional ways of clustering migrant integration literature into different models adopted by different states. Instead, the chapter innovatively groups literature under the following three major discourses of integration: academic discourses about integration, state discourses about integration and media discourses about integration. As the thesis identifies, in reviewing the current literature global events like the war on terror, which began post 9/11 and debates about cultural and civilizational clashes, may have altered public discourses about migrant integration.

Chapter Four examines how Australian Muslims conceptualise integration based on data from four focus groups conducted in Brisbane and in south-east Queensland. The chapter will outline and discuss its chosen research methodology and will include details about the subjects of this study and how the analysis was conducted. The rich data gathered through these focus groups is thoroughly analysed using the qualitative
data analysis tool NVIVO, and the findings are discussed at length. Focus group questions related to how Muslims conceptualised the meaning of integration. Discussions with participants were moderated and later transcribed for analysis. Initial analysis was conducted manually in order to identify the themes that emerged from the focus group sessions. This manual analysis also allowed the researcher to become familiar with the data gathered. As the volume of data gathered was large, a qualitative data analysis tool was then used to gain a deeper understanding of what meanings focus group participants advanced concerning integration.

Chapter Five pushes this examination further by going beyond the pattern of responses that informants provided at the focus group discussions and looking at the cognitive schematic constructs that individual participants employ to define integration. It examines the schemas and frames which Muslims use in conceptualising integration. In order to further deepen the researcher’s understanding of what meanings Muslims assign to the term integration, this thesis employed the social psychology concept of schema in order to comprehend the different integration frames and schemas Muslims engage with in defining integration. The thesis draws on in-depth interviews conducted with influential Muslim leaders in the South East Queensland region. Invaluable information was gathered through these one to one interviews with key opinion makers and leaders. The selection and use of these two different methods of data collection was deliberate and produced two important sets of findings. Information collected was recorded, transcribed and later analysed using a cognitive schema. The researcher wished to go beyond the mere thematic narrative which the participants of the focus group discussants used and uncover the motives and reasons why individuals frame integration in a particular way. The chapter will outline and discuss the chosen research methodology and will include details about the subjects of this study and how the analysis was conducted. Its findings will be presented in consideration of available scholarly literature, in particular the concept of citizenship.

Chapter Six engages in an integrated analysis and discussion of the findings of the two empirical studies in Chapters Four and Five. The chapter specifically carries out in-depth discussions of the thesis findings from both the thematically varied definitions of integration offered by study participants in the initial focus group discussions and the richer cognitive schemata of integration in the second empirical study. In addition to
this, the chapter incorporates the findings of the empirical studies by engaging them with the wider scholarly literature in immigrant integration.

Chapter Seven concludes the research findings and provides a summary of the research project conducted. It underlines how the study achieved its stated main objectives and how it addressed the central research question of the thesis. It further discusses the manner in which this research contributes to the field of international migration and integration. As well as providing a summary of key findings and contributions to the literature, the chapter highlights the new and unique insights that this research adds to the field of immigrant integration. The chapter also looks at research implications and limitations and makes recommendations about ways in which this research can be continued in the future by studying how particular groups of migrants conceptualise integration.
Chapter 1. Migration, integration and the polarisation of the debate

1.1. Introduction

An examination of how Muslims conceptualise integration requires an appreciation of the levels of global mobility of people and the general debates about the phenomena of international migration. Historically, migration has been a process by which different ethnic, cultural, language and religious groups have come together. This coming together is a consequence of migration but perhaps more precisely it is the process by which people leave their homeland to establish a new home elsewhere (Kritz, 1992). Migration and subsequent contact between individuals and groups of diverse people is a product of an increasingly interconnected world where movement of people and goods is easier for some than at any time in the past. For example, relaxed borders, advances in transportation technology, the emergence of transnational economic institutions and the decreasing influence of national sovereignty are all believed to be the main reasons for this increase in international migration (Alexander, 2006). There could be several reasons why a new immigrant leaves their homeland and ancestral place of residence, and these reasons could include seeking asylum or looking for a better life. Generally, economic reasons, fears of shortages in the labour force and lack of skills dictate receiving countries’ invitations to new migrants (Walmsley, Aguiar, & Ahmed, 2015).

1.2. International migration levels

Debates about migration and integration are currently taking place in many parts of the world against a background of ever increasing levels of international migration. In 2013, the number of international migrants reached 232 million people, up from 231 million in 2005 (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs [UN DESA], 2013). These are literally people living outside their home country; 70.8 million of these people are in Asia (UN DESA, 2013) and around 6.9 million people have come to resettle in Australia since the end of the Second World War (Department of Immigration and Citizenship [DIAC], 2010). In a global comparison, Australia is one of the top ten countries hosting international migrants. In almost every nation and society
which is receiving these waves of richly diverse migrants, the most pressing challenge
that international migration poses is not only its scale, but also the diversity of the
groups moving from one cultural background to another (Hagan, 2006; Hugo, 2005).
For example, Hugo (2005) states:

Global international migration is increasing exponentially not only in scale
but also in the types of mobility and the cultural diversity of groups
involved in that movement. As a result more nations and communities will
have to cope with increased levels of social and cultural diversity.
Moreover, the nature of migration itself is changing so that the lessons of
the past with respect to coping with that diversity may no longer be
appropriate. Experience in some parts of the world suggests that it may be
difficult to reconcile the increased diversity with social harmony and social
cohesion (p.1).

Immigration affects the lives of both those who migrate from their original places of
residence and members of the host communities, and presents migrants and members of
the host societies with many opportunities and challenges (Hugo, 2005). In his opening
address of the third global forum on migration and development in Athens in 2009,
United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon highlighted the fact that around the
world, migration is a subject that is vigorously debated in parliaments and societies in
general, but it is also one that provokes tension and fans the flames of prejudice and
discrimination (United Nations, 2009). In the next section, the thesis discusses polarities
in the debates of immigration and integration.

1.3.  Polarisation of the debates about migration and
integration

International migration and the movement of people from one part of the world to
another is an area of significant interest to academics, researchers, governments and the
general public. The manner in which this important debate is conducted is contentious
amongst researchers, politicians and the public alike (Andersson, 2012). Polarities of
the debates arise in different forms: racial labelling (Samers, 2002), increasing anti-
immigrant sentiments across many parts of Western Europe (Segovia & Defever, 2010),
and politicisation of the immigration and integration debate (van Heerden, de Lange,
van der Brug, & Fennema, 2014). These polarities may have created a rather antagonistic space in which debates and discussions about immigration and integration lack objectivity. Several matters that may be aiding these polarities are discussed below.

Increased anti-immigration sentiment across many countries in the West that led to the emergence of invigorated right wing political parties challenges the conduct of an objective and balanced debate on this subject. For example, Lapinski et al. (1997) found negative views about immigration although the majority of those surveyed pointed to illegal immigration. Others such as Segovia and Defever (2010) analysed the trend data and public opinion about immigration in the United States collected by the American National Election Survey (ANES), General Social Survey (GSS), the Gallup Poll, the Pew Research Centre and media surveys from 1992 to 2012, and found that there has been a steady increase in anti-immigrant sentiment in the United States, especially following the period from 11 September 2001.

However, Muste (2013) criticises the studies of Lapinski et al. (1997) and Segovia and Defever (2010) and claims that they often leave time gaps that change the measure of opinion in issues of immigration. Despite Muste’s (2013) cautious remarks, it remains the case that immigration is a polarised and divisive topic in the national discourses of many countries in the West. Similar negative polling results were found elsewhere, including in Australia, where the Lowy Institute found that 73 per cent of Australians endorsed tightened immigration policies in dealings with asylum seekers (Lowy Institute Poll, 2014).

Political rhetoric and the politicisation of the immigration and integration debate further polarises the debate. Overall, immigration and integration are characterised by controversies and excessive politicking, and suffer from what Poppelaars and Scholten (2008) describe as responsiveness to a series of focus events and mood swings. For instance, Entzinger (2006) describes attitudes towards immigrants around the world as being hostile, with the exception of the Netherlands, which is the only country in Europe that has displayed a dramatic shift in its acceptance towards immigrants. The polarities of the debates about immigration and integration are also evident in how some prominent leaders in Europe, such as Germany’s Chancellor, Angela Merkel, UK Prime Minister, David Cameron and former French President, Nicolas Sarkozy all openly attacked the concept of multiculturalism (Novotny, 2011). Angela Merkel has addressed
members of the Christian Democratic Union party and stated: “Germany’s attempt to create a multicultural society has utterly failed” (*The Guardian*, 2010, n.p.).

In Australia, the former conservative Prime Minister, John Howard, is alleged to have polarised the debate about asylum seekers coming to Australia (Van Onselen & Errington, 2007). In fact, Tate (2009, pp. 108–109) cites the following quote from a manifesto that Prime Minister John Howard introduced as Opposition Leader, which was titled Future Direction’s Coalition Policy:

> We endorse the objectives of a cohesive society within which people are free to express their own identity. The sharing of our heritages in an open society that encourages the exchange of ideas and cultural experiences will enrich our nation and strengthen our sense of unity. But there is a vast difference between tolerance, respect, and understanding and indeed welcome for that diversity that now makes up this county and its unique identity and a Government committed to elevate a whole range of different cultures, customs and values and accord them all equal status within the Australian way of life. We want to see one Australia proud of its diverse heritage and able to derive benefit as a nation from its individual groups. We do not want to see an Australia of individual groups, each stressing their differences and only linked in the loosest of ways by a mutual tolerance of diversity.

The diversity of integration models, policies and programs in the available academic literature further polarises the debates about immigrant integration and arguably produce differences in how the concept is perceived. Immigrant integration programs vary and sometimes overlap, and it is important to explain from the outset that a range of terms is used to describe the processes of incorporating newcomers (immigrants) into the receiving societies. For example, these integration processes are explained to mean “integrate, absorb, and assimilate” (Weiner, 1996, p. 46). Other terms used include “acculturation, assimilation, adaptation, incorporation, inclusion, insertion, settlement and citizenship” (Lacroix, 2010, p. 11). The multiplicity of the meanings of integration is discussed in detail in Chapter Three of this thesis. Nevertheless, this thesis notes that “integration” appears to be the term that is widely used in the public debates about
immigrant incorporation. For this reason, this thesis will occasionally use the terms “integration” and “incorporation” interchangeably.

Lacroix (2010) explains how the 2008 national elections in Austria and the United States, the 2007 French presidential elections, and the 2006 and 2003 Dutch general election were all dominated by national discourses linked to immigration. Wyss et al. (2015) assert that immigration and integration debates have become not only polarised in recent times but seem to have declined in quality. The authors researched parliamentary debates on immigration in Switzerland from 1986 to 2014 by using a psychological construct known as cognitive complexity (CC). They found that in the Swiss parliament, the cognitive complexity of debates on immigration has decreased over the period. This decline in the quality of the debate is also true in other Western liberal democracies. Some extreme specific examples of the nature of polarised debates about immigration and integration include the language used and the way in which public and political discussions are framed. For example, Ercan (2015) argues that framing “honour killings” in Germany as being Muslim specific cultural acts rather than as a form of violence against women that happens in many different cultures, polarises the debate and is unsustainable.

In Australia, the debate about immigration is topical and featured prominently in each of the last three of Australia’s federal parliamentary elections. For instance, immigration and the asylum seeker issues in the 2001 Tampa standoff are claimed to have cost the Australian Labor Party the opportunity to win office in the elections of that year (McAllister, 2003). Similarly, other Australian federal election results could be partly attributed to the polarised debates about immigration and asylum seekers. In the 2007 election, Federal Minister Kevin Andrews singled out African immigrants and refugees and alleged that they were not integrating to his satisfaction (Farouque, Petrie, & Miletic, 2007). As a minister and senior member of the Liberal and National Coalition government, Minister Andrews made this statement “Some groups don’t seem to be settling and adjusting into the Australian way of life ... as quickly as we would hope ... slow down the rate of intake from countries such as Sudan.” (Farouque, Petrie, & Miletic, 2007, n.p.)

In the 2013 Australian federal elections, arguably the “Stopping the Boats” campaign could be credited with helping the then opposition conservative coalition of Liberals
and Nationals to ultimately win the election and form government. Similarly, traditional migrant receiving countries such as Australia have recently adopted policies that make it harder for some international migrants to reach their borders. These restricted movements are manifested in campaigns to stop boat people arriving in Australia. For example, in 2014, the Abbott government launched an operation code named “Operation Sovereign Borders” by using the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (Department of Immigration and Border Protection [DIBP], 2014). A survey conducted by an Australian think tank found that 73 per cent of Australians endorse the government’s policy to turn back boats carrying asylum seekers when it is safe to do so (Lowy Institute Poll, 2014).

Despite the politicking about immigrant integration described above, it is worth noting that Australia as a country is unique in its history as a nation, its self-conception and its geographical location. The country prides itself as one that has a long history of migration and successful settlement of people of diverse cultural and linguistic backgrounds. Australia’s current demographic profile speaks for itself. In fact, about 23.5 percent of Australians are born overseas (Biddle, Khoo, & Taylor, 2015, p. 28). In contemporary Australia, immigration is seen as being a way to build the nation, and in 2010 the responsible government’s Department of Immigration and Border Protection celebrated 65 years of nation building (DIBP, 2014). For the most part of this period, the department’s core functions included the successful incorporation of culturally, linguistically and religiously diverse groups of immigrants into the host society. However, historians such as Ganter (2006) state that in the north of Australia at least, poly-ethnicity and multi-faith tolerance predates the policy of multiculturalism, which was introduced only in the 1970s.

In more recent times, the arrival of often unseaworthy boats carrying hundreds of asylum seekers attempting to reach Australian shores has completely overshadowed the immigration debates which had been going on since the turn of the century (Collins 2013; Klocker & Dunn, 2003; O’Doherty & Lecouter, 2007; Pickering, 2001). The heated debates about asylum seekers attempting to come to Australia by boat reached new heights, as these arrivals and the government’s policies seem to have affected Australia’s relations with its important neighbouring Muslim majority countries, such as Indonesia and Malaysia. Koser (2010, p. 3) states that, “Boat arrivals are near the top of
the political agenda in Australia and have been the focus of a flurry of policy making in 2010”. The polarisation of the debate is not limited to the management of boat people attempting to arrive in Australia but extends to the management of asylum seekers once they are in Australia, or to apprehending them in Australian or international waters.

In some cases, the so-called “boat people” aren’t even allowed to land in Australia but are shipped off to offshore detention camps such as Manus Island in Papua New Guinea and the Pacific island of Nauru. Public and political discussions in this area include those that criticise Australia’s mandatory detention regime, claiming the adverse impact of prolonged detention on the mental health of asylum seekers (Newman, 2013). Such claims of inhumane treatment of asylum seekers in detention centres failed to persuade the high court judges in Australia to make detention laws illegal and instead the court ruled that this detention of asylum seekers was legal (Brennan, 2015). Whilst these debates are outside the realm of immigrant incorporation, it is understood that they have a direct influence on the perceptions of how Australia receives and manages its new arrivals, including those seeking protection under the refugee and humanitarian grounds governed by the 1951 United Nations’ Refugee Convention that relates to the status of refugees.

In the broader field of international migration, the integration of migrant individuals and groups receives significant attention. Throughout Europe, North America and Australia, the integration of migrants is a topic of enormous controversy and one that generates fierce debate. In Italy, the large number of immigrants arriving to its shores put immigration at the top of the government’s agenda (Barbulescu & Beaudonnet, 2014). In the United States, amid congressional debate about illegal immigration, a number of local governments have pushed for a comprehensive review of immigration law (Preston, 2006). It has been suggested that the growing number of European extreme right wing parties exploit fear of immigration to advance their opposition to a European integration agenda (De Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2005).

In Australia, debate about so-called illegal immigration and the arrival of boat people put immigration at the forefront of public discussions (Crock, & Ghezelbash, 2010; Koser, 2010). For instance, Lacroix (2010) states that the subject of integrating migrants raises alarm on all fronts, and receiving societies have a fear of new immigrants diluting national culture, changing the established way of life and becoming a burden on social
systems. Receiving nations also perceive that there will be incompatibility between the host community’s values and culture and that of the immigrants, possibly leading to clashes between Islamic and Western societies (p.1). These tensions are mainly due to “out-groups” coming into contact with “locals”. The tragic events of 11 September 2001 in the United States caused further concern about immigrant integration, and government and public opinion linked the terrorist attacks to national security and safety of the wider society (Zimmerman, Gataullina, Constant, & Zimmerman, 2008).

As people migrate from one place to another, they inevitably come into contact with strangers, and they are expected to, or sometimes ordered to, assimilate and become part of the wider society. Debate about international migration and the movement of people from one part of the world to another is an important part of public policy across Europe, North America and Australia, and governments are developing policies to enable integration of their newcomers (Lacroix, 2010). However, the adopted processes and programs to incorporate immigrants into their new societies vary. Immigrant incorporation is thus explained as being the most pressing policy and social challenge that liberal nation states face currently (Goodman, 2010, p. 769). In the introduction chapter of her book, Lacroix (2010, p. xi) explains how integration is a hot topic worldwide and how, “National governments around the world are struggling to find ways to accommodate the increasing number of immigrants crossing their borders or residing in their countries”.

Overall, the above section of the thesis engaged in discussions about levels of global international migration and the nature of polarised debates of immigration and integration. Shedding some light on levels of international migration is essential in order to grasp the complexities involved in integration of minorities in a vastly changing global and local environment. The discussions above demonstrate the fragility of the public debate about migration and immigrant integration. They also explain how these polarised debates are part and parcel of the discussions of Australian Muslims’ integration. But, before the thesis discusses its findings, some context and background on who Australian Muslims are and what their presence in Australia signifies is necessary. In the next chapter, the thesis gives an insight into Muslims in Australia, their presence, and their demographic profile.
Chapter 2. Muslims in Australia: Context and Background

2.1. Introduction

Integration is an important issue in the field of international migration. As explained in Chapter One, this thesis addresses the significant topic of Muslim migrant integration and specifically attempts to comprehend how Muslims in Australia conceptualise the notion of integration. However, it is difficult to achieve this without some context, background and understanding of the history and context of Islam and Muslims in Australia. Indeed, it becomes necessary to provide this important context, as it underpins an understanding and appreciation of Islam and Muslims in this country prior to discussions about their integration. The general intention of this chapter is to enable the reader to contextualise the findings and discussions of the empirical Chapters Five and Six, which follow later in this thesis.

Firstly, this chapter provides a general overview of Islam and Muslims in Australia. It will address the impact of the first contact Muslims had in this country by discussing early migration, as well as the more contemporary movement of Muslim immigrants to Australia. It will also shed light on the current position of Muslims in the wider Australian society. Using the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) data and other resources, the chapter gives insight into the socio-economic place of Muslims in Australia. The tables presented in this chapter provide an overview of socio-economic conditions in respect to demographics, educational attainment, average weekly income, labour market participation and home ownership. Secondly, the chapter gives a detailed account of Islamic and Western relations in general, and the role played by geo-political events such as that which occurred in the USA on 11th September 2001. This chapter discusses the ways in which this tragedy has led to public discussions about perceived problems concerning the integration of Muslims in Australia.

2.2. Early migration of Muslims to Australia

In Australia, public discussions about Muslim integration and migration naively suggest that this migration is a recent occurrence. However, these discussions usually ignore the
fact that Muslims have been a part of the population of this country for a very long time (Cleland, 2002; Jones, 1993; Jones & Kenny, 2007). The extant literature on early Muslim contact in Australia is scarce and generally refers to the Afghan cameleers and the Indonesian Muslim Macassan fishermen (Jones & Kenny, 2007). The contact between Muslims and the first Australians, which occurred long before European settlement, is documented in the cave drawings of the distinctive Macassan boats and in artefacts found in northern Aboriginal communities (Jones, 1993; Saeed, 2004). Although small in number and maybe not as diverse as today’s communities, Muslims have been present in Australia for centuries. However, it is disputable whether either group, the Macassan fisherman who came in the 1600s, or the Afghan cameleers who came in the 1800s, established permanent communities. According to Jones and Kenny (2007) Australia gained a small permanent Muslim population only about 150 years ago.

In fact, the first regular settlement of Muslims began in 1886 with the arrival of three camel drivers from British-India (Yasmeen, 2008, p. 5). Other researchers, such as Saeed (2003), claim that Muslim contact with this country predates European settlement. Saeed (2003) presents the example of the Macassan fishermen from Sulawesi, Indonesia, who are reported to have arrived in Australia around 1750. It is the arrival in 1840 of the Afghan camel travellers, known as the Afghan cameleers, who are credited with the opening up of the vast interior of Australia to European settlement (Cleland, 2002). Historians such as Ganter (2012), who conducted research in Northern Australia, reveal the deep and meaningful engagements that early Muslim settlers had with the indigenous populations of Australia. Other researcher such as Deen (2011) state that it was not uncommon for indigenous people to encounter camel caravans passing through their land and to establish relationships with camel drivers.

Some of the contributions that early Muslim migrants have made are well documented, and the period between the late 19th century and early 20th century is known as the period of the “Afghan Camel Invasion” (Cleland, 2002, p. 41). Camels were needed to access remote parts of Australia in order to trade and transport goods, and the Afghan cameleers had the specialist knowledge and skills needed to drive the camels. This is the explanation for this group of Muslim migrants being invited to come to Australia (Cleland, 2002). The Maccassans and the Afghan cameleers were not the only Muslim
groups who travelled to Australia as early migrants (Jones, 1993). In fact, it is estimated that in 1875 there were 1800 Malays working in Western Australia in the pearling industry as deep-sea divers (Jones, 1993). Evidence of a Muslim presence in this early period included the 1861 building of a mosque in Marree, South Australia (Peucker & Akbarzadeh, 2014).

Muslim migration to Australia continued after Federation in 1901, however, the experiences of early Muslim settlers have not been well documented. After Federation, Muslims, like other non-European groups, were subjected to social and legal restrictions (Kabir, 2004; Samani, 2007). During this early period of Muslim migration, Australia’s immigration laws were by their nature discriminatory. The Immigration Restriction Act of 1901, which later became the Naturalisation Act of 1903, officially put a seal of exclusion on “coloured” people, and they were barred from becoming Australian citizens (Samani, 2007). The policy of sourcing migrants strictly from English speaking countries was directed against groups which were considered to be unable to be integrated (Jupp, 2002, p. 14).

It is quite clear from the literature that those deemed or suspected to be unable to be integrated in society were not singled out because of their faith alone. In fact, in the case of the early Afghan Muslim settlers, it is argued that the discrimination encountered by this group was also aimed at members of non-Muslim faith groups, for example, Irish Catholics, “Simply because these groups were distinguished from the wider society in terms of a range of criteria including colour, religion and language or accent” (Kabir, 2005, p. 43). Other minority groups such as “Chinese and Melanesians were equally discriminated against by the majority white society” (Kabir, 2004, p. 42). Researchers such as Northcote and Casimiro (2010, p. 146) advance that “Australia’s early migration program was both Euro-centric and Christian-centric”. The discrimination that Muslims faced during this early migration period around the early 1900s is directed at particular groups of migrants coming to Australia. Northcote and Casimiro (2010, p. 146) explain that a “Muslim who looked European (Turkish) was acceptable as an immigrant and a non-European who was a Christian (Lebanese) was also acceptable”. But both these two groups may well have been the same people, as Lebanon was then a province under the rule of the Ottoman Empire and, “The people from Lebanon were sometimes referred to as Ottomans or Syrians” (Convy & Monsour, 2008, p. 2).
Arguably, the small number of Muslims who came to this country during the late 19th century and early 20th century lived simply and did not enjoy the same privileges that contemporary larger Muslim communities commonly take for granted. These privileges include a diverse Australian population which did not exist in those days and a great many Muslim community organisations and peak bodies serving contemporary Muslim communities all over the country. However, early Muslim settlers observed their religious duties such as following Islamic burial rites and keeping to a strict halal diet. These early immigrants also had imams (religious leaders) who conducted marriages, and they were able to pray in Islamic mosques (Jones, 1993). A major difference between the early Muslim settlers in Australia and contemporary Muslim communities in Australia is the ferocity of debate over Muslim women’s dress codes. The hijab (or head scarf) is a phenomenon that appeared among Muslims in Australia in the late 1990s as part of a global emphasis on outward expressions of Muslim identity.

The period between 1920 and 1930 saw an increase in Muslim migration to North Queensland to work on the sugar cane farms and to Victoria to work on fruit farms (The Australian Journey: Muslim Communities report, 2009). But it was not until the end of World War II that large Muslim migration to Australia began. Poynting and Mason (2007) state that at the end of the Second World War, Australia undertook the largest migration intake per capita in the history of world with the exception of Israel (p. 66). Turkish Cypriots began to arrive in Australia in the mid-1950s and 1960s and Turkish immigrants followed between 1968 and 1972 (Humphrey, 2001). In the post-World War II era, migration to Australia was in full swing and the immigration of thousands of Muslims from many different countries began (Akbarzadeh & Saeed, 2001). By the late 1960s, the migration agreements the Australian government had with traditional Western European countries had peaked and it became necessary to source migrants from non-traditional Western European countries. Just as many of today’s new Muslims immigrants are fleeing from wars in parts of the Middle East countries such as Iraq and Syria, the post war Muslim immigrants including those from Yugoslavia and Cyprus were displaced by wars (Jones, 1993).

Similarly, demand for labour was at its highest and the migration agreement was extended to Turkey in 1968 and to the former Yugoslavia in the 1970s (Jupp, 2002, p. 23). Migration from countries with a majority of Muslims in their populations, and from
countries with significant Muslim minorities, was the beginning of a large influx of Muslims, and the Muslim population in Australia grew after the Second World War (ABS, 2011).

Since the Second World War, many other Muslim groups have made Australia home, and predominantly, their reason for migration is that they are fleeing from war torn countries. The migration of Muslims from Lebanon to Australia began after 1975 as a result of the Lebanese Civil War, and these groups included both Christian and Muslim Lebanese migrants (McKay, 1989). The demand for Muslim migration to Australia is likely to continue as in the late 20th century and in the early 21st century many ordinary Muslims have been, and are still being forced by geo-political circumstances such as civil wars to flee from their home countries. Examples of countries in which conflict has erupted include parts of the Middle East such as Iraq, Syria and Egypt and Afghanistan, Bosnia and Tunisia. Specific Muslim groups who have migrated to Australia as a result of conflict include the Turks, the Lebanese, the Kosovars, the Bosnians and the Afghans (Akbarzadeh & Saeed, 2001, p. 37). According to Northcote and Casimirotro (2010), as the number of Muslim communities grows and international conflicts involving Muslim societies increase, members of these communities will experience increased pressure from secular Australians. Whilst discussions regarding the early migration of Muslims to Australia are necessary and historically relevant in understanding the integration of Muslim migrant groups in Australia, an appreciation of the social and economic conditions of contemporary Muslim migrants to Australia is equally important.

2.3. The social and economic situation of Muslims in Australia today

In the previous chapter, this thesis provided a brief definition for, and discussion of, integration. A comprehensive definition and discussion of the literature on integration, including different discourses of integration will be discussed in Chapter Three, but for purposes of context and background, it is imperative to understand how integration is measured and how Muslims in Australia fare in a number of indicators of integration. For instance, if the social and economic situation of Muslims in Australia today is utilised as a good indicator of how well Muslims have integrated into the wider society, how are they performing? Amongst a number of key measures of immigrant integration
used in Europe and elsewhere are indicators of labour market participation, educational attainment and housing conditions, which are emphasised by scholars such as Ager, Strang, O’May and Garner, (2002), and Ager and Strang, (2004).

However, other indicators which have been used to measure migrant integration include aspects such as cultural integration, legal and political integration and the attitudes of recipient societies (Entzinger & Biezeveld, 2003). Drawing on the works of the abovementioned scholars, this thesis seeks to gain an understanding of how Australian Muslims fared in 2015, in order to objectively examine their levels of integration. In doing so, a number of key functional integration indicators of Muslim migrants in Australia, namely educational attainment, labour market participation, average weekly income and citizenship and voluntary work participation, are discussed below in detail.

Using specially generated tabulations of Muslim and non-Muslim societal data gathered from the 2011 population census, this thesis attempts to present the relative social and economic position of Muslims in Australia, because this directly relates to the degree of Muslim integration in this society. The data includes information about highest educational attainment, labour market participation and average weekly income, plus citizenship and voluntary activities, which are analysed in this section. The functional integration of migrants is arguably easy to measure objectively by analysing and reflecting on readily available raw data, such as that of the ABS census. However, it is necessary to recognise that these functional elements of integration stated above are not necessarily the only indicators of migrant integration. An indicator of integration could also be the more abstract and difficult to measure aspect of migrant integration, namely cultural integration (Kuran & Sandholm, 2008).

The Australian government takes a census of the population every five years. Amongst many other factors, the census reports the number of persons reporting an affiliation to a religion. The number of Muslims in Australia recorded in the recent Australian Bureau of Statistics (2011) census data is 476,300, constituting about 2.2 per cent of the Australian population. This is higher than the number of Muslims recorded in the previous census data of 2006, in which Muslims in Australia constituted 1.7 per cent of the total Australian population. It is worth noting that the 2011 ABS Census data shows a higher proportion of recent Muslim arrivals reporting an affiliation to Islam than was reported by longer standing migrants; a figure of 8.4 per cent in the 2011 Census and
4.7 per cent in the 2006 Census. With the exception of the “no religion” category, Hindus and Buddhists, Muslims scored higher rates of new arrivals reporting religious affiliation than some of the other religious groups, as shown in Figure 2.1 below.

In order to comply with copyright the figure has been removed

Figure 2.1  
Selected religions – longer standing and recently arrived migrants

Extracted from the ABS website.

The increasing population of Muslims in Australia is not of itself an indicator of how well Muslims are faring within the wider Australian society. Instead, the relative social and economic position of Muslims in this country is a better indicator of their integration (Hassan, 2010). Therefore in order to research this area, some evidence based key indicators of integration must be used, and these are Muslims’ educational attainment, average weekly household income, labour market participation and participation in citizenship projects such as volunteerism (Ager & Strang, 2004; Phillimore & Goodson, 2008; Spoonley, Peace, Butcher, & O’Neill, 2005). Nevertheless, the thesis does not claim that Muslims’ socio-economic position is the best indicator of immigrant integration. In fact, it is quite possible that non-migrant societal groups might have low levels of education, higher unemployment and lower income, and yet it would be problematic to describe them as unintegrated. Whilst integration cannot be solely measured on these functional indicators, the thesis stresses the importance of this aspect of integration for immigrants so that they can play their part in the social and economic fabric of the nation.

Instead integration needs to be defined as much broader than the abovementioned narrow socio-economic aspect and may include cultural, political and identificational
aspects. In the following section, the social and economic position of Muslims in Australia is discussed. Before analysing the customised 2011 ABS Census data, it is imperative to explain that the data that was analysed and the method used to analyse it. Initially the student researcher used ABS Census products, including TableBuilder, DataPacks Online and Survey to create meaningful tables of how Muslims in Australia are faring in the wider society. A total of 6 data tables were generated from the 2011 Census of the count of persons (excluding Overseas Visitors), in Australia by Religious Affiliation (Islam, Other, Total).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.1</th>
<th>Data tables generated from 2011 Census</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1</td>
<td>Country of birth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2</td>
<td>Highest level of educational attainment (postgraduate, bachelor, certificate, schooling, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3</td>
<td>Labour force status (employed, unemployed, not in labour force) by age groups (5 year groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4</td>
<td>Occupation (major groups) by industry (major groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5</td>
<td>Citizenship by voluntary work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6</td>
<td>Tenure type (fully owned, rented, etc.) by individual income ranges.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This data was provided in Excel format. Information on political participation is not collected from the census. In each of the above tabulated data, information retrieved from the table builder included four categories: Islam, other religion, no religion and not stated. In order to make a fair comparison, categories of “other religion” and “no religion” were added together and a new category of “non-Muslim” was created. This means that anyone who responded to the question of religious affiliation but did not identify himself or herself as Muslim was considered to be non-Muslim. The “not stated” category was not counted and was left out of the analysis, as it may potentially include both Muslims and non-Muslims who did not answer the question. Eliminating this category makes the comparisons of the data in each of the following tables more accurate. Overall, the six tables analysed reveal important factual information about the socio-economic situation of Muslims in Australia. The first of these tables is the educational attainment of Muslims and non-Muslims in the 2011 ABS Census of Population (see Table 2.2).

2.3.1. **Level of higher educational attainment**

From the 2011 ABS Census data, the total number of the census population who reported attaining a postgraduate level of education is 631,122. This includes the 22,711 people who did not state their religion in the population census. The fact that there is a
chance that some Muslims might be included in this group dictated that this amount be deducted from total of the Australian population who attained a postgraduate level of education. This makes the total actual number of Australians who attained a postgraduate level of education 608,411 persons. Out of this group, Muslims who attained a postgraduate level of education constitute 25,386, which is about 5 per cent of the total number of people who attained a postgraduate level of education. Correspondingly, the total number of non-Muslims in the same census period comprising people who stated that they either have a religion other than Islam or have no religion at all (termed as non-Muslim) was 583,025, which is about 3 per cent of the population. It is clear that in percentage terms, significantly more Muslim Australians, more than twice their overall population count, have completed a postgraduate level of education. Other categories in which Muslims had higher levels of education than the non-Muslim population in the 2011 Census include completing year 12 at school at 17 per cent, compared to 14 per cent in the non-Muslim population. However, this simply means that a higher proportion of Muslims in Australia have high school as their highest qualification. Those who attained year 8 and lower levels of education were about 5 per cent, as compared to 4 per cent in the non-Muslim group. An important point to note is that, despite their higher educational attainment in the postgraduate level education category, Muslims report a slightly lower percentage in the count of all higher education than the non-Muslim cohort.

In the graduate diploma and graduate certificate levels of educational attainment, both Muslims and non-Muslims report a low figure of 1 per cent. However, Muslims report lower levels of educational attainment at the bachelor degree level at 11 per cent, and 5 per cent in the advanced diploma and diploma levels, as compared to the non-Muslim figure of 2 per cent and 7 per cent respectively. The data concerning Muslim educational attainment in school years 10 and 12 is of particular interest. As the table above shows, Muslims do poorly in completing year 10 of high school and report about 6 per cent completion in comparison with the figure of 11 per cent reported by the non-Muslim group. A reasonable explanation for this phenomenon could be the higher levels of Muslims’ completion of schooling in the year reported above. This could be an explanation as to why the numbers of Muslims completing year 10 is so low.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Highest Educational Attainment</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Non-Muslim</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Postgraduate degree level</td>
<td>25,386</td>
<td>583,025</td>
<td>608,411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate diploma and graduate certificate level</td>
<td>3,052</td>
<td>283,944</td>
<td>286,966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor degree level</td>
<td>51,073</td>
<td>2,209,119</td>
<td>2,260,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced diploma and diploma level</td>
<td>24,726</td>
<td>1,321,648</td>
<td>1,346,374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certificate level</td>
<td>26,694</td>
<td>2,533,949</td>
<td>2,560,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 12</td>
<td>83,207</td>
<td>2,686,562</td>
<td>2,769,769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 11</td>
<td>16,637</td>
<td>955,607</td>
<td>972,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 10</td>
<td>29,024</td>
<td>2,150,943</td>
<td>2,179,967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 9</td>
<td>11,653</td>
<td>775,463</td>
<td>787,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 8 or below</td>
<td>23,355</td>
<td>802,992</td>
<td>826,347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequately described</td>
<td>5,131</td>
<td>231,209</td>
<td>236,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No educational attainment</td>
<td>14,671</td>
<td>109,194</td>
<td>123,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not stated</td>
<td>22,761</td>
<td>908,344</td>
<td>931,105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>138,919</td>
<td>3,639,781</td>
<td>3,778,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>476,289</td>
<td>19,191,780</td>
<td>19,668,069</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, whilst data on religious affiliation by highest educational attainment is generally sound, Muslims report a significantly higher level in the no educational attainment category at 3 per cent, as compared to 1 per cent of the total population. It can therefore be stated that Muslim data on educational attainment is at worst mixed, or perhaps reasonably good, based on the figures reported above. So, if education is a good predictor of the high levels of integration of migrants, then Muslims in Australia are reasonably integrated and potentially have the necessary human capital to contribute to the development of Australia as a nation.

These statistics correspond with the earlier findings of Hassan (2009) who found that the 2006 ABS Census data shows that in all categories except one, Muslim citizens have reached similar or better educational attainment than their non-Muslim counterparts. Bouma (1994) found similar results and concludes that in the attainment of higher education, Australian Muslims match up well with the wider Australian society. He claims that the high value which Muslims place on learning and education, plus the labour market’s preference for migrants with qualifications, are reasons for their high educational attainment. It is also the case that the Australian migration program favours
skilled migrants and this could be a factor in the higher educational levels of Muslim immigrants. Nevertheless, the thesis is cautious in interpreting the data on Muslims’ higher educational attainment. For example, it is difficult to determine how many of these postgraduate qualifications are obtained overseas before migration and whether or not they are recognised in Australia. On the other hand, there may be uncertainty about how these qualifications enable Muslims to be adequately employed in the labour market. In the absence of such information, higher educational attainment cannot on its own be an indicator of a successful integration.

At the macro levels, the importance of high levels of education to immigrants is noted by Carrington and Detragiache (1999) who stress that economists claim that differences in the wealth of nations is a result of the educational levels of populations. Similarly, education is stated to be an important factor in the integration of immigrant communities. For instance, Kaida (2013) cites education and language training as two important tools which enable migrants to escape poverty in their newly adopted societies. Kaida (2013) asserts that education and host society language are factors associated with immigrant poverty and economic disadvantages relating to human capital. It is indeed the case that education and language training alone do not assist migrants to escape from poverty, and may only assist if the education and training they have received allows them to find employment that earns them a good livelihood.

2.3.2. Labour market participation

As indicated in studies by Entzinger, and Biezeveld, (2003), Ager and Strang, (2004), Spoonley et al., (2005) and Phillimore and Goodson, (2008), another important indicator of successful integration is immigrants’ participation in the host society’s labour force, therefore it is imperative to understand how Muslims are faring in Australia’s labour market. But before this comparison takes place, the researcher notes that there is an apparent disparity between the age profiles of the Muslim community and the non-Muslim community. In particular, the 2011 ABS Census of Population data shows that the Muslim community is largest within the age group brackets of 20-24, 25-29, 30-34 and 35-39 (see Table 2.3 below).
Table 2.3  
Age profile of Australian Muslims and Non-Muslims seeking employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age range, years</th>
<th>Muslim employable</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Non-Muslim employable</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>9,780</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>635,774</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>23,743</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1,011,753</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>30,242</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1,109,284</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>29,286</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1,059,397</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>23,053</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1,122,164</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>19,040</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1,166,975</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>15,395</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,149,703</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>10,509</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,075,853</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
<td>6,253</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>854,421</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-64</td>
<td>3,142</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>573,621</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+65</td>
<td>1,428</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>318,388</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>171,871</strong></td>
<td><strong>101</strong>*</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>10,077,333</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (*) More than 100% due to small rounding error

On the basis of the age profiles shown in the above table, the researcher calculates the employment and unemployment rates for each age category for Muslims and for non-Muslims, and then compared them (see Table 2.4 below).
### Table 2.4  Comparison of employment and unemployment between Australian Muslims and Non-Muslims, by age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age range, years</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Non-Muslims</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>% Employed</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>% Employed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>7,011</td>
<td>2,769</td>
<td>9,780</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>534,591</td>
<td>101,183</td>
<td>635,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>19,309</td>
<td>4,434</td>
<td>23,743</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>916,398</td>
<td>95,355</td>
<td>1,011,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>26,482</td>
<td>3,760</td>
<td>30,242</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,046,914</td>
<td>62,370</td>
<td>1,109,284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>26,141</td>
<td>3,145</td>
<td>29,286</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1,010,001</td>
<td>49,396</td>
<td>1,059,397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>20,641</td>
<td>2,412</td>
<td>23,053</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1,073,122</td>
<td>49,042</td>
<td>1,122,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>17,095</td>
<td>1,945</td>
<td>19,040</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1,118,411</td>
<td>48,564</td>
<td>1,166,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>13,972</td>
<td>1,423</td>
<td>15,395</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,105,178</td>
<td>44,525</td>
<td>1,149,703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>9,585</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>10,509</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,036,933</td>
<td>38,920</td>
<td>1,075,853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
<td>5,730</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>6,253</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>822,572</td>
<td>31,849</td>
<td>854,421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-64</td>
<td>2,867</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>3,142</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>550,724</td>
<td>22,897</td>
<td>573,621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>1,334</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>1,428</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>311,812</td>
<td>6,576</td>
<td>318,388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>150,167</td>
<td>21,704</td>
<td>171,871</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9,526,656</td>
<td>550,677</td>
<td>10,077,333</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In comparison with their non-Muslims counterparts, Muslims report lower levels in the total employed category comprised of all age groups (87 per cent) as opposed to the recorded 95 per cent of the non-Muslim group. Certainly, this percentage difference is not very high but still it shows that Muslims record lower levels in the employed category than their non-Muslim counterparts. This data corresponds with the comparative unemployment data figures of all age groups between Muslims and non-Muslim depicted in the same table, which shows 13 per cent unemployment for Muslims and 5 per cent unemployment of the non-Muslim group. However, the data on this table also illustrates that Muslims show poor participation in particular in the age group 15-24 (below 90 per cent), in which they record unemployment levels of 12-28 per cent, and then gradually improve in employment participation of older age groups recording 93 per cent for +65 years. In fact, unemployment for +65 years drops to 7 per cent.

In a period of uncertain economic climate and high levels of national debt and deficit, Muslims in Australia are disproportionately affected by unemployment and face the challenges of underemployment in a competitive labour market. The 2011 ABS Census data concerning Muslim labour force participation is consistent and shows that in all age groups, Muslims report high unemployment percentages as compared to non-Muslims. Figures in different age groups evidently vary, but the census data reliably reports that youth unemployment is specifically a major problem faced by Muslims in Australia. For example, Muslims between the ages of 15-24, which are of course in their most optimal working years, are not active in the labour force. It is indeed important that governments pay attention to this high rate of youth unemployment.

A number of studies point out that the employment circumstances of immigrants and their children is an important dimension of their integration and adaptation into the host societies (Bevelander, 1999, 2000; Bisin, Patacchini, Verdier & Zenou, 2011). Most of the literature where employment outcomes of immigrants are evaluated, and sometimes compared with natives, concerns Europe. For the most part, a review of this literature reveals that in most European countries, immigrants have lower levels of labour market participation rates than members of host societies (Husted et al., 2009). Husted et al., (2009) also note that immigrant labour market participation is important, as it may increase the nation’s aggregate labour supply, economic growth, public finances, and
specifically, it may significantly contribute to major demographic problems such as the ageing of the population.

There is evidence in the available literature to suggest that immigrant participation in the host nation’s labour market can have an effect on integration levels and overall wellbeing (Adida, Laitin & Valfort, 2010). In France for example, Adida et al., (2010) have been able to identify strong levels of religious discrimination against Muslims in accessing the French labour market. They found that over two generations, Muslims performed poorly economically compared to Christians (Adida et al., 2010). This study claims that high youth unemployment generally poses challenges to Australia as a nation, and further argues that high Muslim youth unemployment risks undermining the government’s social inclusion policies and de-radicalisation programs. Equally, underemployment is an important element in the integration of minorities. In spite of these low levels of employment participation within migrant groups, researchers found that adoption of minorities into the Australian labour market improves over time and equals the non-immigrant cohort of the population (Johnston, Forrest, Jones, Manley, & Owen, 2015). The economic performance of immigrants is not only about employment status but is also about what kind of jobs they hold and in which occupational group they are placed.

2.3.3. **Occupational group and industry**

As explained in Table 5, the count of persons (excluding overseas visitors) by religious affiliation, by labour force status, by unemployment and by age shows that Muslims are active in the Australian labour force. However, it is imperative to understand that immigrants’ economic performance is not only about employment status but also about what kind of job they hold and in which occupational group they are placed. Researchers have found that earnings and occupational attainments are equally important indicators of integration (Beach & Worswick, 1993; Tastsoglou & Preston, 2012). In Australia, Muslims work within the full spectrum of industries, occupying a great variety of positions in the labour force.

Muslims occupy 12 per cent of the recorded managerial roles in the labour force, a figure somewhat lower than that of the non-Muslim figure of 16 per cent. However, 27 per cent of Muslims report that they occupy professional positions, whereas the non-Muslim figure of people holding professional positions is 26 per cent. A high
percentage of Muslims (19 per cent) report that they are employed as technicians or trade workers, as opposed to 17 per cent of the non-Muslim population. Muslims also have a greater percentage of the population who are working as community and personal service workers, at 13 per cent as opposed to 12 per cent of the non-Muslim population, however they have a lower number of people who are employed as clerical and administrative workers. In consideration of these figures, it is reasonable to assume that Muslims are well integrated into all facets of Australian life and are working in ordinary jobs, just like most Australians.

Table 2.5 Count of persons (excluding overseas visitors) by religious affiliation, by occupation, by industry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Non-Muslim</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managers</td>
<td>13,883</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,236,423</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1,250,306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>30,439</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2,042,118</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2,072,557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians and trade workers</td>
<td>21,834</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1,345,527</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1,367,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community and personal service workers</td>
<td>14,317</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>921,635</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>935,952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and administrative workers</td>
<td>17,073</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1,416,024</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1,433,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales workers</td>
<td>14,747</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>891,992</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>906,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>112,293</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>7,853,719</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>7,966,012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3.4. Average weekly income

Whilst data on the participation of Muslims in the labour force categorised by various industries and occupational groups and educational attainment can be a guide to Muslim participation in Australian society, it is the data on the average weekly incomes and on Muslim home ownership which could best indicate the integration of Muslims in this country. By looking closely at the 2011 ABS Census data, it is obvious that Muslims do not fare so well in the average weekly income data. For example, with the exception of the three lowest income brackets, “nil income”, those earning between $1 and $99 per week, and those earning between $200 and $299 per week, Muslims reported having lower income levels in all other income brackets, as shown in Table 2.6 below.
Table 2.6 Average weekly income of the Muslim and non-Muslim population in Australia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weekly Individual Income</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Non-Muslim</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negative income</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26,108</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nil income</td>
<td>7,009</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>307,157</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>314,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1-$199</td>
<td>5,845</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>368,045</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>373,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$200-$299</td>
<td>10,138</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>755,408</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>765,546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$300-$399</td>
<td>4,881</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>690,196</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>695,077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$400-$599</td>
<td>5,241</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>690,550</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>695,791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$600-$799</td>
<td>4,384</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>476,819</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>481,203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$800-$999</td>
<td>3,067</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>341,986</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>345,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,000-$1,249</td>
<td>2,479</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>302,956</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>305,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,250-$1,499</td>
<td>1,618</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>195,934</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>197,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,500-$1,999</td>
<td>1,489</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>229,525</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>231,014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2,000 or more</td>
<td>1,688</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>251,604</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>253,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not stated</td>
<td>2,157</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>144,002</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>146,159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable (c)</td>
<td>12,671</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>440,741</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>453,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>63,319</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5,221,031</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5,284,350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The thesis’ finding on the average weekly income of Muslims compared to the non-Muslim cohort of the Australian population merits an investigation into Muslim home ownership.

2.3.5. Home ownership

Just as average weekly income and labour market participation are understood to be good indicators of immigrant integration (Beach & Worswick, 1993; Tastsoglou & Preston, 2012), immigrants’ home ownership is claimed to be another indicator of economic success and integration into the host country (Constant, Roberts, & Zimmerman, 2009). A number of studies point to a link between immigrant integration and housing and home ownership (Bolt, Ozuekren, & Phillips, 2010; Owusu, 1998; Ray & Moore, 1991; Sinning, 2010). To immigrants, the benefits of home ownership determine the expression of long term economic progress, wealth accumulation and financial wellbeing, but may also represent better living standards and higher social status (Constant et al., 2009). Other researchers go as far as linking immigrant home ownership to psychological health and greater life satisfaction, as well as improved educational, behavioural and social outcomes (Constant et al., 2009).
In the Australian context, home ownership is commonly associated with assimilation into the culture of the host society and attainment of the middle class “norm” (Constant et al., 2009). It is also important to understand that home ownership is dependent on the average weekly income of individuals and households. For this reason, these two sets of data are interlinked and reveal how many Muslims own their own homes, how many are renters and what their average incomes are in comparison with those of their non-Muslim counterparts. Outstandingly, the data shows similar results to those of the data in the average weekly income levels, where Muslims record higher income levels in only the lowest paid income brackets and record lower income levels in most of the higher income brackets.

In the following Table 8, analyses reveal that data on home ownership by Muslims in Australia is comparatively lower than that of the non-Muslim population. In particular, in most of the average weekly individual income brackets, the percentage of Muslims owning homes with a mortgage (including rent/buy) is significantly lower than within its counterpart non-Muslim population. But we need to be cautious about drawing any conclusions from this data, as there are a number of variables that can influence these results. Firstly, there is protracted housing affordability stress in Australia that affects Muslim and non-Muslim groups, as explained by the Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute (Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute [AHURI], 2015). In particular, home ownership is more difficult in major capital cities in Australia (AHURI, 2015). Secondly, it is possible that there may be some Muslims who refrain from purchasing a house on a mortgage via a loan from a conventional, interest-based bank. These individuals cite religious reasons for their decisions, notably the prohibition against dealing in usury (riba) in the Quran “O those who believe, fear Allah and give up what still remains of the riba if you are believers. But if you do not, then listen to the declaration of war from Allah and His Messenger” (Quran: Al-Baqarah 2:275).

In addition, the migration stream, the circumstances in the home country and the culture capital of a group all influence home ownership amongst immigrant communities (Forrest, Johnston, & Poulsen, 2014). For example, many Muslim groups migrate to Australia from war torn countries, including Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia. Some of these migrants arrive in Australia under the refugee and humanitarian program and may not have the necessary language and technical skills to be able to enter the labour
market quickly, thus impeding any aspiration of purchasing their own homes during their early years of resettlement. Even those with previous qualifications face the dilemma of difficulties posed by the Australian authorities’ recognition of their prior qualifications. A number of studies point out the difficulties that new immigrants face in the recognition of the credentials they have gained in their home countries, and the effect this has on their participation in the labour market (Andersson & Osman, 2008; Guo, 2009; Wagner & Childs, 2006).

In contrast to the previous group, there are also Muslim groups who have migrated to Australia under its business and skills migration program. These are mainly Muslims from India, Pakistan and from the Southern African region including South Africa, Zimbabwe and Zambia. Evidently, the migration streams, the circumstances of the home country and the social capital of this later group differs from the abovementioned group. The importance of these variables is demonstrated by research undertaken in several immigrant communities across Europe, Canada and Australia. For example, studies into the Polish and Somali refugees in Toronto, Canada found that Poles have been more successful than Somalis in establishing home ownership (Murdie, 2002). The study further asserts that the reasons for this difference were mainly related to socio economic status, household size, community resources and the migrants’ housing situations before migrating to Canada.

It is likely that Muslim migrants from India and Pakistan and those from the southern African region will have the necessary human capital and knowledge to access the labour market and, if they so desire, to establish small or medium size businesses in Australia. But Muslim groups who come to Australia on refugee and humanitarian visas such as those from Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia may not have the same levels of human and financial capital as the previous cohort. The differences between these two groups and the bases on which they are granted visas to resettle Australia are factors that may have an influence on the data on home ownership. For example, in Australia part of the criteria required in order to satisfy the grant of a business visa is to have a successful business record, sufficient capital to invest and a detailed business plan (Collins, 2008, p. 52).
### Table 2.7 Home ownership* by the Muslim and non-Muslim population in Australia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weekly individual income</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Non-Muslim</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negative income</td>
<td>1,275</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>30,750</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nil income</td>
<td>17,390</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>499,670</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>517,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1-$199</td>
<td>13,640</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>478,272</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>491,912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$200-$299</td>
<td>14,617</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>347,600</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>362,217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$300-$399</td>
<td>8,631</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>333,682</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>342,313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$400-$599</td>
<td>11,778</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>549,203</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>560,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$600-$799</td>
<td>11,225</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>631,174</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>642,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$800-$999</td>
<td>8,965</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>582,523</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>591,488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,000-$1,249</td>
<td>7,908</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>613,531</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>621,439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,250-$1,499</td>
<td>5,211</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>466,789</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>472,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,500-$1,999</td>
<td>5,558</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>581,488</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>587,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2,000 or more</td>
<td>4,847</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>529,944</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>534,791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not stated</td>
<td>4,315</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>124,305</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>128,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable (c)</td>
<td>52,766</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1,977,687</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2,030,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>168,126</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>7,746,618</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>7,914,744</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Tenure type: Owned with a mortgage (includes rent/buy)

The above tables give a snapshot of Muslims in Australia and their socio-economic circumstances. Whilst this is not an exhaustive summary, it does give a clear indication of how Muslims are integrating into the wider Australian society. Quite often, issues of migrant integration are directly linked to their participation in the host country’s economic and social fabric. On this basis it is considered that the information in this chapter sheds considerable light on issues relating to Muslim migrant integration. However, it would be misleading to generalise, and to claim that there is uniformity in the ways in which Muslims integrate into Australia and other Western societies. In fact, it is imperative to acknowledge that Muslims in Australia are different in their adaptability and resilience in adjusting to their new home. This is generally because of the diverse nature of their experiences and life journeys, including the circumstances which led them to migrate to Australia. This apparent diversity in the Muslim community in Australia must therefore be an integral part of the debates about Muslim migrant integration. In the next section, we discuss the various forms and shapes of the diversity within the Muslim community.
2.4. The diversity of the Australian Muslim community

In many receiving nations, the management of migrant diversity is at the core of public discussions about integration. Muslim migration to Australia has long been a subject of heated debate, simply because Muslims’ faith distinguishes them from the country’s mainstream, predominantly Christian, population. Something that is often missed in this debate, however, is the fact that Muslims themselves are a very diverse group of people with various cultural, national and ethnic differences, and the discussion assumes a homogeneity that may not exist because of these differences. According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics (2011), as a proportion of the general Australian population, by religious group, Muslims have the fourth highest proportion of people (61.5 per cent) born overseas, after Hindus at 84.3 per cent, Buddhists at 69.4 per cent and non-Christians at 67 per cent (see Table 2.8). This clearly shows that a large proportion of Muslims were born overseas and came to this country from all over the world. It also means that Muslims and other major non-Christian religious groups migrating to Australia are changing the makeup of Australian society (Bouma, 1994).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>'000</th>
<th>Population %</th>
<th>Proportion born overseas(a) %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>13,150.6</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>5,439.2</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglican</td>
<td>3,680.0</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniting Church</td>
<td>1,065.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian and Reformed</td>
<td>599.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Orthodox</td>
<td>563.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptist</td>
<td>352.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran</td>
<td>251.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pentecostal</td>
<td>238.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Christian</td>
<td>960.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Christian</td>
<td>1,546.3</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>67.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>529.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>69.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>476.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>61.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>275.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>84.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>97.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-Christian</td>
<td>168.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>57.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No religion</td>
<td>4,796.8</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (b)</td>
<td>21,507.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extracted from the ABS website.
Muslims in Australia are part of the significant demographic changes that are potentially altering the ways in which Australians view themselves. In modern Australia, communities are not necessarily diverse in their religious views. Arguably however, the religious views of a group of people are by far the aspect which attracts the most attention from cross sections of the society. Certainly, the Australia of today is different from the one in which Bouma (1994) described a normal Australian as being a “…member of the Church of England and of British background” (p. 285). In fact, Bouma (1994) argues that one of the unintended consequences of this massive migration program comprising people of Middle Eastern and Asian origin is the emergence of a very religiously plural society. This is further complicated by the fact that Muslims are from mono-cultural societies such as Afghanistan and Pakistan and from countries where there is cultural and religious diversity, such as Albania, Lebanon and Nigeria (Jones, 1993).

In the discussion above, it is evident that within the rich diversity of the wider society, in general, Australian Muslims are an equally diverse group of people coming from a vast range of diverse ethnic, national, language and cultural backgrounds. Brasted and Khan (2001) explain that it is not quite right to class Muslims as essentially monolithic, to class them as coming from one culture and to associate all Muslims with the tragedies taking place in the Middle East. The diversity in the Australian Muslim population is also a direct reflection of the transnational migration nature of the world’s Muslim population. It is reported that more than 300 million Muslims, a fifth of the world’s total Muslim population, live in countries in which Muslims are not a majority (Pew Forum, 2009). Ethnic diversity appears to be the most prominent and visible difference between all people of Muslim faith in Australia.

Similarly, the community of Muslims in Australia is also diverse in nationality, coming from all continents, and as a result, are disparate in their cultures and in their languages. English language is generally the preferred medium of communication and is justified by certain realities such as the diversity of ethnicity and nationality of congregants of all mosques in Australia (Saeed, 2004). Even where members of one ethnic group manage a particular mosque, the fact that the congregation may come from different ethnicities
and nationalities dictates that English language is often substituted by local group languages such Urdu (Ali, 2012).

In addition to their ethnic diversity, it is apparent that there is diversity in the legal and theological spheres between Muslim communities in Australia and those in other countries. There are two major sects in Islam, and these are the Sunnis and the Shiites (Saeed, 2004). These two very different sects are a result of what occurred during the time of the succession plan following the death of the Prophet Mohammed in 632AD (Blanchard, 2005; Saeed, 2004). The differences between the Sunnis and the Shiites are mainly political in nature, rather than being religious (Esposito, 2003; Saeed 2004). The importance of understanding the dynamics of these two sects of Islam in contemporary times is enormous. Bengio and Litvak (2011) explain the current political changes in the Middle East with the demise of the Sunni dominated Ba’th party of Iraq and the rise of the long oppressed Shia majority. A United States congressional research service reports that the majority of the world’s Muslim population are Sunnis, and the Shiites comprise a small number of between 10 to 15 per cent of the Muslim population (Blanchard, 2005). Countries which constitute a Sunni Muslim majority include some of the most populous Muslim nations, including Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Countries with a Shiite majority include Iran and Iraq (Blanchard, 2005).

Muslims are also a diverse group of people in their Islamic legal and theological traditions. Muslims are categorised into several religious groupings, just as their Christian counterparts have been traditionally classified as churches, sects and cults (Saeed, 2007). Within theological and legal spheres, Sunni Muslims follow one of four major schools of thought; these are Hanafi, Maliki, Shafie, Hanbali (Blanchard, 2005). Throughout the Muslim world, these schools of thought influence the practices of Muslims in different parts of the world.

While these ancient classifications are important, in the recent past, Muslim communities have been categorised and classified in a number of other ways. In fact, Saeed (2007) states that one of the challenges in classifying religious groups is difficulties with changes in classification criteria over time. For this reason, traditionally Muslims were classified as being either Sunni or Shiite but geopolitics and modernity have introduced new classifications. For instance, Ramadan (2003) explains that
contemporary Muslim societies are adherents of the following six main schools of thought: scholastic traditionalism, Salafi literalism, Salafi reformism, political literalist Salafism, liberal or rationalist reformism and Sufism (pp. 27-28). Other scholars such as Saeed (2007) also discuss the diversity of Muslims in the legal and ideological domains, and make these general classifications of Muslims: legalist traditionalists, theological puritans, militant extremists, political Islamists, secular liberals, cultural nominalists, classical modernists and progressive Ijtihads. But a slightly different classification of the legal and theological domains of Muslims is proposed by Ramli (2013) as follows: fundamentalists, traditionalists, reformists, post traditionalists, modernists, liberal/rational reformists and Sufis.

To explain what these categorisations really mean, Saeed (2007) states that some groups are concerned with the maintenance of laws as conceptualised in the classical schools of thought and refers to these groups as legalist traditionalist. For instance, according to Saeed (2007), the great contemporary Muslim scholar Yusuf Al-Qaradawi is a legal traditionalist. On the other hand, the theological puritans differ from legal traditionalist, are mainly concerned with purifying society through mysticism, and are known to perform such practices as the veneration of saints (Peacock, 1978; Werbner, 2008). Referring to the Salafi group, Ramli (2013) explains that the difference between the Salafi groups is that one group are literalists who refuse any mediation of the interpretation of divine scripts and the other group are reformists who are predisposed to investigating the purpose and meaning that they believe underlies the divine script. For a detailed discussion about the differences between these groups and their predisposed typologies of Islamic thought and jurisprudence, see Ramli (2013) and Ramadan (2004).

In reality, the abovementioned classifications hold no meaning for the average non-Muslim Australian. However, assumptions that are often made about the legal and theological affiliation of an individual Muslim suggest that these categorisations may have some influence on their levels of integration. For example, in many Western societies Muslims have been categorised as “moderate” and “extremist” (Kundnani, 2012). Arguably this generalisation and these stereotypes suggest that moderates are easily integrated, whereas extremists are difficult to integrate into society. However, Kundnani (2012) states that the “moderates” are held responsible for failing to stop the extremists, thus labelling all Muslims as being unable to fit into modern society.
Kundnani (2012) also notes, “Muslimness is racialised into what is, in effect, an ethnicity rather than a group sharing a religion” (p. 160). The classifications above also fail to acknowledge how the religion and the identity of many Muslims in the Western world intersect. For instance, Jacobson (2006) poses that the religious identities of young Muslim Britons ranges from devout adherence to nominal affiliation, or the state of being a cultural, “non-practising” Muslim.

To date, little research has been carried out into the extent to which Muslim legal and theological traditions influence their levels of integration. However, the literature does contend that ideological and theological identification are significant factors in integration and immigration (Campese, 2012; Cruz, 2008; Minkenberg, 2008; Peschke, 2009). In a later empirical study (Chapter Five and Chapter Six) this research finds that Muslims use their religion as an important factor which influences their levels of integration into aspects of local culture in Australia. This does not mean that all Muslims agree on the influence of their faith on matters regarding their integration. This will possibly differ between one individual and another and in different contexts and environments. However, it is generally the case that Muslims are treated as a homogeneous group and that consequently this leads to the tendency to treat Muslims and perceived Muslim problems in the same way. However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to investigate the homogenisation of Muslim communities, which has become common in Australia and beyond.

Nevertheless, the perceived failure of integration of Muslims into the wider community has the potential to increase hostility between immigrants and host society members. For instance, research has found that that perception about the number, nationalities, race, religion and culture of immigrants has a strong, yet differential, impact on anti-foreigner sentiment (Escandell & Ceobanu, 2009, p. 50). Muslims are also characterised as holding wide ranging political, theological and sectoral schools of thought (Ramli, 2013). Equally, despite the diversity present in Muslim communities, there is a tendency to lump Muslims together, as though they were one politically relevant monolithic group (Kolig & Kabir, 2008).
The apparent lack of understanding about the diversity of Muslim communities around the globe, and the inaccurate depiction of Muslim communities in Europe and Australia as being a homogenous, ethnic enclave, generates debates about an imagined hostility that Islam holds against the West. The pejorative Western news and print media that projects Muslims as a threat to many Western societies arguably further exacerbates this misinformation. A number of contemporary studies indicate an increasing level of anti-Muslim sentiment in the West, generally described as Islamophobia (Betz, 2013; Kunst, Tajamal, Sam, & Ulleberg, 2012; Morgan & Poynting, 2013). Although perhaps not on the same scale, other historical works have also suggested the existence of an imagined threat faced by European societies from their Muslim communities in decades past: Esposito (1999, p. 1) provides this summary:

> For almost two decades the vision of Islamic fundamentalism or militant Islam as threat to the West has gripped the imagination of Western governments and the media. Khomeini’s denunciation of America as the “Great Satan”, chants of “Death to America”, the condemnation of Salma Rushdie and his “Satanic Verses”; and Saddam Hussein’s call for a jihad against foreign infidels re-enforced images of Islam as a militant, expansionist religion, rabidly anti-American and intent upon war with the West.

Undoubtedly, the integration of Muslims into Australian society is influenced by the broader global debates about the relations between Islam and the West. It is therefore necessary to understand Islam as a major global religion that reaches all corners of the world before an attempt is made to discuss Islamic and Western relations and the integration of Muslim immigrants.

Islam is the world’s second fastest growing religion with followers numbering around 1.6 billion (Pew Research Centre Forum, 2011). According to the Pew Research Centre, a significant minority of Muslims reside in Western countries. In 2010, estimates pointed to the number of Muslims living in Europe as being 44.1 million (Pew Research Centre Forum, 2011). This trend is likely to increase due to the greatly increased levels of connectedness around the globe today. In fact, the Pew Research Centre Forum
predicts that the Western European nations which will have significant increases in their Muslim populations by 2030 are the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy. The presence of large numbers of Muslims in a number of Western European countries is a phenomenon that was referred to by Halliday (2002) as that of the *West encountering Islam*. As explained above, similar trends are occurring in Australia, and the Australian Muslim population has increased significantly, as shown in the data of the last three population censuses of 2001, 2006 and 2011 (ABS, 2013).

Whether it is named as the West encountering Islam, as suggested by Halliday (2002), or Islam encountering globalisation, as suggested by Mohammadi (2002), relations between Islam and the West are certainly strained and are inherently antagonistic (Akbarzadeh, 2005). Mohammadi (2002, p. 14) states, “No subject in contemporary public discussion has attracted more confused discussion than that of relations between Islam and the West”. There is a widespread view in the West that Islam and the West are incompatible “civilisations” (Esposito & Kalin, 2011). For instance, in the West, discourses have been constructed which view Muslim culture, values and religion as being incompatible with, and inferior to, those of the West (Esposito & Kalin, 2011). This, however, is a generalisation, and these views are perhaps in the minority. For instance, Jones (2013) argues that while the arguments of those who claim Muslim immigrants are different from Europeans are popular, the facts remain that Europe is capable, and has a tradition of, reconciling the competing identities of its diverse populations. Jones uses examples of the Netherlands and Turkey as being successful in this regard.

On the other hand, Akbarzadeh (2005) sums up the perceived enduring conflict between Islam and the West amongst Muslim populations into these two theories: 1) conflict is intrinsic to these relations, meaning that coexistence is not possible between Islam and the West, or 2) conflict is an historical product. However, the latter is perhaps more accurate as Islam and the West have co-existed for a very long time. This co-existence is not without challenge, and for the most part is charged with tensions and suspicions. As Funk and Said (2004) stress, the most profound narrative of conflict between Islam and West is that of the United States’ relationship with the Muslim world. In their effort to de-escalate tensions between Islam and the West, Saikal (2005), stresses how the West, and specifically the United States, explains its official stance in the “war against
terror”, and emphasises that it is a war that is non-religious, non-ethnic and non-racist, but one that is directed only against those who hijacked the religion of Islam for their misguided, selfish ends. But Saikal argues that the United States President George Bush’s statement, which described the war on terror as being a “crusade”, contradicts this claim (p.14).

Today, the debate about the relationship between Islam and the West is taking place in the background, while re-evaluation about the sources of human conflict continues. Samuel Huntington’s theory claims that the clash of civilisations in which the most important conflicts in the future will occur will be along cultural fault lines, which separate civilisations from one another (Huntington, 1993, p. 25). Prior to Huntington’s ground breaking claim, others such as the French historian Bernard Lewis have also predicted an imminent clash between civilisations, based along cultural lines (Lewis, 1990, p. 56). According to Huntington, Islamic along with Western, Confucianist, Japanese, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and possibly African civilisations are among the seven or eight cultural groups that will shape the world’s future, with clashes based purely on cultural and religious identity (Huntington, 1993, p. 25). Huntington explains that as the world becomes smaller and interaction between people of different civilisations increases, inevitably, an awareness of differences and commonalities between civilisations will intensify (Huntington, 1993, p. 25).

However, Huntington’s theory was rebutted by Heilbrunn (1998) and Hunter (1998), who argue that future world conflicts are likely to be between groups from the same civilisations, as opposed to between groups from different civilisations. Despite these numerous rebuttals by the abovementioned notable scholars of Huntington’s theory of the clash of civilisations, the debate about whether or not Islam can co-exist with the West and the West’s cultural and value systems still endures. Some scholars, such as Fox (2003), argue that Huntington’s theory of Islam as a civilisation posing a potential threat to the West may have had more validity in the time before the Cold War, rather than in the period following the era of the Cold War. Whilst there are many that disagreed with Huntington including Rubenstein and Crocker, (1994), Henderson, (2005), and Bottici and Challand, (2010), amongst those in agreement are Muslim scholars such as Mohammad Ayoub, who has argued that Huntington’s theory may be correct (Ayoub, 2012).
Ayoub (2012, p. 10) in revisiting the clash of civilisation argument (Huntington, 1993) concludes, “American policy toward the Middle East when analysed through the prism of the clash of civilizations paradigm yields substantial evidence that corroborates Huntington’s central thesis”. Putting the debates of possible or potential clashes of civilizations aside, there are a number of events and incidents that arguably portray an image of conflict between Islam and the West. In the next section, these events and incidents are discussed in the context of how they are affecting relations between Islam and the West, which in turn may have potential consequences for the integration of Muslim immigrant communities in the West.

2.6. **Key incidents and events which have impacted on relations between Islam and the West**

The post-Cold War era is one that has to date been generally characterised by tension and suspicion between Islam and the West (Huntington, 1993; Lewis, 1990). In fact, Lewis proposed, “Islam would become the next major rival of America and of Western civilization in general in the post-Cold War period” (Lewis, 1990, p. 60). These views may be at odds with many examples of close cooperation between Muslim countries and the US during the Cold War, for example, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Indonesia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkey. With the exception of Iran, the West’s suspicion of Muslim countries did not become manifest until after the Cold War ended. A large body of scholarly work has surfaced since the end of the Cold War, discussing rivalries between Islam and the West (Fox, 2001; Funk & Said, 2004; Hunter, 1998; Lewis, 1993; Saikal, 2003).

The suspicion which existed in the pre-Cold War era that Islam will become a major rival to the West (Lewis, 1990) is coupled with a number of major international events and incidents that potentially strengthen the rivalry arguments. These key events and incidents have debatably contributed to the uneasy relationship between Islam and the West. For instance, historical issues such as colonialism may have further strained this uneasy relationship (Saikal, 2003). In this context, a particular mention needs to be made of the controversies surrounding the publication of author Salman Rushdie’s book *The Satanic Verses*, and the reactions from certain sections of the Muslim communities around the world. The *fatwa* (directive) calling for the death of Salman Rushdie issued
by the then leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini, triggered an intense debate about the relationship between Islam and the West (Esposito, 1999). A much wider debate has been taking place since, relating to how to maintain a balance between freedom of speech, blasphemy and religious tolerance in Europe and elsewhere (Asad, 2009; Post, 2007).

In 2005, a similar but slightly different debate was triggered by the publication of cartoons in the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* (Post, 2007). There is little doubt that these cartoons have further fuelled an already deteriorating relationship between Muslim communities and some European countries. The publication of the cartoons, which depicted the Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) as a terrorist, is a classic example of a cause of cross-cultural tensions. Throughout the Western world, people defended freedom of expression, while Muslim leaders, academics and activists described the publication of these cartoons as blasphemy. Powers (2008) reports that after the publication of the Danish cartoons, ambassadors from eleven Muslim majority countries requested a meeting with the then Prime Minister of Denmark, Anders Rasmussen. Rasmussen was asked to take action as a result of the cartoons, and to enact laws against such publications in the interests of inter-faith harmony, integration and Denmark’s ongoing relations with the Muslim world (p. 343). The publication of the cartoons created an intellectual debate between Europe’s most notable academic scholars, and their opinions remained sharply divided. In a series of thought provoking essays, Modood et al. (2006) concludes that the publication of the cartoons does not aid the cause of Muslim integration but instead justifies vilification of Muslims.

However, Hansen (2006) has a different view and claims that Muslim protests about the publication of the cartoons was a result of Muslim exceptionalism. Public discussion of whether Muslims are different to other non-Muslim immigrant groups, requiring different approaches in their integration into their host societies, refers to Muslim exceptionalism (Cesari, 2007; McGoldrick, 2009). The phenomenon of Muslim exceptionalism also arose in discussions about Sharia law and its application to Muslim minority communities in parts of Western Europe (Rehman, 2007). In the West, perceived fear of the introduction of *Sharia* law by minority Muslim communities is an expressed concern. Amongst the aspects of *Sharia* law cited to be of most concern are polygamy, forced marriages and the stoning of women (Razack, 2008).
Other scholars noted that debates about *Sharia* law and Muslim minority communities generally revolve around polygamy, integration and respect for women (Dreher & Ho, 2009). In the case of Australia, Black, (2008) strongly opposes an accommodation of *Sharia* law within the Australian legal system. It is apparent from the researchers’ review of an extensive body of literature that debates about relations between Islam and the West inevitably rebound on issues of cultural incompatibility and discussions about different values. In fact, similarly, discussions surrounding the Rushdie affair and the Danish cartoons are also claimed to have had an element of a battle over values and world order (Andersen, 2008).

Amongst other events of major significance which have played a role in further straining the relationship between Islam and the West, are the 11 September 2001 terrorist bombings of the twin towers in New York, and the subsequent Iraq and Afghanistan wars (Northcote & Casimiro, 2010). In the period before 11 September 2001, there was resentment towards Arabs and Muslim people in parts of the Western world. Poynting and Mason (2007) challenged the generally accepted cliché that the events of 11 September sparked much of the Islamophobia that many Muslim citizens in the West experience today. They have documented the existence of an anti-Arab and anti-Muslim sentiments in the United Kingdom and Australia (Poynting & Mason, 2007, p. 81), and relations between the Muslim world and United States and its Western allies have grown very tense since the tragic events of 11 September 2001 (Saikal, 2005). This single event has generated a fierce reaction from many Western nations and has created a great fear of terrorism. The anti-terrorism measures taken by the USA, UK and Australia have been perceived in the Muslim world as being anti-Islamic, rather than being anti-terrorist (Esposito, 2002). This perception has become an important factor in continuing tension between Islam and the West.

The war on terror has its ideological underpinning in Huntington’s theory of the clash of civilisation, and according to Razack, (2008), projects the image of a dangerous Muslim man, helpless and oppressed Muslim women, and a civilised Westerner. Anderson (2007) asserts that the war on terror has fuelled an already tense relationship between Islam and the West and has appeared to be a war between those who embrace liberal values and those who want a society based on Islamic values. A number of Western countries have adopted a series of anti-terror laws, which some Muslims claim are
targeted at Muslim populations (Al-Marayati, 2004; Haubrich, 2003; Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009). Jackson (2007) explains how the term “Islamic terrorism” has become a constant feature of Western political and academic counter terrorism discourse. By employing a discourse analytic approach to the literature on counter terrorism literature, Jackson (2007) concludes that for the most part, political and academic discourse of ‘Islamic terrorism’ are unhelpful, not least because they are highly politicised, intellectually contestable, damaging to community relations and practically counter-productive.

The above discussion would be incomplete without contemplating the potential effect that debates on terrorism may have on the incorporation of Muslim immigrant communities and the broader debates of building a socially cohesive society. In fact, researchers argue that portraying Muslims as terrorists is counter-productive and dangerous (Esposito, 1999; Jackson, 2007; McDonnell, 2004; Parmar, 2011). The perceived threat of home grown terrorism has led to some Western governments associating minority Islamic communities in their midst with terrorist related activities, but Islamic immigrant minority communities reject these accusations and claim that associating their religion with terrorism and violence is unfair (Aly, 2007; Spalek & Lambert, 2008). Public and political discussions often relate Islam and Muslims with the risk of terrorism, creating what Dunn, Klocker and Salabay (2007) refer to as “racialised religion” and/or what Pantazis and Pemberton (2009) refer to as “suspect communities”. If anything, the war on terror may have further increased the suspicions and tensions between Muslim immigrants and their majority non-Muslim host communities.

The perceptions of Muslims as being a threat to the West is evident in the high number of surveys conducted in many Western European countries. For instance, about 40 per cent of Americans polled in the 2011 Pew Report consider that a belief in Islam is more likely to encourage violence. These negative sentiments towards Muslim communities in the United States are repeated in Australia and in Europe. Public opinion data also reveals that Americans have resented Arabs and Muslims since the events of 11 September 2001 (Panagopoulos, 2006). These negative sentiments and perceptions are not only held by non-Muslims. The latest Gallup Poll (2014) shows that 24 per cent of 66,000 Muslim people surveyed across 65 nations around the globe believe that
America is the greatest threat to peace in the world. The significance of this polling to this discussion is that it shows there is mutual mistrust and fear between the West and the Muslim world. In its survey on Muslims around the world, the Gallup Poll (2014) finds that much of the Muslim world, including in the Middle East, highly rated the fear that America was a threat to world peace. In fact, 44 per cent of Pakistanis rate America as the most dangerous nation in the world (Gallup Poll, 2014).

In an attempt to perhaps exploit the apparent climate of suspicion, fear and tension between Islam and the West, key groups that may have further strained relations between the West and Islam are the growing number of right wing populist parties in many European countries. These include the Norwegian Progress Party, the National Front in France, the Freedom Party of Austria, and the Danish People's Party. Research shows there is a trend in Western Europe for these right wing parties to achieve electoral success (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002; Rydgren, 2005). In fact, researchers have observed that a common election platform for many of Western Europe’s right wing parties is their anti-immigration policy agenda (Rydgren, 2008; Van der Brug, Fennema, & Tillie, 2005; Vink, 2007).

The rise of the right wing political parties in Europe is coupled with the emergence of focal and out-spoken individual right wing party leaders who are promoting an anti-Islam campaign in countries throughout Europe and elsewhere. Amongst the most well-known of these individuals are the Somali born Dutch national Ayan Hirsi Ali and Geer Wilders in Holland (Rydgren, 2008; Van der Brug, Fennema, & Tillie 2005; Vink 2007). The assassination of Theo Van Gogh, a right wing Dutch film director who was stabbed to death in an Amsterdam street in 2004 further increased tensions between Muslims in the Netherlands and the wider society. This killing shocked the Dutch community, and added to an ongoing public debate about Muslim migration to the Netherlands. In light of this unfortunate incident, Dutch and other European right wing political party leaders waged strong public campaigns which were intended to put Islam and Muslims under the microscope in their respective countries (Veldhuis & Bakker, 2009).

Extreme right wing political movements emerged in Australia and examples include Pauline Hanson’s One Nation party. In 1996, Australia experienced an ultra-nationalist movement led by the leader of this right wing One Nation party. Hanson’s anti-
immigration rhetoric was initially targeted at the Asian community (Betz & Johnson, 2004; Jackman, 1998; Johnson, 1998). But her political rhetoric is today stridently parochial, and in particular, includes anti refugees and anti-Muslim and people from the Middle East. It is important to acknowledge that extreme right wing political populism in Australia has not been as successful as in Western Europe. This reality is indeed welcome and positive news for the Australian community’s social harmony and national cohesion. The failure of these right wing political parties in Australia means that there may be a reduction in tensions between Australia’s growing immigrant Muslim community and its non-Muslim majority. Despite its historical success in managing the incorporation of its new immigrant communities, Australia is not entirely immune from the effects of hostile tensions between its Muslim minority community and the non-Muslim majority.

The tragic events of 11 September 2001, the London bombings in July 2005 and the Bali bombings in 2002 in which over 80 Australians died, significantly changed the ways in which Muslims are viewed within the wider society (Poynting, 2007). A discourse has been constructed suggesting that Muslims are a threat to the Australian society (Humphrey, 2007). Each one of these tragic events potentially has dire consequences for the already fragile relationship which exists between Islam and the West. One of the immediate consequences of the events of 11 September 2001 was the United States’ invasion of Afghanistan and then Iraq under the pretext of self-defence (Byers, 2002). In the case of Afghanistan, there were at least four legal justifications which the United States government gave as its reasons for the invasion: Chapter VII of the UN Charter, intervention by invitation, humanitarian intervention and self-defence (Byers, 2002). According to Byers (2002) the United States relied on self-defence in justifying its invasion of Afghanistan.

With regard to Australia, the 2002 Bali bombing is the biggest single terrorist event that this country has ever experienced. Whilst it was an offshore terrorist attack, it claimed the lives of 88 Australian citizens (Herald Sun, 2008). One of this tragedy’s most enduring consequences is the introduction of sweeping counter terrorism measures by successive Australian governments (McCulloch, 2002). Debates continue today about whether or not there is a clear balance between protecting terrorism, apprehending its perpetrators and violating the civil liberties of ordinary Australian citizens. At the time
of writing, the incumbent Liberal and National coalition government proposed further measures allowing intelligence organisations to access internet data which forces telecommunication companies to retain metadata for at least two years (Office of Prime Minister, 2014). These new laws are purported to be a response to the fears that many young Australian men may be fighting in conflicts in Syria and Iraq (Office of PM, 2014). Whilst no major terrorist attack has taken place in Australia for decades, race related tensions have occurred and have presented challenges to the authorities.

In 2005, the riots at Sydney’s Cronulla beach mark Australia’s darkest moment of racial tension between sections of its predominantly Muslim community and members of its wider society. It is important to note that some scholars have described this incident as a media beat up of a small fight between three surf lifesavers and a group of four young men of Lebanese background (Poynting, 2006). Regardless, researchers note that the Cronulla riots have instigated debate about race relations (Collins, 2009; Johanson & Glow, 2007), racism and xenophobia (Babacan & Babacan, 2007), patriotism and nationalism (Due & Riggs, 2008) and the media’s generally pejorative representation of ethnic groups and minorities (Aly, 2007).

With its small Muslim population of just 2.2 per cent (ABS, 2011) and being a country which is conflicted by the cultural and religious values it shares with Western countries, Australia is a case study of relations between the West and Islam. If Huntington’s (1993) theory of the clash of civilisations is to be believed, Australia may be affected more than any other country simply because of its close proximity to Indonesia and Muslim majority Asian countries such as Malaysia. Australia’s geographic location in Asia, and having on its doorstep the world’s most populous Muslim nation, means that it is in a unique position in its relationship with the Islamic world. Coupled with this, its growing Muslim population demands that a concerted effort be made by all concerned to avoid race related tensions. It is imperative for Australia to adopt a narrative that further strengthens a discourse which takes a positive view of relations between Muslim and Western communities (Humphrey, 2007; Huntington, 1996; Savage, 2004).

2.7. Islam in the public sphere

The migration of large of groups of Muslims to many Western societies has created awareness amongst the receiving societies of Islam and Muslims as being culturally
different (Van der Noll, 2014). As a group, Muslims are normally different to the host society populations of many West European societies. The issue of the visibility of Muslims in many Western societies has manifested in a number of ways, including women wearing headscarves, the building of mosques and minarets, and specific Muslim rituals such as slaughtering animals for consumption (Van der Noll, 2014, p. 60). Muslims are a minority faith group in most Western countries, however despite their low population numbers, in the media and in parliamentary politics in relation to immigration, policing, national security and integration, they receive more attention than any other religious group (Kolig & Kabir, 2008). It can be argued that the deeper reasons for this lie mainly in the events of 9/11 in the US, in the London bombings in July 2005 and in the events in Bali in 2005. But equally, increased Muslim migration to Western countries and the visibility of Muslims in the public sphere of many Western societies, together with various acts of terrorism and debates about the clash of civilisation (Huntington, 1993), stimulate and perpetuate these discussions.

As mentioned previously, the presence of Muslims in Australia is not a recent occurrence. However, the visibility of Muslims is a recent phenomenon, and this visibility has generated much public discussion about Islam and Muslims in this country. To contextualise this, it is argued that within the public sphere, negative perceptions of Islam and Muslims are a result of social and political forces dictated by modernity and current socio-political contexts. There are two main factors which influence the visible Islam – global and domestic factors. Global factors refer to the resurgence of Islam in the Muslim world since the 1970s, which is emphasised by outward manifestations of Islamic identity such as dress codes (Esposito, 1993). On the other hand, domestic factors refer to the reality of Australia’s changing demographics characterised by the acceptance of immigrants with diverse cultural and religious orientations (Bouma, 1994). Australia’s policy of multiculturalism is intended to encourage immigrants to maintain and express their own culture and traditions, and historians such as Bouma confirm the reality of religious pluralism in Australia.

A strong, visible Muslim immigrant population has emerged in this society since the Second World War. Australian Bureau of Statistics Census data shows that Muslim populations have increased since the 1970s (ABS, 2011). As their numbers have increased, Muslims have built places of worship (mosques), established Islamic schools
and, due to dress codes, are now visible in the wider community. Muslim mosques and their construction within the wider community have been a focal point of relations between Muslim immigrants and members of host societies. A number of scholars have referred to the ongoing controversies surrounding the construction of mosques as a phenomenon of “Islam in the public space” (Ammann, 2002) or “the Islamisation of the public space” (McLoughlin, 2005). Debates about Islam in the public sphere are specifically revealed in the non-Muslim community’s opposition to mosque construction in certain local municipalities.

Dunn (2005) reports that each of the thirty-odd mosques and Islamic centres proposed in Sydney (and major renovations) since 1980 has encountered community opposition and difficulty from municipal authorities. As Bouma (1994) explains, some sections of the wider community have loudly and clearly expressed their objections to the construction of mosques in their neighbourhood. Mosque opposition is an everyday example of nationalism and belonging, where neo-conservatives are unhappy with the declining normativity of the hegemonic Anglo Celtic culture (Dunn, 2005, p. 291). But on the other hand, having a place of worship is a fundamental principle for Muslim communities everywhere, as the mosque caters for their spiritual and social needs and becomes a place for meetings and gatherings. Mosques are places Muslims go to not only for prayers but also for other reasons such as marriage, divorce and counselling.

The Islamic women’s headscarf, or hijab, is by far the most significant feature in the debates about Islam in the public sphere. The Islamic religion requires that Muslim women be modest and cover their heads (Quran: 24: 30-31). Not all Muslim women cover their heads, but those who choose to do so are easily identifiable in public spaces such as shops, schools and workplaces. Whilst this is a private matter for an individual Muslim woman, there is enormous public debate about what this signifies as a whole. For a Muslim woman, the veil or hijab and the burqa are symbols of modesty and piety as is revealed in the following verse of the Quran:

And say to the believing women that they should lower their gaze and guard their modesty; that they should not display their beauty and ornaments except what (must ordinarily) appear thereof; that they should draw their veils over their bosoms and not display their beauty except to their husbands, their fathers, their husband’s fathers (Quran 24: 30-31).
However, in the minds of many the hijab represents something much more sinister, possibly even a sign that the Muslim women who wear the veil are oppressed (Hussein, 2007). This then generates what Ho (2007) argues to be an emerging discourse, which allegedly purports to protect women’s rights, portraying “Muslims as inherently misogynistic and a threat to Australia’s egalitarian culture” (p. 290). It is possible that the abovementioned public discussions present the perception that Muslims in Australia have difficulty in integrating into the society, if indeed they are able to be integrated at all. In therefore becomes imperative to unpack the perceived problems relating to Muslim integration.

2.8. A perceived lack of integration of Australian Muslims

Situated within the broader public discussions of relations between Islam and the West is the debate about the problematic integration of Muslim immigrants in many Western nations. For example, Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakal (2008, p. 169) point out, “The bulk of studies about immigration in Britain, Germany, France and the Netherlands focus on the problematic integration of Muslim communities and government strategies for improving integration policies”. This perceived notion of problematic Muslim integration is gaining interest in Australia as well, and an intense political and intellectual debate regarding Muslim immigrants’ ability to integrate is ongoing. Bisin Verdier, Pattachini, and Zenou (2008, p. 445) sum up the main causes of this doubt about Muslim integration:

The November 2005 riots in Paris’s suburbs, the March 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid, Spain, the February 2006 riots in many Muslim communities after the publication of vignettes representing Prophet Mohammed are all sparking doubts and worries about the ability and the willingness of Muslim immigrants to assimilate into Western societies.

In analysis of the literature, there appears to be a renewed interest in this subject and in social inclusion generally, as evidenced by an increase in debates about the integration or the lack of integration of Muslims in Australia. For instance, Saeed (2003, p. 186) states that, “both global and local events have contributed to the negative image of Islam and Muslims in general, and while there are many Australian journalists who
have provided other voices, a significant section of media (particularly some of the tabloid newspapers and talk back radios) focused on a negative treatment of Islam”. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the Cronulla riots, the debate has sharpened. It is clear that these heated debates are steered mainly by media stereotypes, sensationalism or political statements (Poynting, 2006). Similarly, Samani (2007, p. 113) notes that the events of 11 September 2001 and the Cronulla riots have created a “…present waxing and waning of anti-Islamic sentiment in many Western nations”. Other scholars such as Portes and Rumbuat (2006) point out that, “Public hostility towards Islam reached a climax after the coordinated attacks against the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in September 2001, and it has been kept at a high pitch ever since” (p. 336).

There appear to be a number of other studies that support this opinion. For example, the study by Celermajer, Yasmeen, and Saeed (2007) finds that the post September 11, 2001 period only added to problems which had been experienced by Australian Muslims in the past. Similarly, the work of Dunn (2004a) is particularly important. A telephone survey he undertook in 2004 of 5056 residents in Queensland and New South Wales, asked respondents to identify whether there were any cultural or ethnic groups that did not fit into Australian society and to nominate three such groups. “The results overwhelmingly indicate the outsider status of Muslims, as well as Australians of Middle-Eastern origin and, less so of Asian origin” (Dunn, 2004, p. 414).

However, whilst the abovementioned literature convincingly shows that the integration of Muslims in the West is debated vigorously, it fails to state specifically what integration is meant to be. In the case of Europe, it is in this context that Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakal (2008) cautioned those calling for Muslim integration not to attach “a good citizenship” to a “…measure of Europeanisation, which in popular debate is often understood as assimilation into a Judeo-Christian culture or, at least, the abandonment of public signifiers of Islam” (p. 169).

2.9. Conclusion

In modern Australia, Muslims are undeniably part of the wider mix of Australia’s diverse multicultural society. Research into the incorporation of Muslim immigrants is relatively new. As a religious group, Muslims face the challenges of often being questioned about their loyalty to, and integration in, the wider society. Despite the
absence of any clear understanding of what integration might mean and whether or not it can be measured at all, there seems to be an emerging body of literature that clearly doubts whether or not Muslims can be integrated into Australian society. This body of literature increased significantly after the events of 9/11 in the United States. The media and opportunistic politicians have taken advantage of these circumstances. For example, Aly (2007) notes how the Australian media identify Muslims both explicitly and implicitly as the “other” and equate Muslims with a threat to the wider society (p. 33). There also appears to be renewed interest in this integration and social inclusion generally, as evidenced by an increase in debates about the integration, or the lack thereof, of Muslims in Australia.

Contrary to this widely held negative perception of Muslim integration, the findings from studies in Australia and successive ABS Census data reveal that Australian Muslims are integrating successfully, for example in the areas of “English language skills, citizenship uptake, home ownership, and university qualifications” (Saeed, 2006, p. 12). If Muslims are benchmarked against these key indicators, their integration is not so problematic. Whilst there is no shortage of literature questioning the levels of Muslim integration, notably absent from the debates about immigrant integration is the question of how Muslims themselves understand the meaning of integration. Before we discuss the ways in which Muslims themselves conceptualise integration, the following chapter will outline the extant discourses about integration.
Chapter 3. Discourses Concerning Immigrant Integration: A Critical Review

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter the thesis provides an overview and analysis of the discourses of integration which have been debated in the scholarly literature. This is intended to set the scene for discussions of the findings in the later empirical chapters, which examine how integration is conceptualised by the Muslim community in Australia. This background is essential to the study because it strengthens appreciation and greater understanding of where Muslims’ conceptualisation of integration fit within the broader debates and definitions of integration. Throughout the discourses concerning international migration, debates centring on integration are taking place as part and parcel of diversity management. There is an immense volume of international migration literature devoted to the subject of managing the diversity of ethnic, cultural and religious groups (Castles, 1995; Koopmans & Statham, 2000; Kymlicka & Norman, 2000; Vertovec, 2007). A way to successfully manage diversity has become necessary due to concerns of ethnic inequality, discrimination, and more importantly, concerns relating to social inclusion and exclusion (Wrench, 2012). The presence of an immigrant “foreigner” in the midst of a group of individuals, for example, a host society which shares certain attributes, is claimed to be the basis for these escalated debates on immigrant integration. The need for integration arises when an established group encounters any group of people they perceive to be different (Modood, 2013). It is this focus on differences during a period of increasing levels of international movement by people of various religious, cultural, ethnic and racial backgrounds which necessitates public and policy discussions on the subject of integration.

Indeed, the increasing diversity of today’s migrants presents both opportunities and challenges to nation states across all continents (Portes & Vickstrom, 2015; Vertovec, 2007). Some of these opportunities include the advantages that diversity lends to a nation’s trade competitiveness in both local and global markets. Ottaviano and Peri (2006) found that cities in the United States, where the share of the foreign born population increased between 1970 and 1990, experienced a significant increase in
employees’ wages and rental costs. There is an extensive body of academic literature that links diversity to societal wellbeing, including economic wellbeing (Cuaresma, Huber, & Raggl, 2015). For example, in the United Kingdom diversity is linked to increased innovation in all fields, and a growing culture of entrepreneurship (Marrocu & Paci, 2013; Nathan, 2014; Qian, 2013). It also includes the ease of development of business partners’ and suppliers’ global networks. However, on the other hand, diversity poses unique challenges in a globally interlinked world. One of its main challenges is the integration of newcomers into the dominant host societies, especially when these newcomers have diverse racial, ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds, a phenomenon Vertovec (2009, p. 86) described as “super diversity”. Other works refer to the complex set of challenges that living with difference poses to nation states and societies, including tensions in identification arising from the local, national gap to the virtual (Chambers, 2012), paradoxical gap that emerges in encounters between values and practices (Valentine, 2008).

But a common theme of concern for policy makers in managing diversity is the risks of inadequately addressing this issue of migrant integration, thus creating an environment in which public discussions about the subject are conducted in a prejudiced fashion, replete with emotion and rhetoric. In response to this prospect, Abbas (2007) cites how some politicians in Britain discouraged references to the “Muslim community” and instead promoted reference to the “British Muslim community” as the latter implies that Muslims belong to this nation. Many Western immigrant-receiving states have developed migrant integration policies to manage the ever-growing social diversity produced by immigration. In fact, promotion of Muslim integration is understood to reduce Muslim radicalisation and extremism (Archick et al., 2011). The core principle of managing diversity is therefore assumed to be ensuring that society’s rich diversity does not cause social and political fragmentation, making the achievement of social cohesion difficult (Hickman, Crowley, & Mai, 2008; Portes & Vickstrom, 2015; Soroka, Johnston, & Banting, 2006).

Sociological scholars have arranged immigrant integration literature into classifications of assimilationist and pluralist (Gans, 2005), or as differential exclusionist, assimilationist or multiculturalist (Castles & Miller, 2003). These traditional classifications tended to ignore significant international events that potentially altered
the debates about immigrant integration. For example, in the period since 11 September 2001, the discourses of integration have grown (Caviedes, 2015; Hoekstra, 2015; Schroeter & Veniard, 2016). Issues such as security and the threat faced by Western and European cultures and values have entered the public discussions of immigrant integration (Croucher, 2013; Humphrey, 2014; Husbands, 2014). The ways in which governments and policy makers approach immigrant integration has changed since the tragic events of 11 September 2001 (Abbas, 2007; Birt, 2006; Cherney & Murphy, 2015; Poynting & Mason, 2007; Vanparys, Jacobs, & Torrekens, 2013). In the case of Europe where there is closer political, social and economic cooperation under the auspices of the “European Integration” agenda, national models of integration such as assimilation, integration and multiculturalism are unworkable (Jacobs & Rea, 2007). Similarly, Jacobs and Rea (2007) call this new situation “the end of national models” and envisage that there will be more convergence in the ways in which European member states incorporate their immigrant newcomers.

In line with these important new developments, this thesis adopts more informative categorisations of the discourses of integration, which take into consideration the actors and the players in the process of integration, namely the nation-state, the academic field and the media. On this basis, the thesis notes that how immigrant integration literature is classified merits a revisit. The thesis concedes that integration is the product of the intersection between individual migrant aspirations, with regulatory frameworks in four domains – state, market, welfare and culture (Freeman 2004). On this basis, this review departs from the above traditional classifications of pluralism versus assimilationism (Gans, 2005), and the Castles and Miller (2003) categorisations of differential exclusionist, assimilationist and multiculturalist theories. This review maintains that the above categories do not necessarily comprehend the depth of the debates of integration in the post 11 September 2001 period. It argues that integration’s constituent actors: the state, academia and the media, avoid in-depth scrutiny due the emphases placed on above classifications. In the following sections of this chapter, the meanings of integration with respect to these important actors will be discussed. This is important to the research question of what Muslims’ conceptualisations of integration are because it sheds light on whether the calls for integration of Muslims are consistent between these stakeholders and whether or not Muslims’ conceptualisation of integration match these stakeholders’ interpretations of integration.
3.2. State discourses about integration

The management of ethnic, cultural and religious diversity is a major government function and it includes instituting and enforcing various migration regulations (Jupp & Kabala, 1993; Kelley & Schmidt 1979). The state, as an important actor, develops policies and programs to incorporate newcomers into their new societies. It has legislative power to determine the size and composition of the flow of migrants and newcomers into the sovereign state. It has a distinctive responsibility in the successful resettlement of migrants to ensure that cohesiveness and inclusion into the wider society is realised. Based on its unique responsibilities in the integration discourse, the state is an important player in the public debates about the integration of migrants (Laurence, 2012). In the recent past, the government’s role in immigrant integration has been significantly expanded and a host of immigration reforms, including policies directed at integrating minorities, were introduced as a result of perceived national security threats (Johnson & Trujillo, 2006). The increased role of the state in immigration and minority integration is also explained as being the protection of the imagined national culture and values that are under threat (Triandafyllopoulos, 2011).

In recent times, the movement of people from one part of the world to another has increased significantly, but similarly, the diversity of the groups of people moving from their ancestral homes to countries with different cultures, ethnicity, race and religions continues to increase. But integration is also a product of the interactions, discourses and events which happen “on the ground”, in everyday settings, with which governments and public institutions interact regularly. The state is then confronted by a new set of realities that are more complicated than the traditional ways of resettling newcomers from somewhat similar backgrounds. It becomes imperative for the state to engage in this discussion in reference to the undeniable fact of today’s globalised society, which is characterised by diversity in not only race but in religion and ethnicity. Since the events of 9/11, contemporary migrant integration literature struggles to find a balance between diversity and integration, and faces dilemmas in the interplay between terrorism, radicalisation, extremism and integration (Triandafyllidou, 2015).

The literature review specifically brought to light new public concerns about the integration of Muslims (Adida, Laitin, & Valfort, 2016). The importance of balancing the demands of integration with the reality of diverse communities is paramount, as
“othering” Muslims may impede the noble idea of integration (Poynting, 2009). In the reviewed literature, across Europe, North America and Australia, governments have developed national models of immigrant integration. Whilst the local environment dictates the model each country adopts, their anticipated aims remain to incorporate migrants successfully into the wider host society. State discourses of immigrant incorporation have been around for quite some time, and have been evolving and changing over many decades. Among the most discussed themes in the state discourses of integration in the literature are the models of assimilation, integration, citizenship and multiculturalism. In the next sections, the thesis discusses these concepts to shed further light on this aspect of the research question.

3.3. Assimilation

Assimilation was a dominant theory of immigrant incorporation during the period of the 1920s and 1930s (Alba & Nee, 2003; Castles & Miller, 1998). It is the oldest and most discussed state discourse of immigrant incorporation in the literature. The review of the literature pertaining to assimilation finds that despite being the oldest model, to date, assimilation remains a significant relevant factor in public and academic discussions of immigrant integration. In the beginning, assimilation was envisioned as eradicating the distinct features of ethnicity and other cultural differences between the host society and immigrants. A number of definitions of assimilation provided in the literature indicate that this is the objective of assimilation. A number of definitions of assimilation are provided in the literature (see Alba & Nee, 2003; Castles, 1999; Heisler, 1999; Morawska, 2005). For example, it is defined as “the policy of of incorporating migrants into society through a one sided process of adaptation: immigrants are expected to give up their distinctive linguistic, cultural or social characteristics and become indistinguishable from the majority population” (Castles, 200, p. 137). Today, the assimilation model is primarily associated with the 1964 work of Milton Gordon’s 1994 book *The Nature of Assimilation*. In explaining Gordon’s work, Heisler (1999, p. 626) says:

Assimilation is a multifarious process involving several stages (seven, to be exact) moving from mere acculturation (the adoption of language, religion and other cultural characteristics), structural integration (interaction in
primary relationships and the absence of discrimination and prejudice) and finally assimilation.

But, in the late twentieth century, the realities of an increased global human movement and the mass migration of non-Europeans to America raised questions of the effectiveness and practicality of assimilation (Rumbuat, 2015). The abovementioned definitions of assimilation are contested by some contemporary scholars who point out that this view of “single sequential path of assimilation” by which immigrants give up past languages, identities and cultural practices is being challenged by new models of “resurgent or reactive ethnicity” which suggest that, “Racial hierarchies and/or limited economic opportunities shape identities and integration” (Bloemraad et al., 2008, p. 163). It is apparent that assimilation has not lived up to its expectations, and after more than hundred years in existence, the concept remains vague and elusive (Alba & Nee, 2003).

The traditional view of assimilation also faces criticism from a number of other scholars. Amongst them is Kivisto (2005) who argued that within a decade of the publication of Gordon’s book, assimilation theory’s hegemonic status came under attack (Kivisto, 2005). But it is works like that by Glazer (2005) which question the practicality of assimilation as an effective method, citing the impact assimilation had on racial and ethnic elements in the United States, and its failure to successfully assimilate the African American populations. Other contemporary scholars such as Morawska (2005, p. 128) summarise the arguments for and against assimilation as follows:

Political and moral arguments in favour of assimilation have been based on such beliefs as these: the drastic reduction of the salience of ethnic group membership supports greater equality, weakens the sources of discrimination, increases individual freedom, and helps create more flexible society. Political and moral arguments in favour of dissimilation – the preservation of subculture differences and even their revival – have been on such beliefs as these: ethnic groups can be powerful centres of opposition to coercive states, can protect valuable cultural resources that are lost in a basically one-way assimilation process, and can reduce anomie and the sense of alienation by giving individuals an identity in a complex and confusing world.
A significantly large bulk of literature views assimilation as a model that has passed its use by date. For example, Doomernick and Knippenberg (2003) criticised assimilation as, “An illegitimate and virtually unusable model of incorporation in today’s modern societies” and condemned it as being, “A strategy that used violence, repression and coercion to absorb minorities into majority culture” (p.44). Other criticisms levelled against assimilation are its limitations and its narrow primary focus on the adjustment of the newcomer, paying scant attention to the necessary adjustments which receiving societies must make in order to accept and accommodate newcomers (Heisler, 1999).

This review acknowledges the existence in the literature of various understandings of assimilation. For instance, to illustrate the complexity of the term, Kivisto (2005, p. 4) points out three incontrovertible facts about assimilation that he has identified: “(1) There is little consensus about what we mean by the term; (2) it remains highly contentious; (3) it is back in vogue”. Additionally, the way in which a state practices assimilation might be different to the way in which another state will employ this discourse. It is evident in the literature about immigrant incorporation that in the application of assimilationist models, there are variances between nations and societies. For instance, Legrain (2006, p. 266) explains the French model of assimilation as “Exacting a heavy toll on personal freedoms, by striving to erase cultural differences, without delivering the equality and national cohesion it espouses.” The author goes even further and asserts that the one size fits all homogenisation which the model proposes seems “neither desirable nor achievable” (Legrain, 2006, p. 266).

In contrasting ways in which states respond to immigrant incorporation, Castles (1999, pp. 3-17) concludes, “Pluralist models of incorporation, depending on the degree of state intervention, are far superior and more successful than assimilation and differential exclusion models”. It is evident in the literature that some immigrant receiving nation states may have used a mix of immigrant integration methods. However, Castles (1999, p. 3) found that where nations have adopted an assimilation model but also attempted to embrace elements of the pluralist model, a contradiction was found between the stated goals and the actual policies. For instance, Castles (1999, p. 16) provides the example of countries such as France and the Netherlands as states based on political and cultural community, which tend to follow an assimilation model, partially moving to a pluralist model of immigrant incorporation. In the case of countries such as Australia, Canada
and the United States, Castles (1999, p. 16) found that a predominant model of immigrant incorporation is a pluralist one, based on “Encouraging permanent residence with easy naturalisation and access to civil and political rights”.

In spite of the criticism of assimilation as a model discussed above, there are defenders of assimilation, including some contemporary scholars. For instance, Glazer (2005, p. 125) by answering his own question—Is assimilation dead?—states that “The word may be dead, the concept may be disreputable, but the reality continues to flourish” and he cites “The high rate of intermarriage of European ethnic groups as a clear example of how thin ethnicity became among Americans of European origin” (p. 125). Unlike assimilation, other state discourses about immigrant integration in the literature appear to be mainly pluralistic. In contrasting ways in which states respond to immigrant incorporation, Castles (1999) concludes that, “Pluralist models of immigrant integration depending on the degree of state intervention are far superior and more successful than assimilation and differential exclusion models” (pp. 3-17). In reality, different states may adopt different models of integration based on their political and social realities. It has become the norm for some states to move from a particular model of integration to another over time. State discourses of integration receive much more attention than academic ones, as they become the official discourses of governments. These state discourses have both assimilationist and pluralist forms of integration. Pluralist models of immigrant integration, which are extensively discussed in the literature of immigrant incorporation, are citizenship, integration and multiculturalism.

3.4. Citizenship and integration

A significant body of literature sees the grant of citizenship and naturalisation of immigrants to be a prominent method of immigrant integration (Bauböck, Honohan, Huddleston, Hucheson, Shaw, & Vink, 2013; Huddleston & Vink, 2015; Vink, 2013). Understanding this is important to the research question this thesis attempts to examine because citizenship and belonging are methods in which states settle their newcomers in their new homeland. The grant of citizenship through a process of naturalisation is a pluralist model of immigrant incorporation, which is generally considered to encourage immigrants to become a permanent part of the mainstream society (Hansen, 2014). Successful integration is understood as meaning a process whereby citizenship rights and entitlements are granted to newcomers (Li, 2003, p. 330). Bloemraad et al., (2008)
define citizenship as, “A form of membership in a political and geographic community. It can be disaggregated into four dimensions: legal status, rights, political and other forms of participation in society, and a sense of belonging” (p.154). But in Western liberal democracies, citizenship rights are paired with obligations (Kerber, 1997). In fact, “Legal status, rights, participation, and belonging are traditionally anchored in a particular community with a defined national identity and territorial sovereignty” (Bloemraad, 2008, p. 154).

Based on this definition, citizenship as legal status, rights, full participation, or belonging, usually happens within the borders of the country within which immigrants settle. However, this is very much complicated by the fact that, “Over the past two decades an expansive and growing body of literature questions such a bounded approach, raising normative and empirical questions about the relevance of state borders” (Bloemraad at al., 2008, p. 164). However, other works such as that of Bloemraad (2004) found shortcomings in the model and argue that the traditional model of citizenship naively assumes that immigrants gradually lose attachment to their country of original citizenship, and that most immigrants will adopt a primary identity and loyalty to the receiving country.

It is not entirely clear from the scholarly literature whether citizenship and integration mean the same thing, or if integration is a stand-alone discourse of immigrant incorporation. It is also the case that individuals who are deemed legally to be citizens of a nation-state may not be fully integrated or may have questionable levels of integration. This further polarises the debate and evades the issue of what is meant by integration. It is also argued that integration is, “The most common form of referring to migrant adaptation process, not only when discussing normative dimensions of policy, but also when discussing empirical patterns or migrants’ own experiences” (Erdal & Oeppen, 2013, p. 869). But on the other hand, this difficult to define concept is one that is more popularly used in the public and policy discussions of immigrant incorporation. This is how sociologist and philosopher Adrian Favell (2003, p. 13) summarises the difficulties associated with conceptualising the term “integration”:

> Despite its somewhat old fashioned, functionalist air, “integration” is still the most popular way of conceptualising the developing relationship between old European nations-states and their growing non-European,
“ethnic” populations. It is also widely used to frame the advocacy of political means for dealing with the consequences of immigration in the post World War Two period. Many similar, difficult to define concepts can be used to describe the process of social change that occurs when immigrants are integrated into their new host society. But none occur with the frequency or all encompassing scope of the idea of integration across such a broad range of West European countries.

This apparent confusion on what integration means is a result of the proliferation of meanings of integration. The review notes the complexity and confusing nature of various definitions and terms that are used to describe the processes of incorporating immigrants into their new societies. For example, Weiner (1996) points out that the different terms used, such as “integrate”, “absorb” and “assimilate”, all suggest the level of complexity, ambiguity and contention of what integration means.

This apparent confusion in the literature comes from the seemingly interchangeable use of the terms “integration” and “incorporation”. Further analyses of the literature reveal the existence of contradicting definitions (both assimilationist and integrationist) of what integration means. For instance, Shadid (1991, p. 362) defined integration as, “The participation of ethnic and religious minorities, individually and as groups, in the social structure of the host society while having possibilities to retain the distinctive aspects of their culture and identity”. Others such as Mogahed and Nyiri (2007) propose a definition of integration as being less about cultural conformity, and more about having shared goals and commitment. Legrain (2006) argues that integration is a two way street where immigrants need to have the will to assimilate to local ways, and natives must be willing to accept them, however he concludes that if society is racist, immigrants will not be able to integrate.

A further confusion in the scholarly literature is the difference in what integration means from one group to another. A United Nations briefing paper for a world summit (1994), found that social integration might mean different things to different people, further noting this problem. For some, it can be an inclusionary goal, meaning the availability of opportunities for all. For others, becoming integrated can have a negative connotation and an unwanted imposition of uniformity. For some, it might mean neither (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1994). Furthermore,
Mogahed and Nyiri (2007, p. 2) in their article *Reinventing Integration* proposed redefining integration as less about cultural conformity, and more about having shared goals and commitment. They oppose judgement of the woman’s veil and other religious symbols as being measures of integration and suggest more focus be placed on issues of substance, rather than on the artificial indicators of integration such as appearance, Soysal (1994, p. 30) explains that integration occurs automatically as immigrants start participating in legal and organisational structures and become part of the host nation’s welfare system, participate in housing and quickly begin their own businesses. It also begins when they gain access to rights and privileges, and are allowed to participate in elections.

Analysis of the current literature reveals that most of the work concentrates on the individual immigrant rather than the receiving communities. According to Li (2003, p. 324), “The current academic discourse on immigration seldom interrogates the notion of integration as a theoretical concept”. Instead, it readily adopts a narrow empirical framework for studying integration by measuring how immigrants differ from native-born Canadians. In so doing, the academic discourse has unwittingly accepted the conformity premise of integration and has equated the extent of immigrants' integration with the degree of compliance with the average Canadian standard. Overall as Erdal and Oeppen (2013, p. 869) state, “Integration has been used as a middle ground between multiculturalism and assimilation as it focuses on migrants’ full participation in the labour market and their formal citizenship, but left matters of social membership and cultural preferences open to personal choice”. In the public discussions about immigrant incorporation, the concept of immigrant integration has remained in the forefront since the tragic events of 11 September 2011. New waves of integrationist approaches are evident in the incorporation policies of some European countries (Kundnani, 2012, p. 159). In this thesis, the term “integration” will be used as encompassing various ways and methods to incorporate newcomers into the host society.

### 3.5. Multiculturalism

Amongst all discourses of immigrant integration, multiculturalism seems to have received significant attention from policymakers, academics and the media. The discourse relating to multiculturalism has emerged from receiving countries’ realisations that the notion that all newcomers should join the majority national culture
is unworkable (Castles & Davidson, 2000). Arguably, in recent times, individuals and groups in a number of Western nations have resisted the concept. Multiculturalism as a pluralist model of immigrant incorporation seems to overlap with other models of immigrant incorporation in some shape or form. For instance, Doomernick and Knippenberg (2003) assert that the dominant form of incorporating immigrants into receiving societies is integration into a multicultural state. Furthermore, a report produced by the National Multicultural Advisory Council (1999, p. 6) expressed the view that, “Concepts are interlinked but each is important in its own right. ‘Citizenship’ should be primarily seen as a bond or glue, consisting of shared membership in a political community—a commitment to the Constitution and the laws, the rights and obligations and the core values and practices of Australian democracy. This expanded idea of ‘citizenship’ does not negate the place and role of Australian multiculturalism as defined in this report. Instead, the Council sees the relationship between ‘citizenship’ and multiculturalism as symbiotic and complementary.”

On the other hand, multiculturalism as a concept may be embraced by a number of states and societies, but still its application and impact on those it refers to might substantially differ. Indeed, there is what Jakubowicz (2007b) referred to as “Anglo multiculturalism” citing apparent contradictions in policies of cultural diversity in both Europe and Australia. For example, Legrain (2006, p. 284) points out how the Canadian model of multiculturalism is extremely successful by citing the city of Toronto’s motto “Diversity Our Strength” and the fact that, “Canada as a country does more than pay lip service to multiculturalism by even encouraging children of immigrants to learn their parent’s native languages”. Some propose that comparatively, Canadian multiculturalism is superior to other forms of multiculturalism practiced in Europe and Australia (Banting & Kymlicka, 2013; Bloemraad, 2012).

Despite its popularity and use for decades in many parts of the Western world, the concept of multiculturalism has come under sustained pressure and criticism on a number of fronts. For example, Samani (2007) points out that the discourse about the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the London underground attacks and the Spanish train bombings implicates multiculturalism in part as being “culpable” for these criminal acts. In the case of Europe, where the retreat of multiculturalism is claimed to be widespread (Joppke, 2013; Winter, 2015), evidence suggests quite the opposite (Banting
& Kymlicka, 2013; Modood, 2014). In fact, Banting and Kymlicka (2013) point out that, with the exception of the Netherlands which went backwards, much of the rest of Europe has either maintained its multicultural policies or in some instances added more programs. They also found that in some cases, some European governments have blended multiculturalism with civic integration policies, but no evidence was documented of mass departure from multiculturalism in Europe. Uberoi and Modood (2013) come to the same conclusion and argue that, if understood correctly, multiculturalism has flourished in Britain, at least. By observing the multicultural policy index, evidence shows that multicultural policies persisted and in many cases expanded (Multiculturalism Policy Index, 2015). It is therefore clear that arguments that suggest multiculturalism is rejected in Europe are at best exaggerated or possibly invented.

According to Bloemraad (2006), a laissez faire model has assumptions built into it which include that an individual immigrant’s choice, plus a framework of individual rights and anti-discrimination legislation will result in incorporation of new immigrants in a unified citizenry. Other criticisms levelled against multiculturalism come from cosmopolitan supporters. Whilst still not considered a model of integration, cosmopolitanism is perhaps an important element to consider in the debates about multiculturalism. The cosmopolitan critique of multiculturalism demands consideration of the concept beyond the out-dated liberal multiculturalism, which ignores major recent world-wide societal transformations (Delanty, 2009, p. 141). Delanty advances an intellectual critique that brings to light the realities of the difficulties associated with the delineation between ethnic groups and the majority culture (Delanty, 2009, pp.141-142).

Overall in the discussion above, there seem to be multiple state discourses of integration, all holding various meanings and conceptualisations, including the multicultural meaning of integration. Doomernick and Knippenberg (2003, p. 46) explain that the integrationist model of immigrant incorporation appears to be superior to assimilationist notions of integration because of its culturally-pluralistic basis. In all its different forms of incorporation, Erdal and Oeppen (2013, p. 869) assert that, “A state discourse of integration appears to be a one-way process where the burden is on migrants to integrate into societies of settlement”. This point is vehemently rejected by Ehrkamp (2006, p. 1692) who argues, “Integration should be a process of negotiation
and relationship between members of the host society and migrant groups and individuals”. Correspondingly, there is an emerging number of non-state discourses of immigrant integration, namely the concepts of trans-nationalism, post nationalism and cosmopolitanism, which will be discussed in the following section. Understanding these key academic theories of integration informs the research question of Muslims’ conceptions of integration because analysis data will critically examine the prevalence or absence of pluralistic and/or assimilationist definitions of integration in Muslim participants’ responses.

3.6. Academic discourses of integration

Discourses of migrant integration are not only debated in government circles and public policy forums. Debates about the successful integration of immigrants and newcomers into the wider society are also taking place in the academic sphere. The distinction between these two parallel debates suggests that in academic circles, the debate tends to be generally pluralistic, if not universalistic. Amongst the major discourses of integration debated in the academic sphere include the concepts of trans-nationalism, post-nationalism and cosmopolitanism. Sometimes referred to as theories of integration, these discourses are not models that are necessarily adopted by states as policies of incorporation, but they are theories of integration documented in the academic arena. A common theme amongst these discourses is their pluralistic and universalistic nature, and their claim that the mass movement of people of diverse backgrounds from one part of the world to another demands a fresh approach that takes into account universal human rights. These discourses acknowledge that globalisation and advances in telecommunications technologies and mass air transportation systems enable immigrants to be connected to their ancestral places of birth (Alba & Nee, 2003). But the difficulty is that, even though these discourses are sound and good in theory, they have not been tested or used by states and societies. To date, no state has ever developed an integration policy named either post-nationalism, cosmopolitanism or transnationalism. Despite this fact, these concepts remain central to the academic debates of integration. Amongst the most popular of these academic theories is the concept of post nationalism.

Post nationalism is the notion that a grant of citizenship, such as legal rights and status, is not sufficient to fully incorporate immigrants into the host society. In her book *Limits*
of Citizenship Soysal (1994) cites world pressures, such as universal human rights, as a new force which makes the existing models of citizenship less important. Whilst post nationalists acknowledge that citizenship occupies a central place in the processes of immigrant incorporation, according to Bloemraad (2004, p. 392) they similarly assert that, “Theories of post nationalism challenge the very idea that citizenship remains linked with state membership be it territorialised or not”. In the contemporary immigrant incorporation literature, this view is gaining momentum. It is in line with the idea that analysis solely centred on the experience of individual nation states becomes a barrier to the understanding of a phenomenon of global immigration.

In support of this view, Thomas (2006) explains that post nationalism is the theory that national citizenship is giving way to a new post nationalist perspective, which is influenced by international human rights norms and respect for personhood. Bloomraad (2004) provides similar views about how human rights undermine traditional notions of citizenship, due to their power as an accepted normative framework. It is also claimed that, “States are increasingly instruments of implementing international human rights conventions and norms” (Joppke, 2005, p. 6). In general, according to post-national scholars, “Human rights undermine traditional notions of citizenship due to their power as an accepted normative framework and through their institutionalisation” (Bloemraad, 2004, pp. 392-396).

However, the literature about the post nationalism model of immigrant incorporation has faced challenges from the research of other scholars. For example, Joppke (1999, p. 187) asserts that the limitation of post national membership is that it is well suited for the first generation of migrants who have a “deceptive” idea of returning home one day. Other criticisms include those of Bloemraad (2004, pp. 389-426) who used a sample of Canadian statistical census data and found that, “There is little evidence that immigrants adopt a strict post national view of citizenship but reveal the possibilities of transnationalism and continued relevance of traditional frameworks”. In reference to earlier models, and using the case of Germany as an example, Joppke (1999, p. 189) explains that post nationalists view assimilation as both undesirable and unnecessary, as it violates the dignity of the individual and is against the constitution that protects the liberty of the person in spite of his or her citizenship.
In an era of globalisation and massive international movement with virtually blurred boundaries, the concept of citizenship is contested by new research into cosmopolitan identity. Vertovec and Cohen (2002) list a number of ways in which cosmopolitanism can be described: as a socio-cultural condition, as a philosophy or world view, as a political project for transnational institutions or other subjects, as an attitude or disposition and as a practice or competence. Within the literature of international migration and its relations with integration, the contributions of the concept of cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan citizenship cannot be ignored. In an era of globalisation and massive international movement, with virtually blurred boundaries, one of the new and emerging concepts of immigrant incorporation is that of cosmopolitanism. Just like other academic discourses about integration discussed above, cosmopolitan theorists stress that the globalised and interconnected worlds we live in dictate that we identify beyond the boundaries of our nation states. Emphasising the importance of cosmopolitanism in this matter, Skirbis et al. (2004) explain the level of interconnectedness and interdependence of the world, citing Chernobyl, the AIDS virus, terrorism and CNN as being factors that influence the lives of many people in different parts of the world.

In relation to the extent to which people are connected to the world and local settings, Woodward, Skirbis & Bean (2008) found that almost two-thirds, or 65 per cent, of the subjects of their study showed that they feel both a citizen of the world and of their country of origin. In spite of this, cosmopolitanism remains an abstract concept and a good theory, and no state or government has until now adopted it as a method of immigrant incorporation. That is not to say it cannot happen. It may perhaps happen if, as stated by Skirbis and Woodward (2007), society eliminates its inner contradictions of accepting the benefits of an interconnected world such as travel and an international cuisine while not being so keen to show hospitality to strangers and immigrants. But the theory of cosmopolitanism does not escape criticism, and whilst acknowledging its universalistic approach to differences and diversity, it is accused of having a focus on the individual and of being a concept that denies groups the right to exist or to be politically recognised (Modood, 2013). In contrast, multiculturalism embraces cultural diversity as much as cosmopolitanism does, but the two concepts differ in their recognition of group versus individual identity. Sited between these two noteworthy academic ideas is the concept of transnationalism.
Transnationalism and transmigration, as a form of incorporation, is vehemently debated in the academic literature (Anghel, 2012; Erdal & Oeppen, 2013; Guarnizo et al., 2003). It is evident from the literature about international migration that the concept of transnationalism has also gained significant interest in the recent past. In response to one way assimilation, American sociologists and anthropologists have introduced transnationalism as a new model of belonging and incorporation (Hagan, 2006). Transnationalism is a concept that allows individual immigrants to have multiple attachments. Contemporary works such as that of Clark (2009), which addresses nation-state belonging among Asian Australians and the question of transnationals, is worthy of note. Using the data on the Australian survey of Social Attitudes, Clark (2009) found that migrants are likely to develop multiple attachments to local and global allegiances that lie beyond the boundaries of the nation state. The study also found that Asian Australian migrants have similar views towards the nation state as the rest of the Australian population.

The researcher faced a dilemma as to whether or not to catalogue transnationalism as an academic discourse, or as a state discourse and a model of integration. This predicament was overcome, accepting transnationalism to be both. However, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, to date, Singapore is the only country that has adopted transnationalism as a model of immigrant integration (Rahman & Kiong, 2013). In its application as a practical model of integration, Singaporean policy makers call this transnational inclusion, and estimate that its transnational immigrants constitute one-fourth of its population (Rahman & Kiong, 2013). Arguably, the Singapore case highlights how the concept of transnationalism directly interacts with processes of immigrant integration in today’s complex migration settings. However, in a much deeper analysis, the key question is: What are the relationships between the concepts of integration and transnationalism?

Erdal and Oeppen (2013, pp. 872-873) identify four different and overlapping positions in the literature about this relationship: the alarmist view – divided loyalty preventing migrants from fully integrating into the host community, the less alarmist but pessimistic view which states that transnational activities may help migrants with less human and cultural capital to integrate, the positive position that states that integration and transnationalism could be mutually supportive, and the fourth proposition which
states that transnational ties exist alongside processes of integration, so that the concepts are not mutually exclusive. Central to the debates about transnationalism is the question of how migrants should organise themselves, or whether or not transnationalism is at odds with nationalism. This debate is concerned with how migrants’ transnational posture interacts with the model of integration that is adopted by the state. In answering this important question, Erhkamp (2006) informs that that a national model of integration alone does not shape the incorporation of migrants. In a study of ethnic Romanians who migrated to Germany and to Italy, Anghel (2012, p. 322) found that migrants’ transnational involvement plays a crucial role their status and sense of success at the national level. In fact, researchers found that transnationalism is observed as both advancing international trade and helping with an income strategy for underprivileged migrants, but at the same time impeding adequate incorporation into the host society (Snel, Enbersen, & Leerkes, 2006).

Contemporary research into transnationalism mainly focuses on studying a specific ethnic group’s transmigration, and is generally concerned with how transnationalism affects the integration of ethnic minority groups. For example, Snel et al., (2006) conducted a survey of 300 immigrants from USA, Japan, Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Morocco and the Dutch Antilles and found that transnational involvement in general did not impede integration. However, migrant groups known for their poor integration levels have less involvement in transnational activities. In the case of immigrants from Morocco and the Dutch Antilles who had the weakest labour market participation, these people identified more strongly with their country of origin than others. Generally, the concept of transnationalism is a politically sensitive subject for certain states and societies and is seen to be at odds with citizenship and integration. Transmigration is also an issue of controversy, where powerful groups and dominant host society members can exploit arguments of divided loyalty.

From the above discussions of the academic discourses about integration, it is apparent that academic theories of integration include some that are critical of pluralist forms of integration and instead promote notions of conformity and uniformity. However, the vast bulk of scholarly literature tends to support the pluralist notions of integration. Li (2003) argues that the notions of integration in the academic discourse are generally about how to bring together various elements of society and are mainly concerned with
social order and social change. From this understanding, the academic discourses are generally more accommodating than the state discourses of integration discussed above. Just like the state and the academic sphere, the media has weighed into the debates. In this study, it is important to understand media discourses on integration because it further informs the thesis if Muslims’ conceptions of integration are different or similar to the media definitions of integration.

3.7. Media discourses on integration

The media is often referred to as a social institution and a major element of contemporary Western society (Koopmans & Statham, 2010; McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Norris, 2000). Matters relating to immigration and integration of minorities are often newsworthy in the major resettlement countries in the West and the media plays a critical role in reporting issues of immigration and ethnic minorities. Researchers studying migration and ethnic minorities recognise the media’s distinctive informational source that functions as, “A powerful co-author of individual understanding of a social matter” (Matei, 2011, p. 86). As a vital source of information, the media “Conveys or constructs particular representations of minorities and immigrants, including negative depictions, and acts as space for the participation of migrants and minorities in a public sphere where they can advance their interests and identities” (Bleich, Bloemraad, & De Graauw, 2015, p. 859).

The role of the media in society is understood to be even deeper than news provision but also sets public policy agenda (McCombs, 2002). Research shows how the general public as consumers heavily rely on media discourses about integration. For example, “Not only do people acquire factual information about public affairs from the news media, readers and viewers also learn how much importance to attach to a topic on the basis of the emphasis placed on it in the news” (McCombs 2002, p. 1). As the media plays an important role in the integration of new immigrants (Christoph, 2012), its profound effect on the worldview of its consumers should be considered in matters of immigration. The power of the influence that the news media has to set a nation’s agenda, to focus public attention on a few key issues, is an immense and well-documented fact (McCombs, 2002, p. 87).
With its powerful influence and its ability to set the agenda for society and sway public opinion, the media’s discourse about integration is quite different from that adopted by governments and discussed in the vast bulk of academic literature. In most media outlets, debates about migrant integration are polarised. The reasons for this polarised debate can be attributed to the fact that through the media, social processes create narratives or stories within interpretive frameworks that are embedded in the cultural and political assumptions of the wider society (Aly, 2007, p. 27). But it is also accepted that the agenda-setting influence of the news media is not limited to this initial step of focusing public attention on a particular topic, but also influences the next step in the communication process, our understanding of and perspective on the topic in the news (McCombs, 2002).

In the extensive literature reviewed, the media discourse of immigrant integration is generally negative (Peucker & Akbarzadeh, 2014; Rane & Abdalla, 2008; Rane & Hersi, 2012). Issues concerning migration and integration are negatively reported in a number of countries including the Netherlands (Roggeband & Vliegenthart, 2007) as well as in the United Kingdom (Luchtenberg & McClelland, 1998). In Australia, the majority of media reports on Muslim immigration have been negative, specifically, reports about Muslims’ integration into the wider society (Aly, 2007; Celermajer, 2007; Rane & Abdalla, 2008; Rane & Hersi, 2012). Negative media reporting is not Muslim specific, and studies show that media discourse about integration tends to negatively represent ethnic minorities (Christoph, 2012). For instance, the predominantly non-Muslim south Sudanese community in Australia has experienced some negative media reportage (Nunn, 2010).

The media’s negative representation of migrants in general, and Muslims in particular, differs from one country to another. For example, a comparative study conducted by Luchtenberg and McClelland (1998) found that Australia’s print news media was more accommodating of diversity and multiculturalism than the German print news media. In the case of the Romanian print press, Matei (2011) finds that the media’s negative reporting on migrants was sensationalised, relied on evidence based on isolated cases, lacked context and had a high degree of generality. In Australia, despite the fact that only 2.2 per cent of the Australian population identify themselves as Muslim (ABS, 2014), Australian Muslims receive more attention than any other group in the media and
in parliamentary politics (relating to immigration, policing, national security and integration), (Kolig & Kabir, 2008, p. 18). The deeper reasons for the attention paid by the media to the Muslim community are claimed to be “Due to the terrorism events of 11 September 2001, the London bombings of 7 July 2005 and the Bali bombings of 2002” (Kolig & Kabir, 2008, p. 18).

The extent to which the mass media carries out its reporting of Islam and Muslim people in a balanced and positive way or a biased and/or pejorative way is discussed in the available literature. Manning (2003), who investigated two major newspapers in Sydney, found a consistent use of negative language and of an association of Muslims and Islam with violence. In particular, the study found that textual reading of Arabs and Muslims shows that the reporting is specifically framed as “us” and “them”. In their examination into the way in which the subject of Muslim integration is reported in Australia’s print news media, Rane and Hersi (2012) found that the issues of Muslim integration reported in four of Australia’s major newspapers, namely The Age, The Australian, the Sydney Morning Herald and the Courier Mail are politically influenced, pejorative, and/or represent Muslims as outsiders. Using a framing perspective, the study found that the issue of Muslim integration occurs most frequently in coverage concerning the debates over multiculturalism and Australian values as well as terrorism and radicalisation.

Rane and Hersi (2012) also found that only a small number of articles in these major newspapers provided any definition of integration. When the term is defined, cultural and civic indicators are most frequently used. Very few articles discuss integration in terms of legal, economic, political or broader social indicators. They also found that the Australian press coverage of Muslim integration contains both favourable and pejorative representations of Muslims—on balance the coverage could not be said to be either pro or anti-Muslim. However, the coverage tends to focus on certain themes that represent only a minority of Muslims, such as radicalisation and terrorism, the emphasis on which is likely to negatively impact on social inclusion (Rane & Hersi, 2012). In fact, research shows that this negative and unbalanced coverage affects Muslims’ views of the media’s objectivity in its reporting of Islamic and Muslim issues. For example, in Britain, Ameli, Marandi, Ahmed, Kara & Merali (2007) found that British media reporting of Islam and Muslim issues was unfair and unbalanced.
The media discourse on integration tends also to be influenced by political rhetoric. The dominant discussion in the Australian press concerning Muslims and integration revolves around comments made by politicians. One of the most highly publicised comments was John Howard’s statement in 2006 that a segment of the Muslim community was resistant to integration, which he defined in terms of a failure to learn English and a lack of acceptance of “Australian values”, such as gender equality (Rane & Hersi, 2012, p. 145). Such sentiments have not gone unchallenged in the Australian press, but they seem to have been allowed to determine the framing of the Muslim integration debate. More importantly, political discourse seems to be responsible for the featuring of this issue in the media’s agenda. Overall, the concern is that the press coverage of Muslims’ integration is unlikely to make any positive contribution to social inclusion. Rather, it is more likely to reinforce Muslims’ perceptions of social exclusion and perceptions of Muslims among the wider society as being the “other”.

The media discourses about integration are discussed in recognition of the role the media plays in pluralist societies. The media’s choice of how it portrays migrant and ethnic minorities may enhance or reduce the integration of migrants into their host societies (Rane & Hersi, 2012). For instance, this choice might involve creating, “An image of immigrants as an indivisible group, which may portray them negatively, or as individuals which portrays them positively” (Christoph, 2012, p. 977). Arguably, the role the media plays in this important subject is crucial for the social cohesion of the Australian community. Overall, any questions about how the media discourse about integration plays a positive or negative role in shaping society’s opinions and views about migrants are under researched. For instance, activities and behaviour such as discrimination which impede the integration of Muslims in Australia seem to be absent from the media discourse on integration.

This is despite the fact that the work of Entzinger and Biezenveld (2006) shows that discrimination, both in its covert form, that is, denying an immigrant a job, and its overt forms, mainly referred to as structural discrimination, impedes integration. Additionally, they assert that media emphasis on bad news about migration and ethnic minorities tends to “Reinforce prejudice and may hamper integration” (Entzinger & Biezenveld, 2006, p. 30). For this reason, part of the measurement of the level of integration of migrants must include knowing the reported cases of discrimination, perceptions of
migrants by the host society, incidence and effects of diversity policies and the role of the media (Entzinger & Biezeveld, 2006). The media, as an intervening agency, has the potential to create the grounds in which migrants and non-migrants share a sense of belonging (Matei, 2011, p. 86). The problem remains that the media discourse of integration is prone to be distorted by one’s inclination to choose a particular definition of integration that supports a world view.

In Australia, intense attention means that some media outlets are more infamous perpetrators of the construction of a negative image of Islam and Muslims than others. The national tabloid The Australian is specifically accused of lacking context and detail in its reportage, and of exploiting community fear by publishing material that suggests Muslims are a threat to Australian society (Kabir, 2004). The media is an integral part of a modern democracy and Muslims are inevitably subject to media attention and scrutiny. It is debateable whether this media attention is good or bad and beneficial or harmful, but the media’s critical role in creating a discursive public sphere is widely accepted (Koopmans & Statham, 2010; McCombs, 2002; Norris, 2000). In discussing ethnic and religious minorities, Bloemraad et al. (2015, p. 890) argue that, “Invisibility might result in exclusion from deliberation of resource allocation, political decision making, and the like”. However, Bloemraad et al. (2015) contend that invisibility of ethnic minorities in the mainstream media is a topic for future research, as little is yet known about this issue.

This review concludes that media coverage of issues to do with Islam and Muslims in Australia is, for the most part, negative. In this debate, erroneous assumptions are generally made with respect to the makeup and character of Australian Muslims (Anderson, 2015). It is also quite evident that the Western mass media uses distorted constructions of Islam and Muslims as being a monolithic group (Peucker, Roose, & Akbarzadeh, 2014). What is generally ignored in mass media reportage is the fact that Muslims are as diverse as the wider Australian public and are not homogenous. Despite their rich diversity of ethnicity, sect and country of origin, there is always tendency on the part of the mainstream media to incorrectly lump Muslims together as one homogenous group (Kolig & Kabir, 2008, p. 18; Aly, 2007). In fact, Aly (2007, p. 28) claims that, “The construction of Muslims as a homogenous unit enables the media to
create narratives that both reflect and shape the cultural and political assumptions of the wider community vis-a-vis the Australian Muslims”.

In the above sections of this chapter, the literature of immigrant integration is classified as state discourses, academic discourses and media discourses. The above categorisations of immigrant integration literature are informed by how public discussions of immigration and integration are currently conducted. But in reality, different countries might have adopted different discourses of integration dictated by their local contexts. In the next sections of this chapter, the review discusses the importance of national context, and the differences between an integration policy adopted by a state and the experiences of integration by individual immigrants. These discussions highlight the need to exercise caution in understanding the differences between nation-state adopted models of integration and the integration processes, and the long settlement journeys of immigrant individuals and groups.

From the outset, it is important to underline the relevance of national context in how nation states respond to the subject of integrating their newcomers. For example, a particular model of integration that a nation-state adopts will be primarily dictated by local realities, such as the origins of the types of groups of people to be resettled into that country, as well as other internal and other external factors. Schiller and Caglar (2009) go further than national context and suggest that the integration of immigrants can be even more localised and can become city centric. The authors note the imbalanced attention that existing literature pays to the national models of integration and the fact that seldom does this acknowledge the importance of the local and subnational context in the debate of immigrant integration.

This review also stresses the importance of differentiating integration processes from the integration policies that nation states may adopt. This review has disproportionately emphasised integration models pursued by different nation states such as assimilation, integration and multiculturalism. It is acknowledged that generally integration is the permanent, long settlement process that individual immigrants go through. For instance, individual immigrants might struggle to understand some of the integration models and concepts that states may adopt as policies of integration. However, they may have a better understanding of the integration processes they go through as individual immigrants, the experience of their long resettlement period and the extent to which
they feel they belong to the nation state, feel accepted in their local environment, have jobs and the extent of discrimination they face.

There is however interconnectedness between the micro level of processes of integration and macro levels of nation-state models of integration. Favell, (2001, p. 351) explains that through the long process of settlement, “states may develop intervention strategies, policies and programs such as basic legal and social protection, grant of citizenship and assistance in education and housing to enhance immigrant integration. It is these programs and policies that inform the nation states’ preferred model of integration”. In the later empirical findings of Chapters Five and Six of this thesis that it becomes apparent that integration processes are preferred constantly over integration policies at the individual immigrant level, at least for the Muslim subjects of this study. Muslim participants noticeably referred to such processes as participation and belonging, and rarely alluded to any of the state models of integration in their understandings of integration. In line with the importance of the national context, this study finds it necessary to distinguish Australian immigrant integration literature from the broader international literature of integration, in particular that of Europe, as discussed below.

3.8. Evolving Australian discourse on integration

Australia is a major resettlement country and has a long history of migration. Millions of people from across the world with diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs have resettled in Australia since the Second World War. Policies and programs to integrate immigrants into the wider society have evolved over the years. As Jupp (2011) summarises this evolution, Australia has gone through phases such as: the introduction of the White Australia Policy (1850), the adoption of an Immigration Restriction Act (1901) an assimilationist phase (1947-1966), an integration phase (1966-1972), a multiculturalism phase (1972-1996) and a post-multiculturalism phase (1996-2007). In its early history, Australia enforced segregating and discriminatory migration policies and programs. A document prepared by the National Multicultural Advisory Council (1999) states that prior to 1949 the legal status of people living in Australia who were not “aliens”, was that of British subject. With the passing of the Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948, which came into effect on 26 January 1949, most of these people became Australian citizens automatically.
The evolution of Australia’s immigrant integration policies has been explained as having taken place due to several reasons including the changing demographics of the community (Jayasuria, 1990, pp.50-63) and the apparent failure of unrealistic policies of assimilation (Poynting & Mason, 2008, p. 231). Whatever the reasons, migrant integration has remained an important function of governments of all persuasions in this country, however some political parties and leaders are credited with having left significant immigrant integration policies as their legacies. Political leaders who are attributed with enacting better and more humanitarian immigrant integration policies include Gough Whitlam, Don Dunston and Harold Holt (Jupp, 2011, p. 46). Similarly, Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser has been commended for pioneering multiculturalism, and under his leadership multiculturalism became official state policy in Australia (Poynting & Mason, 2008).

Former Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser not only encouraged cultural diversity in the nation but also practically implemented this through deeds by establishing the Special Broadcasting Services (Mayne, 2009; Poynting & Mason, 2008). Former Prime Minister Bob Hawke is also recognised as having defended multiculturalism from a fierce political Opposition which rejected multiculturalism outright, thus discarding a bipartisan approach to the policy between the major political parties (Jupp, 2011). Succeeding Bob Hawke, former Prime Minister Paul Keating continued to support multiculturalism and held the view that in a globalised world, a multicultural society with all its diverse language and cultural capital is more competitive economically than a monocultural one (Johnson, 2000).

In Australia, a contentious issue in the integration debates is what form of multiculturalism is adopted and what the concept means to ordinary Australians. When John Howard was elected as the new Prime Minister of a Liberal National coalition government in 1996, it was apparent that the Coalition government had a determined policy of moving away from multiculturalism, back to integration (Tate, 2009). This move was described as being, “A radical restructuring of many of the practices and institutions created under 13 years of Labor” (Jupp, 1997, p. 29). The change of government in Australia in 1996 highlights how Australia’s immigrant incorporation models shift with time, depending on the ruling party at a particular period. For example, under the federal Coalition led by John Howard, an alternative to
multiculturalism was a “constitutive” model, premised on an ideal of assimilation (Tate, 2009). Researchers such as Poynting and Mason (2008) point out that integrationism replaced multiculturalism during John Howard’s leadership. The Howard government’s introduction of the citizenship test is explained as proof of the government of the time’s final departure from multiculturalism.

In Australia, the debate about multiculturalism has continued for decades. For a historical account of how Australian governments of diverse political persuasions approached the concept of multiculturalism see Jakubowicz (2002), Jakubowicz (2007a), and Jakubowicz (2009). There appears to have been a partisan policy shift between the conservative Liberal and National parties and the Australian Labor party, moving between multiculturalism and integration. Bloemraard (2006, p. 233) points out that Australia, a country which previously embraced multiculturalism, is now retreating from this method of integration, and is adopting a laissez faire immigrant integration system similar to that of the United States. Bloemraad’s comments appear to be in reference to the hard line approach taken by the Liberal and National coalition parties to the refugees arriving by boat. This apparent retreat from multiculturalism is revealed in the shift of policy and approach in matters relating to migration and integration between the two major political parties in Australia. A notable illustration of the departure from multicultural policies occurred when the former Howard government changed the name of the federal Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA) to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC).

During the time of writing this thesis, the Liberal and National coalition government led by former Prime Minister Tony Abbott, departed further from multiculturalism and again changed DIAC’s name, this time calling it the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP, 2013). Depending on the politics of the day, the emphasis on integration moves between citizenship, border protection and multiculturalism. It is quite apparent that removing the reference to multiculturalism from the department’s name is an attempt to focus on citizenship and values, in line with discontent with the concept reported in many parts of Europe and elsewhere. It can be argued that the emphasis placed on citizenship, together with the requirements of citizenship tests imposed on immigrants, may be creating a vetting process to deny citizenship for some, or to ensure that their conformity to the mainstream is enforced.
The fact that these immigration portfolio name changes occur generally after the government changes suggests that this government department is perhaps the most highly politicised in Australia’s cabinet. After winning office in 2007, the Australian Labor party re-embraced multiculturalism and reignited the debate. However, Portes and Rumbuat (2006) report that there is a widespread view among the members of many host societies, in particular the United States, that having a distinct cultural and ethnic identity undermines unity and social integration. Others such as Jongkid (1992, p. 365) assert that, “Keeping one’s own culture further increases feelings of alienation”.

Overall, Tate (2009) claims that under the Liberal Government led by John Howard (1996–2007), government support for multiculturalism waned as support for cultural unity, assimilation and integration increased. But former Prime Minister John Howard’s policies did not last forever. In office, in 2011 the Australian Labor Party re-embraced the concept of multiculturalism. In a speech at the Sydney Institute, the then Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, the Honourable Chris Bowen MP referred to Australia’s multiculturalism as being “unique” and different from that of Europe and refers to it as “genius multiculturalism” (DIAC, 2011). The fact is that in a period in which multiculturalism was condemned in most of Europe, in Australia it has been pronounced as being resilient and effective, and is claimed to have served Australia well for over 40 years—much longer than a policy of assimilation (Tavan, 2012).

3.9. Conclusion

This literature review reveals the competing views of the discourses about integration between policy makers, academics and media outlets. The harmonisation of these competing views of what integration means may help relationships between members of the host society and newcomers. The review noted that whilst most state discourses have both assimilationist and pluralist discourses of integration, the non-state discourses tend to be mainly pluralistic, if not universalistic. In comparing assimilationist and pluralist discourses about integration, Doomernick and Knippenberg (2003) conclude, “Integrationist models of immigrant incorporation appear to be superior to assimilationist models because of their culturally-pluralistic basis” (p. 46). The debates about discourses of integration also become more complex when integration is linked to the particular incorporation model that a state chooses to adopt. For example, the concept of multiculturalism is debated in the context of immigrant integration. This lack
of uniformity in discourses between these important players may lead to confused public narratives of integration, which have the potential to undermine social cohesion. In order to move forward, debates about discourses of integration require a balanced approach which examines the substance of the discussions and explores the similarities and differences between various discourses.

This study’s review of the literature finds that academic theories suggest a notion of integration which mainly emphasises the interconnectedness of the world, and the impact the movement of people has, thereby promoting diversity in management processes which accommodate newcomers and immigrants. It can be argued that this notion of integration is influenced by the world’s rapid advancement in technology and telecommunications, which make interaction between people of diverse backgrounds easier. On the other hand, state discourses about integration appear to generally favour the normative expectations of conformity, with an emphasis on how immigrants are faring in the wider society, disregarding the acculturation processes that host society members must confront. With the exception of Dandy (2009), most of the reviewed academic literature focuses on newcomers and neglects the intergroup relations and the dynamics that are involved in the integration process. This is despite research indicating that the attitudes, beliefs and behaviours of host society members have a considerable influence on the experiences of the newcomer (Bourhis et al., 1997; Van Oudenhouven, et al., 2006). The integration process is generally influenced by both the members of the dominant society’s views of integration and how the media reports issues of newcomer integration.

The rise of ultra-conservative parties in parts of Europe and beyond is generally understood to be a response to waves of non-traditional migrant groups moving into towns, cities and villages, thus becoming visible. The media discourses about integration are guided purely by considerations of profit, recognising that the major consumers of the daily news are members of the host society and not people from the minority migrant groups. In response to the profit motive, the media uses sensationalist reporting of social and political events in a local context. Freeman (2004) describes post national incorporation model frameworks as not being fully cohesive, constantly changing and at best being described as belonging to a handful of loosely connected conditions (p. 945). People’s integration is slotted somewhere between the exclusion of
immigrants, demands for assimilation and an embrace of multiculturalism (Freeman, 2004). The concept of integration is vague, and that in itself maybe the reason why it is the term most widely used to describe the incorporation of immigrants.

This review concludes that the existence of these diverse discourses of integration, characterised by distinct sectoral and group level analysis, further polarises the debates about immigrant integration. The review has provided an overview of the different discourses and has explained how each of these discourses puts emphasis on aspects of integration which are generally negligible or omitted in other discourses. It is however not clear how the existences of diverse discourses about integration which place importance on varying aspects of integration may influence the meanings of integration adopted by Muslim communities in Australia. It is also not clear whether the ways in which these discourses of integration are reported have any relationship with the meanings Muslims attach to integration. The review also found that absent from the debates of the discourses about integration is the individual migrant’s understanding and experience of integration, with reference to their family’s and their household’s experience. This is a particular aspect that is largely ignored by the current immigrant integration discourse scholarship. The review notes that such debates tend either to be politicised, as is the case with state discourses, dramatized, as is the case with media discourses or bloated, as is the case with academic theories. The above integration constituent actors further problematise the debates about discourses of immigrant integration.
Chapter 4. Muslim Conceptions of Integration: Perceptions, Belief system and Practices

4.1. Introduction

Muslims in Australia are increasingly becoming a visible minority group within the wider society. Despite their diverse cultures, languages, ethnicities and nationalities, they share a common religious identity. As a minority religious group, Muslims are subject to both public and policy discussions about their integration into the community. Thus, an understanding of how Muslims’ conceptions of integration are similar or different from the accepted definitions of integration in the broader scholarly literature becomes important. Muslims are one of the many large groups of immigrants that have made Australia home since the Second World War, and until recently, concerns raised about their integration related to welfare (Cox, 1983) and labour market participation (Tran-Nam & Neville, 1988; Harrison 1984). However, Chapter Two, the context and background chapter of this thesis, explains that there are perceived problems with Muslim integration. To assist in the debate and to put it into context, Chapter Three presented the various discourses of integration which are debated in the broader literature concerning international migration. This chapter provides the Australian Muslim conceptions of integration, which have until now been noticeably absent from the debate, however the ways in which Muslims conceptualise integration is discussed in line with the diverse debates about Muslim integration taking place in Australia and parts of Western Europe today.

Despite being a key policy objective for the governments of a number of states in an attempt to resettle their new immigrant groups, to date integration remains the subject of a significant level of controversy, both in Australia and the rest of the world. For information about debates about integration discourses see the works of Castles and Miller, 2003; Gans, 2005; Freeman, 2004; Legrain, 2006; Bloemraad et al., 2008; Erdal and Oeppen, 2013. It is a fact that in a number of Western nations including Australia, the character and integrability of Muslims has become central to debates about integration. In these debates, negative perceptions about the integration of Muslims is evident in parts of Europe such as Britain, Germany, France and the Netherlands.
Numerous studies into immigration focus on the problematic integration of Muslim communities, and government strategies for improving integration policies (Bloemraad et al., 2008, p. 169).

In the case of Australia, a number of studies suggest that there is perceived to be a problem regarding the integration of Muslims into the society (Celermajer et al., 2007; Portes & Ruben, 2006; Dunn, 2004a). While notions of integration have been integral to public debates around migration and settlement, there is often little consensus about what integration means practically, and how different social communities within Australia understand it. To date, what integration means to Muslims themselves has notably been absent from the debate. This chapter addresses an important issue that has not been specifically addressed in the larger body of literature examining Australian Muslims and citizenship, that of Muslim interpretations and conceptions of integration. A discussion of the practices and perceptions of integration advanced by Muslims in Australia will certainly make an important contribution to the research into the debates of immigrant integration.

At the outset, the chapter notes that research into Muslim immigrant incorporation is relatively new, and Muslims as a distinct faith group face the challenge of living with their religious loyalty. As a result, their integration into the wider society is often questioned. Despite the absence of any clear understanding regarding what integration might mean and whether or not it can be measured, either subjectively or objectively, there seems to be an emerging body of literature that casts doubt on whether or not Muslims in Australia are integratable (Samani, 2007; Aly, 2007; Portes & Ruben, 2006). This chapter draws on the findings of four focus groups from interviews conducted with Muslim communities in the South East Queensland region of Australia. The purpose was to identify how Muslims understand and define integration. In other words, what do Muslims identify as perceptions of successful integration and perceptions of barriers to integration? We begin with an overview of the conceptualisation of integration in the academic literature and then proceed to examine data from our focus groups on Muslims’ interpretations of integration.
4.2. Diverse meanings of integration

An examination of immigrant incorporation literature confirms the existence of a variety of perceived meanings of integration. The apparent interchangeable use of the terms “integration” and “incorporation” perhaps produced some confusion, as was detailed in Chapter Three of this dissertation. The words used to describe the processes of migrant incorporation include “absorb”, “assimilate”, “acculturate”, “adopt” and “integrate”. The presence of these diverse terms to describe integration shows the level of complexity, ambiguity and contention in the issue (Weiner, 1996). The review notes variations in the way integration is conceptualised by different groups in society. For instance, members of the dominant host community’s views of integration differ somewhat from the way integration is conceptualised by immigrants and newcomers.

For example, there is a widespread view among the members of many host societies, in particular that of America, that having a distinct cultural and ethnic identity undermines unity and social integration (Portes & Rumbuat, 2006). This is despite the fact that some countries are actively encouraging new migrants to retain aspects of their local cultures and traditions. The contrasting viewpoints advanced in these debates appear to be between assimilationist versus pluralist modes of integration, as well as preferences for cultural integration over socio-economic integration, and vice versa. Nevertheless, Doomernick and Knippenberg (2003) conclude that, “Integrationist models of immigrant incorporation appear to be superior to assimilationist models because of their culturally-pluralistic basis” (p.46).

Integration is defined as, “The participation of ethnic and religious minorities, individually and as groups, in the social structure of the host society while having possibilities to retain the distinctive aspects of their culture and identity” (Shadid, 1991, p. 362). Shadid’s definition is closer to the multicultural meaning of integration, but there are other definitions that emphasise participation in the social and economic fabric, disregarding the retention and practice of ethnic culture (Portes & Rumbuat, 2006). Successful integration means more than economic activity and social participation and may include belonging and showing allegiance to one’s country, language proficiency and commitment to liberal values (Goodman, 2010, p. 754). As a result, meanings of integration that emphasise civic engagement through cultural commitment are becoming prevalent in Europe, North America and Australia (Joppke,
2007; Goodman, 2010; Kostakopoulou, 2010). For example, in the case of the Netherlands, De Leeuw and Van Wichelen (2012) explain how sexual freedom, gender equality, freedom of speech and individuality, are identified as symbols of Dutchness, however, the authors agree that the adaptation of these dominant liberal and secular virtues ignores the cultural and religious diversity of the Dutch community. In fact, the Dutch model of civic integration that emphasises culture over all other determinants of integration has been implemented by many other European and non-European countries, including Australia (Joppke, 2007; Lowenheim & Gazit, 2009).

The review notes that a multicultural meaning of integration has gained momentum in Canada, Australia and parts of Europe (Meer & Modood, 2009; Meer, Dwyer, & Modood, 2010). A considerable body of literature written by Australian multicultural theorists contributes to this debate (Kalantzis & Cope, 1988, 1999; Castles, 1992; Colic-Peisker, 2011; Jacobuwicz, 2011) examining Australia’s multicultural meaning of integration. The concept of multiculturalism has prevailed as an alternative to the traditional assimilationist discourses which demand that migrants shed some of their past cultures and embrace the dominant society’s cultures (Shadid, 1991). Multiculturalism was institutionalised in the 1970s in parts of Western migrant receiving countries, but fell out of favour during the 2000s (Colic-Peisker & Farquharson, 2011, p. 579). A considerable body of recent work examines the perceived retreat of multiculturalism in Australia. Colic-Peisker and Farquharson (2011, p. 582) assert that the Australian government’s treatment of asylum seekers is an important litmus test of a real – and not just declarative – commitment to multiculturalism.

Multiculturalism as a concept and as a policy has come under scrutiny recently, and a body of literature suggesting “the retreat of multiculturalism” has emerged (Banting & Kymlicka, 2013; Kymlicka, 2010; Tip et al., 2012). This perceived retreat is explained by a lack of public support for the concept, failed multicultural policies and the assertiveness of the liberal state in imposing liberal principles (Joppke, 2004). Another reason claimed to be causing the retreat from multiculturalism is the perceived threat felt by members of the dominant society about the implacability of newcomers to maintain their home culture (Tip et al., 2012). The social mobility of “ethnics” and their increased visibility is also claimed to be causing this perceived retreat (Colic-Peisker & Farquharson, 2011, p. 581), however, the way in which the debate about the retreat
away from multiculturalism was carried out differs between Europe and Australia. In
general the position of most European scholars is that there is a retreat from
multiculturalism (Joppke, 2004; Poynting & Mason, 2008; Vertovec & Wassendorf
, 2009; Koopmans, 2013). As an exception to this trend in thought is the work of Lenard
(2012), who claims that the retreat of multiculturalism is grossly exaggerated, declaring
that the death of the concept is premature (p.194). Kundnani’s (2012, p. 155)
contribution to the debate is also invaluable, summarised as follows, “Attacks on
multiculturalism from across the political spectrum reduce the complex history of
settlement and interaction in the United Kingdom to a simple narrative of excessive
British tolerance and increasingly disruptive immigrant communities.”

In Europe the debate seems to be polarised and tense, with claims that multiculturalism
poses a core challenge to liberal democracies (Goodman, 2010, p. 754). The
predominant view in Europe is that there is crisis of multiculturalism despite the
absence of empirical evidence (Lentin & Titley, 2012). Responding to these public
debates about integration and multiculturalism, many of Europe’s leaders have weighed
in. For example, senior political figures in Germany such as Chancellor Angela Merkel
openly state that multiculturalism is a failed policy (Weaver, October 2010). Similarly,
British Prime Minister David Cameron claims that multiculturalism has failed as
reported by British Broadcasting Corporation (Kuenssberg, 2011). The emergence of
this considerable body of literature about the retreat away from multiculturalism (Colic-
Peisker & Farquharson, 2011; Poynting & Mason, 2008; Tilbury, 2007; Joppke, 2004)
arguably takes us back to the failed assimilationist model of incorporation.

There is an argument which suggests that the debate of retreat of multiculturalism paved
the way for the introduction of interculturalism as a new, more plural and alternative
concept of an ideal immigrant integration model (Council of Europe, 2008). The
Council of Europe promoted the concept as a mode of integration preferable to
multiculturalism (Meer & Modood, 2013, p. 30). Despite this endorsement,
iculturalism as a model faced its own challenges in distinguishing itself from
multiculturalism. Serious doubts were raised about whether or not interculturalism
means the same as multiculturalism. Some scholars have struggled to differentiate
between the two concepts, and have explained that they should be considered to be
complimentary (Meer & Modood, 2012). Meer and Modood put forward their
suggestions of the four ways in which interculturalism can differentiate itself from multiculturalism: 1) its emphasis on beyond multicultural co-existence, 2) the fact that it is less groupist and culture bound, 3) its strong sense of whole and 4) its illiberalism and culture (Meer & Modood, 2013, p. 30-33).

This review notes that a move away from multiculturalism is evident in scholarly literature even if interculturalism is not fully embraced. Throughout Europe and Australia, integration policies are now shifting towards a model of civic integration (Goodman, 2010, p. 753) where immigration and naturalisation are conditional on learning local history, language and value commitments. This new shift towards civic integration means attaching mandatory integration requirements such as citizenship tests to status acquisition (Goodman, 2010, p. 753). Placing the emphasis on gaining citizenship after successfully completing a number of citizenship tests may seem to be creating a vetting process to deny citizenship for some, or to ensure that their conformity to the mainstream is enforced.

However, there are stark differences between the policies of Europe and Australia, mainly in the areas of social integration policy. The issues of how best to integrate migrants are vigorously debated in Europe, and the literature review notes that the bulk of academic studies concerning immigrant integration is Europe based. In Europe, there is a Migrant Integration Policy Indicator Index (MIPEX) in which specific countries are ranked and rated against seven integration policies adopted by those countries, namely labour market mobility, family reunion, education, political participation, long term residence, access to citizenship and anti-discrimination laws (MIPEX, 2013). Australia joined this index only in 2010 and is faring well across all the migrant integration policy index rankings.

4.3. Indicators of immigrant integration

Like the meanings of integration discussed above, this thesis also notes the multiplicity of migrant integration indicators used by nation states to measure the integration of their immigrant populations. In the literature about migrant integration reviewed in this chapter, there is not a single agreed measure of integration among the indicators which ranged from social, political and economic measures. Measures used to evaluate levels of migrant newcomer integration include socio-economic, legal, political and cultural
dimensions (Entzinger & Biezeveld, 2003; Waldrauch & Hofinger, 1997). Other measures used include employment status, education and income levels (Phillimore & Goodson, 2008). A study commissioned by the Home Office of the United Kingdom (UK) also cites housing, employment, education and health as markers and means of integration, but more importantly found that relationships (social bonds) are the key to both the definition and achievement of integration (Phillips, 2006).

Public discussions of the indicators of integration seems to range between two competing camps: one which uses functional indicators which mainly focus on the immigrant’s educational attainment, employment access, absence of discrimination and rate of inter-marriage, against a camp that uses the host nation’s institutional modes and policies as determinants of integration (Soysal, 1994). Nevertheless, there have been attempts to measure integration, and Ager and Strang (2004) suggest functional indicators of immigrant integration that mainly emphasise employment, housing, education and health. Similarly, other studies suggest that immigrant integration should be benchmarked against the following four dimensions: socio-economic status, spatial concentration, language assimilation and intermarriage (Waters & Jimenez, 2005). Using the level of intermarriage between immigrants and members of the host society, as an indicator, Furtado and Theodoropoulos (2009) stress the role human capital plays in the social integration of immigrants. Interaction between the functional dimensions of integration and social integration is emphasised by some researchers, for example, Phillimore and Goodson (2008). The harmonisation of these two opposing views becomes important in the integration of Muslims in Europe. For example, in the Dutch society:

The accomplished changes in the Dutch regulations and guidelines in favour of Muslims indicate a dis-balance between the pace of integration in the juridical sphere on the one hand and in the socio economic sphere on the other. However, socio-economic integration of Muslims in the Dutch society is impeded by the existing prejudice and discrimination (Shadid, 1991, p. 355).

Similarly, the Islamic community in Austria follows a policy of integration through participation, which it is claimed contributed to a social climate between the Muslim minority and the non-Muslim majority which is largely devoid of tension and conducive
to inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue (Abid, 2006, p. 263). One reason cited for this positive relationship is that Muslims in Austria are officially recognised as a religious community, have equal access to the labour market and enjoy an absence of various forms of discrimination. Throughout Europe, Austria is referred to as by far the most accommodating country (Abid, 2006, p. 263). The assertion may be disputed, but evidently Austria’s long, harmonious relationship with Muslims from the former Yugoslavia and from Turkey helps alleviate tensions between its citizens.

In the wider debates concerning the indicators of integration, there is a body of literature that looks at the subjective indicators of integration. In particular, the work of Maxwell (2010) refers to subjective integration factors such as the migrant’s feelings of satisfaction with life in the host community (p.25). Maxwell examines abstract notions of integration such as the trust migrants have in their parliament, individuals’ concerns about the government’s legitimacy and allegiance to their host country or to their homeland. This is in line with an emerging body of literature that links the Islamic women’s veil or burqa to the integration debate, which claims that the burqa is a barrier to integration (Freedman, 2004; Ajrouch, 2007; Hamel, 2002). Further to these public and academic discussions about the indicators and measures of integration, are studies that assert that it is impossible to set standards for an “ideal” integration process due to the immense diversity of immigrants and host societies (Entzinger & Biezeveld, 2006). Some studies have even questioned whether integration is quantifiable at all, citing the perpetrators of the 7th July 2005 London bombing as being reasonably well adjusted men, born and bred in the United Kingdom (Kolig & Kabir, 2008). It is due to this apparent confusion of what integration and means and how to measure it that necessitates this chapter, which examines Muslims’ conceptions of integration. The following section details the methodology used to examine Muslims’ conceptions of integration.

4.4. **Methodology**

The notion of migrant integration remains central to the policy agendas of governmental institutions and also has currency within the public imagination; the question arises as to how different social actors and groups understand the term. An issue that remains unexplored in the literature is to what extent different social groups and social institutions have differing, and perhaps contradictory, definitions of integration. What
are the criteria and available discourses, and what means do these social actors bring to bear to understand the meaning of integration? In other words, what symbolic and social boundaries are at play in social actors’ understandings of the notion of integration (Lamont & Molnar, 2002)? The answers to these questions may make a significant contribution to sociology in general, and in particular, to the field of migrant incorporation.

Based on information collected during interviews conducted with Muslim participants in four focus groups and in-depth interviews, this study attempts to investigate how Muslims understand and define the concept of integration. According to Morgan (1996) a focus group is, “A research technique that collects data through group interaction on a topic determined by the researcher” (p. 130). By carefully considering the research questions, this thesis seeks to undertake a qualitative study. Focus groups were selected as an adequate method as they allow the researcher access to the conceptual, schematic and symbolic material which guides people’s understandings of the meanings of integration. A qualitative research method also allows the researcher to gain access to the motives, meanings, actions and reactions of people in the context of their daily lives. In particular, the focus group methodology used in this research efficiently exposes collective discourses, especially the schema and logic which support them.

In a review of the efficacy of focus group research, Munday (2006) notes this feature of focus groups. While her approach pays more attention to the interaction within the group, she concludes that focus groups are useful for investigating how collective agreements are reached on matters of social identity. A number of scholars have recognised the relative importance of the role of the moderator in focus group discussions (Wibeck, Dahlgren, & Oberg, 2007; Kidd & Parshall, 2000). With the help of the moderator, group participants are encouraged to voice their views on issues at hand, with the moderator encouraging the expression of difference in viewpoints to capture the full variety of opinions.

In moderating the group discussions, the researcher was familiar with the challenges inherent in mixed gender, age and socio-economic group composition and how hierarchy within a group may influence the quality of data collection (Kitzinger, 1995, p. 311). The researcher ensured that no individual participant was dominant in these discussions and encouraged both young and female participants to make their
contributions. Due to the nature of the topic of discussion and the passion participants had for the issues discussed, it appears that the majority of the participants had the necessary confidence to openly make their contributions in the group discussions. The often-generalised misconception that Muslim women may not speak openly in front of Muslim men, and that younger participants may not speak freely in front of older and more educated participants, was not experienced during these focus group discussions.

As noted by Morgan (1996, p. 139), focus groups allow researchers to access performative modes of reasoning where, “Participants both query each other and explain themselves to each other”, and where positions of diversity and agreement can be highlighted within group discussions. Frequently, the group tends to arrive at a symmetry point in the discussion – a point where opinions and the discursive field around a topic are fully explored by participants, and all the dimensions of a topic are exhausted. Over the course of 2010 and 2011, four focus groups were conducted with men and women of the Muslim faith in Brisbane and in the Gold Coast region.

According to Morgan (1996) a common rule of thumb for most projects is to have between four and six participants in a focus group (p.144). The scope and budget of this research project allowed the minimum of four focus groups to be conducted and data became saturated at the end of the fourth group discussion. Saturation is a methodological principle for qualitative research and is defined by Morse (1995) as the “data adequacy”, meaning that data needs to be continually collected until no new information is obtained.

Purposive sampling using segmentation was employed as a strategy to recruit groups with variations in age, birthplace, gender and occupational backgrounds (Morgan, 1996). Participants were then recruited with the help of a number of Muslim community associations in Brisbane and the Gold Coast. This was achieved through the distribution of flyers during Friday sermons in several mosques in Brisbane and the Gold Coast, assistance received from the Islamic Women’s Association of Queensland who sent an email invitation to their mainly female staff on behalf of the researcher, as well as placing a flyer in a local weekly online newsletter, Crescents of Brisbane which has over 5000 readers. In recruiting participants, the researcher took note of the religious observance of the focus group participants and ensured the inclusion of Muslims who frequent the mosques, and those who do not frequent the mosques. Focus group
participants were diverse, as indicated by such factors as their age, ethnicity, observance or non-observance of traditional Muslim attire such as headscarf or face veils among women, and the wearing of more Western-style dress and clothing. The researcher acknowledges from these simple observations that no generalisations could be made about the consistency of these subjects, however, the representativeness of the group participants is enhanced in relation to their different levels of religious observance. In other words, the researcher has carefully recruited a group of Muslims that vary in their observance of their religious practices.

A total of 31 persons participated in 4 focus groups consisting of 20 males and 11 females of various ages, occupational and educational backgrounds. The median group size was 7 participants per focus group. Discussions for each group lasted 90 minutes and sessions were tape-recorded. Details of the four focus groups are shown in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1 Focus groups and participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5/3/2011</td>
<td>Gold Coast</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/11/2010</td>
<td>Brisbane</td>
<td>Men/Women</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/11/2010</td>
<td>Brisbane</td>
<td>Men/Women</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three of the focus groups were held at the Kuraby community council hall in the south of Brisbane and one was held at the Gold Coast mosque. Both locations were sites familiar to participants in the respective groups. A pilot focus group was conducted to test the design and order of the questions, and to ascertain whether responses to the questions provided the necessary information this study is attempting to examine. This pilot focus group is not included in the data analysed in this paper. On the basis of this pilot stage, some questions were subsequently modified. This integrity-testing step is crucial in improving the quality and clarity of questions in the research. The participants of the focus group discussions included Muslims of all ages and occupational backgrounds. The following is a summary of the social profiles of the four focus groups:

1. ‘Regional city’ was a group of males living in a coastal city about 60km south of Brisbane. Participants included those born in Australia and overseas, were
mainly young and the majority were blue collar workers such as labourers. One member of the group had a degree and the remainder had lower levels of education, including completing either year 10 or year 12.

2. ‘Urban city #1’ was a group of mixed males and females living in Brisbane. Amongst the female group, some covered their hair, others did not and some wore a burka. Participants were a mix of Australian born, overseas born, young and old and were both blue and white collar employees. One member of the group is a fourth generation Australian.

3. ‘Urban city #2’ was a group of mixed males and females living in Brisbane. Participants were both Australian born and overseas born, young and old, and were in blue and white collar occupations. Amongst the overseas born was a non-English speaking background participant who came to Australia under the refugee and humanitarian program.

4. ‘Urban city #3’ was a group of mixed males and females living in Brisbane. Some participants were born in Australia, others overseas, they were of various ages and the majority were in white collar occupations. One member of the group was an academic and medical specialist.

Using a purposive sampling strategy, the researcher not only paid attention to the diversity of the group members in terms of gender, age and occupation but attempted to recruit Muslim men and women born in Australia, Muslims who had been living in Australia for several generations and newly arrived migrants including people who were eligible for special humanitarian visas. The researcher had no influence on the recruitment of participants and the composition of the group members, to allay any concerns that the researcher could be considered to be an insider to the subjects and the community under study. For the collection, access and/or use of identified personal information, participants were informed of the researcher’s obligations to safeguard their anonymity at all times. It was made clear that the information collected was confidential and would not be disclosed to third parties without their consent, except to meet government, legal or other regulatory authority requirements. Participants were also informed that only a de-identified copy of this data may be used for other research purposes.
In conducting the group discussions, the role and function of the moderator was kept to a minimum in order to prevent any perceived bias of the process and content that may arise as a result of the researcher’s intervention (Flick, 2006, p. 193). However, as Flick (2006) suggests, the researcher has three important primary functions: (a) control of the agenda for discussions by adhering to the schedule of questions, and to the start and finish times of the discussion, (b) topical navigation of the discussion so that participants do not digress, plus deepening discussions where necessary by asking probing questions, (c) monitoring the dynamic and group interaction by expanding discussion, and by encouraging the more reserved participants to put forward their points of view whilst controlling the dominant participants.

The study claims that the diversity found in this small sample is illustrative of Muslims communities in Queensland only, and an effort was made to make the focus group participants reflect the ethnic and religious sect diversity that is apparent in this community. The study used the 2011 ABS Census data as a guide for recruiting a representative sample of the Muslim communities in the Southern Queensland region. As a guide, it has also used the ABS Standard Classification of Countries (SACC), which groups countries in the world in the following regional blocks: Oceania and Antarctica, North West Europe, Southern and Eastern Europe, North Africa and Middle East, South East Asia, North East Asia, Southern and Central Asia, the Americas and sub-Saharan Africa (ABS, 2011). The researcher then chose regional blocks that related to patterns of representations of Muslims in Queensland, Australia. The regional origins of the groups represented in the study are shown in Table 4.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub Saharan Africa</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa region</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two people chose not to answer the country of origin question and therefore were not included in the country of origin data table.

The information gathered in the focus group discussions was analysed by synthesising the many and diverse data which was collected to draw meaningful conclusions. At the
initial stage, an inventory of points discussed was created under each specific research question. This allowed the researcher to appreciate the diversity of issues discussed and the degree of consensus in the group discussants (Bertrand, Brown, & Ward, 1992).

Analysis of the data proceeded along three stages. The researcher first used a professional transcriber who had a high degree of accuracy and data was changed into a written form for closer study. A total of 6 hours of focus group discussions were transcribed. The professional transcriber did not encounter any major difficulties in transcribing the audio files. The researcher’s field notes also proved to be useful in the analysis of data. Following a procedure of open coding, the transcripts were then read several times to identify the development of themes. Transcripts were finally uploaded into NVIVO software for ease of organising the data and coding it along thematic lines.

Thematic analysis is a qualitative analysis tool that helps the researcher to identify, analyse and report patterns or themes within data (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 79). A constant comparative textual analysis was then carried out to extract meaningful categories and themes from these discussions. The analysis focused on the patterned responses participants provided to the focus group research questions. According to Braun and Clarke (2006, p. 82), “A theme captures something important about the data in relation to the research question and represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set”. The main patterned responses the study looked for were what meanings participants give to the term integration and the indicators of successful or unsuccessful integration.

4.5. Findings and discussion

The findings of this study reveal there are a proposed range of practices, behaviours and activities which represent integration. Throughout the group discussions, it was noted that three main areas dominated the bulk of discussions. Firstly, Muslims have shown that they are suspicious about the integration debate itself. Secondly, Muslims make a distinction between assimilation and integration. Thirdly, Muslims stress that their belief system and the Islamic religion inform their understandings of integration. Finally, Muslims advance a host of practices that they deem to represent either determinants of integration or barriers to integration. In the following sections, these
three main areas which dominated the discussions about integration are discussed in
detail.

4.6. Perceptions and suspicions

Before presenting the findings about the dimensions of how Muslims understand and
define integration, it is noteworthy to first discuss the general Muslim response to the
integration debate. The participants in our study tend to regard the integration debate
with suspicion and see it as slanted against Muslim communities. The reservations that
Muslim participants have about the term integration are a clear discussion thread in all
four focus groups. The core of the participants’ concerns was that they understood the
call for integration to be a demand for the abandonment of their culture and religion.
The following are the comments of a 25 year old Muslim male in response to the
question “what does integration mean to you?”

I think that the meaning of integration from the Western perspective
regardless of how they are portraying it to be is that we end up accepting
and respecting their way of life and ultimately perhaps integrating in a way
adopting their way of life as our own. That’s what I believe integration
means from the Western perspective.

A 32 year old female respondent attempts to highlight how she is sceptical of certain
interpretations of integration by some in the wider society and offers a counter
interpretation of integration.

Actually my understanding of integration is this. You work hard in
Australian society, whatever you work in whatever your job is, you do it
honestly, pay taxes and so on. We take part in developing this beautiful
country. To me that is my understanding and there is another
misunderstanding from the government’s point of view or from the people’s
point of view, they think integration means we dress like them, we eat the
way they eat, they do many things we can’t, so I think it is best for them to
respect us and we can tell them, our understanding about integration is this,
we will be contributing to this society, but there are a few personal things
that we cannot negotiate.
The suspicions Muslim participants express about what integration means may have occurred as a result of one or more of the following possible reasons: the general perceived anti-Islamic sentiments, termed Islamophobia, experienced by Muslims may be influencing some Muslims to be suspicious about the calls for integration. Tufail and Poynting (2013) make a link between the new post multiculturalism integrationism concept that changes meanings of integration from acceptance and accommodation to punishment and blame and the phenomenon of Islamophobia. Feelings of “othering” and constantly being referred to as foreigners may be factors that have led some Muslim participants to be suspicious of meanings of integration (Tufal & Poynting, 2013). Constant and ever present negative representations of Islam and Muslims by hostile media outlets could be another factor for suspicions about the integration term (Gardner et al., 2008).

Other important factors which increase this sense of suspicion among Muslim participants are the general controversies about immigrant integration in Europe, Australia and beyond. The immigration and integration of migrants are becoming highly topical issues and extremist elements in various parts of Europe blame migrants, including Muslims, for failing to integrate (Norris & Inglehart, 2012). These public discussions are also occurring at a time when the Muslim population is increasing, and Muslims are becoming more visible in the public sphere of many European and Australian communities (Freedman, 2004; Ajrouch, 2007; Hamel, 2002). The increasing visibility of the Islamic religion and Muslims in the public space has sparked deep discussions. Controversy is rising about an individual Muslim’s preferred allegiance to his or her adoptive country or ancestral home, the wearing of the veil for women (Ajrouch, 2007; Hamel, 2002) and the existence, and building of new mosques and Islamic schools (Verkaaik, 2012).

Similarly, the frequency and heightened pitch of public discussions about integration may have led many Muslims to be somewhat suspicious about what is meant by integration. Muslim participants in this study conveyed that, despite their personal efforts to integrate linguistically and in matters relating to appearance and dress code, some members of the wider society continue to cast doubt about whether they are integratable at all. As a 36 year old Muslim male participant conveyed:
This guy came to me where I was praying and he started talking to me about how we guys haven’t integrated, and I said, ‘What are you talking about, integration, I am speaking the language, I am dressed like you, I am sitting here saying hi to you, what more do you want, what else do you want more than integration?’

Suspicions about what integration might mean appear to be held by both male and female participants in the focus group discussions. One Australian born Muslim female participant confirmed suspicions that integration means something different to some members of the wider society than to how she conceptualises it. For instance, this participant explains that Muslims are asked to conform rather than integrate. She challenges the unwillingness on the part of some in the wider society to accept that Muslims as a group are different.

My father was in the air force for thirty-two years, so he is a military man, so you can understand exactly where he comes from, America US all the way, he went to Vietnam and all that stuff. It has taken him a long time to accept that he has got Muslim grandchildren that don’t have English names I don’t mean that it has taken him a really long time, but is it something that he’s had to stomach. But that being the case I think that the average Australian probably simply wants Muslims to be like them. Not look physically different, don’t do things different, just be like us. Without actually saying what it is that you should do, just somehow don’t be different. Which I think ultimately is what Pauline Hanson’s message was. I’m not saying we have to agree with it and I don’t, but I think that’s what Australian people believe. When they are saying that Muslims don’t integrate, what they are saying is that Muslims aren’t like me, they don’t look like me, they don’t act like me, they don’t do what I do. Therefore you’re not Australian.

A Muslim convert who was born and bred in Australia advanced a similar argument. He explains that he faces the dilemma of not being acknowledged as being integrated by his family members simply because he embraced the Muslim faith. As he states:
Convert 2: It wasn’t my parents, it was my sister maybe, she could not explain it. I have been in the military, I have been shot at, blown up in defence of Australia, I’ve gone to Australian schools, I’ve worked in Australia, paid taxes in Australia but she still can’t explain to me why I’m not Australian.

The above sentiment suggests that there is a perception that some citizens are not accepted simply because of their Muslim faith even if they consider themselves to be part of an “in-group” apart from their religion. Possibly this perception caused some Muslims to respond to the question of integration with suspicion.

The findings of this study also show that Muslims themselves make a distinction between integration and assimilation. In fact, when they are asked what integration means to them, their responses to the research questions generally referred to what integration is not, rather than what it is. From the focus group data, it is clear that Muslims consistently understood that the concept of integration did not mean assimilation.

The first thing I would say is that there’s a big difference between assimilation and integration. A lot of people tend to mix these two terms and use them together in the same sentence even though they have two very different definitions to me. Assimilation is totally different, assimilation is when you’re expected to change the whole way of life that you live according to your culture your beliefs your values just to integrate with the society that is a totally different context.

The vagueness implanted in the meanings of the concept of integration discussed at great length above further justifies participants’ suspicion of its true meanings. It is evident in the literature that at times calls for integration might mean assimilation (Bowskill et al., 2007). For example, Bowskill et al., (2007, p. 805) argue that, “Integration was often used synonymously with a privileging of assimilative outcomes, while assimilation itself was never directly oriented to. Typically, this was predicted on an implicit rendering of insider and outsider status”. The very fact that Muslims are called upon to integrate suggests that they are positioned as outsiders and are not considered an in-group.
Respondents providing explanations of differences between the meanings of integration and assimilation was a common thread throughout the discussions. In responding to the question of what integration means to them, one of the study participants commented as follows:

The term integration is very loose and I don’t think it can be defined but it has implications, there is a very thin line as to what you see integration is, what’s outside of what is integration, what’s the difference between assimilation and integration. However, assimilation is when you adopt the morals, adopt the values, adopt the entire … basically copy, identically copy the popular culture, the popular beliefs and popular political methodology and ideology of Australia.

The comments above are perhaps a bit exaggerated but show the level of scepticism some Muslim participants have of what is meant by integration. These inflated Muslim definitions of integration were not uncommon throughout the group discussions. Another Muslim respondent commented:

I personally have always said that when we speak of integration people usually confuse it with assimilation, which if you look, there is a fine line between integration and assimilation. In the sense that when you say assimilation is that you accept other people, not only their way of life, but also their values and their entire being, whatever they do you tend to do as well, and it becomes something that looks good, that’s something that makes you happy to be part of that community. For example, if you look at the French colonial system, that’s what it was based on, that the people should act like the French, they should eat like the French, they should have freedom like the French, while the English system was different, they were colonising people but they had to stick to their own values and all that, so in my own view, integration doesn’t mean assimilation.

In their rejection of assimilation, Muslim participants in the focus group discussions also state that issues relating to their appearance, mode of dress and how they look should not be used as measures of their levels of integration. In particular, strong references were made to the Muslim women’s veil, the male Muslims’ jalabiya and the
growing of the beard. A middle-aged Muslim male convert participant referred to these issues as being superficial:

Some might say that because I wear a scarf I’m not integrated but some others might say that because I speak English and I have a job that I am integrated. It depends how we individually want to look at that, whether we are going to individually integrate ourselves or whether we are waiting for acceptance of others if we’re integrated or not.

The Muslim convert participant also confirms that members of the wider society judge Muslims on their appearance, and explains how he personally makes an effort to lessen this perceived pressure from the wider society. His comment on this matter is as follows:

I tell my wife don’t scare the white folks, just dress in lighter colours today, not that I am saying don’t wear what you want to wear, but just by wearing a colourful scarf and just by wearing a lighter colour straight away they are disarmed. One day she wore all black and she came home and she said you’re right, no one waved or looked at me today, it happens.

Similarly, others argued that Muslims are judged on their appearances unfairly when compared with the wider society. A young Australian-born Muslim participant also highlights how changing your appearance does not increase or decrease your level of integration. As he explains:

Just on the point of clothing and stuff like that, again it is one of these fake issues that people have brought up. Somebody can be the gothic or emo type or all of the weird piercings and all of that and nobody will say they’re multi-integrated into the Australian society but from the history as well that happened with the Aboriginal people on all of the missions. They took them from wearing nothing in their sense and shoved them into Western clothes but it was still another forty-fifty years for them to be granted Australian citizenship. So even if you look the part it doesn’t mean that the wider white population are going to accept you or allow you to integrate anyway so I think that people who bring up this as an objection, Muslims don’t integrate
because they look different, well you don’t integrate because you’ve got red hair. So I don’t buy it, I think that physical appearance is irrelevant.

In addition to the perceptions that Muslims had about the meanings of the term integration, they also indicated that the extent to which they believe in their religion plays a role in how they understand integration. The slippery nature of the term integration has allowed Muslim participants to come up with a compromise definition of integration that fits their personal circumstances as a distinct faith group. A number of the participants stressed the significance of maintaining their belief systems whilst integrating successfully into the wider society. In this next section, the thesis discusses responses provided by Muslim participants about integration and maintaining their belief system and how that aligns with the scholarly literature.

4.7. Belief system

The thesis notes that at the core of the integration conceptualisation of Muslim Australians is the belief system, and Muslims openly link aspects of their integration to their religion. Responses to research focus group questions reveal a wide range of definitions of integration, with the majority of participants mentioning Islam, religion and spirituality related terms in their definition. The extent to which Australian Muslim participants in this study linked their integration to their belief system was evident in the focus group discussions. Whilst conceptualising integration with similar definitions to those prevalent in the scholarly literature on integration, Muslims emphasise that their faith limits some aspects of the wider society’s culture into which they may be able to integrate. Muslim participants expressly reject activities and behaviours they perceive to compromise their faith. In particular, across all the four focus group discussions, Muslims identified practising the cultures of the social drinking of alcohol and attending night clubs as areas in which they would be in breach of their faith. A 29 year old Muslim male participant explained the issue in this way:

You can’t get more Australian than the, you know, beach, kabana, VB, you know, being Muslims I’m outta that, coz I can’t eat the sausage or it has to be halal, just like a Jew won’t eat it, wants kosher. I don’t drink alcohol.
I think the value of choosing how to live your life, social life. Like some, if we have to integrate like non-Muslims and they choose on the weekend to go to nightclubs and things like that, I mean that is fine because that is how they choose to live their life but at the same time they should accept that we can’t do that to be able to friends with them, have that continuous relationship with them.

The comments above illustrate how specific spheres of a Muslim’s everyday life, such as going to the mosque, interrelate with aspects of identity and integration. The comments also highlight the importance of the key requirements of adoptability and flexibility in intercultural relations. In the abovementioned comments, it is also clear that of particular concern to Muslims was the social space of the wider society, and in particular the culture of social drinking of alcohol and going to bars and night clubs which are understood not to be permitted in the Islamic faith. The above comment suggests that explicitly Muslims are demanded to accept social drinking of alcohol to show they are integrated into the society. This claim is highly questionable and there is no evidence to show that this is the case.

The comments of members of the focus group misleadingly suggest that identified social and cultural drinking is specific to non-Muslims. In fact, the comments of some of the respondents above implying that drinking and night clubbing does not happen in a Muslim majority country are false. Although on a lower scale and less acceptable to wider Muslim majority communities, social drinking and nightclubbing still happen in those countries. It is generally the case that, over time, individual Muslims might adopt the host society’s accepted norms and cultures. Social drinking is one of Australia’s accepted popular cultures. Muslim youth may be more susceptible than older Muslims to adopting the culture of social drinking and going to nightclubs.

It is expected that participants in a group discussion do what they say they do and how they say they feel might be different from what happens in private. Respondents may have specifically mentioned activities prohibited by Islam as a result of social desirability. They may have made comments that they perceived to be appropriate within the group. This limitation of the focus group discussions is addressed by conducting in-depth one on one interviews with key Muslim community leaders (see Chapter Five). Nevertheless, it can be argued that Muslim respondents’ suspicions of
integration are possibly dictated by a set of unpleasant external factors that are generally unsympathetic to their presence in the newly adopted land.

In general, a number of participants stress that there should be no contradictions between being a Muslim and being integrated into Australian society, as in the comment below, from a 56 year old Muslim female:

I think integration probably means when Muslims, particularly Muslims come to this country, Muslim migrants, they don’t have to accept the way of life of the average Aussie, which is contrary to Islam. And if a person is more religious than another person that doesn’t necessarily mean they are not integrating, if anything a religious man who goes to the mosque, but then goes to, you know he’s at work and he is doing the exact things we spoke about, just living his life as a Muslim is supposed to, that’s integration, whereas if a person believes in confining himself in that mosque and not mixing with the wider society, that’s not integration, so his religiosity does not impact on a person’s ability to integrate or not.

Despite the abovementioned conditions, Muslim participants in the study showed willingness to integrate and even assimilate with aspects of local culture and values where common fundamental principles of their faith match with that of the wider society. As a 20 year old Muslim male participant comments:

…the Islamic principles are that whatever good is happening outside, like the Christians are doing good for the homeless, it is encouraged that the Muslims support that because it is good for the general community, but in terms of them wanting us to go and drink alcohol and stuff, no, no that’s not my principle.

Questions of whether or not high levels of religiosity help individuals to integrate or impede integration are not well explored. Debates about whether or not faith is a determinant or a detractor of integration are neglected. Mogahed and Nyiri (2007) found that there is an assumption in the public, political and media discourse that Muslim religiosity is both an impediment to integration and a threat to Western society. However, other studies conducted in the UK find that strong religious identity has not been an impediment to the integration of Muslims. Rather, higher levels of income and
job qualification were found to be closely linked to strong religious identity and integration (Bisin, Pattachini, Verdier, & Zenou, 2008). This study finds that Muslims exclusively framed their responses to the meanings of integration in terms of what is acceptable within their faith. However, in explaining what integration means, 116 references to religion and faith were recorded from the four focus group discussions. The significance of this is the number of times in which participants referred to faith and religion in defining integration. As a result, the implications might be that Muslim participants in this research are agreeable to integration in the wider society as long as it did not mean comprising their faith.

It was apparent from the focus group data that Muslims were more likely to consider that they were integrated only where it did not compromise their faith. A number of study participants clearly stated that they do not wish to do certain things that are not endorsed by the Muslim faith, even though some in the wider society see these things as being a sign of Muslim participation in social life in Australia. Importantly, Bisin, Pattachini, Verdier, and Zenou (2008), also found that religiosity is not a factor in respect to support for integration: Previous research such as Dunn et al. (2004), assert that religiosity does not suggest lack or slow in integration. Similarly, Rane et al (2011, p. 10), make the observation that “strong retention of cultural (religious) mores does not weaken feelings of association with Australia”. But there are also studies which show that other variables, including unemployment and inequality, play an integral role in immigrants’ integration and affect their levels of religiosity (Tubergen & Sindradottir, 2011). These studies have demonstrated that income inequality and a higher level of unemployment are positively related to higher levels of religiosity in the general population.

Any discourse about the possible interactions between religion and integration appears to have been understudied. As a few studies have looked at this matter, including that of Bisin, Pattachini, Verdier and Zenou (2008), who, using the probability of having a strong religious identity as a measure, found that in the UK Muslims integrate less and more slowly than non-Muslims. Notable is also the work of Kastoryano (2004) in which he discusses the incorporation of religious groups into the secular systems of government in Germany and France. However, contrary to the assumptions which declare that Muslim religiosity somewhat threatens the existence of Europe (Mogahed
& Nyiri, 2007, p. 14), the participants in this research did not see that their religion impeded their level of integration.

Peschke (2009) states that the relationship between religion and integration is one that centres around discussions of whether or not religion is a factor of integration or disintegration. The cultural and religious diversity of new immigrant groups seems to have been attributed to this link between religion and integration. Researchers who studied the religiosity levels between immigrant communities and members of host society members in 27 European countries found that, on average, immigrants are more religious than the native-born population (Tubergen & Sindradottir, 2011). They also found that higher numbers of immigrants attend religious services at least weekly, that is, 18.02 per cent compared to 16.86 per cent of the native-born population (Tubergen & Sindradottir, 2011). Leaving aside the apparent differences in religiosity of immigrant groups and host societies, it is imperative to understand how these differences are playing out in the sphere of immigrant integration.

The role which religion plays in immigrant integration is viewed differently in different nation states. For example, in the United States, the religious views of immigrants are viewed in a positive light, and are thought to promote ethnic and socio-economic integration and to facilitate the incorporation process (Portes & Rumbuat, 2006). On the other hand, in Western Europe, the religiosity of immigrants is seen rather as an impediment to integration, and is associated with inherent conflict, discrimination and social distance (Tubergen & Sindradottir, 2011; Diehl, Koenig, & Ruckdeschel, 2009; Kalmijn & Van Tubergen, 2006). Muslim integration is linked to Muslim religiosity and Muslim religiosity is claimed to be a phenomenon that perhaps undermines effective integration and one that raises fears about potential radicalisation (Foner & Alba, 2008; Abbas, 2007; Casanova, 2006).

One of the most pervasive assumptions in the discourse of European Muslim integration is that Muslim religiosity threatens the survival of Europe (Mogahed & Nyiri, 2007). Those who believe in the irreconcilability of Western and Muslim identities generally argue that Muslim piety, expressed in religious symbols and moral conservatism, contrasts with an increasingly secular and sexually liberal Europe, and is a recipe which will increasingly insulate Muslim communities and create profound alienation from the current European national identity (Mogahed & Nyiri, 2007, p. 14). But these believers
are somewhat blind to the fact that religious pluralism is a key feature of Australia’s democracy and is an undeniable part of the fabric of its society. As the numbers of Muslims in Australia increase, Islam becomes more visible, and interaction with Australians of other faiths is unavoidable. The notion that migrants’ religious identities would successively disappear as they acculturated to the values of liberal democracy is falsified by the increasing visibility of Islam in the public sphere (Koenig, 2007, p. 911).

The debates about Muslim women wearing the hijab or veil are part of the discourses about the interplay between religion and integration. Amongst the top unique identifiers of a Muslim female in the public space is the headscarf, which has created controversy in some parts of Europe (Freedman, 2004; Ajrouch, 2007; Hamel, 2002). However, contrary to the notion that strict observance of a religion, Islam in particular, is a hindrance to integration, it is argued that France’s focus on secularism, for example, banning the veil, is a barrier to integration and decreases the strength of the right to differ (Freedman, 2004, p. 2). Modood (2013) suggests that there is an apparent contradiction between the secular thinking of some Western countries and their support for religion. Most governments in Europe state openly that Christianity is Europe’s cultural marker. In Australia at this time there is a constant decline in the number of people identifying themselves as Christians.

According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, 96 per cent of Australians identified themselves as Christians in 1911 whereas in the last census of population figures, this number had decreased to 61 per cent (ABS, 2011). If, as suggested, this proposition is accepted, integration needs to be redefined as a process based less on ideas of cultural conformity, and more on having shared goals and commitment (Mogahed & Nyiri, 2007). But it is not only about religion because just as Muslim participants conditioned meanings of integration to what is acceptable within their faith, similarly they advanced the argument that integration does not equal assimilation. So, what then does integration mean to Muslims? In their responses to the research questions, the participants in this study have described some practices that they perceive to suggest complete integration.

In the focus group discussions, it was revealed that there are certain practices that Muslim participants determine as meaning integration. Similarly, they identified other practices that they deemed to be detractors from their full integration. In this context, determinants are practices, behaviours and actions that aid and/or influence integration, whereas detractors are practices, behaviours and actions that impede integration. In analysing the focus group data, Muslim participants’ conversations were coded along these thematic lines. In the following sections, the thesis discusses in detail the meanings of integration, that is, practices, determinants and detractors as advanced by the Muslim participants in the study.

Within all four focus groups, there were 161 references to factors perceived to be determinants of integration. These 161 items were grouped into ten categories in their respective order (see Table 4.3). The eight categories which had highest ratings in their respective order (see Table 4.3) were:

1. participation in mainstream society’s social, economic and leisure activities (44 mentions);
2. contribution to activities within the wider society (38 mentions);
3. being accepted and feelings of belonging (36 mentions);
4. participation in the labour market (26 mentions);
5. playing sport (20 mentions);
6. learning the English language (20 mentions);
7. education (15 mentions); and
8. political participation (14 mentions).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Determinants of Integration</th>
<th>No of Groups</th>
<th>Mentions</th>
<th>Per Cent (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belonging</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English language</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political participation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>N/A</strong></td>
<td><strong>213</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In addition to these eight categories, two others, obeying the law (1.2 per cent) and learning Australian history (1.2 per cent), were mentioned, but far more infrequently than the other categories, and therefore these were not included in this discussion. In the following discussion of the findings, the researcher begins by examining the general associations participants make with the notion of integration. Following this, the researcher explores and presents three important themes in the focus group data. These are: (1) the meaning of various types of social and civic participation as being emblematic of integration; (2) reflections on the relationship between religious faith and values, and their role in shaping people’s capacity to integrate; and, (3) reflections on the precise character of the meaning of integration, specifically its relational difference to notions of assimilation.

4.8.1. Participation

In their conceptualisation of the meanings of integration, participants emphasised the importance of participation and contribution to the economic and social fabric of Australian society. Noticeably, they conceptualise integration in socio-economic terms rather than cultural terms. Active participation in Australia’s economic, political and social fabric was what some Muslim participants of the focus group discussions assigned to the meaning of integration. According to one young participant:

When we, uhh, when we have elections and we want to see how the economy is going and we try to give each other support in the community, when we are helping the people in need, when we’re joining in, like our welfare shop does, we don’t discriminate against the Aboriginals, or any other race. (26 year old professional Muslim female).

Other participants of the focus group discussions echoed similar sentiments. For example, a 31 year old professional Muslim male also made the following comment:

We try to help the whole community, the same thing with education, we have open days at the school, we have fetes, we have community events we even have Crestwalk, anybody can join in, all they have to do is join in. We have a lot of things where anybody can integrate.
The above comments show that Muslim conceptions of integration refer mainly to their desire to participate in the social, economic and political spheres of Australia’s multicultural society. Both of these comments are from Muslim professionals of different genders. In the context of Australia, Rane et al. (2011) finds a positive correlation between levels of educational attainment and support for integration among Muslims. In the scholarly literature, there is disagreement about whether or not religiosity is associated with low or high levels of integration (Peschke, 2009). But participants in this study suggested that they used their belief systems to influence their levels of integration. They used religion not only as an aspect of the wider society’s life that they may be able to integrate, but they also used their religion to justify their belief that Muslims have a faith-based obligation to integrate. As an example, the study finds a middle aged Muslim participant who referred to a religious text to explain what integration means. In fact, he did not see participation as a determinant of integration only, but also as being a Muslim individual’s duty. He commented as follows:

Being proactive as a Muslim you can’t just sit back and think I'm going to take the benefits of the country and just live it and enjoy it without giving back as well. (42 year old Australian born Muslim male).

Similarly, emphasis on participation in the activities of the wider society was clear from the responses of other participants. A middle aged Australian-born Muslim participant was critical of the attitudes of some Muslim community members because of their lack of participation in the social and economic fabric of the nation. He provided the following comments:

I’m not going to get a job because all of the jobs are haram (impermissible) and just live off Centrelink payments. It’s just these lazy cop out attitudes that are clear examples of someone not wanting to participate and basically saying that participation with broader society equals integration so those people who stubbornly refuse to participate are failing to integrate.

These findings correspond with the findings of other research undertaken in the mainly non-Muslim immigrant groups in Europe. For example, in Germany, middle aged and older post-Soviet immigrants who were long time unemployed, insisted that the importance of paid work was uppermost in their feelings of integration (Matejskova,
2013). One article about integration incorporated the phrase “one needs to work” in its title (Matejskova, 2013). Adaptation into the labour market of the receiving country is seen to be a major hurdle that many immigrants face in their initial period of settlement. In Israel, for example, former Soviet Union immigrants have shown better coping strategies in overcoming barriers in the Israeli labour market than Ethiopian immigrants (Heilbrunn, Kushnirovich, & Zelter-Zubida, 2010). It is important to note though that both of these two groups of immigrants entered Israeli based upon their religious affiliation (Heilbrunn et al., 2010) and therefore no conclusions can be made in how immigrants with no religious affiliation to the receiving society adapt in the receiving country’s labour market.

On the other hand, some of the respondents provided examples of participation in Australia’s economic, social and political life, including undertaking voluntary activities, education and employment. Amongst the focus group discussants was a 45 year old Muslim school teacher who explains how engaging in such activities determines integration. He comments as follows:

Voluntary activities, like recently the floods and the Muslim organisations have got together and gone to various government organisations saying we want to help out, with this aspect of the floods and this type stuff, so we went out and helped, and in that aspect we were integrated.

Yeah for me it’s just normal activities, the norm in the society, getting a job, paying your taxes, is a way of integrating.

Participation in the social life of the wider society and having interaction with local populations is rated high in the determinants category. In particular, emphasis was placed on the interaction with neighbours, and this importance is shown in the following comments:

When you get accepted, you get invited to their homes and you invite them to your home I think that would suggest that you have been accepted into the society yes.

We have a lot of Australian neighbours in my area and we do invite them to anything. When we had Ramadan we used to take food to them because
they could smell the food and they would say it is beautiful food, so we give it to them, next time they bake a cake they will bring it to you.

About ten years ago I was invited to a Muslim South African’s home and brought a plate of food for the barbecue. Present there were his white Australian neighbours, a chap by the name of Chris and his wife and kids and so on. He said do what Yusuf has been doing, if all you Muslims invite your Australian neighbours to your home, let them come and see what type of people you are, you are just as like us, you dress like us, you eat like us, you have got the same aspirations for your kids like us, we didn’t know that, the impression is that you are some weirdos.

Whilst Muslims generally place emphasis on participation, they rated political participation at the bottom of their list. Even those who commented on political participation were engaging in limited participation in the politics of Australia, namely exercising their right to vote. Political integration is generally measured by political interest and participation (Wright and Bloemraad, 2012). It is not clear from this thesis why Muslims rate political participation low. But previous studies of minority groups such as the Lao community in Canada suggest that autocratic nature of politics in back home may possibly discourage minorities in their participation of politics in their new homeland (Harles, 1997, p. 724). The extent to which this proposition is true regarding Muslims in Australia is not tested in this study. For the case of the Lao community in Canada, the very idea of politics is tainted by the homeland experience (Harles, 1997, p. 724).

Nevertheless, absent from their comments from Muslim respondents were any meaningful and deep engagement in politics, such as joining a political party and standing for political office. The importance of the political integration of Muslims is crucial, as previous research suggests increased participation of minorities in the political systems strengthens democracies (Petrusevska, 2009; Bieber, 2008).

Consistent with the findings of this study are the realities of low participation of Muslims in the political system in Australia. For example, the Honourable Ed Husic is the first Australian Muslim federal Member of Parliament and in 2010 was elected on an Australian Labor Party ticket in the safe Labour seat of Chifley. He was re-elected in
2013 in the same federal seat and remains the only Muslim member in the Australian federal parliament. While Muslims in Australia are not fully participating in the politics of the nation, there is a highly educated Muslim elite emerging which is pro-active and wants to represent Muslim issues on national platforms (Peucker, Roose, & Akbarzadeh, 2014).

4.8.2. Belonging and acceptance

A sense of belonging is defined as being a subjective feeling of being valued and respected that is derived from a reciprocal relationship to an external referent (the wider society), built on a foundation of shared experiences, beliefs and personal circumstances (Mahar, Cobigo, & Stuart, 2013). A significant number of focus group participants understood the general meaning of integration to be “to belong” and “to be accepted” into the wider society. The Muslim participants in the study rate belonging and acceptance as the third most important determinant of integration. Some of them used phrases such as “integration is to be part of”, “to interact” and “to mingle”. Some examples of such statements include:

Integration is to make Australia a better country, for everyone involved, whatever happens to Australian society happens to us because we’re a part and parcel of that society, definitely. (Female, 27).

I think that basically [integration] is that we need to be accepted at all levels. No matter what level, if it is a kid at school, and he does school activities that include sport activities (Male, 58).

This is what I think most migrants want, to be accepted in this society, and to be part of the society and to be given equal opportunity (Female, 22).

In the above comments, Muslim participants stress the importance of the need to feel that they belong to the Australian society. They used words such as acceptance and being part of the wider society. Their conceptualisation of integration, apart from access to opportunities of employment and education and their public expressions of wanting to belong, are evident in their comments. Modood (2013) asserted that sectoral integration (employment, education and housing) is not full integration without some degree of subjective identification with the society or country. In stressing this point, Modood (2013) also cites the work of the Commission on Multi Ethnic Britain who
called this degree of subjective identification a “sense of belonging” (Commission on Multi Ethnic Britain [CMEB], 2000).

The concept of belonging is directly related to the meanings of integration. The feelings of belonging, and the way in which collectively shaped individual emotions influence the degrees of success of integration of migrants, was discussed by the study participants. This is in line with findings of Woodward et al., (2008) who point out that, “A sense of belonging is central to the experience and performance of elementary human sociality and it is derived from the capacity and the need of people to form meaningful attachments” (p.53). Belonging and membership in the wider society is therefore seen as an important step in achieving full integration. Muslim participants in this study linked integration and their acceptance as being interrelated issues. It is not suggested that Muslims do not feel accepted, but the fact that they mention this more often than other perceived determinants of integration is worth noting. Previous studies undertaken in Australia, such as that by Dunn (2004), have found that over 70 per cent of Muslims felt comfortable in identifying as Australian, and a majority indicated the importance of their children being accepted as being Australian. But in their conceptualisation, integration is not independent of their belief system and Muslims saw no inconsistency between being a Muslim and being Australian. (Dunn et al., 2007).

Overall, the thesis finds that comments made by Muslim participants are positive about how they feel about belonging in Australia. The Australian Muslim participants to the study attempted to demonstrate that they want to belong to the wider Australian community. The subjective sense of belonging and acceptance by the majority that they are full members of society was mentioned a number of times. For instance, in the area of sports in social life, Muslims provided comments about how they felt the majority accepted them. The following are the comments of a 58-year-old Muslim male participant:

   My kids play sports, they play for […] school, my son is a good cricketer, and in his team are all white kids, if I could use that term, he is the only sort of non-European, he is accepted.

Garbutt (2009), whilst explaining the sense of local belonging, explains that practises such as regularly engaging in team sports are accepted ways of establishing and
maintaining a sense of belonging. However, the facts remain that in any process of integration, there is a group who is not integrated, does not belong or is considered to be outside the in-group. It is the basis of the conceptualisation of social inclusion which places boundaries on being included or excluded in society (Garbutt, 2009). Muslim participants seem to be negotiating local membership during a period in which concepts of national identity, belonging and citizenship pose challenges to the nation-state in a globalised world (Castles, 1999). Furthermore, in the aftermath of the 9/11 events in the US, the question remains, how could Muslim migrants belong in situations where belonging is denied, discounted or pushed out of reach by host communities (Skirbis et al., 2007)? It is therefore apparent from the Muslim participants’ comments above that they are attempting to negotiate their membership within the wider society with the expectations of that society, namely the willingness and openness to accepting Muslim communities as in-groups rather than as out-groups.

Hagan (2006) endorses the use of a framework of expectations of immigrant groups to negotiate social membership in contemporary societies. Nevertheless, belonging must not only be the mere membership of a group, but something that is on-going, practised every day (Garbutt, 2009). The thesis acknowledges the difficulties associated with measuring belonging and acceptance of a group such as Muslims in Australia, and concedes that there may be variables that make this relative to social and personal circumstances and contexts. It has already been documented that differences in integration contexts, including institutional arrangements in education, the labour market, housing, religion and legislation, can play a role in how someone perceives a sense of belonging and acceptance or vice versa (Crul & Schneider, 2010).

The subjective nature of this concept of belonging and local membership makes it difficult to achieve an agreed conceptualisation. Overall, participants described participation and belonging and acceptance as being key determinants of their integration into Australian society. But in addition to their conceptualisation of integration, the thesis asked participants to describe key barriers to their integration. In the next section, participants’ responses and conceptualisations of barriers to integration are discussed.
4.9. **Practices: barriers to integration**

Just as they described activities, behaviours and actions that mean integration to them, the participants also described activities, behaviours and actions they deemed to mean lack of integration or detractors from integration. The researcher observed that the respondents, whilst stating perceived structural barriers to integration, were also open about the failure of some people to make the effort necessary to integrate. In fact, they were not reluctant to state that certain individual Muslims are not serious about the responsibilities they need to undertake in order to become integrated into the wider society. In analysing the research data, it was found that participants in the focus group discussions mentioned what they perceived to be barriers to integration 161 times. These entries were grouped into ten categories. The following are the 8 items in their respective order. (See Table 4.4), discrimination (20 times), media bias (18 times), self-imposed isolation (15 times), lack of English language (13 times), negative perceptions about host society (9 times) religious observance (5 times), unwillingness to participate (3 times) having cultural baggage (2 times). Cultural baggage was an item which was deemed to be insignificant as it appeared in only two of the discussions groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barriers to Integration</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Number of Entries</th>
<th>Per Cent (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media bias</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-imposed isolation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of English language</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative perception</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious observance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unwillingness to participate</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The barriers listed above can be grouped into two main themes: individual barriers to integration, where the person has some control over what to do about the situation, and institutional barriers to integration where such control is perhaps beyond the individual’s capacity. For example, discrimination, media bias and negative perceptions are the structural barriers, whereas self-imposed isolation, lack of English language and unwillingness to participate can all be regarded as individual barriers to integration. It should be acknowledged that the two forms of barriers stated here are not mutually
exclusive, and there is a possibility that they may lead to another barrier. We discuss these two main classifications of barriers to integration in the following sections.

4.9.1. Institutional barriers to integration

4.9.1.1. Discrimination
Integration of immigrants is generally understood to be the efforts undertaken in order for their inclusion into the national social and economic fabric of society. Non-integrated, or not integrated sections of society can be referred to as the excluded. But not integrated could mean that the individual immigrant did not take responsibility for his integration. It could also mean a failure of systems and policies, namely that of governments failing to develop an environment which enables integration. In this, there are two possible contributors to a failure of integration, that is, the institutional, and the individually controlled contributors. In their attempts to define integration, Muslims discussed the reverse of integration or the lack of integration. It is indeed easier to understand if a person knows what it is not. Respondents to this study identified barriers to immigrant integration as being both individually controlled and structural and systematic ones. They categorised self-imposed isolation and lack of English language as “individually controlled” barriers to integration, and discrimination and media bias as two “institutionally controlled” barriers to integration.

However, research participants rate the structural elements of integration, such as discrimination and media bias, highly in their understanding of the barriers to integration. In line with this understanding is the extensive body of available scholarly research that confirms the fact that ethnic minority groups face racism in Western liberal democracies (Bovenkerk, Miles, & Verbunt, 1990; Dunn, 2007). The identification of discrimination as an institutional barrier to integration is not a new finding. Previous studies have documented the effect of institutional racism in ethnic groups (Pettus, 2013; Durey et al., 2012; Pilkington, 2011; Phillips, 2011; Trepagnier, 2010). This study reveals that Muslims in Australia view the discrimination they face from sections of the wider society to be an individual barrier to their level of integration. In particular, they place emphasise on discrimination in the labour market, stereotypes about their dress code, including undesirable opinions about the wearing of the hijab. Following are the comments made by some participants:
When we become adults we want to be able to fit into the workplace, as equals and not be discriminated against.

When we get discriminated against for getting jobs, that’s failure of integration.

When we get discriminated against promotionally, when you are in a certain job and you can’t get promoted because you are a Muslim, that’s failure of integration.

I’ve been with the government for ten years, they don’t trust me, and I know that, and I have been working more than the others, and for example my security clearance took 18 months, my colleague in the same position took 2 months, and a lot of questions I had to complete about 28 pages and all these things.

The above quotes from research participants indicate that discrimination is viewed as impeding the efforts of individual migrants to integrate. This discrimination can take the form of unfavourable selection processes, but can also be in the form of affording an already employed person the same promotional opportunities as those given to other employees. Some of the participants consider that these discriminatory practices do not provide them with a level playing field. In fact, it was apparent that Muslims were linking concepts of justice, equality and fairness, which, as their comments show, are important to the process of incorporating immigrants. One participant said:

So this is what I think most migrants want, to be accepted in this society, and to be part of the society and to be given equal opportunity.

Discussions about discrimination were not gender neutral. Whilst most men made comments relating to unfair treatment and discrimination mainly in workplaces, some of the women participants indicated that they faced discrimination, particularly in the public space, on the basis of their dress. They explained that unfair treatment of Muslim women is a barrier to their integration. As one participant commented:

The way we get discriminated against on the basis of our dress, if our women are harassed because they have got the hijab, that’s failure of integration.
However, the research notes that participants stress differences in the barriers to integration between Muslim men and women. They explain that, in addition to their alleged harassment on the streets because of their distinct Muslim dress, some women participants state that discrimination against them takes place in the workplace. They are particularly of the view that some employers are denying them opportunities for work by telling them that the kind of clothes they wear are unsuitable for the work that the employer wants to be done. Following is one of these comments:

I think when some non-Muslims see you in the community, like in the workplace, it does set some boundaries for some women, I mean maybe not for the men but for the women because we choose to wear abayas, or our hijab. I remember one sister, she went for an interview and they said, ‘well you can’t wear that big hijab because in the kind of work field that you want to do it’s going to get in the way’, and I feel that that made a boundary for her.

In regards to the socio economic factors of integration, studies (Dunn, 2004; Dunn, Klocker, & Salabay, 2007; Hassan, 2010; Choudhry et al., 2005; Beckford et al., 2006) all show that Muslims in several Western countries face discrimination in the labour market, thus impeding this core integration criterion. For example, in the Netherlands, the unemployment rate for immigrant Muslims is, as a general rule, higher than the national average, for example 31 per cent and 24 per cent for Moroccans and Turks respectively (Cesari, 2007, p. 59). This is despite anti-discrimination being one of the core tenets of multiculturalism. Dunn (2004) concludes that despite society’s strong support for the policy, it is not succeeding in decreasing the discrimination faced by Muslims in Australia. Researchers report an upsurge of discrimination against Muslims in Australia and Britain since the events of 11 September 2001 (Marranci, 2004). Islamophobia was particularly high in countries where multiculturalism is embraced, and where multicultural policies are developed to maintain social cohesion (Marranci, 2004). This begs the question, how effective is multiculturalism in protecting the rights of minority communities?

Contrary to a widely held view that multiculturalism served ethnic minorities well, it can be argued that multiculturalism does not necessarily address the needs of culturally and religiously diverse groups in Australia, as it has become a superficial concept that
merely mirrors the celebration of cultural festivals. The policy of multiculturalism confines the state’s responsibility to integrate immigrant groups by providing annual funding grants to sponsor ethnic specific cultural festivals. Instead, immigrants in general, and Muslims in particular, may be better off demanding full participation in the economic, social and political life of the nation, as opposed to receiving funding for cultural festivals. Joppke (2004, p. 244) cites one of the “...shortcomings of multiculturalism with respect to the inherent socio-economic marginalisation of migrants and their children”. In the case of Muslims in Australia, the existence of higher levels of discrimination has been well-documented (Dunn, 2004; Hassan, 2009). The events of 9/11, the war on terror, and the Bali bombings of 2002, all further alienate Muslims as outsiders, and research has indicated that the way terrorism news is reported has inadvertently increased prejudice against out-groups (Das et al., 2009, p. 457).

Participants in this research rated discrimination highly in their discussions of what they understood to be structural barriers to integration. The researcher observed that the majority of the respondents were keen to comment on this issue during the discussion. Amongst the most cited discriminatory practices individuals claim they experienced in Australia was racism based on their appearance, their Muslim names in public and in their work places. It is obvious that Islam does not constitute one race or ethnic group as Islam encompasses a variety of racial groups, however the notion of racism appears to have emerged from the participant’s discussions. In fact, being a Muslim is not biologically determined in the same way that biology determines being “black” or being “Asian” (Meer & Modood, 2012). The arguments that link racism to ethnic groups and disregard other forms of group identity are discredited by a number of researchers (Meer & Nayak, 2013; Modood, 2013). In response to the writings of Miles (1988) and Miles (1989) about racism, Modood (2013) summarises the argument as follows:

The root of the problem is that contemporary anti-racism defines people in terms of their colour; Muslims—suffering all the problems that anti-racists identify—hardly ever think of themselves in terms of their colour. […] We need concepts of race and racism that can critique socio-cultural environments which devalue people because of the physical differences but also because of the membership of a cultural minority and, critically, where the two overlap and create a double disadvantage. (Modood, 2013, p. 272)
These ideas lend some credibility to the argument that the religion of Islam and Muslims are “racialised” or that Muslims are turned into an “ethno religious group” (Modood et al., 2006). For these and other reasons, gaining an understanding of racism becomes important. Van Dijk (2000c, p. 87) defined racism as follows “A system of social inequality in which ethnic minority groups are dominated by a white (European) majority on the basis of origin, ethnicity, or attributed ‘racial’ characteristics.”

In Australia, studies about racism have been pioneered by the work of Kevin Dunn. Some of his writings about racism have an Australian Muslim focus, and discuss public attitudes towards the wearing of the hijab (Dunn, 2009), contemporary racism and Islamophobia, racialising religion (Dunn, 2007), and repetitive and troubling discourses of nationalism in the local politics of mosque development in Sydney (Dunn, 2005). Just as comparable immigrant receiving Western societies struggle with issues of race relations and racism, Australia faces the challenges of incorporating its highly racially diverse immigrant community. In the midst of writing this thesis, a major, heated debate developed in Australia about the proposed changes to the racial discrimination act of 1975. The incumbent coalition government of Australia, comprised of Liberal and National parties, proposed these changes.

The background to these proposed changes relates to a racial vilification court case against Andrew Bolt, a conservative journalist and columnist, undertaken by nine Aboriginal applicants who Bolt alleged were taking professional advantage from the colour of their skin (Bodey, 28 September, 2011). The Federal Court ruled that Andrew Bolt was in breach of the Racial Discrimination Act. The proposed changes to the Act are specifically Section18c, of which Bolt was found to be in contravention. The proposed laws faced significant public opposition, mainly from ethnic groups. The government invited public submissions, and was inundated with over 5000 submissions from peak ethnic organisations and other interested parties. There was also reported backbench revolt in the Liberal National Coalition government against these proposed changes, and in particular, this was the case for members of parliament who held seats with significant ethnic majority votes. The government finally surrendered to the public demand, dropping the changes to the law. However, recently the government was accused of linking the dropping of the changes to the law to its new anti-terrorism measures.
4.9.1.2. Media bias

In regard to institutionally influenced detractors of integration, Muslims rated the media highly. A significant number of focus group discussants explained the ways in which distorted reporting by mainstream media about the place of Muslims in Australia was a barrier to integration. In particular, Muslim focus group participants were concerned about the media’s influence on the public perceptions of Muslim immigrant integration. For the most part, participants were of the view that the Australian mass media projects a negative image of Islam and Muslims in this country. One participant explains how the mainstream mass media influences the wider public’s views about a number of issues:

I think their (wider society) attitude is like all the brothers said, is mainly controlled by the media, in the sense that 90 per cent of Australians get their information from the mass media and the mass media stigmatises the Islamic community.

The comments above suggest that the wider society receives clues of what integration means from what is reported in the mass media. This is in line with content analysis of the Australian press coverage of integration as it pertains to Australia’s Muslim communities. Rane and Hersi (2012) analysed articles published in The Australian, The Courier Mail, The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age between 2002 and 2010. The sample of their analysis included editorials, features, opinion pieces, and general news content published in alternate years, specifically 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. Overall, they found that the largest proportion of articles that mention Muslims and integration tended to be reported in the context of terrorism and radicalisation (14 per cent). This selective reporting of integration was particularly a concern for some of the Muslim participants in the focus group discussions. Below is the comment of one participant, accusing mainstream media of selective reporting and bias against Muslims in Australia:

The fact that you can walk on [...] Street or any of these big shops, you’ll see idols, Buddhist statues everywhere, and Australian people, majority of them, they don’t see any harm with that, they take that in, it doesn’t talk to them but they take that in, it’s the government rather the media doesn’t put any emphasis on this kind of religious or spiritual thinking, of idols and
gods and, this is actually promoted I find, but when it comes to Islam, which is undoubtedly from my view is the truth, not false, it’s truth, and that becomes then a focus of fear and they cannot have the school at such and such, and Islamic school, it’s all about no, no, we don’t want it here, but a temple is not a problem, and it’s got a lot to do with the media.

Another major concern for some participants was the constant redefinition of integration by the media, based on the political rhetoric of the government of the day. The Australian press coverage frames Muslim integration in terms of cultural and civic indicators, Australian values and English language skills, rather than the broader definitions found in the scholarly literature, which include employment, education, income, legal and political indicators (Phillimore & Goodson, 2008; Entzinger & Biezeveld, 2003; Waldrauch & Hofinger, 1997). Below is a comment by a Muslim participant criticising the mass media for redefining integration and assigning it to meanings that differ from its well-intended objectives:

Well their (wider society) swallowing of the media propaganda whole is definitely causing a redefinition, restructuring of the entire integration away from its true meanings, away from its true values it was founded on and based on, into rather what political agenda it’s served by, and that’s going against integration.

Muslim participants cast doubt on the media’s meaning of integration and highlight the reality that the concept can potentially be used to exclude, rather than to include, certain groups of the society. Looking at how the media frames debates about Muslim immigrant integration in Australia, this perception has some substance. The following two comments were made by Muslim participants in the focus group discussion:

Yes, I think that the media has got a lot to do with this, that they like to keep throwing a little bit of petrol on the fire and letting the wider community know that these Muslims could be a threat to us in the future.

It has this fear attached to Islam so the information that is provided (by media) to the (community), that is what drives their attitude, so for example, there is something happens, an explosion or whatever, the first thing that
comes to their mind is that it must be an Islamic person behind it, regardless of an investigation, so we are... and this hinders integration a lot.

Whilst this criticism of the media fuelling tensions between Muslims and the wider society is hard to corroborate, there are indications that terrorism and Muslim radicalisation feature among the dominant issues concerning Muslims in Australia (Rane & Hersi, 2012). It appears to be the case that the media has a tendency to frame integration as a potential answer to Muslim radicalisation and terrorism, while little attention has been paid to the potential for this discourse to alienate and marginalise Muslims. In particular, because of the current Iraq and Islamic State (IS) stand-off, and previously, the events of the aftermath of 11 September 2001 and the London bombings in 2005, the dominant discourse tends to shift from international jihadists to the threat posed by home-grown Muslims not integrating into society. In fact, there is possibly a high risk that the meaning of integration will be distorted and become generalised into the reporting of Muslims in Australia as being a threat to this country. This is a point made by the former Australian Federal Police Commissioner, Mick Keelty who stated: “In order to avoid terrorism, the country must not marginalise people” (Roberts, 2006, p. 5) meaning that increased vilification of Muslims [in the media] has the potential to foment home-grown terrorism. The focus group participants in the study understood the implications of distorted media reporting and one participant made the following comment:

They are controlled by the media and what the media does, in the world today, is portray Islam which is the true religion of Allah which goes back to Noah, as a religion of fear and fundamentalism and terrorism, that’s the situation, that’s what they teach the masses and there is a struggle between truth and falsehood in our societies all over, even in Muslim countries.

Another notable reason why Muslims viewed the media as a barrier to integration is their treatment and depiction of Muslim women. In particular, the issues concerning Muslim women and their head covering were discussed as a significant issue in focus group discussions. A participant in the study made the following comment:

Could I mention something, I think a good case study, that not Muslims live as an activity but has come up on the news and in the West, is the issue of
the *niqab*, the issue of the face veil. And the media and a lot of leading voices in the West consider that Muslim women who are covered from the face down are not integrated into the community.

This word has many different meanings, depending on the agenda. If the agenda is, at the moment we are having an unpopular war overseas and we need to regroup and regain support within the country or we need to increase terrorism laws, they want to raise public hysteria about the Muslim community. So what do we do? We discuss how they are failing to integrate into the community because of their scary *hijabs* and the media will be used as one of the roles.

It is not surprising that Muslims rightly or wrongly criticise the media as being biased, because minorities, and occasionally interest and pressure groups, generally blame the media for their own demise. It can be argued that the media has a role and a responsibility in the formation of a united and socially inclusive nation. But the relationship between the media and minority groups is a complex one. It is not at all disputed that it is a formidable force as an important source of information of host communities (Mahtani, 2001). However, the extent to which the media is helping to build a socially cohesive nation is in doubt. Researchers have criticised the media for stigmatising minority groups, for example, Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart (2007) found that the media played a crucial role in rising anti-immigrant populism throughout Western Europe.

The abovementioned negative media representations of Muslims in Europe are also experienced by Muslims in Australia (Saeed, 2007; Aly, 2007; Poynting & Mason, 2007; Ho, 2007). This has manifested as, “The construction of Muslims as a homogenous unit which enables the media to create narratives that both reflect and shape the cultural and political assumptions of the wider community vis-a-vis the Australian Muslims” (Aly, 2007, p. 28). Arguably, this could have implications for Muslim immigrant integration and it may be the case that distorted reporting of the debate about Muslim integration may undermine social inclusion. It may also create tensions between “born and bred”, immigrants and non-immigrants and Muslims and non-Muslims. Studies have shown that where the media plays a positive and constructive role, it has enhanced the understanding between Muslims and their host
societies. For example, in Austria, the media is credited with creating a good relationship between Muslims and members of the wider public. When the headscarf debate was at its height in several European societies, remarkably tensions remained low in Austria (Abid, 2006, p. 270) due to the objectivity of media outlets in their coverage of this debate. Furthermore, any distorted reporting of the debate risks increasing the alienation of Muslims, rather than integrating them. For example, Muslims may create alternative narratives of identity (Aly 2007, p. 38). For Muslim youth in Australia, this may perhaps undermine state efforts currently underway to develop counter violent extremism programmes.

4.10. Individual barriers to integration

4.10.1. Self-imposed isolation – reflexivity and identity

The study reveals that Muslim participants in the focus group discussion engaged in a self-critiquing exercise, and the majority of them viewed imposed self-isolation as a detractor to integration. Participants used their knowledge of their local communities and appeared to be speaking from personal encounters with members of their communities who have isolated themselves from the wider society. They explained that this was a hindrance to the integration levels of those individuals. Following are examples of comments made by some of the participants:

I think it’s (lack of integration) when you make an intention not to integrate, and not be part of society. So you will only isolate yourself within the Muslim community, you only shop at the Muslim shop, you only go to the Islamic school, you really just limit yourself in the Muslim community and almost create, like, a ghetto.

It’s (lack of integration) when you just isolate yourself and say look I’m not going to follow the rules of this country, I’m not going to do that I’m not going to mix with anyone, I’m just going to stay in my place, I’m not going to get out of my house because I will see a lot of things that I don’t like outside, I think that’s when Muslims fail to integrate.

Analysis of the focus group discussions reveals that Muslims were critical of the behaviour of some of their own community members who isolated themselves from the
rest of society. They particularly stressed their objections to isolation where the religion of Islam was used as the reason for the individual’s withdrawal from the mainstream society. Participants also observed an apparent contradiction between an individual’s selective withdrawal from society whilst being keen to accept government handouts and the unemployment benefit. Below are examples of comments made by participants:

Even though there apparently are no ghettos in Australia but you create a ghetto effect whereas the Australian mainstream society is bad, it’s bad, it’s bad and I’m not going to be tainted by it and I’m not going to be dirtied by it and I’m going to stay within the Muslim community and only mix with Muslims and only communicate with Muslims and only shop at Muslim shops. I think that’s a failure of that. But you’ll take the benefits of Australian society, whether it be the dole or whatever else, but you don’t actually do anything positive for this society at all.

Fair enough for a new Muslim, you do have to spend that time in isolation, but the rest of us, it is very easy and I do it now, to exist between mosque, Islamic school, halal butchers, it’s very easy just to be in that circle, and you have to step out of that circle, and that’s something I am only doing now, and it’s been seven years.

Nevertheless, the above sentiments did not go unchallenged in the focus group discussions, and one participant explained the differences between self-imposed isolation and what he describes as “a comfort zone”. Here is his comment:

Living in isolation in a bubble is one thing but having a comfort zone is something else. Because every group of people has a comfort zone.

An Australian Muslim convert in the group discussion, who is also a teacher working with young people, describes what he sees as some Muslims having more than a comfort zone, but instead living in a confused situation and in a bubble. Below are his contributions to the discussion:

No matter what their cultural or religious background is, birds of a feather flock together, you know that’s normal. But living in a bubble, and I have seen that, and I think that is very, very harmful especially for young
Muslims who are trying to develop some form of identity. Their parents for some reason are living in Australia but their heart and soul is still in ‘Whereveristan’, (related to Afghanistan, Pakistan, etc.) and they want to go back but they don’t want to leave Australia and so they are trying to bring up their kid with some, I don’t know, values from elsewhere that just don’t match with what the experience is for the child, and so the child is becoming very confused they just, all of the general society around them doesn’t add up to what they’re being told and in the end they just rebel or become nothings and that’s the beginning of social problems.

I would say it would only help if the person is able to say to themselves, I am Australian and live here. It doesn’t matter that I happen to be different from Johnny that lives next door, but I am Australian. If they have that kind of attitude then there won’t be a problem, they will be able to bring up their children as well rounded, wholesome, but if they’re trying to force themselves and their own family to live in an imaginary bubble then they’re living in La La Land, and they’re not going to integrate because they certainly don’t want to.

A young participant in the group discussions explains the importance of Muslims becoming engaged in the political systems and addressing their grievances on perceived certain governmental decisions. His comments are as follows:

There are two categories of those who oppose it, there is one category of those who participate within the Australian system to try to change the policy towards the war or bring troops home or whatever, there would be another portion who say to hell with the whole war, to hell with the whole community, I am stepping out. I’d say this person here is not integrated.

A sense of self-reflection and self-evaluation was evident in the responses Muslims provided to define the meanings of integration and barriers to integration. In the determinants of integration, participants highly rated the ability to be able to communicate in English. Similarly, a lack of knowledge of the English language is rated highly in the barriers to integration.
4.10.2. Lack of English language skill

The Muslim participants in the focus group discussions recognised the drawbacks that a lack of English language may have in their successful integration into the host society’s many facets of life. A lack of English language proficiency is therefore linked to limited social interaction, and financial and economic survival of the family unit (Hwang, Xi, & Cao, 2010). Immigrant integration is multi-faceted, and immigrants must feel integrated in all facets and levels in the society. In the group discussions, there was recognition that English language proficiency can make a difference between a family unit’s economic wellbeing or living in poverty. The following are examples of comments by some of the participants:

And just thinking about my parents, for example, my family migrated from Vietnam to America, my dad is more proficient in English, so he is able to get around, get a job, and stuff like that, but my mother has very limited English, so she relied on her children to be translators for most things.

I could give you a horror story, I know of one family that is here in Brisbane where the father only speaks Arabic and despite having lived here for almost forty years can’t speak English and he has got sons that don’t speak any Arabic because they were born here, a completely dysfunctional family where one of his sons left Islam too. So it can be a measure of lack of integration. I have heard of people, outside of Australia though, people from the sub-continent in London who have been there for fifteen years and actually can’t speak English, that’s going to reflect poorly on us if people can’t speak English and it’s not that speak English or die, it’s not like that, English is just a tool for communication.

Another dimension is the possible link between an immigrant’s English language proficiency, labour market integration and economic wellbeing, and researchers report that there is a conditional relationship between English language proficiency and earnings among immigrants. For example, in the United States, Hwang, Xi and Cao (2010) acknowledge the importance of English language proficiency for immigrants, but explain that this is contingent upon factors which determine the need for intergroup interactions. In using Blau’s structural theory (1977), they explain that the language
environment in which immigrants live dictates whether or not better language proficiency becomes an advantage in the labour market.

There are a number of studies that corroborate the effect that lack of local language proficiency has on the economic wellbeing of immigrant groups in many Western countries. For example, in the United States, Hwang, Xi and Cao (2010) assert that the ability to communicate in the host community language not only affects an immigrant’s social interaction within the wider society but also his economic viability in the labour market. Beyond the economic effects of a lack of proficiency in English language are also the social disadvantages which result from this lack. This is a fact that is well recognised by some of the major immigrant-receiving countries in Western Europe. For instance, Kaida (2013) states that language training constitutes an integral part of the settlement policies of many immigrant-receiving societies such as Canada and some European countries, for example, France and the Netherlands. In Australia, the government runs and funds the Adult Migrant English Language Program (AMEP), the government’s largest settlement program (Department of Industry, 2014). In recognition of the importance of acquiring language skills, the government provides 510 hours of free English language tuition to immigrants eligible under humanitarian grounds.

English language proficiency or its lack is an important part of the debates about immigrant integration. Researchers noted that some anti-immigrant cohorts of the native English speaking host societies in parts of Western Europe cite lack of English language as an indicator of a failure of integration (Xi, 2013). A number of studies have documented a robust assimilation effect (Bleakley & Chin, 2010; Chiswick, Lee, & Miller, 2004; Alba et al., 2002). However, in the case of the United States, Akresh et al., (2014) caution that previous studies focusing on English proficiency lead inevitably to other dimensions of assimilation, and suggest that this link is incomplete. Instead, they argue that proficiency is necessary but is an insufficient condition for both cultural and linguistic assimilation (Akresh et al., 2014, p. 209). Muslim participants generally accepted that a lack of proficiency in English is an impediment to integration, but dispute that this is a Muslim specific problem. A number of their comments referred to other non-Muslim immigrant group including Greeks, Italians and Chinese. Below are some of these comments:
The other thing the language as we mentioned is very important, but some communities, not only Muslims, for example the Italian or Greek community, they been here for fifty, sixty, seventy years and they’re still not communicating in English. There are reasons behind that because they have everything there, the shop, the community, they don’t need to communicate with the Australians, they just communicate in their language. Is it possible to have the same, Italian or Greek, we have the same who don’t want to learn the language, I know a family in here she was here with the family, she failed the citizenship test though she has been here for ten years she can’t communicate in English. She has been for the citizenship test I think ten times. So this is another thing.

Just a really quick example to share which moves away from the Muslim community, I actually worked with a girl who came from a firm within the accounting profession that only spoke Chinese and she moved out of there to go out again but it was totally eye opening to realise that within Australia we’ve got companies or firms that operate purely on a different medium. So that would seriously be a lack of integration.

Whilst agreeing on the importance of having English language proficiency, there was no consensus about how much English is necessary for successful communication. Muslim participants in the study recognise the inherent problems in framing successful integration as the sole responsibility of the individual immigrant, and ignoring the systematic discrimination that presents major obstacles to the individual immigrant’s incorporation. As one participant noted:

So she, I wouldn’t say she integrates much, I mean she gets by, but not as much as she could possibly integrate, because of limited English. So I would say language is a major thing. And you know, you, moving to a country where you don’t speak that language, you would be very limited as to what you can do.

This thesis notes that there is sometimes an overlap between determinants of integration and barriers to integration. For example, whilst English language proficiency is a determinant and its lack is a barrier to integration, it is arguable that the lack of
proficiency in English could lead an immigrant to isolation. However, it is debatable whether this isolation is due to the individual’s failure to learn the local language or whether the state failed to assist them in this regard. Researchers found that this predicament is particularly true of older immigrant groups (Treas & Mazumdar, 2002).

4.11. Conclusion

Since the events of 9/11, in Australia, parts of Europe and the United States, Muslims have principally become the subject of debates concerning issues of their integration in host societies. However, these debates generally disregard the existence and prevalence of institutional obstacles of integration into the host societies, as opposed to individual obstacles. Muslim participants were asked to explain the barriers to their integration into their host societies. The study found that Muslims identified both individual and institutional barriers to integration. For instance, Muslim participants report self-imposed isolation and lack of proficiency in English as being individual obstacles to integration, whereas they report discrimination and media bias as being institutional obstacles to integration. Overall, Muslim participants’ descriptions of barriers to integration are comparable to those prevalent in the scholarly literature on integration, except that little attention is paid to the institutional barriers to integration as opposed to the individually based obstacles.

This study has explored the meanings Muslims attribute to the notion of integration. As is evident in the academic literature reviewed, and also within public sphere debates about immigration and multiculturalism, the meanings of integration vary greatly. This variation is indeed a product of the diverse life experiences and backgrounds evident in pluralist societies, but it also reflects particular positions of social power and access to power and social resources. This study found that integration is a politically charged term. For Muslims, we have found that the term may provoke some suspicion by its perceived suggestion of the idea that one must “give up” aspects of his or her beliefs and values, specifically their faith. The study found that this perception of giving up something, in particular one’s faith, is something that Muslims seem to distinctly resist relating to the meaning of integration. In a particular way, Muslims understood their faith to be a significant element in informing their understandings of integration. For non-Muslims, and also within popular discourses, integration can become a polarising term that could possibly be used to blame or exclude other sections of the community.
Our results show that Muslims tend to define integration in terms of participation, belonging and contributing to the wider society. They conceptualise integration in socio-economic, rather than cultural terms. Faith was found to play a role in Muslims’ understanding of integration. Muslims make a distinction between integration and assimilation. The findings of this chapter revealed what behaviours and practices Muslims consider relate to their integration into the wider society. This chapter discussed integration as a social process but a deeper understanding of this dynamic social process requires comprehension of the concept beyond these definitional terms. In the next chapter (Chapter Five) the thesis attempts to explore the cognitive dimensions of how Muslims interpret the meanings of integration. In other words, understanding how Muslims negotiate and manage perceptions of membership of the in-group and the out-group.
Chapter 5. Muslim Cognitive Schemas of Integration

5.1. Introduction

As we have extensively discussed in the previous chapter (Chapter Four), integration is understood to mean a number of things to the Muslim participants in this study. Using the concept of integration as taken from a cognitive psychology point of view, this chapter attempts to gain an understanding of the mental processes undertaken by individual participants, and the ways in which they interpret and employ cognitive schemas in their understandings of integration. It is deemed necessary to do so since the participants’ experiences play a role in the development of their individual mental life. Unlike the previous study in Chapter Four of this thesis, in which participants were asked to describe what they understood the meaning of integration to be, this chapter is concerned with the reasons why participants describe integration in a particular way. Despite this difference in approach, this work compliments the focus group study presented in Chapter Four, in which participants described integration only along thematic lines. Before we present the findings of the schemas Muslims use in their interpretations of the meanings of integration, the next section gives a general overview of the cognitive theory of schema.

5.2. Application of the cognitive theory of schema

Brubaker, Loveman and Stamatov (2004) report that there is an implicit cognitive turn in the study of ethnicity and assert that drawing on cognitive research in social psychology may extend our understanding of this subject. Integration is referred to as a crucial concept in the psychology of acculturation (Boski, 2008). Others have pointed out the possible common grounds and convergences that may exist between cultural sociology and psychology (Carley, 1989; Cicourel, 1973; White, 1992; DiMaggio & Markus, 2010). There are however some sociologists who are sceptical of the application of cognitive theories in sociology (DiMaggio, 1997). According to Cerulo (2010) however, there is an increase in the number of studies which use cognitive psychology theories. It is cultural sociologists in particular who show interest in
engaging research in cognitive psychology (Igantow, 2007). Inspired by these reported convergences, this chapter utilises the cognitive psychology theory of schemata to understand how Muslims in Australia construct cognitive schemas of integration.

The cognitive schemas of integration which Muslims in Australia construct are important in the researcher’s investigation. An understanding of these schemas enhances the depth of this research, enlarging it from being mere definitional concepts of integration (see Chapter Four) to accessing an individual participant’s mental processing of what the term means. Academic disciplines such as economics, anthropology, geography, law, psychology and sociology have all considered the topic of international migration from their own perspective. Cultural sociologists have paid special attention to the incorporation of newcomers into their host societies. This chapter attempts to further add to the examination of this new cognitive sociology, and enters into the cognitive psychology theory of schemata.

Zerubavel (1997, p. 7) contends that the world is experienced not only through senses but also as mental membership in various social groups. Muslim Australians, just like any other citizens, use their frames of reference and schemata to develop their own worldview. As individuals, they construct their understanding of the meanings of integration. The schemas and frames they use in interpreting their surroundings are important and may shed light on why they behave in a certain way or conceptualise integration in a particular way. Our cognitive development is situated within a particular social context and is constrained by specific social circumstances (Zerubavel, p. 15). Whilst our experiences and personal circumstances may dictate how we perceive others, it is also the case that we employ certain strategies to achieve these mental constructions. Cerulo (2002) calls the strategies and techniques in which human beings organise and sort information “representational constructs” of the brain, and these include concepts, frames, formats and schemas (pp.113-119). As human beings we can hardly escape from these representational constructs in our everyday lives. In fact, social psychologists find that our social environment plays a major role in how we actually interpret things (Zerubavel, 1997, p. 25).

The way in which our perception is affected by our prior cognitive orientation is also quite evident in science. Even in the world of “hard” science, what one observes is never totally independent of the particular “lens” through which it is mentally processed.
Zerubavel, p. 25). A classic example of the way we perceive novel objects and situations as mental extensions of familiar schema is the case of the European “discovery” of America in the 1490s. This so-called discovery is distinctly characterised by Columbus’s stubborn attempts to force everything he encountered on the shores of the “New World” into the image of the world he had prior to his arrival there (Zerubavel, p. 25). The Muslim participants interviewed in this study were found to have employed mental cognitive constructs of the meanings of integration. They appear to have used their own cognitive frames in their attempts to define what integration means. Frames are static constructs that allow human beings to represent stereotyped interactions and situations (Cerulo, 2002, p. 116). Cognitive scientists contend that human beings develop a repertoire of situational and interactional frames – configuration frames for home or office, play frames, work frames, danger frames, intimacy frames, and so on (Cerulo, 2002, p. 116). In further deepening the researcher’s understanding of what meanings Muslims assign to the term integration, this chapter attempts to exploit the social psychology concept of schema in order to comprehend what integration frames and schemas Muslims employ in defining integration.

5.3. Methodology

This study attempts to evaluate the cognitive schemata of integration adopted by Muslims in Australia. The study specifically aims to identify the frames that represent Muslims’ understanding of integration. In other words, what values are derived from the schema of integration? Schemas are cognitive classificatory systems, which cluster associated phenomena into meaningful categories, including culturally acceptable symbols and value judgements (Spencer & Shinkevich, 2014; DiMaggio, 1997). Schemata theory deals with how specific knowledge is organised and stored in the memory so that it can be accessed and used when it is needed. It is about how people categorise information, interpret stories and make inferences. The schemata theory enables researchers to tap into these assumptions and evaluate what is behind people’s spoken words (Cerulo, 2002, p. 6).

The identification of the frames that represent Muslims’ understanding of integration requires accessing and speaking to Muslim community members. The fact that this research involves human subjects necessitates addressing important ethical questions such as recruitment of interviewees, privacy and obtaining the interviewee’s consent to
participate in the research. Ethical clearance was obtained before any recruitment and interviews were conducted. In recruiting participants, a purposive sampling method is used and key Muslim community leaders in the South East Queensland region were identified. A number of Muslim community associations were engaged to help in the recruitment. Purposive sampling is a non-probability sampling technique that is most effective when the researcher needs access to knowledgeable experts within a certain cultural domain (Given, 2008).

Purposive sampling was selected on the basis that the community leaders are knowledgeable informants who may advance the research in a better way than would randomly selected individuals (Given, 2008). The interviewees selected for this study also had a broad range of ethnic representation, reflecting the diverse nature of the Muslim community. The participants were males and females, their ages ranged from 26 years to 62 years and they differed in race, country of origin, and theological sect.

The sample included an imam of a mosque, an editor of a newspaper, a director of a Muslim women’s association, a medical doctor, a youth worker and a volunteer.

In 2013, individual in-depth semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with ten Queensland Muslim community leaders. The interviews lasted between 1 to 1.5 hours each at the participants’ choice of location. “The in-depth interview is a qualitative research technique that involves conducting intensive individual interviews with a small number of respondents to explore their perspectives on a particular idea, program, or situation” (Boyce & Neale, 2006, p. 3). The interviews were tape-recorded and data was subsequently transcribed using a professional transcriber. In-depth interviews allow the researcher to reveal the answers to social questions through the subjective meaning and understanding people bring to their interpretation of the social world (Walter, 2006). In illustrating how appropriate in-depth interviews are in uncovering social meaning, Walter (2006) cites the case of the 2005 Cronulla riots in Sydney, NSW, and explains how the study by Collins et al., (2011) found that, “The most interesting data was collected through interviews with the youth and police officers” (p. 84). However, in-depth interviews have some limitations, including the problems of interviewer influence and the social desirability effect, that is, people telling the interviewer what they consider to be acceptable in society (Walter, 2006). An interview is understood “...as any interaction in which two or more people are brought
into a direct contact in order for at least one party to learn something from the other” (Brenner et al., 1985, p. 3). In order to reduce any concerns of the interviewer’s undue influence, the researcher/interviewer was continually aware of this issue.

Despite these limitations, as Minichiello et al. (1995) assert, “Social reality exists as meaningful interaction between individuals and can only be known through understanding other’s point of view, interpretations and meanings” (p 73). As a social research method, “In-depth interviews are developed from an interpretivist perspective that sees that social research needs to address the complex ways in which people understand their lives” (Minichiello et al., 1995, p. 61). Overall, the in-depth interview was chosen because, “There is implicit or explicit sharing and/or negotiation of understanding in the interview situation which is not so central, and often not present, in other research procedures” (Brenner et al., 1985, p. 3).

It is usual when there is a mention of mixed methods that one thinks the study is using both qualitative and quantitative methods, however there is much value in combining qualitative data by the use of different methods (Ritchie et al., 2013). For instance, focus groups are combined with surveys, content analysis and/or in-depth individual interviews. Morgan (1996) reveals that over 60 per cent of the empirical research conducted the decade before his study combined focus groups with other research methods. In this thesis, focus groups discussions are combined with individual in-depth interviews. The rationale is to extend the group discussions in the previous chapter (Chapter Four) to a deeper level, to check the conclusions from its analysis and to expand the study population. This in turn allows the researcher to gain further insight into issues that the group discussions have only touched on and which have not been comprehensively deliberated.

According to Morgan (1996) focus group discussions and in-depth interviews are complimentary methods of inquiry. An in-depth interview with an individual participant allows the researcher to explore specific opinions and experiences in more depth. As a result, the use of in-depth interviews enables the researcher to canvass the topic of discussion more intensively. This may eliminate a drawback from the focus group method used in the previous study (Chapter Four), whereby the group setting creates a situation in which individuals might withhold information, perhaps because of how others might feel about their opinion. This is not to suggest that the two methods of
inquiry are the same. In fact, they are vastly different and scholars such as Fern (1982) have highlighted their strengths and weaknesses.

Fern (1982) asserts that two eight-person focus groups might produce as many ideas as ten individual in-depth interviews. This thesis adopted this approach and the researcher decided to use focus groups as an initial stage to raise and begin to explore relevant issues, which will then be taken forward through in-depth interviews. However, the individuals interviewed in depth were different to those who participated in the focus group discussions. This had the desired effect of testing the results of the previous group discussions, and the use of this method is considered to be cognitive interviewing (Gaskell, 2000).

5.4. Findings and discussion

As stated above, the main objective of a schema is the construction of an interpretation of the spoken word or the text in question (Cerulo, 2002). In this study, it is revealed that the two main dominant schemata of integration conceptualised by Muslims in Australia are the functional and the cultural framing of integration. Throughout the analyses of the responses from the research participants, there were clear indications of the participants’ focus when it came to general frames of integration. The researcher then unpacked this data and organised it under these two frames. Respondents provided accounts of different actions, behaviours and values which can reasonably be categorised under these schemas. However, it was also apparent that sometimes these schemas influenced each other and could potentially be classified in both of the general schemas. The following table is an illustration of these two main schemas of integration:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional</th>
<th>Cultural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pay tax</td>
<td>Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study</td>
<td>Respect for the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donate blood</td>
<td>Belong to country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business development</td>
<td>Participate in festivals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English language</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide services</td>
<td>Good neighbour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equality/ fair go</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is often the case that individual participants emphasised one schema more than another. In the initial analysis of the data, the functional aspects of integration emphasised by the research participants seemed straightforward, but the cultural frames of integration were not quite as obvious to the researcher. This apparent difference is due to the fact that culture is an abstract concept that is normally different to the tangible functional notions of integration. It is perhaps for this reason that cultural studies have become an interesting development in the study of sociology (Kashima, 2014). For instance, Kashima (2014) states that even though culture has become a critical concept in social psychology over the past half century, its dynamics, its processes, mechanism of formation and maintenance and transformation has begun to be investigated only recently.

This thesis approaches Muslim schemas of integration on the basis that humans are meaning making animals who create, recreate, and exchange information, and then turn this information into a meaningful basis for action (Kashima, 2014). Similarly, on a common sense level, people obviously construct meaning in relation to their lives. Schmidt (2001) refers to this process as a “constructionist view of knowledge”. In analysis of the research data, it is revealed that the meaning Muslims make of the concept of integration align with the four dimensions of integration identified by Heckmann & Schnapper, (2003, p. 10) as “Structural integration, cultural integration, interactive integration and identificational integration.”

In the initial analysis of this data, the researcher applied a simple coding procedure (Bloor et al., 2001). For example, statements which informants made in response to the research questions were coded using two alphabetical letters, where (F) denotes the functional and (C) denotes the cultural. In the open coded analysis, it was apparent to the researcher that the way in which informants conceptualised integration falls under these two principal schemas. The following are samples of statements indicating the functional schemas of integration:

Rehana  To contribute positively in your community or be a resourceful person contributing to society; by paying taxes um. It’s like it’s not really integrating if you’re on the dole or you’re getting social um, you’re just living from hand to mouth.
Nabeel So of the Muslims I know, they are posted in the Australian government and some of them are engineers and doctors as well, like uh, providing these kind of services to people.

Nezar I think a portion of the young Muslim generation, they are not integrating. Um, if they feel they are uh, disenfranchised they are feel they can’t get a job; if they feel that um, they are discriminated against uh, regarding name; regarding uh, dress; um, regarding ideas.

Sadik What it means to me personally is, integration for me is when I’m, I’m productive within the community, whether is, I’m going to work or, I’m studying and involved with the day to day life in Australia.

Soko When there is high unemployment amongst the Muslims, our ability to integrate with the rest of society is drastically reduced. If we are unemployed then our movements in society are from our home to our mosque to the halal butcher shop to the halal grocery store and back to our homes again; and there is absolutely no integration whatsoever.

The above five sample statements share the perception that to integrate means to have a job, pay taxes and contribute to the society. These respondents conceptualise integration in the more direct sense of having some kind of input into the general wellbeing of society, not becoming a burden on it. Specific fields of functional integration are mainly tangible, measurable and are those that are generally reported by government and policy institutes. For example, employment is the most researched area of integration and it takes a significant space in the scholarly literature (Bisin, Patachini, Verdier, & Zenou, 2011; Kogan, 2011; Krause & Liebig, 2011). However, it is apparent from the data that how some Muslim individual participants perceived the notion of integration differed significantly, and there are participants who conceptualised integration in cultural terms rather than functional ones. The following are samples of statements indicating the cultural schemas of integration:
Nezar What belong to integration is to adhere to overarching themes of a society. The overarching themes for Australian society as I said it’s the, the country for the fair go, it is the country for the freedom, and it is a hard work place. It is a country for equality. Uh, it is a country for choice. If, if this person maintains, uh, and strongly support the ideas of equality; of freedom of choice; of hard work.

Sadik Bettering my life and doing the right thing by my family; by this country; abiding the law. For me, that’s integration. I obey the law of this country. Follow it to the tilt (sic). So I do follow and obey the law of this country. Should I say, I am a valuable member of the community by volunteering; I do volunteer every now and then. When we had the floods I went and volunteered; though we didn’t have any floods in Calamvale; but I went, I chipped in you know, I went, I helped people who I don’t even know. And that’s part of living; you feel part of this place.

Soko To behave in a proper manner. To, uh, to be sensitive to the, uh, the values and the mindset and the culture of the host country, the host people. You know, that everyone should be allowed to be themselves. Um, and everyone should be allowed to move around and to benefit from the country like anyone else. Right? So this to me is integration. Because fundamentally I believe that by following the basic ethics and morals of what Islam teaches us makes you uh, the most reliable, the most professional, the most suitable, um, business partner, employer, work colleague, contractor, that you could possibly be. You honour contracts.

The above three responses also share the schematic perceptions of integration that emphasise the non-functional aspects of integration. They conceptualise integration as being more cultural and value based than functional and practical based. The emphasis on the overarching themes of equality, fairness and volunteerism are specific fields of cultural integration that are mainly abstract, not concrete, and are difficult to measure. They are generally based on perceptions and tendencies which are reported in
mainstream media in the context of Muslims not fitting in, lacking loyalty, radicalisation and posing a threat of terrorism.

Cognitive schemas used by subjects in the study to conceptualise integration diverged and appeared to emphasise different aspects of the individual’s perceptions of integration. For example, Nabeel’s schemata are value dependant, whereas Nezar conceptualises integration in an identificational sense. However, Rehana’s schema is constituted of tangible contributions to society, such as paying taxes. The interesting observation made in analysing the data is that the functional is not independent from the cultural on certain occasions. For example, one needs to have the right attitude of altruism to volunteer, but is functional at the same time by doing voluntary work. Chipping in and volunteering, of course, have something to do with the values of fair go, citizenship and civic duties. In other words, it is clear that occasionally the functional overlaps the cultural and abstract notions of citizenship.

Participants in the study were highly engaged in the discussions about how they conceptualised meanings of integration. Their cognitive frames of what integration means varied. They were asked three broad questions followed by prompt questions. These questions are: What does integration mean to you? What are indicators of successful integration? And what are indicators of failure of integration? In the next sections, the thesis discusses the various schematic meaning of integration that the Muslim participants of this study conveyed.

5.5. Schematic meanings of integration

The introduction of the topic of integration to a private conversation seems to have offered the opportunity for participants to talk about themselves and their understandings of integration. A basic feature of the concept of integration is that participants in the study interpreted it differently based on their individual lived experiences of integration. Their interpretations are wide ranging, and evidently particular notions of citizenship inform Muslims’ understandings of integration. These are generally ideal discourses of citizenship which enlighten ways of seeing people and events. The study found that the most noticeable of these schematic discursive structures that Muslims used are as follows: good citizen, flexible citizen, productive citizen and respectful citizen. Accordingly, these discursive structures were coded by
using the two letters denoting a particular schema, for example good citizen (GC), flexible citizen (FC), productive citizen (PC), and respectful citizen (RC). But it was also apparent from the un-coded data that there are more identifiable sub schemas under each of the four categories of schemata. This necessitated a further coding procedure. For example, a good citizen originally coded as GC was explained to have economic contribution, thus was coded again (GCE), may also have service to country coded as (GCS) and is possibly educated coding as (GCED). The following sections of this chapter will discuss these schemas of integration.

5.5.1. Good citizen schema

The frame of good citizen is a dominant feature in the in-depth interviews conducted with the research participants. The way in which people understand themselves as citizens is likely to have a significant impact on their perception of rights and obligations and on whether they participate, in what form and why (Thorson, 2012). Muslims’ conceptualisation of citizenship is in line with the other various conceptualisations of good citizen in the general community. In their responses to the research questions, Muslims made a number of positive statements relating to their conception of what it means to integrate into the wider Australian society. In other words, they attempted to explain what they perceived represented qualities of good citizenship. The series of quotations are from the interview data of study subjects and inform how individuals framed their answers to the question asking what the indicators of successful integration are. Samples of statements indicating the GC schema include:

Hussein: and it doesn't matter what you believe. You know, Christians, Muslims, or Buddhists or something, because all religion tells you not to do any cheating, stealing or crime.

Nezar if you are a good neighbour; if you help your neighbour; if you care about him; if you talk with him frankly with frank discussion; open discussion; you express your views; he expresses his views; I mean, this is integration in Australia.

Soko You are um, you know, you are compassionate towards your employees, when they face difficulties. Uh, and when they cause you grief and cause you inconvenience, uh, you’re able to deal with
it because of the values that Islam teaches you about being compassionate towards others, being understanding towards others. Um, you are trustworthy, when it comes to business dealings.

Fenti but at the moment I'm in Australia, my duty is to produce the good citizen, it is my children, that's my responsibility. So in Australia I will continue to be a good citizen people, educated and all these things.

Rehana I'm not shy of saying "hello" to a stranger, if we are in a queue, let it be in a bus, in a post office or shop, if they give me a smile I give a smile back.

Muslims participants appeared to describe schemas which they believed constituted good citizenship, and one of these schemas is undertaking a desirable practice such as volunteerism. All the above sample statements are made in relation to what respondents perceived to be qualities of a good citizen. It is understood that this understanding of integration is as a result of the cognitive schemata used by participants. For example, reference to different aspects of good citizenship such as compassion, being a good neighbour, and the simple, everyday greetings to a stranger could be directly related to the individual participant’s family and work background. The inference from this is that it is possible that even Muslims’ conceptions of integration and the frames they use are dictated by individual circumstances. The challenge is that the schema of good citizen is equated to the concept of democracy, which is quite often enacted in a particular context in which positioning, method and motives play an important role (Pykett et al., 2010). The notion of being a good citizen is translated into being an active and participatory citizen (Bolzendahl & Coffe, 2013), and in particular undertaking a role as a volunteer. For example, Spalek (2008, p. 83) states the following:

Underpinned by the principle of ‘active citizenship’, whereby individuals are encouraged to volunteer their services, to participate in and contribute to civil society, communities are viewed as an important resource for tackling crime and incivility, by working with local criminal justice organisations, as well as other statutory and voluntary sector organisations.
In the sphere of participating in the Australian community’s voluntary activism, Muslims in this country appear to be integrating reasonably well, as shown by ABS Census data on good citizenship and volunteerism (see Table 5.2 below). In particular, the Census reveals the figures on persons (excluding overseas visitors) by religious affiliation, by citizenship and by those undertaking voluntary work. In these areas of altruism and patriotism, Census data shows that Muslims do participate in volunteer activities and are willing to give back to the community. Out of the total of 2,824,250 people who undertook voluntary work for the country in the latest 2011 Census, 21,461 Muslims are represented as volunteering, which is about 6 per cent as opposed to the 16 per cent of non-Muslims who reported doing some voluntary work in the same Census.

In explanation of this data, it is clear that on one hand, volunteerism is an indicator of full participation in unpaid communal services in the nation because in percentage terms, whilst Australian Muslims constitute only 2.2 percent of the population (ABS, 2011) the 6 percent of them involved in voluntary work is a significantly high figure. Assumptions can be made that Muslim participants may be referring to their religious duty of care to the elderly and relatives as a voluntary work. The “not a volunteer” category was reported by 58 per cent of Muslims, while 62 per cent of their non-Muslim counterparts reported that they were “not a volunteer”. These rather contradictory results could be attributed to different conceptualisations by Muslims and the wider census population of what is considered to be voluntary work. The fact that there was a strong element of faith in Muslims’ conceptualisation of integration lends credibility to this assumption.

Table 5.2 Volunteerism among Muslim and non-Muslim Australian citizens

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Voluntary Work</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Non-Muslim</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australian</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>21,461</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2,709,920</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2,824,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian</td>
<td>Not a volunteer</td>
<td>204,856</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>10,566,147</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>11,241,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
<td>14,018</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>475,436</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>547,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>112,590</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3,344,568</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3,457,158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>352,925</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>17,096,071</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>18,261,807</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, the frames of good citizen schemas that Muslim participants used were diverse, and the thesis forms the view that this could well be true between immigrant groups, and between a group of immigrants and the native population which hosts them. This
then necessitates the need for cross-contextual ways in which to judge various claims about the capacities, behaviours and attitudes of good citizens (Pykett et al., 2010). In the scholarly academic literature, the expression of good citizenship arises in different contexts and domains. For instance, Shapcott (2013) used the term “good citizen” to describe a responsible member of a community of nations. Others such as Lawler (2007) used similar expressions to describe countries in their conduct in international affairs. The term is also used in the corporate world to describe a good corporate citizen (Petrovic-Lazarevic, 2010). On a much broader scale than the national, considerable differences were noted in the case of what a “good European citizen” is, and these differences occurred at the levels of the policy makers, civil society and ordinary citizens (Van Deth, 2009). Against this background, it is important to understand Muslims’ conceptualisations of being good citizens. It can reasonably be stated that the definition of a good citizen in this case is only the Muslim view, and the definition may be different in other groups.

5.5.2. Flexible citizen schema

In addition to being a good citizen, study participants suggested that flexibility is another worthy quality of citizenship and integration. Muslim participants’ belief in flexibility supports views mentioned in the literature which suggest that existing concepts of citizenship which imply lifelong attachment to one nation-state fail to comprehend the realities of individuals acting in a globalised society (Frey, 2003). Notions of the flexible citizen as suggested by participants varied, and included changing oneself by accommodating others, learning about other cultures and making friends outside the Muslim community. Sample statements relating to these notions of the flexible citizen include:

Rehana

I haven’t put my children in Islamic school because I feel that they need to be knowing there are so many different peoples. So for me, I feel, if you only have Muslim friends; you only go to Islamic school; you only live in a Muslim area; you only go to the masjid; you don’t; it’s like you, the only time maybe you go to the shops; but then you only go to the Muslim shops; the halal butcher, the Muslim, you’re not really, because you’re not seeing the wider society.
Fatuma  Because so long as you still want to cover your face when you are
only being asked do you want to drive and do you want to acquire a
driving license you should take the covering on the basis of safety
or the basis of identification. So, I would not say that the Muslims
have integrated.

A key component of this argument is that cultural rigidity was explained to mean lack
of integration. However, it is interesting to note the inconsistency inherent in Muslim
participants’ understanding of integration in this study which calls for flexible
citizenship, and the study’s findings in the previous chapter (Chapter Four) where
Muslims specifically promoted maintenance of aspects of their religion. Despite these
apparent contradictions, some Muslim participants welcome and encourage cultural
adjustments into the dominant host culture. Samples of statements relating to this
understanding are the following:

Sadik  You need to adjust of course. Definitely, when it comes to
integration you have to adjust. When you move into another country
you need to adjust, you know?

Soko  You have people, if they come to Australia and they start having
barbeques um, and they, you know, they start um, doing things
which are considered Australian this is a cultural conformity which
is not only harmless, I think it’s beneficial.

These seemingly contradictory positions held by Muslim participants are not difficult to
explain. For instance, it appears as though Muslims in Australia value the country’s
diversity, whilst at the same time making claims that they need to maintain their unique
cultural and religious identity. Their views of the flexible citizen are, to some extent,
aligned with the shifting and changing meanings of integration and citizenship that were
experienced over decades as a result of increasing diversity of citizens within a bounded
nation state territory. Staeheli (2010) asserts that citizenship is “continuously in
formation, never static, settled or complete” (p. 398). A body of contemporary scholarly
literature also supports Muslims’ views of flexible citizenship, which calls for the
departure from bounded to flexible citizenship (Russell & Kleyn, 2013; Nyamnjoh,
2013; Nyamnjoh, 2008; Benhabib, 2007; Mitchell, 2013).
In the field of immigrant incorporation, the notion of flexible citizenship has transpired in the form of changing and shifting models of integration which have initially arisen in the form of membership of a community (Bloemraad, 2006). These modes of integration have then moved from post national (Soysal, 2012) to multicultural citizenship (Kymlicka, 2011) and in the recent past, to cosmopolitan citizenship (Beck, 2014). The thesis finds that Muslim participants recognised this shift in integration from uniformity to unity in diversity, including religious diversity. The following sample statement describes how Muslims navigate through the dichotomies of solidarity and diversity.

So it means that the parent have to give up this almost fantastic, in a fantasy, in a dream situation where life back home was perfect and better in all ways, and then here in Australia, my children, my child is not, has not become what I imagine what they should become. So, there's that level of having to give up, but giving up my entire faith, well Christians didn't have to do that when they came out to Australia. Christianity is not a native Australian religion.

Arguably, Muslim participants are engaged in a process of negotiating belonging and being different at the same time. In the sense of belonging, they understand that one must participate and interact with fellow citizens in Australia. In explaining what integration means, Rehana takes particular issue with the self-isolating attitudes some Muslims have, simply staying within Muslim circles of socialisation.

Similarly, Gregory’s flexible citizen schema is critical of the attitudes of some Muslims who are resisting their children’s wishes to adopt and apply parts of their lives and experiences as members of the wider society. Soko, on the other hand, explains aspects of Australian culture that Muslims should not be afraid to adopt and gives the examples of the proud Australian outdoor culture of barbequing in suburban parks and back yards. However, it is Fatuma’s schematic conception that takes issue with the inflexibility of some Muslims in matters of security and safety significant to the nation; in particular the reports that some veiled Muslim women refuse to uncover their faces for official identification.
While Muslims generally hold strong ideas about flexible citizenship and provided the positive statements above, several of the respondents observed that this notion of flexibility is limited by what is acceptable in Islamic tradition. Samples of statements from Muslim participants who made these observations include:

Rehana  If I go to your house and you have a drink, I’m not going to sit and eat with you; I’m not so strict about those things. If I go to some friend’s place and there’s you know music, I’m not gonna, I don’t want those kind of things.

Soko  If people come to Australia, like I said, and they go to the beach, go to the beach, and the women are dressed in ‘burqini’ and they swim with their families on one side, you know, a little bit away from the others, because you know, they feel a little self-conscious, um, I find, I think this is healthy.

Gregory  Well, if somebody said if they don't go to the pub, well yeah, I know a lot of people who don't go to the pub. My nephew's wife doesn't drink alcohol, she's a Christian. She doesn't even drink tea or coffee. So does that mean she needs to be ostracized from Australian society even though her ancestors were sixth generation Australian or something, because she refuses to go to the pub or drink alcohol? Is she less Australian now? It doesn't make sense, that's not an objective measure to determine whether or not people have integrated into society or not.

The notion of flexible citizenship is not new to the debates of immigrant integration. The term flexible citizenship has appeared in debates about the transnational activities of some immigrant groups in Canada and Europe. In the case of Canada, Waters (2010) explains the flexible citizen in the context of Chinese economic immigrants, where at least one parent returns to the country of origin to maximize the families’ economic wellbeing whilst at the same time leaving children behind with their partner so they can obtain a good education. He calls these families “Astronaut families and satellite kids” (Waters, 2010, p. 72).
5.5.3. Participatory citizen schema

The third of the four schemas that were dominant in the participants’ understandings of integration is the notion of the productive citizen (PC). In this schema, topics relating to labour market participation, education and paying taxes took prominence in the discussions of the interviewees and were repeatedly explained as meaning integration. Unlike the other three schemas, the productive citizen schema is noticeably conceptualised consistently and is explained as having a job, educating oneself and engaging in business and economic activities for the benefit of the individual and the wider society. Sample statements of productive citizen schema include:

Nezar You can’t just be observing people going to their jobs or their work and you staying at home and you just saying that you are integrating.

The schema of the participatory citizen is the most general of all the schemas and encompasses individual immigrants’ participation in the national economic, social and political life. Based on personal experiences, attitudes and preference dictated by age, gender and other factors, different people emphasised different participation areas. For instance, the following are comments from some Muslim participants who stated that education was an important factor in participation:

Nabeel First of all as I told you I got my bachelor’s degree in this country and for me a bachelor’s degree from Australia is a big thing. I mean, and then, uh, like, I came from Pakistan, and Pakistan doesn’t have that international standard that Australia has got.

Sadiq What it means to me personally is, integration for me is when I’m, I’m productive within the community, whether I’m going to work or I’m studying and involved with the day to day life in Australia. For me that’s integration.

Nezar Um, second, I’m uh, doing my best to be uh, part of the society in terms of uh, in terms of uh, like, hard work, either by doing my PhD or after that by getting a job on this basis.
Previous research in immigrant community participation in the national life supports education as being an important element in the integration of newly arrived groups. For example, research into Canadian immigrants finds that increased participation in tertiary education is linked to improved career opportunities, thus leading to full integration (Adamuti-Trache & Sweet, 2010). But in addition to education and training, other examples of the participatory citizen include the economic development of the self and society. As illustrated in the comments below, Muslims’ schema of integration is very broad and includes having a business, engaging in import and export activities and issues identified as helping Australia’s economic progress. Muslim participants’ focus on the business side of participatory citizenship came with comments that defend the integration of early Muslim settlers in this country. Specifically referring to early Muslim settlers, the following are the comments made by people who have become successful in business, thus showing their allegiance to Australia.

Nabeel  
Yeah, I think in 1860s Muslims, Afghan Muslims, they came first time in Australia, they started trade in Australia and they changed Australia a little bit, I think, they changed Australia a little bit and now, even now a lot of Muslim countries they are doing business as I’m doing business in Australia. I’m importing a lot of stuff from my own country and providing, you know importing and exporting and providing goods to them, as trying to help this country.

Nabeel  
What I would say, they have a big involvement in developing this country. Especially a very famous family, called the Deen family, which came like uh, 100 or 200 years ago to this country. And they have some big names and they are some people who are in high positions in Australia. And who are doing good for Australia.

Soko  
Functioning as an employer, functioning with my clients, uh, working in society uh, you know, uh, in my field of work um, you know, inter- uh, what is it? Uh, having to deal with customers, having to deal with clients, who are perhaps 98 – 99% not Muslim, uh, from all different walks of life.
Despite the above commentary and claims by the Muslim participants that they successfully participated in a number of aspects, issues Muslims identified in their participatory citizen schema of integration above are absent from the current debates about Muslim integration. This absence is not a surprise to this researcher as immigrant groups are generally considered to integrate some aspects of the host community faster than other aspects. This is what is termed in the literature as segmented integration. As such, the absence of any debate about these aspects of economic integration could be seen as affirmation of their success in this part of integration.

5.5.4. Respectful citizen schema

The fourth schema of integration is that of the respectful citizen (RC). In their conceptualisation of integration, Muslim participants have provided examples of attitudes and behaviours that they considered respectful. At the forefront of interviewees’ conceptions of the respectful citizen are respect for the diversity of the Australian population and respect for the rule of law in this country. Again, there are wide ranging opinions about this schema and the emphasis placed on it varied. For instance, Nabeel and Mustapha stress the cultural, religious and racial diversity of Australia which they should respect. Samples of statements referring to the respectful citizen schema include:

Nabeel Here because, in my country I mean, like uh, there is only my community. But when I came here I saw, black people, white people, grey, all communities I saw here. So I should rather instead of like uh, talking against them like I should give respect to them, everybody is equal.

Mustapha I have to give respect to each and every individual in Australia regardless of his background or culture, because if we believe if it is a multicultural society then we should have a rule for accepting others, if we don't have a rule for accepting others then the word integration is wrong.

But on the other hand, Gregory and Sadiq emphasise respect for the norms of the society and following the rule of law. For example, the following statements take the
issue of individual Muslims who disregard certain aspects of council laws, specifically the council regulations which assign specific locations for the slaughtering of animals.

Sadiq Integration is when you accept the law of the land. I’ll start with the first one, which is, I obey the law of this country. Follow it to the tilt (sic) As long as you’re decent, obeying the laws of this country you do rightful things by your family and the people of this country you’re fine.

Gregory Following the law properly. Whatever form. What I mean is like, you know, could be road rules, could be, for example, people complain about not being able to have halal at home, so they want to slaughter in the back yard. There are reasons why it's not allowed in Australia and it's not because the Australian government hates Muslims. It's got nothing to do with it. It's health regulations.

However, in the following statement, Fenti’s schema of the respectful citizen goes further than the other two participants’ understandings of integration and appears to be intolerant, as she is against Muslims imposing their culture and values on others.

Fenti Respect this country’s meanings, we don't as Muslim we don't push so much what we believe, the one the Australian will not understand, and this is what I want, you do it my way, Islam doesn't teach this.

The schema of the respectful citizen appears as if Muslim participants made these comments to fend off the criticism that they lack respect for the law in Australia, and the notion that perhaps they are even trying to change the laws of this country. This is an area in which Muslims are constantly criticised by the media, which feed fears about the Muslim presence in Australia (Black & Sadiq, 2011). Assertions about Sharia law in Australia suggesting that Muslims are attempting to impose their religious laws on Australia’s majority Christian population are false (Abdalla, 2012). But despite this, attitudes of the wider non-Muslim society in Australia towards any form of Sharia remain negative (Abdalla, 2012). Black and Sadiq (2011, p. 383) classify Sharia as the “good sharia” and “bad sharia” and explain that the Australian government and majority non-Muslim population are more resistant to the family law side of Sharia (marriage,
divorce, inheritance) than to the banking and finance sector. This contradiction between embracing Sharia law in the political and economic arena on one hand and rejecting it in the personal domain on the other hand is referred to as form of neo-liberal multiculturalism (Roose & Possamai, 2015).

Relevant to the Muslim respectful citizen schema is how the Islamic community is viewed by the wider society and its respect and obedience to the laws of the land. An absence of obedience to the law is what is termed in some scholarly literature as delinquent citizenship (Ríos-Rojas, 2011). A number of responses and comments made by Muslim participants appear to refute the notion of delinquency, which is a narrative adopted mainly by the media and which has been used in some political rhetoric (Rane & Hersi, 2012). Currently in Australia, the intelligence assessment is that over sixty Australian Muslim citizens, young men and women, have joined the notorious Islamic State to fight in Iraq and Syria (White, 2014). It is these reports that perhaps create perceptions of delinquency and of Muslim immigrants’ lack of respect for the law. Internationally, research into the experiences of immigrant youth in Barcelona, Spain, suggests that immigrant youth are confused by contradictory discourses that identify them as terrorists at some times and victims that need to be rescued at other times (Ríos-Rojas, 2011). Although no similar research has been conducted in Australia, it could be argued that Muslim youth in Australia have difficulties navigating their way through similar contradictions.

5.5.5. Loyal citizen schema

In their conceptualisations of meanings of integration, the Muslim participants in this study have also invoked notions of the loyal citizen. Terrorism and extremism have been closely linked with Muslim identity in the past decade, and this, together with the constant reference to Muslims as being outside the realm of loyal citizenry, has caused a sense of loyalty to be at the forefront of respondents’ concerns, and this was not a surprise to the researcher. Research shows that there is some suspicion about the loyalty Muslims have to Australia and to parts of Western Europe (Poynting, 2002). For example, Poynting (2002) states that representatives of the tabloid media and personalities on commercial television and talkback radio demand that immigrant leaders of Arabic background declare their allegiance to Australia. Similarly, in his speech to the American Academy of Religion (AAR), Esposito (2014) stated that
Muslims in the United States and Europe continued to be visible at every level of society but faced questions regarding their loyalty to their new homeland. Loyalty is another schema that was apparent from the conversations with the interviewees. The schema of the loyal citizen was strongly advanced by a number of informants. Here are a couple of sample statements:

Nabeel They really don’t like this country. And they say, I mean, uh, I don’t know why but they are. I have many experiences I have seen people like, they live here but even then they talk bullshit against Australia.

Fenti Like I'm so cranky when in the school when our children singing the national anthem and these parents just refuse it in front of these little kids, that is just make me cranky.

Hussein Like I said if something should happen to this country, for example if there's a war, you know. They all have to put their hand together, and if they're all called, ah for war then they have to be accepting it.

As per the above statements, Muslim participants have plainly expressed their patriotism and loyalty towards Australia. For example, saying negative things and not singing the national anthem were identified as being signs of disloyalty. Some participants however went even further and explained that loyalty needs to be shown, not only to a visible extent, but also in an intangible way, such as being content and satisfied with life. The following are sample statements in this context:

Soko Integration to me means that the person not only accepts um, the new country where they’re, you know, where their host country where they’re settling in, but they’re more than happy to be there. They see an obvious benefit in being there.

Nezar This is a very high sign of integration for them and it’s a very high sign of integration for me. Because if this blood is going to mix with anyone’s blood in the society, that means you are fully integrated.
Gregory: Now I know of people. Lebanese people for example, but others also, who have had children here, that were born here in Australia and they say I've, I'm fed up with Australia I want to go back and take their kids back to Lebanon, or whatever, and they don't even last a couple of weeks, because their children are completely Australianised.

In the above statements, Muslim participants seem to stress the importance of being loyal to Australia. By employing the schema of loyalty, they appear to understand that being productive, respectful and flexible is not enough to integrate them into the society. However it is not clear from the analysis whether Muslim participants conveniently provided these responses to counter the documented popular narratives in both the public and political discussions that question Muslim immigrant loyalty to the nation state. The schema of the loyal citizen informed the researcher in most of the integration schemas Muslims provided. It appears as though Muslims are aware of the current dominant discourse of integration that emphasises dominant values and norms, and that they define integration through cultural commitment or loyalty (De Leeuw & Van Wichelen, 2012).

However, an inherent problem has been reported in conceptualising integration as being loyal to a particular bounded locality. This is especially problematic at a time of increased ambiguity about where, and to whom, citizens owe loyalty in a globalised society (Canovan, 2000; Johnson, 2013). Interestingly, the researcher also notes that the Muslim schema of loyalty exists not at an abstract level but is occurring during the experiences of everyday activities and conversations. The emphasis placed on not speaking negatively about Australia and singing the national anthem are examples of participants’ focus on everyday activities rather than on a theoretical discussion of integration. Muslim participants appear to be attempting to express loyalty to the dominant majority and want to identify with them, and to be included in the society. It is also apparent that they understand the significance the wider society places on the national flag and the national anthem.

A number of Western European immigrant receiving countries, including Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Austria, have recently introduced formal citizenship tests, loyalty requirements, and ceremonies to increase the value and
meaning of citizenship for immigrants who are becoming naturalised (Joppke, 2013). It is specifically these citizenship tests that have become standard in many Western societies since the 11th September 2001 that are in direct contradiction to Muslim participants’ understandings of integration. For example, in Holland, the tests’ emphasis on secular liberalism, and their focus on cultural tropes such as sexual freedom, gender equality, freedom of speech and individuality are seen as indicators of Dutchness (De Leeuw & Van Wichelen, 2012). De Leeuw and Van Wichelen (2012) agree that this definition of integration leaves little room for cultural and religious variations. But Muslim participants in this study take the opposite view of integration schemas, and whilst still being loyal to Australia, provide a meaning of integration that provides little room for their cultural and religious variation.

5.6. Conclusion

Integration has been conceptualised in a variety of cognitive schematic frames. Broader frames of functional versus cultural schemata of integration were obvious in the Muslims’ understandings of integration. Absent from functional integration indicators which Muslim participants identified are housing and health issues. These are notions of integration identified by integration policy documents in Europe and beyond. For example, Ager and Strang (2008) refer to these areas of integration as the markers and means of integration. The apparent absence of these important areas of functional integration could be explained as being related to the privileged position of Australians, including the new migrants, in securing acceptable housing and their accessibility to Australia’s universal health care system—Medicare. Migrant integration policies and programs are nation centred and dictated by local circumstances. But in order to benchmark itself against other liberal democracies in Europe, Australia has recently joined the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), which rates policies of member countries and how they perform against a set of criteria regarding their integration policies. In the conceptual framework of defining core domains of integration, Australia does better than comparable migrant receiving European countries (MIPEX data in Europe).

Based on information discussed in Chapter Four, in the cultural frames of integration in the Muslim context overall it is the case that Muslims are functionally integrating. However, cultural integration appears to be an area in which Muslims attract criticism.
from the wider society. Debates about values and culture are included in the general
discussions of integration. Emphasising the cultural rather than the functional, talking
down and ridiculing Australia is seen to be an indicator of lack of integration. Just as the
beach loving, surfing culture is not a measure of integration, Muslim dress such as the
*burqa* or Muslim men wearing a beard is not an indicator of lack of integration.
Employment is directly referred to as benefitting a migrant’s social integration and this
is another example of how the cultural and attitudinal markers are not independent of
the functional indicators of integration. This study concludes that the demand for
conformity to mainstream culture is perceived by some Muslims as being prejudicial. In
fact, meanings of integration that suggest conformism tendencies face resistance.
Instead Muslim immigrants who hold participatory realistic notions of integration may
have better chances of achieving full integration.
Chapter 6. Integrated Analysis and Discussion

6.1. Introduction

International migration is a topical issue in international affairs. The reasons for this may be due to the fact that international migration is a phenomenon that crosses national borders and affects two or more nation states (Castles, 2007). Managing the diversity inherent in international migration is the new, emerging challenge of international migration policies. In most countries of the Western world, those which generally resettle a significant number of migrants face significant challenges in incorporating immigrant newcomers. Researchers have noted these challenges in Australia, North America and Europe (see Li, 2003; Bloemraad, 2006; Wets, 2006; MacEinri, 2007; Castles, 2007). As a result, immigrant integration remains an area of significant interest to governments, policy makers, academics and the media. The increase in the global movement of people will be further complicated by the sheer diversity in the people migrating from one country to another.

In the realisation of this ever-increasing diversity, to date, a number of countries in the west are making significant changes to their migration policies. For example, countries like Australia, New Zealand and Canada have started to shift their immigration intake priorities (Akbari & McDonald, 2014). These countries have become focused on attracting skilled migration, on expanding temporary migration visa regimes, appealing to international students with a view to some securing permanent settlement after graduating from universities, as well as implementing reforms to their refugee and humanitarian programs (Akbari & McDonald, 2014). Immigration reforms in these countries are not only limited to migrant intake but extend to the successful settlement of new immigrants in their host societies. Australia and some Western European countries have indeed undergone some significant changes in this area (Hollifield, Martin & Orrenius, 2014). With an increase in the diversity of migrants coming to these countries, the challenges of maintaining a socially cohesive nation have become a reality and have necessitated reform. There has been a shift away from a focus on functional integration to an emphasis on migrants adopting the dominant society’s culture and values (McHugh, 2014). It is what is now termed in the contemporary international migration literature “civic integration” (Goodman, 2010). One explanation
for this cultural notion of integration is perhaps that some members of host society groups have a perceived fear of immigrants who have an unfamiliar culture and religion (Koopmans, Lancee, & Schaeffer, 2014). Similarly, geo-political consideration may have led to anxiety about new immigrant groups, especially those which originate in regions where extremist and terrorist groups operate.

Public and political discussions of immigrant integration continue to take a significant space in the scholarly literature of international migration, and this will continue into the future, as constant, large flows of migrants challenge destination countries to find innovative ways to meet their needs and promote their integration (McHugh, 2014). Nation states often attempt to make the necessary reforms in this significant public policy area, however the approaches adopted by different nation states differ and are mainly dictated by local circumstances and the types of groups of immigrants involved (Bertossi & Duyvendak, 2012). They are also influenced by context and country, and by which particular groups of immigrants are involved (International Organisation for Migration, 2014). For example, the Netherlands is asserted to be one Western European country which is retreating from pluralist forms of integration and is instead adopting an assimilationist form of immigrant integration, due to popular anxiety caused by profound changes in the Dutch society (Entzinger, 2014).

As a country with a long and generally positive history of migration, Australia has introduced a set of citizenship tests for its immigrant communities (Bloemraad, 2012). Civic integration is the latest of Australia’s constantly shifting immigrant incorporation policies, which has progressed from segregated assimilative forms to integrationist forms, and then to multiculturalism (International Organisation for Migration, 2014). Australia’s adoption of civic integration is in line with shifts in the immigrant incorporation policies of many other Western states (Entzinger, 2014). These significant policy shifts are believed to be in response to a perceived lack in the integration of migrants in general, but Muslim immigrants in particular, who are often seen as a group which poses problematic integration (Dunn et al., 2008; Bouma et al., 2011; Markus, 2011; Markus, 2012).

As governments adjust immigrant incorporation policies, they face the difficulties of negotiating the meanings of integration stipulated by the different actors in the integration process. This thesis has previously established that integration is conceived
as a loose concept with different interpretations, thus producing multiple meanings (see Chapter Three). However, when it comes to Muslims in Australia, in spite of the absence of any agreed definition of integration in the scholarly literature, Muslims become the target of those who espouse the view that diversity threatens social cohesion (Fozdar, 2012). This happens without any acknowledgement of the existence of multiple interpretations of integration adopted by different groups, societies and actors. The existence of competing frames of immigrant integration is well documented in Chapter Three of this thesis, in which these discourses were categorised as those adopted by the media, the state and academia. This thesis therefore takes the view that Muslim conceptualisations of integration lie within one of these competing frames of integration. It goes further to suggest that there may not be a problematic integration of Muslims in Australia, but there is certainly a clash of integration frames evident in both the international migration literature and the responses provided by the Muslim participants in this study. In the next section, the thesis discusses this clash of integration frames.

6.2. The clash of integration frames

Integration has been defined by many constituent actors, for example, the media, the state and academia, however none of these actors has provided a consistent and uniform meaning of integration, and in some cases, they have offered competing immigrant integration frames (see Chapter Three). There are also variances in the way in which integration is framed between different countries, cities and regions. For example, in their examination of the integration frames of eight Italian regions, Campomori and Caponio (2013, pp. 169-171) found, “A social welfare frame, an assimilationist frame and a would-be citizen frame”. In an examination of the thesis’s findings, it is apparent that Muslims have made a hefty contribution to this clash of integration frames.

Muslims have accepted and embraced certain frames of integration, mainly those which relate to the functional elements of integration, such as social and economic participation in the host society. For the most part, the meanings of integration Muslims provided were similar to those advanced by immigrant integration literature. In fact, for Muslims in Australia, the prevailing conceptualisation of integration was to participate in the social, economic and political life of this country. However, even within these broader conceptualisations, there were clear discrepancies in how much emphasis was
placed on one integration factor (employment integration) over another (political integration). For instance, while the participants’ responses to questions about employment integration were forthcoming, their responses to questions about political integration were much more reserved.

The question is what are the barriers that impede individual Muslims to participating in the political systems of Australia? It is difficult to answer this question without empirical examination, but in a speech at the Sydney Institute after losing the election of 2004 in the seat of Greenway for the Labor party, the current Muslim federal Member of Parliament hints that Islam and religion was used against him in the national election campaign of 2004 (Husic, 2006). Husic does not however blame this alone as the reason for his loss but cites other factors such as the effective use of fear of interest rate hikes under a Labor government. However, it can be reasonably hypothesised that the current Islamophobia experienced by many Muslim citizens in Australia is possibly one factor contributing to the lower level of Muslim political participation.

Whilst agreeing with the general understandings of integration in the wider scholarly literature, there were discrepancies between individual participants in their responses to these conceptualisations. There were notable differences in their preferences of one form of integration over another. These thematically varied definitions of integration offered by study participants reflect the larger disagreements about the meanings of integration in the literature. It is believed that these variances are not limited to group differences, but are obvious in personal and individual spheres. The study stresses that participants have also subscribed to integration frames that emphasise civic duties and citizenship, in particular the rights and responsibilities of a citizen.

The integration frames that Muslims question are assimilationist and culturally dense frames of integration. In particular, Muslims appear to be contesting the new and popular discourse of integration which emphasises dominant values and norms, one that defines civic membership through cultural commitment (De Leeuw & Van Wichelan, 2012). At the same time, the study found that whilst the meanings Muslims generally assign to the term integration are by and large similar to those prevalent in the scholarly literature on integration, it is however the case that emphasis was placed on how perceptions, belief systems, culture and values play a part in how integration is defined. In analysing the research data, it is apparent that Muslims had mixed reactions and
responses to issues pertaining to cultural integration. In this study, religion and integration were at the forefront of many of the discussions with participants. This was not a surprise, as the thesis findings are supported by the findings from previous research, which found that beliefs, values and symbols weigh into the policy debates about immigration, specifically in discussions relating to immigrant integration (Lahav, 2004).

The thesis findings are also strengthened by findings of previous research which confirm that religiosity is an important determinant of how new immigrants self-identify by ethnicity or religion (Zimmermann et al., 2008; Mitchell, 2013). Religiosity is key to how integration is framed by Muslims. It is important to note that in addition to religion, research conducted in Germany found that different characteristics have also played a role in determining immigrants’ feelings about being German (Zimmermann et al., 2008). In this particular study, for males the research found that religion, education in the home country and ethnicities are pre migration characteristics which influenced how immigrants felt about being German (Zimmermann et al., 2008). For females, the research found that both pre and post migration characteristics played a role in how females felt about Germany. It can be concluded from this observation that belief systems, values and cultures influence not only immigrant communities but also their host societies’ acceptance of newcomers. As Van der Noll (2014, p. 63) explains, “Traditional morality is expected to induce opposition towards the visibility and presence of Islam in the German public sphere because this conflicts with the traditional beliefs and behaviours and provides space for other lifestyles”.

The findings of this research also confirm the suggestion by Cesari (2007, p. 56) that “Religion and Islam are powerful elements of identity formation that can weave together people of different nations, cultures and countries”. Despite the diversity of the focus group and interview participants in terms of nationalities, cultures and countries of origin, it was found that issues of integration were always defined in accordance with what is perceived to be acceptable to a Muslim person. Whilst Muslims condition their integration to what is permissible within their religion, similarly, Jackson (2011) refers to immigrant integration in relation to the biblical and mythological insights. However, it is the phenomenon of Islam as a transnational religion that is perceived as presenting a dilemma to the notion and concept of immigrant integration. This dilemma has only
become an issue in the recent past, as Islam as a religion and Muslims as people have a history of migration to non-Muslim societies with no major concerns. According to Eickelman and Piscatori (1990) Muslim societies have a long history of movement to non-Muslim countries for migration, pilgrimage and commercial and other reasons.

Not only does Muslim society’s history of migration predate modern migration times, but also the causes and precursors of Muslim migration to places of non-Muslim populations are centuries old. A noteworthy example is the contemporary issue of asylum seeking, where individuals and groups who face persecution for racial and religious reasons seek protection in other places. In his time, the prophet Mohammad asked a group of his close companions to flee from the persecution they faced from the Meccan Arabs in what is today Saudi Arabia, and migrate to the Abyssinian land of a just Christian king, Negus (Elmadmad, 2008). Abyssinia today is Ethiopia, and in this country Muslims and Christians share a history of living together harmoniously.

The notion of more secularised Western society encountering a heightened resurgence of Islam and its alleged transnational Islamic agenda is of particular interest to the thesis. Globalisation poses its own challenges in this sphere and whether or not Muslim individuals should identify with the nation or the global Islamic identity (Ummah) is contentious (Hassan, 2006). According to Hassan (2006, p. 311) “The concept of Ummah embodies the universalism of Islam and provides a framework for religious unity, which accommodates the cultural diversity of believers”. But pledging allegiance to the community of faith (Ummah) beyond the national boundaries of the state may create a tension between a more secular host society and the Muslims in its midst. In our analysis of research data, participants did not indicate identification with Ummah (community of faith) but were rather seeking acceptance and accommodation of their faith by the wider society.

At the outset, the thesis notes that there could well be a discrepancy between what Muslim participant say in the group discussions and how they behave individually outside the group discussions. Observations made by the researcher show there are clear indications that Muslim participants who were the children of third or fourth generation Muslims had slightly altered their performative outlook as Muslims. This means that even though the majority of Muslim participants stated the importance of the faith in the integration process, there is a subtle process of mutual adaptation and integration.
between Muslims and the wider society. Studies show that ties to homeland gradually fade to some extent, but religious ties may not fade as quickly, and individuals who have spent a longer time in their receiving countries certainly accommodate other people of different faith more than do those who have settled more recently (Harles, 1997).

Australia is a nation of people of multiple faiths, and Muslims know their constitutional rights to practise their faith. Muslim participants appear to be making strong claims to conditioning their integration on acceptance of their religion. Their conceptualisation of integration in this way is also possibly a rejection of complete assimilation. As much as Australia is a multicultural society, it is also a multi-faith society due the large number of religious belief systems practised by its diverse citizen groups. Researchers have already noted that Australian citizenship has “religious features” and suggest that multicultural countries like Australia should consider themselves to be multi-faith rather than secular (Hudson, 2003, p. 429). Despite their small number, Muslims in Australia are already attracting significant attention in public and political discussions relating to terrorism, radicalization and extremism. In this climate of fear, the proposition of turning multicultural Australia into multi-faith Australia is somewhat enthusiastic and is not beneficial to the debate.

In fact, there is an outright rejection of any call for the accommodation of Sharia law in Australia (Abdalla, 2013), but what is perhaps missed in the debate is the fact that only small numbers of Muslims call for the partial application of Sharia law, and this is mainly in the areas of marriage and divorce, Islamic banking and female circumcision. Whilst the argument for implementing Sharia law for matters relating to marriage and divorce is perceived to have some merit, the idea is unworkable in the present climate of suspicion and fear overshadowing the wider society’s consciousness about Muslims and Sharia law (Abdalla, 2013, p. 659). Despite this fact, there are advocates for the recognition of Sharia law in Australia, especially concerning family issues (Black, 2008; Black & Sadiq, 2011). These scholars stress that Australia as a multi ethnic and multi faith society needs to embrace legal pluralism. However, this thesis asserts that the proposition of Australia partially adopting Sharia law is provocative when considering the general debates about Muslims and Sharia law.
At a technical detail level, the extent to which Sharia law should be followed in Australia is debatable. In his work, Sacred Law In a Secular Land: To What Extent Should Sharī ‘a Law be Followed in Australia? Abdalla (2012) extensively documents the extent to which Muslims are obliged to follow Sharia in a non-Muslim context. Relying on the views of leading classical and contemporary Islamic scholars, Abdalla (2012) argues that in a non-Muslim country, Muslims are only obliged to follow certain aspects of personal status law. What is missing in the debate is the fact some proposals suggest that Muslims are about to change the cultural and religious landscape of Australia by imposing harsh Sharia laws. The participants to this study mentioned that they would prefer accommodation for cultural and religious differences, but none provided responses even mildly suggesting an imposition of their faith on others.

The above discussions of religion and Sharia law and their influence on the integration debate are not independent from the much broader debates of culture and values that are consistently becoming part of this debate (Tolsma et al., 2012; Bisin et al., 2011; Arai et al., 2011). In addition to religion, the cultural debate undeniably presents another challenge to the definition and meaning of integration. It specifically presents considerable risks where integration is conceptualised as an interaction between an inferior (Muslim) subordinate culture and value into a superior (Western) one. This possibly erroneous conception of imagined superior culture and values has the potential to lead to what Huntington describes as a cultural and civilisational clash (Huntington, 1993). Regrettably, this culturally dense debate of integration is prevalent in public and policy discussions, and there are indications that it is becoming the immigrant integration policy choice of many liberal and conservative led governments in Western Europe (Kymlicka, 2012).

The thesis acknowledges that the particular meanings that actors such as political organisations assign to integration are normally dictated by a set of political philosophies and ideological underpinnings. The clashes of frames of integration are also manifested in the way different political parties approach the concept of integration. In some cases, variations have been made between liberal and conservative ideologies in regards to the propensity to use a more culturally dense definition of integration. For instance, Kundnani (2012) observes the differences between the liberal and the conservative parties in Britain over issues concerning immigrant integration. He
argues that while the conservative discourse of integration emphasises Enlightenment and its legacy of secularism, individualism and freedom of expression, the conservatives mark out racial difference and use British values, comparing these with those of others such as Muslim community values (Kundnani, 2012).

Correspondingly, the thesis findings reveal that Muslim meanings of integration are also influenced by cultural, philosophical and ideological underpinnings as well as individual circumstances and experiences. This is absent from current immigrant integration discourse, but presents another argument which is informed by how Muslim participants frame the concept of integration. The link between integration and religion and what is acceptable in the participants’ faith is a clear example that their conceptualisation of the term is informed by religion and culture. The participants to this study appear to downplay possible limitations that their faith might impose on their integration levels, and they reject an apparent contradiction between being a Muslim and being well integrated into the Australian community. Similarly, a study of 30 prominent Australian Muslim leaders finds that Islamic texts and teachings do not cause problems with social integration (Sohrabi & Farquharson, 2015).

In recognition of the complexity of Australian society following post war mass immigration, this thesis supports the view of Mason (2010) who calls for a new policy of inclusion which does not oblige immigrants to surrender their cultural heritage. In fact, he points out that cultural landscapes were central to migrants’ ongoing relationships with Australia (Mason, 2010). As with other important actors of the debate such as members of the host society, it is not a surprise that Muslims bring their own culture, beliefs, customs and values to the debates of immigrant integration. Since Huntington’s (1993) theory of a clash of civilisations, it appears as if culture and values are noticeable in matters relating to Islamic and Western relations (see Chapter Two). It is evident that a clash of integration frame is emerging in this debate.

The thesis envisages certain difficulties which may be caused by this emerging clash of integration frames. For example, it might confirm that a clash of integration frame is an unexpressed form of cultural and civilizational clash (Huntington, 1993). The arguments advanced by this thesis are supported by findings of other research which reaches the same conclusion. For example, Kuran and Sandholm (2008) argue that policies which aggressively support social integration serve to homogenise preferences.
among communities and may have the effect of undermining multiculturalism. It is also the case that there is an apparent contradiction between cultural integration and the pursuit of policies of multiculturalism, which in essence is to preserve the multiplicity of cultures. The findings of this research show that the concept of civic integration faces challenges from globalisation. Whilst the concept of civic integration is intended to create a harmonious, socially cohesive society, minority ethnic and religious groups may see it as being tool of exclusion. For these groups, it appears that there are two constituent groups who are talking at cross purposes, that is, the immigrant groups and the members of host communities. The thesis finds that Muslims are willing to be functionally integrated into the wider society, and statistics and other available measures indicate that they are fully integrated in this aspect of integration. However, there appears to be some discontent amongst Muslims in aspects of cultural integration. In the contemporary debates about integration and what it might mean, what is now emerging is a new and contested concept of citizenship that is operating both as force for inclusion and a force for exclusion.

Kuran and Sandholm (2008) conclude that cultural integration will continue both within and across boundaries. Practically, this means that in coming decades today’s cultures will undergo major transformations; efforts to protect existing cultures from foreign influences seem doomed to fail. At the same time, cultural integration will induce conflicts within and among countries. Indeed, today’s political instabilities are rooted partly in tensions fuelled by cultural integration (Kuran & Sandholm, 2008). Overall, this study challenges previous studies which solely considered that the philosophical sense of nationhood and national identity of the host society informs what the concept of integration means (Heckmann & Schannaper, 2003, p. 12). Instead, this thesis finds that any definitional proposition which squarely focuses on the philosophies and expectations of the host society while neglecting the philosophical and expectations of the newcomer is erroneous. This study clearly shows that Muslims’ understandings of integration are correspondingly informed by the lived experiences, attitudes, faith and values held by the Muslim immigrant group.

However, this research demonstrates that Muslims conceptualisation of integration is at least far more complex and dynamic than is widely acknowledged by available scholarly literature. For example, this study found there is little mention in the scholarly
literature of the ways in which religion and faith influence how individual Muslims interpret integration. Quite often, the scholarly literature conflates issues with integration, religion, culture and values without clear demarcations and boundaries of how these frames and schemas interact with each other. In spite of the clashes of integration frames apparent in the discussions above, there were conceptualisations of integration which Muslim participants contested. For example, one particular frame of integration that Muslims appear to contest and challenge is the new and developing theme of civic integration. This theme introduces a host of new hard line policies that condition status on immigrants’ cultural integration. These policies may take the form of citizenship tests, language proficiency, learning dominant society history, values and culture (Joppke, 2013; Bocker & Strik, 2011; Wiesbrock, 2011; Goodman, 2010). In fact, Muslim participants challenge defining integration in this particularly narrow cultural tradition, and advance the view that the increasingly complex global environment requires integration to be defined in a globally meaningful and less rigid fashion.

Instead, Muslims tend to advocate a cosmopolitan meaning of integration, despite the fact that, to date, no country has accepted cosmopolitanism as a form of immigrant incorporation. As the cosmopolitan nature and realities of the increasingly high levels of diversity in a number of nation states demand a change, perhaps it is time to revisit how states and policy makers define integration. The concept of cosmopolitanism, however, is weak in the sense that it generally refers to the individual as opposed to the group (Modood, 2012). It could be argued that a secular liberal view of integration does not a fit in the multicultural and multi religious landscape which is characterised by many Western societies. Drawing on the findings of this study, it is clear that Muslims’ definition of integration is one that is attempting to discredit those narratives.

In this study, it was clear that there were meanings which Muslims attached to the concept of integration which are in line with the themes, models and frames of integration adopted by Australia and other Western countries. These include participatory citizen frames of integration, where Muslims emphasise the importance of making social and economic contributions to the host society and pledging loyalty to Australia. Whilst that is positive in itself, Muslim participants in this study acknowledge that there are other meanings of integration adopted by some members of the host
society which have the potential to fragment social cohesion, to increase distrust between Muslims and members of the host society. The view of this thesis also concurs with interpretations of notable scholars in this field such as Modood (2013) who argues that the symbolic framework of integration (identity, religion, perception of the “other”, collective memory, and so on) is no less important than its functional or material framework.

This thesis stresses the importance of understanding how Muslims in Australia conceptualise integration. This is because it is indeed the case that despite these divergent conceptualisations of integration, whilst seeming conflictual the debates are at the same time influencing each other. For instance, it is necessary to understand the influential role that the media plays in this important area of public policy discussion. In the Netherlands, one study of how issues of immigration and integration are debated in the parliament and in the press reveals that an increase in the use of a frame by the media led to the increase of the same frame by the parliament (Roggeband & Vliegenthart, 2007).

The manifestation of the clash of frames of integration and contestable frames of integration risks the production of a competitive framing process of integration. This competition is between the integration processes’ actors, namely, the immigrant, the members of the host society, the state and the media. It is apparent that each constituent actor prefers a frame of integration deemed as serving their particular narrative. The absence of an agreement between all frames of integration is therefore the new challenge that is posed by the current increasing levels of international migration.
Chapter 7. Conclusion

Australia’s migration program is much more inclusive today than in previous times, and migrants are sourced from different parts of the globe. The ever-present diversity of the population is evidence that Australia has sourced its migrants from many different countries and continents. Whilst not facing the discriminatory migration system of the white Australia era, a challenging state of affairs which contemporary Muslim immigrants encounter is the wider society’s perception of their lack of integration. A number of various definitions of integration are present in the available literature (see Chapter Three).

This thesis set out to explore how Muslims in Australia conceptualise the term integration and has identified that Muslims’ conceptualisation of integration is part of the various interpretations of integration which exist among different actors and stakeholders. These stakeholders include members of the wider society and the media. The wider society’s perception of Muslim immigrant integration is characterised as being problematic (Celermajer, 2007; Samani, 2007; Poynting, 2006; Saeed, 2003), but the general literature of immigrant integration fails to provide a universal definition of integration. The study of how Muslims in Australia conceptualise integration is appropriate, as a lack of understanding of the meanings of the concept may potentially lead to a complete breakdown in the ability of migrants to integrate.

The thesis stresses the importance of immigrant integration and specifically refers to the possibility that disintegration or lack of integration of immigrants may cause disturbances in the societal order (Husted, Heinesen, & Andersen, 2009). In this chapter, the thesis presents the main empirical findings of the study with regard to the research questions, and makes general conclusions about the overall study. The chapter also presents the strengths and limitations of the study and gives suggestions for further research in the field. The chapter concludes with its own recommendations for better conceptualisations of integration which may create more socially cohesive societies in Australia and other Western resettlement countries.

The main empirical findings of the study are chapter specific and are supported with discussions of existing literature about the subject of immigrant integration. The
examination of this complex subject requires in-depth analysis of how integration is framed by all of its actors. A thorough review of immigrant integration literature uncovered the existence of clashing, and sometimes conflicting, frames of integration. This necessitated the creative use and application of two methods of inquiry. In the first study, focus group discussions were conducted and participants provided their responses to what the concept of integration meant to them. These initial focus group discussions were then followed with one on one in-depth interviews in order to deepen and enhance the study’s thoroughness. The latter was analysed using the cognitive psychology theory of schemata. This second phase of data collection allowed the researcher to more deeply probe the study participants’ ideas to gain greater insight into their understandings of integration.

The thesis investigated Muslim conceptualisations of integration and, in particular, what practices and behaviours Muslims attach to the meaning of integration. In this investigation, an understanding of how integration is generally defined in the broader scholarly literature was crucial. This understanding may indicate the extent to which Muslims subscribe to similar or different, and perhaps contradictory, definitions of integration by other important stakeholders such as the media, academia and composers of public policy documents. The thesis’s aim was specifically to address the question of what activities, behaviours, characteristics and values Muslim people attach to the meaning of integration. For instance, is it to assimilate into the host society? Is it to participate in the host society’s economic, social and political fabric, or is it simply to be naturalised and obtain a certificate? This thesis also recognises the importance of understanding the extent to which Muslims define integration in a singular or pluralist form and/or in a cosmopolitan or universalistic fashion. The following is a summary of how Muslim participants responded to the three research questions.

7.1. **What does integration mean to Muslims in Australia?**

The thesis findings demonstrate that Muslims’ conceptualisation of integration is part and parcel of an existing clash of integration frames in the debates about immigrant integration. Muslims’ conceptualisations of integration are found to be part of the general confusion about meanings of integration. The thesis reveals a number of the
different interpretations of the meanings of integration offered by Muslims. Some of these conceptualisations are consistent with interpretations found in the scholarly literature, but in some cases, participants in the study have developed their own interpretations of what integration means. It is also clear that on occasions those interpretations were in line with meanings stated in the broader literature about immigrant integration. Australian Muslims generally provide meanings of integration that are in line with general definitions of integration which are available in the academic literature and public policy documents, nevertheless, they do so with the addition of a strong perception of their own cultural and religious traditions.

7.2. What activities, behaviours, characteristics and values do Muslim people attach to the meaning of integration?

The findings also demonstrate the openness and acceptance of Muslim participants towards certain frames of integration, and their reluctance and resistance to other frames of integration. The thesis demonstrates that Muslims’ conceptualisation of integration includes the proposition that they resist assimilation, especially in the sphere of cultural and religious assimilation. For example, the first study of this thesis described in Chapter Four focused on what integration means to the Muslim participants. The central research aim of this study was to identify what determinants and/or detractors of integration Muslim participants provide in their responses. Muslim participants tended to focus on participatory meanings of integration. They provided meanings such as participation, belonging and acceptance as being determinants of integration, whereas discrimination, isolation and lack of English language are understood to be detractors. After carefully analysing the data collected from the focus group discussions using Nvivo, the thesis draws some interesting associations between Muslim determinants and/or detractors of integration, and determinants and detractors of integration documented in the available scholarly literature (Entzinger & Biezeveld, 2003; Ager & Strang, 2004; Akresh et al., 2014; Esses et al., 2014).
7.3. To what extent do Muslims define integration in a singular or pluralist form and in a cosmopolitan or universalistic fashion?

The thesis findings show that Muslim definitions of integration are quite often pluralistic and universalistic. In some cases, Muslim participants deliberately shifted their conceptualisation of integration from one context to another. For example, they contest media discourse that narrowly defines integration in the context of terrorism, extremism and radicalisation which repurposes the meaning of this concept from one context to another. In other situations, Muslim participants broaden the application of the definition of integration and concur with the academic literature which stretches the concept of integration to a universalistic meaning. This makes the concept of integration a subjective term that eludes consensus. With no clear parameters or objective measures of integration, both the host society that receives immigrants and the immigrant groups themselves will doubtless remain confused.

The following two competing and conflicting paradigms in the debates about the meanings of integration arguably influence the meanings of integration adopted by Muslims. The first is the introduction of a new concept of civic integration, which is generally formulated to reaffirm and preserve the dominant Western society’s culture and values. The second paradigm is the emergence of a resurgent Islam that is suspicious of Western powers, perhaps due to a history of colonisation. It is against these two paradigms that the meanings of integration are redefined. For example, civic integration is an example of how dominant Christian communities in Europe, North America and Australia are redefining integration, but at the same time, Muslim communities in Europe perceive that their religion is constantly under attack, and assert that a rise in Islamaphobia is a threat to their freedom of religion. The majority Christian communities also perceive Islam as being an invasion of their values.

The paradigm of enforcing immigrant integration through a notion of cultural supremacy is directly at odds with resurgent Islam where individual Muslims might identify with a community of faith making the nation-state irrelevant in their lives. Both of the above respective positions are dangerous and risk undermining social cohesion. The thesis takes the view that commitment to religious practice and the pursuit of
spiritual perfection are not to be interpreted to mean unwillingness to integrate. On the other hand, the notion that Muslims in Australia must show willingness to fully participate in the social and economic life of the nation and show their loyalty and allegiance to Australia is strong and uncompromised. However, certain contemporary realities pose challenges to the realisation of this middle ground position.

For instance, the debates about immigrant integration are heavily influenced by international events, creating fear and insecurity between Muslims and members of the wider society. This is evident in the tone of their conversations, including the emergence of conservative discourse that warns against “the Islamisation” of Europe (Pilbeam, 2011). This leads to the belief that the integration debate therefore in part suffers from a perceived clash of civilizations. It is specifically the political aspect of Islam that is perceived to be a threat by some in the wider Australian society (Bergin & Townsend, 2007). In response to this perceived threat, a divisive and sometimes harsh political rhetoric directed at Muslims and Muslim leaders has emerged. The thesis supports the findings of Jakubowicz (2007b) who argues that ill-advised political decisions that are not practical and engaging, and marginal groups gaining leverage in Muslim society, both risk undermining the potential for immigrant integration in Australia.

Muslims in Australia conceptualised the term integration more often in its positive aspects than its negative ones. In general, Muslims’ conceptualisations of integration appear to have been constructed against a background of their struggle for inclusion. Their responses to the research questions showed that they used significantly more positive interpretations than negative ones. For example, feelings of participation, belonging, loyalty and embracing diversity were all declared as meaning that they felt they were integrated. It is clear from the study that their cognition of integration is not far from the meanings that the concept is assigned in the available academic discourse (Skirbiš, Baldassar, & Poynting, 2007). With the exception of their faith influencing their interpretations of integration, Muslims have stated their belief that a host of universal standards of acceptance, sense of belonging and loyalty to the host society mean integration.

The thesis concludes that integration is a slippery term and one that can mean different things to different individuals, groups and societies. If it is not understood in its
contextual framework, the concept can be misleading. Based on an extensive literature review encompassing analysis of multiple actors’ perceptions of integration, and as informed by the empirical findings on Muslims’ conceptions of integration, the thesis proposes the following definition of integration: Integration is an ideologically loaded term that sits at the interface of settlement of immigrants in a rapidly changing international order. This interface has behavioural, emotional, functional, cultural and political dimensions. These then produce particular forms of performance of self: for a believing Muslim, it is about membership in a secular Western nation without fundamental compromise to their faith; for the state it is seeking a contributing and obedient citizen; for the host community, it is accommodating newcomers without significant changes to their cultural and historical environment; and for the media it is a normalised social subject. Muslims’ meanings of integration may be better understood in the context of the competing interests between these actors.

The dynamics of immigrant integration are clearly a social process and the above definition of integration obviously presents another difficulty. In Muslims’ conceptualisation of integration, the thesis findings reveal a combination of aspirations (functional integration), resistance (faith limitations) and comprise (a middle way). This comprise is generally to integrate in the public sphere but remain separated in the private sphere. This apparent self-selection is something that perhaps the wider society would dis-endorse. This may then lead to suspicions about the newcomers and tensions may emerge between the new immigrants and members of the host society. Australian Muslims described prejudicial treatment and discrimination as key barriers to their integration into Australia society.

The findings of this thesis concur with those of Hamid (2011), who confirms the link between integration and discrimination by referring to many young Muslims in the United Kingdom who became fully integrated when they overcame challenges of structural inequality and high levels of deprivation, disadvantage and discrimination. Hamid (2011) further stresses that these inequalities may inhibit opportunities for young British Muslims, thus leading to social exclusion. In this case, the thesis finds the theories of prejudice and group contact useful and informative. In explaining the Muslim threat narrative in the literature, previous research findings suggest that majority community members who strongly perceive immigrant minorities as being
threatening may have fewer friends who come from minority groups (Van Acker, Phalet, Deleersnyder, & Mesquita, 2014).

Overall, the meanings Muslims use in interpreting the concept of integration and their choice of frames and schemas about integration are important. Muslims’ understandings of integration are similar to various other interpretations found in the wider scholarly literature about integration. The thesis findings suggest that Muslims have pre-formed meanings of integration that are produced by their lived experiences as members of the wider society. The term integration is seemingly viewed differently and its meaning is seen by some of the participants as being ubiquitous and pejorative. However, the thesis argues that the meanings Muslims and other immigrant groups attach to the concept of integration will not be static and may be susceptible to continual modifications and adjustment, mainly dictated by individual, group, local and international circumstances.

7.4. Implications

Although this study is of a modest scale and deals only with Muslims’ understandings of integration, it exposes some valuable dimensions of the public debates on integration. Specifically, we found that Muslims tend to understand integration in socio-economic terms rather than cultural ones. That is, their emphasis is on dimensions of everyday life such as employment, education, making a contribution to society and learning the English language. The study finds the differences to be remarkable between this understanding of integration and understandings of integration that have been adopted by other important actors in the public debate about integration, in particular the media.

The study concludes that variations of the ways in which important social actors of public debate define integration may have implications for the building of an inclusive and cohesive society. In this study the thesis has sought to understand how Muslims in Australia conceptualise the concept of integration. The findings reveal what practices Muslims attached to the meanings of integration and the cognitive schemes they use in their interpretations of these meanings. In this section, the thesis focuses on the study’s implications and suggests possible directions for future research. The implications of this study may be multi-faceted and may include the following:
a) One practical implication is that integration stakeholders may have a better and more informed understanding of how Muslims conceptualise integration. Stemming from the very fact that meanings of integration vary depending on who is defining the concept, uncovering Muslims’ conceptualisation of integration may lead to adjustment on how Muslims and members of the wider society negotiate in defining integration in a manner that is acceptable to all its constituent stakeholders. A meaning of integration negotiated between stakeholders is believed to produce less prejudiced public discussions of the concept. This may in turn lead to increased social harmony and cohesion.

b) Amongst other possible implications that merit consideration is that the study’s findings may inform policy makers and other interested parties about the possibility that certain frames, schemas and meaning of integration employed by individuals and groups may have positive or negative effects on social inclusion and exclusion. For instance, meanings which advance a pluralist understanding of integration will arguably have inclusivity effects, whereas assimilationist meaning of integration will have the opposite effect. In other words, this study’s findings may similarly inform policy makers about how social cohesion and social inclusion should not be detached from the conceptualisation of what integration means.

c) Another important implication is the fact that frames of problematic community integration and threat narratives which denigrate Muslims provide little or no chance for integration. At this juncture of the national debate about the Muslim community in Australia, this study becomes critical. In a time of heightened terrorism alert, the Australian community needs to be cohesive and trusting. Governments in particular have a greater responsibility to develop policies and programs which help Muslims to integrate and not feel isolated.

d) This thesis adopts the view that there is a great deal of risk in the politicisation of the concept of integration, as this dilutes the true meaning of integration. The thesis asserts that meanings of integration advanced by certain politicians, and the political rhetoric of Muslim integration or its lack, may be counterproductive. Evidence shows that politicisation of integration risks altering the interplay between policy setting and knowledge production, thus
creating further confusion about how integration is conceptualised (Entzinger & Scholten, 2015).

7.5. Recommendations

The thesis notes the ubiquitous challenges presented by the current debates of immigrant integration, which hardly agree on a common definition of integration. The thesis provides a suite of recommendations that may help immigrant groups, members of host societies and governments to have a more realistic expectation of each other’s conceptualisation of integration. It is expected that these recommendations may help to overcome the dilemmas created by the multiplicity of integration frames. The following are the key recommendations put forward by this study:

a) This study stresses the importance of conceptualising integration as a two-way street, meaning new immigrants and their receiving societies must be willing to go through a process of adaptation and adjustment. It also notes that the adaptation skills of immigrants vary as much as the reception immigrants receive, which may be warmer from one community to another. This inter-reliance on the mutual integration of the immigrant and the newcomer is arguably missed in contemporary migrant integration literature. The notion that immigrants must integrate with the host society ignores the adjustments that host society members need to make, and this may increase the confusion and misunderstandings about the meanings of integration.

b) The thesis also recommends the adaptation of a more conciliatory tone in the debates of immigrant integration and calls on all participants of the debate to acknowledge the fact that there are different conceptualisations of integration dictated by different circumstances and situations (see Dukes & Musterd, 2012). The thesis calls on an approach that builds bridges between these competing and sometimes contradictory frames of integration (Scholten & Van Nispen, 2008). In order for this to occur, it is necessary to understand the multiplicity of integration frames existing in debates about integration. It is the assessment of this thesis that Muslims’ conceptualisations of integration that focus on loyalty, flexibility, respect and participation concur with calls for the building of bridges between competing frames of integration. These bridges are now being
constructed in certain spheres of the debates about immigrant integration. For example, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), which is the peak intergovernmental organisation in matters relating to international migration, adopts a compromising meaning of integration as follows: “While the term ‘integration’ can be understood differently depending on the country and context, it is generally defined as the process of mutual adaptation between host society and immigrant” (International Organisation for Migration, 2014, n.p.).

c) Also recommended by this study is the adoption of a more generalised conceptualisation of integration, especially one that considerably accepts and accommodates differences in cultural, religious and language differences and emphasises reciprocated mutual integration between immigrant groups and newcomers. It is what Wilkinson (2013) calls for—the development and testing of a generalisable frame of integration, especially one that reconciles differences of cultural practices, religion and language differences. In essence, the thesis argues that the concept of integration is ambiguous and is often poorly defined by its stakeholders. It argues that the concept should be context based and dependent on levels of reception by members of the host society and other environmental factors in order to integrate new immigrants. It should also factor in the levels of shared cultural and historical features between the host society members and the new immigrants. This allows policy makers to realistically raise the expectations of integration stakeholders.

d) Another important recommendation is the abandonment of integration frames that are monocultural rather than multicultural in nature. The departure from these types of integration conceptualisations implies that there is an appreciation that a sense of obligation and respect for a core set of values that bind migrants will go further than insisting that new arrivals integrate into a dominant society culture. A multicultural frame can also be important in giving both immigrants and members of host communities a common purpose. The particular meanings and frames of integration we adopt may have the potential to strengthen and maintain our social cohesion, but can equally create disharmony between societies (Dukes & Musterd, 2012). Today in this era of thriving global terrorist networks, integration is essential for all stakeholders, not only as a way of
providing economic and cultural benefits but also for ensuring the security and stability of societies as a whole (International Organisation for Migration, 2014).

e) The thesis also recommends that a holistic integration approach needs to be employed, rather than using piecemeal and selective integration frames. In particular, as Alexander (2013) suggests, a shift is required from a focus on the functional elements of integration such as employment, education and wealth, to a cultural sociological approach which emphasises meanings and emotions. In countries like the Netherlands, Dukes and Musterd (2012) assert that social cohesion policy would benefit from framing the integration debate differently. Similarly, Carrera (2006) argues that European Union states need to readjust their conceptualisation of their perceived national identity and values, from one that emphasises a mythical national unity to one that is heterogeneous, diverse and multicultural (Carrera, 2006, p. 9).

7.6. Research limitations

The ever-increasing levels of the global movement of people demand the developments of policies and programs that encourage social inclusion and social cohesion. This thesis is especially timely and addresses an important question in the field of international migration, particularly the subject of immigrant integration. The thesis has thus far produced empirical knowledge of how Muslims in the region of South East Queensland conceptualise the concept of integration. However, this research is not conducted without certain limitations or shortcomings. Below are some of the limitations and suggested areas of further study in this important field in international migration.

a) The first limitation is considerations concerning sample size and selection. This thesis has focused on only Muslim community groups in the South East Queensland region, in Australia. This means that, strictly speaking, the conclusions can only be drawn about Muslims in this region. Whilst the findings may generally imply that other immigrant groups may conceptualise integration differently to the official definitions, conclusions drawn from this research cannot be transferred to other non-Muslim immigrant groups in Australia. This is one area in which the thesis readily accepts that the work presented can be advanced and strengthened. For example, examining whether other immigrant
groups would conceptualise integration similarly or differently to Muslim immigrant groups may confirm or refute the notion that immigrant groups understand integration in the same way.

b) Additionally, a review of the wider society’s conceptualisation of integration would add to the debate and shed light on what factors cause one group to emphasise aspects of integration over another, and how individuals select those preformed perceptions of integration. The absence of this basic research is a limitation to this study, as comparisons between how different groups conceptualise integration cannot be made. Whilst this limitation is worthy of acknowledgement, this thesis advances the debates about immigrant integration and adds to it a new and untapped research angle that potentially enhances greater understanding of this subject. It concludes that the concept of integration suffers from definitional vagueness and oversimplification.

Integration processes occurs in complex social, political and economic environments and require future researchers of the subject to produce more grounded empirical studies which would enhance theoretical arguments and create a universal understanding of integration. The thesis’ findings may also inspire important questions that may lead to future research in areas and aspects, which this study deemed to be beyond its scope. Further research could address several issues which have emerged from this study. Firstly, because the sample size of this study was relatively small, a new study could target a much wider population size. Secondly, it would be important to determine whether respondents from a national study share the same conceptions of integration as those reported in this study. Thirdly, it would be important to conduct further studies that examine how Muslim immigrant groups in comparable countries have similar or different conceptions of integration.

Despite the above stated research limitations, the findings of this thesis contribute significantly to the growing body of immigrant incorporation literature. This study complements and sometimes contrasts previous research on the subject of immigrant integration. It specifically confirms how culturally, linguistically and religiously diverse groups of people may conceptualise certain generally accepted terms such as integration differently to the understandings hitherto stated in the scholarly literature.
References


European Foundation for the Improvement of Living. (2006). *Fifteen years of working conditions in the EU: Charting the trends (Vol. 11).* European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions.


Phillips, T., & Smith, P. (2000). What is 'Australian': Knowledge and attitudes among a
gallery of contemporary Australians. Journal of Political Science, 35(1),
203–222.

Pickering, S. (2001). Common sense and original deviancy: News discourses and


and Local Immigrant Integration Policies in the Netherlands. Administration
& Society, 40(4), 335–357.

Transnational Political Action among Contemporary Migrants. American

University of California Press.

Portes, A., & Vickstrom, E. (2015). Diversity, social capital, and cohesion. Migration:
Economic Change, Social Challenge, 161.

Constellations, 14(1), 72–90.


Poynting, S. (2002). Racism and community safety. Current Issues in Criminal Justice,
13(3), 328–332.


Intercultural Studies, 30 (4) 373–386.


Appendix A  Griffith University Human Research Ethics Committee

10-Feb-2015

Dear Mr Hersi

I write further to your application for a variation to your approved protocol "NR: Australian Muslim Conceptions of Integration" (GU Ref No: LEJ/08/09/HREC). This request has been considered by the Office for Research.

The OR resolved to approve the requested variation:

Requested a change to the title of the project from "NR: Understanding the meanings of Integration: Perspectives of Muslims, wider public and the State." to "NR: Australian Muslim Conceptions of Integration". Assurance provided that the change in title does not reflect any change to the research design.

Please note that an ethical conduct report (http://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/word_doc/0007/515284/ethical_conduct_report_form.doc) is very overdue for this clearance. Please complete and submit the report ASAP.

This decision is subject to ratification at the next meeting of the HREC. However, you are authorised to immediately commence the revised project on this basis. I will only contact you again about this matter if the HREC raises any additional questions or comments about this variation.

Regards

Dr Gary Allen
Senior Policy Officer
Office for Research
Bray Centre, Nathan Campus
Griffith University
ph: +61 (0)7 3735 5585
fax: +61 (0)7 3735 7994
email: g.allen@griffith.edu.au
web:
Cc:

Researchers are reminded that the Griffith University Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research provides guidance to researchers in areas such as conflict of interest, authorship, storage of data, & the training of research students.

You can find further information, resources and a link to the University's Code by visiting http://policies.griffith.edu.au/pdf/Code%20for%20the%20Responsible%20Conduct%20of%20Research.pdf

PRIVILEGED, PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

This email and any files transmitted with it are intended solely for the use of the addressee(s) and may contain information which is confidential or privileged. If you receive this email and you are not the addressee(s) [or responsible for delivery of the email to the addressee(s)], please disregard the contents of the email, delete the email and notify the author immediately.
Appendix B  Invitation to Focus Groups

Student Investigator: Abdi Hersi (Doctor of Philosophy Candidate)
Key Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice and Governance
Tel: 402554560 (mob)
Email: a.hersi@griffith.edu.au

Supervisor  Dr Halim Rane
Supervisor  Dr Ian Woodward

As part of his PhD candidature, Abdi Hersi is conducting research titled Australian Muslim Conceptions of Integration

We warmly invite you to participate in one of two focus group discussions on the Saturdays of 13th and 20th of November 2010 between 10:00 to 11:30 am, to be held at Kuraby Community Hall (corner of stiller drive and Beenleigh road). Each focus group will run for about 90 minutes.

Members of the focus group will be asked to discuss the following issues:

In the context of how Muslims need to fit into the wider Australian society, what is integration? How do you know when a person integrates and how much? Are Muslims in Australia Integrating? Why and why not?

Should you be interested in participating in a focus group, please contact Abdi Hersi via email: a.hersi@griffith.edu.au and he will provide you further details.

Our project has received ethics approval from Griffith University Research Ethics Committee in research involving Humans (Protocol Number LEJ/08/09/HREC). Being part of the focus group is completely voluntary, and opinions expressed during the focus group will not be attributed to identifiable individuals in any subsequent reports.

If you have any queries about the overall project or its progress, please contact me on 07 33410463 or via email a.hersi@griffith.edu.au
Appendix C  Schedule of Questions / Agenda:

Topic: Australian Muslim Conceptions of Integration

Schedule of Questions / Agenda:

- Introduction of facilitator.

- Good morning. My name is Abdi Hersi and I am PhD student at Griffith University. Thank you for taking the time to participate in these discussions. I will honour your time by making sure that we wrap up in the next 90 minutes.

- Review consent / information forms.

- Complete personal details.

- Explain research objective and introduce research team.

- Discussion themes

Theme One: Understanding what Integration means with respect to Muslims in Australia.

In relation to the Muslims living in Australia, what does integration mean?

(Probe for meanings such as cultural conformity, shared goals, retain culture but have overriding commitment to Australia, being a citizen and having rights and responsibilities etc.)

Theme Two: Understanding what people attach meaning of integration.

What values, activities, characteristics or behaviours do you attach the meaning of integration?

(Probe for meanings such as transmigration, dual nationality, level of religiosity and devotion, business, economic and professional development, volunteerism, social activities, etc.)
Theme Three: **Understand how people measure Integration**

How do you know when a person integrates and by how much? What are good indicators of successful or unsuccessful integration?

(Probe for meanings such as occupational and educational attainment, rates of intermarriages, absence of discrimination, language assimilation, membership of a local club (neighbourhood watch, cricket, soccer, etc.)

What are examples of failure of integration?

(Probe for meanings such as failure to learn English, Sending children to an Islamic school, the way a person dresses, the level of religious observance and devotion, delinquency and involving criminal activities, etc.)

**Theme Four:** **Understanding perceptions about host society attitudes and views about integration**

Explain what you think is host society’s understanding of integration and the extent to which you agree with it?

**Theme Five:** **Understanding government role in immigrant integration.**

Explain what you think is the government’s understanding of the meaning of integration? What is the government’s role in Muslim immigrant integration?

**Other issues you want to discuss.**

Thanking participants, informing them they will know the progress of the project and its findings.
Appendix D  Information Sheet And Consent Form

Australian Muslim Conceptions of Integration

Chief Investigator: Abdi Hersi (Doctor of Philosophy Candidate)
Key Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice and Governance
Tel: 402554560 (mob)
Email: a.hersi@griffith.edu.au

The research project:

International migration and the movement of people from one part of the world to another is an area of significant interest to academics, researchers, governments and the general public alike. One of the most pressing challenges that this global mobility of people poses is managing the diversity of people moving from one cultural background into another. In his opening address of the third global forum on migration and development (GFMD, 2009) Athens, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon highlights that around the world, migration is a subject that is vigorously debated in parliaments and society in general but it is also one that provokes tension and fans flames of prejudice and discrimination. Muslim immigrants in various parts of the Western world including Australia face difficulties including negative perceptions of their lack of integrating into their host societies. This thesis is concerned with observing the extent to which there is collective understanding of what integration means to its three constituent actors, that is, Australian Muslims, members of the wider society and the State. The primary objective of this thesis is to investigate the extent to which the three actors subscribe to somewhat the same or different and perhaps contradictory definitions of integration.
Your involvement:
Your agreement to accept to be interviewed is voluntary. The interview will seek your insights on the issues concerning your understanding of what integration means to you.

Participant selection:
You are selected on the basis of being one of the three important constituent actors of the processes of immigrant integration.

Expected benefits of the research:
This study is intended to provide policy makers and the general public with a better understanding of issues relating the incorporation of immigrants into the host society. It seeks to offer insight into what activities, behaviours, characteristics and values people attach to the meaning of integration.

Risks:
It is your insights and opinions that are being sought on the basis of your understandings of what the term integration means to you. However, your anonymity will be protected by this research and your identity will not be disclosed without your approval.

Confidentiality:
Your statements may be included in scholarly publications that arise from this research such as a book or journal article. Please note, however, any statement that you make, that is intended to be included in a publication, will only be included upon your consent. Upon completion of our meeting, if a transcript is prepared you will be given a copy upon request. In the event that you agree to be quoted and identified in a publication, you will be first contacted, most likely via email, and will be informed of the intention to use your statements. The statements will be quoted back to you for your approval. Upon receipt of your approval only then will your statements be reproduced. Following transcription, any digital voice recording of the interview that was made will be erased.

Voluntary participation:
Your participation is voluntary. You do not need to answer every question unless you wish to do so. You are free to conclude the meeting at any time.

Questions / further information:
Further information about the research can be provided by the Director of the Key
Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice and Governance, Prof Richard Wortley (Phone: +61 7 3735 5761; Email: r.wortley@griffith.edu.au). For an independent contact you may wish to phone Dr Gary Allen, Manager Research Ethics, on +617 3735 5585; or email him at research-ethics@griffith.edu.au.

**The ethical conduct of this research:**

Griffith University conducts research in accordance with the *National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research*. If potential participants have any concerns or complaints about the ethical conduct of the research project they should contact the Manager, Research Ethics on (617) 3735 5585 or research-ethics@griffith.edu.au.

**Feedback to you:**

Should a transcript of the interview be made, you will be sent a copy upon request. An audio file of the interview will also be available upon request. Additionally, upon request, you may also obtain a summary of the overall research once the publication is complete.

**Privacy Statement**

The conduct of this research involves the collection, access and / or use of your identified personal information. The information collected is confidential and will not be disclosed to third parties without your consent, except to meet government, legal or other regulatory authority requirements. A de-identified copy of this data may be used for other research purposes. However, your anonymity will at all times be safeguarded. For further information consult the University’s Privacy Plan at www.gu.edu.au/ua/aa/vc/pp or telephone (617) 3735 5585.
CONSENT FORM

Australian Muslim Conceptions of Integration

Chief Investigator: Abdi Hersi (Doctor of Philosophy Candidate)
Key Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice and Governance
Tel: 402554560 (mob)
Email: a.hersi@griffith.edu.au

By signing below, I confirm that I have read and understood the information package and in particular have noted that:

- I understand that my involvement in this research will include a meeting and interview with the researcher, Abdi Hersi
- I have had any questions answered to my satisfaction;
- I understand the risks involved;
- I understand that there will be no direct benefit to me from my participation in this research;
- I understand that my participation in this research is voluntary;
- I understand that if I have any additional questions I can contact the research team;
- I understand that I am free to withdraw at any time, without comment or penalty;
- I understand that I can contact the Manager, Research Ethics, at Griffith University Human Research Ethics Committee on 3735 5585 (or research-ethics@griffith.edu.au) if I have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the project; and
- I agree to participate in the project.

Name
Signature
Date

Verbal consent given: ☐