Elites and Prospects of Democracy in East Timor

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ABSTRACT

East Timor is a former colony of Portugal and one-time province of Indonesia. Portuguese colonization ended in 1975 amid brief civil warring between local political parties that had recently been established. This conflict was followed by an Indonesian military invasion, ushering in a period of domination that only ended in 1999 when the United Nations carried out a referendum by which to determine East Timor’s future. But this occupation also ended with much violence, generating bitter sentiments between elites that has hampered democratisation even as independence has been won.

One of the conclusions made in this study is that East Timor’s transition to democracy fails to correlate fully with any of the modal processes outlined in the literature. Rather, in the case of East Timor, a number of pathways merge. In some ways, it begins with what Huntington conceptualized as bottom-up ‘replacement’, with local mass publics voting against their oppressors. But one of the factors that quickly distinguished this case is that the voting by which change was organized by an external force, the United Nations (UN), and targeted a foreign power, the Indonesian government. In this way, the processes of independence and democratisation were nearly coterminous.

East Timor’s progress was also complicated by Indonesia’s responding to the referendum’s outcome by instigating much violence through the militia groups that it controlled. This summoned yet another external actor, the Australian military. It also greatly extended the role of the UN, geared now to restarting the democratisation process by organising founding elections.
But if East Timor’s democratic transition is complex, an account of the precariousness of the democracy that has been brought about is straightforward. Put simply, given the weakness of institutions and civil society organization, this thesis restores attention to the autonomy and voluntarism possessed by national elites. The hypothesis guiding this thesis, then, is that elites are disunified, but have avoided any return to outright warring. Further, they are at most ‘semi-loyal’ in their attitudes toward democracy. Accordingly, democracy persists in East Timor, but is subject to many abuses.

Thus, most of the research in this thesis seeks to explain elite-level attitudes and relations. In particular, it shows that cooperation between elites and shared commitments to democracy has been hampered by the diversity of their backgrounds. Some elites gained their standings and outlooks under Indonesian occupation. Others gained their statuses because of the guerrilla resistance they mounted against this occupation. The attitudes of other elites were deeply coloured by their experiences in a multitude of countries, including Indonesia, Portugal, Mozambique and Australia.

This thesis then demonstrates that these diverse origins and standings have shaped elite attitudes and relations in ways that are unfavourable for political stability and democracy. Under Portuguese rule, three distinct elite groups emerged in East Timor: top government administrators, business elites and young professionals or intellectuals. In the last years of Portuguese domination, they formed some political parties, enabling them to emerge as political elites. Lacking what Higley et al. label structural integration and value consensus, these elites engaged in violent conflict that peaked in brief civil warring and triggered the Indonesian occupation. This elite-level disunity persisted during occupation, with elites continuing to use violence against each other. National
elites were also diversified further, with the administrators and resistors joined by pro-
Indonesian groups, the Catholic Church group, and nationalist intellectuals, hence
extending the range of social origins and ideological outlooks.

East Timor finally gained independence in 2002. However, this thesis shows that
elite relations still lack integration and consensus. Their country’s political frameworks
were negotiated by officials from Portugal and Indonesia under the auspices of the UN.
Moreover, even after the referendum sponsored by the UN was held, UN officials in
New York overshadowed the preferences and decision making of national elites. This
exclusion denied East Timorese elites the opportunity to learn and to habituate
themselves in making political decisions based on peaceful dialogue and bargaining.
Thus, while the use of overt violence diminished, elites continued to harbour deep
suspicions, encouraging their use of manipulations, subterfuge, and violence by proxy
in their dealings with one another.

In consequence, tensions between elites in East Timor, while stopping short of
outright warring, continue to simmer. It is thus uncertain whether, or for how long,
these tensions might be contained by the formal institutions and procedures that have
been put in place. Analysis is also clouded by the fact that in the wake of independence,
still more kinds of elites have appeared on the scene. New fault lines thus stem from
generational membership (older and younger), geographic location (diaspora and
homegrown), and new kinds of organisational bases (political parties, state bureaucracy,
security forces, business, the Catholic Church, and civil society).

These elites have only begun to interact with another directly and regularly since
East Timor’s independence. They find that they possess different outlooks and levels of
influence and power. Nonetheless, despite these inauspicious beginnings, it is important
to underscore the fact that since independence, elites have refrained from the open warring that they once undertook. This thesis predicts that sustained elite skirmishing, but not open warring, and semi-democratic politics, rather than ‘full’ democracy or hard authoritarianism will persist. Much should be made clearer, though, by the ways in which the next parliamentary election, due in 2007, is conducted.
STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY

The material presented in this thesis has not been submitted for a degree or diploma in any other university, and to the best of my knowledge, contains no material published or written by any other person, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis itself.

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(Francisco da Costa Guterres)
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After a quarter-century of struggle, East Timor gained its independence in 2002. Its challenge now is to consolidate the new political democracy that has formed. In analysing this democracy’s origins and persistence, this thesis acknowledges the role of the international community, social forces and institutions. But it finds that local elites are most crucial in determining whether democracy will persist in the Timorese setting.

More specifically, this thesis focuses on elite-level attitudes and behaviours. Through personal observations, elite-level interviewing, and a systematic reading of primary and secondary source material, I have discovered that elites in Timor regard one another with deep suspicions, but have stopped short of the open warring that prevailed prior to independence. In this situation, inter-elite relations have lacked full structural integration and value consensus. In addition, their attitudes toward democratic procedures can at best be characterised as ‘semi-loyal’. Accordingly, democracy in East Timor has persisted, but remains unconsolidated. Much should be made clearer by the way in which the next parliamentary election, due in 2007, is conducted.

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Francisco da Costa Guterres

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The study of democratic transitions and consolidation has attracted much attention in comparative politics during the last quarter of the twentieth century. Indeed, so many transitions took place during this time that Samuel Huntington referred to democracy’s ‘third wave’. According to Huntington, this wave involves ‘a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specific period and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period’.\(^1\) He notes that the world has experienced three waves of democratisation. The first wave occurred after World War I and the second amid the decolonisation that took place after the World War II. The third wave, which numerically has been the largest, started in Portugal in April 1974 and rolled through Southern Europe, Latin America, and reached East, Southeast, and South Asia by the mid-to-late 1980s. Moreover, at the end of that decade, a surge of transitions took place from former communist authoritarian countries in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. During the 1990s, some countries in Africa also democratised.\(^2\) This latest wave has increased the proportion of countries in the world with some form of democratic government, and changed the political landscape

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of the world. By 1998, 61 percent of the countries in the world have at least some form of democratic government.³

Democracy in recent years has been regarded as the only kind of regime that protects human rights and political freedoms, has regular, free and competitive elections, a separation of powers, checks and balances, government accountability to the people, and autonomous civil society organisations.⁴ According to Diamond, democracy is the best form of government since it offers the best prospect for ‘accountable, responsive, peaceful, predictable, good governance.’ Diamond went on to argue that democracy is instrumental to freedom since it contains free and fair elections which inherently require political rights of expression, organization, and opposition, maximizes the opportunity for self-determination (‘for persons to live under laws of their own choosing’), and facilitates ‘moral autonomy, the ability of each individual citizen to make normative choices’.⁵ Thus, democracy promotes ‘human development (the growth of personal responsibility and intelligence) … [and provides] the best means for people to protect and advance their shared interest.’⁶ In doing so, one could argue


⁵ Diamond, *Developing Democracy*, pp. 2-3.

that democracy has real consequences for ordinary people since it provides the security necessary for freely expressing preferences, electing governments, and holding governments accountable.

The Case of East Timor and Its Contribution to Democratization Theory

During the 1980s-1990s, Southeast Asia experienced several cases in which authoritarian regimes were replaced by new democracies. In the Philippines, President Ferdinand Marcos’ authoritarian rule was replaced by a new democratic regime in 1986. Thailand then followed the Philippines example by democratising its politics in 1992. Indonesia began to democratise its politics in 1998, replacing Suharto’s authoritarian regime with a new democratic procedures.7 Further, this democratization of Indonesian politics impacted strongly on East Timor’s politics. In 1999, the new Indonesian government allowed the East Timorese to decide their political future through a United Nations (UN) sponsored referendum. This paved the way for East Timor’s independence and democratization.

The aim of this thesis is to investigate the dynamics and prospects of democratization in East Timor. I begin by assessing the socio-economic and political

conditions that prevail in the country, posing sets of conditions that variously promote and impede democratising processes. Indeed, a single case study of the distinctiveness of these conditions in the East Timorese setting provides new insights into the challenges and possibilities of political change. By way of introducing this case, this section briefly enumerates these variables.

Unfavourable colonial legacies, high levels of political violence, low levels of socioeconomic development, and the extreme weakness of civil society pose challenges to the consolidation of democracy in East Timor. With regard to unfavourable colonial legacies, for example, under Portuguese rule, East Timorese political elites gained little experience with governance, accountability, representativeness, rule of law, or competitiveness. Instead, Portuguese colonisation introduced powerful state apparatuses, ‘geared principally to socio-political and resource exploitation.’ Such unfavourable colonial experience caused political conflicts between East Timorese political leaders in the final year of Portuguese rule. Similarly, we will see that during the Indonesian occupation, East Timorese elites were only given a limited role in domestic politics.

Turning to legacies of political violence, in 1975 East Timor was undergoing decolonisation by Portugal when it was plunged into conflict, culminating in a brief civil war between political parties that had recently been formed. This outbreak can be attributed to a lack of political experience among local elites, as well the suddenness with which independence was granted. This civil war was followed by an Indonesian

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military invasion and annexation which lasted until 1999 when the UN carried out a referendum, marred by violence, to determine the future of East Timor. This violent legacy of decolonisation has generated bitter legacies between elites which, as we shall see, continue to hamper democracy’s consolidation.

In addition, given its low levels of socioeconomic development, East Timor faces enormous challenges in advancing its democratization. Some scholars of democracy have argued that economic performance to some extent influences the democratization process. Diamond indicates that some third wave democracies have broken down in ‘the face of sharp increases in poverty and unemployment due to economic crisis and reform’. Since 2001, East Timor’s economy has contracted 2 percent with income per capita less than a dollar per day. This puts East Timor on a par with the poorest countries in Southeast Asia and the former Portuguese colonies in Africa, and below some of the small countries in the Asia Pacific and Caribbean. To be sure, East Timor has a potential source of income in gas and petroleum which lies in the sea between East Timor and Australia, the sharing of which is currently under negotiations between these two countries. East Timor is expected to obtain billions of dollars in revenue from gas

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and oil once the negotiation is settled. However, the records of many gas and petroleum producing countries show that these commodities often only perpetuate authoritarian politics and high levels of corruption. For example, Nigeria, one of the largest producers, has long been mired in unstable authoritarian politics and high levels of corruption. In the early 1990s, oil revenues declined, shaving GDP by a much as 10 percent a year. On the other hand, some oil-producing countries in the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia and Iran have stabilized their politics. But civil liberties are suppressed.

At another level, civil society in East Timor is extremely weak, preventing it from effectively holding the government accountable. Indeed, in 2004 the government introduced a new regulation which expressly restricted civil society’s involvement in politics. This regulation gives the government authority to limit demonstrations and other political activities. Hence, this measure could pose a major obstacle for the country’s democratisation since, as Linz and Stepan have shown, civil society

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constitutes one of the forces that most provides effective control over the government and advances societal interests.\textsuperscript{16}

On the other hand, East Timor possesses some advantages which support the democratisation process. These include the benign national leadership exercised by the current president, Xanana Gusamao, favourable mass attitudes, and extensive external support provided to East Timor by the UN, international agencies and such countries as Australia, Portugal, the United States, and Japan.

As Larry Diamond has observed, leadership in Asia plays an important role in shaping political development.\textsuperscript{17} He writes that a leader who develops ‘a self-interest in adhering to the rules of the game’ is likely to make agreed constitutional rules ‘self-enforcing’.\textsuperscript{18} With Xanana Gusmao as president, East Timor is fortunate in having such a leader. Once the commander-in-chief of guerrilla forces resisting Indonesian occupation, Xanana enjoys great respect among former FALINTIL (Forcas Armadas da Libertacao National de Timor Leste, resistance armed wing) members and the country’s broader mass publics. Unlike some leaders in East Asia, Xanana Gusmao has not exploited the great popularity he possesses to install an authoritarian regime. Rather, he has used his prestige to support the United Nations (UN) transitional administration

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{18} Diamond, \textit{Developing Democracy}, p. 70.
\end{footnotes}
process to establish basic conditions for democratisation. In brief, during the first UN organised election in 2001 (the elections for a Constituent Assembly), he promoted civic and voter education programs in order to encourage people to vote and also to avoid violence during the election. In 2002, Xanana allowed himself to be nominated for the presidency in the election organised by the UN. Although declaring his reluctance to assume high office, he won overwhelmingly.

Since then, Xanana has steadfastly adhered to constitutional rules and regulations. Most notably, he has tried to use his limited presidential powers to check the government and the parliament, a body that has been dominated by one party, FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionario de Timor Leste Independente). Thus, Xanana has vetoed several legislative proposals introduced by the government and passed by the national parliament which were assessed by many analysts as violating the rights of the people. To be sure, several of these vetos have been overridden by a two-thirds majority of the parliament as allowed in article 88 of East Timor’s constitution.19 Nonetheless, Xanana’s leadership has been widely assessed as helpful for democratic development. He has also acted to promote reconciliation with Indonesia, in some measure alleviating international pressures.

19 According to East Timor’s Constitution, article 88, point 2, the National Parliament within 90 days can overturn a president’s veto with an absolute majority. One of the acts vetoed by Xanana was the Security Act which gives the government power to control the opposition. But later the act was reintroduced and passed by two-thirds of the parliament, which forced President Xanana to promulgate the act. See also JSMP Press Release, ‘New Internal Security Act May Be Unconstitutional’, 27 August 2003 in author’s collection.
Studies of democracy have also demonstrated a strong relationship between mass attitudes and democracy. In his book *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*, Diamond argues that ‘if democracy is to become stable and effective, the bulk of the democratic citizenry must develop a deep and resilient commitment to it’.\(^{20}\) He cites Portugal, Greece and Spain as examples in which favourable mass attitudes supported democratic outcomes. With more than 50 percent of their citizens supporting democracy in these countries, democratic transitions and consolidation took place.\(^{21}\) In the case of East Timor, a survey conducted by the International Republican Institute in 2003 found that 57 percent of East Timorese supported democracy. A majority of respondents thus believe that democracy will help to resolve many existing problems and improve economic conditions.\(^{22}\) These positive mass attitudes can help to lay the foundation for democratic development in East Timor.

Since 1999, East Timor has also had extensive support from the international community through the UN and other international organisations. Since organising the referendum in East Timor, the UN has remained deeply involved in establishing basic conditions for the democratisation processes through the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). From late 1999 to May 2002, UNTAET was the only organisation with executive, judicial and legislative power governing East Timor. UN support has continued even after East Timor gained independence through its different missions, the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNMISET) and the


United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), which supervise and still provide advice to the East Timor government.

In addition to the UN, some other international agencies have been very active in helping East Timor to build its democracy, such as AusAID from Australia, USAID, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and the International Republican Institute (IRI). This international involvement in East Timor is important, and provides an excellent case study through which to understand the extent to which international promotion and activities can interact with important domestic variables in advancing democratisation.

To sum up this section, it can be seen that unfavourable colonial experience, legacies of political violence, low levels of socio-economic development, and the extreme weakness of civil society have weakened democracy’s prospects in East Timor. But its prospects have been bolstered by favourable national leadership and mass attitudes, as well as extensive external support offered by the United Nations and other international agencies and countries. The aim of this thesis, however, is to demonstrate, that amid these countervailing sets of variables, democracy’s prospects turns primarily on elite-level attitudes and relations.

**Literature Review**

The scholarly literature on East Timor is fairly limited. What exists, however, can be classified under the following headings: history, economic and political development, and UN analyses. Let us briefly survey this literature in order better to see how that country has traditionally been analysed.
East Timor’s historical record has been elaborated by such authors as John G. Taylor, Geoffrey C. Gunn, Mario Lemos Pires, and Luna Oliveira. Their historical analyses can be collated into three main areas: Portuguese colonization, East Timorese conflict, and resistance against Indonesian occupation. On Portuguese colonisation, Luna Oliveira recounts important events between the 1860s and the 1940s. For example, Oliveira briefly elaborates the establishment of the first effective administration of Portuguese in Timor in 1901 and one of the major revolts against Portuguese rule in 1912 by the East Timorese leader, D. Boaventura in Manufahi.23 John G. Taylor and Geoffrey G. Gunn in their books emphasize the impact of Portuguese colonization on East Timor culture and how the Timorese organized themselves to resist Portuguese colonization.24 David Hicks’s article also examines how Portuguese colonization influences the traditional structure of East Timor, especially in Tetum communities.25

With respect to the civil warring that took place at the end of Portuguese rule and ushered in Indonesian forces, John G Taylor argues that foreign intervention was the main cause. He claims that before the UDT coup in August 1975, Indonesian military intelligence had infiltrated East Timor in order to foment conflict, creating a pretext for


invasion. Gunn agrees with Taylor, asserting that Indonesian military intelligence played an important role in inciting the conflict. Further, he argues that the occupation of East Timor was the result of US and Australian support to Indonesia.

Another author, James Dunn, whose book discusses extensively the Indonesian occupation in East Timor, also points to the Indonesian military intelligence role in the conflict. Mario Lemos Pires, the last Portuguese governor in East Timor, argues that the lack of political experience of East Timor’s leadership and the Indonesian military intelligence intervention were the cause of the political conflict in 1975, culminating in a civil war. George J. Aditjondro, an Indonesian scholar living in Australia, examines the impact of the Indonesian occupation on daily life in East Timor. For example, he describes how the Indonesian government transferred the ownership of major coffee plantations to the Indonesian military-connected company PT Denok. According to Aditjondro, this company was given the monopoly right on the coffee trade in East Timor.

With respect to the East Timorese resistance mounted against the Indonesian military, Taylor and Gunn note the ability of the resistance leaders to mobilise local fighters. The current East Timor Foreign Minister, Jose Ramos Horta, discusses in his

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book FRETILIN’s political ideology and resistance against the Indonesian occupation. He states that FRETILIN’s ideology was based on Maubereism, an ideology which defends the rights of poor and oppressed people. He recounts his work in the UN after the Indonesian invasion to bring the issue onto the UN agenda.³¹

Xanana Gusmao’s autobiography, edited by Sarah Niner, provides important insights into the resistance. Though one of only two survivors of FRETILIN’s Central Committee members, Xanana effectively reorganized the guerrilla movement. His book also highlights the internal divisions between resistance leaders during the Indonesian occupation, which led to the surrender of some of guerrilla commanders to the Indonesian military.³² Helen Mary Hill also examines East Timor’s resistance. She focuses her discussions on FRETILIN by arguing that from 1974 to 1978 FRETILIN was the only national movement capable of organizing the resistance against the Indonesian military. However, in doing this, her book ignores the role of other important institutions such as the Catholic Church in the resistance movement role.³³ There are also some Portuguese and other foreign authors’ analyses of East Timorese history such as Artur Teodoro de Matos,³⁴ A. Faria de Morais,³⁵ Noam Chomsky³⁶ and

Bill Nicol\textsuperscript{37} that more generally address Portuguese colonisation, Indonesian occupation and the East Timorese resistance.

With respect to economic and political development, Hal Hill and Joao Saldanha recently edited a book which is a compilation of articles written by different authors that were presented in the Dili Economic Forum 2001.\textsuperscript{38} This volume examines East Timor’s politics, its economy and post-conflict reconstruction. For example, J.A.C. Mackie’s article suggests that analysts focusing on the establishment of East Timor’s political institutions should consider issues of corruption, politicization of bureaucracy, transparency and accountability. Mackie goes on to argue that a best form of government for East Timor may be semi-presidential because it provides a sharing of authority between president, prime minister and the parliament.\textsuperscript{39}

Anthony Smith, in his article, focuses his analysis on political conflict between East Timorese leaders and how these conflicts affected the East Timor election. He also touches briefly on the issue of divisions between leaders which, in his view, were a


result of the earlier conflicts. On this count, Dennis Shoesmith focuses more closely on the origins of these political divisions. He also examines the present-day strains between Xanana Gusmao and the Primer Minister, Mari Alkatiri. In his view, these tensions emerges from Xanana Gusmao’s decision to remove FALINTIL, the resistance armed wing, from FRETILIN in the 1980s.

Dwight Y. King’s article analyses the social bases of the major political parties. Observing results of the Constituent Assembly election, he argues that FRETILIN (the ruling party) finds its roots in the eastern part of the country, while other major parties gain more support in the western part. He notes that a high degree of patrimonial, local clan, or ethnic loyalties have encouraged whole villages to vote the same way.

There are also other articles written by Brien Hallett and Ralph Summy, William Maley, Chisako M Fukuda, Mathew Jardine, Michael Salla, Alan Dupont,  

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Paulo Gorjao, Peter Zinoman, and Nancy Lee Peluso, Joseph Nevis, James Cotton. These articles discuss issues related to security, reconciliation, violence during the UN-sponsored referendum and the impact of the East Timor issue on the diplomatic relations of other countries such as Australia, Portugal and Indonesia. For example, Michael Salla’s article discusses political violence during the Indonesian occupation and reconciliation. According to him, reconciliation was the only way in which to resolve these tensions. Chisako Fukuda also suggests that a non-violent approach taken by the resistance movement during the Indonesian occupation was vital to ending East Timor’s conflict. James Cotton’s article focuses more on negotiations between East Timor and Australia over maritime boundaries in the Timor Sea, the outcome of which is vital for East Timor’s economy. Cotton is also concerned about the ability of East Timor’s government to manage the revenues that it will gain in ways that avoid the dangers associated with oil wealth.

Finally, with respect to analyses produced by the UN, most of them focus on the agency’s involvement in pacifying and administering the territory. For example, Ian

Martin, the former head of United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), in his book discusses the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) and its work in organizing the referendum. He also notes that during his work in that particular period, divisions between political leaders created political tensions and conflicts in the territory. He also observes how East Timorese leaders, especially those who were ‘pro-Indonesia’, came under the influence of the Indonesian military, which made them unable to make crucial decisions in that period. Jamsheed Marker, the UN Secretary General Representative for East Timor, in his memoirs, notes that the UN encountered huge obstacles in resolving various confrontations. For example, during the tripartite (UN, Portugal, and Indonesia) talks, Portugal and Indonesia refused to make concessions. He also notes that at Indonesia’s insistence, East Timorese leaders were excluded from these negotiations. Thus, before the referendum was carried out, the UN dealt almost exclusively with Portuguese and Indonesian authorities. Geoffrey Gunn also produced a book in which he examines the legality of the East Timorese demand for self-determination. He compiles some of the UN resolutions on decolonisation and East Timor to show that the East Timorese indeed had a right to self-determination.


One of the most important analyses on UN involvement in East Timor after the referendum was written by Nassrine Azimi and Chang Li Lin. Their volume is a compilation of articles written by different authors about the UN administration in East Timor after the referendum. The book’s overall conclusion is that the UN has achieved significant, though only partial success in establishing democratic institutions in East Timor. One of the articles in this book criticized the UN for favouring one party, FRETILIN, which deeply politicised the bureaucracy. Paulo Gorjao, a Portuguese academic living in Lisbon, in his article also characterises the UN work in East Timor as ambiguous in its outcomes. In particular, he notes that the UN administration never consulted the East Timorese people in making important decisions regarding East Timor’s fate.

The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade also published a book which discusses Australia’s involvement in helping the East Timorese to become independent and how Australia work closely with the United States and the UN to prepare the UN military intervention in East Timor after the referendum. This book has been criticized by some academics, however, including James Cotton, who asserts

that it was published to exonerate the Australian government over its policy toward East Timor during 1975-1999.\textsuperscript{60}

Most of the analyses surveyed here give too much attention to external or international factors. This thesis contends that while external factors—and societal forces—are important, the attitudes and relations of local elites weigh more heavily upon the ways in which democratization unfolds. Of course, most of these works do make reference to political conflicts and their impact on elections and political development. But they fail to analyse comprehensively the way in which these tensions affect democratic consolidation in East Timor. Most notably, they focus on the tensions between Xanana Gusmao and Mari Alkatiri, even if in recent years these tensions have diminished. But seriously under-analysed are many other areas of tension, producing struggles between other kinds of elites, within and between political parties, and between such institutions as FRETELIN and the Catholic Church.

Moreover, the attention given by international scholars to East Timor has declined in the wake of the handover of administration from the UN to the East Timorese people on 20 May 2002. Scholarly articles in journals and books about East Timor have lately grown scarce. However, the most crucial period of political development is now under way, since there are many political developments that need to be studied in order to understand the future of East Timor’s political development and the prospects for democracy.

On this count, Robert Elson, in discussing the ‘tragedy’ of modern Indonesian history, observes that a ‘preparatory’ step is necessary among elites if serious political

failings and breakdowns are to be avoided. In the Indonesian case, he shows that early in the country’s independence period, national leaders and elites remained unable to settle their differences, paving the way for innumerable political problems later. This thesis is the first attempt systematically to analyse the impact of elite attitudes and relations on East Timorese political development and the prospects for democratic consolidation.

A Brief History of East Timor

East Timor is located geographically between Indonesia and Australia (see Map 1.1). It has a population of approximately 900,000 people and income per capita of USD 300 in 2001. East Timor was a Portuguese colony for almost 450 years, and an occupied territory of the Indonesian military for 23 years. East Timor was liberated from Indonesia in 1999 after a majority voted against the Indonesia’s proposed autonomy in the UN sponsored ballot on 30 August 1999. Before the UN intervention, there was violence carried out by militias, pro-Indonesian supporters, which resulted in approximately one thousand people being killed, while more than 200,000 were forcibly deported or fled the country.


63 An estimated one thousand people were killed, and tens of thousands of houses and other structures were destroyed through extensive looting and arson. See Francisco da Costa Guterres, ‘Reconciliation in
To provide some background, this section briefly outlines East Timor’s history in three phases: Portuguese colonisation, Indonesian occupation, and the UN intervention.

The Period of Portuguese Colonization


64 The Portuguese Government withdrew from Dili, East Timor’s capital, to the islet of Atauro on 27 August 1975.
Timor due to a brief civil war between East Timor political parties. Portugal at that time could not control the territory, decided to withdraw, and left the territory in chaos.

The Portuguese were not the first foreigners to reach the island. Before their arrival Chinese traders visited the island as early as the fifteenth century for trade purposes. The arrival of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century was mainly for trading sandalwood, as the island produced high quality white and yellow sandalwood that was sold on India’s market. The other purpose of the Portuguese was Evangelizacao (Evangelisation). According to David Hicks, it was in 1562 when missionaries of the Dominican Order arrived in the island for evangelisation, which also marked the real beginning of the colonization period. Subsequently, the Portuguese established its administration in East Timor to control the territory.

Colonization ended in 1975 after the Carnation Revolution (revolucao das flores) in Portugal on 25 April 1974 overthrew the authoritarian Salazar regime and replaced it with a democratic regime. The new government then gave freedom to all Portuguese colonies overseas (provincias ultramarinos), including East Timor, to decide their own

65 Boxer noted that, ‘a Chinese chronicle of 1436 remarked that the mountains [of Timor island] are covered with sandal-trees and the country produced nothing else’ quoted in James Dunn, Timor: A people Betrayed (Sydney: The Jacaranda Press, 1983), p. 15.

66 Antonio Pigafetta explained that the island was the source of all sandalwood and wax traded by the people of Java and Malacca quoted in James J. Fox, ‘Tracing the Path, Recounting the Past: Historical Perspectives on Timor’, in James J. Fox and Dionisio Babo Soares, eds., Out of Ashes: Destruction and Reconstruction of East Timor (Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing, 2000), p. 7.


68 Hicks, ‘Unachieved Syncretism’, p. 20.
future. In response to that situation, three major political parties were founded in East Timor: Uniao Democratica Timorense (UDT), FRETILIN and Associacao Popular Democratica Timorense (APODETI), each with different ideologies. The main objective of UDT, according to its manifesto, was progressive autonomy within a multi-continental and racial Portuguese community, which was ‘to be achieved by an increasing participation of Timorese in all sectors of public administration at all levels under the Portuguese flag’. But later UDT changed its political objective from a federation with Portugal to integration with Indonesia. FRETILIN, on the other hand, advocated independence for East Timor with the rejection of colonialism and neocolonialism. APODETI declared itself in favour of an autonomous integration into the Republic of Indonesia in accordance with international law.

From April 1974 to August 1975 the situation of East Timor was very tense as political manoeuvres intensified, because each political party had begun to carry out campaigns throughout East Timor to obtain greater support in elections that were expected to be held in late 1975. Due to a lack of political knowledge and experience, and the unwillingness of political leaders or elites to adhere to democratic rules, East Timorese engaged in violent conflict several times throughout East Timor. These political clashes culminated in UDT’s short-lived coup d’état, an attempt to take over the government and to eliminate other political parties, especially FRETILIN, which

69 Pires, Descolonizacao de Timor, pp. 38-42.
70 Ibid., pp. 106-17.
was accused by other political parties and the Indonesian government of being communist. But the coup was unsuccessful as FRETILIN took counter measures, gained control as much of the territory, and unilaterally proclaimed East Timorese independence on 28 November 1975. UDT, together with other political parties (APODETI, Kota and Trabalhista), on 30 November the same year proclaimed the integration of East Timor within Indonesia. This declaration provided a pretext for Indonesia to invade East Timor.

The Period of the Indonesian Occupation

On 7 December 1975 Indonesia invaded East Timor. In the following year, on 17 July 1976, it annexed East Timor as Indonesia’s 27th province. With the invasion of Indonesia, Portugal took the issue of East Timor to the UN, claiming that the intervention of Indonesia was a disruption of the decolonisation process under way, and that Indonesia should withdraw from East Timor. Many countries were sympathetic to Portugal’s claims and many voted in favour of the UN resolutions calling for Indonesia to withdraw without delay from East Timor. Since the issue of East Timor moved into the UN it became an issue of decolonisation where discussion revolved around whether the East Timorese had the right to self-determination. The UN Secretary General was charged by the General Assembly of the UN to find a just and comprehensive solution to the case, a model that could be acceptable to all parties concerned. The Secretary General started organising meetings between Portugal as the administering power of East Timor and Indonesia, the occupying force, to discuss the issue of East Timor.
In East Timor, Indonesia’s occupation—which was to last almost 24 years—encountered stiff resistance from many East Timorese, especially FRETILIN supporters. After the Indonesian invasion, the war in East Timor was transformed from a civil war to a military confrontation between the Indonesian military and East Timor’s independent guerrilla fighters. The occupation resulted in East Timor’s become the 27th province of Indonesia, dramatically changing the territory’s political, economic and social systems.

In this way, East Timorese identities were changed, with citizenship shifting from Portuguese to Indonesian. East Timorese were thus exposed to a new language, Indonesian. They were forced to adopt Indonesian civil administration and legal systems, greatly distorting traditional political and legal systems. For example, the local structure at the village and hamlet levels had to be changed to mesh with the Indonesian village administration system. East Timorese elites were also affected—as this thesis will explore later. Some of these elites lost their statuses due to their involvement in FRETILIN and other resistance movement that opposed the Indonesian occupation. Others survived the change because they cooperated with Indonesia. At the same time, new elites emerged due to their political affiliation with the Indonesia occupation. In addition, strategies of violence became deeply institutionalised. It is possible that as many as 200,000 people died in that period as a result of killings committed by the Indonesian military, and because of the starvation and disease that accompanied the occupation.72

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72 This figure is still subject to discussion, since there is no independent investigation to provide the exact figure. The Santa Cruz massacre in 1991 was among other massacres committed during the Indonesian occupation. See The Washington Post, ‘East Timor Atrocities Detailed; At Least 100,000 Died, Report to
However, the fall of Soeharto in 1998 brought unexpected changes in Indonesian government policy toward East Timor. On 29 January 1999, B.J. Habibie, Soeharto’s successor as president, allowed the East Timorese to choose between remaining with Indonesia, although with greater political autonomy, or gaining full independence. Habibie’s policy was then discussed by Portugal and Indonesia under UN auspices, and on 5 May 1999 they reached an agreement for organising a referendum for the East Timorese. The UN was then given the task of administering this referendum. On 30 August 1999, the referendum was held and the result was announced on 4 September 1999, with 78.5 percent of East Timorese opting for independence and only 21.5 percent supporting autonomy with Indonesia. The reporting of these results triggered a new wave of political violence, with East Timor’s infrastructure was almost totally destroyed by the pro-autonomy militia groups. The period of violence resulted in an influx of almost 200,000 refugees into Indonesian West Timor.73

The humanitarian crisis created by the pro-Indonesia militias generated a deep sense of hatred and a desire for revenge in the East Timorese people. As a consequence, victims of the violence have demanded severe punishment for pro-autonomy supporters and the Indonesian generals responsible for East Timor’s security.

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73 At the time of writing, more than half of them have now returned. Currently, an estimated 50,000 are still in West Timor or other parts of Indonesia including both victims and perpetrators. See Hayner, and van Zyl, ‘The Challenge of Reconciliation in East Timor’.
The Period of the UN and Independent East Timor

On 20 September 1999, the UN Multi-National Forces (Interfet) led by Australia intervened in East Timor to halt the violence. Once INTERFET had brought the territory under control, the UN Security Council through Resolution 1271/1999 established the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to administer East Timor. This marked the first time the UN assumed full sovereignty over a territory. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) was ultimately responsible for the legislative, executive and judicial systems in East Timor. Such an administration was a transition to prepare for the independence of East Timor. Before handing over authority to the East Timorese, the UN in 2001 succeeded in carrying out an election for a Constituent Assembly on 30 August 2001 to draft the East Timorese Constitution. Later, on 14 April 2002, the UN organised another successful election, the presidential election. After these two successful elections, on 20 May 2002, East Timor proclaimed its independence with the first president, the former guerrilla leader, Xanana Gusmao.

This historical account shows that the East Timorese had never experienced any form of democratic government during the Portuguese and Indonesian periods. Instead, Portuguese colonisation and Indonesian occupation caused deep political divisions between local elites. Further, the decolonisation processes were marked by extraordinary levels of violence, hardening attitudes in ways that were also inimical for democracy. Yet despite these historical legacies, East Timor’s politics have been
democratised. The aim of this thesis is to investigate this transition and, more importantly, the prospects for democratic consolidation.

**Democracy**

Before investigating the role of elites in advancing or hindering the democratisation of East Timor’s politics, this section will analyse some of the different ways in which democracy has been conceptualised.

Political democracy can be traced back to the ‘Athenian legacy of popular government within a small city’. This Athenian democracy in its origins was a popular government in which citizens were at the same time ‘subjects of political authority and the creators of public rules and regulations’. According to David Held, this kind of democracy became ‘a fundamental source of inspiration for modern western political thought’ early on. Jean Grugel notes that democracy was ‘rediscovered in the republican and communitarian traditions of the European Middle Ages, and later reformulated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England and North America’. But by the eighteenth century, this classical participatory democracy no longer seemed viable with the change of city-state to nation-state. To accommodate

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76 Held, ‘Democracy’, p. 16.

such a change of liberal notions ‘representation, equality before the law and accountability were eventually grafted onto democracy’. 78

In discussing an ideal type of democracy in the modern era, we note first the different ways ‘in which [democracy] has been principally understood: substantive and procedural’. 79 Substantive democracy ‘involves equality between classes, ethnic groups, genders, and other forms of identity and affiliation, cumulating in a literature that comes broadly under the headings of social, economy, and industrial democracy’. 80 For substantive democracy, democracy is only achieved through social justice. By contrast, procedural democracy gives ‘greater attention to civil liberties and regular elections, practices associated with ‘polyarchy’’ 81. Procedural democracy focuses on the recruitment process of governing elites through free and fair competition and unhindered mass participation based on universal suffrage. The question is, which of these two interpretations, substantive or procedural, is more analytically fruitful in discussing democracy?

As Burton, Gunther, and Higley argue, social equality may be a precondition for democracy, but to equate ‘democracy with greater equality in the distribution of national wealth and with ‘social justice’’ results in a loss of explanatory power. 82

78 *Ibid.*. See also Held, ‘ Democracy’, p. 23.

79 *Case, Politics in Southeast Asia*, p. 5.


developing this argument, they refer to the German Democratic Republic (GDR) wherein the distribution of wealth was equal and the official ideology ‘endorsed social justice as a main goal’, but the GDR can hardly be understood as a democratic country. Burton, and his colleagues went on to argue that there is a broad agreement among scholars that democracy can best be conceptualised through the procedural criteria of polyarchy associated with Robert Dahl.83

In this understanding, democracy involves a political regime that allows enough liberal participation and electoral contestation to provide space for competition among individuals and organizations (political parties) for government positions at ‘regular intervals’ peacefully, to endorse more political participation in the selections of the leaders through fair and regular elections, and to promote civil and political liberties.84 Of course, no country in the world is likely to fulfill these ideal criteria, because there are a number of factors that may affect to the implementation of democracy, such as ‘the quality of professional politicians, and their willingness to engage in corruption’.85

Burton, Gunther, and Higley thus define democracy in procedural terms as a regime which ‘effectively recruit[s] governing elites through free and fair competition among all parties that want to participate – in conformity with democratic rules of the game, but irrespective of other aspects of their ideologies or programmatic preferences- and

83 Ibid.


85 Juan J. Linz, quoted in Case, Politics in Southeast Asia, p. 6.
through widespread and unhindered mass participation based on universal suffrage’. 86
This is elaborated more fully by Robert Dahl in terms of ‘polyarchy’, which contains six
elements critical to modern democratic countries: elected officials, free, fair, and
frequent elections, freedom of expression, access to alternative sources of information,
associational autonomy, and inclusive citizenship. 87

At base, however, Samuel Huntington contends that these procedural
corporalizations of democracy boil down to two principal dimensions: ‘liberal
participation’ and ‘electoral contestation’. Liberal participation ‘involves civil liberties,
especially freedom of political communication and organisation, making possible a
vibrant civil society and potent opposition parties’. Electoral contestation involves ‘free,
fair, meaningful and regular elections, enabling the opposition parties to replace the
incumbent governments and set new policy directions’. 88 O’Donnell and Schmitter
concur. 89 Liberalisation encompasses the expansion of legal individual and group rights,
and tolerance and competition for political parties, enabling civil society organisations
to form. Democratization entails contestation over ‘the right to win control of the
government… [through] free competitive elections’. 90

Thus, if both of these dimensions are present, a procedural democracy exists. But if
one or both of these elements are missing, different kinds of authoritarianism prevail.
Thus, a ‘hard’ or ‘closed’ authoritarian regime exists where civil liberties are suppressed

89 Quoted in Case, Politics in Southeast Asia, pp. 6-7.
and no elections are held. In this situation, Diamond, Linz, and Lipset observe that little pluralism is tolerated, with the government ‘typically banning political parties (or all but the ruling one) and most forms of political organization and competition, while being more repressive than liberal in their level of civil and political freedom’.

Further, between hard authoritarian and democratic regimes lie various ‘hybrid regimes’, usually denominated as *semi-democracy* and *pseudo-democracy*. Semi-democracy is a type of authoritarian polity in which the government manipulates procedures in ways that enable it to perpetuate its grip on state power, but allows some level of electoral contestation to take place. Malaysia and Singapore can be classified as semi-democratic countries. Further, *pseudo-democracy* is a regime where ‘elections are also held regularly’, but these elections are rigidly controlled, civil liberties, freedom of expression, assembly, and information are utterly suppressed. Indonesia, during the New Order period under Soeharto, is best categorized as a pseudo-democracy.

Thus, in this thesis, democracy is understood as a form of political regime in which civil liberties are respected and meaningful elections are regularly held. Candidates in

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elections must have the opportunity to express their political views freely, and to form political associations in order to gather support for their bid to power. And citizens must at the same time be equally free to obtain political information, to associate freely, and to support the political parties they wish. Accordingly, this thesis is guided by a procedural definition of democracy in which political regimes are best understood as ‘a set of rules’, which emphasises the involvement of citizens in the process that satisfies the right to participate.96

*Democratic Transitions*

The breakdown of many authoritarian regimes during the 1970s and 1980s led to the emergence of a vast literature on democratic transitions. These writings helped to shape understandings of the process of political change. One of the earliest and most important writings on transition was by Dankwart Rustow. Rustow’s model comprises three phases and a ‘background condition’. According to Rustow the background condition of transition is ‘national unity’, which means that citizens should at least agree that they all belong to the same political community. The first phase of transition is the ‘preparatory phase’, characterised by a prolonged and inconclusive political struggle between political elites which represent well-entrenched forces. The second is a decision phase where the political leaders accept a diversity of views and institutionalise ‘some crucial aspects of democratic procedure’97 in order to structure and channel this


97 Dankwart Rustow, quoted in Gill, *The Dynamics of Democratization*, pp. 43-45.
diversity. The ‘habituation phase’ is a stage in which the politicians learn from successful resolution of issues and ‘place their faith in the new rules and to apply them to new issues’, new politicians are ushered into the new structure, and a mass public is linked the structure through effective parties.

Rustow’s work encourages more thinking about the origins of democratic regimes. Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead provide important explanations of transitions that further understanding of what transition consists of and how it occurs. According to these authors transitions are ‘[an] interval between one political regime and another’ with an important characteristic of ‘uncertainty’. This uncertainty is not simply related to the outcome of the transition—to democratic polity or to other form of regime—but importantly to the process itself. Thus, transitions are characterised by the lack of ‘structural and behavioural parameters to guide and predict the outcome’, producing indirection and uncertainty. Since uncertainty became the focus of studies of transition, it has created analysis of ‘various elite actors whose maneuverings and relationships constitute the dynamic of the transition process’.

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98 See ibid., pp. 43-44.
100 O’Donnell at el., quoted in ibid., pp. 44-45.
101 O’Donnell at el., quoted in ibid., p. 44.
102 Ibid., p. 44.
103 Ibid., p. 45.
In addition, O'Donnell and Schmitter in their seminal work describe the occurrence of transitions as a result of divisions between ‘soft-liners’ and ‘hardliners’ in an authoritarian regime.\textsuperscript{104} When disunity set in between these elites the regime may break down as the authoritarian coalition begins to disintegrate, forcing elite soft-liners to negotiate with moderate opposition leaders. Negotiations between them may result in agreement that lead to transition to democracy.\textsuperscript{105} Their analysis underlined the importance of elites in changing regimes.

The literature on transitions has grouped different modes of transition into three major categories, transition by \textit{transformation}, by \textit{transplacement}, and by \textit{replacement}.\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Transformation} occurs when the elites in power, calculating that they can protect their most essential interests, take the lead to bring about democracy. In this type of transition, the incumbent elites are the primary actors of the transition process. \textit{Transplacement} occurs when elites in the regime and the opposition negotiate the transition process as equal partners. Since the power of the governing elite is diminishing due to pressure from the people through demonstrations, the result of negotiations will be in favour of the opposition. At the same time, some scholars have argued that mass participation and popular mobilization can harm the process of democratisation.\textsuperscript{107} These kinds of transitions have been associated with Latin America and Southern Europe.

\textsuperscript{104} See William Case, \textit{Politics in Southeast Asia}, pp. 22-23.

\textsuperscript{105} See Smith, \textit{Understanding Third World Politics}, p. 253.

\textsuperscript{106} Huntington, \textit{The Third Wave}, pp. 114-62.

\textsuperscript{107} See Smith, \textit{Understanding Third World Politics}, p. 253.
These distinct modes of transition have in recent years been criticised for ignoring the causal role of mass publics, perhaps cohering in civil society, in bringing about transition. Thus, some studies of transitional democracies argue that the breakdown of an authoritarian regime can result primarily from ‘pressures from public protest, and industrial and political action by trade unions’. The Philippines, Eastern Europe (former communist countries), and some African countries are cases in point, where ‘transitions have been predominantly brought about by mass protest’. \(^\text{108}\) This transition can be categorised as transition by \textit{replacement}, which occurs when civil society takes the lead in bringing about transition to democracy and the authoritarian regime collapses completely. \(^\text{109}\)

In addition to these modes of transitions that are internally transacted, some scholars have identified another pathway that involves external or international pressure. One way in which this transition can occur involves a foreign power intervening to topple an authoritarian regime. Recent examples include US interventions in Panama, Iraq, and Afghanistan. \(^\text{110}\) This international pressure can involve supporting domestic factors in bringing down an authoritarian regime through economic sanctions, trade embargoes, international ideological pressure, global recessions, and explicit military force. \(^\text{111}\) The effectiveness of external pressures, however, depends on the


\(^{110}\) See also Smith, \textit{Understanding Third World Politics}, p. 255.

\(^{111}\) See \textit{ibid.}, pp. 255-56; see also Gill, \textit{The Dynamics of Democratization}, pp. 18-25.
extent to which ‘domestic economic and political actors, institutions and structures’ are connected to ‘global geopolitical forces’.

Additional research has raised important questions over whether transitions always result in democratic consolidation. Thomas Carothers, a prominent practitioner of democratic ‘assistance’ or ‘promotion’, argues that most transitions fall short. He notes that ‘of the nearly 100 countries considered as ‘transitional’ in recent years, only a relatively small number—probably fewer than 20—are clearly en route to becoming successful …democracies’. The majority of these 100 countries have not achieved ‘relatively well-functioning democracy’. Carothers’ assessment was anticipated by O’Donnell et al, who concluded that transitions do not necessarily lead to democracy. Rather, transitions may lead to authoritarian regressions, revolutions, or to hybrid regimes. In these hybrid regimes, variously cast as democraduras and dictablandas,

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112 Graeme Gill, quoted in Smith, Understanding Third World Politics, p. 256.
114 Guillermo O’Donnell, and Philippe C. Schmitter Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 6-14; Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘Debating the Transition the Paradigm: In Partial Defense of an Evanescent ‘Paradigm’, Journal of Democracy, 13:3, 2002, p. 7. Carothers also defines these hybrid regimes into Feckless Pluralism and Dominant-Power Politics. According to him, Feckless Pluralism features ‘significant amount of political freedom, regular elections, and alternation of power between genuinely different political groupings’ with political participation extending very little beyond the voting. Political elites from all major parties are perceived as ‘corrupt, self-interested, and ineffective …dishonest, and not serious about working for their country’. Further, Dominant-Power Politics offers little space for political contestation by the opposition because the ruling party or dictator dominates the political system with little prospect for alternation of power. In this political system, the line between the state and the ruling party is blurred as all state sources such as
democracy suffers serious deficits, including ‘poor representation of citizens’ interest, low levels of political participation beyond voting, frequent abuse of the law by the government officials, elections of uncertain legitimacy, very low levels of public confidence in state institutions, and persistently poor institutional performance by the state’.  

However, despite this elaboration of transitional modes, none of those identified commonly in the literature apply fully to the East Timor case. The transition in East Timor most closely resembles opposition–led replacement because it was brought about by the collapse of Indonesia’s authoritarian regime, the removal of Indonesian government officials and their local agents amid great violence, and the emergence of new local elites. However, economic crisis also appears as an important factor, sorely weakening Indonesia. In addition, democratisation was advanced by external forces, in particular, the United Nations (UN), which introduced democratic procedures, first in the form of a referendum to determine East Timor’s future, later by overseeing founding elections. This UN involvement was encouraged by sustained guerrilla activity in East Timor conducted by local elites and followings, which meant that independence and democratisation were undertaken nearly simultaneously. Accordingly, East Timor’s money, jobs, public information and police power ‘are gradually put in the direct service of the ruling party’. See Thomas Carothers, ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’, pp. 9-12; See also Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘In Partial Defense of an Evanescent ‘Paradigm’’, p. 7.


Ibid., pp. 9-10.
transition amounts to a process that departs from established modes in important ways, hence contributing to our understanding of transition dynamics and outcomes.

*The Consolidation of Democracy*

Linz and Stepan define democratic consolidation as ‘a political situation in which, in a phrase, democracy has become ‘the only game in town’’ 117. Political competitors and mass public must have a broad normative and behavioural consensus on the legitimacy of the constitutional system. They argue that for democracy to become consolidated, political leaders and mass publics: (1) behaviourally restrain themselves from using any undemocratic means to overthrow the democratic regime; (2) attitudinally perpetuate the regime even in situations of severe political and economic crisis; and (3) constitutionally, elites become habituated to resolve political conflict according to the established norms.118

Linz and Stepan go on to argue that consolidated democracy involves five arenas that ‘reinforce one another.’ First, for a democracy to be consolidated, there must be conditions for the development of a free and lively civil society which is autonomous from the state. Second, democratic consolidation needs a ‘relatively autonomous and valued political system’ through which to exercise control over public power and the state apparatus. Third, the rule of law must exist to ensure ‘legal guarantees for citizens’ freedom and independent associational life.’ The rule of law also requires ‘a clear hierarchy of laws, interpreted by an independent judicial system and supported by a


strong legal culture in civil society.’ Fourth there is a ‘usable bureaucracy’ that will deliver public and basic services and protect the rights of the citizens. The final arena of consolidated democracy involves an economic society which requires ‘institutionalisation of a socially and politically regulated market.’119

Diamond conceptualises democratic consolidation more explicitly in terms of persistence and quality. Capacity to persist means that there is no significant threat from collective actors who challenge the legitimacy of democratic institutions and regularly violate the country’s constitutional norms, procedures, and laws and that, elite and mass organisation manifest deep commitment to democracy.120 And democratic quality denotes that citizens have ‘ample freedom, political equality, and control over public policies and policy makers through the legitimate and lawful functioning of stable institutions’.121

Collaborating with Leonardo Morlino, Diamond next elaborates democratic quality in terms of eight dimensions: the rule of law, participation, competition, vertical accountability, horizontal accountability, respect for civil and political freedoms, the progressive implementation of greater political (social and economic) equality, and responsiveness. Diamond and Morlino group these eight dimensions into three distinct but related categories: procedural dimensions, substantive dimensions, and a bridging dimension. ‘Procedural dimensions’ entail the rule of law, participation, competition, vertical and horizontal accountability which regards mostly with rules and practice.

119 Ibid., pp. 7-15.
120 Diamond, Developing Democracy, pp. 65-73.
‘Substantive dimensions’ involve respect for civil and political freedoms, and the progressive implementation of greater political (social and economic) equality, hence promoting social justice. And a ‘bridging dimension’ entails responsiveness which ‘bridges procedural and substantive dimensions by providing a basis for measuring how much or little public policies (including laws, institutions, and expenditures) correspond to citizen demand and preferences as aggregated through the political process.’

Further, these dimensions interact densely and sometimes unfold together either ‘toward democratic improvement and deepening or toward decay’. Diamond and Morlino thus recognise that not all good things may ‘go together smoothly’. Maximising one dimension can result in other dimensions being neglected or eroded. High quality democracy ‘does not rate infinitely high on every measure of democratic quality, but instead represents a balancing of virtues that lie in tension’. These insights of quality democracy help us better to understand the notion of democratic consolidation. One of the questions that this thesis will try to address, then, is whether East Timor’s new democracy is consolidating.

Elites as a Unit of Analysis

Early studies of democratic transitions in the classic cases of Southern Europe and Latin America placed elites at the analytical centre. As O’Donnell and Schmitter wrote, ‘there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence –direct or indirect – of

\[122\] \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 29-30.
important divisions within the authoritarian division itself”. In more recent analyses of transitions in Eastern Europe, Africa and East Asia, however, much attention is given to popular upsurge, protests, and riots. The experience of East Timor, however, brings us back to early analysis of the voluntarism of leaders and elites. In countries such as East Timor where there is a lack of political institutionalization, elite level voluntarism tends to play an important role in shaping political outcomes. In such circumstances, many scholars argue that elite actions and behaviours shape those of the mass-level followings. Diamond writes that ‘elites lead partly by example (good or bad); when they are contemptuous of the rules and norms of democracy, their followers or audiences are more likely to be as well.’

In East Timor, with civil society and political institutions weak, and with the economy under-developed, elite dominance is proportionately heightened. In addition, given popular perceptions of these elites as liberators, having waged guerrilla resistance against Indonesia, they can readily mobilise mass-level support. Indeed, in many new countries that have emerged from long period of colonisation and occupation, resistance leaders tend to dominate political life.

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123 O’Donnell et al., quoted in Case, Politics in Southeast Asia, p. 23.
124 See also Graeme, The Dynamics of Democratization, pp. 44-46; Diamond, Developing Democracy; pp. 65-70.
125 Dahl, quoted in ibid., p. 66.
126 During the Portuguese period, only 9 percent of East Timor’s population was literate, and the income per capita was very low. See Gunn, A Critical View of Western Journalism, p. 40.
127 Smith, Understanding Third World Politics, pp. 144-46.
These sets of power relations demonstrate that in analysing politics, especially in newly independent and less developed countries, the study of elite attitudes and relations is crucial. According to Christian Welzel, political institutions and legal rights adopted in a constitution are never sufficient to make democracy effective. Elite attitudes are the primary factor for the effectiveness of democracy.\textsuperscript{128} B.C. Smith also notes that in some African countries elites lack of commitment to democratic principles has made it difficult for these countries to sustain democracy.\textsuperscript{129}

In East Timor, most national elites appear to support democracy.\textsuperscript{130} There are a number of reasons for this. The first involves a generally strong reaction against the Indonesian occupation. Many of the country’s political leaders (especially the resistance members) experienced brutal authoritarian rule first hand. Indeed, many of them were tortured and executed by Indonesian forces because they advocated independence for East Timor.\textsuperscript{131} Accordingly, in the immediate aftermath of Indonesia’s occupation, most of the new country’s elites have agreed, that political democracy best guarantees their personal security and civil and political liberties. Larry Diamond makes this point in more theoretical terms, noting that a society that has experienced severe repression tends to have positive perception and favourable assessment of democracy.\textsuperscript{132}


\textsuperscript{129} Smith, \textit{Understanding Third World Politics}, p. 266.

\textsuperscript{130} See East Timor Constitution 2002, article 1.6, and 7.

\textsuperscript{131} Interview with Paulo Assis Belo, Dili, 18 March 2003.

\textsuperscript{132} Diamond, \textit{Developing Democracy}, Fig. 5.2, p. 204.
Second, if only for fear of losing their mass-level followings, most East Timorese elites do not wish to be seen as reneging on the commitments to democracy that they declared while mounting resistance. In galvanizing the people of East Timor in this struggle, resistance leaders had promised that an independent East Timor would be democratic.\textsuperscript{133} And they reiterated these promises during the run-up to the referendum.\textsuperscript{134}

Third, during the Indonesian occupation, some East Timorese leaders had lived in exile overseas, part of a diaspora that was especially well-represented in Portugal and Australia. While residing in these countries, they grew impressed by the democratic procedures they observed. Not only did they appreciate their political freedoms, but they calculated too that democracy also brought economic development. Resistance leaders remaining in East Timor concurred with Xanana Gusmao, believing that democracy would bring stability and sustainable political and economic development.\textsuperscript{135}

These favourable elite attitudes toward democracy are reinforced by the involvement in East Timor of the international community. In particular, though East Timorese elites were rarely consulted by the UN as elections were organised, they have

\textsuperscript{133} Address of President Xanana Gusmao on 100 Days of Independence, 30 August 2002 in author’s collection.
\textsuperscript{134} Taylor, \textit{East Timor}, pp. 92-110.
afterward grown dependent on international aid. And such aid, of course, is usually made conditional upon their continuing to respect democratic procedures.

However, weighing against these benign factors are elite-level rivalries and conflicts that threaten to derail the democratic process. The most obvious evidence of this conflict involves the writing of East Timor’s constitution. During the process of drafting the constitution, there was a tussle between the ruling party, FRETILIN (which won the Constituent Assembly election in 2001 organised by the UN) and the opposition over the distribution of institutional power between the president, the parliament, and the government. The opposition wanted power to be distributed equally between the presidential office, the parliament and the government in order to create a system of ‘checks and balances’. However, FRETILIN leaders wanted most power to be given to the parliament and the government. Because FRETILIN dominates the parliament with 55 of 88 seats, it won the ‘struggle’ by limiting the power of the president in the constitution.\textsuperscript{136}

This has created a precarious situation, because rivalries and conflicts percolate down, sometimes through party apparatuses, to the grass-root levels. These rivalries peaked in the violence of 4 December 2002, when people took to the streets to demonstrate against the government and destroyed property, even burning the residence of the prime minister. Still more violent demonstrations took place in July 2004. Even

\textsuperscript{136} Sixteen parties took part in the 2001 election, FRETILIN, PD, PSD, UDT, APODETI, Kota, Trabalhista, Parentil, PDC, UDC/PDC, PDM, PPT, PNT, ASDT, PST, Partido Liberal. But only 12 of these political parties have seats in the parliament, FRETILIN 55 seats, PD 7 seats ASDT and PSD 6 seats each, PNT, and PPT 3 seats each, UDT, Kota and PDC 2 seats each, and Partido Liberal, UDC and PST 1 seat each.
the Catholic Church has organized protests which, while mostly peaceful, have been confrontational in tone. These three sets of demonstrations were mounted in order to force the resignations of Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, and Minister of the Interior, Rogerio Lobato.

A second source of rivalry and conflict at the elite-level involved the adoption of some mechanisms from the Portuguese and Mozambique Constitutions. In the view of some opposition and civil society leaders, these adopted articles created confusion and the potential for authoritarianism. For example, articles 24, 41 and 97, taken from the Mozambique constitution, greatly elevated the executive over other government branches, while offering new mechanisms by which the government can limit civil and political liberties.137 Already these articles have been deployed by the government to justify their introduction of a controversial security act, a special police force, and restrictions on civil and political liberties.138 In addition, the government simply decreed that the Constituent Assembly (CA) in which it held a large majority be converted into the new National Parliament. This raised concerns about the legitimacy of the parliament and the government because they were established without parliamentary


The issue of legitimacy resurfaced during the demonstration organized by the Catholic Church in 2005. Thus, as this thesis will show, elites in East Timor have not possessed so much structural integration and value consensus that their relations can be characterised as cohesive. But while endlessly skirmishing, they have not yet resorted to outright warring. In trying to explain these elite-level configurations and their impact on democracy’s prospects, this thesis focuses on the backgrounds and processes of elite formation, the processes by which elites are recruited, the institutional bases that they hold, and the attitudes and relations that they maintain.

An important aim of this thesis is to investigate how political elites in independent East Timor have tried to find common ground as a basis for cooperation, given that they come from very diverse backgrounds. Thus, our story begins with the Portuguese period, enabling us to understand better the ways in which these patterns originated and have persisted over time. We will see too that many more elites were created during the Indonesian occupation, either supporting this occupation or resisting it. And still others were created outside the country in Australia, Portugal and Mozambique and Indonesia. These different histories and backgrounds greatly complicate elite-level integration and consensus, perhaps threatening the prospects for democratic consolidation. According to

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139 See ibid.; See also Gorjao, ‘The Legacy and Lessons’, p. 326; East Timor Constitution articles 24, 41 and 91.
Linz and Stephan, ‘deep and continuous disagreements or confrontation’ among leaders creates severe problems for new democracies.\textsuperscript{141}

**Sources and the Methodology**

Qualitative methods are employed in this study, which involves collecting, analysing and theorizing various forms data.\textsuperscript{142} Relevant theories, drawn largely from the literature on comparative democratisation, will be used to enhance understanding of issues and to develop concepts that can describe East Timor political and democratic development.

The collection of data has taken various forms. First, in-depth and open-ended interviewing has been conducted with different groups of elites through which to identify their origins and perceptions of the future of East Timor; their relations with other elites; and their understandings of, and to attitudes toward democratic procedures. An open-ended format was used in order to give maximum latitude for expression to respondents. Elite-level respondents were classified into five different groups: political elites, military elites, religious elites, business elites, and intellectual elites. Each of these five groups have played significant roles in East Timorese politics in different areas. Research in East Timor was conducted mainly in Dili, with most of persons categorised as elites residing there. Interviews were conducted in Tetum, an official

\textsuperscript{141} Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition*, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{142} W. Lawrence Neuman, *Social Research Methods; Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches* (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1997), p. 328.
language of East Timor. In addition, questionnaires were distributed to those elites who were not available for face-to-face interviews. Interviews were also conducted with independent researchers and analysts in Portugal in order to cross-check responses made by East Timorese elites. Further, in order to get some sense of mass attitudes toward elites, political development, and scope for participation, I conducted interviews with some liurai descendants (traditional leaders), head of villages, farmers and traders at the village level.

Through archival research, I traced the historical records of elite formation during the Portuguese and Indonesian periods, focusing especially on the contours of policy making by the Portuguese and Indonesian governments. This research was mainly undertaken in the Arquivo Historico-Diplomatico, the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Arquivo Nacional de Torre de Tombo, and the Arquivo Historico Ultramarino, all in Lisbon. I was also able to access a private collection of documents held in Darwin, Australia by Kevin Sherlock.

In addition, I collected some statistical material on civil servants during the Portuguese period, as well as some data on East Timorese population, education, and economic development during the Portuguese administration, the Indonesian occupation, the period since independence. This data was obtained in the Biblioteca de Sociedade Geografia, Lisboa, the Arquivo Historico-Diplomatico, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lisboa, and the Timor Institute of Development Studies (TIDS) in Dili. These materials have shed much light on the backgrounds, recruitment, and attitudes of elites in East Timor. For example, through statistical data on education, I learned much about the schooling and socialisation processes that East Timorese underwent during the Portuguese, Indonesian, and independence periods.
Organization of the Thesis

The organization of this thesis is as follows: Chapter One introduces the major research questions and conceptualization. Here, notions of elites, regimes, and democracy are further elaborated. Chapter Two assesses some relevant theories of elites by which better to understand the formation of elites, the patterns of elite-level interaction, and the ways in which elites perpetuate their statuses. In Chapter Three, the study will focus on the pattern of elite origins and relations during the Portuguese period. Because the Portuguese period is so long (450 years) and much of it of little relevance to this examination of contemporary politics, this study will focus on elites only during 1900 to 1975. Chapter Four analyses elite-level patterns during the Indonesian period. By comparing elite formations during the Portuguese and Indonesian periods, we learn more about the extraordinary diversity of elites that has emerged in so small a country as East Timor, as well as the challenges this poses for harmonious relations and democratic stability.

Chapter Five addresses the United Nations (UN) period and the emergence of national elites. At the start of this period, the UN transitional administration provided little opportunity for local political leaders to participate in the development of electoral procedures. Only later were East Timorese elites exposed to electoral contestation more fully. Chapter Six focuses closely on East Timor democratic transition, elite-level relations, institutional design and the prospects for democratic consolidation. Chapter Seven summarizes the conclusion of my research.
CHAPTER TWO
ELITES, REGIME OUTCOMES AND INSTITUTIONS

As noted in the Chapter One, many democratization theorists highlight the role of elites in bringing about democratic transitions and the process of consolidation. O’Donnell and Schmitter observe that in Latin America and Southern Europe, elites were the principal actors in conducting transitions. Diamond, Linz and Lipset also argue that strong commitments by political leaders to democratic politics contribute to democratic stability.\(^1\) Burton, Gunther and Higley argue similarly that elites are central to the stability and survival of democratic regimes, particularly when elites establish substantial consensus among themselves in regard to the rule of the ‘democratic game and the worth of democratic institutions’.\(^2\) Furthermore, Giovanni Sartori\(^3\) suggests that in order to perpetuate democratic stability, elites should understand politics ‘as bargaining’ rather than ‘war’, while viewing political outcomes are ‘positive- not zero sum’.


\(^3\) Giovanni Sartori, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 3.
This chapter will begin by addressing the conceptualization and functioning of political elites. Next, this chapter will investigate the ways in which elites operate and interact in settings like East Timor where political institutions and procedures are weak. Finally, this chapter will explore the institutional framework that elites may create in new democracies, feeding back to regularize elite interactions. Particular attention will be given to representative structures and electoral processes.

**Understanding Elites**

*Historical Background*

In the past, the concept of elites was often associated with *elitism* due to the status and privileges enjoyed by these persons. Elite theorists in many circumstances had been considered guilty ‘of much worse than the stability bias seen generally to tarnish the field of comparative politics’.⁴ For example, one of the classical elite theorists during the 1930s, Gaetano Mosca, was seen to have been very critical of democracy in his early writings. Vilfredo Parreto dealt with the rise of fascist in Italy in 1920, and Robert Michels was regarded as ‘an apologist for Fascism’.⁵

But beginning in the 1970s the concept of elites was ‘reviewed in a more positive light’.⁶ Elite collusion and circulation, for example, were now seen as cooperation and

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competition and their existence was seen as useful in managing societies, easing tensions, holding countries together and in many circumstances ‘conforming to democratic procedures’.7

Scholars such as Robert Putnam, Giuseppe Di Palma, and Lowell Field and John Higley describe such positive elite relations and behaviours in terms of ‘solidarity’, ‘restrained partisanship’, and ‘consensual unity’.8 Elites in this regard compete for power openly, ‘but not violently’, because, according to Case, they are confronted by ‘two broad kinds of restraint’. The first is the avoidance of elites in systematically undercutting the ‘statuses and resources’ of other elites, purging one another from high positions, dismantling their organizations and forcing ‘them into prison or bankruptcy’. Second is the avoidance of elites in inflaming social grievances in order to mobilize their supporters.9

During the 1980s and early 1990s, the role of elites in the democratisation process was more explicitly recognized. As mentioned above, in their analysis of democratic transitions in Southern Europe and Latin America, O’Donnell and Schmitter argued that elites play important roles in transitions to democracy.10 This study has to some extent shifted scholarly attention from structural determinants to elite-level contingency. A vast literature on elites was produced in this particular period, which addressed issues related to elite relations and attitudes. Discussions were primarily focused on the ways in which soft-lining elites in governments of authoritarian regimes started to negotiate

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7 Ibid.
8 These authors are quoted in ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 quoted in ibid., p. 23.
with opposition leaders to reach agreements which were conceptualized as ‘pacting’
‘crafting’ ‘accordism’ ‘garantismo’ and ‘settlement’.11 By reaching agreement with the
opposition, incumbent soft-lining elites could ‘regulate the pace of democracy’s
progress, made manifest in state-led or heavily brokered process of ‘transformation’ and
‘trans-placement’’.12 But when elites remained divided, their failure ‘to make deals with
the opposition, … risked their regime’s unmodulated ‘replacement’’.13

In these conditions, Case notes that transitions in Latin America and Southern
Europe can be better described by the first mode, while transitions in Southeast Asia can
be illustrated by the second pattern, a region which they have been brought about by
mass protest organized by oppositions and civil society. This illustrates ‘the great
contextual differences between these regions’.14 Although democratic transition
developments in Southeast Asia revealed that the role of elites is less important than
those in Latin America and Southern Europe, they still play important role in
democratic stability. Their relations are the most important factors for regime stability.
For example, in the case of Indonesia, even though there was widespread mass protest,
Soeharto decided to step down as president only after many of his ministers led by
senior economic minister Ginandjar Kartasasmita resigned from the government. After
Soeharto’s resignation, elites continued to play important role especially on regime

11 Burton, Karl, and Di Palma quoted in _ibid._

12 Samuel Huntington, _Third Wave: Democratization in Late Twentieth Century_ (Norman: Oklahoma

13 _Ibid._; See also Case, _Politics in Southeast Asia_, p. 23.

14 Huntington quoted in _ibid._
stability.\textsuperscript{15} Thus, one can argue that elites still play an important role in political stability in Southeast Asia including East Timor which had just become independent. By studying inter-elite relations in East Timor one can understand whether a new democratic country will be stable and consolidated since inter-elite relations hold a major implication for the persistence of regimes.\textsuperscript{16}

**Defining Elites**

Efforts to theorize elites can be traced to Mosca and Pareto’s conceptualizations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Both Mosca and Pareto defined elites as a small group that ‘either exercised directly, or were in a position to influence very strongly the exercise of political power’.\textsuperscript{17} Elaborating on this conceptualization Burton, Gunther, and Higley defined elites as persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations, to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially. Elites are the principal decision makers in the largest or most resource-rich political, governmental, economic, military, professional, communications, and cultural organizations and movements in a society.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{15} The author is very grateful to Prof. Robert Elson for this point.


\textsuperscript{18} See also Burton & Higley 1987b; Dye 1983; Higley, Deacon and Smart 1979; McDonough 1981; Moyser and Waystaffe 1987; Putnam 1976. These authors are quoted in Burton et al., ‘Introduction’, p. 8.
Burton, Gunther, and Higley highlight two important elements in their definition of elite, that is, ‘regularly’ and ‘substantially’. By ‘regularly’, they mean that elite ‘point of view and possible actions’ are regarded as important factors that can be considered by leaders. However, regular influence in decision making does not mean that the ‘typical elite person affects every aspect of regime operation and policy, but rather, she or he is able to take influential actions on those aspects that are salient to his or her interest and location’. By ‘substantially’, they mean that ‘without their support or opposition an outcome salient to their interest and locations will be noticeably different’. This definition broadly encompasses not only individuals holding a government position, but also leaders of the opposition, people holding key positions in non-government organizations or having influence in social and economic circles.

Such a definition suggests that elites can be broadly categorized into different groups specializing in different areas. Pareto’s classical theory divides elites into ‘governing elites’ and ‘non-governing elites’. Governing elites include ‘individuals who directly or indirectly play some considerable part in government. Non-governing elites are ‘less associated with the exercise of power’. Instead they are leaders of political

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21 Ibid.

parties which are not in power, representatives of new social interests (trade union leaders), groups of businessmen, and intellectuals. Based on Pareto’s categorization, T.B. Bottomore includes members of ‘government and the high administration, military leaders, in some cases, politically influential families of an autocracy or royal house and leaders of powerful economic enterprises’ as political elites. Geraint Parry also based his discussion of political elites on Pareto’s work by dividing political elites into ‘military elites’, ‘business elites’ and ‘bureaucratic elites’, according to their degree of influence in decision-making.

But recent studies of elites have not really emphasized the distinction between political elites and non-political elites. Today, most democratization theorists focus closely on political elites, viewing this category of elites as central to transition and consolidation development.

Types of Elite

Based on recent studies of elites, Burton, Gunther, and Higley note that there are ‘two basic but parallel dimensions in the structure and functioning of elites: the extent of structural integration and the extent of value consensus’. Structural integration involves ‘the relative inclusiveness of formal and informal networks of communication

and influence among elite persons, groups, and factions”. Value consensus suggests ‘the relative agreement among elites on formal and informal rules and codes of political conduct and on the legitimacy of existing political institutions’. Hence, they categorize elite relations in terms of three configurations. The first is a *disunified elite* in which structural integration and value consensus are minimal: ‘communication and influence networks do not cross factional lines in any large way, and factions disagree on the rules of political conduct and the work of existing political institutions’. Elites deeply distrust one another and perceive ‘politics as war’ or in zero-sum terms, and engage in violent conflict. According to Burton, Gunther, and Higley, lack of communication and influence networks result in disagreement by elites over the rules of the political game and ‘the worth of existing institutions’, which in turn promote forcible seizures of power and attempt at seizures. Thus, even where a regime operated by this kind of elite is outwardly democratic, it remains unstable. Moreover, within disunified elites there exist what Juan Linz terms ‘semi-loyal’ or ‘anti-system opposition’ elites. They provisionally agree to democratic games while waiting for the opportunity to use undemocratic means including ‘violence against their opponents to stay in power’.

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27 Higley and Moore, and Kadushin quoted in *ibid.*, p. 10

28 Di Palma, Prewitt and Stone, and Putnam quoted in *ibid.*


A second configuration is characterized by Burton et al. as a *consensually unified elite*, in which structural integration and value consensus are relatively inclusive. In this second type, communication and influence networks are overlapped and interconnected, ‘encompass all or most elite factions; no single faction dominates these networks; and most elites therefore have substantial access to government decision making’. According to Giovanni Sartori, elites of this type perceive politics in ‘positive-sum’ or ‘politics-as-bargaining’ terms. They regularly and publicly ‘oppose one another on ideological and policy questions’, but they share an ‘underlying consensus’ about ‘rules of the game and the worth of existing political institutions’. They compete in a ‘restrained partisanship’ in which they vie for mass support by avoiding explosive issues and conflicts and by ‘sharply limiting the cost of political defeat’. A consensually unified elite, according to Burton, Gunther, and Higley, is associated with stable, and democratic regimes in which election is the only way to change political leadership.

A third configuration involves an *ideologically unified elite*, where structural integration and value consensus are monolithic. Communication and influence network although ‘encompass’ all factions of the elite, but ‘are sharply centralized’ by the ‘dominant faction’. Value consensus ‘is uniform’, in that there is no deep disagreement between elite on ideology and policy. They instead ‘conform’ to a single and explicitly ideology which is construed by the ‘uppermost leaders of the dominant faction, party or

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34 Di Palma, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 11.
movement’.\textsuperscript{36} This configuration of elite interaction is associated with single-party regimes, as totalitarian ones, in which elite relations are tightly controlled and power transfer is undertaken without mass-level participation.\textsuperscript{37}

According to Burton, Gunther, and Higley elites universally ‘cluster’ around these three types with ‘greater or lesser proximity’.\textsuperscript{38} For the purpose of this study, only consensually unified and disunified elites will be discussed, since these two types of elite configuration apply most readily to patterns of elite relations in East Timor.

\textit{Inter-elite Relations and Regime Outcomes}

These three elite configurations outline different elite relations and regime outcomes. Dis-unified elites, their relations characterised by rivalries and suspicions, often engage in violent conflicts. According to Higley and Burton, a basic feature of disunified elites is deep insecurity, and fear of punishment by the winners if they lose. Accordingly, they take extreme measures to protect themselves and their interests including ‘killings, imprisoning and banishing opponents, fomenting rebellions against ascendant factions, [and] expropriating opponents’ resources’. In addition, Higley et al. argue that, ‘the origin of elite disunity lies in the process of nation-state formation’. Historically, events in Latin America, Japan and some African countries during the process of nation-state formation in the early nineteenth century suggest that some groups of elites were repeatedly suppressed by others and this created ‘deep and

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{38} Sartori quoted in \textit{ibid.}, p. 12.
unremitting elite disunity’. The outcome of this relationship is regime instability, an insight bearing major implications for the politics of East Timor. Higley et al. define instability as a condition in which government executive power is subject to ‘irregular seizures, attempted seizures, or widely expected seizures by force’, through revolutions, uprisings, or coups d’état, with the aim of changing the control of government executives offices.

On the other hand, maintaining unified or cohesive relationship between elites produces a situation whether elites refrain from engaging in violent conflict. Higley et al. argue that elites who ‘regularly take opposing ideological and policy positions consistently refrain from pushing their differences to the point of violent conflict’. They enjoy considerable personal security which means that they do not expect to be killed or jailed for losing policy disputes or other forms of political competition including elections. This type of relationship, as mentioned above, helps to perpetuate regime stability.

Moreover, according to David Brown, elite cohesion ‘must be created, deliberately and repeatedly, by the elites themselves’. Elites may achieve their unification through a variety of much-studied mechanisms, including ‘pact-making’ and more

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40 See ibid.

41 Ibid.

comprehensive ‘settlements’.\textsuperscript{43} According to Burton, Gunther, and Higley, elite settlements are ‘relatively rare events in which warring elite factions suddenly and deliberately reorganize their relations by negotiating compromises on their most basic disagreements’.\textsuperscript{44} Elite settlement have two consequences, creating patterns of open debate but peaceful competition among elite factions and can facilitate the emergence of a consolidated democracy.\textsuperscript{45}

In sum, this analysis of democratization in East Timor will focus on two major configurations of elite relations, cohesive and disunified, each of which correlates with specific combinations of democratic politics and stability. A regime is stable where there is elite cohesion resulting in a situation where elites do not engage in violent conflict. This pattern of elite relations is also more likely to produce democracy. But where elites suffer a loss of cohesion or become disunified, unstable and usually undemocratic politics results.\textsuperscript{46}

Another important factor for regime outcomes involves mass attitudes and participation. According to Graeme Gill, mass participation depends on the regime’s relationship to the society. This relationship is determined by the extent to which the state controls social forces. When the state penetrates the society to the extent of establishing total control, then there is very limited space in which society can participate autonomously in the political process, hence producing authoritarian politics.


\textsuperscript{44} Burton et al., ‘Introduction’, p. 13; See also Burton, and Higley, ‘Elite Settlement’, p. 295.


But where the state establishes only limited control over society, leaving space for social forces to exercise their political rights, a democratic regime may prevail.47

Combining these dimensions, one can state that where elite relations are cohesive, and where a mass public participates autonomously in the political process, the regime that results is stable and democratic. But where this stable regime limits or prohibits—suppressing civil liberties, political rights, and electoral contestation—then the regime that results is an authoritarian one.48 Further, in explaining change from one regime to another, authoritarianism may be weakened by elite-level disunity, enabling mass publics to mount ‘replacement’. But the consolidation of any democracy that results depends upon elites establishing new levels of cohesion.49

**Figure 2.1: Description of Elite Relations and Regime Outcome**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elite cohesion</th>
<th>Elite disunity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quiescent constituents</td>
<td>Stable authoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participatory society</td>
<td>Stable democracy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Adapted from William Case, Politics in Southeast Asia: Democracy or Less (Curzon Press: Richmond, 2002), p. 24*


49 See *ibid.*, p. 22-23.
Institutions

During the 1990s, social scientists rediscovered the causal importance of institutions for democratic consolidation. After transitions have taken place, institutions serve to ‘habituate’ elite behaviour.\textsuperscript{50} Crawford and Ostrom define institutions as ‘enduring regularities of human interaction in frequently occurring or repetitive situations structured by rules, norms and shared strategies, as well as by the physical world’.\textsuperscript{51} D. North defines institutions as rules and constraints which shape human interaction and, ‘as a consequence, behavioural incentives’. He observes, too, that institutions ‘reduce uncertainty by establishing stable and predictable structures for interactions between people, either as individuals or groups’.\textsuperscript{52} North’s definition of institutions is strongly rooted in economic perspectives wherein he sees institutions playing an important role in ‘structuring markets, reducing transaction costs and facilitating exchange’.\textsuperscript{53} For political scientists, though, institutions evoke rules that ‘generate stable, recurring, predictable patterns of behavior’.\textsuperscript{54} David Potter, for


\textsuperscript{51} Crawford and Ostrom quoted in David Potter, ‘Explaining Democratization’ in David Potter, David Goldblatt, Margaret Kiloh, and Paul Lewis, eds.,\textit{ Democratization}, (Walton Hall: The Open University, 1997), p. 27.

\textsuperscript{52} North quoted in Benjamin Reilly,\textit{ Democracy in Divided Society: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 5

\textsuperscript{53} D. North quote in \textit{ibid}.

\textsuperscript{54} Goodin quoted in \textit{ibid}.
example, claims political institutions include a ‘particular system of competitive
elections, the structure of a party system, the particular relations between different
government departments, and relations between trade unions and political parties’.\textsuperscript{55} In
his book \textit{On Democracy}, Robert Dahl states that political institutions are important in
helping citizens to exercise influence over the conduct and decisions of their
government.\textsuperscript{56} Linz and Stepan also share that assessment when arguing that
institutional choice is of paramount importance for democratic consolidation and
sustainability.\textsuperscript{57}

With respect to the choice and design of specific institutions, Saideman et al. note
that the interests of specific elites may clash with those at the national level.\textsuperscript{58} Thus,
political elites who are entitled to design political institutions should be neutral,
professional, and as ‘independent as possible’\textsuperscript{59} in order to design the best possible
political institutions to serve the country’s interests and promote democracy. Hence one
can argue that political institutions are important for democratic development as they

\textsuperscript{55} David Potter, ‘Explaining Democratization’, p. 27.


p. 17.

\textsuperscript{58} See Stephan M. Saideman, David J. Lanoue, Michael Campenni, and Samuel Stanton,

\textsuperscript{59} Donald L. Horowitz, ‘Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision Makers’, \textit{Journal of Democracy}, 14:4,
2003, p. 126.
regulate norms and rules for ‘political contestation’. At the same time institutions also habituate elites in negotiating political settlements peacefully.

Recent debates on institutions, however, have turned on the relative merits of presidential and parliamentary systems. This thesis will focus on presidential and parliamentary systems, electoral design, political parties and party systems, because of their importance in East Timor’s political settling.

Presidential and Parliamentary Systems

In their study of democratic persistence, Przeworski, Alvares, Cheibub, and Limonge focus on two key institutional arrangements, presidentialism and parliamentarism. These systems are distinguished primarily by the respective positions of their executives. In a parliamentary system, the head of government is variously labelled as prime minister, chancellor, premier and minister-president, while the cabinet is ‘dependent on the confidence of [the parliament] and can be dismissed from office by a legislative vote of no confidence or censure’. In a presidential system, the head of the government is separately elected for a fixed term, and that the cabinet is not dependent on the confidence of the parliament. Another difference is that under presidentialism, heads of the government are elected through a direct popular vote or an electoral


college. In the parliamentary system, by contrast, prime ministers are usually selected from the parliament. The question is, which of these two systems is more suitable and durable for democracy?

Przeworski et al. argue that democracy in a parliamentary system is more durable than in presidentialism. They cite several factors in support of their argument. First, they cite Juan Linz arguing that stakes are ‘higher under presidentialism, since a race for the presidency can have but a single winner’. In a presidential system, then, the defeated candidate for president has ‘no official role in politics’, while under parliamentarism, the defeated candidate for prime minister will be the leader of the opposition in the parliament. Moreover, under presidentialism, the chief executive is at the same time the head of state, enabling he or she to portray their partisan interest as the national interest, hence weakening the opposition’s legitimacy. Second, presidentialism is more likely to generate ‘legislative paralysis’. This deadlock can occur in either presidential or parliamentary system, but is more serious and threatening under the former. In their study of contemporary presidential systems, Przeworski et al. observe that sharp conflicts between a president and separately elected legislative can reach an impasse wherein ‘no one can govern’.

Semi-presidentialism involves a combination of presidential and parliamentary systems. In this regime, the president is popularly elected and has political powers, including the authority to appoint (or at least nominate) the prime minister and usually to dissolve parliament. The cabinet, however, is collectively responsible to the parliament. The president does not have constitutional authority to dismiss ministers, as they are responsible to the parliament. There are three features of semi-presidential government: (1) the president is elected by universal suffrage; (2) he or she has considerable powers and; (3) next to president there is a prime minister and ministers who possess executive and government power and can stay in the government office as long as there is sufficient support from the parliament. Thus, in sum, a semi-presidential system is a synthesized one in which the president (the head of the government) is elected by universal suffrage, but the government (prime minister and ministers) is responsible to the parliament.

According to Maurice Duverger, ‘semi-presidential governments are relatively homogeneous… [but have] considerable differences with regard to the powers of the head of state’. In looking at the experiences of seven countries that have adopted semi-presidential systems, such as Finland, Austria, Ireland, Iceland, France, Portugal and the Weimar Republic from 1919 to 1933, Duverger collates this system into three types: a first in which the president is in reality a figurehead (Austria, Ireland and Iceland); a second in which the president is all-powerful (France); and a third in which the

In the first model, the president, even though elected by universal suffrage, has only ceremonial powers such as ratifying all decisions put forward by the government. The only real power that the president possesses involves his choosing the prime minister. In the second model, the president is elected by universal suffrage. He or she becomes the supreme head of the executive and real head of the government in which the president exercises his/her power on the prime minister and the government by reducing the prime minister and the government to obedience. Finally, in the third model, the president is elected by universal suffrage, but shares power with the prime minister and the government. This model introduces a dualism of executive in which the president and prime minister and the government share governing responsibilities. Thus, from the perspective of this thesis, a major question involves which institutional design would encourage the elite unity necessary for consolidating democracy in a country such as East Timor?

In 2002, East Timor adopted a mixed system (semi-presidential or premier presidential) seeking to balance executive and legislative powers and, at the same time, to promote national unity between elites. However, these aims were not fulfilled

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68 Ibid., pp. 143-46.
69 The East Timor semi-presidential system is similar to the first model of Duverger.
because presidential powers emerged as largely ceremonial.\textsuperscript{71} This has created a situation where the government, which was formed from the winning party, dominates national politics by dictating partisan policies and controlling the parliament.\textsuperscript{72} For example, the adoption of the security act, which is considered by civil society and other political parties to breach human rights principles\textsuperscript{73}, showed that there is little balance in power-sharing between the president, the parliament and the government. The president could not prevent the promulgation of the act, because the president’s veto of the act was overturned by the two-thirds (2/3) votes of the national parliament as mentioned in Chapter One.\textsuperscript{74} This situation has to some extent generated political tension between political elites. The eviction of Mario Carrascalao, the president of one of the opposition parties, the Social Democratic Party (PSD), from his house in 2003 by the government

See also Lusa, ‘East Timor: Gusmao Rejects FRETILIN ‘Pressure’ To Run as Independent’, 13 February 2002.

\textsuperscript{71} Interview with Clementino Amaral, Member of the National Parliament from KOTA, Dili, 21 May 2003.

\textsuperscript{72} The East Timor National Parliament has been branded as ‘rubber stamp’, because it has been controlled by the government. Interview with Joao Mariano Saldanha, PhD, Executive Director, Timor Institute of Development Studies (formerly East Timor Study Group), Dili, 22 June 2003; See also AP, ‘East Timor’s First President Resigns From Legislature, Citing Government Failures’, 14 March 2005.

\textsuperscript{73} See also JSMP (Judicial System Monitoring Programme) Press release, ‘New Internal Security Act May Be Unconstitutional’, Dili 27 August 2003.

\textsuperscript{74} Interview with Paulo Assis Belo, former Vice Secretary of FPI, CNRT, and currently Member of the National Parliament from Democratic Party, Dili, 18 March 2003, Aquelino Fraga Guterres, former Vice Secretary of region four, CNRT, and former Member of the National Parliament from Democratic Party, Dili 25 March 2003, and Paulo Alves, former Vice Secretary of region three, CNRT, Member of the National Parliament from Democratic Party, Dili, 25 March 2003.
is the case in point. Moreover, these elites also accused each other of being Indonesian collaborators in the past, which to some extent created deep division between them and their supporters. As a consequence of this division, supporters of the ruling party, FRETILIN, have carried out intimidation and violence in some villages. Many of Carrascalao’s party supporters became the targets of this violence. This situation can be considered as a danger for democracy because it can spark more violence in the country.

Thus, the East Timor case presents a perfect example of one of the problems of the institutional design sketched by Saideman et al. Elites who are in power tend to design institutions and rules that can serve their best interests which may clash with the national interest. This has generated political tension and division between political elites and their supporters.

Electoral Systems

Another political institution that is considered central for democratic development is, of course, the electoral system, with elections providing the mechanisms through which political elites compete for mass-level support. On this count, G. Bingham Powell, Jr argues that elections establish connections that encourage the policymakers

(elites) to pay attention to citizens and also ‘to reward or punish the incumbents’.\textsuperscript{77} Electoral systems can also partly ‘shape and constrain the way in which politicians [elites] and constituents behave’.\textsuperscript{78} This approach views elections not only as means of choosing representatives and forming government, but also as a public event that establishes patterns of ‘political behaviour that resonate beyond the boundaries of the electoral contest itself’.\textsuperscript{79} Thus, in analysing different kinds of electoral systems, scholars have focuses on which—and under what set of conditions—might best promote connections between legislators and their constituents, as well as encourage positive behaviours among politicians and mass publics.

David M. Farrell understands electoral systems as processes that lead to ‘outputs’, that is, translating votes into legislative seats and governments.\textsuperscript{80} He begins by disaggregating electoral systems into component mechanisms, identifying three such mechanisms: ‘district magnitude’, ‘ballot structure’, and ‘electoral formula’. District magnitude refers to the size of the constituency based upon the number of the seats to be filled. If in one constituency there is only one legislator to be elected then the District Magnitude (DM) is one. On the other hand if in one constituency there are two legislators to be elected, forming a multi-member district, then the DM is two. Further, the notion of ballot structure refers to how voters cast their votes. Commonly it is


\textsuperscript{78} Horowitz, ‘Electoral Systems’, p. 116.

\textsuperscript{79} Reilly, \textit{Democracy in Divided Society}, p. 13.

distinguished between ‘categorical’ ballots where voters are simply given a choice between various candidates on the ballot paper. By contrast, through ‘ordinal’ ballots, voters can provide different amounts of support to all candidates on the ballot paper by ranking them based on their preferences.

Finally, ‘electoral formula’ relates to the translation of the votes into seats. Electoral formulas in democratic regimes can be organized in many ways, though Farrell classifies them into three main families: plurality, majority, and proportional. Plurality system means that in order to win, a candidate need not gain a majority, but simply, one vote more than any other candidate. In a majority system a winning candidate must have won an overall majority (at least 50 per cent) of the votes. Finally, under a proportional (representation) system, the number of seats received by each party reflects the number of votes earned in the election. There are different variations of proportional representation, but the most common is party list system in which voters vote for political parties instead of candidates.

Analyses of electoral systems have highlighted an important issue, namely, which kind of mechanisms and procedures serve best ‘to link citizens and policymakers’. According to Donald L. Horowitz there is no electoral system that can accurately reflect ‘the preference of voters’. Rather he contends that the nature of an electoral system is

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82 Ibid., p. 19.
83 Ibid., pp. 68-69.
‘to aggregate [voter] preferences and to convert them into electoral results, and no system can do this as a passive translation of individuals wishes into a collective choice’. He argues further that every electoral system has ‘biases built into its mechanism of decision, and these then feed back into the structure of choices confronting voters, constraining and changing choices that they might have made under other systems’.85

Thus, because there is no electoral system that is regarded as neutrally reflecting voter preferences, the choice of electoral system should be carefully weighed in order to minimize biases while making political change possible. According to Horowitz, an electoral system which is designed to favour the incumbents will ‘make necessary political change impossible to achieve’.86 He further notes that an electoral system that limits the power of central party leaders is more likely to ‘produce more responsiveness representatives’.87

But perhaps the most important question in designing an electoral system for a country such as East Timor is how can procedures be designed in ways that encourage cohesiveness among conflicting elites? Saideman et al. suggest that proportional representation can best minimize conflict, because minority groups are ‘more likely to at least have some representation in the legislature’. This will enable them to channel their aspirations through existing political arrangements.88 At the same time it will

86 Ibid., p. 126.
87 Ibid., p. 117.
discourage elites from using violence against each other in order to pursue their political objectives.

East Timor, in the election held in 2001 under the UN supervision, adopted a mixed system, a combination of single member plurality (SMP) and proportional representation systems. This was done in order to provide ‘a better representation’ of parties in the national parliament through which more fully to accommodate political elites in the Constituent Assembly. Thus, of sixteen parties running for the elections, twelve gained representation in the national parliament. As suggested by Carey the more (reasonable number of) political parties represented in the national parliament, the more interests are represented. See Carey, ‘Institutional Design’, p. 67. However, by mid-2005, at the time of writing this thesis, analysts grew concerned about the potential manipulation of the next general elections, due in 2007.

These concerns can be attributed to the several factors. First, political elites in the government have not yet fully accepted free and fair electoral contestation. Since they have not yet been ‘habituated’ in democratic norms, they may yet resort to overtly ‘undemocratic means’ by which to win elections. Interview with Joao Mariano Saldanha, Marcelino Magno, Researcher at Timor Institute of Development Studies, Dili East Timor, 6 May 2003, Cipriana Pereira, Member of National Parliament from FRETILIN (the ruling party), 6 June, 2003. In the National Dialog on Local Government, delegates from districts strongly proposed that the count of the vote should be done in each polling centre and witnessed by the public in order to avoid any manipulation that may occur during the vote counting. The author was invited to that dialog and elected as the head of Commission Three which discussed elections issue. See the result of the National Dialog on Local Government, organised by the office of the President of East Timor, 30 May 2003 in author’s collection; Group discussion between the author and some traditional leaders in Uato Carabau, 12 July, 2003, and Viqueque, 10 July 2003.
suco) and sub-village (chefe povoacao) heads are elected in East Timor. At the end of 2004, in two districts, Oecussi and Maliana, FRETILIN’s (the ruling party) candidates were defeated by independents, prompting FRETILIN to retaliate by intimidating villagers before a next round of district elections in Baucau, Lospalos, and Manatuto, Dili and other districts. FRETILIN also discouraged independent candidates from running.91 Thus, when the elections were held, FRETILIN won majorities in the eleven remaining districts. But FRETILIN’s victory was tinged with manipulation and intimidation, raising serious doubts about the party’s preparedness to permit competitive electoral processes.92 These concerns are akin to Huntington’s characterization of Argentina’s former president, Carlos Menem, winning elections by ‘undemocratic means’.93

At the same time, FRETILIN began to politicize the bureaucracy. Many ruling party members have been employed in the government bureaucracy, occupying strategic position such as head of sub-districts without proper recruitment procedures. By occupying these positions, FRETILIN has tried to extend its domination to sub-districts

91 See STL, ‘Prosesu Eleisaun Suku Laduun Diak’ (Villages Election Processes are Fraud), 14 March 2005.
92 STL, ‘STAE taka odataman ba votantes’ (STAE close the doors to the voters), 21 September 2005;
and villages through the existing bureaucracy. Such policy has been criticized by the civil society and the opposition parties because it encouraged nepotism and collusion as well as politicization of the bureaucracy.

In their analysis of democracy, Timothy J. Power, and Mark J. Gasiorowski attempt to measure democratic consolidation by observing the conduct of ‘second elections’ held for the national executive. The successful realization (free and fair) of these post-founding elections are the initial signs of elite-level commitments to rule-bound competition. A second dimension involves the alternation in executive power. Power et al. define alternation in power as ‘an unambiguous change in the partisan composition of the executive branch’. They note that ‘approximately half of Third World democracies have broken down before effecting an alternation in power’. According to Huntington, alternation of power is ‘the most direct test of elites’ willingness to surrender power in accord with the rules of the new democratic game’. In the case of East Timor, the 2007 election in East Timor constitutes a key test of the extent to which political elites are willing to observe the rules of democratic game.

94 This is very similar to Golkar, the Indonesian former ruling party during Soeharto regime. Golkar controlled the bureaucracy and used local (formal) authorities to win the elections. See for example R.E. Elson, *Suharto: A Political Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 186-90.


96 Huntington quoted in *ibid.*, p. 132.
Defining political parties in the Third World is difficult given the ‘immense variety that is found’. B.C. Smith suggests that the most satisfactory definition is that provided by Coleman and Rosberg as follows:

associations formally organized with the explicit and declared purpose of acquiring and/or maintaining legal control, either singly or in coalition or electoral competition with other similar associations, over the personnel and the policy of the government of an actual or prospective sovereign state.

As such, writes Smith, political parties in developing countries have a number of roles, including regime legitimation, providing a mechanism for political recruitment, and forming conduits for popular expression and political pressure.

Many different party systems have been identified. They take two basic forms in democratic regimes: two-party and multi-party systems. Farrell notes that there is a link between electoral systems and party systems. He observes that majoritarian systems

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98 Coleman and Rosberg quoted in *ibid.*, p136.


have usually been associated with the two-party system, while proportional systems tend to encourage multipartism.\textsuperscript{101}

In evaluating which system is more likely to consolidate democracy, Mainwaring has argued that two-party systems can produce stable democracies. By contrast, multiparty systems foster ‘ideological polarization’, ‘immobilism in executive/legislative relations’, and difficulties in establishing coalitions, risk political instability.\textsuperscript{102} However, in testing Mainwaring’s hypothesis, Power et al. found that multipartism poses few intrinsic obstacles to the success of democracy.\textsuperscript{103} Similarly, Diamond et al. found that multipartism did not necessarily lead to party deadlocks and democratic breakdown.\textsuperscript{104} Thus, analysts are divided over which kind of party system most effectively consolidates democracy.

According to Smith, single party systems, prevalent in many developing countries, usually coincide with authoritarian regimes. This is because single parties in these countries usually emerge from the nationalist movements that they dominated while fighting for independence.\textsuperscript{105} Power et al. also argue that there is a common pattern in

\textsuperscript{101} Farrell, \textit{Electoral System}, p. 4; See also Horowitz, ‘Electoral Systems’, p. 121.

\textsuperscript{102} Mainwaring quoted in Power et al., ‘Institutional Design’, p. 126.

\textsuperscript{103} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 145-46.


\textsuperscript{105} But, Smith also acknowledges that in some countries of the third world countries multi party system has survived since independence such as India. See Smith, \textit{Understanding Third World Politics}, pp. 142-43.
many countries with a single party when national liberation movements transformed themselves into hegemonic parties. This is likely to generate an undemocratic regime.\textsuperscript{106}

East Timor has adopted a multi-party system. As mentioned above, in the UN organized election in 2001, sixteen political parties were registered to contest. But FRETILIN’s majority victory, the adoption of some articles of the Mozambique Constitution, the transformation of the constituent assembly into a national parliament, and the attempt of the ruling party (FRETILIN) to limit resources in order to force the opposition into bankruptcy raised concerns about the possibility of FRETILIN adopting an authoritarian regime. In consequence, elites from opposition parties have even accused FRETILIN of trying to adopt Golkar’s policy during Soeharto’s regime, in which opposition parties were given very limited space to carry out their political activities.

In order to challenge FRETILIN’s strategies, the opposition parties in May 2003 established a \textit{Plataforma Unidade Nacional} (Platform of National Unity). The main agenda of the Platform was to force an early election of the national parliament in order to stop FRETILIN to adopt an authoritarian regime. The argument the opposition put forward was that FRETILIN’s government was illegitimate because it had not been formed on the basis of elections for the national parliament, but on the transformation of the Constituent Assembly into a national parliament. FRETILIN leaders retaliated by accusing the opposition parties of being collaborators of the Indonesian military who wanted to create political instability. The opposition move did not succeed, largely because President Xanana refused to call for an early election. In Xanana’s view such a

\textsuperscript{106} Power et al., ‘Institutional Design’, p. 147.
demand could damage political stability and encourage more political turmoil and elite disunity. However, Xanana’s intervention failed fully to mitigate elite suspicions, as we will see.\textsuperscript{107}

Internal party conflict is another serious problem for democratic development in East Timor. These internal rivalries have diminished the capacity of many parties to aggregate popular aspirations. As Carey has noted, parties that are internally divided can not act collectively and respond quickly to policy crisis, and ‘present voters … coherent choices in elections’.\textsuperscript{108} In East Timor, for example, in 2000, UDT suffered grave internal conflicts that had been triggered by some of its key members, including, Mario Carrascalao, and Leandro Izaac. They then left to form a new political party, the Social Democrat Party (PSD). But PSD later developed its own internal problems which culminated in 2003 when one of the founding members, Leandro Izaac, was dismissed. FRETILIN, too, experienced internal conflicts. Some members of the party Central Committee, including Victor da Costa, Vicente Maubossy and Reis Kadalak have openly opposed the Secretary General of the party, Mari Alkatiri, who is also Prime Minister, by calling for an extraordinary National Congress in order to replace him, a demand which was dismissed by the leadership of the party. The dismissal of Victor da Costa, one of the FRETILIN’s Central Committee members who challenged the leadership of Mari Alkatiri in the party, from his positions as Director of Civil Services Recruitment Centre in the government, the suspension of two members of Central


Committee of FRETILIN, Reis Kadalak, and Vicente Maubossi, and the dismissal of Leandro Izaac as Vice-president of PSD are cases in point.

Conclusions

Transitions in Latin America and Southern Europe demonstrate that elites play a central role in bringing about democracy. Democratization theorists argue that elite-level commitments to the rules of the democratic game are central to democratic persistence. Scholars have identified two major configurations of elite relations, cohesion and disunity, each of which correlates with specific combination of democratic politics and stability. Where elites are cohesive, they avoid violent conflict. The relations are essential for stabilizing regimes, especially democratic ones. By contrast, where elites suffer a loss of cohesion or become disunified, unstable and usually undemocratic politics results.

But while elites possess much autonomy in organizing their relations, their outlooks and behaviours may be guided too by the forms that institutions take. Thus, if during the 1980s, social scientists rediscovered the importance of elites, during the 1990s, they gave new attention to institutions, recognising the ways in which they ‘habituate’ elite behaviours. Thus, this chapter also surveyed various institutional arrangements, including presidential and parliamentary systems, and different kinds of electoral systems and party systems. Recent debates have focused most intently on varying capacities of presidentialism and parliamentarism to restrain elite rivalries and promote democratic development. But they have also evaluated different kinds of electoral
procedures and party systems along similar lines, trying to determine which most encourage elite-level commitments to rule-bound competitiveness and further, which can best structure mass participation.

In East Timor, the institutional framework consists of a parliamentary system, a proportional representativeness, and multipartism, features that will be outlined more fully in later chapters. However, this framework has only recently been set up. Elites, then, have only been lightly habituated by the institutions in which they operate. Thus, East Timor offers and excellent case in which to examine the centrality of elite attitudes and behaviours for democracy’s prospects.
Portuguese colonisation in East Timor can be traced back to 1512. However, only in the late nineteenth century was Portuguese administration firmly established. The governors of East Timor at that time divided East Timor into different units in order better to control the territory.

In the early 1900s some East Timorese were recruited into the Portuguese government. At the same time, some others began their studies at Catholic Church schools and seminaries in East Timor, Macau and Lisbon in order to be prepared as future priests serving in East Timor. In the last few years before the Portuguese departure from the territory, some East Timorese were sent to Portugal to study in different universities. Some later returned to East Timor to form political parties advocating different ideologies. For example, Gregorio Basilio (Lobodara) was sent to the Catholic Seminary in Lisbon to study for the priesthood, but later changed his mind and was recruited into the Portuguese army and stationed in Mozambique. After the Revolucao da Flores (Carnation Revolution) in Lisbon he decided to return to East Timor and joined FRETILIN. During the Indonesian invasion he was killed by the Indonesian military. Vicente Reis after, finishing his secondary high school, obtained a Portuguese scholarship to undertake tertiary education in Portugal. But in 1975 he returned to East Timor without finishing his study and became a member of the Central Committee of FRETILIN.
In this chapter, this intersection between Portuguese administration and indigenous society will be analysed in order to understand the origins of East Timorese elite formation. This chapter will first discuss indigenous social structure before the arrival of the Portuguese on the island. Then I shall examine the Portuguese administration and the process of East Timorese recruitment into the bureaucracy. The most important part of this chapter is the discussion of East Timorese elites and their new organisational bases.

Pre-colonial Rule

Before the arrival of the Portuguese, Timor was ruled by three different reinado (small kingdom): the reinado of ‘South Belu’ (a coastal plain), the reinado of Sonba’i (west of the island) and the reinado of Suai-Kamanasa (south centre of the island), all of which existed at the same time. Schulte Nordholt contends that these kingdoms formed, a unitary realm in Babiko-Babali (Waiwiku-Wehale), and that ‘the ritual leader of this realm had three subordinate liurai (rulers)’: the liurai of South Belu, the liurai of Sonba’i and the liurai of Suai-Kamanasa, each of ‘whom exercised the executive power in his own territory’. Nordholt’s argument is based on Duarte Barbosa’s letter, which

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noted that beyond Greater and Lesser Java there were many islands inhabited by heathens and Moors, amongst which there was one called Timor with an ‘independent king and tongue’.

In addition, Antonio Pigafetta, a sailor on the *Victoria*, the only ship to complete the first voyage around the world by Magellan’s fleet, and which made a landfall on the north coast of Timor at Batu Gede in 1522, wrote that there were four brothers who were *liurai* of the south coast of the island. The names of the communities of these four *liurai* were Oibich, Lichsana, Suai and Cabanaza. Linking the name of these *reinado* with the *liurai* mentioned above, one can say that the island was ruled by at least three *liurai*—the *liurai* of South Belu (Oibich), the *liurai* of Sonba’i, and the *liurai* of Suai-Kamanasa (Suai and Cabanaza)—which were independent of each other with the highest authority in the hands of *liurai*.

Below the *liurai* was the *chefe do suco* (head of villages). Under the *chefe do suco* was the *chefe knua* (in Portuguese *povoacao*, or head of hamlet), who had significant power over the people living in the *knua*, received tribute and paid it to the kingdoms and ‘organised marital alliances with neighbouring clans’. The lowest rank of *reinado*

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3 Duarte Barbosa who was in the service of the Portuguese army until 1516 or 1517 visited Malacca and wrote that beyond Java island there were other islands including Timor. In Barbosa’s view Timor island had only a single and unitary realm. See Nordholt, *The Political System*, pp. 159-60.


5 Lichsana, according to Nordholt, could be Insana which ‘had an important port in Mena on the north cost’ which represented the Atoni area which was part of the realm of Sonba’i. See *ibid*.


7 Taylor, *East Timor*, p. 4.
was *katuas uma-kain* (the ruler of big house). Under this structure were the common people, which consisted of *reino* (ordinary people) and *ata* (slaves). The description of this structure is based on European sources, given the scarcity of indigenous ones. This poverty of sources creates difficulties, of course, in understanding fully the original social structure of the Timorese people. European sources are distorted by their political and economic motivations.\(^8\)

In sum, we note that before the Portuguese arrival the East Timorese were organised in different and autonomous institutions based on geography. These pre-colonial patterns provide the basis for measuring Portuguese influence upon East Timor’s social structure and its people.

**Portuguese Rule**

The date of the Portuguese first arriving in Timor is commonly accepted by historians as somewhere between 1512 and 1520.\(^9\) The island of Timor was first mentioned in a letter of Rui de Brito to D. Manuel, the King of Portugal, written on 6

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January 1514, which described the island of Timor as the island of Sandalwood.\textsuperscript{10} Further, Pigaffeta in his report in 1522 also mentioned Timor as one of the islands that the Portuguese visited on 26 January 1522.

As mentioned in Chapter One, the Portuguese were by no means the first foreigners to reach the island, as before their arrival Chinese traders made contact.\textsuperscript{11} The visit of the Portuguese was mainly to trade sandalwood.\textsuperscript{12} Apart from trade, the Portuguese were also concerned with \textit{Evangelizacao} (Evangelisation). In 1562 missionaries of Dominican Order arrived in the island for evangelisation. This is also the year identified by Portuguese historians as the date when colonization formally commenced.\textsuperscript{13} In the seventeenth century, many of the \textit{liurai} were converted to Catholicism.\textsuperscript{14}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{10} David Hicks, ‘Unachieved Syncretism: The Local-Level Political System In Portuguese Timor, 1966-1967’, \textit{Anthropos}, 78, 1983, p. 20. The Portuguese first settled in Malaka, on the western coast of the Malay peninsula, which once was the most important commercial centre in Southeast Asia, in the beginning of sixteenth century. From Malacca the Portuguese fleet began to move toward east to set up their factories in the Spice Islands especially in the island of Ambon in the Moluccas. Their first settlement close to Timor was Solor, and when Solor was captured by the Dutch the Portuguese moved to Timor where they first settled in Lifau, on the north coast of the island. See Taylor, \textit{East Timor}, p. 3.
\bibitem{13} Hicks, ‘Unachieved Syncretism’, p. 20.
\end{thebibliography}
This initial contact to some extent affected the relationship between *chefes* and *liurai* in coastal areas. *Chefes* that had contact with the Portuguese benefited economically. These *chefes* conducted trade with the Portuguese in the form of exchanging sandalwood for items from the Portuguese such as cloth, guns, and iron tools. Having become more advanced economically than their *reinado* due to their trade with the Portuguese, the *chefes* began to defy their erstwhile rulers.¹⁵ The evangelisation also affected this relationship. Some *chefes*, who converted to Christianity, swore oaths of loyalty to the king of Portugal.¹⁶ Taylor argues that this change of relationship was part of a long-term Portuguese campaign aimed at undermining the Timorese *reinado* ‘to produce smaller less powerful units, more amenable to European control’.¹⁷

From 1562 to 1613 Timor was linked administratively to Solor island.¹⁸ Both islands during that period were run ‘ecclesiastically’ by Dominican priests as the Portuguese Government in Malacca took the view that it was not worthwhile to establish its authority over these two islands. The Portuguese missionaries were left to organise native Christians for their defence.¹⁹

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¹⁸ In 1613 Solor was occupied by the Dutch, which forced the Portuguese to move to Larantuka, the island of Flores. See Agencia Geral do Ultramar, *Timor Pequena Monografia*, p. 35.

While searching for sandalwood, the Dutch landed at Kupang in 1568, enabling them to extend their influence to other parts of the island. Accordingly, the Dutch and Portuguese battled for control over the island. After learning that the ecclesiastical ‘administration’ in Timor was not effective in terms of deterring Dutch influence, the Viceroy of India, Antonio de Melo e Castro in 1665, decided to send a military officer, Capitan Simao Luis, to take over the ‘administration’ from the Dominican priests and convert it to a civil authority. According to Hicks, this change was to keep Timor out of Dutch hands, bring all the liurai under the suzerainty of the Portuguese crown, and convert the Timorese to Catholicism. Not until 1859 did these rivalries end, with the Portugal and the Netherlands finally agreeing to divide the island of Timor into Portuguese Timor and Dutch Timor.

**Portuguese Administration**

The formal Portuguese administration of Timor began in 1701 when Antonio Coelho Guerreiro was appointed as Governor of Timor under the jurisdiction of the Viceroy of Goa. Headquarters were established in Lifau on the northwest coast of

20 Hicks, ‘Unachieved Syncretism’, p. 21.

21 Ibid. After arrived in Timor, Simao Luis built a fort in Lifau (Oecussi), which was a first capital of Timor. See also Agencia Geral do Ultramar, Timor Pequena Monografia, p. 36.

22 Hicks, ‘Unachieved Syncretism’, p. 21.

23 Ibid; See also Nordholt, *The political System*, p. 166.
Timor, currently the East Timor enclave of Oecussi. Timor during 1701 was one district of the *Estado da India* (the State of India).

Guerreiro was successful in establishing a ‘fortified beach’ at Lifao to defend the Portuguese administration. As Timor was ruled from Goa, the administration from 1701 to 1844 encountered great obstacles. The Portuguese administration did not penetrate to the *suco* (village) level. Instead, the *suco* were left to the *liurai*, who ran them based on indigenous rules. In 1703, after one year as governor, Antonio Guerreiro granted these *liurai* Portuguese military ranks in a bid to get sufficient support from the *liurai* and to integrate the territory into a military organization. After a series of revolts, the capital of Timor was shifted from Lifau to Dili.

In 1844, Macau and Timor were separated from India and constituted an independent government, in which Timor became an autonomous district of Macau. After being appointed district governor of Portuguese Timor, Afonso de Castro divided the ‘colony’ into territorial administrative units, *concelhos*, under the jurisdiction of an

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25 *Estado da India* (the State of India) was a colony of Portuguese in the Far East, which consisted of Goa, Damao and Dio in India, Macau, and Timor, and ruled by a Viceroy (vice-rei). Goa was the capital of the State of India.

26 Boxer *Fidalgos in the Far East*, p. 185


28 Boxer *Fidalgos in the Far East*, pp. 185-86.

29 Pires, *Descolonizacao de Timor*, p. 20
administrador (administrator). This division was later amended in order to effectively deter revolts that might surface against the Portuguese. The territory then divided into eleven districts. A number of reinado constituted one district and the head of the district was a commander of the Portuguese military detachment stationed in each district.

### Table 3.1: The Division of Districts and Reinado in 1863

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Reinado</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District 1: Dili</td>
<td>Dili, Motael, Ulmera, Hera, Caimanc, Dailor, Failacor, Laclo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 2: Manatuto</td>
<td>Lacore, Manatuto, Laclubar, Funar, Laleia, Cairui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 3: Vemasse</td>
<td>Vemasse, Fatumarto, Venilale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 4: Lautem</td>
<td>Faturo, Sarau, Matarufa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 5: Viqueque</td>
<td>Bibiluto, Viqueque, Luca, Lacluta and Dilor, Biblioco-Barique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 6: Alas</td>
<td>Dotic, Alas, Manufahi, Raimean, Camenasse and Suai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 7: Vibicusso</td>
<td>Samoro, Vibicusso and Claco, Foulau, Faturo, Turiscai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 8: Cailaco</td>
<td>Atsabe, Deribate, Leimean, Mahubo, Cailaco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 9: Maubara</td>
<td>Boibau, Hermara (Ermera), Maubara, Liquica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 10: Batugade</td>
<td>Cutubaba, Sanir, Balibo, Cova</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 11: Oecussi</td>
<td>Oecussi, Ambeno</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 1844, the first schools in Portuguese Timor were established in Dili and Batugade. These two schools were founded by the Portuguese to teach selected Timorese basic skills. In addition, the Portuguese government also founded a ‘college’ to accommodate the children of liurai in order to teach them the history of Portugal as

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well as to introduce Portuguese culture to these future liurai.\textsuperscript{32} The establishment of these schools was merely to serve Portuguese interests in the territory because, through its educational system the Portuguese intended to ‘prepare indigenous people to take over the work of proselytisation’.\textsuperscript{33} By learning the history and culture of Portuguese, these Timorese (originating from the strata of liurai and their descendants) felt that they were part of a civilized Portuguese imperium, which in turn accepted the Portuguese presence in the territory.

Under this administrative system, compulsory labour was also introduced. Every reinado had to provide five men to the head of the district as security guards and one person as a servant. Taxation was imposed to the territory. Every reinado had to pay finta (tax) every year to the head of the district.\textsuperscript{34}

In October 1896, Portuguese Timor was proclaimed as an autonomous colony by the King of Portugal, separating it from Macau. According to the decree issued by the Minister and State Secretary of Maritime and Overseas Affairs, Jacinto Candido da Silva, such a separation was to solve communication difficulties that caused delays in decision-making, which had always prejudiced Timor in terms of development.\textsuperscript{35} For example, in appointing or replacing Portuguese officers working in Timor, the two governors—the governor of the province of Macau and Timor and the governor of the district of Timor—had both to agree. If they did not, then such divergence had to be solved in Lisbon which, according to Luna Oliveira, was ineffective and inefficient, as

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., p. 9.


\textsuperscript{34} Luna, \textit{Timor na Historia}, p. 60

\textsuperscript{35} Decree of Timor Autonomy, 17 October 1896, quoted in \textit{ibid.}, p. 496.
decisions from Lisbon could take months or years to be made due to the distance between Timor, Macau and Lisbon.

An interesting development after Timor was separated from Macau involves the patterns of interaction in the Lesser Sunda region between the Portuguese and the Dutch. Governor Lopes de Lima in 1850 concluded an agreement with the Dutch to forego Portuguese claims on the Lesser Sunda islands. In exchange, the Dutch agreed to pay 200,000 florins and cede an enclave in Portuguese Timor that they possessed. But the Portuguese still maintained Oecussi, totally surrounded by Dutch territory. This agreement was made to raise revenue for Portuguese Timor. The agreement with the Dutch, however, was rejected by the Portuguese crown and Lopes de Lima was arrested. But in 1860, the treaty that Lopes de Lima had made was ratified by Portugal and Holland, and in 1914 the final boundaries settlement was made.

In 1894, the division of districts was again changed by the governor, Celestino da Silva, who launched a military campaign from 1894 to 1908 to dismantle the power of the remaining rebellious liurai and create effective control over Portuguese Timor. Da Silva then divided Portuguese Timor into 15 comandos militares (military commands) in 1908, centrally administered from Dili. Celestino da Silva also established a company, Sociedade Agricula Patria e Trabalho, to carry out economic activities in

36 Ibid., pp. 312-14.
38 Felgas 1956, p. 316 quoted in Hicks, ‘Unachieved Syncretism’, p. 22.
39 Oliveira, Timor na Historia, p. 291.
order to provide financial support to the territory. The company later was given the right of monopoly by the Portuguese government as coffee exporter.

In education, with the help of Catholic Church, Celestino increased the number of schools.\textsuperscript{40} The Catholic Church (Cannossians) were in charge of a few female colleges which most of \textit{liurai} daughters attended. One school for males that later became the best school during the Portuguese administration, \textquote{Escola Bispo de Medeiros}, was opened in 1898.\textsuperscript{41} These schools to some extent produced educated Timorese who later were recruited into the Portuguese administration, and some went on to study for higher degrees (tertiary education) in Portugal. Pedro Lobo, for example, was among the few first Timorese sent to Macau and Portugal to study in a seminary. He did not finish his studies, but later was brought to Macau by Bishop Medeiros in 1936 and involved in business activities where he became one of the richest and most politically influential people in Macau.\textsuperscript{42}

After the 1912 revolt against Portuguese rule by Dom Boaventura (one of the \textit{liurai}), many \textit{reinados} were abolished and divided into small units called \textit{suco}. Many \textit{liurai}, especially those who revolted against the Portuguese, were removed from their positions which were filled by individual \textit{liurai} descendents and aristocrats totally loyal to the Portuguese.\textsuperscript{43} Later on, these \textit{suco} were adapted to become new \textit{comandos militares}, which increased the number of \textit{comandos militares}. These \textit{comandos militares}, which increased the number of \textit{comandos militares}. These

\textsuperscript{40} Texeira, 1968, p. 125 quoted in Ranck, ‘Recent Rural-Urban Migration’, p. 55.

\textsuperscript{41} Oliveira, \textit{Timor na Historia}, pp. 511-13

\textsuperscript{42} Interview with Moizes Fernandes, Historian in Instituto de Ciencias Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa, Lisbon 16 October 2002.

\textsuperscript{43} Ranck, ‘Recent Rural-Urban Migration’, p. 57.
militares were dismantled in January 1934, and gradually replaced by a civil system of administration, the circunscricoes. This change resulted in the establishment of a new institution, posto, coordinating a few sucos in one small region. A number of postos constituted a circunsriccao (district).

In 1942, according to Hicks, Portuguese Timor consisted of one concelho (Dili) and six circunscricoes (Lautem, Sao Domingos, Manatuto, Suro, Fronteira and Oecussi). In 1953, the status of Portuguese Timor was changed from a colony to a provincia ultramarina (overseas province) of Portugal. As a provincia ultramarina, Portuguese Timor enjoyed administrative and financial autonomy, and all indigenous Timorese, regardless of their status and educational background, became Portuguese citizens. In addition, a new political institution, concelho do governo (government council), was established to support the governor administering the territory. The governor was the head of the concelho do governo. One of the main functions of the concelho do governo was to discuss and pronounce local government laws (diploma legislativo), including the annual budget of the local government, and to provide suggestions to the government. Before 1959 there was a native Timorese, Francisco de Araujo, who was

44 Felgas, 1956, p. 316 quoted in Hicks ‘Unachieved Syncretism’, p. 22.
45 A Concelho has a municipio (town) which is administered by the administrador (administrator), and circunsriccao, was administered directly from the provincial capital, Dili. See Hicks, ‘Unachieved Syncretism’, p. 22.
a member of the *concelho do governo*. In 1959 after the revolt of that year,⁴⁷ Francisco was arrested, accused of supporting the rebels. He was later sent to Portugal for trial, but was set free in Lisbon after Pedro Lobo lobbied Salazar, the Portuguese dictator.⁴⁸

In 1966, the Portuguese Timor administrative structure underwent a substantial change. Only Dili and Occussi retained their status as *concelho* and *circunscrição* respectively, while the rest of Portuguese Timor was divided into eight *concelhos*: Lautem, Baucau, Viqueque, Manatuto, Suro, Ermera, Bobonaro and Covalima.⁴⁹ The Portuguese also created more *postos* in order to control the villages. The change of the structure gave opportunities to East Timorese to be recruited into the Portuguese government, based on the educational background.⁵⁰ In 1968, some East Timorese had assumed the roles of *Adjunto Administrador do Concelho* (Deputy District Administrator), and *Chefe do Posto* (Sub-district Administrator), which previously were only designated to Portuguese.⁵¹ At the same time, the Portuguese government maintained the rule of the indigenous leadership in *suco* with some changes. The *sucos*

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⁴⁷ The 1959 revolt, which also called Viqueque massacre was a revolt against Portuguese rule in Uato-Lari and Uato-Carabau, Viqueque, eastern part of East Timor.

⁴⁸ Interview with Moizes Fernandes.

⁴⁹ Hicks ‘Unachieved Syncretism’, p. 22.


⁵¹ Boletim Oficial de Timor No. 8, 24 February 1968, p. 148 in author’s collection.
became part of the Portuguese administration by receiving orders from chefe do postos (the lowest structure of the administration).\(^{52}\)

A legislative council (Concelho Legislativo) was created to support the governor in administering the territory. By the terms of the Estatuto Político Administrativo da Provincia de Timor 1963 (Decree of Political Administrative of Province of Timor), the legislative council consisted of 11 members, selected through very restricted elections,\(^{53}\) with the governor of province as the head of the council.\(^{54}\) In 1968, some East Timorese were elected as members of the council, such as Manuel Carrascalao, a Timorese-Portuguese, and Gaspar Correia da Silva Nunes, the liurai of Maubara.\(^{55}\)

This basic structure was maintained until 1974, but the number of concelho and posto increased due to the increase of the population and for security reasons. In addition, there was a small change in Oecussi’s status: previously a circunscricao, it became a concelho. By dividing the territory into small units the Portuguese government could more easily control the territory and its people.

\(^{52}\) East Timor was divided into concelho, circunscricao, posto, suco, and povoacao. A concelho had a number of posto (sub-districts), each run by a chefe do posto (sub-district administrator). These posto consisted of sucos (villages), each of which was administered by chefe do suco (chief of village). The suco consisted of a few povoacao, (hamlets), which were headed by a chefe da povoacao, headman. The chefe do suco and chefe da povoacao were always Timorese, who were of royal and aristocrats lineage. Interview with Mr. Joao Baptista, Liurai descendant, 4 September 2002 by telephone.

\(^{53}\) Many adult East Timorese did not take part in the elections. Only those adults who resided in the capital of the province and districts were given the opportunity to vote in the elections. Interview with Joao Baptista.

\(^{54}\) See Estatuto Político Administrativo da Provincia de Timor 1963 in author’s collection.

\(^{55}\) Boletim Oficial de Timor No. 8, 24 February 1968, p. 148.
# Table 3.2: Administrative Division in 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concelho (Districts)</th>
<th>Postos Administrativos (Sub-districts)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dili</td>
<td>Sede Dili, Atauro, Metinaro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baucau</td>
<td>Sede Baucau, Quelicai, Venilale, Baguia, Laga, Vemasse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bobonaro</td>
<td>Sede Maliana, Balibo, Bobonaro, Atabai, Cailaco, Lolotoi, Lebos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cova-Lima</td>
<td>Sede Suai, Fatu-Mean, Fohorem, Fatu-Lulic, Mape, Tilomar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ermera</td>
<td>Sede Ermera, Atsabe, Hato-Lia, Letefoho, Rairaco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lautem</td>
<td>Sede Lospalos, Luro, Iliomar, Lautem, Tutuala, Lore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquica</td>
<td>Sede Liquica, Maubara, Bazartete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manatuto</td>
<td>Sede Manatuto, Laclubar, Barique, Laclo, Laleia, Soibada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Sede Same, Alas, Fatu-Berliu, Hatudo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ainaro</td>
<td>Sede Ainaro, Maubisse, Hato-Builico, Turiscai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viqueque</td>
<td>Sede Viqueque, Ossu, Uato-Lari, Lacluta, Uato-Cardabau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oecussi</td>
<td>Sede Pante Macassar, Oe-Sili, Nitibe, Passabe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aileu</td>
<td>Sede Aileu, Remexio, Laulara, Lequidoe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In sum, one notes that the Portuguese administration experienced several changes in order to support the colonisation of East Timor. These changes also impacted deeply on the early formation of East Timorese elites. The Portuguese government perpetuated some forms of indigenous leadership. But changes in 1968 also allowed some East Timorese to be recruited into the administration.

## Elite Formation

Political power in Portuguese Timor in the early twentieth century was held largely by a group of elites whose authority derived from two different systems, the colonial structure and the indigenous kinship system. Power in the indigenous system was exercised by *liurai* and *chefes do suco*, despite their political displacement in the early twentieth century, while power in the colonial system rested on administrative, military
or economic foundations (in trade and or plantation holdings). The indigenous power in
the mid-twentieth century was diminished due to Portuguese government policy of
placing the indigenous system under the posto’s (sub-district) control. Many
descendants of the liurai were educated in new schools, then recruited into Portuguese
administrative structures and religious institutions. For example, Father Jose Antonio,
former Vicar General of Diocese of Dili is the son of liurai Fatuberliku. Fernando
Osorio Soares, the former Portuguese Chefe do Posto (sub-district administrator) was
the son of liurai Laclubar. In addition, there was also a Chinese community, which
composed 1 percent of the Portuguese Timor population, but dominated the commercial
sector in retailing. According to Taylor, by the end of the 1960s, ‘397 of the 400 retail
outlets were run by Chinese families, who also played an important role in the buying
and selling of grain’.\(^5^6\)

In this section I will first examine East Timor’s elites based on existing conceptual
frameworks. This will be followed by some discussion of their organisational
background in order to shed light on where their origins and the forms of organisation
that they adopted.

**Elites**

According to T.B. Bottomore, elites can be grouped into three different categories:
high government officials, managers of industry, and intellectuals.\(^5^7\) In the case of
Portuguese Timor, three different groups that resembled Bottomore’s categorisation

\(^5^6\) Taylor, *East Timor*, p. 16.

emerged in the early twentieth century: the government employees, business elites, and the young ‘professionals’ or ‘intellectuals’. Of these three groups, government employees were, of course, by far the largest in the territory.58

The business group did not play an important role in East Timor politics. But it did forge relations with the centre of power (government employees and the liurai). It also developed this personalist power in more organised ways, with some members joining the political parties that emerged in 1974. Finally, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, a group of young ‘professionals’ or ‘intellectuals’ emerged. Since then, it has engaged actively in politics. Let us examine these groups more fully.

**Government Employees**

By 1974, government employees in Portuguese Timor numbered about 2155. They were distributed across 13 *concelhos*, 63 *postos* and 23 government offices (*servicos*), as well as the *camaras municipais* (major’s office). In one *posto*, there were usually 7-9 government employees consisted of a sub-district administrator, an *enfermeiro* (nurse), three *cabo sipaio* and *sipaio* (police officers), a *pecuario* (veterinarian officer), and a *guarda fio* (linesmen).

These government employees were grouped into three different categories—*quadros aprovados por lei* (permanent staff), *contratados* (hired employees) and *assalariados* (employed on a salary basis). Among these 2155 civil servants, it is difficult to ascertain how many East Timorese were employed. But based on the

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positions in the administration, one can say that vast majority of Timorese held low rank, with only a few were in the medium and high levels (see Table 3.3). On the other hand the majority of Portuguese occupied high and medium levels. Some of mesticos (mestizos) also occupied certain positions in high and medium levels. For example, the position of the governor, districts administrators and other senior staffs were designated to Portuguese people. Some mestizos were also recruited into these positions.

But the Timorese were only recruited into positions of deputy district administrators, head of sub-districts, and medium and low levels.

The recruitment of government employees was based on education and social status. This model of recruitment is similar to Robert Putnam’s models of elite recruitment, based on higher social status than education. Education became increasingly important, however. Many of liurai descendants were educated people, because of the access to education that they enjoyed in the early twentieth century. So it became relatively easy for them to be recruited into the civil service. Thus, during the 1960s, education—bolstered by high social standing and loyalty to the government, became crucial for recruitment into civil service.

59 Jobs like Guarda-fios (wiremen), Drivers, Guarda Auxiliar da Quarta e Quinta Classe (Auxiliary Police of 4th and 5th Class) were filled by Timorese.

60 Interview with Clementino do Amaral, Member of the National Parliament from KOTA, Dili, 21 May 2003. Amaral during the Portuguese period was Adjunto Administrador do Concelho (Deputy District Administrator) stationed in Baucau.


# Table 3.3: Education in Portuguese Timor from 1953 to 1973 (both government and Catholic schools)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schools and students</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>1973</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ensino primaria</em> (primary school)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrolled</td>
<td>3,429+</td>
<td>6,292+</td>
<td>16,946++</td>
<td>30,203+++</td>
<td>61,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approved**</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2,944</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>11,664</td>
<td>41,733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em><em>Secondary</em> School</em>* 63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ciclo preparatorio</em> (junior high school)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrolled</td>
<td>47+</td>
<td>107+</td>
<td>611++</td>
<td>454+++</td>
<td>641+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approved**</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liceu</strong> (high school)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrolled</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>477+++</td>
<td>233+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approved**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>145</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Escola comerciais e industriais</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(commerce and industry school)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrolled</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>439+++</td>
<td>138+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approved**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>259</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Escola de pabilitacao de professores do posto</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(teaching training school)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrolled</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>114+++</td>
<td>206+++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approved**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>74</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total enrolled**                     | 3,476 | 6,399 | 17,557 | 31,687   | 62,233   |

**Notes:**
- * Seminary and Catechist schools were included in the Secondary School.
- ** Students advanced to the next grade or level

**Sources:**
- ++ Timor Pequena Monografia, Agencia Geral do Ultramar, 1965, pp. 56-60.

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63 A few Portuguese children whose parents were stationed in East Timor attended both junior and senior high school. In 1973 when the author attended a junior high school in Dili (*Ciclo Preparatorio do Ensino Secundario- Escola Tecnica*), some of the author’s colleagues were Portuguese.
After education became one of the requirements for civil service recruitment, many East Timorese began to send their children to school. Between 1964 and 1973, the number of primary school students increased sharply. At the same time the Portuguese government in 1964 also introduced free and compulsory education for children of school age between 6 to 12, regardless of their status in the society.64 This increase did not affect the secondary school system, which was neither free nor compulsory. As we can see, the number of students of liceu (senior high school) in 1973 dropped from 477 in 1968 to 233. This is mainly because of economic difficulties which prevented many East Timorese to send their children to secondary schools.

Because there was no tertiary education in Portuguese Timor and few opportunities to study at the tertiary level overseas, secondary school remained a ‘luxury’ with only liurai and wealthy families could afford. In 1973, only 52 Timorese were sent to Lisbon for tertiary education, studying philosophy and theology (11), art (4), law (8), social science (5), natural science (3), engineering (5), sciences related to medicine (13), agriculture (2), and nautical science (1).

Despite their similar origins, relations between members of this elite group cannot be characterised as cohesive.65 Indeed, they sharply divided in their outlooks, and these divisions were made manifest in the formation of different political parties during the 1970s. For example, Francisco Xavier do Amaral and Francisco Lopes da Cruz were Customs Officers. But after the Carnation Revolution, they formed different political parties which later fought against each other. Xavier do Amaral became President of

64 Although state primary schools were free, the parents had to pay for books and uniforms. See Ranck, ‘Recent Rural-Urban’, p. 69.
65 Bottomore, Elite, p. 89.
FRETILIN and proclaimed the independence of East Timor in 1975, while Francisco Lopes da Cruz, as President of UDT, signed a petition supporting the Indonesian invasion. Mario Carrascalao who was head of the Forestry Office, together with Lopes da Cruz founded UDT and during the Indonesian occupation was East Timor’s appointed governor for ten years. The majority of members in this group were conservative and pro-Portugal because of the privileges that they had enjoyed. Only a very few of them were critical of the Portuguese colonial system. This small group portrayed themselves as nationalists, and they felt strongly at that time that ‘an independent East Timor could be a manageable economic unit’, but they did not have ‘any coherent ideological vision beyond independence’.66 Their political thinking was reflected in the formation of political parties after the Carnation Revolution.

The majority of the civil servants, including Mario Carrascalao, Francisco Lopes da Cruz, Domingos Oliveira, a Custom officer, Cezar Mourinho, Mayor of Dili joined UDT, a party which advocated a federation with Portugal and conservative. A smaller number, including Xavier do Amaral, and Nicolau Lobato, joined FRETILIN in advocating a total independence for East Timor.67 In addition, there was also a very small number of the civil service including Domingos Pinto, a Custom officer, Gaspar


67 Francisco Xavier do Amaral and Nicolau Lobato were members of an informal discussion group which shared the ‘aversion to the backwardness of the Portuguese colonial system’. Ramos Horta, a *Voz de Timor* journalist was also member of the group. The group later became the nucleus of nationalists which formed ASDT and later FRETILIN. See Horta, *Funu*, p. 34.
da Silva, a Finance officer\textsuperscript{68}, and Antonio Freitas Parada, a Finance officer were members of APODETI, a party which called for integration with Indonesia.

Thus, one notes that the recruitment of East Timorese into the Portuguese civil administration was based on social status, education, and loyalty. The East Timorese were only employed in the medium and low level structure of the government, while the Portuguese themselves occupied the high positions. By 1974, only a few East Timorese occupied positions such as head of office and mayor. Nonetheless, the relations between these local elites were revealed to be disunified. In particular, while majority of them advocated federation with Portugal in 1974, some demanded independence, while still others called for integration with Indonesia.

**Business Elites**

Elite members of Portuguese Timor’s business community were mostly ethnic Chinese engaged in various forms of commerce. However there were also few Portuguese companies that were involved in business activities such as *Sociedade Agricola Patria e Trabalho* (SAPT), *Associacao do Comercio, Agricola e Industria de Timor* (ACAIT), and *Sociedade de Trabalho e Agricola* (SOTA). SAPT and SOTA were involved in the import-export business and the processing of coffee, while ACAIT was involved in small industries, trade and agriculture. In addition, there were also few Timorese who could be considered as small traders or businessmen because they owned coffee plantations.

\textsuperscript{68} Both Domingos Pinto and Gaspar da Silva were killed by FRETILIN in 1975 in Aileu, a few weeks after the Indonesian invasion.
Sometimes business elites demonstrated some political clout. In 1972 the Chinese community influenced the appointment of Portuguese Timor’s governor. The Chief of Staff of Portuguese Timor’s governor was appointed as governor, but the Chinese community protested such a decision, which led the Portuguese government to change the appointment. The formerly designated governor was finally replaced and later was appointed as governor of Macau.  

Most business elites were ethnic Chinese. They were fairly closely knit, and they grouped themselves into an association called the Associacao Comercial Chinesa (Chinese Commercial Association) in Dili. The Portuguese and the mestizos were members of general business associations (socio de comercio) such as ACAIT and SOTA, though some Chinese also became members of these two associations. However, if ethnic Chinese were cohesive, these relations did not embrace Portuguese and Timorese businessmen. Instead, businessmen from each ethnic group tended to only deal with co-ethnics. It is more difficult, however, to assess their political outlooks, because few were involved in political parties. A number of Timorese, though, became sympathisers of UDT, FRETILIN and APODETI.

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69 Interview with Moizes Fernandes.

Young ‘Professionals’ or ‘Intellectuals’

The Young ‘Professionals’ or ‘Intellectuals’ were those who had tertiary education and became opinion leaders, often as journalists.\(^{71}\) This group emerged during the late 1960s, after the Portuguese government broadened access to education (including tertiary education in Portugal). Most of them came from high social status (\textit{liurai}) and gained education either in Timor or in Lisbon. Vicente Sahe, a former member of the FRETILIN Central Committee, and a son of the \textit{liurai} of Bucoli, finished his secondary school in Dili and won a Portuguese scholarship to study engineering in Lisbon. Sahe as mentioned above did not finish his studies, and in 1975 he returned to East Timor and joined FRETILIN. Upon his return, he set up agricultural cooperatives, women’s organizations and a group that discussed politics in his village, Bucoli.\(^{72}\)

Borja da Costa, a former member of the FRETILIN Central Committee, was a son of the \textit{liurai} of Same, who studied at the seminary at Dare and went to Portugal for project research and later became a journalist working for a local newspaper, \textit{a Voz de Timor}. Ramos Horta was a journalist in \textit{a Voz de Timor}, who wrote articles that criticized the Portuguese Government. Due to his criticism he was arrested by the Portuguese Secret Police (PIDE) and sent to Mozambique. He did not have a chance to study at tertiary education. Xanana Gusmao, the current president of East Timor, was also a journalist in \textit{a Voz de Timor}, who used a pseudonym, \textit{Xanana}, to criticise government policies. Before becoming a journalist, Xanana Gusmao was a Portuguese civil servant as a third clerk. Due to his idealism, he decided to leave the job and joined

\(^{71}\) See also Bottomore, \textit{Elites}, pp. 70-71.

\(^{72}\) Helen Hill, \textit{Stirrings of Nationalism}, p. 67.
João Carrascalao, the current president of UDT, in his return from Switzerland after finishing his diploma in land survey, in 1975 he joined UDT and became one of the key elements of the party.

Members of this group were greatly divided in their outlooks, as can be seen in their diverse affiliations with political parties. For example, Ramos Horta, Sahe, and da Costa were founding members of FRETILIN, while Joao Carrascalao was a member of UDT. But in general, this group was deeply nationalist and very critical of the government. Even before the Carnation Revolution, some members of this group such as Horta and Mari Alkatiri, had already begun to think about how independence might be obtained. Most members of this group became founding members of FRETILIN.

In sum, one notes that the emerging East Timorese elites during this period included small numbers of educated East Timorese who were recruited into different institutions and organisations. A majority of these elites were descendants of the liurai, autocrats and mestizos. Again, Xavier do Amaral, Fernando Osorio Soares, Vicente Reis (Sahe), Xanana Gusmao, Domingos Oliveira, former Secretary General of UDT, Nicolau Lobato, and Borja da Costa were descents of liurai, while Ramos Horta, Joao Carrascalao, Mario Carrascalao and Cesar Mouzinho were descendants of mestizos. Lopes da Cruz was descent of an aristocrat. Da Cruz father was a teacher at the Colegio of Soibada (Catholic Primary School in Soibada). Only a very few of them became elites due to their modern education. Mari Alkatiri was one of the very few East Timorese who achieve this, finishing his secondary schooling in Dili in 1974.

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74 See Horta, Fumu, pp. 31-32.
75 Ibid., pp. 34-35.
Organisational Background

There were several institutions under colonial rule that played important roles in Portuguese Timor’s political development, offering the bases for elite-level standings. For the purpose of this study, I will discuss only three crucial institutions: the Portuguese civil administration, the Catholic Church, and political parties. By discussing these institutions, one can understand how elites organised themselves politically, the role of these institutions in forming political elites, and the organisational basis of elites. Some of the institutions only played important roles in education, while others became sources of income and provided political basis for those elites. Many East Timorese political elites worked in the same institution but became political opponents in 1974 as mentioned above.

Civil Administration

Civil administration became a bastion for many educated East Timorese with high social statuses. The structure of the civil administration was designed to serve the Portuguese regime, which, of course, was deeply authoritarian. The governor was ultimately responsible for decision-making in the territory, even though there was a legislative council which, according to the Estatuto Político Administrativo da Provincia de Timor, officially wielded some political influence. However, because the governor was also the head of a legislative council, the institution became a rubber stamp with no real control over political decision making.
Table 3.4: Distribution of Government Employees According to Rank in 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Number of Employees*</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 High</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>Governador (Governor), Chefe dos Servicos (Head of Office), Administradores dos Concelhos (District Administrators), Adjunto de Administradores do Concelho (Adjunct District Administrators), Primeiro Oficiais (First Officials), Medicos (Doctors), Enfermeiros Gerais (general nurse).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Middle</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>Administradores do Posto (subdistrict administrators), Adjunto de Administradores do Posto (adjunct subdistrict administrator) Segundo e Terceiro Oficiais (second and third officials), Enfermeiros e Enfermeiras (male and female nurse), Primeiro, Segundo e Terceiro Escriturario (first, second and third clerk), Aspirantes (aspirants), Professores do Posto Escolar (Teachers of secondary school and headmaster), Tecnicos (technicians).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Low</td>
<td>1,14576</td>
<td>Dactilografos e Dactilografas (male and female typewriters), Monitores Escolares (teachers of primary school) Serventes (servants), Condutores (drivers), Porteiro (doorkeeper).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* There was no data available on how many of these employees were non-Portuguese.


As we have seen, many East Timorese were recruited into the civil service, but they only held medium- and low-level positions. All high positions were occupied by the Portuguese. Until 1974, only two Timorese held a position of Chefe de Servicos, Mario Carrascalao, Chefe de Servicio de Agricultura e Florestas (Department of Agriculture and Forestry), and Jose Gonsalves, Chefe de Servicio de Economia (Economy). Cesar

76 Chefe do suco worked for the government but were not formally employed and did not get salary.

There is another group of employees (about 175 people), Guarda Auxiliares da Quarta Classe and Guarda Auxiliares da Quinta Classe, which statistically were not in the table, but formally employed by the government with the salary paid by Camara Municipal.
Mouzinho was the only Timorese to hold a position of Presidente da Camara Municipal of Dili (major of Dili) in 1974.

Cumulatively, these structures were powerful as they ran the formal administration of Portuguese Timor from provincia (province) to posto (sub-district) in authoritarian ways. Before the Carnation Revolution, there was a powerful and fearful institution called PIDE (Policia Internacional da Defesa do Estado), a secret police, which had the power to arrest and hold people who criticised Portuguese rule. As mentioned above, for these reasons, Ramos Horta was arbitrarily arrested by the PIDE and deported to Mozambique.

The Catholic Church

Since its establishment in Portuguese Timor, the Catholic Church had been involved in educational, social and religious development. From 1874, the Catholic Church established several schools in the territory. Then, in 1904, the Catholic Church (Jesuits) developed an improved education system. It established a Catholic primary school in Soibada which at the time was regarded as the best school in the territory. In 1924, the Escola de Professores de Catequistas (School of religion teacher) was also established in Soibada in order to prepare Timorese to support the work of the church. Later, in 1936, a seminary was also founded in Soibada to prepare Timorese to study for the priesthood. This seminary was to some extent a place of preparation for seminarians before they were sent to Macau and Lisbon. In 1954, the seminary was moved to Dare, Dili, after temporarily being relocated to Lecidere, Dili.
Of those who graduated from the Soibada school, some went to seminaries in Macau and Lisbon to continue their studies for the priesthood, and some became teachers or professor catequista (religion teachers) stationed in primary Catholic schools, at the same time working for the parish in the area where they were stationed. Of those who continued their studies in the seminary, some became priests.\(^77\) Those who ‘failed’ to become priests, however, were usually recruited into the civil service, and formed the tiny core that led the differing political parties in 1974.\(^78\) For example, Francisco Xavier do Amaral, Francisco Lopes da Cruz, and Fernando Osorio Soares were at the same seminary in Dili, and went to Macau to continue their studies. Having ‘failed’ to become priests, the three were recruited into the civil administration. Amaral and da Cruz were employed in Customs, while Soares was recruited as Sub-district Administrator. In 1974 they formed different political parties (Amaral president of FRETILIN, da Cruz, president of UDT, and Soares Secretary General of APODETI) which, as we have seen, were later to conflict. Xanana Gusmao, and Jose Ramos Horta were both in the Catholic Primary School in Soibada. After finishing their studies in Soibada, both continued their studies in Escola Technica and Liceu (Junior and senior high school).

\(^77\) The first native Timorese who became a priest was Pe. Jacob dos Reis e Cunha who was ordained as a priest in 1863 before the establishment of the primary school in Soibada and other catholic primary schools in the territory. Pe. Cunha went to Portugal on 11 September 1858 where he was accepted into the Real Colegio de Sernache do Bonjardim (Catholic College), was ordained on 1 May 1863 and stationed in Timor on 14 June 1864. He was among the only 4 priests stayed in the territory after the expulsion of other priest from Portuguese Timor in 1833. See Pe. Manuel Texeira, ‘Macau e a sua Diocese – x – Missoes de Timor’, Macau, Tipografia da Missao do Padroado, 1974, pp. 191-92.

\(^78\) Ranck, ‘Recent Rural-Urban’, p. 67.
During the 1960s and 1970s, those who graduated from Catholic schools were regarded as people of high quality and were easily recruited into the military and civil administration. Thus, the Catholic Church was considered one of the most influential institutions in Portuguese Timor. By 1973 the Catholic Church was operating 50 primary schools and three secondary schools (Seminario Nossa Senhora de Fatima, Dili, Escola Bispo de Medeiros, Dili, and Escola Elementar Agricola de Fatumaca, Baucau, school of agriculture). Francisco Lu Olo, the current President of the National Parliament, attended the Catholic primary school, Colegio de Santa Teresinha, Ossu. Lu Olo, after finishing his primary school, was employed as a teacher of the same Catholic primary school just before the Indonesian invasion.

In sum, we observe that the Catholic Church was deeply involved in educational development, with most East Timorese political leaders educated in Catholic schools. However, although they were educated in the same schools, these leaders (elites) failed to establish sound relations based on structural integration and value consensus. Rather, they eventually turned to violent conflict. Thus, Catholic education provided basic knowledge and skills that enabled East Timorese better to serve Church organisations and Portuguese rule. But this education did not provide additional knowledge about political participation and democratic procedures.


80 Francisco Lu Olo in 1972 was author’s boarding school teacher in Colegio de Santa Terezinha, Ossu.
Political Parties

Another set of institutional bases that emerged in 1974 after the Carnation Revolution in Portugal involved political parties. These parties formed in response to the Portuguese policy of decolonisation. Given the lack of political experience, and with illiteracy estimated at more than 90 percent, only a few educated Timorese were involved in the formation of political parties through which to decide the future of Portuguese Timor.

Three major political parties were established in the territory, each with a very different view on the future of the territory. APODETI promoted integration with Indonesia, UDT favoured a federation with Portugal, and FRETILIN advocated total independence for the Portuguese Timor. From 1974-1975 tensions erupted between these political parties, as the Portuguese government promised to hold elections. The power struggle reached its peak when UDT launched an abortive coup on 11 August 1975. FRETILIN responded with counter measures nine days later, which resulted in FRETILIN controlling much to the territory and unilaterally proclaiming the independence of the territory on 28 November 1975. Indonesia, supported by UDT, APODETI, Kota and Trabalhista, militarily invaded East Timor on 7 December 1975. This was the beginning of 24 years of war between the Indonesian military and FALINTIL, FRETILIN’s armed resistance wing, which ended after Indonesia, Portugal and the United Nations signed an agreement to organise a referendum in East Timor for the people of East Timor to decide their own future.

These political parties were primarily responsible for East Timor’s descent into conflict, due to their leaders’ lack of preparedness and political maturity. But since then,
these institutions have contributed to East Timor’s political development. Many East Timorese political elites have been involved in political parties. Mario Carrascalao, former Indonesian appointed governor of East Timor, was a member of UDT. Abilio Osorio Soares, the last Indonesian appointed governor of East Timor, was a member of APODETI. Xanana Gusmao and Ramos Horta were members of FRETILIN and Mari Alkatiri is a member of FRETILIN.

The methods for recruiting members of political parties, especially during the Portuguese period, were diverse. Some members were recruited because of political relationships. The founders of FRETILIN, Nicolau Lobato, Mari Alkatiri, Ramos Horta and Borja da Costa were members of a clandestine anti-colonial group (an informal political discussion group), which was formed in January 1970. Others were recruited due to their social status, education and influence. Francisco Xavier do Amaral was recruited as President of FRETILIN because of his education and high status as the son of the liurai of Turiscai.81 Many were recruited due to family connections. Abilio Osorio Soares was recruited as a member of APODETI because his older brother was a founder of APODETI. Regerio Lobato became a FRETILIN member because of Nicolau Lobato, his old brother. By contrast, all prominent members of the Carrascalao family joined UDT, with Mario Carrascalao, Joao Carrascalao and Manuel Carrascalao emerging as the party’s founders.

These leaders of political parties later became the political elite during Indonesia’s occupation and East Timor’s independence. For example, Lopes da Cruz and Mario Carrascalao, during the Indonesian occupation, became Indonesian Ambassador at large

81 See Horta, Fumu, pp. 34-37.
for East Timor’s Affairs and Indonesian-appointed Governor respectively. Ramos Horta, and Xavier do Amaral after independence became Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Speaker of East Timor’s National Parliament respectively.

In late 1974, relations between members of different political parties were marked by tension. For example, UDT accused some members of FRETILIN of being former elements of the PIDE (Portuguese Secret Police), while FRETILIN accused UDT of being opportunists and wanting to maintain the fascist regime in East Timor. FRETILIN also accused APODETI of being traitors and reactionaries who wanted to sell East Timor to Indonesia. This created a sense of distrust, producing a perception of political outcomes in ‘zero sum terms’. In this situation, elites were prompted to wage ‘violent struggles for dominance’, to use the conceptualisation of Higley et al.82

Indeed, in analysing elite-level relations during these years in terms of Higley’s work, a lack of communication and deep suspicions became hallmarks. After forming political parties, these elites could not agree on formal and informal rules by which to decide East Timor’s political future. They even rejected their opponents’ presence in conferences organised by the Portuguese government to discuss the future of East Timor. For example, in 1975, the Portuguese government organised a conference (Cimeira de Macau) in Macau in order to discuss the future of the territory. FRETILIN, however, chose not to participate in the conference. It did not want APODETI’s leaders

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to be present, fearing that the conference would be used as a means by which to eliminate FRETILIN.83

**Conclusions**

We have seen the ways in which Portuguese colonialism reshaped East Timor’s social structure. In addition, the Portuguese introduced administrative structures through which to deepen its control. On one side, these structures heavily modified indigenous patterns of rule. However, these also created new institutional bases upon which East Timorese could establish elite-level statuses.

Under Portuguese rule, three important elite groups emerged in East Timor: government employees, business elites and young ‘professionals’ or ‘intellectuals’. The most dominant group was government employees, most of whom were educated in Catholic schools. But there was much transfer across institutional bases. During the last years of Portuguese rule, then, some East Timorese government employees became leaders of political parties. In this way, Xavier do Amaral, for example, gained political support from FRETILIN to become East Timor’s president in 1975 after the unilateral proclamation of East Timor’s independence.

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Relations between these elites remained disunified, however, resulting in violent conflicts, even civil warring. FRETILIN gained ascendancy, but this helped to prompt the Indonesian military to invade East Timor. During these struggles and the Indonesian occupation that followed, many new political elites were killed. For example, Domingos Lobato, the leader of FRETILIN’s Youth Organisation, UNETIM (Uniao National Estudantil Timorense), was killed by UDT. Fernando Osorio Soares, Secretary General of APODETI, Cesar Mouzinho, Vice President of UDT, and other members of these two parties were arrested and killed by FRETILIN after the counter coup. This shifting elite-level configuration and sets of strained relations persisted under Indonesian rule, the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER FOUR

ELITES UNDER THE INDONESIAN REGIME

As mentioned in Chapter One, after a brief civil war in 1975, East Timor was invaded by the Indonesian military. The occupation that followed changed East Timor’s political and economic systems and its social structure. It also fundamentally reshaped the organisational bases and relations of East Timor’s elites.

However, the Indonesian occupation ended when the United Nations organised a referendum in August 1999 in which East Timorese were allowed to choose between accepting an Indonesian proposal of autonomy or rejecting the proposal which would lead to the independence of East Timor. In that referendum, 78.5 percent of eligible East Timorese voted against the Indonesian proposal, which paved the way for UN intervention in East Timor to prepare the island’s independence.

This chapter will begin by outlining the events of Indonesian occupation and the resistance of FRETILIN leaders in order to provide an understanding of the political structures and organisational bases that during this period supported the formation of new kinds of elites. This will be followed by an analysis of the ways in which elites emerged, formed new attitudes, and conducted their relations.
Indonesian Occupation

After forming three political parties the East Timorese political leaders started campaigns throughout East Timor to obtain support in the elections that were to be held in late 1975.\(^1\) During this period, tensions grew and clashes between three political parties took place several times. This situation worsened when the Indonesian military began to intervene. It set up a military operation within East Timor to demoralise those parties that advocated either federation with Portugal and independence. In addition, it also tried to discourage East Timorese leaders from actively supporting the Portuguese proposal for decolonisation, because Indonesia wanted to incorporate East Timor by any means, even military invasion.\(^2\)

The main reason why Indonesia was so interested in incorporating East Timor was a fear over its own disunity. It was thought East Timor’s independence might inspire some Indonesian provinces to advocate independence. This fear encouraged Indonesian President Soeharto and his aides to conclude that an independent East Timor was not in

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\(^2\) Pires, *Decolonizacao de Timor*, pp. 120-24.
Indonesia’s best interests. If the Portuguese were to leave, the territory should be absorbed into Indonesia.³

In pursuing this aim, ‘Comodo Operation’—a military plan to identify and establish key points of support, and to destabilise the political situation in East Timor—was set up. This operation was designed to undermine supporters of independence, indeed to spread chaos across East Timor in order to legitimise Indonesia’s intervention. The operation encompassed military operations by recruiting East Timorese who favoured integration to train at the special intelligence centre for covert operations, diplomatic manoeuvres, and disinformation tactics.⁴

After more than a year of political destabilisation, UDT, supported by the Indonesian military, carried out a coup detat on 11 August 1975, with the aim of taking over the government from Portugal and dismantling FRETILIN. But UDT only controlled East Timor for nine days, before being driven out by FRETILIN, which then controlled much of the territory until the Indonesian invasion in December 1975.

UDT lost the war and withdrew to Indonesian territory. On 30 November 1975 UDT leaders along with APODETI, KOTA and Trabalhista leaders, signed the ‘Balibo declaration of integration’ of East Timor into Indonesia. This declaration was a response to FRETILIN’s proclamation of independence on 28 November 1975.⁵ For the Indonesian government, the Balibo declaration was a pretext for Indonesia to invade East Timor militarily. Exploiting the pretext that East Timor was in chaos—hence,

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⁴ See Pires, *Decolonizacao de Timor*, p. 117.

threatening Indonesian stability—Indonesia on 7 December 1975 invaded East Timor. A few months later, Indonesia incorporated East Timor as its twenty-seventh province.

The Indonesian military intervention soon encountered great resistance from the East Timorese, especially from supporters of FRETILIN. After the Indonesian invasion, the war in East Timor changed in nature from civil warring to military confrontation between the Indonesian military and East Timor’s independent guerrilla fighters.

Thus, we observe that prior to Indonesian occupation, East Timorese elites were used by the Indonesian military to create chaos as a pretext for Indonesian military invasion. Moreover, the lack of political experience and sophistication prompted East Timorese political elites to resort to violence in order to eliminate their political opponents. During the civil war and Indonesian occupation, political elites arrested, tortured and killed their political opponents. This occupation resulted in the emergence of two major and conflicting political groups, the first favouring Indonesia and the second mounting resistance. These two groups formed the new sets of organisational bases for East Timor’s elites.

Indonesian Occupation and East Timorese Resistance

The Indonesian military intervention deepened political divisions between East Timorese elites. The resistance leaders decided to continue fighting against the Indonesian occupation and establish their own political structure, while the pro-Indonesians became part of the Indonesian political structure established after the incorporation of the territory. This created two different political structures in East
Timor: those favouring and those opposing the Indonesian occupation. In this section I will discuss these two political structures in order to understand how these two structures worked in a parallel way in East Timor, and how they provided political support to the elites.

The Resistance

Analysis of the resistance movement will address two broad issues: the change of strategy and the recruitment of different levels of society into the resistance movement. This will help to explain how the resistance organised itself and gathered support from the people in order to maintain opposition against the Indonesian occupation. In addition, this will provide an understanding of how the resistance movement became an alternative political organisation to the Indonesian government, and a basis for political elites who opposed the Indonesian occupation.

East Timor’s resistance against the Indonesian occupation was carried out in two different phases. The first phase involved conventional warring between the FRETILIN armed wing, Forcas Armadas da Libertacao Nacional de Timor Leste (FALINTIL, East Timor National Liberation Army) and the Indonesian military, which was supported by the UDT and APODETI paramilitaries. This marked the beginning of a long armed conflict, not between East Timor political parties, but between the Indonesian military and FALINTIL.

This war began in November 1975 and ended with the defeat of FALINTIL in 1978, in which FRETILIN’s Base de Apoio (supporting base) was destroyed and many FRETILIN leaders and FALINTIL commanders killed or captured or surrendered. In
1981, Xanana Gusmao and Mau Hunu, the only two remaining members of the Central Committee of FRETILIN\(^6\) still living in East Timor, revised FRETILIN’s strategy from a conventional war into guerrilla warfare. Then they established *Concelho Revolucionario da Resistencia Nacional*, CRRN (the Revolutionary Council of National Resistance) to replace *Direccao da Luta da FRETILIN* (the command of struggle of FRETILIN) which had been destroyed by the Indonesian military. In the same year Xanana then assumed the position of Commander-in-Chief of FALINTIL.\(^7\)

This new strategy marked the second phase of resistance. To implement this new strategy, FRETILIN needed to mobilise wide support among mass publics, regardless of their political backgrounds and affiliations. Xanana Gusmao, as Commander-in-Chief of FALINTIL, opened a consultation process with different levels of society, first with Catholic Church members and East Timorese serving in the Indonesian army, but also among FRETILIN’s political opponents, APODETI and UDT members.

After a long period of consultation, Xanana Gusmao concluded that many people wanted to join the resistance movement, but they did not want to be under FRETILIN’s coordination.\(^8\) For example, Guilherme Gonsalves, the former Indonesian-appointed governor, leader of APODETI, and one of the signatories of the declaration of Balibo,

\(^{6}\) See Xanana Gusmao’s Briefing Notes to the participants of Extraordinary Conference for the dissolution of CNRT/CN, 7 June 2001, Dili, East Timor. A copy of the notes is in author’s collection. The author was one of the participants of the conference and was appointed as a member of drafting team which prepared the final report of the conference.

\(^{7}\) Xanana Gusmao’s Briefing Notes.

\(^{8}\) Interview with Paulo Assis Belo, former Vice Secretary of FPI, CNRT, and currently Member of National Parliament from Democratic Party, Dili, 18 March 2003.
was among those who agreed to participate in the resistance movement, but not under FRETILIN’s control. To accommodate these aspirations, Xanana established the *Convergencia Nacional da Resistencia do Povo Maubere*, CNRM (the National Convergence of Resistance of Maubere), a non partisan organisation, as an umbrella organisation for resistance movements, which later changed into *Concelho Nacional da Resistencia Timorense*, CNRT (the National Council of Timorese Resistance).

Then, in 1987, to increase the effectiveness of resistance, Xanana Gusmao separated FALINTIL from FRETILIN. This move was designed to embrace the Catholic Church and FRETILIN’s opponents, especially APODETI and other organisations that wanted to join the resistance. This change in FALINTIL’s position was well received among the East Timorese serving in the Indonesian army and civil servants, because FALINTIL was no longer an armed wing of one political party, FRETILIN, but became an armed wing of the new resistance movement, CNRM. Thereafter FALINTIL became one of the three organs in the CNRM,⁹ which in many circumstances directly controlled different resistance organisation activities and made

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⁹ CNRM consisted of three organisations which supported each other in fighting against the Indonesian occupation, the Diplomat Front, FALINTIL and Clandestine Movement. The Diplomatic Front operated outside East Timor under the coordination of Ramos Horta. FALINTIL was in charge of making crucial decisions about guerrilla warfare and the Clandestine Movement operated in town or cities to provide logistical support and information to FALINTIL and the Diplomatic Front. Interview with Paulo Assis Belo, Aquelino Fraga Guterres, former Vice-Secretary of Region Four, CNRT, and former Member of National Parliament from Democratic Party, Dili, 25 March 2003, Jose Folaran, former Vice Secretary of Autonomous Region Dili, CNRT, former Member of National Parliament from Democratic Party, Dili 25 March 2005, and Paulo Alves Tulodan, former Vice-Secretary of Region Three, CNRT, Member of National Parliament from Democratic Party, Dili 25 March 2003.
decisions on guerrilla warfare strategies. The Commander-in-chief of FALINTIL also became the president of CNRM and *Comando da Luta* (the commander of the struggle), hence giving directions and instructions to all resistance movements.\(^{10}\)

By the early 1990s, Xanana Gusmao had succeeded in coordinating and establishing all resistance networks in Dili and other districts. In carrying out this type of resistance, Xanana used two distinct strategies: inclusion of, and participation by political opponents and the Catholic Church into the struggle, and the change from armed to a non-armed confrontation.

The participation and inclusion of FRETILIN’s political opponents (UDT and APODETI), the Catholic Church, Youth, Civil Servants and East Timorese serving in the Indonesian army into the resistance movement boosted the resistance movement. For example, the joining of APODETI and UDT leaders such as Guilherme Gonsalves and Mario Viegas Carrascalao, another former Indonesian-appointed governor, to some extent encouraged their followings to support the resistance.\(^{11}\)

The Catholic Church’s participation elevated the credibility of the resistance inside the territory because it changed the perception of many of FRETILIN’s political opponents and also served to ward off the Indonesian accusations that FRETILIN was communist. Thus, many East Timorese who previously were sceptical of FRETILIN changed their sentiments and actively participated in the resistance movement.\(^{12}\) The participation of the Church also influenced many people to join the resistance, since the Church is very influential in East Timor. For example, in Ermera, the late Father Mario

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\(^{10}\) See Xanana Gusmao’s Briefing Notes.

\(^{11}\) Interview with Paulo Assis Belo, Aquelino F. Guterres and Jose Folaran.

\(^{12}\) Interview with Paulo Assis Belo and Aquelino F. Guterres.
Belo encouraged his followings, including his catechists, to voluntarily join the resistance. Father Belo helped Xanana Gusmao to coordinate the work of resistance in Ermera by driving Xanana from Dili to Ermera several times undetected by the Indonesian military in the early 1990s before Xanana’s capture. The participation of Father Domingos ‘Maubere’ Soares, the parish priest of Letefoho, in the 1980s, influenced many young East Timorese to support the resistance. Father Soares then became one of the leading figures of the resistance movement inside the territory, one of the two Catholic priests who organised the CNRT National Convention in Peniche, Portugal, as well as representing Xanana Gusmao and other resistance members who were not able to participate in the convention for security reasons.

The participation of the Catholic Church began in the early 1980s after Mgr. Martinho Lopes, the Apostolic Administrator of Dili Diocese, met Xanana Gusmao in Lospalos. Thereafter, Mgr. Lopes became a human rights advocate who was critical of the Indonesian military’s human rights abuses. He also linked the resistance people with the international community. But in 1981, Mgr. Lopes was forced to leave his position in East Timor as the Vatican bowed to Indonesian pressure. But his successor, Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo, continued his work, with Belo denouncing Indonesia’s human rights abuses. In 1996, he was awarded the Noble Peace Prize together with Jose Ramos Horta, the CNRM representative at the UN. Due to its participation in the resistance, the

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13 The late Father Mario Belo recounted this story to the author in an informal meeting in Baucau, 12 June 2003.

14 The other priest was Father Filomeno Jacob, SJ. Interview with Paulo Assis Belo and Aquelino F. Guterres. Father Domingos Soares also recounted this story to the author in Dili, 19 August 2000.

Catholic Church often became the target of physical harassment. Father Domingos ‘Maubere’ Soares, for example, was the subject of constant psychological and physical harassment. Father Mario Belo had to take temporary shelter in Portugal in 1992 after the capture of Xanana Gusmao.

With many, civil servants, East Timorese serving in the Indonesian military, and youth groups joining the resistance, the movement strengthened considerably. Thus, the resistance, which in 1979 had been very small, now had a large number of supporters. Youth groups, for example, decided to establish their own organisations to support armed resistance. Constancio Pinto, an Indonesian civil servant with a few other young East Timorese, established a youth organisation called 007 to support the armed resistance and organise various demonstrations against the Indonesian occupation, including at the time of the visit of Pope John Paul II to Dili in 1989. He then became Secretary Executive of CNRM in Dili and head of the Santa Cruz demonstration in which more than 200 people were killed when the Indonesian army fired on demonstrators on 12 November 1991.

Likewise, East Timorese students in Java and Bali with Indonesian government scholarships also established a resistance organisation, Resistencia Nacional dos Estudantes de Timor Leste, RENETIL (East Timorese National Student Resistance). RENETIL then became one of the organisations that linked the diplomatic and armed resistance front. It became one of the student organisations that actively recruited many students to join the resistance, including sons and daughters of persons who supported Indonesia’s occupation. Due to its active participation, many RENETIL leaders were imprisoned by the Indonesian military. For example, Fernando Lasama Araujo, the then secretary general of RENETIL, was arrested and jailed by the Indonesian military along
with Xanana Gusmao in 1993. Other leaders, including Carlos da Silva Lopes, the founder of RENETIL, and Domingos Sarmento, the provisional coordinator of RENETIL, sought political asylum in the US embassy in Jakarta in 1994 during the APEC conference in Jakarta and were later flown to Portugal.\(^\text{16}\)

The participation of civil servants also lent great support to the resistance. Many confidential documents from the Indonesian government were leaked to resistance leaders.\(^\text{17}\) As well, these civil servants could use resources available to support the resistance. For example, many government vehicles were used by these civil servants to transport supplies for the resistance. The movement was also aided by those East Timorese serving in the Indonesian army and police who joined it. Many acted as double agents to safeguard many FALINTIL commanders’ lives. Important intelligent information was passed to FALINTIL so that they could avoid being killed or captured.\(^\text{18}\) These East Timorese serving in the Indonesian Army even became liaison officers between FALINTIL and urban resistance networks. Some even left the Indonesian military and join the resistance outright. David Dias Ximenes, for example, in the last years of the Portuguese period, was a Portuguese armed officer and later became an Indonesian army officer. He resigned from the Indonesian army in 1979 and voluntarily joined the resistance organisation in the same year. He then became one of the persons responsible for the Marabia attack in 1980, in which FALINTIL simultaneously attacked Dili from different directions and occupied Dili for several

\(^\text{16}\) Interview with Carlos da Silva Lopes, the founder of RENETIL and Democratic Party, 13 August 2004 by e-mail.

\(^\text{17}\) Interview with Jose Foloran, Paulo Assis Belo and Aquelino F. Guterres.

\(^\text{18}\) Interview with Paulo Assis Belo, and Aquelino F. Guterres.
hours before retreating to the bush. During this attack, the resistance arm successfully seized weapons and ammunition from the Indonesian military. Ximenes was then arrested and sentenced to 16 years in, Cipinang prison in Jakarta. However, he was released in the mid 1990s, enabling him to re-join the resistance movement. In 1997, Ximenes was appointed as Vice-Secretary of *Frente Política Interna*, FPI (Internal Political Front), a combined organisation of armed and clandestine fronts.\(^{19}\)

Another important aspect of the resistance struggle was the re-joining of some of the remaining former FRETILIN leaders and FALINTIL commanders leaders into the resistance.\(^{20}\) These leaders and commanders, after being arrested or captured, sometimes gained their release through the efforts of their relatives, pro-Indonesian leaders and the Catholic Church. But many of them then returned to resistance activities. For example, Paulo Assis Belo,\(^{21}\) the former FRETILIN leader, after being captured by the Indonesian military in 1978, was released after negotiations conducted by the Catholic Church and his family. He then worked with the Catholic Church in Baucau as a teacher at the Catholic Secondary School in Fatumaka. He later was sent by the Catholic Church to Kupang, Nusa Tenggara Timur, to undertake his Bachelors degree in mathematics, in a Catholic University, Widya Mandira, Kupang. After finishing his study he was later recruited by the local government and just before the referendum was appointed as Education District Manager of Baucau. He rejoined the resistance in early 1982, and in 1997 was appointed as vice-secretary of FPI together with David Dias Ximenes.

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\(^{19}\) Interview with David Dias Ximenes, former Vice-Secretary of FPI, CNRT, currently Secretary of State for Veterans Affairs, Dili, 1 April 2003.  
\(^{20}\) Interview with Aquelino F. Guterres.  
\(^{21}\) Interview with Paulo Assis Belo.
Aquelino Fraga Guterres, one of the former FALINTIL commanders, was captured in 1979, but later released to his family. Afterward, he was recruited into the Indonesian government civil service. Guterres later was appointed as Vice-Secretary, Regiao Quatro (Region Four) of the clandestine movement overseeing the western part of East Timor, including the enclave of Oecussi.22

Belo’s and Guterres’ recruitment into the civil service was part of the Indonesian political strategy of gathering former FRETILIN leaders and FALINTIL commanders and their followings to support the Indonesian incorporation. Some of the FRETILIN leaders and FALINTIL commanders, after being recruited, became supporters of East Timor’s absorption into Indonesia. But others, even though they had been recruited into the civil service, continued their work of resistance and later became key persons in the clandestine movement. Paulo Assis Belo’s and Aquelino F. Guterres’ activities are cases in point.

The recruitment of people to participate in East Timor’s struggle was also conducted outside East Timor. The Frente Diplomatica (diplomatic front), one of the fronts of resistance, was in charge of carrying out the work. Jose Ramos Horta, the former Foreign Minister of FRETILIN who left FRETILIN to represent CNRM in the international arena was in charge. It approached some non-East Timorese who were sympathetic to the cause of East Timor to participate. In early 1990s, the Non-East Timorese established a solidarity group network in different countries such as the USA,

22 Guterres, due to his involvement in the clandestine movement, was arrested several times and imprisoned. Interview with Aquelino F. Guterres.
Australia, England, Ireland, Japan, Portugal, Indonesia and other countries to support the resistance movement in the international arena.23

Thus, the participation of every level of society in the resistance inside the territory created different fronts of struggle that the Indonesian military had to deal with. Now, the Indonesian military had to face different organisations including the Catholic Church and its own personnel, which put the Indonesian military in a difficult situation. Meanwhile, outside East Timor, Indonesian diplomats had also to face various organisations including the UN, human rights groups, and the East Timor solidarity groups. This amounted to a dual strategy, combining armed resistance with non-violent pressures. This change came because Xanana was aware that without any support from the people, FRETILIN with its armed wing FALINTIL would not survive the guerrilla war.24

After the establishment of CNRM/CNRT, FALINTIL became only one element of the resistance. FALINTIL was only used to support clandestine and diplomatic networks by providing information about human rights abuses, recruiting new resistance members or leaders and giving directions to the resistance. The struggle was practically carried out in the town. This change of the strategy allowed Xanana Gusmao to travel freely and undetected from city to city to organise and to recruit people into the resistance movement, because Xanana was hidden and protected by the people. This new strategy helped to win recognition from many foreign governments and

23 In USA, for example, John Miller and Charles Scheiner set up a network called ETAN (East Timor Action Network) which lobbied the US Congress and government to support the East Timor cause.

24 Interview with Paulo Assis Belo and, Aquelino Fraga Guterres.
international human rights organisations, as the resistance became more overtly political in nature, arguing for political right and self-determination.

This increased pressures on Indonesia. Every arrest of resistance leaders drew condemnation from human rights groups and foreign governments. The arrest of Xanana and his subsequent trial even gained scrutiny from the United Nations. This new strategy paid-off with the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Bishop Belo and Ramos Horta in 1996, and the meeting between Nelson Mandela, the then President of South Africa, and Xanana (at that time a prisoner in an Indonesian prison) to discuss possibilities of resolving the East Timor case in Jakarta, Indonesia, in July 1997.\(^{25}\) The award and the meeting were a tacit recognition by the international community of East Timor’s struggle for independence.

In sum, we see that the recruitment of the Catholic Church and FRETELIN’s political opponents into the resistance broadened popular support for the movement. It now became a significant alternative political organisation to the Indonesian government, and a basis for political elites who opposed the Indonesian occupation. Interestingly, the joining of political opponents forced FRETILIN leaders to change their attitudes and behaviours from a confrontational posture to more tolerant and moderate one. FRETILIN now recognised the existence of its political opponents, increasing scope for the later formation of a peaceful multi-party system. These values, after independence, were incorporated into East Timor’s constitution.

Consultations carried out by Xanana with the Catholic Church and political opponents over changing FRETILIN’s policy were aimed primarily at winning support

from the people of East Timor and the international community. Moreover, consultations also showed that there efforts were made by the resistance leaders at temporarily to settle their differences. Resistance leaders were aware that elite rivalries would only prolong East Timor’s political conflict and may bring political defeat.\textsuperscript{26} Thus, in 1997 they decided to establish CNRT, a national resistance umbrella organisation to unify the resistance supporters in order to face the Indonesian occupation. The consultation also served as a means of reconciliation between FRETILIN leaders and their opponents.\textsuperscript{27}

\textit{The Indonesian Occupation}

The Indonesian government, after incorporating East Timor as its twenty-seventh province, began to establish a civil administration to run the territory. On 17 December 1975 the Indonesian government established a \textit{Pemerintahan Sementara Timor Timur}, PSTT (provisional government of East Timor) to prepare conditions for the incorporation of the territory. One of the tasks assigned to this provisional government was to carry out propaganda against FRETILIN.\textsuperscript{28} This provisional government was the


\textsuperscript{27} After independence, Xanana Gusmao continued to carry out reconciliation with former pro-autonomy leaders.

first attempt of the Indonesian government to assemble members of UDT, APODETI, Kota and Trabalhista—the signatories of the Balibo declaration—in one organisation to fight against FREtilin. Two political leaders, Arnaldo de Araujo, the President of APODETI, and Francisco Lopes da Cruz, the President of UDT, were appointed as the head and deputy head of the provisional government respectively. Other positions in the provisional government were filled based on political affiliation. Two former FREtilin leaders, Jose Gonsalves (the former vice-minister of finance and economy of FREtilin) and Mario Sanches became head of the economic bureau and district administrator of Dili respectively. The remaining positions were filled by the other political parties.

The most significant aspect of these developments is the recruitment of these two FREtilin leaders, Jose Gonsalves and Mario Sanches. In doing this, the Indonesian government wanted to prove to the international community that its presence in East Timor was benign, motivated by no more than its wish to resolve political conflicts in East Timor. But these FREtilin leaders had close connections with leaders of APODETI and UDT. Gonsalves, for example, was the son of Guilherme Gonsalves, an APODETI leader who later became the second Indonesian-appointed governor of East Timor. Gonsalves’ older brother, Tomas Gonsalves was also a leader of APODETI and commander of the Indonesian paramilitary. Thus, his appointment can be attributed to family connections. Many FREtilin leaders who lacked such connections to the leaders or members of APODETI and UDT were arrested and executed on the first day of the Indonesian invasion.\footnote{For example, the vice-president of FREtilin, Nicolau Lobato’s wife was executed on 7 December 1975 in Dili, because she had no connections with any UDT or APODETI members.} The PSTT was replaced by the new government.
established just after the ceremony of the incorporation of East Timor on 17 July 1976. Araujo and da Cruz were appointed governor and vice-governor of the new province respectively.

After establishing the provincial government, Indonesia began to synchronize the structure of the East Timor local government with other Indonesian local governments. It established a provincial parliament which was headed by Guilherme Gonsalves and a district and sub-district administration (see Table 4.1).

**Table 4.1: Division of Districts and Sub-Districts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Sub-district</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dili</td>
<td>East Dili, West Dili, Atauro, Metinaro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baucau</td>
<td>Baucau, Vemasse, Laga, Bagua, Venilale, Quelicai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manatuto</td>
<td>Manatuto, Laclubar, Soibada, Barique, Lacro, Laleia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lospalos</td>
<td>Lospalos, Luro, iliomar, Lautem, Tutuala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viqueque</td>
<td>Viqueque, Ossu, Uato-Cardabu, Uato-Lari, Lacluta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ainaro</td>
<td>Ainaro, Maubessi, Hato-Builico, Hato-Udo, Mape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufahi</td>
<td>Same, Alas, Fatuberliu, Turiscai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covalima</td>
<td>Suai, Tilomar, Fohorem, Fatululic, Fatu-Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambeno</td>
<td>Pante Makasar, Oe-Silo, Nitibe, Pasabe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bobonaro</td>
<td>Bobonaro, Maliana, Lolotoi, Atabai, Balibo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquica</td>
<td>Liquica, Bazartete, Maubara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ermera</td>
<td>Ermera, Atsabe, Hatolia, Letefoho, Railaco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aileu</td>
<td>Aileu, Remexio, Laulara, Lequidoe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Because the main objective of the Indonesian administration was to support the incorporation of East Timor, it only slightly modified the old Portuguese structure (see Figure 4.1). In this way, the Indonesian government wanted to show that it respected the existing structure of the society. In distinguishing district and sub-district administrations, for example, the Indonesian government added a few more sub-
districts. In the district of Dili, for example, in the Portuguese period there were only two sub-districts, Atauro and Metinaro. But after the incorporation, the Indonesian government added two more sub-districts, East Dili and West Dili (see Table 4.1). At the district level, however, existing delineations were kept intact.

A second important dimension of the Indonesian occupation involved the incorporation of the ‘traditional’ structure into the local government which, in the Portuguese period, was left to the traditional leaders to govern (see Figure 4.1). This incorporation implicitly marked the eradication of the local indigenous (traditional) structure. Non-liurai descendants could now become the heads of villages, something that during the Portuguese period was not possible. The recruitment of the head of villages was now based on loyalty to the Indonesian government and affiliation to the political parties that supported Indonesian incorporation.
Indonesia also created military institutions, beginning at the provincial and working down to the villages. Accordingly, society in East Timor was put under the constant
surveillance of the Indonesian military (see Figure 4.1). In many ways, these military institutions grew more powerful than the local government. For example, in the resettlement program, the military had the authority to decide the place for the resettlement of displaced people. Many of these people were barred by the military from returning to their home villages. Instead, they were resettled in places where the military felt that they could be more easily controlled.

After establishing this administrative structure, the Indonesian government began to recruit East Timorese to fill different positions. The recruitment process was mainly based on political affiliation and loyalty to Indonesia as mentioned above. Many East Timorese who were loyal to Indonesia and members of UDT and APODETI were recruited into the local government and the Indonesian army. For example, Abilio Soares, one of the leaders of APODETI, was assigned as head of the office of public works. Gaspar Nunes, leader of UDT, became deputy speaker of the local parliament.

But in the early 1980s, Abilio Soares began to recruit former members of FRETILIN into his office. For example, Jose Piedade, former FALINTIL commander

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30 From 1975 to 1988, East Timorese travelling from one village to another village had to acquire permission from the military. The same thing applied to East Timorese travelling to other provinces.
31 Interview with Joao Baptista, Liurai descendant of Uato Carabau, 4 September 2002 by telephone. Discussion with traditional leaders in Uato Carabau, 12 July 2003 and head of villages in Uato Lari, 16 June 2003. In Uato Carabau for example, people who used to live in the mountains were settled in the flattered area and closed to the main roads. See also Taylor, East Timor, pp. 88-90.
32 Soares policy’s was rejected by the Indonesian army and he was dismissed from his position in 1981, and sent to Jakarta as a tahanan kota (city prisoner). He only returned to East Timor in 1982. Abilio Soares recounted this story to the author in September 1998 in an informal meeting in Dili; See also
was employed in the public works office in 1980 and later was sent to Bandung, Indonesia, to undertake an undergraduate diploma in engineering. As mentioned above, this recruitment was merely a political strategy to save the lives of these former FRETILIN leaders and to convince the remaining FRETILIN members that if they surrendered they would be well received and employed in government offices. His policy, though rejected by the Indonesian army, was later followed up by Mario Carrascalao. Thereafter, many former FRETILIN leaders were recruited into the Indonesian civil service. Abel Larissina, former minister of works for FRETILIN, and Bernardo Quintao, former commander of FALINTIL, were recruited into the civil service. However, this policy failed to persuade all the remaining and former FRETILIN leaders and FALINTIL commanders to surrender and support the occupation. Most of them vowed instead to continue waging guerrilla warfare against the Indonesian occupation through the resistance movement.

Because the territory was mostly controlled by the Indonesian military, the East Timorese appointed in different positions such as governor, district and sub district administrators, and heads of government departmental offices had little power or authority over important political decisions. Rather, they were dictated to by the Indonesian government and the military. For example, according to Indonesia’s Law 5/1974 on local government, the governor was the highest authority in the province and officially possessed the authority and power to make top-level decisions over political,
security, economic, and social matters at the provincial level. But in the case of East Timor, the governor had no real capacity to make such decisions. Instead, he had to consult with the military before acting.

After the establishment of the local administration, the Indonesian government moved quickly to introduce political parties to East Timor. The political parties established in East Timor were branches of the two authorized political parties in Indonesia: PDI and PPP, and GOLKAR. As in the rest of Indonesia, all other parties were banned. In 1982, East Timorese for the first time voted in Indonesia’s general elections to choose members of the national parliament and provincial parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD). Every East Timorese of the age of 17 or above was entitled to vote in the election.

However, voters were strongly advised, of course, to choose GOLKAR. To monitor whether voters complied, military personnel were deployed at the polling stations to supervise balloting. In subsequent Indonesian elections, East Timorese were similarly pressured to vote. Anyone who did not was considered a FRETILIN supporter.

33 See Indonesian Regulation # 5/1974 on Local Government; See also Mario Carrascalao’s Briefing Notes presented in the East Timor Study Group Leadership Training in Dili, 4 June 2003 in the author’s collection.

34 Mario Carrascalao was the third appointed governor. The first was Arnaldo dos Reis Araujo (the head of provisional government), the second Guilherme Gonsalves, and the fourth Abilio Osorio Soares. See also Saldanha, The Political Economy, p. 120.

35 The 1982 Indonesian election was the first experience of the author to vote in the election.
and could be prosecuted. But however unconvincing these displays might have been, it was in this way that Indonesia sought to demonstrate to the international community that the East Timorese wanted integration.

Thus, one can conclude that during the Indonesian occupation there were two parallel but different political organisations in East Timor: the resistance organisation, and the Indonesian local government. These two organisations became the basis for two distinct political groups, pro-independence and pro-Indonesia, each with very different sets of organisational bases, outlooks and behaviours. The resistance movement advocated independence for East Timor and an underground and guerrilla organisation, while elites who supported integration rooted their statuses in bureaucratic structures.

Another difference between these sets of elites stems from the resistance having recruited East Timorese to join a clandestine movement, to organise resistance around guerrilla warfare, and to disseminate information about the abuses of human rights to the international community. By contrast, those who supported integration with Indonesia were engaged in development projects such as road and building construction, agricultural schemes, and health and education in efforts to gain popular support.

Another important aspect is that the East Timorese working with the Indonesian local or central government gained some limited, but real experience in administration, running political parties, organising elections and carrying out parliamentary work. The introduction of the elections and political parties in East Timor, for example, gave some

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36 Only in early 1990s, the East Timorese were allowed to vote for other political parties such as PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party) and PPP (Islamic Party).

37 Interview with Paulo Alves Tulodan, Jose Folaran, Aquelino Fraga Guterres, and Paulo Assis Belo.

38 Interview with Salvador Ximenes Soares.
positive experiences to the East Timorese as they at least learnt about how elections and political parties functioned. Indeed, they experienced first hand the ways in which elections might be manipulated, perhaps strengthening among some of them a conviction that these strategies should be avoided. Following independence, in the Second National Dialog on Local Government organised by the office of the President, many delegates voiced their concern about potential manipulation of votes in the elections should the government and president ignore their concerns.\textsuperscript{39} Moreover, East Timorese who were recruited into Indonesian political parties gained some experience in organising campaigns and running political parties. And those who were ‘chosen’ in the elections as members of the Indonesian local and national parliament also gained some experience about parliamentary work.\textsuperscript{40}

But in other cases, this exposure to Indonesian practices encouraged East Timorese officials to do likewise. For example, many East Timorese began to engage in corruption, especially the manipulation of government funds through which to enrich themselves. In politics, the East Timorese were also introduced to a non-competitive and corrupt system that encouraged them to use violence against their political opponents and to carry out manipulations in the elections. Members of the parliament and politicians were not allowed to express opinions different from the government’s

\textsuperscript{39} See the result of National Dialog on Local Government, Dili, 30 May 2003, in author’s collection.

\textsuperscript{40} Interview with Clementino dos Reis Amaral, Member of the National Parliament from KOTA, Dili, 21 May 2003. Amaral during the Indonesian time was a member of the Indonesian National Parliament. Interview with Salvador Ximenes Soares.
policies. Local and national parliaments only became ‘a rubber stamp’ to legalise
government proposals.41

The presence of these parallel and conflicting orientations caused deep divisions
between East Timorese political elites. Each set of elites perceived the other as a threat
to their very existence, with high levels of violence became routinised. Pro-Indonesian
elites, with the support of the Indonesian military, for example, tried to dismantle the
resistance organisation by arresting their leaders, then killing or imprisoning them. For
example, Sabalae, one of the leaders of the resistance was arrested by the Indonesian
intelligent agency in Dili in 1990 and later killed by the Indonesian military. In turn, the
resistance also used violence against their political opponents. For example, Belarmino
Lopes da Cruz, the younger brother of Francisco Lopes da Cruz, was assassinated by
FALINTIL due to his association with the pro-Indonesia group and the Indonesian
military.

These deep divisions during the Indonesian occupation could not be resolved or
settled even with the help of the UN and the Catholic Church. The UN tried to ease
these fractures by organising dialogs between political leaders of East Timor. But they
failed to solve their political differences.42 For example, from 1994 to 1998, the UN
organised several meetings in Austria called All Inclusive Intra East Timorese Dialog
(AIETD), where leaders of these two political factions met and discussed possibilities

41 Interview with Clementino Amaral, and Salvador Ximenes Soares.

42 The failure of elites of reaching an agreement to solve the issue of East Timor was also due to the
Indonesian government intervention. Indonesia prohibited East Timorese to discuss political issues in
those meetings and pressured the pro-Indonesians not to make any political concession with the pro-
independence people.
for solving East Timor’s political problems. But they failed to find a solution for the issue of East Timor.

This deterioration in elite relationships culminated in the violence carried out by the militias supported by the Indonesian military after the announcement of the result of the UN referendum in September 1999. Even after independence, these rivalries have only partially subsided. Indeed, some of those leaders who favoured integration reside in West Timor today, still refusing to recognise East Timor’s independence. And they continue to advocate violence through the infiltration of militia across the border. Meanwhile, within East Timor, those who favoured integration are still subject to political harassment.43

The Formation of New Social and Political Groups

As mentioned above, during the Indonesian occupation there existed two parallel but different sets of political organisations, forming the organisation bases for East Timorese elites. Elites thus assembled into different groups according to their social origins and political association.

As described in Chapter Three, one can begin by categorising these elites into three different groups: the resistance, the administrators, and the nationalist intellectuals (see

Table 4.2). But as shown in this chapter, another grouping also appeared, those who during the Indonesian occupation had been allied with the Indonesian government or military. But after independence, many of these elites abandoned these sentiments in order to gain positions in the new East Timor government. In addition, elites based in the Catholic Church elites must be analysed because during the Indonesian occupation, they played a significant role in providing support to the resistance movement. Some of the Catholic priests were deeply involved in the resistance activities, most notably by gaining international attention for East Timor’s plight.

Table 4.2: Description of Elites in the Indonesian Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Components</th>
<th>Social/ Political base/ origins</th>
<th>Political believe/thinking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>FRETILIN</td>
<td>Past political parties</td>
<td>Independence for East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UDT</td>
<td>Skill to fight and</td>
<td>Reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clandestine</td>
<td>campaign against</td>
<td>Socialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FALINTIL</td>
<td>Indonesian occupation</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>Traditional power</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>No political affiliation</td>
<td>Former Portuguese employees</td>
<td>Professionalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sympathizers of resistance</td>
<td>Technical skills</td>
<td>Good governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pro-Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Non-violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>sympathizers of resistance</td>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>intellectuals</td>
<td>Involved in resistance activities</td>
<td></td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pro-Indonesian</td>
<td>Radicals and militias</td>
<td>Past political parties</td>
<td>Integration with Indonesia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Moderates</td>
<td>Integration supporters</td>
<td>Confrontational Authoritarian</td>
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<td>The Catholic Church</td>
<td>Active in resistance movement</td>
<td>Catholic Church Structure</td>
<td>Independence East Timor</td>
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<td>Sympathizers of resistance</td>
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<td>Democracy</td>
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Thus, I will now examine these groups of elites in order to understand their social origins and political bases, their political outlooks, and the nature of elite-level relations and competitions. After independence, these groups formed a new national elite, one that has reshaped East Timor’s political development.

**Table 4.3: Description of Resistance Elites**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components</th>
<th>Social/Political base/ origins</th>
<th>Political believe/thinking</th>
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<tr>
<td>FRETILIN</td>
<td>FRETILIN 1974 Sympathisers</td>
<td>Socialism Revolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDT</td>
<td>UDT 1974 Traditional power</td>
<td>Conservative Democracy Pro-Portugal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clandestine Movement</td>
<td>Former members of FRETILIN, UDT and other old political parties Youth group Independents</td>
<td>Democracy Human rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>FALINTIL</td>
<td>FALINTIL 1974 and independents</td>
<td>Democracy Moderate Reconciliation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Youth groups</td>
<td>Students movement Youth movement</td>
<td>Democracy Human rights</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

_The Resistance Group_

Elites in resistance gained their standings through their capacity to confront the Indonesian military or through their political affiliations with FRETILIN or UDT. These elites mostly assembled under an umbrella resistance organisation, CNRM/CNRT. The best example, of course, is Xanana Gusmao, who gained elite status through his ability to organise guerrilla warfare. Xanana later became president of CNRM/CNRT. Ramos Horta gained elite status because of his campaign against the Indonesian occupation in the international arena. Horta was elected as vice-president of CNRM/CNRT in 1997.
Mari Alkatiri became a member of the elite due to his position as FRETILIN leader residing overseas. He was appointed as CNRM/CNRT political commissioner in 1997.

The involvement of many groups and individuals into the resistance group created different political factions. At least five main political factions emerged in the resistance group: FRETILIN, UDT, FALINTIL, the clandestine movement, and youth groups. FRETILIN formed the core of the resistance movement. For example, Xanana Gusmao was a member of FRETILIN’s Central Committee who initiated the establishment of a new umbrella resistance organisation, CNRM/CNRT. Gusmao resigned from FRETILIN in only 1987 in order to persuade FRETILIN’s opponents and the Catholic Church to join the resistance movement as mentioned above. FRETILIN had a significant influence in decision-making processes (in the resistance movement), because many of its leaders were in the field commanding FALINTIL against the Indonesian occupation. One example is Nicolau Lobato, the former president of FRETILIN and FALINTIL commander who was killed by the Indonesian military in 1978. Konis Santana, the former leader of FRETILIN, was Xanana’s principal field advisor, and after Xanana’s capture he also became Deputy Commander of FALINTIL. Francisco Lu Olo, the current Speaker of East Timor National Parliament, and President of FRETILIN, was also in the jungle with FALINTIL.

Most FRETILIN leaders traced their affiliations to the time of the organisation’s formation in 1974. Examples include Mari Alkatiri, the current Secretary General of FRETILIN, and Jose Luis Guterres, the former President of FRETILIN and currently Permanent Representative of East Timor in the UN.

45 After his capture, Falintil members decided to keep Xanana as Commander-in-Chief of Falintil. Interview with Paulo Assis Belo, David Dias Ximenes, and Aquelino F. Guterres.
During the early years, 1975-1982, FRETILIN was committed to socialism. It became a radical organisation which opted for a single party system based on revolution.\textsuperscript{46} Due to this political ideology, FRETILIN had killed many of its political opponents and other people who had different political views as mentioned above. For example, Leao de Carvalho, one of the leaders of APODETI was killed by FRETILIN in Aileu in 1976. Joao Baptista Guterres, one of the UDT leaders from Viqueque, was also killed by FRETILIN in Aileu in 1976. FRETILIN only changed its ideology in late 1982 after Xanana took over the leadership of resistance and commander of FALINTIL as mentioned above. Thus, FRETILIN reformulated its political thinking by adopting a multi-party system and a moderate stance.\textsuperscript{47}

UDT was another faction which joined the resistance after long negotiations with commanders of FRETILIN, FALINTIL, and various resistance leaders, especially Ramos Horta. UDT, though portrayed by its leaders as one of the big parties in 1974, actually had little support in East Timor, because most of its members had become supporters of integration with Indonesia. For example, Lopes da Cruz, the former president of UDT, became one of a prominent advocate of integration. He was then appointed as Roving Ambassador for East Timor by President Soeharto. Mario Carrascalao, Manuel Carrascalao, and Leandro Isaac, former leaders of UDT living in East Timor, were supporters of integration until early 1990s when they decided to support the resistance due to their disappointment with the abuses of human rights

\textsuperscript{46} See Xanana’s Briefing note. Interview with Francisco Borolaco Soares, one of the former leaders of FRETILIN, and currently Deputy Commissioner of East Timor Revenue Service (Tax), Department of Finance, 13 July 2005 by telephone.

\textsuperscript{47} Interview with Francisco Borolaco Soares.
carried out by the Indonesian military.\textsuperscript{48} Thus, UDT had only limited influence in decision-making processes in the resistance organisation, since no UDT leaders had joined FALINTIL to resist the Indonesian occupation.\textsuperscript{49}

In addition, UDT was less well-organised than FRETILIN (especially in East Timor), and it mostly operated from Australia, where its president, Joao Carrascalao, resided. UDT’s political outlooks can be characterised as pro-Portugal and conservative. UDT adopted this political stance because UDT received support from Portugal, while many UDT members lived there. But UDT also advocated democracy for an independent East Timor, a preference that can be attributed to many other UDT leaders living in Australia. Milena Pires, for example, one of the leaders of UDT lived in Sydney.

Socially, UDT drew support through its traditional connection with the \textit{liurai}. For example, Aleixo Guterres, one of the leaders of UDT was \textit{liurai} of Venilale. Most UDT leaders were also original members of UDT of 1974 who had survived the civil war with FRETILIN. For example, Joao Baptista, one of the leaders of UDT from Uato Carabau, and Hermenegildo Guterres, leader of UDT in Viqueque, were imprisoned by FRETILIN in 1975, but survived the killings and now they become members of UDT.

What came to be labelled as the’ clandestine movement’ is another faction which consisted of individuals or former leaders of old political parties who joined the resistance but did not want to be under FRETILIN’s control. For example, Constancio Pinto, a civil servant working in the local government, joined the clandestine group as

\textsuperscript{48} See Mario Carrascalao’s Briefing Notes; Interview with David Dias Ximenes, and Salvador Ximenes Soares.

\textsuperscript{49} Interview with Aquelino Fraga, David Dias Ximenes and Carlos Lopes da Silva.
an independent (with no link with any old political parties, especially FRETILIN). Pinto later became one of this movement’s leaders. David Ximenes, a former Portuguese army officer, also became one this movement’s leaders, though refused to join FRETILIN. Guilherme Gonsalves and Frederico Almeida, former leaders of APODETI, also joined the resistance but did not want to be under FRETILIN’s control. Finally, even Xanana Gusmao and Ramos Horta resigned from FRETILIN in order to widen the appeal of the clandestine movement.50

This group had influence in decision-making processes since many of its members became quite active in organising resistance networks and activities. For example, Constancio Pinto became head of the Executive Committee of the clandestine organisation which organised the 12 November 1991 demonstration in which the military opened fire and killed as many as 200 civilian demonstrators, while David Ximenes was appointed as vice-secretary of Frente Politica Interna as mentioned above.

The political outlook of this group can be described as pro-democracy, moderate, and conciliatory. Its members took such a political stance because it was ordered by FALINTIL commander, Xanana Gusmao, to conduct dialog and negotiations with political opponents of the resistance. Furthermore, the group was active in recruiting people to become member of the resistance. For example, in early 1990s, the leaders of this group approached Paulo Fatima Martins, an East Timorese officer in the Indonesian police, in order to persuade him to join the resistance. He later changed his political stance or ideology from pro-Indonesia to supporting the resistance movement.

50 Paulo Assis Belo, Aquelino F. Guterres and Francisco Borolaco Soares, former FRETILIN leaders, rejoined the resistance as independents. Interview with Francisco Borolaco Soares.
The FALINTIL elites were members of FRETILIN’s armed wing who initiated the counter-coup against UDT, or sympathisers with the resistance who were recruited into FALINTIL to fight against the Indonesian military. The group was the most powerful group in the resistance because all political and guerrilla strategies were designed by this group. The commander of FALINTIL became the president of resistance movement (CNRM/CNRT), as well as Comando da Luta (Commander of Struggle) as mentioned above. For example, Xanana was FALINTIL commander as well president of CNRM/CNRT and commander of the struggle who gave orders to all resistance groups. As noted above, many of them became elites because of their capacity and skills in fighting against the Indonesian military. One prominent example, is Alin Laek, who became Adjunto (adjunct commander). He was regarded one of the bravest adjunct commanders in FALINTIL. He was later dispatched by FALINTIL to hold talks with pro-Indonesian leaders and the district administrator of Baucau, Vigilio Marcal in the lead up to the referendum in 1999.  

This group advocated a moderate, conciliatory and pro-democracy stance. This political thinking was adopted in order to encourage political opponents of the resistance, in particular, the Catholic Church and youth groups, to join CNRM/CNRT. For example, before his capture by the Indonesian military in the late 1980s, Xanana had several dialogs and meetings with Mario Carrascalao, who at that time was East Timor’s appointed governor. Xanana also conducted several meetings with pro-Indonesian supporters, including Guilherme Gonsalves, the former appointed governor of East Timor (the predecessor of Mario Carrascalao).

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51 Interview with Manuel Alari, the former Member of the National Council, and one of the Resistance leaders of Baucau region, Baucau, 22 June 2003.
The Youth group consisted of different youth and students organisations which were established to support the resistance movement. This group had divergent political backgrounds. Some of them came from APODETI families. For example, the families of Fernando Lasama, Domingos Nagasoro, and Carlos Lopes Saky were members of APODETI. Their joining the resistance movement can be attributed to their commitments to human rights.\(^52\) Others were former FRETILIN activists. Lucas da Costa, one of the leaders of RENETIL was a former leader of FRETILIN.\(^53\)

This youth group provided essential support to FALINTIL and Xanana Gusmao during his imprisonment in Cipinang, Jakarta. It also expanded by recruiting young people, including the sons and daughters of pro-Indonesian leaders, to join and support the resistance as mentioned above. In the UN referendum in 1999, the student groups, especially the *Dewan Solidaritas Mahasiswa Timor Timur* (Council of East Timor Student Solidarity), RENETIL, *Ikatan Mahasiswa dan Pelajar Timor Timur*, IMPETTU (Association of East Timor Students), and *Objelatil*, a youth organisation formed by FALINTIL, actively campaigned for the resistance movement. The political thinking of the group is pro-democracy with a strong appreciation for human rights.

\(^52\) Interview with Carlos da Silva Lopes.

\(^53\) Besides the youth group, there was also a group of young East Timorese supporters of resistance who decided to establish a local Non Governmental Organisation (NGO), Yayasan HAK to clandestinely provide financial support and legal aid to the resistance movement and its leaders who were arrested or captured by the Indonesian military.
The ‘administrators’ were those who had administrative, legal, technical, and foreign language skills, and had been appointed by the Portuguese or Indonesian governments to significant posts. Most members of this group were educated in Indonesian universities. But there were a few of them who obtained their degree in universities in Portugal or other countries. Many of them possessed either traditional or professional statuses. For example, Evaristo Sarmento, the former District Administrator of Ainaro, is a descendant of liurai in Maubessi. Jose Belo, a professional lawyer and currently lives in Portugal is liurai descendant of Baucau.

Few members of this group had no political affiliation with either pro-Indonesian or resistance groups. But some began to sympathise with the resistance (see Table 4.2). For example, Virgilio Marcal, the former district administrator of Baucau, provided shelter (sanctuary) to some of the resistance leaders, including Paulo Assis Belo. Others provided financial support or even became members of the resistance. One example is Jacob Fernandes, the former sub-district administrator of Hatolia.

On the other hand, some members of this group shunned the resistance, instead seeking higher positions in the government. Mateus Belo, for example, the former Secretary of District of Baucau, remained indifferent to the resistance in order to pursue his career in the Indonesian bureaucracy. Just before the UN-sponsored referendum was held, a small number of the group even decided to support the pro-Indonesia

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54 Interview with Paulo Assis Belo and Manuel Alari.

55 Just before the UN referendum, Mateus Belo decided to support the resistance by providing financial support. Interview with Manuel Alari and Paulo Assis Belo.
campaign. For example, Oscar Belo, the former Ketua Bappeda Tingkat I (Head of Provincial Development Planning Office) supported the pro-Indonesian group because of his high position in the local government. But after independence was won, Oscar Belo returned to East Timor, where he now works in one of the foreign embassies.

There was also a small contingent of East Timorese who held administrative positions in Portugal. They tended to sympathise with the resistance. But because they were more committed to their professional careers, they usually avoided any direct involvement. For example, Claudio de Jesus, the current East Timor Court of Appeal president, remained in Portugal as a judge. He supported the resistance during the Indonesian occupation, but was not an active member. He only returned to East Timor on the request of President Xanana to help the development of the judicial system. His colleague, Jose Belo, supporter of the resistance, turned down president Xanana’s invitation to return to East Timor. Belo told president Xanana that he wanted to pursue his professional carrier in Portugal. This group was very diverse in political thinking, but basically most members of the group supported non-violence and professionalism.

56 Xanana’s invitation to de Jesus and Belo was made during a meeting between president Xanana and the East Timorese community living in Portugal on 15 October 2002 in Lisbon. The author was present in that meeting.

57 Interview with Evaristo Doutel Sarmento, former District Administrator of Ainaro, who is currently working in the office of President Xanana, Dili, 19 July 2003, and Candido Conceicao, former Minister of Infrastructure in UNTAET Administration, Dili, 25 May 2003.
The Nationalist Intellectuals

This group consisted of individuals with higher education obtained in either Indonesia or foreign countries such as Australia, USA, New Zealand, England, Singapore and Portugal. Members of this group come from families with very diverse past political connections such as FRETILIN, APODETI and UDT. For example, Joao Saldanha, a PhD graduate from University of California, San Diego, is from an APODETI family. Edmundo Viegas, a PhD graduate from Massey University, New Zealand, is from a FRETILIN family. Helder da Costa, a PhD graduate from Adelaide University in Australia is from a UDT family. Most of them came from the high stratum of society. Benjamin Corte Real, a PhD graduate from Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia is of liurai descent.

Some members of the group after finishing their studies became lecturers at the East Timor University. For example, Armindo Maia after finishing his Masters degree in New Zealand in 1994 became Acting Rector of East Timor University for two years before fleeing to the United States. He was accused of helping organise several demonstrations carried out by the students at the university in 1995 against the Indonesian occupation. Others, after finishing their Master degrees decided to continue their doctoral studies in different universities in the United States, Australia and New Zealand. For example, Joao Cancio Freitas, after finishing his Master degree from Victorian University of Technology, Melbourne, Australia in 1999 decided to continue his doctoral studies in the same university.

Saldanha and Viegas are currently members of the Forum of National Unity, a forum that was established in August 2005 to discuss government policies.
Members of this group were very diverse in their political background (see Table 4.2). Most members were sympathetic to the resistance, but sought no active role in the fighting. Rather, their main contribution was to publicise Indonesian human rights abuses. In their view, the only way to halt these abuses was for East Timor to gain independence. They believed that an independent East Timor would be a democratic country that respected human rights.59 Some succeeded in publishing accounts in Indonesian newspapers and other media outlets that criticised the Indonesian occupation and human rights abuses.60 Others developed a good relationship with the resistance movement and even attended meetings and discussed strategies of resistance.61 Many of them were studying overseas with scholarships provided by foreign governments that were also donors to Indonesia. Others did not want to take any political risks, because of their family connections with pro-Indonesian leaders.62 But later, in 1996, a few of them

60 Because they have families or good connections with the pro-Indonesian leaders these intellectuals were not arrested. But they experienced political harassment during the Indonesian occupation.
61 Armindo Maia, Helder da Costa and Joao Mariano Saldanha attended several meetings and seminars of resistance. Interview with Armindo Maia, Minister of Education, Culture, Youth and Sport, Dili, 29 March 2003.
62 Joao Mariano Saldanha, for example, was very sympathetic to the resistance and even developed a good relationship with Ramos Horta and Xanana Gusmao. But he decided not to be actively involved because of his old brother, Salvador Ximenes Soares was a Member of Indonesian National Parliament. In 1996 Saldanha took initiative to organise closed doors meeting between resistance leaders and Indonesian government in Sweden with the support of Uppsala University, Sweden. In 1997 Saldanha organised another closed door meeting in which East Timorese studying in overseas (Australia, the USA,
lobbied universities in the United States and Sweden to organise closed doors meetings to discuss possible solutions for the East Timor case.63

Despite the diversity of their origins, members of this group were small in number and possessed close relations. They tended to share common principles such as appreciation for human rights, democracy, good governance, and, of course, East Timor’s independence. Further, they pursued their political goals through different methods, including the mass media and regular meetings. But they avoided any direct role in the resistance movement. And they never cohered in any single organisation.

*The Pro-Indonesian Group*

Pro-Indonesian elites, of course, were those who supported the Indonesian occupation. Due to their unqualified support for Indonesia, they were appointed in high positions (see Table 4.2). The best example is Abilio Osorio Soares, who was appointed

63 This group called East Timor Study Group which established in 1997 when its members for the first time gathered in the American University, Washington, to discuss the issue of East Timor. Members of this group came from different political background family. They shared one principle, which was a peaceful solution under the UN arrangement. They, in the early stage of the establishment of ETSG, proposed a transitional autonomy for a period of five years, and to be followed by an UN sponsored referendum to decide the political future of East Timor. Their main strategy was to pressure Indonesia to withdraw its military from East Timor and to provide the East Timorese with a free vote in an UN sponsored ballot. See East Timor Study Group document, ‘Washington Nine Points’.
as East Timor governor from 1992 to 1999. Vidal Sarmento became district administrator of Manatuto due to his association with pro-Indonesia.

The political background of those in this group was diverse. Many of them had been members of UDT and APODETI. For example, Armando Mariano was one of the APODETI leaders who, after the Indonesian invasion, became the district administrator of Dili. And shortly before the UN-sponsored referendum, he was appointed speaker of the local parliament. Joao Tavares, one of the UDT leaders, in early 1980s was appointed as the district administrator of Bobonaro. In 1999 he became a commander of pro-Indonesian militias, which, after the referendum, destroyed so much of East Timor’s infrastructure and killed many resistance leaders.

In addition, a new generation emerged in this group during the late 1980s. Again, they could trace their roots to various political parties, including APODETI, UDT, and even FRETILIN. But they rarely acknowledged their backgrounds, instead only identifying themselves as supporters of Indonesia.

This young generation later formed the core of radical supporters of pro-autonomy during the UN referendum in 1999. Domingos Soares (Koli), for example, a son-in-law of Arnaldo de Araujo, after graduating with Master of Law degree from the University of Airlangga, Surabaya, Indonesia, was appointed as District Administrator of Dili. During the UN referendum he then established *Forum Persatuan Demokrasi dan Keadilan*, FPDK (Forum of Unity, Democracy and Justice), a radical faction of the pro-autonomy movement and became the president of the organisation. Basilio Araujo, before becoming supporter of Indonesia, was one of the members of the resistance. After finished his Masters studies in England in 1998 he returned to East Timor and was appointed one of the officer in *Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal Daerah*, BKPMD.
(Local Investment Coordinating Unit). In 1999 he became spokesperson of the FPDK and militias.

In addition, the Indonesian military helped in the creation of militia organisations in various districts in order to counter FALINTIL, but also to intimidate the population. These militia organisations were attached to the military. The military usually recruited unemployed and poorly educated people to become militia fighters. Some of them were appointed as commanders, gaining elite-level statuses. Probably the most notorious example is Eurico Guterres, who was poorly educated and possessed an ordinary family background in Uato Lari. Due to his firm commitment to integration, he was made a commander. He soon became a vocal pro-integration leader. During the UN-sponsored referendum, Eurico became the most feared militia commander in Dili, because his militia group, Aitarak carried out killings and burnings in Dili just before and after the voting. There were also a few people with high (tertiary) education who joined the militia groups and became commanders of the militia. For example, Cancio de Carvalho, a commander of militia, Mahidi, from Ainaro, had graduated in law in one of Indonesian universities. Carvalho is also a son of the liurai of Ainaro.

The social origins of this group is very diverse. Some came from high status groups such as liurai. For example, Abilio Osorio Soares is a liurai descendant and the son of a catechist. Some came from ordinary backgrounds with no high education, but due to their commitments to integration, they were made leaders or members of the elite. For example, Joanico was from an ordinary family in Uato Lari became a leader of the militia due to his loyalty to Indonesia and his position as soldier in the Indonesian special forces (Kopassus). He was a member of the Kopassus team which captured Xanana Gusmao in 1992.
The major political aim of this group, of course, involved the integration of East Timor with Indonesia. Most of them adopted highly confrontational outlooks. In their view, the resistance movement needed to be crushed so that integration might be completed. They were intolerant of political or ideological differences. Many members of this group cooperated with the Indonesian military to fight against the resistance. Some became members of the military intelligence agency to provide information to the military to arrest resistance leaders. For example, Labut Melo, a pro-Indonesian leader working in the local government as head of the public administration bureau, was one of the leaders of the military intelligent agency who had the power to arrest anyone suspected to be a member of the resistance.64

_The Catholic Church Group_

Another group of elites involves leaders of the Catholic Church in East Timor, many of whom performed a significant role in the resistance movement. From 1974-1975, the Catholic Church was neutral. It did not support any political party. The Church’s support to the resistance began in early 1980 because of the abuse of human rights committed by the Indonesian military, and the change of resistance political strategy as mentioned above. For example, father Mario Belo, as mentioned above,

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64 Melo was the most fearsome Indonesian intelligence agency in Dili. People arrested by Melo seldom reappeared. For example, Gaspar, a resistance member working in Bank Dagang Negara (Indonesian bank), Kupang branch was arrested by Melo’s group in Kupang, and was never found again. Interview with Francisco Borolaco Soares.
drove Xanana Gusmao several times from Dili to Ermera to organise the resistance movement in Ermera.

The Church organisation was never included under the resistance (CNRT) structure, but some of its priests participated as individuals. Father Domingos Maubere Soares, for example, was appointed by Xanana Gusmao as head of the CNRT Secretariat (see Table 4.2). The Church was one of the more influential institutions in CNRT decision-making processes, because it enjoyed the trust and confidence of the people and also provided shelter to the resistance leaders.65 In terms of its political outlooks, the Church favoured democracy, appreciation for human rights, and social justice.66 It also promoted conciliation between political opponents. This was evident when the Church organised two important meetings in Dili and Jakarta in 1998 and 1999 attended by leaders of pro-Indonesia and the resistance with the main objective to reduce the level of violence in the lead up to the UN-sponsored referendum.

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65 Due to its activities, Catholic Church in 1999 was one of the primary targets of the militias and the Indonesian military. For example, in April 1999, militias with the support of the Indonesian army attacked a Catholic Church in Liquica killing more than hundreds refugees who took shelter in the church. In addition, a few days after the announcement of the result of the UN referendum, 6 September 1999, Bishop Belo’s residence and Diocese of Dili were attacked by the Indonesian military backed militias. The attack killed thousands of people who took refugees in these two places. Regarding the Church influence see also Taylor, East Timor, pp. 153-54

66 Father Domingos Sequeira, the former Chancellor of Dili Diocese, presented the Catholic Church view in a meeting organised by Uppsala University, and East Timor Study Group in Washington, July, 1997. The author was present in that meeting.
Elite Relations and Competitions

Given the diverging political backgrounds of East Timorese elites during the Indonesian occupation, and the legacy of political violence during the last years of the Portuguese rule, elites have been divided in their relations and violent in their competitions. We can identify three different categories of such competition: ideology, power, and strategy. Distinguishing elite competitions along these lines will help us to understand what the aim of competitions might be and how they have been conducted, thereby shedding light on elite relations.67

Competition over ideology involves the struggle between elites over East Timor’s relationship with Indonesia, broadly polarised between independence and integrationist positions. This competition carried over from the end of the Portuguese period, as described in the previous chapter. Its nature change, however, after the UDT changed its political ideology from a federation with Portugal to integration with Indonesia.

FRETILIN, on the other hand, decided to resist the Indonesian occupation. This caused the elites and the people to be divided into two main ideological streams, pro-Indonesia and pro-independence.

This political competition over ideological aims was conducted with great violence. It bears underscroing that when UDT carried out its coup on 11 August 1975, it killed some of FRETILIN members. In retaliation, FRETILIN arrested and killed many UDT leaders in late 1975 and early 1976, including UDT’s vice-president, Cesar Mourinho.

FRETILIN also killed many APODETI leaders including Fernando Osorio Soares, Secretary General of APODETI. This violence continued and even escalated during the Indonesian occupation. The pro-Indonesian elites supported by the Indonesian military used violence against the pro-independence elites ranging from persecution, arrests, torture, disappearances, and killings. For example, Caetano Guterres, one of the resistance leaders, was arrested in 1981 by the Indonesian military, tortured and detained unlawfully for more than ten years, before being released.\(^6^8\) Henrique Balmiro, one of the leaders of the clandestine movement, was arrested in 1991, tortured and detained until 1999.\(^6^9\) The peak of the competition came in 1999 with the UN-organised referendum to decide the future of East Timor. After the announcement of the result as mentioned above, the pro-Indonesians (militias) with the support of the Indonesian military ravaged East Timor and killed some of the pro-independence leaders. This competition ceased to exist after East Timor’s Independence 2002.

Competition over power can be understood as internal contestation between elites of the same factions or same political ideology (pro-Indonesia or pro-independence) in order to gain control of positions, whether in the resistance movement or in the Indonesian local government. For example, during the mid-1980s, conflict raged between Mario Carrascalao and Abilio Osorio Soares over government appointments. This began when Carrascalao, as governor of East Timor, marginalised some of Soares’s political allies from APODETI by appointing his friends to key government positions.

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\(^{68}\) Caetano Guterres recounted this story to the author in Dili, 17 July 2003.

\(^{69}\) Balmiro currently suffers severe brain damage. He has undertaken medical treatment and at this stage is in the process of recovering.
Tensions mounted when Carrascalao accused Soares’s allies of being behind the intimidation and arrest of resistance leaders, because many of them were working for Indonesia’s Intelligence Agency of Special Forces. Carrascalao also denounced them as the instigators of the Catholic Church incident in Motael which claimed two lives, including Sebastiao da Costa (resistance) whose seven day remembrance ended with the Santa Cruz massacre on 12 November 1991.

Thus, when Abilio Soares was nominated as governor of East, Carrascalao mounted opposition. Carrascalao then allied himself with the Indonesian military while proposing that his deputy governor, Saridjo, a member of the military, serve as his successor. This move was not successful, however, causing Carrascalao to respond by intensifying his mudslinging. Later Carrascalao’s group decided to join the resistance movement. APODETI leaders were then appointed to high positions such as District Administrators, while Carrascalao’s close friends were sidelined.

Conflicts over positions then began to brew between Abilio Osorio Soares and some of his former colleagues, Tito Baptista, Domingos Koli Soares and Armindo Mariano. This conflict was instigated by the Indonesian military, piqued by Soares’s having called for East Timor’s special status or autonomy, meaning that top administrative positions would be filled by East Timorese. He also proposed to the

70 Interview with an anonymous source in Dili, 23 May 2003.

71 Interview with Salvador Ximenes Soares.

72 Martinho Fernandes, Edmundo Conceicao and Vidal Sarmento, close friends of Abilio Soares and members of APODETI, were appointed as District Administrator of Viqueque, Lautem (Losplaos), and Manatuto respectively. On the other hand, Rui Texeira Lopes, a close of friend of Mario Carrascalao after serving his ten years as district administrator of Suai became jobless during Abilio’s gubernatorial terms.
central government an inclusion of all old political parties into the negotiation process to solve the issue of East Timor. He even accused the military of using the politics of *divide et impera* to control East Timor which, in his view, would bring more conflict.\(^3\)

Thus, military saw Abilio Soares’s proposal as threatening military interests in East Timor. The military responded by encouraging Tito Baptista, *Asisten Satu Setwilda Tingkat Satu* (Deputy to the Provincial Government Secretary), Domingos Koli Soares and Armindo Mariano to accuse Soares of cooperating with the resistance to launch a coup against the Indonesian military, and practicing corruption, collusion, and nepotism. Tito Baptista was dismissed from his position by Soares. But the conflict continued until the referendum was held in 1999, with the military lobbying Indonesian President Habibie to dismiss Soares by accusing him of being soft in dealing with resistance and corruption.\(^4\) Habibie dispatched Frans Seda, Senior Political Advisor of the President, to East Timor to investigate the case. In his report, Frans Seda advised Habibie to retain Soares as the East Timor governor.\(^5\)

What stands out about this competition is that, after failing to depose Soares, the Domingos, Armindo and Tito faction, with the support of the military, formed a pro-autonomy radical group, FPDK, to carry out campaigns of intimidation and terror

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\(^3\) Saldanha, *The Political Economy*, pp. 358-59

\(^4\) In fact, after being appointed governor, Abilio organised a meeting with some of resistance leaders, including David Dias Ximenes, and Mauhudu. The purpose of that meeting was to discuss the possibilities for solving the issue of East Timor peacefully.

\(^5\) Although the Armindo Soares’ group and the military failed to depose Abilio Soares, they succeeded in removing Salvador Ximenes Soares, supporter of Abilio Soares, from Member of the Indonesian National Parliament. Interview with Salvador Ximenes Soares.
against the resistance leaders during the UN sponsored referendum as mentioned above. The militias set up by the Indonesian military were integrated into this forum. To balance the activities of FPDK, Soares’s group, with the support of Lopes da Cruz, established the more moderate pro-autonomy faction in which Lopes da Cruz was appointed as the head of the *Barisan Rakyat Timor Timur*, BRTT (Front of East Timor People). Salvador Ximenes Soares, the former member of Indonesian National Parliament became Secretary General of the faction.\(^{76}\)

On the resistance side, the clearest conflict over power within FRETILIN occurred in 1976 between Aquiles Soares, one of the commanders of FALINTIL, and the leadership of FRETILIN. Soares and his group wanted the FALINTIL commanders to be given more authority to carry out military campaign against the Indonesian forces. But the Central Committee of FRETILIN rejected Soares proposal which led to a violent clash between the Central Committee and Soares group.\(^{77}\) The conflict ended with the arrest and execution of Soares and three other members of his group in 1976.

Overseas, conflicts over power occurred between Abilio Araujo, the former president of FRETILIN, Mari Alkatiri, and some other FRETILIN leaders over the presidency off the organisation. Araujo and his group in the early 1990s held reconciliation meetings with pro-Indonesians led by Francisco Lopes da Cruz in London. Alkatiri and other leaders opposed the meetings and they decided to dismiss Araujo and his group from FRETILIN membership. Araujo’s position as the president of FRETILIN was taken by Jose Luis Guterres. Araujo later formed a new political group he called ‘the third way’ which, during the UN-sponsored referendum in 1999, 

\(^{76}\) Interview with Salvador Ximenes Soares.

\(^{77}\) See Taylor, *East Timor*, pp. 95-96.
supported the proposal of autonomy. Just before the election for Constituent Assembly (CA), Araujo established a new political party, Partido Nacional Timorense, PNT (Timorese National Party) which won two seats in the CA.

This competition was violent because elites used intimidation, terror and killing against their political opponents. Some members of the elite were suppressed by others. The dismissal of Abilio Soares’ friends from their positions in the local government during Carascalao’s gubernatorial term is a case in point. Some elites decided to leave their political groups or factions and joined other parties, while others lost their lives during that competition. The dismissal of Abilio Araujo from President of FRETILIN, and the execution of Aquilis Soares are prominent examples.

Finally, the competition over strategy is understood as the struggle between elites over ways of advancing their common agendas. This competition is more associated with the resistance elites, divided over how best to fight the Indonesian occupation. This competition bred deep suspicions between elites, leading sometimes even to violence.

For example, during early 1980s, conflict erupted between FALINTIL commanders who wanted changes in FRETILIN and FALINTIL strategies as mentioned above and those who preferred the status quo.78 When Xanana Gusmao decided to carry out consultation as mentioned above, some of the FALINTIL commanders opposed his decision, triggering internal ructions. Then, Gusmao’s opponents took action against

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78 The conservative group, led by Reinaldo Kilik did not want any change that might diminish FRETILIN’s status as the only legitimate party that fought for independence. The group also did not want to have dialog with FRETILIN’s opponents. See Xanana’s Briefing Notes.
him and key supporters. Many of those responsible for this challenge then surrendered to the Indonesian army and even joined the Indonesian paramilitary to fight against their former comrades. After overcoming this internal conflict, Xanana re-grouped FALINTIL, which later became the most unified group in the resistance movement.

During the mid-1980s, there was also conflict between UDT’s president, Joao Carrascalao, and the CNRM leadership. Carrascalao at that time did not want to be part of CNRM because in his view CNRM (Concelho Nacional da Resistência Maubere), which contained the word Maubere, was more inclined to FRETILIN, UDT’s opponents. Before the CNRM changed its name to CNRT (Concelho Nacional da Resistencia Timorense), UDT, and especially its leader, Joao Carrascalao, refused to recognise CNRM and the leadership of Gusmao. Only later, at a conference in Lisbon in 1998 did Carrascalao accept the name change and Gusmao’s leadership. Nonetheless, during the UN administration, the UDT withdrew from CNRT, with its leaders complaining of having been side-lined. The conflict was only fully ended, then, when the Constituent Assembly election was held in 2001 and the UDT only won two seats, leaving it with little capacity to challenge Gusmao.

Another conflict of this order occurred between Xavier do Amaral, the president of FRETILIN, Nicolau Lobato, the vice-president, and some other organisational leaders. After the expansion of Indonesian military operations in East Timor, do Amaral proposed to the Central Committee of FRETILIN to negotiate with the Indonesian army

80 See Xanana Gusmao’s Briefing Notes.
81 Interview with Carlos da Silva Lopes.
in order to reduce the level of fighting. Lobato and other leaders, however, did not agree with do Amaral, and they accused the latter of wishing to give up the fight. Thus, Lobato ordered the arrest of do Amaral and imprisoned him for ‘high treason’. Do Amaral was later captured by the Indonesian military.  

But probably the most significant conflict over strategies was waged at the leadership level between Xanana Gusmao and Mari Alkatiri. This conflict emerged because Xanana decided to leave FRETILIN and establish a new resistance organisation, CNRM. Alkatiri, leading FRETILIN, agreed to join CNRM/CNRT in 1997, then became the National Political Commissioner, even as he continued to struggle against Xanana. But then, during the UN transitional administration in East Timor in 2000, when, after the CNRT’s national congress in August 2000, Alkatiri persuaded other FRETILIN leaders to withdraw from CNRT. This deepened tensions with Xanana and other FRETILIN factions. Relations grew more strained still when, in writing East Timor’s constitution, FRETILIN exploited its large majority of seats to award the president only ceremonial powers.

As described in Chapter One, this conflict swelled beyond Xanana and Alkatiri to envelop their respective supporters and various political parties. During the presidential election in 2002, Alkatiri urged FRETILIN supporters to spoil their ballots or vote for Xanana’s political opponent, Xavier do Amaral. However, Alkatiri’s urgings were ineffective, with Xanana finally winning more than 80 percent of the vote. 


Thus, we see here that during the Indonesian occupation, competitions between elites were unbounded by formal and informal rules, hence frequently spilling over into violence. The most sustained and violent competitions were ideological, wherein those supporting integration with Indonesia and those calling for East Timor’s independence were pitted starkly against each other.

The ways in which these competitions were conducted reveal the deep disunity in elite relations. There was lack of communication and personal ties among elites, even within particular factions. In the words of Higley and Burton, elites were ‘ignorant of and disregarded the other’ elites. They perceived ‘politics as war’ or in ‘zero-sum’ terms. They developed a deep insecurity, and fear of serious punishments by their opponents if they lost. Thus, they decided to take extreme measures to protect themselves and their interests by killing, imprisoning and banishing their political opponents. Conflicts between Mario Carrascalao and Abilio Soares, pro-Indonesian and resistance groups, Aquiles and the leadership of FRETILIN, and Xavier do Amaral and the leadership of FRETILIN, are cases in point.

Conclusions

After brief civil warring in East Timor in 1975, the Indonesian military invaded, then next year incorporated the territory as Indonesia’s 27th state. During this occupation

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period, the patterns of elite relations were profoundly altered, while political, economic and social structures were changed.

At the broadest level, two major bases emerged for elite statuses, a first associated with the Indonesian occupation, a second with resistance. These two poles displayed vast ideological differences, encouraging elites to engage in violent conflicts. But even beyond this, we find additional elite-level differentiation. In addition to the resistance group and administrators, this thesis identified pro-Indonesia groups, nationalist intellectuals, the Catholic Church group, and youth groups. Moreover, across this terrain, elites display very diverse social origins and political ideologies. And they wage competitions on multiple levels, ranging beyond ideology to power and strategy.

Accordingly, with so little structural integration or value consensus, elites in East Timor during the Indonesian occupation must be characterised as seriously disunified. They lacked communications and personal ties within, as well as across various groups and factions. They perceived politics as war or in zero sum terms. They resorted regularly to violence. In the next chapter, we will consider how these relations have persisted or been reorganised during the independence period.
CHAPTER FIVE

UN INTERVENTION AND A NEW NATIONAL POLITICAL ELITE

A referendum sponsored by the United Nations (UN) changed East Timor’s status from an occupied territory to a newly independent country. Before achieving its independence, East Timor underwent a short transitional period under UN administration. This transitional period focused on the establishment of social, economic and political institutions. In addition, the UN transitional administration was assigned by the Security Council of the UN to create necessary conditions for democratic development in East Timor. For example, the UN organised two elections, first for a Constituent Assembly (CA) which was assigned to write the East Timor Constitution, and second a presidential election. After establishing these basic institutions, the UN on 20 May 2002 handed over authority to the East Timorese. But the question now is whether East Timor will become and remain a democratic country.

This chapter will first discuss the process of the settlement of the East Timor issue under UN supervision. Next, this chapter analyses the transition period under

UN administration in order to understand the UN’s contribution to the formation of a national political elite. Finally, it will examine the basis of elite structure, and inter-elite relations.

**The UN Secretary General and East Timor**

After Portugal took the issue of East Timor to the United Nations (UN) in 1975, the UN became involved in seeking a peaceful, just, and comprehensive resolution to the problem of East Timor. From 1975-1981, the UN General Assembly produced five resolutions and the Security Council two resolutions that called for Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor. However, Indonesia never complied with any of these UN resolutions.

Then, in 1982, the UN General Assembly assigned the UN Secretary General to organize dialogue between Portugal and Indonesia under the Secretary General’s auspices to find an internationally acceptable solution of the issue. Thereafter, the issue of East Timor moved to the UN Secretary General’s office. The UN Secretary General, upon being given the task of exploring possibilities that might help solve the question, held talks with Indonesia and Portugal in the form of a Tripartite Dialogue. The first talk was about building confidence between these two countries which at that time did not have diplomatic relations. From 1982 to 1997, most of the talks were carried out for confidence building which failed to produce any clear
result, because Indonesia and Portugal did not discuss the substantive issues of the decolonisation process and the political future of East Timor.\textsuperscript{2}

However, when Kofi Annan became the UN Secretary General, in February 1997 he appointed Jamsheed Marker (a senior Pakistani diplomat) as the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy of East Timor to assist the UN Secretary General to find a solution. At the same time, the UN Secretary General also created a Senior Official Meeting (SOM) at the ambassadorial level between Indonesia and Portugal with the aim of developing a workable concept that could be discussed in the pending tripartite meetings. By appointing a special envoy of the UN Secretary General for East Timor, and creating the ambassadorial level meetings, the UN Secretary General hoped to create a ‘political atmosphere’ for tripartite dialog through which to accelerate the process of finding a solution to the issue.

In an attempt to involve the East Timorese in the process, Indonesia and Portugal agreed to set up a forum for dialog between East Timorese from pro-Indonesia and the resistance, the so-called All-inclusive Intra-East Timorese Dialog (AETD). Indonesia, however, put some conditions on the meeting by not allowing the East Timorese to discuss the political status of East Timor. Instead, the East Timorese would only be allowed to discuss cultural issues. In the last meeting of AETD in 1998, resistance leaders, especially Jose Ramos Horta, decided to abandon the meeting since in their view such meetings only served Indonesia’s aim of

legitimising its occupation of East Timor. None of the four AETD meetings which were held in Austria produced significant results.

Thus, it must be concluded that during the search for an East Timor political settlement, East Timor’s resistance leaders were excluded or denied opportunities to discuss substantive issues. Instead, only Portugal and Indonesia were involved in discussing a political settlement under UN auspices.

**Change in Indonesia, May Agreement, the UN mission, and Referendum**

In May 1998, after long demonstrations in Jakarta, Soeharto was forced to step down as president. He was succeeded by his deputy, B.J. Habibie. The fall of Soeharto precipitated an era of new political freedoms and reforms (*reformasi*). In the wake of *reformasi*, East Timor issues were widely discussed in Indonesia, in East Timor and in international forums. For the first time, meaningful debate in Indonesia focused on possibilities for East Timor’s greater autonomy, even independence.

On 27 January 1999, the new president Habibie announced two options for the East Timorese in which they were to be allowed to vote for autonomy or independence through an UN-sponsored referendum. The announcement of the two options was followed by discussions at ambassadorial and ministerial levels between Indonesia and Portugal under UN auspices to execute Habibie’s two options. On 5

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3 See *The Diplomat; The Journey of One Man. The Birth of a Nation*, Sally Browning (producer), Film Australia Limited, 2000.

4 Interview with Salvador Ximenes Soares, former Member of the Indonesian National Parliament and currently Editor-in-Chief Suara Timor Lorosae (STL), national newspaper, Dili, 19 May 2003.
May 1999, the talks produced an agreement to allow the UN to organise a referendum in East Timor in which the East Timorese would vote to accept the Indonesian proposal of autonomy as a final solution or to reject this proposal, leading to independence.

Central to this agreement was Indonesia’s stated willingness to accept the outcome of the referendum. Thus, if a majority of East Timor’s people voted for autonomy, both Portugal and Indonesia would take immediate and necessary measures to implement the autonomy. They would also withdraw East Timor from the list of Non-Self Governing Territories of the General Assembly, which deleting related issues from the agendas of the Security Council. But most important, if a majority of voters rejected autonomy, Indonesia would take constitutional steps to terminate its links with East Timor. Portugal, Indonesia and the UN would then make arrangements for a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority in East Timor to the UN, and the Secretary General would initiate the procedures enabling East Timor to begin a process of transition towards independence.5

Next, the Security Council passed a resolution to establish a United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) which was in charge of determining the date of the referendum, finally settling on 8 August 1999. A few weeks later, a delegation of more than 1,000 UN staff members chaired by Special Representative of the Secretary General, Ian Martin, began to arrive in East Timor. UNAMET established almost 700 polling centres throughout East Timor and a few in Indonesia, Australia, 

Portugal and other parts of the world. Prior to the registration process, the Secretary General delayed the day of the ballot to 20 August 1999, because Indonesia had not fulfilled the minimum requirements for security. For the same reason, the poll was postponed again to 30 August 1999. After the second delay, however, the Secretary General went ahead with the plan. To be sure, registration commenced in an atmosphere of terror and intimidation. But this did not discourage East Timorese from going to the polling centres and registering.

The situation during the campaign was very volatile. Terror and intimidation increased on a large scale. Many CNRT leaders and members were harassed and even murdered. Some of them fled to the mountains or overseas. CNRT had little space in which to carry out its campaign freely. Only in Dili and Baucau, CNRT was able to campaign effectively. In other cities it used its clandestine networks established during the Soeharto era to carry out campaigning. Xanana Gusmao (the President of CNRT), Jose Ramos Horta and some CNRT leaders from amongst the overseas Timorese were not allowed to return to Dili for the campaign. Meanwhile, the pro-autonomy leaders and supporters were allowed to carry out campaign freely with the support of the Indonesian government and military.

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8 Interview with an anonymous former pro-autonomy, Dili, 6 July 2003.
Against this backdrop of terror the UN organised the referendum on 30 August 1999. The result was 94,388 (21.5 percent) in favour and 344,580 (78.5 percent) against the proposed special autonomy. The result of the referendum was reported on 4 September 1999. This announcement was followed by violence carried out by the militias supported by the Indonesian military. As a result, more than 200,000 East Timorese fled the territory and most of the remaining people went to the mountains for hiding. The Indonesian civil administration also left the territory, which created a vacuum of authority. The judiciary and court systems also vanished. Essential services such as water, electricity, and medical services were in a state of collapse.

This situation had not been anticipated, because in the May agreement, the Indonesian government had agreed to an orderly transfer of authority to the UN, if a majority voted against autonomy. But after the announcement of the result of referendum, the Indonesian government did not transfer authority to the UN. Instead it imposed a martial law which brought the territory under military control. East Timor was in a state of pandemonium.

Then on 15 September 1999, the Security Council of the UN responded to the situation by adopting resolution 1264/1999, calling for international intervention to stop the human catastrophe in East Timor. The resolution concerned first, the formation of an UN multi-national force leading to its deployment in East Timor, second humanitarian assistance to help rebuild East Timor, and third preparations for the transfer of authority in East Timor from the Indonesian Government to the UN and required the Secretary General to prepare a plan of the UN transition.

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9 See Press Release of the UN Security Council, 3 September 1999.

10 Interview with an anonymous former pro-autonomy member.
administration leading to independence. 11 After more than three weeks of rampage by the militias, on 20 September 1999, East Timor was brought under the control of the UN Australian-led multi national force (INTERFET).

We see first in these developments that East Timorese political leaders during the reformasi era enjoyed only a small role in negotiating their political future. They were not able to participate effectively in negotiations between Portugal and Indonesia under UN auspices on the referendum in East Timor. This exclusion of East Timorese was due to the Indonesian government’s refusal to recognise and to involve the resistance leaders in the negotiation process because, in the Indonesian view, any recognition or involvement of the resistance leaders in the negotiation process would lend legitimacy to the resistance campaign against the Indonesian occupation. 12 This was a deliberate strategy of the Indonesian government, especially the military, to deepen divisions between the East Timorese pro-Indonesia and resistance elites. Denying the East Timorese elites (pro-Indonesia and resistance) the opportunity to negotiate their political differences would foster suspicious between elites of these two groups. Thus, they grew more easily open to the use of violence should any political disagreements among them emerge. They were never habituated, then, in bargaining over issues. To the contrary, they internalised norms of ‘winner takes all’ in which the political fate of the East Timor people was decided once

11 Interview with Joao Mariano Saldanha, Executive Director of Timor Institute of Development Studies, TIDS (formerly East Timor Study Group) who was member of Joint Assessment Team, Dili, 14 May 2003.

12 The Indonesian government did not only exclude the East Timorese resistance leaders, but it also prevented the East Timorese pro-Indonesian leaders in any kind of negotiation process.
through a referendum. This condition deepened existing mistrust and schisms between political leaders, which resulted in the East Timorese pro-Indonesian leaders, especially the militias, with the support of the military, to use violence in the 1999 post-referendum period against the resistance leaders and supporters.

To exacerbate elite disunity, the Indonesian military set up militias in all districts of East Timor with the aim of using violence against pro-independence people. In the lead up to UN-sponsored referendum the military established a few more groups of militias in early 1999 with the objective of disrupting the UN-sponsored referendum and to intimidate the people to vote for the Indonesian proposal of autonomy. For example, Aitarak, a militia organisation headed by Eurico Guterres, was created in early 1999 by the Indonesian special force in Dili. This militia was meant to create a situation of terror and chaos in Dili in order to force the UN to withdraw from East Timor and abandon the work of the referendum. If the UN went ahead with the referendum then this militia will be used to intimidate and terrorise the people of East Timor in order to force them to vote for autonomy. Just before the UN-sponsored referendum the militias carried out several act of violence including the

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14 One cannot ignore the role of the Indonesian military to stir up violence in East Timor.


16 Interview with Salvador Ximenes Soares. See also Guterres, ‘East Timor in Transition’.
killing of people and the resistance leaders in the Catholic Church in Liquica on 6 April 1999 and the killing of some resistance members in Dili on 14 April 1999 as mentioned above.

In addition, the exclusion of East Timor’s political elites also induced deep distrust among them. They disagreed on ‘the rules of political conduct’ and the work of the UN in organising referendum. They perceived ‘politics as war’ or in ‘zero sum terms’ and hence that their political opponents should be exterminated. They feared punishment by their political opponents should they lose the referendum. For example, the pro-autonomy leaders especially the radicals (FPDK), just one day after the UN referendum, decided to withdraw from negotiations organised by the UN to discuss the establishment of a Consultative Council that would assist the UN to implement the result of the referendum. Instead, after the announcement of the result of the referendum, these pro-autonomy radicals with the support of the military engaged in the violence which destroyed Dili and other districts and killed more than one thousand people including some leaders of resistance.

18 Interview with Salvador Ximenes Soares. See also Ian Martin, Self-Determination in East Timor: The United Nations, the Ballot, and International Intervention (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), pp. 69-70.
19 See ibid, pp. 67-69.
Transition under the UN

Discussion on transition under the UN will provide an overall understanding of the international agenda of establishing democracy in East Timor and the response of East Timorese leaders to the international work as well their ability and skill to mobilise their constituents to support the international presence. I will begin by examining what UNTAET had done during its mandate to provide an understanding on the conditions that it created to bring about democracy in East Timor. Then will follow a discussion on the role and the response of the elites during the UNTAET administration.

The Establishment of the UNTAET

According to the May Agreement mentioned above, the Indonesian government had to transfer authority to the UN after a majority of East Timorese voters opposed the autonomy proposal, thus paving the way for the territory’s independence. To this end, in its session on 20 October 1999, the Indonesian National Assembly ratified the results of the vote, formally terminating Indonesia’s ties to East Timor. This enabled the UN to take control of East Timor by establishing a transitional administration.

After ratification, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1271/1999 through which it established the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). This resolution gave the UN overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and empowered it to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice. This administration
comprised three parts: governance and public administration, humanitarian assistance, and the military.

The Governance and Public Administration component was designed to oversee the rebuilding of East Timor’s judiciary, civilian police force and public services. It was designed also to handle economic, financial and development activities, run electoral operations, and take charge of each of the territory’s thirteen regencies (i.e., districts). With respect to humanitarian assistance, the administration was to ensure the coordination and delivery of assistance and rehabilitation, as well as to work towards the return of refugees from West Timor. The military component, made up of 9,000 peacekeeping forces, was charged with securing the environment, principally by monitoring the ‘prompt and complete withdrawal of Indonesian troops and … disarm[ing] and demobiliz[ing] armed groups’. 20 Furthermore, the administration was also to establish a trust fund for rebuilding infrastructure and paying local civil servants. The UN Secretary General appointed a Brazilian diplomat, the late Sergio Viera de Melo, as the head of UNTAET. It was scheduled to replace Australian-led multi national forces in 2000. The administration was to run East Timor for no more than two years before transferring power to a newly elected government.

After assuming full responsibility for administering East Timor, UNTAET’s first step was to establish an administration that extended from Dili to the sub-district level through which to carry out development reconstruction and lay the groundwork

for East Timor’s independence. This administration consisted of mostly by international personnel, with East Timorese only assuming positions as interpreters, security providers, drivers, and cleaners.

At the same time, in order to involve East Timorese political leaders more fully, while gaining the confidence of mass publics more generally, UNTAET worked closely with CNRT, identifying it as the only umbrella organisation that had led the resistance against the Indonesian occupation. Thus, UNTAET created an advisory body, the National Consultative Council (NCC), which consisted mainly of CNRT leaders and international staff whose task was to advise the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) in areas of political, economic, security, and social policy. This advisory body was not given, however, any binding authority to change decision-making processes. As in the earlier negotiations conducted with Indonesia and Portugal, East Timorese involvement seemed intended only to provide legitimacy for UNTAET decision making.


22 At many times, crucial decisions including rehabilitation programs had to be taken in New York by the Security Council and Secretary General of the UN. See Joao Saldanha co-authored with Marcelino Magno ‘Mission Implementation: Developing Institutional Capacities; UNTAET: Mandate, East Timorese Role, and Exit Strategy’ in ibid, pp. 162-63.
This approach by the UN was challenged by CNRT leaders. In their view, the UN was severely limiting East Timorese participation. \(^{23}\) This criticism by CNRT leaders prompted UNTAET to restructure arrangements in ways that were even less favourable. Specifically, UNTAET began distancing itself from CNRT, justifying this new orientation by casting doubt on the legitimacy of CNRT’s standing. \(^{24}\) For example, UNTAET highlighted the break up of FRETILIN from CNRT in August 2000. \(^{25}\) As mentioned in Chapter four, this break up was the result of long standing conflict between FRETILIN’s leadership and Xanana Gusmao due to Xanana’s decision of leaving FRETILIN in the mid-1980s. UNTAET officials also questioned the representativeness of CNRT’s policy commitments to the adoption of Portuguese as the official language, an aim that appeared discordant with popular aspirations. Indeed, Portuguese was spoken by fewer than ten percent of East Timorese. Finally, UNTAET averred that CNRT ‘had not been legitimised by any electoral process’. \(^{26}\)

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\(^{24}\) The CNRT proposal for the establishment of a Council of East Timor Transition ‘to work in partnership with the UN including an action plan was rejected by the UN’. See Rodrigues, ‘Introductory Remarks and Keynote Address’, pp. 30-31.

\(^{25}\) The UN at that time was concerned about the transformation of CNRT into a political party. In the UN view, the transformation can thwart the establishment of a multi-party system in East Timor. See Simon Chesterman, ‘East Timor in Transition: From Conflict Prevention to State Building’.

\(^{26}\) Summary Executive of the Report of the 2002 Tokyo Conference in Azimi and Ling (eds), The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET); p. xxix.
Naturally, none of these criticisms were accepted by the CNRT leaders, hence deepening tensions between CNRT and the UN.

This political rift led the UN eventually to change its policy by creating some new political institutions, most notably, a joint cabinet involving East Timorese and international members tasked with carrying out executive functions. It also created a National Council (see Figure 5.1), tasked with legislative duties. The cabinet consisted of five East Timorese and four international members with the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) ‘serving as the chair’. The National Council included East Timorese representing CNRT, other political parties outside CNRT, civil society groups, the Catholic and Christian churches, and the Muslim community.\(^{27}\) This new framework formed came to be labelled the First Transitional Government, enabling East Timorese and international members to cooperate in governing East Timor.

\(^{27}\) Sue Ingram, ‘Mission Implementation: Developing Institutional Capacities’ in *ibid*, pp. 86-87.
Although the National Council (NC) was assigned to exercise legislative power, it did not have authority to control the executive headed by the SRSG. Rather, the SRSG still assumed the position of the head of the transitional government, in which he had a power to exercise all legislative and executive authority.\(^{28}\)

Just before the UN-sponsored election for the Constituent Assembly, in June 2001, CNRT was dissolved. The dissolution of CNRT paved the way for the transfer of power from the first transitional government to a second transitional government, which consisted of a Timorese Council of Ministers and an elected Constituent Assembly (CA) which was assigned to write the East Timor constitution. The membership of the Constituent Assembly was determined by the CA election, held in

\(^{28}\) The SRSG had the authority to reject any laws or regulations adopted by the National Council. Interview with Salvador Ximenes Soares, who was a former Member of the National Council.
August 2001. In turn, FRETILIN, having won in this election more than 50 percent of the Constituent Assembly seats and, thus, the speaker’s post, formed the Timorese Council of Ministers. In this way, executive and legislative powers were exercised more fully by East Timorese (see Figure 5.2). However, though the Constituent Assembly gained authority over the Council of Ministers, the SRSG remained beyond its grasp. At this stage, the UN representative retained final authority over the country (see Figure 5.2).

The Constituent Assembly was initially given three months to write the constitution, though its term was later extended to six months. The UN was criticised for this short time-line as, in the view of many East Timorese, it was too brief a period in which to write a document so fundamental to East Timor’s democratic development. Due to these time constraints, the CA did not carry out proper consultation with the people through a referendum. Instead, the constitution was simply imposed on 22 March 2001, two months before the proclamation of East Timor’s independence. Then, after adopting this constitution, the CA transformed itself into the National Parliament. This transformation also sparked criticisms as it was seen by many East Timorese, especially opposition elements and civil society organisations, as cementing the ascendancy of FRETILIN as the dominant party.

Just before the proclamation of East Timor’s independence, the UN organised a presidential election. This election was important because it aimed to establish another important political institution, the presidency which, together with the government, would exercise executive authority. East Timor now had at least four important political (democratic) institutions, including the parliament, the president, the government and judiciary. These institutions were to function in accordance with rules and areas of competence specified in the constitution.

Thus, during the UNTAET administration, East Timorese political elites possessed only a small role in making political decisions, ones that involved security,
translation services, transport and basic maintenance. After being criticised by the East Timorese, though, the UN started to recruit the East Timorese into the administration more fully as ministers or directors. Further, after the Constituent Assembly election, the East Timorese elites took full control of the government. The CA was given a task to write the constitution and at the same time exercised legislative functions, by approving laws and national budget. And the election’s winning party, FRETILIN was given a mandate by the UN to form a new government. Moreover, a judiciary was set up by the UN. Conditions were also created in which a range of NGOs and other social religious institutions such as the Catholic Church were able to flourish. 31

Elections

As mentioned above, one of the most important elements in the UN transition period involved the organization of the two elections. The Constituent Assembly election was held on 30 August 2001 and the presidential election in April 2002. These two elections served as mechanisms by which eligible East Timorese might freely choose members of the assembly and the chief executive. In addition, these elections served as a means for the East Timorese political elite to compete for power without using violence. These political elites were restricted by the rules and regulations of the elections from using violence to pursue their political aims, finally habituating them with norms of restrained partisanship

After these two elections, a national parliament, a government, and a presidential office were established. The national parliament was formed based on the result of the 2001 election. The party that won the most seats then formed the government. The second election was held to choose by majority the president who would serve as head of the state.

To participate in the CA election, East Timorese elites organised themselves into political parties based on their political associations. Some decided to retain their existing party memberships, whether in FRETILIN, UDT, APODETI, Kota, or Trabalhista, while others established new political parties. For example, Mari Alkatiri, and Lu Olo, who during the Indonesian occupation were leaders of FRETILIN, remained in FRETILIN in order to contest the CA election. Mario Carrascalao, the former UDT leader, decided to establish a new political party, *Partido Social Democrata* (Democratic Social Party). Fernando Lasama along with some intellectuals and resistance people also formed a new political party, *Partido Democratico* (Democratic Party, PD). PD brought together some members of RENETIL, some intellectuals, resistance leaders from CNRT, former FALINTIL

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32 Any candidate, either from political party or independent, who received 1.3 percent of the vote in the election was elected as a member of the national parliament. See Back Door Newsletter, ‘East Timor’, available on: http://www.pcug.org.au/~wildwood/01sepresults.html, accessed on 7 November 2005 and Centre on Democratic Performance, available on: http://www.binghamton.edu/cdp/era/elections/tim01par.html, accessed on 7 November 2005.
commanders, and some UDT, APODETI, and FRETILIN members in order to counter-balance FRETILIN.\footnote{Interview with Paulo Assis Belo, former Vice Secretary of FPI, CNRT, and currently Member of the National Parliament from Democratic Party, Dili, 18 March 2003, Aquelino Fraga Guterres, former Vice-Secretary of Region Four, CNRT, and former Member of the National Parliament from Democratic Party, Dili, 25 March 2003, Jose Folaran, former Vice Secretary of Autonomous Region Dili, CNRT, former Member of the National Parliament from Democratic Party, Dili 25 March 2005, and Paulo Alves Tulodan, former Vice-Secretary of Region Three, CNRT, Member of the National Parliament from Democratic Party, Dili 25 March 2003.}

Xanana Gusmao, Jose Ramos Horta, and some other former FALINTIL commanders, however, decided to remain neutral. In 1987 as mentioned in Chapter four, these elites had decided to withdraw from FRETILIN in order to form CNRM/CNRT, an overarching resistance organisation. Xanana Gusmao then assisted the UN in providing civic education through which to reduce potential political violence during election campaigning. Xanana visited nearly all of East Timor’s districts, pleading with citizens to participate in election by voting rather than resorting to violence.\footnote{In a mass service held in Dili Cathedral, 20 August 2001, Xanana Gusmao assured the people that there would be no violence during the election and that people should vote according to their choice. The author was present in the mass service which was to celebrate the anniversary of FALINTIL.}

The Catholic Church also played an important role in preparing conditions for the 2001 election. For example, in the lead up to the election, clergy organised a public meeting in which most political party leaders attended the meeting and pledged to avoid violence, respect the results of the election, and form a government of national unity.
In some ways, however, these elections impacted negatively on elite attitudes and relations. In particular, political elites deployed campaign techniques that re-activated old rivalries from 1975 that had lain dormant since the mid-1990s. Rarely did they articulate coherent visions and constructive programs before the electorate. Instead, they accused each other of making no contribution to the struggle for independence, or even of having secretly supported the Indonesian occupation as mentioned in Chapter two. Mari Alkatiri, for example, denounced Xavier do Amaral, the current president of the ASDT party and nominally East Timor’s first president after FRETILIN’s declaration of independence in 1975, as an Indonesian collaborator. Moreover, FRETILIN leaders, including Mari Alkatiri, and Lu Olo, accused the UDT party of masterminding the Indonesian takeover. In responding to this accusation, UDT leaders accused FRETILIN of having been communist in 1975, prompting UDT to mount an anti-communist coup. These displays of disrespect and lack of forbearance, inflaming political tensions during the campaigning, signalled deep strains in elite-level relations.

In these conditions, party candidates failed to convey coherent appeals to East Timorese voters. They were consumed instead with attacking one another’s past political records, while exaggerating their own contributions to the country’s

35 See Suara Timor Lorosae (STL), ‘Prezidente Laran Susar, FRETILIN La Husu Deskulpa’ (President Is Sad Because FRETILIN Does Not Ask For Forgiveness), 31 August 2005.

36 Interview with Clementino Amaral, Member of the National Parliament from KOTA, Dili, 21 May 2003. Amaral during the Indonesian time was a Member of the Indonesian National Parliament.
Leaders of FRETILIN even demanded that the people vote for them or risk being wiped out. Only with the intervention of Xanana Gusmao was the tension finally reduced and calm restored. But suspicions between elites persisted beyond the election, leaving their relations strained. The presidential election was also tinged with conflicts between FRETILIN and Xanana Gusmao, now a candidate for the presidency. This conflict marked a resurgence in rivalries between FRETILIN and Xanana due to the latter’s decision to withdraw from FRETILIN as mentioned in Chapter Four. During the campaigning, FRETILIN’s Secretary General, Mari Alkatiri, urged FRETILIN supporters to vote for another presidential candidate, Francisco Xavier do Amaral, or to cast blank votes.

In the 2001 Constituent Assembly election, FRETILIN won 55 of 88 seats. The Democratic Party came second with seven seats; ASDT and PSD each won six seats; UDT, Kota and other parties each won one or two seats. Significantly, these results appeared to be accepted by leaders of the competing parties. But their motivations for this acceptance indicate that tensions were merely suppressed, rather than fully resolved. Specifically, losing parties accepted the election outcome because they realised that any upsurge in violence would delay East Timor’s gaining

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38 Interview with Paulo Assis Belo and Francisco Borolaco Soares, Deputy Commissioner of East Timor Revenue Service (Tax), Department of Finance, 13 July 2005 by telephone.
independence. At this stage, their loathing of the UN, which they regarded as slow and authoritarian, was greater than their rivalries with one another.

In organising these two elections, the UN used two different electoral systems. In the Constituent Assembly election, the UN used a ‘mixed’ electoral system that combined party list proportional representation with a single-member district plurality system as mentioned in Chapter One. The party list was used to choose 75 members from a list of candidates nominated by the parties, while the plurality system was used to elect one member from each district of 13 districts. This system was chosen to ensure that the numbers of seats won by each party reflected ‘as closely as possible the number of votes received by the parties’. At the same time the UN also wanted the people in the districts to be represented in the parliament. The purpose of this mixed system was to promote representativeness and inclusion, enabling as many organised parties and social groups as possible to participate in writing the constitution. The other aim of this approach was to institute a multi-party system in East Timor in order to promote democratic development. Of the 16 parties that ran for the election, 12 gained seats in the national parliament (see Table 5.1).

Table 5.1: The Result of the Constituent Assembly Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>PR (Party list)</th>
<th>District Representative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>% Votes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FREITILIN</td>
<td>205,531</td>
<td>57.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>31,680</td>
<td>8.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>29,726</td>
<td>8.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDT</td>
<td>28,495</td>
<td>7.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDT</td>
<td>8,581</td>
<td>2.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNT</td>
<td>8,035</td>
<td>2.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDC</td>
<td>7,181</td>
<td>1.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOTA</td>
<td>7,735</td>
<td>2.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPT</td>
<td>6,483</td>
<td>1.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDC</td>
<td>2,413</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>4,013</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PST</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDM</td>
<td>1,788</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APODETI</td>
<td>2,181</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTT</td>
<td>2,026</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARENTIL</td>
<td>1,970</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>384,248</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: na= Not available or did not participate; Registered voters: 446,666.


In the presidential election, the UN used a majoritarian run-off system in which a candidate must gain an overall majority of the votes cast in order to win. For example, in the first election, if none of the candidates receive fifty (50) percent of the votes, then there should be a second election where only two candidates that received more votes in the first election will compete. As envisaged in article 75 of the East Timor Constitution, to become a presidential candidate one should have East
Timorese citizenship by origin,\textsuperscript{40} be at least 35 years old, and be supported by a minimum five thousands electors. The president has a mandate of five years and can be re-elected only.\textsuperscript{41} This system was chosen in order to ensure that the victorious candidate win by a reasonably large margin, thereby increasing the ‘prospect of strong and stable government’.\textsuperscript{42}

On the surface, then, the two elections organised by the UN were peacefully waged, with voters participating in large numbers while the parties and their candidates accepted the results. At the same time, however, the elections had negative effects, rekindling old rivalries between elites. At this stage, these tensions did not erupt in open elite warring and major acts of violence. These tensions were nonetheless revealed, however, by some discrete outbreaks of violent behaviour. This included a violent demonstration on 4 December 2002, the forced eviction of Mario Carrascalao from his house by the government in July 2002 from his house, a demonstration against Mari Alkatiri’s government organised by former resistance leaders in July 2004 which turned violent, and a peaceful demonstration in May 2005 that was organised by the Catholic Church as mentioned in previous chapters.

\textsuperscript{40} The East Timor constitution classifies East Timorese citizenship into two main categories, citizens by origin and citizens by acquisition. See article 3 East Timor Constitution.

\textsuperscript{41} See article 75 East Timor Constitution. See also David M. Farrell, \textit{Electoral System: A Comparative Introduction} (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 4-5.

Perhaps the most important achievement during the UN transition involved the Constituent Assembly’s adopting a new constitution. Such a document, in ‘lay[ing] down a basic democratic framework of government’ through which to safeguard political and civil liberties, is a necessary, if insufficient condition for East Timor’s democratic development. ⁴³ While drafting the constitution, East Timorese political leaders were introduced to a new system of resolving their political differences through lobbies, deliberations, and voting. Ideally, they would then remain guided by established institutions and procedures that would restrain them from resorting to violence in order to pursue their political aims.

Even so, the drafting of the constitution was tainted by the efforts of FRETILIN leaders to shape the formation of institutions in ways that would serve their party interests. For example, in structuring power relations between the president, the government and the parliament, FRETILIN, as mentioned in Chapter Two, forced through constitutional measures by which the prime minister gained far more power than the president, an office which was commensurately reduced to a ceremonial role. This action stemmed mainly from the fierce political rivalries that were brewing between FRETILIN leaders and Xanana Gusmao. These FRETILIN leaders, especially Mari Alkatiri, sought revenge for Xanana’s having left FRETILIN during the mid-1980s as mentioned in Chapter Four, hence motivating them to erode the president’s power and standing. This created a situation, then, in which the

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government is able to make major decisions without any check imposed by the
president.44

In addition, the judiciary, which was still in the process of being established,
also lacked the power or authority with which effectively to check the government.
For example, opinions conveyed by the court of appeal to the government and the
parliament on draft of laws were rejected by both the government and the parliament.
This is due to the fact that currently East Timor has only a court of appeal whose
decision on constitutional matters does not bind the government.45 Meanwhile the
Supreme Court which, according to the constitution, has power and authority to
check the government has not been established by the government.46 In turn,
opposition parties and civil society organizations accused FRETILIN of ramming
through constitutional measures that principally served the interests of FRETILIN,
while marginalizing other parties and institutions.47

In doing this, FRETILIN borrowed some provisions from the constitution of
Mozambique, increasing the government’s capacity to propose laws and impose
regulations through which to control civil society and the opposition. The adoption of

44 Francisco Xavier do Amaral, ‘Perdoo os Oportunistas Porque Todos Nos Preocupámos Com as
Nossas vidas’ (I Forgive the Opportunists as We All Preoccupy with Our Lives) an interview with
Jornal Nacional Semanario, 3 April 2005.
45 See Judicial System Monitoring Program (JSMP) Press Release, ‘JSMP Disappointed With the
Passing of Unconstitutional Immigration and Asylum Law’, 1 October 2003 in author’s collection.
46 See East Timor Constitution, articles 123, 124 and 125.
47 Interview with Marcelino Ximenes Magno, Researcher of Timor Institute of Development Studies
(TIDS), 15 July 2005 by telephone.
the *Lei da Segurança Interna* (Internal Security Act) and the Law on Freedom of Demonstration are cases in point.

Furthermore, during the writing of the constitution, FRETILIN did not conduct much dialogue, or consultation in pursuit of compromise within the Constituent Assembly. Rather, it consistently forced issues to a vote, knowing that its large majority would ensure its victories. In FRETILIN’s view, compromise is not ‘a sign of rationality and good will but as a signal of weakness and lack of resolve’. The party’s leaders, then, took a confrontational approach in their dealings with elites from other parties. In this situation, opposition parties and civil society organizations grew frustrated. During the Constituent Assembly’s final session in which the constitution was adopted, some opposition parties, including the PD (Democratic Party) and the PSD (Social Democratic Party), decided to vote against the draft. Their efforts were hardly enough, however, to block its passage. Thus, political tensions between political elites persisted. During the first years of independence, this was most clearly made manifest in the deepening rivalries between the FRETILIN government and President Xanana Gusmao. For example, in November 2002, Xanana called for the dismissal of the minister of Internal Administration, Rogerio Lobato, who was accused of being involved in forming armed gangs to...

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48 Interview with Marcleino Magno, Paulo Assis Belo, and Francisco Soares. See also Sung-joo Han, ‘South Korea: Politics in Transition’ in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia* (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 1989), p. 285.

49 Observer, ‘Krise Konstituisaun?’ (Constitutional Crisis?), No. 1, March-April 2002; See also Interview with Marcelino X. Magno.
create conflicts in East Timor.\textsuperscript{50} But Xanana’s request was simply dismissed out of hand by Mari Alkatiri, the Prime Minister, as an unwarranted intervention in the government’s decision making.\textsuperscript{51}

In addition, Xanana used his constitutional power to veto several laws and regulations introduced by the government, including the Security Act and the law on Freedom of Demonstration. But, as mentioned in Chapter Two, these vetoes could not prevent the adoption of these measures. According to the constitution, the president’s veto can be overturned by the parliament through an extraordinary two-thirds majority. But the government’s overriding the president’s veto routinely triggered popular demonstrations. What is more, the opposition even challenged the government’s basic legitimacy of the government. In its view, the transformation of the Constituent Assembly into a national parliament without any referendum amounted to a severe manipulation of constitutional procedures that unfairly advantaged FRETILIN. There had been no prior agreement that the CA should do anything more than write a constitution.\textsuperscript{52} As mentioned in Chapter Two, in May 2003, the opposition parties forged a \textit{Plataforma Unidade Nacional} (Platform of

\textsuperscript{50} Interview with an anonymous former member of resistance in Dili, 27 May 2003. See also Lusa ‘Gusmao Urged PM to Dismiss Minister of Interior, Rogerio Lobato due to Incompetence and Negligence’, 2 December 2002.

\textsuperscript{51} Lusa, ‘East Timor: PM Alkatiri Rejects President’s Demand He Sack Interior Minister’, 2 December 2002.

\textsuperscript{52} Interview with Marcelino X. Magno and Francisco Borolaco Soares. Fernando Lasama also raised this issue in a discussion organised by East Timor Study Group, 20 May 2003 where the author was the moderator of the discussion.
Nation Unity) to challenge the government by pushing for an early election. But this plan did not succeed because of Xanana Gusmao’s intervention. The president asked the opposition parties to abandon their actions because it risked creating even greater political instability.53

Accordingly, East Timor’s constitution gives far more power to the prime minister than to other political institutions. In the current circumstances, he is even able to avoid any meaningful scrutiny by parliament. This has generated political tensions between elites that have in some circumstances threatened violent confrontation.

Thus, one concludes that political transition under the UN held profound implications for elite-level relations and democratic prospects in East Timor. On the one hand, this transition saw East Timor establish democratic institutions such as a national parliament, a presidential office, a judicial system, and civil and political freedoms. The most important manifestation of this involved the UN’s organising two competition elections by which East Timorese political elites competed peacefully for the power. The UN also supported the writing of the constitution which became the foundation for democratic development. Nonetheless, these gains were compromised by the tenor of FRETILIN’s election campaign appeals, the way in which it rammed through constitutional measures, and then converted the Constituent Assembly into the parliamentary body that perpetuated its dominance—actions that raised questions about underlying relations between elites and the stability of East Timor’s new democracy.

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53 Interview with Marcelino Magno Ximenes.
The Formation of National Elites

The independence of East Timor paved the way for the formation of autonomous national elites. These elites are now ‘the principal decision makers’ in East Timor. The major political groups that during the Indonesian period had engaged in violent conflict now faded away, with the resistance group coming to the fore. However, relations between these new elites quickly grew fractious, with different groups tracing their roots to different experiences under Portuguese and Indonesian rule. As we have seen, some of them were educated during the Portuguese period, worked for the Portuguese government, and became Indonesian civil servants during the Indonesian occupation. Some were educated and lived in Portugal, while others were located in Australia or Mozambique. Still others grew up in Indonesia and received education in Indonesian schools and universities. These varied experiences influenced their respective patterns of political outlooks and behaviours.

In this section, three main variables are analysed that impacted strongly upon East Timor’s new national elites: generational differences, geographic location, and organisational basis. This classification is made in order to shed light on the formation of distinct political attitudes and behaviours. In addition, this will help to increase understanding of inter-elite relations and tensions and the ways in which these impact on political decision making.

54 See also Burton & Higley 1987b; Dye 1983; Higley, Deacon and Smart 1979; McDonough 1981; Moyser and Waystaffe 1987; Putnam 1976. These authors were quoted in Burton, et al., ‘Introduction’, p. 8.
Generational Differences

East Timor’s national elite after independence can be classified into two main groups, an older and a younger generation. The older generation includes those who held high positions in political parties, government and other social institutions in the Portuguese regime. During the Indonesian period, they either cooperated with the Indonesian or opposed the Indonesian occupation (see Table 5.2). Xanana Gusmao, Ramos Horta, Mari Alkatiri, Jose Luis Guterres, the permanent representative of East Timor in the UN, Joao Carrascalao, Xavier do Amaral, and Francisco Lu Olo, the Speaker of the National Parliament, can be classified into the older generation that decided to fight against the Indonesian occupation. And Mario Carrascalao and Leandro Isaac can be identified as the old generation who during the Indonesian regime decided to cooperate with the Indonesian government.

Many in this older generation hold key positions in East Timor’s government, political parties, and business firms today. For example Xanana Gusmao, Mari Alkatiri, Francisco Lu Olo, and Jose Ramos Horta are President of East Timor, Primer Minister, Speaker of the National Parliament, and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation respectively, while Joao Carrascalao and Mario Carrascalao are the presidents of UDT and PSD. Oscar Lima, Manuel Carrascalao, and Julio Alfaro are presidents of private companies.
Table 5.2: Description of Elites based on Generational Differences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Components</th>
<th>Social/Political base or origin</th>
<th>Political believe/thinking and attitude</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Old Diaspora*</td>
<td>Resistance organizations</td>
<td>Conservative and autocratic</td>
<td>Paternalistic and suspicious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom fighters</td>
<td>Past political associations</td>
<td>Paternalistic and suspicious</td>
<td>Confrontational and pro-Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent elites</td>
<td>Administrators (technical people)</td>
<td>Democracy and reconciliation</td>
<td>Pragmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Young and Nationalist intellectuals</td>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>Idealistic and pragmatic</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Youth organizations</td>
<td></td>
<td>Human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td>Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Those that during the Indonesian occupation lived in overseas countries such as Australia, Portugal, and Mozambique.

The new generation can be identified as those who were too young during the Portuguese regime to hold any significant social, political, and administrative positions. They only became involved in political, administrative, and social activities after the Indonesian occupation. Furthermore, few members of this generation have yet attained high positions in independent East Timor. Rather, they only hold technical positions in the government, as ministers and director generals of departments, and other social and political institutions. Only a few of them are in charge of running political parties or other social institutions. Fernando de Lasama, Aniceto Guterres Lopes, the former president of the Commission for Truth, Reception and Reconciliation of East Timor, Joao Mariano Saldanha, Executive Director of the Timor Institute of Development Studies (formerly East Timor Study Group), Avelino Coelho, President of PST, Armando Maia, Minister of Education.
and Culture and Rui Araujo, Minister of Health are rare examples of those in the new generation who hold high positions.

These two types of elite have different political outlooks. The older generation can generally be characterised as more ‘conservative\textsuperscript{55} and self-interested’, pragmatic, and pro-Portuguese (see Table 5.2).\textsuperscript{56} Their conservatism is driven by their ambitions to secure political positions in the government and other political institutions. Thus, some of them tried to preserve FRETILIN’s symbols from 1975 in order to claim authorship of the resistance against the Indonesian occupation. This would enable them to strengthen their popular support among voters.\textsuperscript{57} For example, Mari Alkatiri and Lu Olo decided to change FRETILIN into a political party to run for the Constituent Assembly election which received overwhelming support from the people. This can be attributed to FRETILIN’s image as the only nationalist political organisation that advocated independence and fought against the Indonesian occupation.

Moreover, to burnish their image as the true leaders of the resistance, during the writing of the constitution, they imposed the adoption of the FRETILIN’s independence flag and the 1975 national anthem.\textsuperscript{58} Another example is the adoption

\textsuperscript{55} Xanana Gusmao, Ramos Horta, and some of the former FALINTIL commanders and members are the exception. Interview with Paulo Assis Belo, Aquelino F. Guterres, Paulo Alves Tulodan and Jose Folaran.

\textsuperscript{56} Since most of the older generation members are in charge of the government and the parliament their conservative attitude is reflected in political decision makings.

\textsuperscript{57} See for example, Smith, \textit{Understanding Third World Politics}, p. 143.

\textsuperscript{58} See also Smith, \textit{Understanding Third World Politics}, pp. 143-45.
of Portuguese as the official language, as mentioned in Chapter Four.\textsuperscript{59} This measure enhanced the autonomy of their decision making because all government discussions and documents were to be written in Portuguese, a language understood by less that 10 percent of East Timor’s population.\textsuperscript{60}

This older generation can also be evaluated as highly pragmatic in its aims and behaviours. President Xanana Gusmao perhaps displays the greatest pragmatism, driven by his concern for East Timor’s political stability and secure borders with Indonesia. Many pro-autonomy militias are reportedly still active. Between 1999 and 2003 these militias persisted in infiltrating from Indonesia into East Timor, killing civilians as well as two soldiers of the UN PKF (UN’s Peace-Keeping Force, one from New Zealand and one from Nepal).\textsuperscript{61}

In demonstrating his political pragmatism, Xanana promoted reconciliation, thus encouraging forgiveness and justice, mutual respect between neighbouring countries, political neutrality, and minimization of political confrontation with Indonesia.

\textsuperscript{59} See East Timor Human Development Report, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 2002, p. 36

\textsuperscript{60} One of the minister in Mari’s cabinet told the author anonymously source in June 2004, that in every Ministerial Council Meeting only those who speak Portuguese that can engage in discussions, while the rest just accept whatever the decision made by those who speak Portuguese.

\textsuperscript{61} There is a lack of the Indonesian military commitment to disband militia groups. Some radical elements of TNI are still behind militia activities in West Timor. See Francisco da Costa Guterres, ‘Reconciliation in East Timor; Building Peace and Stability’, a paper prepared for Swedish International Development Agency, Stockholm, Sweden, 2003 published in Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden, website: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/program/EastTimor031008.pdf.
Xanana visited Indonesia several times in order to meet with pro-autonomy militia members. He met also with representatives of the Indonesian government and military in order to better relations between their respective countries.\(^{62}\) These efforts were supported by Mari Alkatiri, Jose Ramos Horta, and Francisco Lu Olo\(^ {63}\).

The new generation is made up of some intellectuals and youth groups. As might be expected, its members can in some ways be understood as more idealistic, even as they seek more rigorous treatment of former militia members (see Table 5.2). Thus, they tend to advocate democratic procedures, human rights and justice. Further, in demonstrating their idealism, some of them have established NGOs which advocate human rights and justice such as Yayasan HAK (an NGO working in the human rights area), and Judicial System Monitoring Program, JSMP (an NGO working in the justice area). At the same time, these two NGOs are the most vocal human rights groups which demand punishment of the perpetrators of the post-referendum violence in 1999 through an international tribunal. Hence, they have criticized the conciliatory outlooks of the older generation.\(^ {64}\)

In addition, some members of the younger generation have established research and education institutions through which to train people, to increase knowledge and

\(^{62}\) The author was a member of Xanana Reconciliation Team which held various meetings with pro-autonomy leaders in East Timor-Indonesia border, and various cities in Indonesia, Jakarta, Denpasar, and Kupang with the message of forgiveness.


skills in order actively to enhance popular participation in decision-making processes. Members of these institutions have sometimes criticised government policies that they have considered to be authoritarian.65

Some of them have gone further, establishing political parties with which to contest against members of the older generation whose outlooks they do not share.66 In this way, the PD was formed. Others have joined existing political parties such as FRETILIN, UDT, and Kota. Due to their association with different political parties and their skills and knowledge, some of them are now in the government and the National Parliament. For example, Armindo Maia, Rui Araujo, and Ovidio Amaral, members of FRETILIN who are valued for their skills and technical capacities, hold positions as Minister of Education and Culture, Minister of Health, and Minister of Telecommunications respectively. Still others are in the parliament representing different political parties. For example, Mariano Sabino and Rui Menezes are from PD, Lucia Lobato is from PSD, and Jose Reis67 is from FRETILIN.

Some members of this new young generation group have grown very critical of the government. They have several times complained openly in the media over government policies that they view as failing to reflect popular interests. For example, Fernando Lasama, Mariano Sabino, Rui Menezes and Lucia Lobato have become the most outspoken persons in the parliament, loudly criticising government

65 In a discussion with Marcelino Magno and Joao Mariano Saldanha in Dili, 12 May 2003, both expressed their concerns about the adoption of the act which was seen as the way of implementing an authoritarian regime.

66 Interview with Carlos da Silva Lopes.

67 Reis in August 2005 was appointed as State Secretary of Region One in Mari’s government.
policies. Aderito de Jesus Soares a young lawyer associated with FRETILIN has criticized the government, as well as Xanana’s policy of establishing the Commission of Truth and Friendship with Indonesia.\(^{68}\) Even so, this group’s role in the decision making-process is limited by their inability to speak Portuguese.

This young generation group, more than the older one, favours democratic change. This can be ascribed to their recent experiences with repression under the Indonesian regime, as well as their greater knowledge of democratic procedures. Indeed, some of them were tortured by Indonesian security forces.\(^{69}\) Others learned about political and civil rights while studying in Indonesian universities.\(^{70}\) Many of them then joined human rights groups in Indonesia or established human rights NGOs during the Indonesian occupation which helped in framing their political attitudes and behaviours in ways that favoured democracy and justice.\(^{71}\) Some others were studying in universities in Australia, Portugal, New Zealand and other countries in Europe, where they were exposed more deeply to democratic procedures,


\(^{69}\) Interview with Ricardo Ribeiro, Security Advisor of Prime Minister, Dili, 20 July 2003.

\(^{70}\) Interview with Armindo Maia, Minister of Education and Culture, Dili, 28 March 2003, and Ricardo Ribeiro,

\(^{71}\) Mario Carrascalao, ‘Bank Dunia Batasi Ruang Gerak Pemerintah’ (The World Bank Limits the Government Movement) interview with Suara Timor Lorosae, a national newspaper, 19 May 2003 (special edition) and interview with Clementino Amaral.
deepening their beliefs that democracy was the only regime type under which East Timor could develop politically.\textsuperscript{72}

Moreover, this new generation has also criticised the older generation’s adopting Portuguese as the official language. But not all the younger generation’s members share these principles. Those who have been appointed bureaucratic and government posts as directors and ministers have tended to grow more pragmatic and supportive of the older generation.\textsuperscript{73}

In sum, members of the older generation are diverse and hence fractious, with many of them still grounding their elite statuses in the various political groups that launched their careers. And reared in an environment of intense political conflict, their relations are often marked by deep suspicions and confrontational behaviours. In partial contrast, the younger generation tends to be more idealistic, more pro-democratic, and more deeply nationalistic. Those who have found positions in the bureaucracy and the government, however, have grown more pragmatic and conservative. They sometimes developed a more confrontational attitude with their colleagues who were critical to the government.\textsuperscript{74} This new generation is also divided over its political and social bases.

\textsuperscript{72}Interview with Armando Maia.

\textsuperscript{73}See interview with Carlos da Silva Lopes.

\textsuperscript{74}Interview with Joao Mariano Saldanha.
Distinctions between different elite groups can also be made according to geographic location. More specifically, during Indonesia’s occupation, many members of East Timor’s national elite found sanctuary overseas. Thus, on this dimension, East Timor elites can be identified as members of the ‘diaspora’ or and the ‘home grown’ groups. The ‘diaspora’ group consisted of individuals who left East Timor during the Indonesian occupation and resided in countries such as Portugal, Australia, Mozambique, and other countries where they continued to wage opposition against the Indonesian occupation. For the most party, they only returned to East Timor after the UN referendum. This group is comprised of different factions of elites who were acculturated in distinctive ways by the different societies in which they lived (see Table 5.2).

The Australian group is associated most closely with Ramos Horta and Joao Carrascalao. But even within this group, vast attitudinal differences can be found. For example, Horta, considered to be the informal leader of the Australian group, is more democratic and moderate in his outlooks. He is associated with CNRT and Xanana Gusmao.

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75 The concept of geographic location is merely to help the author to distinguish elites based on their adopted country. For example, those who have been living in Australia, Portugal, Mozambique and other countries during the Indonesian occupation are considered diaspora group, while those who have been living in East Timor during the occupation are classified the home grown group.

76 Mario Carrascalao, ‘Bank Dunia Batasi’, and interview with Cipriana Pereira, Member of the National Parliament from FRETILIN, Dili, 6 June 2003.
Like Horta, many members of the Australian group are associated with Xanana Gusmao. This relationship was due primarily to Horta’s position as Xanana’s representative in the diaspora during the Indonesian occupation. In 1999 when Xanana was allowed to set up an office while under house arrest in Salemba, Jakarta, some members of this group, including Xanana’s wife, Kirsty Sword-Gusmao were called in to assist Xanana. During 1999-2001, they gained key positions in CNRT and became liaison officers with the UN Transitional Administration (UNTAET). For example, Inez Almeida, Horta’s spokesperson living in Sydney, became Xanana’s press officer and UN liaison officer. Emilia Pires was assigned by Xanana Gusmao to become Xanana’s personal assistant, organising, for example, a conference on East Timorese development in Melbourne in 1999 and in Dili in 2000. She was then appointed as the Head of the UNTAET Planing Department in 2001. Milena Pires, another member of the Australian group, became a member of the National Council representing women’s networks and was appointed as deputy speaker of this body in 2000.

After the dissolution of CNRT in 2001, most members of the Australian group joined PSD and held different positions in the party. Their close association with Xanana Gusmao, however, has continued. For example, Hagio Pereira, one of Horta’s representatives living in Sydney, became Vice-president of PSD. During the presidential election in 2002 many of them became the core group of Xanana’s campaign team. Milena Pires became Xanana’s campaign manager. After the election, some of them were appointed as officials in the office of the president. Hagio Pereira was appointed the president’s Chief of Staff, for example, while Ines Almeida became the president’s press officer.
Other members of the Australia, group, however joined FRETILIN, enabling many of them to find position in government. For example, Raul Mosaco, became Vice-Minister of Public Works. Jose Texeira, a law graduate from an Australian university, became Vice-Minister of Natural Resources, Mining and Energy Policy, as well as team leader for negotiations over the Timor Sea. Emilia Pires was appointed Secretary of Development Planning.  

The Australian group has gained much influence over the political decision making process. Ramos Horta remains a key member in government, while Jose Texeira, due to his legal expertise, has become one of the important members in the cabinet (see Table 5.3). Furthermore, members of the Australian group tend to be more democratic in their outlooks. This is commonly attributed to their experience of living in Australia. 

Members of the Portugal group are considered to be very diverse in their political attitudes. After returning to East Timor, many members of this group joined different political parties or formed new ones. For example, Abilio Araujo, the former FRETILIN leader who during the referendum supported autonomy, established a new political party, Partido Nacionalista Timorense (Timorese Nationalist Party) which ran for the 2001 election and won two seats in the Constituent Assembly. Some others became heads of various government institutions. Claudio de Jesus Ximenes, an East Timorese judge who lived in Portugal during the Indonesian occupation, was appointed as president of the Court of Appeal of East Timor in 2003.

77 Carrascalao, ‘Bank Dunia Batasi’; Interview with Cipriana Pereira, and Clementino Amaral.

78 Mario Carrascalao, ‘Bank Dunia Batasi’. 
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
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<th>Political/social origin</th>
<th>Political base</th>
<th>Political believe/thinking and attitude</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Australia</td>
<td>Past political parties (FRETILIN and UDT)</td>
<td>PSD Xanana Gusmao</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mozambique*</td>
<td>FRETILIN</td>
<td>Mari Alkatiri FRETILIN</td>
<td>Paternalistic Conservative Authoritarian Confrontational** Solid</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Past political parties (FRETILIN and UDT)</td>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>Democracy Dosunified</td>
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<td>Homegrown</td>
<td>Freedom fighters</td>
<td>FALINTIL CNRT</td>
<td>People in the villages CNRT network FALINTIL</td>
<td>Unified and solid Democracy and reconciliation Pragmatic</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incumbent elites</td>
<td>Administrators (sympathizers of the resistance)</td>
<td>New political parties Bureaucracy</td>
<td>Democracy Good governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pro-Indonesia</td>
<td>Political parties (FRETILIN) Bureaucracy</td>
<td>Authoritarian and confrontational</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:  
* The most influential faction in decision making process  
** Confrontation with other groups  
*** The incumbent elite is elites who during the Indonesian occupation held positions in the Indonesian government and currently occupying positions in the government or political parties or other business and social institutions. These elites are divided into two groups, resistance and pro-Indonesia

This group has very little influence in decision making as they have not gained the highest posts in government. Still, this group is advantaged by its command of Portuguese language. Since many of its members speak Portuguese, they are able to obtain positions in private and government institutions. Like the Australia group,
though, this one tends also to value democratic procedures, attitudes that were acquired while residing in Portugal. 79

The Mozambique group centres on Mari Alkatiri (as Secretary General of FRETILIN) and FRETILIN (see Table 5.3). Members of this group focus their loyalties on Mari Alkatiri and appear to be more deeply unified. Due to their unquestioning support of Alkatiri, many of them have gained high positions in government. Ana Pessoa, for example, has become Minister of Administration where she oversees local administration. Rogerio Lobato, a longtime friend of Alkatiri, and Madalena Boavida similarly a close friend, are also in government as Minister of Interior, which oversees the Police and Natural Disaster Management, and as Minister of Finance respectively.

The Mozambique group has been evaluated by most analysts of East Timor’s politics as politically the most powerful group today, controlling the core of government and a large majority in parliaments. 80 Resorting to the political strategies it learned while in Mozambique under the rule of FRELIMO, this group often betrays authoritarian inclinations and confrontational outlooks, 81 hence

79 Interview with Clementino Amaral. See also Mario Carrascalao, ‘Bank Dunia Batasi’.
80 An anonymous source in the government told the author in May 2003 in Dili, that there are three members of the Mozambique group who have huge influence in the government, Mari Alkatiri the Prime Minister, Ana Pessoa, Minister of Administration, Madalena Boavida, Minister of Finance and Planning, and to some extent Roque Rodrigues, Minister of Defence. See also interview with Cipriana Pereira, and Clementino Amaral.
81 Mari’s approach to any political differences is always confrontational. See Radio Australia, ‘Ex-FALINTIL Guerrillas Call For Veteran Affairs’, 23 July 2004. See also Suara Timor Lorosae (STL), ‘FRETILIN Lakon Ema Sei Mate’ (If FRETILIN Lost Many Would Die), 15 August 2005; STL,
demonstrating attitudes toward democracy that appear at most to be ‘semi-loyal’.  

The constitution they drafted resembles that of Mozambique. In these circumstances, rival elites, especially in the Australian group, but also in the younger generation, have grown embittered. The Catholic Church has also been alienated by the Mozambique group, causing it to mount protest action.

Finally, a group of ‘home grown’ elites can be identified, consisting of individuals who remained in East Timor throughout the Indonesian occupation. Most of them either fought as guerrillas, or joined youth groups or other clandestine organisations that sympathised with the resistance. Today, this group encompasses several factions (see Table 5.2). The former guerrillas trace their roots to FALINTIL. Thus, this faction includes Xanana Gusmao, the current President of East Timor, and Francisco Lu Olo, the Speaker of the National Parliament and President of


82 Interview with Cipriana and Clementino Amaral. See Carrascalao ‘Bank Dunia Batasi’ and Xavier do Amaral ‘Perdoo os Oportunistas’.

83 Interview with Cipriana, Clementino Amaral, and Paulo Assis Belo. See also Mario Carrascalao, ‘Bank Dunia Batasi’.


FRETILIN. This faction is characterised by strong mutual loyalties, even as its members have subsequently joined differently political parties such as FRETILIN, PD, and PSD. They also hold various high-level positions in the National Parliament and government. For example, Francisco Branco Miranda and Gregorio Saldanha are members of the National Parliament from FRETILIN; Paulo Assis Belo, Paulo Tulodan, and Aquelino Fraga Guterres are members of the National Parliament from PD, and Vidal de Jesus Riak Leman is member of the National Parliament from PSD. Further, Joao Alves, the former CNRT political commissioner, Virgilio Smith, the former CNRT regional vice-secretary, and David Dias Ximenes, the former vice secretary of Internal Political Front of CNRT, are currently State Secretary for Coordinating Physical Development and Environment, Secretary State for Coordinating Region Two, and Secretary State for Veterans and Former Freedom Fighters respectively.

However, despite this group’s ‘heroic’ background and great popularity, the organisational positions it has obtained have not translated into significant state power. Even Xanana Gusmao has little real influence over government decision making. This can be attributed to various factors. First, this group is more committed than others to political reconciliation and democratic procedures. And it is also more closely aligned with the Catholic Church.

86 Interview with Joao Mariano Saldanha.

87 See Address by H.E. the President of the Republic, Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão, on the occasion of the appointment of new members to the First Constitutional Government, Lahane, 28 July, 2005 in author’s collection.
Alongside the resistance faction within the home grown group, we also find elites who held government positions during the Indonesian occupation. Further, this group can be subdivided into those who, even while holding positions, sympathised with the resistance, and those who unequivocally supported the Indonesian occupation. For example, Mario Carrascalao, and Jacob Fernandes held positions during the Indonesian occupation as Governor of East Timor and head of sub-districts of Ermera respectively. However, there is evidence that during their tenures, they favoured independence. For example, Mario Carrascalao, during his gubernatorial term, helped the resistance to smuggle out information about human rights abuses carried out by the military, while Fernandes provided financial support to the resistance.\(^8\) Today, Carrascalao is president of PSD and a member of the National Parliament and Fernandes is a member of FRETILIN and Deputy Speaker of the National Parliament.

Also among the group of home grown elites are those who held positions under and strongly favoured the Indonesian occupation. Nonetheless, they showed great political agility after East Timor’s independence was won, quickly joining FRETILIN and other political institutions. Some of those newly affiliated with FRETILIN were able to secure positions in government. For example, Sebastiao Ximenes, the former head of the Law Bureau of Indonesian Local Government in East Timor and a fervent supporter of Indonesian rule, joined with FRETILIN after independence, then gained the post as East Timor’s ombudsman. To be sure, this

\(^8\) Interview with Francisco da Costa Soares. See also Mario Carrascalao’s Briefing Note presented in the East Timor Study Group Leadership Training in Dili, 4 June 2003 in author’s collection.
created much controversy, given Ximenes’s having earlier supported a radical faction of the FPDK which favoured autonomy.  

A last category of elites can also be enumerated in conjunction with those home grown elites who sympathised with the Indonesian occupation, but gained positions in East Timor’s government after independence. In this case, though, members of this category held government positions in Indonesia during the occupation. Later, however, they professed to have supported East Timor’s independence and they then gained positions in Timor’s political parties, government, and bureaucratic apparatus. For example, Clementino Amaral, had been a member of the Indonesian National Parliament (DPR/MPR) and Secretary General of the Indonesian Human Rights Commission. But after independence, he returned to East Timor and became vice-president of KOTA, a party that advocates monarchy, and was elected as member of the National Parliament. Abel Fatima during the Indonesian period was Assisten Urusan Administrasi Setwilda Tingkat I (Assistance of Administrative Affairs) of the Indonesian local government in East Timor and after independence he was appointed as district administrator of Suai.

Overall, this group of home grown elites is very diverse in its political outlooks. Some of them are very supportive to democracy today, while others appear to be more authoritarian in their outlooks. Not surprisingly, those who favour democracy

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are usually active in the opposition parties, while those who tilt toward authoritarian rule are found in government.⁹⁰

In sum, we observe that the home grown group is internally diverse in its political associations and outlooks. Of course, most members are supportive of Xanana Gusmao, reconciliation, and democratic procedures. And because of their record as guerrilla fighters for the resistance, they enjoy much popular support. What is striking, however, is the ways in which members of the smaller subset that had favoured Indonesia’s occupation have gained more government positions and state power.

Organisational Bases

A final dimension by which to categorise elites involves the organisational bases⁹¹ upon which their statuses depend. In this section, East Timor’s elites are analysed in terms of their standing in political parties, independent organisations (civil society), business, the military, and the Catholic Church.

By distinguishing elites according to their organisational or institutional support bases, we can better understand their relative standings and impact on overall elite relations, political stability, and the prospects for democracy. Thus, they can be

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⁹⁰ Interview with Cipriana Pereira. See also Smith, *Understanding Third World Politics*, p. 143.

⁹¹ This concept is merely to help the author to understand the factions of elites that exist in East Timor and their relations which is the most important variable to be used to analyse East Timor democratic development.
divided into six types: political party elites, bureaucratic elites, security forces elites, business elites, Catholic Church elites and civil society elites.

The political party elites are those who compete for power through regular elections and base their support on parties. Ana Pessoa, for example, bases her support on FRETILIN in order to become a member of the Constituent Assembly and later Minister of Internal Administration. Mariano Sabino became a member of the National Parliament due to his association with PD. The group is made up of former resistance leaders, members of clandestine movements, youth groups, diaspora elements, and home grown elites. For example, Francisco Lu Olo, a former guerrilla fighter and Mari Alkatiri, a key member of the Mozambique group, are in the same party, FRETILIN, serving respectively as president and Secretary General. Fernando Lasama Araujo and Ricardo Ribeiro, members of the youth group, perpetuate their standings today through their membership in other political parties. Araujo is the president of PD and Ribeiro is a member of FRETILIN and currently the Prime Minister’s Security Advisor.

These elites can be divided into the ruling elites and the opposition elites. The former is more associated with FRETILIN and consists of some former CNRT members, FRETILIN leaders, and Pro-Indonesians. For example, Virgilio Smith, a member of Central Committee of FRETILIN and currently, State Secretary of Region Three was Vice-Secretary of region three of CNRT. Meanwhile, Francisco Lu Olo and Mari Alkatiri are FRETILIN leaders, and Francisco Kalbuadi Lay, member of the Central Committee of FRETILIN, and currently president of Commission of Finance and Budget of National Parliament, was member of pro-Indonesian group. Lay was a foster son of Dading Kalbuadi, an Indonesian General
who was in charge of the Indonesian occupation in 1975, and had worked closely with Tutut Rukmana, the eldest daughter of former president Soeharto, to campaign for integration.

The ruling elites base their support on FRETILIN, Lu Olo and Mari Alkatiri. For example, Gregorio Sousa became State Secretary of the Cabinet because of his close association with Mari Alkatiri. Cesar Moreira was appointed as Vice-Minister of Public Works because of his close relations with Francisco Lu Olo. Moreira is a nephew of Francisco Lu Olo. And Jose Reis became State Secretary of Region One due to his position as Deputy Secretary General of FRETILIN. This group appears to be more authoritarian and conservative in their outlook. For example, the adoption of the Internal Security Act and Law on Freedom of Demonstration reflects their political outlook in which they try to restrict the opposition and civil society in checking the government. The most recent event was the eviction of one of the major local newspapers, *Suara Timor Lorosae*, from its building acquired during the Indonesian occupation, in February 2005. Before the eviction, the newspaper’s journalists were under constant pressure from the government not to publish accounts from the opposition, civil society, or the Church that criticised the government’s policies. But the newspaper decided to publish some of these accounts, including an article on hunger in East Timor, in October 2004, which led the government to evict *Suara Timor Lorosae* from the building.\(^9^2\) In 2004, the government also deported an

\(^{92}\) See a press release of the Editor-in-Chief of Suara Timor Lorosae, Salvador Ximenes Soares, 7 March 2005 in author’s collection.
Australian freelance journalist who was in East Timor to carry out an investigation on corruption in the government. \(^9^3\)

These elites are also confrontational in their political attitudes. For example, Mari Alkatiri has been several times in confrontation with Xanana Gusmao as mentioned above. Alkatiri is also in constant conflict with the opposition which led him to evict Mario Carrascalao, the president of an opposition party, PSD from his acquired house as mentioned above. The group is also pragmatic in its political attitude. Recently, these elites have been supportive to Xanana Gusmao’s initiative of reconciliation. The group has several times dismissed calls from civil society to push for an international tribunal for the case of post UN-sponsored referendum conflict. Thus, one can note that the Mozambique group outlooks reflected in the ruling elite political thinking which led one to conclude that the (Mozambique) group dominates the ruling elites.

Meanwhile, the opposition elites are those who currently do not hold positions in the government, but some of them are currently members of the National Parliament. The group background is very diverse since its members were from different past political parties, youth and intellectuals, former members of CNRT and FALINTIL, and the pro-Indonesian group. Riak Leman, for example, currently Vice-President of an opposition party, PSD, and member of National Parliament, was former FALINTIL commander. Ernesto Dudu, former Vice commander of region three of FALINTIL, is currently coordinator of PD, another opposition party, in Ermera. Jose

Buras, the Vice-President of PD, was former leader of *Objelatil*, a youth organisation established by FALINTIL during the Indonesian occupation as mentioned in Chapter Four. Interestingly, most of members of the Australian group are in opposition parties since they are associated with PSD as mentioned above. For example, Joao Gonsalves, leader of PSD faction in the National Parliament, is from Australia. Besides, some members of the group are from intellectual groups. For instance, Joao Boavida, a Masters Graduate from Oxford University, England, is one of the leaders of PD. He recently was appointed by President Xanana Gusmao as member of the Council of State, representing PD.

The group bases its political support on their political parties and former CNRT networks. For example, Paulo Tulodan, Aquelino F. Guterres and Paulo Assis Belo were elected as leaders of PD and became members of the National Parliament due to their involvement in the CNRT as leaders. During the elections they made use their CNRT networks to gather votes. Meanwhile, Vicente Guterres, the president of *Uniao Democratica Crista*, UDC (Christian Democratic Union), an opposition party, was elected as member of the National Parliament due to his position as the leader of the party. The opposition elites tend to be more democratic in their political thinking. Many of the leaders of the opposition parties had experiences as former members of the resistance under the Indonesian military oppression or who were living in countries such as Australia and Portugal as mentioned above. Fernando Lasama Araujo, the president of PD, for instance, advocated democracy because of his experience being imprisoned by the Indonesian government in 1992 in an

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94 Interview with Francisco Borolaco Soares, Paulo Assis Belo and Aquelino Guterres.
Indonesian prison, Cipinang, Jakarta, due to his activities as Secretary General of RENETIL.

According to Diamond, a society repressed during an authoritarian regime tends to have positive attitude towards democracy, as mentioned in Chapter One.95 Vicente Guterres, the president of UDC, and Zacarias da Costa, the former Secretary General of PSD, advocated democracy due to their experiences living in Portugal. Besides, the former FALINTIL commanders who became leaders of the opposition parties also contributed positively to the adoption of democracy. This is due to their commitment to political reconciliation and democratic procedures that they adopted during the Indonesian occupation as members of FALINTIL, as mentioned above. Some of the young members of the group, however, are more idealistic in their outlooks. For example, most of the new generation of the opposition parties in the parliament opposed the establishment of the Joint Commission of Truth and Friendship by the East Timor and Indonesian government.96

Relations between party elites are filled with suspicion and mistrust. On several occasions, rivalries between elites have spilled over into violent confrontations between their supporters. The 4 December 2002 violent demonstration and the 19 July 2004 demonstration in which demonstrators, mostly former freedom fighters, staged a rally in front of the government building to demand the resignation of Mari Alkatiri and Rogerio Lobato, but which ended violently as mentioned in Chapter One, are cases in point.

95 Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), Figure 5.2, p. 204.

96 Interview with Francisco Borolaco Soares.
These disunified relations undermine East Timor’s political stability and gravely weaken its prospects for democracy. The recent political debate on the government’s programs on economic development between leaders of the ruling party, FRETILIN, and the opposition during the village elections created political tension. For example, in early 2005, supporters of FRETILIN in the subdistrict of Uato Lari assaulted and destroyed houses of PSD leaders. The most recent case took place in the village of Bucoli, district of Baucau, in which FRETILIN members in that village ransacked the secretariat of Partido Unidade Nacional Democratica da Resistencia Timorense, UNDERTIM (National Unity Democratic of Timorese Resistance Party), an opposition party and burnt the party’s flag.97

These incidents indicate clearly that the ruling elites orchestrated terror and intimidation campaigns against the opposition in order to diminish their presence in the villages. This leaves the ruling party, FRETILIN, as effectively the only party to have access to the villages in order to gather support in these elections and later in the national election in 2007. In addition, Mari Alkatiri’s and Francisco Lu Olo’s campaigns in Dili and Liquica in September 2005 induced more political tension as they used threats to intimidate the people in the villages into voting for FRETILIN. They told the people that if FRETILIN lost in the villages there would be conflicts.

and no economic development. Their statement was later reflected in terror and intimidation carried out by FRETILIN supporters in the villages against opposition candidates. FRETILIN supporters asked the opposition parties candidates and independents not to run for the elections, in return for which they would be employed in government offices. Otherwise, they would face consequences where they and their supporters would not receive any benefits from the government and may physically be harassed.

Bureaucratic elites are those who currently employed in the government offices occupying top positions such directors, secretary generals and commissioners of government departments. Their appointments or ascent to their current positions were due to their technical skills. For example, Henrique Ximenes became Director of Immigration, Department of Justice, due to his skill. Ximenes graduated from the Institut Ilmu Pemerintahan, IIP (Institute of Government Studies), Jakarta, Indonesia. During the Indonesian occupation he became administrator of the sub-district of Laulara. Candido da Conceicao during the UNTAET government was appointed as Minister of Infrastructure due to his knowledge and ability in civil administration. Conceicao during the Indonesian occupation was Assistant to the District Administrator of Oecussi overseeing economic development. Currently, he became one of directors in the Department of Finance.

98 STL, ‘Laos FRETILIN Mak Ukun, Sei Mout Ba Tasi Laran’ (If it Was Not FRETILIN to Govern, Everything Would be Wiped Out), 19-09-05. STL, ‘Governu Alkatiri Kria Mauhu’ (Alkatiri’s government Creates Spies), 16 September 2005; An anonymous source recounted this story to the author on 2 September 2005 by telephone.

### Table 5.4: Description of Elites Based on Organisational Basis

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<th>Components</th>
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<th>Political believe/thinking and attitude</th>
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<td>Ruling elites</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>FRETILIN</td>
<td>Lu Olo</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Pro-Indonesist</td>
<td>Mari Alkatiri</td>
<td>Confrontational</td>
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<td>Opposition</td>
<td>Past political parties</td>
<td>FRETILIN</td>
<td>Pragmatic</td>
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<td>Youth and intellectuals</td>
<td>Lu Olo</td>
<td>Idealistic</td>
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<td>CNRT and FALINTIL</td>
<td>Mari Alkatiri</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
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<td>Administrators</td>
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<td>Bureaucratic elites</td>
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**Note:** * Civil service either in the Portuguese or Indonesian government

Interestingly, these bureaucratic elites can also be divided into two main groups, the administrators and political appointees. The administrators can be identified as those who rose to high positions in the bureaucracy due to their professional careers. For example, Mariano Lopes da Cruz became Inspector General because of his...
career during the Indonesian occupation as district administrator of Maliana, and just before the referendum he was appointed as *Assisten Satu Setwilda Tingkat Satu* (assistant to the secretariat of the provincial government). Many of them were recruited during the UNTAET period. For example, Candido Conceicao and Cancio Oliveira, Director of Customs and Border Control, were employed by UNTAET and, after independence in 2002 they continued as East Timor government employees. Meanwhile, the political appointees are those who appointed to the high positions due to their connections with the ruling party, FRETILIN. Lino Torezao, for instance, became Director General of the Department of Internal Administration because of his connection to FRETILIN.

This group has been under public scrutiny due to the corruption that is flourishing in the government. The Inspector General’s report in 2004 found fourteen cases of corruption in the government. These cases were mostly related to the misuse of government funds. The most obvious case was the misuse of fund in the Department of Public Works where money designated to rebuild roads in the villages was used to buy luxury cars for government officers.\(^{100}\) This behaviour was attributed to the fact that most members of the group came from a background in the Indonesian civil service that had exposed them to an open corruption system during the Indonesian period, as mentioned in Chapter Four.

This group is also divided in their outlooks. The administrators advocate good governance and professionalism. This is mainly a result of their view that a state bureaucracy should be usable by any new government and guarantee the good deliverance of good basic services that citizens demand. Meanwhile, the political appointees tilt towards autocracy. This latter subset of bureaucratic elites has been accused of forging many government policies and regulations that have underpinned FRETILIN’s dominance. They have been accused by the opposition and civil society of being behind the adoption of the Local Governance Law which gave more power to the central government to control local government. Lino Torrezao, the Director of Internal Administration, was assigned to lead the team to draft the law which later was adopted by the parliament. This law was in contradiction with the result of the national dialog organised by the office of President Xanana Gusmao to discuss the organisation of local governance. The result of the dialog was greater autonomy for the local government to make decisions.

These elites were also accused of being behind the terrorising, intimidation and manipulation that has recently distorted village elections. The most obvious case


102 The author participated in the seminar organized by the team to discuss the draft of the law in June 2003. During discussions the author came to know the content of the law which was more centralistic.

103 The author participated in the national dialog which was organized in May 2003. See the result of the National Dialog in the author’s collection.
involved the appointment of Tomas Cabral, a FRETILIN member, as the head of Secretariado Tecnico da Administracao Electoral, STAE (Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration), which was in charge of organising village elections.

During the balloting there were complaints from opposition members about irregularities carried out by the staff of STAE and the government, but none of these complaints were addressed. For example, in Kampung Alor, Dili, where FRETILIN’s candidate won election as the head of the village, there were one hundred ballots more than there were registered voters. In Becora, the stronghold of oppositions (PD and PSD), many voters could not find their names, hence they were not allowed to vote. 104

In sum, relations between these administrative and political elites are best understood as divided, but not openly. The administrators remain focused on their professional offices and undertakings and conduct their dealings in comparatively rule-bound ways. Political appointees, by contrast, work frequently to undermine, circumvent, or otherwise politicise the bureaucracy.

The security force elites hold high positions in the military and police. In this section, I will clearly define both military and police as they have different political bases and outlooks. First, the military elites consist of mostly former FALINTIL commanders and members, and youth groups who were recruited into East Timor army. This group is not seeking any political position or power due to their

commitment to FALINTIL principles. In addition, the group also advocates democratic principles. Thus, it decided to distance itself from political decision-making process and activities. The group, however, commands some respect from the politicians because its leaders earned wide support from the people in the villages due to their historical background as members of FALINTIL. Interestingly, many politicians try to connect themselves with the group in order to obtain support from the people. But the group several times has reiterated that it would not support any political group, since its work was security. This group is the most unified group due to their discipline and structure, which do not allow any members to oppose policy made by their commanders.

Meanwhile, elites in the police force are mostly former officers in the Indonesian police who were recruited by UNTAET. For example, Paulo Fatima, current East Timor Police Commissioner, was an officer (major) in the Indonesian police force stationed in Dili. Besides, there were also some youths recruited into the police force.

These two subgroups of security forces elites have different political attitudes. The military is democratic and reconciliatory in its outlook. This results from their background as former commanders of FALINTIL who are still committed to the FALINTIL principles which were adopted during the Indonesian occupation. The police force is more confrontational in its approach. This is because a majority of

105 Taur Matan Ruak’s briefing notes in a seminar organised by TIDS on 17 July 2004 in the author’s collection.
106 Interview with Marcelino Ximenes Magno.
107 Interview with Paulo Assis Belo, Aquelino F. Guterres and Paulo Alves Tulodan.
108 Interview with Marcelino Magno Ximenes.
police officers were Indonesian police officers who were used by the Indonesian military to fight the resistance. Currently, the police force has been under public scrutiny due to its lack of discipline in handling political and criminal cases. In dispersing a demonstration in Dili, on 19 July 2004, for instance, the police used excessive force by beating and shooting some demonstrators. This situation raised the concern of politicians and the international community. The Special Representative of Secretary General (SRSG) in East Timor, Sukehiro Hasegawa, acknowledged police brutality in handling protesters of 19 July 2004. The Australian and New Zealand governments also recognised this attitude by providing funds for the East Timor government to train its police forces in order to be more professional.

Interestingly, these two subsets of the security forces elites have strong connections with different political institutions and persons. The military is more associated with President Xanana Gusmao. This is due to the fact that most of them were former FALINTIL commanders who are still loyal to their former commander-in-chief, Xanana Gusmao. Taur Matan Ruak, the current commander-in-chief of Forcas Armadas da Defesa de Timor Leste, FDTL (East Timor Defence Forces) was deputy commander of FALINTIL, Lere Anan Timor, chief staff of FDTL, was commander of region one of FALINTIL, and Falur Rate Laek, Commander of first infantry battalion of FDTL, was commander of region three of FALINTIL.

Meanwhile, the police force is more connected to the government. Since most of the

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110 See STL, UNMISET Responsible for PNTL Brutality, 28 July 2005.
police officers were Indonesian police forces, their loyalty to the government was merely to secure their positions or obtain promotions. This is because the government controls the police force. This has raised concerns of many analysts, because any conflict between politicians can spill over and may cause these two institutions to be involved.\footnote{The author is very grateful to Dr. Helder da Costa, the former head of Research Institute, East Timor National University, and Dr. Joao Cancio Freitas, Rector of Dili Institute of Technology for this point. See also interview with Marcelino Ximenes Magno.}

Relations between these two subsets of security institutions at the elite level have been tinged with conflicts. The most violent conflict was on 24 January 2004 when a few young soldiers of the military force attacked a police station in Lospalos which resulted in several police being injured. Many analysts argue that conflicts between these two institutions are mostly due to psychological problems. Many officers of these institutions in the past fought against each other. For example, while serving in with the Indonesian police, officers fought against FALINTIL members. Thus, their presence in the police force today has alienated many FALINTIL members.

However, these strains have not developed into a greater power struggle because Xanana has several times intervened to resolve their problem.\footnote{Timor Post, ‘Confrontation Between FDTL Soldiers and Police Forces in Lospalos’, 26 January 2004; STL, ‘FDTL Shooting a Big Mistake – Says Xanana’, 27 January 2004; STL, ‘Those Involved in the Shooting Have to Face Justice’, 27 January 2004.} For example, in the case of Lospalos, President Xanana established a commission of inquiry to investigate the case and asked the military to discipline those were involved in the
incident. The commission’s report was never made public but provided some important inputs to reduce the level of conflict.\textsuperscript{114} Furthermore, the issue of the establishment of a special force unit also contributed to conflict. In 2003, the government created a special force which was placed under the police structure. This government policy was first rejected by civil society and opposition parties, fearing that the government might use this special force to crack down on the opposition and its critics, since the unit was created based on the controversial Internal Security Act. Critics suggested that the special force should be placed within the military to be used only against external threat. The government, however, rejected those concerns and went ahead with the decision to place the special force unit under the police force.\textsuperscript{115} This created a situation of hostility since the military felt that the government gives more attention to the police. This situation could be of concern in the future, because these two institutions can be used by political elites to create conflicts that may damage the prospect of democracy.

Despite East Timor’s low levels of development, enough private sector economic activity takes place that a category of business elites can be identified. During the Indonesian occupation, many of these elites were involved in merchant trading. They also participated in politics by joining sundry resistance movement. Oscar Lima, and Julio Alfaro, two of the most successful businessmen in


\textsuperscript{115} Timor Post, ‘Special Police Force Under Internal Ministry’, 1 December 2003.
independent East Timor, were businessmen during the Indonesian occupation, but at the same time supporters of the resistance. For example, Julio Alfaro was director of P.T. Rosario, a company that was operating in constructions during the Indonesian period. The company usually obtained contracts with the Indonesian local government to construct or rehabilitate buildings, government houses and roads. The company also sometimes won the tender for supplying equipments to the government. Oscar Lima was director of P.T. Surik Emas, a company operating in real estate development during the occupation. Lima usually obtained credits from the Indonesian bank, Bank Tabungan Negara (BTN), to build houses that would be sold to the public through the bank. He also sometimes obtained contracts from the Indonesian local government and the military to supply equipment to them.

There is also a younger generation that is currently involved in business. For example, Ricardo Nhew, the former teacher of Dili Polytechnic, and Rui Manuel, are President and Secretary General of the East Timor Chamber of Commerce and Trade (ETCCT) respectively. These two young people are currently contactors in building constructions and merchant traders. Nhew operates a shop in Vila-Verde, Dili that trades foodstuffs and household goods.

Some business elites are associated with political parties, especially as financial donors. For example, Oscar Lima, and Julio Alfaro are members of FRETILIN. Naturally, their association with FRETILIN has increased their business opportunities in government-linked enterprises. For example, Julio Alfaro, and Oscar Lima are currently large-scale stake holders in Timor Telecom, a telecommunication
company which is partly owned by the government of East Timor. The company is given the right of monopoly in telecommunications by the government. Alfaro and Lima are regarded as two of the major financial donors to FRETILIN. During the 2001 election they had provided significant financial support to FRETILIN. Due to their position as financial providers for certain political parties, including the ruling party, FRETILIN, and as relatives of ruling party leaders, elites in this group in some circumstances influence the political decision-making process. They usually lobby the government to make decisions which could benefit their business.

For example, Lima and Alfaro succeeded in lobbying the government to introduce a regulation that gives their company the only corporation that operates in telecommunication. Bader Alkatiri, a young brother of Mari Alkatiri, was granted a lucrative monopoly to supply military equipment to the East Timor security forces. His contract with the government has raised concerns about government transparency and policy in making contracts with business companies, as mentioned above. Interestingly, elites in this group have tried to avoid any political tensions or outright conflict that may threaten their business activities.

116 Besides the government, Julio Alfaro and Oscar Lima, there are some other stake holders including Manuel Carrascalao, and Portugal Telecom. The author could not obtain any details about the ownership of each of them, since there is no data available.

117 TIDS in its report on corruption in East Timor mentioned that some of the form of corruption in East Timor is the award of government contracts to the members of ruling party and families of government. The report is in author’s collection.

118 Interview with Francisco Borolaco Soares.

A strong Church-based elite can also be identified in East Timor. It consists of mostly Catholic Church leaders and other religious such as the Protestant Church and the minority Moslem leaders. The Catholic Church performed a pivotal role in mobilising resistance against the Indonesian occupation. In consequence, Bishop Carlos Felipe Belo, a tireless campaigner for human rights and independence under the Indonesian occupation, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996. And the late Father Mario Belo was one of the most active priests to provide support to the resistance. Due to its history in the resistance, the Church to some extent has influence in political decision making process. For instance, in the issue of whether religion should be a compulsory subject in public schools, the Catholic Church staged almost a month of demonstrations to force the government to change its decision and accept the church demand that religion should be a compulsory subject in public schools.\textsuperscript{120}

The Church has been considered by the people as the most effective institution that provide social control to the government.\textsuperscript{121} For example, the opposition of the Church to the creation of the Truth and Friendship Commission (TFC) has encouraged the victims and human rights NGOs to protest the government in regard to the creation of the TFC. Such protest has created political tension in East Timor between the government and the NGOs. Xanana Gusmao, who is regarded as the progenitor of the TFC, was criticised by some victims and youth groups during a dialog in Lospalos. Gusmao was even accused of betraying the victims of the

\textsuperscript{120} Catholic World News, ‘Timor Strikes Deal to End Church-Backed Protests’, 10 May 2005

\textsuperscript{121} Discussions with the head of villages in Uato Lari, 16 June 2003.
violence who died to defend East Timor independence. At the same time, the church has also criticised government policies. The Catholic Church currently does not have a good relationship with the government due to the May 2005 demonstration and the Church’s opposition to the TFC. The government, in turn, has been very suspicious of the Church.

Civil society elites are those who during the resistance decided to distance themselves from political parties and became only members of the CNRM/CNRT. After the dissolution of the CNRT in 2001 they became independents who did not adhere to any existing political parties or established new political parties. Some young intellectuals who during the Indonesian occupation were sympathetic to the resistance but did not fully involve themselves in the activities, who after the referendum continued to be neutral, can also be included into this group (see Table 5.3).

Xanana Gusmao, Jose Ramos Horta, Deonisio Babo, Helder da Costa and Joao Saldanha are members of this elite. They usually base their support on their past political organisation or their social institutions. For example, Xanana Gusmao bases his support on CNRT, FALINTIL/FDTL and the people in the villages. After the dissolution of CNRT, Xanana establishes his base on Veterans of Resistance

122 STL, ‘Prezidente Xanana: Hau Involve Iha CVA Laos Osan’ (President Xanana: I Am Involved in TFC Not Because of Money), 15 August 2005; STL, ‘Xanana: Hau Mak Ba Uluk Tribunal’ (Xanana: I Will Be the First to Go to Tribunal), 1 September 2005.


124 Interview with Marcelino Ximenes Magno.
Association and FALINTIL/FDTL. Xanana has been regarded by the people of East Timor as the resistance leader and East Timor hero due to his leadership in commanding the guerrilla fighters and establishing clandestine networks throughout East Timor during the Indonesian occupation. His influence is incomparable to any other member of the elite and political party including FRETILIN. For example, during the Presidential election, FRETILIN leaders especially Mari Alkatiri tried to avert FRETILIN’s support to Xanana by appealing to FRETILIN supporters to cast a blank ballot, as mentioned above. But such efforts had no impact on Xanana’s vote as he won comfortably with 82.7 percent of the valid votes cast.\textsuperscript{125} Ramos Horta bases his support on the Australian group and CNRT. After its dissolution he gathered support from the Veterans of Resistance Association. Horta to some extent tries to use his own reputation as Nobel Peace Laureate to gather support. He also tries to bolster his image as a long time advocate of East Timor independence in order to give him a political advantage, like Xanana Gusmao. In the villages, people regard Horta as a member of the resistance triumvirate which also includes Xanana Gusmao and Bishop Carlos Belo.\textsuperscript{126} Deonisio Babo, Helder da Costa and Joao Saldanha build their support from social institutions such as Makaer Fukun (the lawyers’ association), the University of East Timor, and the Timor Institute of Development Studies (TIDS). For example, Deonisio Babo is the president of Makaer Fukun, Helder was the Director of University of the East Timor Research Institute, and Joao Saldanha is Executive Director of TIDS.

\textsuperscript{125} See BBC, ‘Gusmao Wins Timor Presidency’, Tuesday, 16 April, 2002.

\textsuperscript{126} Discussions with head of villages in sub-district of Ossu, 8 July 2003 and traditional leaders in Uato-Carabau 12 July 2003.
Civil society elites generally perpetuate strong relations between them since they share certain principles, good and clean governance, democracy, and human rights. Some members of this group usually criticised government policies which in many circumstances resulted in political tension between them and the government. For example, Xanana Gusmao, since he became president, has tried to use his constitutional authority to prevent the government and the national parliament from producing wrong policies and regulations. Gusmao’s efforts have thus created tensions between his office and the government. The request of Gusmao to dismiss Interior Minister, Rogerio Lobato, in November 2002 and his vetoes on the Security Act and the Law on Freedom of Demonstration are cases in point. Joao Saldanha has also bemoaned the lack of good governance. In turn, the government denounced Saldanha as favouring autonomy within Indonesia. This accusation, however, invited many criticisms from civil society and the opposition parties.

Beside these elite groups, there are also some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that form the core of civil society. Their presence is still weak compared to political and other social institutions, but to some extent they have tried to encourage social activism. For example, in the adoption of Security Act and Law on Freedom of Demonstration, these NGOs were the most active critics of the government. They

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held different forums to discuss the consequences of the Internal Security Act.\textsuperscript{129} Their criticism indirectly prompted the President to veto the Act. But the Act was later reintroduced by the ruling party, FRETILIN, to the Parliament and was passed by 2/3 of the parliament, a minimum requirement to force the president to promulgate the Act as mentioned in Chapter Two.

In addition, these NGOs have also been very active in lobbying international organisations including the UN not to support the creation of Truth and Friendship Commission (TFC). They have criticised the government and Xanana Gusmao on the formation of TCF. They tried to prevent the formation of the TCF by appealing to the national parliament to block Xanana and the government’s efforts of forming the TCF.\textsuperscript{130} This has created some strained relationship between these NGOS and the government.

Meanwhile, the pro-Indonesian elites ceased to exist in East Timor because many of them left East Timor and currently live in West Timor, Indonesia. Abilio Osorio Soares, the former governor of East Timor, now lives in West Timor. Eurico Guterres, one of commander of militia, is now in Jakarta and Armindo Mariano, the former speaker of the local parliament, now lives in Kupang. Interestingly, some of them lost completely their status as elites and were convicted by the Indonesian Ad

\textsuperscript{129} Dili Institute of Technology (DIT), and Dili University organised two different forums to discuss the Security Act in May and June 2003. The author attended DIT’s seminar.

Hoc Tribunal in the case of the UN-post referendum violence. For example, Soares and Guterres were both convicted by the court for instigating violence in East Timor. They were sentenced to ten years imprisonment. But only Soares was imprisoned for more than few months and later was released by an Indonesian Supreme Court decision.

Others decided to return to East Timor and joined different groups of elites. For example, Sebastiao Ximenes, a radical pro-autonomy supporter, upon his return to East Timor joined FRETILIN and later was appointed as East Timor Ombudsman as mentioned above. Salvador Ximenes Soares, the former secretary general of a moderate faction of pro-autonomy, Barisan Rakyat Timor Timur, BRTT, upon his return established a newspaper, Suara Timor Lorosae, an independent newspaper that in recent months was under government pressure due to its reports on hunger and criticisms of the opposition and civil society of government policies.

In addition, members of this group, especially the militias, have on several occasions stirred tensions on the border. Some of the militias infiltrated into East Timor and attacked local populations or ambushed vehicles and killed people, while others ransacked border areas and destroyed property. The current case was the conflict in Oecussi, where militias and the local Indonesian population, with the support of the Indonesian military, ravaged a few East Timor villages along the border and destroyed properties.\(^{131}\) Their presence on the border still constitutes a security threat to East Timor. This may destabilise East Timor politically in the future.

In sum, one notes that East Timor’s elites consist of different types and organisational bases. They mainly organised themselves into small components that reflect their past political association, generation, organisational base and geographical location. Each component of the elite has a different political and social influence in the society. For example, the Mozambique group is considered by East Timorese as the most influential group, as it is in charge of the government. The freedom fighters group and the Catholic Church have more social and religious influence in the society, since these two groups have been regarded by the East Timorese as protectors.

Most important in this classification, however, is that elite political outlooks and behaviours differed significantly from one group to another. The old generation, for example, is more conservative and pro-Portugal while the young generation is more idealistic and pro-democracy. The Mozambique group is more pro-authoritarian while the Portugal, Australia and the freedom fighters groups are more pro-democracy. Their political outlooks and behaviours are shaped by the place where they used to live during the Indonesian occupation. For example, the Mozambique group is more autocratic and pro-authoritarian regime since the country they used to live was operated in authoritarian ways. In addition, elite division based on past political associations has led to the renewal of past political conflict. Conflicts between FRETILIN and UDT during the CA election and Xanana Gusmao and FRETILIN during the presidential election are cases in point.
Conclusions

We observe that the role of East Timorese elites in negotiating the territory’s status under Indonesian occupation was a small one. Portugal and Indonesia were the central participants in dealings that were facilitated by the UN. Even after the UN sponsored-referendum was held and during the UN transitional administration that followed, the role of East Timorese elites in decision making process remained modest. Rather, crucial decisions were made by UN officials in New York. Such exclusion denied East Timorese elites the opportunity to learn and to habituate themselves in making political decisions based on peaceful dialogue and bargaining. Thus, they remained predisposed to the use of subterfuge, even violence, in their dealings with one another. The December 2002 and 19 July 2004 demonstration are cases in point.

Accordingly, while the UN was essential for the introduction in East Timor of governing institutions and democratic procedures, relations between local elites were never reorganised in ways that would encourage their peaceful interaction within these institutions. In consequence, tensions between elites continue to simmer. It remains unclear whether, or for how long, these tensions might be contained by the formal institutions and procedures that have been put in place. The aim of this chapter has been to chart the origins and dimensions of the many kinds of elites that participate in East Timor’s politics today. Basic fault lines stem from generational membership (older and younger), geographic location (diaspora and home grown), and, since independence, different organisational bases (political parties, state bureaucracy, security forces, business, the Catholic Church, and civil society). And
given their diverse origins and attitudes toward democracy, unmoderated by serious external guidance, whether provided by the UN or Portugal, or internal settlement or pact-making, it is little wonder that elites in East Timor regard one another with deep suspicions, posing real challenges to their peaceful interactions, political stability, and democratic politics. Thus, even while so far avoiding outright warring, different elite factions remain wary of one another and doubtful over the worth of democracy. Indeed, the present-day ascendancy of elites in the Mozambique group bodes ill for East Timor’s democratic consolidation.

To see this more clearly, a more explicit assessment must be made of the extent to which relations between elites in East Timor must be classified as disunified. It is to this that Chapter Six now turns.
CHAPTER SIX
ELITE RELATIONS, INSTITUTIONS AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

As elaborated in Chapter One, the literature on democratic transitions cannot adequately analyse cases in which a country’s independence and the democratisation of its politics are coterminous. The case of East Timor is complicated also by several situational variables. As discussed in Chapter Five, local elites were not the major force in negotiating political changes. Instead, the governments of Portugal and Indonesia were central, pursuing these changes under United Nations (UN) auspices. Second, the local resistance movement against Indonesian rule depended heavily on international support, especially from civil society organisations in Australia, the United Kingdom, the USA, Ireland, New Zealand, and Portugal. Third, after the UN-sponsored referendum in August 1999, existing institutions including civil administration and the judiciary totally collapsed in East Timor. These institutions were re-established in early 2000 by the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).

These factors have affected East Timor’s democratic development. For example, as mentioned in Chapter Five, the exclusion of East Timorese elites from participation in the political settlement process increased suspicious among them. They had little role, too, in the formation of institutions. In these conditions, elites have been predisposed to turn to violence when political disagreements have emerged. The violent demonstrations of 4 December 2002, and 19 July 2004 are cases in point. The major question in this chapter, then, is whether, given the lack of elite-level habituation in
peaceful interaction and democratic norms, East Timor’s new democracy will be consolidated.

In this chapter, I will first discuss elite relations in East Timor in order to gauge the extent to which the country’s politics are stable or unstable. Next, I will examine the new institutions that have been established to assess the prospects for the new democracy consolidating. Finally, I will sketch some scenarios of East Timor’s political outcomes based on the current situation.

Elites Relations

Since independence, East Timorese elites have competed for ideological ascendancy and state power. Contestation over ideology has persisted since the struggles during the mid-1970s between resistance leaders and those favouring incorporation into Indonesia (as discussed in Chapter Four). Even today, though many members of the latter faction have left East Timor and live in Indonesia, they continue to pursue the re-integration of East Timor into Indonesia, activities that can affect East Timor’s democratic development. Most notably, pro-Indonesian militias are still active on the border, sometimes crossing into East Timor, with the latest incursion taking place in Oecussi in September 2005. While this warring persists, East Timor is denied even the ‘stateness’ that precedes political stability and democracy.1

1 Francisco da Costa Guterres, ‘Reconciliation Between East Timor and Indonesia: In Search of Justice and Stability’ a paper written for the International Conference, Peace Justice and Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific Region, The Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, The University of
On a brighter note, former resistance leaders in government today have been trying to promote reconciliation and the peaceful return of many pro-Indonesians to East Timor. To this end, the office of President Xanana has organised several meetings since 2001 with elites who favour reintegration with Indonesia, seeking to convince these elites of the desirability of East Timor’s independence. These meetings have been somewhat fruitful, with some who have favoured integration returning to East Timor where, as mentioned in Chapter Five, they have gained bureaucratic positions. What is more, East Timor’s leaders have signed an agreement with the Indonesian government to establish a Truth and Friendship Commission with which to deal with the legacies of violence. In August 2005, Francisco Lopes da Cruz, a pro-Indonesia leader, appointed by Indonesia’s government as its ambassador to Portugal, visited East Timor. In his statement, da Cruz acknowledged East Timor’s independence and promised to cooperate with the East Timor government in promoting the country’s economic and social development. Thus, there are grounds for thinking that this ideological


contestation over East Timor’s sovereignty will subside, removing an impediment to its political stabilisation and democratic development.

The political competition over state power within East Timor, however, persists, exacerbated by historical rivalries and long-standing suspicions between elites. Clear examples of this involve the tensions that marred the Constituent Assembly election in August 2001 (as discussed in Chapter five), as well as the violent demonstrations referred to above.

In trying to account for these suspicions and rivalries, I turn to the patterns of elite-level relations identified by Burton, Gunther, and Higley. Briefly, they specify two broad features: ‘structural integration (the inclusiveness of elite networks of communication and influence)’ and ‘value consensus (agreement among elites over the norms of political conduct and the worth of existing institutions)’. 6 In East Timor, elite relations can be regarded as disunified, because elites remain ready to mobilise their followings to violence against their political opponents. Communication between elites is minimum; they do not even cross ‘factional lines’ as sketched by Burton et al.7 Elites distrust each other deeply and perceive politics as war or as a ‘zero-sum’ game.8 The


7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.
opposition desire to topple the government through mass mobilisation and the government’s efforts to expropriate resources from the opposition are cases in point.

There are several characteristic features of this relationship. First is the re-activation of past political rivalries which began in the 2001 UN-sponsored election as mentioned above. Elites accused their political opponents of being former supporters of pro-Indonesia and thus guilty of treason against the nation.\(^9\) This has generated political tensions as elites engaged in defaming each others in order to undermine their opponent’s political credibility as mentioned in Chapter five. Such a situation created a vulnerable group, the former leaders and supporters of pro-autonomy, which has been the subject of political and physical harassment. The accusation of being pro-autonomy re-ignited the desire for revenge by many supporters of independence against former pro-autonomy leaders or supporters. In Uato Lari, for example, families of pro-autonomy leaders were physically harassed and their cattle were stolen. At the time of writing, former pro-autonomy leaders are still experiencing some verbal harassment. They also experience some kind of limitation of movement in East Timor. Some of them have not yet returned to their home villages, as they are still afraid of revenge due to their political association.\(^{10}\)

This exploitation of pro-autonomy issues was intended to divert public attention from administrative failings and corrupt practices. For example, during the 2005 village elections in Dili, Mari Alkatiri falsely accused Joao Saldanha, executive director of the Timor Institute of Development Studies (TIDS), of writing a book during the


\(^{10}\) Interview with an anonymous former pro-autonomy, Dili, 6 July 2003.
Indonesian period that sought to discredit the resistance movement. According to Joao Cancio Freitas, Mari’s aim was to shift unfavourable attention from his government’s record. Moreover, these rivalries between elites precipitated divisions between their respective village-level followings. As mentioned in Chapter Five, elites mobilised their followings in the villages to advocate violence against their political opponents. Such attitudes reflect lack of ‘structural integration’ and ‘value consensus’ among elites as sketched by Burton et al. The case of Uato Lari and Bucoli, Baucau, in which supporters of FRETILIN attacked PSD local leaders and UNDERTIM headquarters and followings as mentioned in Chapter Five are cases in point.

A second indicator of this elite-level disunity involves the ‘expropriation of opposition resources’. The ruling party, FRETILIN, has used this strategy systematically to weaken its political opponents. For example, as mentioned in Chapter Five, in July 2003, the government evicted Mario Carrascalao, the president of an opposition party, PSD (Social Democratic Party) from his official residence. With this action coinciding with the establishment of Plataforma da Unidade Nacional (Platform

of National Unity), a coalition of parties that challenged Alkatiri’s government by calling an early election as mentioned in Chapter Five, it was clearly designed to intimidate the opposition. It coincided also with the release of a survey conducted by the International Republican Institute survey that revealed Mario Carrascalao as the preferred Prime Minister should Alkatiri’s government be dismissed. As an opposition leader, Carrascalao has regularly criticised the government for failing to contain the mounting corruption in East Timor. In addition, the government turned down an application made by the PD (Democratic Party) to use one of the government buildings as its headquarters. Meanwhile, FRETILIN has made free use of government facilities as headquarters.

Beyond expropriating resources from its political opponents, the ruling FRETILIN has evicted media companies that have criticised it. For example, in February 2005, the government ousted a local newspaper, Suara Timor Lorosae, from the building that it had acquired during the Indonesian period. This action was taken in retaliation for the newspaper’s having published interviews with opposition parties and reports of food

14 Platform of the National Unity was formed by Democratic Party, Social Democratic Party, ASDT (Associacao Social Democratica Timorense), Kota, PDC (Christian Democratic Party), and PST (Partido Socialista Timorense). See STL, ‘The Signatories of the Political Platform of National Unity to Meet President Xanana’, 9 May 2003.


16 Interview with Clementino Amaral, Member of National Parliament from KOTA, Dili, 21 May 2003, and Cipriana Pereira, Member of National Parliament from FRETILIN, Dili, 6 June 2003.
shortages and hunger in East Timor. The partisanship of these actions against Carrascalao and Suara Timor Lorosae are made plain by the fact that there are still many supporters of FRETILIN and other NGOs sympathetic to the government who occupy government facilities. One example involves FOKUPERS, a women’s organisation, that while closely aligned to the government remains in government quarters.

The bitterness in elite-level relations is revealed also by the opposition’s strenuous efforts to oust the government by forcing early elections on dubious grounds. The opposition, citing the rise in corrupt practices, has challenged the very legality of the government. It has also deemed as unconstitutional the transformation of the Constituent Assembly (CA) into a national parliament. In these circumstances, elites in opposition and civil society have tried to encourage their followings to mount large demonstrations, pressuring the president to call an early election. But Xanana Gusmao rejected their demands, urging them to remain committed to constitutional procedures as mentioned in Chapter Five. Nonetheless, Mari Alkatiri responded by accusing the opposition of acting unconstitutionally. Further, his supporters are alleged to have intimidated opposition members. For example, Lucia Lobato, the vice-president of PSD and a member of the National Parliament, received threatening phone calls after she


18 See the Result of Discussions in East Timor Study Group (ETSG), 20 May 2003. The author was present and became moderator of the discussion.

19 See STL, ‘PM: There is no Anticipated Election’, 5 May 2003.
criticized the government and called for early elections.\textsuperscript{20} Alkatiri’s government followed this up by introducing the Internal Security Act and Law on Freedom of Demonstration which prohibited protesters from questioning the government’s legitimacy or mounting protests of any kind in front of government buildings.\textsuperscript{21}

On this count, Article 8 of Internal Security Act gives the power to the government to define the guidelines and policy of internal security, which raised concerns about the use of the act against the government’s opponents or critics.\textsuperscript{22} Still, Articles 6, 7, and 15 of Law on Freedom of Demonstration restrict the right of the people to assembly and to demonstrate against government policies.\textsuperscript{23} In addition, at the time of writing this thesis, the government has also introduced a new Penal Code containing harsh criminal penalties for individuals guilty of defamation. This new law will have a detrimental impact on the free flow of information and freedom of expression in East Timor. As well, this new Penal Code will provide special protection to the government officials and move them away for being accountable to the people. Mari Alkatiri has used this defamation bill to take court action against Fernando Lasama, the president of PD for

\textsuperscript{20} The government denied the claim but many people believe that this action was from the government. Interview with Marcelino Magno Ximenes, Researcher of Timor Institute of Development Studies (TIDS), 15 July 2005 by telephone. Interview with Salvador Ximenes Soares, 4 November 2004 by telephone and e-mail.


\textsuperscript{22} See Article 8 of Law No. 8/2003, Internal Security, 8 October 2003.

accusing Alkatiri receiving bribes from the Australian government to sign the Timor
Sea agreement on 12 January 2006.  

But even where shared networks prevail, relations between elites in East Timor
must be characterised as disunified. Thus, not only do elites in the government and
opposition clash, but so do elites within parties, creating what Larry Diamond has
characterised as ‘internal factionalism’. In brief, East Timor’s political parties lack
discipline, organisation and coherence. They have so far failed to specify clear game
rules by which to regulate elite behaviours within parties, leaving politicians to pursue
self-interested agendas rather than party-based strategies and programs. For example, in
the opposition PSD, Leandro Isaac, the party’s vice-president, strenuously confronted
Mario Carrascalao, the party’s president. Carrascalao responded by accusing Issac of
breaching the party’s code of conduct by voting in favour of the government’s
budgetary proposals in parliament. Isaac was also accused by party members of
accepting various inducements from the government, leading to his finally being

24 This policy has been criticised by the international community especially by journalist associations,
civil society and the opposition parties. Committee to Protect Journalist (CPJ) and The International Press
Institute have written to President Xanana Gusmao urging him not to sign the bill until all articles about
defamation are removed. See letters of Committee to Protect Journalist (CPJ), 13 January 2006, and The
International Press Institute, 12 January 2006 in author’s collection. See also STL, ‘PM Alkatiri Taking

25 Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymor Martin Lipset, ‘Introduction: Comparing Experiences with
Democracy’ in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymor Martin Lipset, eds., Politics in Developing
Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienns Publishers,

26 Interview with an anonymous PSD member, Dili 22 July 2003.
purged. However, with his supporters contesting this action vigorously, a faction broke away to create the new *Partido Millennium Democratico* (Millennium Democratic Party), further eroding party discipline and fragmenting the opposition.

FRETILIN experienced some of the same internal factionalism when some of its Central Committee members, including Victor da Costa, Vicente Mau Bossy, and Reis Kadalak, challenged the leadership of Mari Alkatiri and Lu Olo. Da Costa and his colleagues challenged the competence of Alkatiri and Lu Olo in their leadership roles. They accused Mari Alkatiri of corruption and nepotism, hence jeopardizing FRETILIN’s standing prior to the next elections. Da Costa, Bossy and Kadalak formed a new faction called *Renovador* (agent of change) the hope of generating support for themselves in FRETILIN’s next national congress. In response to this challenge, Lu Olo and Mari Alkatiri suspended Bossy and Kadalak from the party and dismissed da Costa as head of Centre of Civil Servant Recruitment (CISPI) as mentioned in Chapter Five. *Renovador* and Alkatiri and Lu Olo then accused each other openly of authoritarian behaviours and character failings.

This elite-level disunity and internal factionalism extended also to the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). In 2003, the party president, Antonio Ximenes, dismissed his vice-president, Jose Sereno, because of the latter’s involvement in the Platform of National Unity. In reaction to his dismissal, Sereno gathered support from members of the party and succeeded in organising a special congress that dismissed Antonio Ximenes. Ximenes then challenged the result of the congress through the court of


28 Joao Cancio, Rector of Dili Institute of Technology recounted this story to the author in August 2004.
appeal, enabling him to gain reinstatement. But this outcome also left the party bitterly divided, with Sereno and his allies rejecting the court’s decision. Each side, then, claims still rightfully to hold the party presidency.

In this internal factionalism, elites also advocated violence against their rivals, because in their perception, the existence of their rivals could pose a threat to their political interest and ambitions to grasp power. For example, in FRETILIN, Lu Olo and Alkatiri have publicly asked their followings to reject the presence of their internal opponents, Mau Bossy and Reis Kadalak, in the villages. Such an appeal has restricted Bossy’s and Kadalak’s movement. In Lu Olo’s and Alkatiri’s view, Bossy’s and Kadalak’s activities may threaten their political interest in the party, since the national Congress of FRETILIN will be held soon, in mid 2006.29

To summarise this section, elite relations in East Timor are difficult to classify clearly in terms of the typology developed by Higley et al. Put simply, these relations do not amount to the open warring that constitutes disunity. But neither do they feature the structural integration and value consensus associated with elite-level unity. Instead, elite persons and factions, with divisions traceable to formative periods under Portuguese and Indonesian rule, and crystallised by rivalries during the mid-1970s, engage one another warily and skirmish tirelessly.

As Higley et al. note ‘the origin of national elite disunity apparently lies in the process of nation-state formation’.30 As recounted in the third chapter of this thesis,

three main political parties emerged, UDT, FRETILIN and APODETI which, far from
gaining any structural integration and value consensus, competed in unregulated ways
for popular support and state power. This encouraged the UDT to mount a coup, during
which it imprisoned and killed some leaders of FRETILIN. This was followed by
FRETILIN’s counter coup, during which it retaliated by killing many of UDT and
APODETI leaders. This sequence grew deadlier still in December 1975 when the
Indonesian military, with the support of UDT, APODETI and two other small parties,
KOTA and Trabalhista (Labour Party), invaded East Timor, precipitating a long period
of bitter struggle between pro-Indonesian forces and FRETILIN. Indeed, as we have
seen, during the Indonesian occupation, the Indonesian military and its local
collaborators targeted resistance leaders in FRETILIN. Later, after the UN-sponsored
referendum, many FRETILIN supporters took revenge by systematically harassing pro-
Indonesians.

These legacies bear still upon elite relations today, with many elites from the mid-
1970s still active, most notably Mario Carrascalao, Joao Carrascalao, Mari Alkatiri,
Xavier do Amaral, Ramos Horta, Xanana Gusmao and Abilio Araujo. Mario
Carrascalao was a senior leader of UDT, while Joao Carrascalao was the commander-
in-chief of UDT forces that carried out the coup which sought to sideline FRETILIN.
Xavier do Amaral, Ramos Horta, Mari Alkatiri and Abilio de Araujo, senior leaders of
FRETILIN, spearheaded the counter-coup. Xanana Gusmao, the pivotal figure, was
imprisoned by UDT, then later rescued by FRETILIN forces.

More recently, these elite-level rivalries have been reinforced through the formation
of some political organisations. For example, the Concelho Popular da Defesa da
Republica Democratica de Timor Leste (CPD-RDTL) was established in 1999 by some
disgruntled members of FRETILIN, including Antonio Aitahan Matak, Cristiano da Costa, pro-Indonesians, and former FALINTIL commanders. During the period of UN administration, this group also pressed for the UN’s immediate withdrawal, hoping to create a vacuum in which it might seize power. It then boycotted the elections that the UN organised, decrying them as illegal. Moreover, after independence, the CPD-RDTL pressed for adoption of the 1975 constitution, even though it had been rejected by the government and parliament. And it continues to agitate at the village level, demanding that people refuse to acknowledge the current government and constitution. As president, Xanana has several times tried to engage this group in dialogue, hoping to persuade it to reorganise as a political party that will compete through electoral procedures. But the group has rejected Xanana’s entreaties, prompting the government to start arresting some of its members.

Thus, even as elites in East Timor avoid outright warring, their relations clearly lack forbearance and trust. Thus, FRETILIN leaders view opposition parties and critical civil society organisations as unfairly constraining their prospects in the next election.

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31 These former FALINTIL commanders were those who attempted to challenge Xanana Gusmao leadership, then surrendered to the Indonesian military as mentioned in Chapter Four.


34 See STL, ‘PM: There is No Anticipated Election’, 5 May 2003, Dili.
They also fear that if they were lose this election, they will be treated harshly afterward, perhaps permanently sidelined from competitive politics. They calculate, then, in order to avoid these outcomes, they must take strong measures to protect themselves and their interests by intimidating their political rivals and discrediting them as pro-Indonesian, expropriating resources, and manipulating electoral procedures. Accordingly, opposition parties view FRETILIN’s ascendancy as a threat to their very political existence.\(^{35}\)

Inter-elite relations can be understood in East Timor, then, as nearly ‘zero-sum’.\(^{36}\)

However, despite these suspicions, elite relations in East Timor have not deteriorated yet into outright and sustained violence. This can be attributed to several factors. First, in deploying his leadership paramountcy in benign ways, President Xanana has several times intervened in factional struggles. For example, in May 2003 when the opposition parties established *Plataforma da Unidade Nacional*, seeking to pressure the government through massive demonstrations to step down, Xanana persuaded the leaders of these parties to withdraw. Xanana recognised that such a confrontation threatened political stability and democratic development as mentioned in Chapter Five.\(^{37}\) In addition, after the violent demonstrations mounted by former resistance members against the government in July 2004, Xanana mediated effectively between the government and protesters in order to find common ground.\(^{38}\) And when in May 2005 the Catholic Church mounted protests against the government over its policy

\(^{35}\) See STL, ‘National Parliament has been guided by majority party’, 5 May 2003, Dili. See also interview with Cipriana Pereira.

\(^{36}\) See Higley and Burton, ‘The Elite Variable’, p. 19; see also Burton et al., Introduction, p. 10-11.

\(^{37}\) See also interview with Joao Cancio Freitas.

of eliminating religious education from the public-school curriculum, leading to serious confrontation, Xanana again mediated an agreement by which tensions were defused.  

A second factor that restrained elite warring involved East Timor’s high level of aid dependence on international donors. Currently, more than 60 percent of the government’s budget is derived from international aid sources. Thus, a sustained presence in East Timor of the UN and international donor agencies has helped to dissuade local elites from resorting to violence. Many donor countries provide assistance to East Timor on condition that democratic procedures, human rights, transparency, accountability and the rule of law are respected. After the outbreak of violence in December 2002, international donors continued their aid programs, but demanded that an investigation into the conflict be conducted. Local elites grew more willing to comply after some foreign investors took flight, fearing that their business prospects had dimmed.

In these conditions, where pressures exist for both unified and disunified elite-level behaviours, patterns have emerged that are best understood in terms of what Juan Linz

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has conceptualized as ‘semi-loyalty’. In this configuration, elites do not fully recognise one another as legitimate power contenders. Nor do they fully respect democratic procedures as the rightful arenas in which their competition should be conducted. Accordingly, elites interact with deep wariness, but do not regularly resort to outright violence, attitudes that can tip either way, holding commensurate implications for East Timor’s political stability and democracy. To gain more perspective, let us turn now from elite-level attitudes to the institutions that have been developed, another dimension that by regulating elite behaviours can affect the consolidation of new democracies.

**Institution Building**

As discussed in Chapter Two, while historical legacies can impact on elite attitudes and relation, so too can institutional design. Thus, institutions, too, in affecting elite behaviours, are important for the consolidation of any new democracy. They can be important for democratisation because they can help to regulate elite behaviours. As Jack Snyder has argued, institutions can regularise—and hence, make more predictable—elite-level attitude and behaviours. Indeed, as noted in Chapter Two,


Crawford and Ostrom define institutions as long-term and steady human interactions which occur frequently or repetitively, giving rise to rules and norms.\textsuperscript{45} Thus, institutions may help to habituate elite behaviours after a democratic transition has been completed and questions over consolidation begin to loom.\textsuperscript{46} Analysts of democratisation also argue that institutions are central to creating broader norms of citizenship.\textsuperscript{47} On this score, Larry Diamond makes explicit reference to institutions that encourage political freedoms, accountability, representativeness, the rule of law, and administrative capacity.

In East Timor, after the announcement of the results of the UN sponsored referendum on 4 September 1999, all formal institutions established by the Indonesian government suddenly collapsed, leaving the country utterly devoid of an institutional base. Intervention by the UN helped to re-establish some of these institutions, in particular, basic administrative and judicial structures. And as soon as UNTAET was set up in East Timor, it established a body to assist the UN in running the transitional administration, forming the basis later for a state bureaucracy. According to Linz and Stephan, the state bureaucracy, of course, is one of the institutions most necessary for providing services and upholding the rights of citizens.\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{45} Quoted in David Potter ‘Explaining Democratization’ in David Potter, David Goldblatt, Margaret Kiloh, and Paul Lewis, eds., \textit{Democratization}, (Walton Hall: The Open University, 1997), p. 27.


\textsuperscript{47} See Smith, \textit{Understanding Third World Politics}: p. 271.

However, while the bureaucracy from the Indonesian period had been wiped away, its legacies of corruption and ineffectiveness seemed to persist. East Timor’s bureaucracy, then, however new, remains tainted with corruption and lack of discipline. In addition, as noted above, because the bureaucracy and other institutions were imposed by foreign agencies, rather than formed in consultation with local elites, attitudes of semi-loyalty persist. Corrupt practices and nepotistic recruitment thus appear to be deeply rooted in some of East Timor’s new administrative departments,\textsuperscript{49} including the Office of the Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{50} For example, in arms procurement, Alkatiri’s young brother Bader Bin Hamut Alkatiri’s company, Cavalo Bravo Pty Ltd, was granted a lucrative contract from the government to provide arms, ammunitions, tanks and other military equipment to the East Timor government without observing procedures of tender established by the government.\textsuperscript{51} The deal, which was worth USD 108,000, has raised concerns about transparency and corruption that, according to the

\textsuperscript{49}See the Result of Timor Institute of Development Studies, TIDS (Formerly East Timor Study Group) and International Republican Institute discussion, ‘Corruption as a Threat to the Good Governance’, Dili, 12 May 2004, in author’s collection. See also, Speech of President Xanana Gusmao at the commemoration of 28\textsuperscript{th} November, Dili, 28 November 2002.


World Bank report, is a serious and growing problem in East Timor. Yet, according to the report in 2004 the Inspector General office has found fourteen cases of corruption and ten cases have been referred to the prosecution, but none of these cases have been proceeded with. For example, in 2003, there was corruption in the department of Public Works in which the Vice Minister misused funds which were previously designated for road construction in villages for purchasing luxury cars for his own use. But the Inspector General refused to refer the case to the General Prosecutor for investigation, which encouraged the rise of corruption in other departments. Another problem that afflicts the state bureaucracy involves its high degree of politicisation. The bureaucracy has thus grown very large, with its positions used to reward members of the ruling FRETIMIL and other political allies. In consequence large numbers of unskilled people have been recruited, greatly reducing administrative effectiveness. Further, the loyalties of position holders are not directed toward institutions, but instead toward those persons in the ruling FRETIMIL who appointed them, thereby placing bureaucratic neutrality and democratic procedures at risk. As

53 See ibid.
56 Interview with Cipriana Pereira. See also Smith, Understanding Third World Politics p. 143
shown above, the government having introduced the Local Government Law indicates its preference for tight administrative centralisation and control, leaving little discretion over policy decisions to local government agencies.

UNTAET also helped to rebuild East Timor’s judiciary, essential for the rule of law. UNTAET began by establishing district courts as courts of first instance. These courts were given a limited mandate to try criminal and civil cases. Meanwhile, a special panel of justice, the Serious Crime Unit (SCU), was created by the UN, part of whose jurisdiction extended to political violence. After independence, the SCU was disbanded, and East Timor established a court of appeal. A Supreme Court, however, occupying the judiciary’s apex and checking the government’s power—as envisaged in article 126 of the East Timor Constitution—has not been established yet. Thus, problems throughout East Timor’s legal system have resulted, with the government rejecting many decisions that have been made by the court of appeals. As one example, with respect to the Immigration and Asylum Law, the court of appeal declared that some of this legislation’s articles violated constitutional tenets and fundamental principles of human rights. This decision was rejected by parliament, however, on orders from the government, declaring that ‘not a comma will be changed’.

Another example of the government ignoring the judiciary’s standing can be found in a commercial dispute involving Metal Enterprise, a foreign company which the


government ordered to cease operations. This case was initially a dispute between Alkatiri’s family company and the director of Metal Enterprise on the export of used cars and other metal equipments. Alkatiri’s family wanted the company to cease its operation in this field, leaving the family’s company as the only exporter. However, the director of Metal Enterprise rejected the call, prompting Alkatiri to dispatch his State Secretary for Trade, Arlindo Rangel, to order the shutdown of the company. The company rejected the order, prompting Alkatiri to call police to shut down the company. The case was then brought to the Dili district court by the director of Metal Enterprise company in 2003. The court ruled, however, that the government’s order was illegal because of insufficient evidence. But the government rejected this decision, forcing the company’s manager to close down and leave the country. This directly contravened Article 118, point 3 of the constitution, which holds that all court rulings must be obeyed by East Timorese citizens.

Another problem that leaves the judiciary weak is its lack of training and resources. Judges, prosecutors, public defenders and lawyers are usually new holders of bachelor of law degrees from Indonesian universities. They have had little legal experience. Many of their rulings are flawed or otherwise inappropriate in East Timor’s new democracy, which does nothing to encourage public confidence. For example, in a case involving Suara Timor Lorosae case, wherein the newspaper was accused of defaming a businessman, the district court of Dili ordered the daily to pay USD50,000

59 Interview with Marcelino Ximenes Magno.

to the plaintiff without even considering the defendant’s evidence. This decision created an outcry in East Timor over judicial incompetence and partisanship. However, lawyers for *Suara Timor Lorosae* appealed the decision to the court of appeal and gained a favourable ruling.\textsuperscript{61}

Another source of grave inefficiency in the judiciary involves language. The East Timor government has decreed that the court should use Portuguese in conducting trial proceedings. Few judges, however, can speak Portuguese. During the period of UN transition, the court used the Indonesian language,\textsuperscript{62} which judges, having graduated from Indonesian universities, commonly speak. But after independence, in pursuing its language policies, the government began to replace young East Timorese judges in district courts with recruits from Mozambique and other Portuguese speaking countries. This decision exacerbated the judiciary’s ineffectiveness. With few international judges possessing any background in East Timor’s law or culture, they produced a range of highly controversial decisions.\textsuperscript{63}

In these conditions, East Timor’s judiciary, lacking a court of final resort and deprived of rigorous training and resources, has posed few checks on the country’s government. The government thus routinely ignores the judiciary, while ordinary citizens avoid the institution, therein stunting the rule of law that is so crucial to

\textsuperscript{61} Interview with Salvador Ximenes Soares. Informal discussions with Cosme Cabral in Baucau 13 May 2003, and an anonymous judge from Baucau district court, in Dili 26 June 2003.


\textsuperscript{63} Deonisio Babo recounted this story to the author in Brisbane, 2 April 2005.
democratisation. According to Linz and Stepan, a country without rule of law leaves citizens unable to ‘exercise their political rights with full freedom and independence’.

Another institution that was set up was the national parliament. As we have seen in Chapter Five, FRETILIN unilaterally transformed the constituent assembly that had been elected in 2001 into the parliament. By the terms of East Timor’s constitution, the parliament is the country’s highest political body. But the reality is rather different, with the government retaining such firm control over the institution that it avoids all accountability.

After the constituent assembly election UNTAET oversaw the formation in East Timor of a transitional government. With FRETILIN having won a large majority in the election, it led the new government, though it recruited three Democratic Party (PD) members as vice ministers. However, after independence, PD withdrew from the government because it rejected FRETILIN’s policy of establishing an inclusive government which was against the early agreement before the elections about forming a coalition government, leaving FRETILIN to govern alone as mentioned in Chapter Five. The government then asserted its pre-eminence by virtually dictating legislation

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66 Interview with Carlos Lopes, one of the founders of Partido Democratico (PD), 13 August 2004 by email.
to the parliament, rejecting the president’s advice, and, as mentioned above, ignoring adverse decisions from the court of appeal.

A presidential election was held in April 2002. Xanana Gusmao gained the presidency with over 80 percent of the popular vote, defeating Francisco Xavier do Amaral. However, as mentioned in Chapter Five, the president only possesses ceremonial powers, leaving the office unable effectively to check the government and balance the parliament. To be sure, Xanana has been able to invoke his great personal prestige in order to influence outcomes. But it is doubtful that any of his successors will possess the same standing.

At the base of East Timor’s institutional structure lies the constitution. As Robert Dahl has argued forcefully, constitutional documents matter for any country’s democracy because they provide the foundation from which all other institutions and procedures should flow. However, in the case of East Timor, as elaborated in Chapter Five, the constitution has been unable effectively to order relations between state institutions. Rather, because it was written and ratified by a Constituent Assembly dominated by FRETILIN, the document has been skewed to reflect the interests of this dominant party. To this end, some of its components were borrowed selectively from the constitutions of Portugal and Mozambique. For example, articles 42 (point 2) and 150 which were adapted from the Mozambique constitution, give power to the government to regulate demonstrations and to declare the unconstitutionality of the law

or regulations passed by the parliament. This gives FRETILIN’s government power to control the people and the opposition. In addition, article 12, which was adopted from Portugal’s constitution, aimed to eliminate the Catholic Church’s influence on society to prevent it controlling the government.69

East Timor’s political party system is another institution that has formed in ways that fail to restrain elite behaviours. This system’s main vehicles—UDT, APODETI and FRETILIN—and the patterns of interaction between them emerged during the final years of Portugal’s rule, then persisted during the Indonesian period, even as ideological orientations changed. UDT initially advocated federation with Portugal, then favoured integration with Indonesia, then jointed FRETILIN in resisting occupation. APODETI also shifted its orientation from integration with Indonesian to independence. FRETILIN remained more consistent, mobilizing movements against Indonesian occupation.

During the run-up to the UN-sponsored election in 2001, these old political parties re-emerged. At the same time, new political parties were established, seemingly meeting the need to provide institutionalised outlets for mass-level political participation.70 But in reality, the reconstitution of the political party system has appeared to harden elite-level rivalries across vehicles. Further, as mentioned above, these parties have bred fierce internal factionalism, leaving it difficult for parties to define their appeals and pursue concrete programs in disciplined ways.


70 Huntington quoted in Smith, Understanding Third World Politics, p. 138.
Yet another institution that has failed to restrain elites involves elements that can collectively be labelled civil society. The UN and various other international agencies, most notably USAID and AusAID, laid the groundwork for civil society’s resurgence in East Timor. As Linz and Stepan argue, in democratising countries, civil society is one of the institutions most necessary to ‘help start transitions, help resist reversals, help push transitions to their completion, and help consolidate and deepen democracy’.  

Under the guidance of the UN and supported by the Catholic Church, a range of civil society organisations have appeared in East Timor. Thus, during the election organised by the UN in 2001, civil society grew very active in promoting civic and voter education. NGO Forum, for example, an umbrella organisation for civil society organisations, cooperated closely with the UN in carrying out awareness programs in key districts. The Catholic Church also stressed to voters the need to avoid electoral violence. After the election, other civil society organisations tried to keep the government accountable, in particular, the Timor Institute of Development Studies (TIDS), which researches issues of socio-economic development, and Yayasan Hak (Human Rights Organisation), which focuses on human rights. Thus, when the government proposed the new Internal Security Act, it drew strong opposition from civil society, prompting the president to veto it. But as mentioned above, since the president’s veto can be overturned by a two-thirds (2/3) majority of the parliament, such opposition was not sufficient to stop the passage of the Act. The Act was afterward reintroduced and easily passed by the two-thirds majority mustered by FRETILIN, thus overriding the president’s veto and rebuffing civil society. To be sure, the Catholic

71 Linz and Stephan ‘Toward Consolidated Democracies’, p. 17.
Church has put up stronger resistance, encouraging the government to withdraw its proposals to ban religious subjects in public schools, for example. But the government has responded to the Church—and to civil society more generally—by demanding that civil society organisations avoid discussion of broad political issues and confine themselves to narrow areas of policy interest. The government, then, looks upon civil society with contempt, ignoring most societal-based efforts to hold it accountable.

Analysts often treat electoral systems, too, as institutions. According to G. Bingham Powell Jr, inasmuch as elections provide the arenas by which elites compete for constituent support and state power, it is necessary that they be structured in ways that restrain elite behaviours. In the case of East Timor, however, the electoral system has not yet been fully defined. And as development continues, concerns have arisen that the government and the parliament that it controls may fully exploit their powers of incumbency, taking a partisan approach that will lock in their electoral advantages. As Donald Horowitz observes, such an outcome would ‘make necessary political change impossible to achieve’.

During the two elections organised by the UN, a mixed system of proportional and majoritarian approaches was adopted. This system has gained international recognition as best guaranteeing minority representation and government effectiveness in plural societies. But after independence, in East Timor’s village-level elections, the

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government resorted to an exclusionary plurality system. This system, which tends to strengthen major parties, greatly advantages FRETILIN. Hence, concerns have arisen that the government will transpose this system to the national level before the next elections, due in 2007. Elections would thus pose little restraint upon governing elites. They might also alienate opposition elites, with their semi-loyal attitudes then deteriorating into overtly anti-system behaviours.  

Overall, one must conclude that, at this stage, elite attitudes and behaviours in East Timor are no more constrained by institutions that they are by structural integration and value consensus. Elites, especially those in the government, ride roughshod over institutions, effectively dictating legislation to parliament, ignoring the judiciary, rebuffing civil society, and manipulating electoral procedures. In these conditions, one is right to ask what the prospects might be for East Timor’s democracy.

**Some Political Scenarios**

The aim of this section is to speculate about East Timor’s democratic prospects, especially in light of the parliamentary elections to be held in 2007, the first to be organised mainly by Timorese themselves. Three broad scenarios are canvassed here (see Figure 6.1).

In the first scenario, the parliamentary elections are ‘successfully’ conducted. More specifically, elites restrain their partisanship and observe democratic norms, accepting

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75 Interview with Joao Cancio Freitas.
the uncertainties of elections. Procedural manipulations and violence are thus substantially avoided in the course of campaigning and balloting. Further, mass-level participation in campaign activities and voting is ordered in democratic ways, leading to elections that are free, fair, and meaningful. Elites grow more habituated into these patterns, ensuring that as competitiveness mounts over time, government turnovers take place. In this situation, as Power, and Gasiorowski contend, democracy ‘survives through the holding of a second election for the national executive (italic in original)’, signalling its consolidation.

In a second scenario, distrust between elites deepens, prompting them finally to shed what attitudinal and institutional restraints have existed. The political manipulations and sporadic violence that were in evidence during December 2002 and in the demonstrations of July 2004 thus grow significantly worse in the 2007 parliamentary election. In addition, corruption deepens, the judiciary deteriorates further, and mass populations grow inflamed and polarised, perhaps even encouraging, then, the resurgence of pro-Indonesia violence from beyond the border. In these circumstances, notwithstanding any international assistance that may be forthcoming, politics are destabilised and the new democracy breaks down. East Timor thus descends into authoritarian rule, which might equilibrate if FRETILIN can suppress those elites that oppose it, or remain fragile if it cannot, with guerrilla struggles recurring in the hinterland.

Figure 6.1: Possible East Timor Political Scenarios

First scenario
- International community
- (Supervision)
- East Timor political future
  - Second scenario
    - Alteration of power successful
      - Stable democracy
    - Alteration of power unsuccessful
      - Unstable and semi-democracy
  - Third scenario
    - Non-elements of democracy take control of the regime
      - Authoritarian regime
    - Elite and mass polarisation
      - Elite abide to the rules, and democratic institutions institutionalisation)
      - Mass participation
      - Election of 2007 successful
      - Resolution of conflict between elite
      - Rule of law
      - Control of media
      - Abuse of power and crackdown of opposition
      - Mass mobilisation continues
      - Sporadic violence
      - Mass mobilization continues
      - Corruption
      - Judicial system weak
      - Potential manipulation in future elections
      - Election unsuccessful
      - Elite distrust each other deeply and engage in violent conflict
      - Mass mobilisation continues
      - Control of media
      - Abuse of power and crackdown of opposition

A third scenario, however, is most likely. In this trajectory, elites do not significantly alter the suspiciousness that characterises their relations or the semi-loyalty with which they look upon the regime. Corrupt practices persist, even worsen, as more resources become available, especially as more petroleum and gas revenues begin to replace international aid. But enough of these resources are shared with opposition elites that they at some level remain placated.

In this scenario, the incumbent government will probably tighten its single-party dominance, enabling it subtly to manipulate elections in ways that return it perennially to power. But it will stop short of monopolising seats in parliament, leaving a significant minority of them to the opposition. Similarly, bureaucratic postings, state enterprise positions, and command of the security forces will be shared in uneven ways. The media will remain curbed, but not closed. Other civil and political liberties will be limited, but not extinguished. Hence, elites will perpetuate what amounts to a corrupt, but reasonably stable semi-democracy. A collapse into harder authoritarianism remains impeded by the legacies of international conditionalities, the foundational leadership of Xanana Gusmao, and perhaps the recollection, too, of the authoritarian abuses that scarred Indonesian rule and the heroic resistance that was waged against it.

Conclusions

In its uniqueness and complexity, East Timor’s democratic transition fits uneasily into the ideal-type patterns that analysts have identified in Latin America, Southern Europe and post-Communist countries. East Timor has undergone two transitions
simultaneously, a first to independence through the economic collapse of a foreign oppressor, and a second to democracy through the assistance of international agencies. It is difficult, then, to apply available templates to East Timor’s patterns of political change and outcomes.

It is thus difficult also to classify the country’s elite relations. As Higley et al. have noted, the ways in which nation-states are formed impacts strongly on elite attitudes and behaviours. But the literature is silent on how the unique way in which East Timor gained independence might produce consensual elite unity or disunity. Of course, the very extensive literature on post-Communist countries might on first blush appear to be instructive. But these countries remained shaped by long histories of independence prior to Soviet domination, and once Soviet forces withdrew, there were no systematic efforts to create mayhem. By contrast, East Timor had never in modern times known independence before Indonesia’s withdrawal. And in seeking to get it, the country suffered horrific violence.

What is more, East Timor’s elites remained largely unconsulted as international forces constructed democratic transitions, leaving them unhabituated in processes of bargaining and peaceful negotiation. Suspicions between elites have thus remained deep-seated. And elites have looked upon the new democracy with semi-loyalty. They have never been fully restrained, then, either by structural integration and value consensus or formal institutions.

Nonetheless, despite these inauspicious beginnings, elites have refrained from open warring. At the moment, this can be attributed to fears over the withdrawal of international assistance, as well as to the moderation of Xanana Gusmao’s leadership. Given these countervailing forces and the complex ways in which East Timor gained its
national independence and commenced a democratic transition, this thesis predicts sustained elite skirmishing, but not open warring, and semi-democratic politics, rather than ‘full’ democracy or hard authoritarianism. Much should be made clearer by the ways in which the next parliamentary election, due in 2007, is conducted.
CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

East Timor is a former colony of Portugal and one-time province of Indonesia. In both cases, domination was only ended with much violence. In 1975, as East Timor entered into a process of decolonisation by Portugal, a brief civil war broke out between local political parties that had been established during the final year of Portuguese rule. In part, this violence can be attributed to the haste with which decolonisation was undertaken, as well as the inexperience of local elites. This civil war was followed by an Indonesian military invasion, ushering in a period of domination that only ended in 1999 when the United Nations carried out a referendum by which to determine East Timor’s future. But this period of domination also ended with much violence, generating bitter sentiments between elites that has hampered the democratization process.

One of the conclusions made in this study is that East Timor’s transition to democracy fails to correlate fully with any of the modal processes outlined in the literature. Not only was the process fraught with violence, but it occurred in the wake of collapse by an external power that controlled it. It thus coincided with East Timor’s gaining independence. More specifically, democratization unfolded after the collapse of Indonesia’s authoritarian regime, the removal of Indonesian government officials and their local agents amid great violence, and the emergence of new local elites. Economic crisis also appears to be an important factor, sorely weakening Indonesia. But importantly, the democratisation process was then advanced by new external forces,
namely, the United Nations (UN), which organized a referendum over independence and founding elections. Accordingly, East Timor’s transition amounts to a process that departs from established modes in important ways, hence contributing to our understanding of transition dynamics and outcomes.

Early studies of democratic transitions in the classic cases found in Southern Europe and Latin America placed internal forces, especially national elites, at the centre of analysis. Over time, accounts broadened to include popular upsurge, protests, and riots which, while mass-based, still generated an entirely internal dynamic. The experience of East Timor, however, involving simultaneous process of independence and decolonization, highlights the importance of external factors. But it also takes analysis back to the earlier literature that emphasized the voluntarism of leaders and elites. As this thesis has shown, many elites gained their standings as guerrilla leaders, enabling them to pose as liberators. In many cases, then, their heroic statuses earned them unquestioning mass-level support. Social forces have been weakened also by low levels of development and literacy. At the same time, with occupying forces swept away, elites have remained mostly unconstrained by political institutions and procedures. Thus, as in many new countries that have emerged from long periods of colonisation and occupation, resistance leaders tend to dominate political life. In such circumstances, many scholars argue that elite actions and behaviours shape those of their mass-level followings. Diamond writes that elites lead partly by example. And when they are contemptuous of the rules and norms of democracy, their followers or audiences are likely to follow suit.

The degree of voluntarism that elites are able to exercise in cases like East Timor makes plain the continuing importance of studying elite attitudes and relations. As
Christian Welzel has argued, while new institutions and procedures may be set up and constitutionally enshrined, considerable time must pass and habituation take place before elite behaviours are effectively constrained.\(^1\) Thus, prospects for democracy depend heavily on the ways in which elites exercise their voluntarism during early stages in the transition. As B.C. Smith has shown in the case of many African countries, elites have failed to demonstrate appropriate commitments, sharply diminishing their new democracies.\(^2\)

This thesis has shown too that in East Timor, cooperation between elites and shared commitments to democracy has been hampered by the diversity of their backgrounds. Some elites gained their standings and outlooks under Indonesian occupation. Others gained their statuses because of the guerrilla resistance they mounted against this occupation. The attitudes of other elites were deeply coloured by their experiences in a multitude of countries, including Indonesia, Portugal, Mozambique and Australia. These variations in the origins of elites have impeded their cooperation and hence, the structure and functioning of an institutional framework for governing. Democracy’s consolidation has thus been threatened commensurately.

In trying to understand more fully the role of elites in East Timor, this thesis has drawn upon the conceptual dimensions developed by Burton, Gunther, and Higley: structural integration (the inclusiveness of elite networks of communication and influence) and value consensus (agreement among elites over the norms of political


conduct and the worth of existing institutions). Further, these dimensions help us to identify three distinct categories of elite-level relations, *elite disunity* (structural integration and value consensus are minimal), *consensual elite unity* (structural integration and value consensus are relatively inclusive) and *ideological elite unity* (structural integration and value consensus are monolithic).³

In analysing elites in East Timor, this thesis has found the first two categories of disunified and consensually unified elites to be conceptually useful. These categories of elite-level relations also correlate closely with regime outcomes. Thus, where elites are disunified, their relations are strained, with their violent conflict then destabilising politics, whether practiced in democratic or authoritarian ways. But where elites are consensually unified, their restraint enables the regime to persist. Only in these conditions, then, can democracy gain resilience.

A major aim of this thesis has been to investigate the role of elites in hindering or advancing the democratisation of East Timor’s politics. This study has shown that the diverse origins and standings of elites has shaped elite attitudes and relations in ways that are unfavourable for political stability and democracy. Under Portuguese rule, three distinct elite groups emerged in East Timor: top government administrators, business elites and young professionals and intellectuals. Elites who held positions in the administrative apparatus were closest to Portuguese rulers, possessed the best educations, usually from Catholic schools, and in consequence wielded most power. During the last years of Portuguese domination, they formed some political parties,

enabling them to emerge as political elites. One example was Xavier do Amaral who, after FRETILIN declared East Timor’s independence in 1975, gained support from the party in his bid to become president.

But the disunity between elites was revealed by the violent conflicts that soon broke out. On 11 August 1975, one party, UDT, launched a coup against its political opponents, most notably, FRETILIN. Nine days later, FRETILIN mounted a counter-coup enabling the party to gain control over East Timor until 7 December when the Indonesian military invaded. During these conflicts, many new elites were killed. For example, Domingos Lobato, the leaders of FRETILIN’s Youth Organisation, UNETIM, was killed by UDT. In turn, FRETILIN mounted its counter-coup, during which Fernando Osorio Soares, Secretary General of APODETI, Cesar Mouzinho, Vice President of UDT, and other members of these two parties were arrested and killed. This disunity that so weakened elites and encouraged Indonesia to invade can be partly attributed to the nature of East Timor’s colonial experience under the Portuguese. Put plainly, elites were exposed to authoritarian domination, providing them with few insights over how peacefully to mediate profound political differences.

To be sure, the Catholic Church played a significant role in shaping elite statuses through the education that it provided. For example, Xavier do Amaral, the former president of FRETILIN, Francisco Lopes da Curz, the former president of UDT, and Fernando Osorio Soares, the former Secretary General of APODETI were former students of Catholic Seminary in Dili, Maucau and Lisbon. However, like Portuguese colonial experience, Catholic Church education was unable to promote consensual unity among the new elites that it helped to produce.
This configuration of elite-level disunity persisted during the Indonesian occupation, with elites continuing to use violence against each other. Indeed, their relations worsened, as elites were exposed to new kinds of violence under Indonesian rule, as well as extensive corruption. In addition, rivalries were sharpened by the new institutional bases for elite statuses that appeared and the polarization that set in between them, pitting Indonesia’s provincial administrative apparatus against the resistance movement.

What is more, as this thesis has shown, national elites were diversified further, with the administrators and resistors joined by pro-Indonesian groups, the Catholic Church group, and nationalist intellectuals, hence extending the range of social origins and ideological outlooks. Elites associated with the resistance movements were arrayed across different political organizations, including UDT, APODETI, the Youth groups, FRETILIN and its armed wing, FALINTIL. Their strategic aims also clashed sharply, ranging from deep integration with Indonesia, some form of accommodation, and outright independence. Different groups placed different value too upon democracy, human rights, and governance issues.

Competing visions over East Timor’s future thus fuelled violent conflicts between groups. Elites were deeply divided, lacking conduits of communication and experience in peaceful negotiation. In the language of Higley and Burton, elites were ‘ignorant of and disregarded the other’, signalling their lack of any structural integration. In evaluating politics ‘as war’ or in zero-sum terms, they feared severe retribution from their opponents if they lost. They resorted then to strategies of violence by which to protect their standings and interests, banishing, imprisoning, and killing their opponents.

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Conflicts that raged between Xavier do Amaraal, Mario Carrascalao, Abilio Soares, and their respective organizations are cases in point. This pattern persisted for almost 24 years, only subsiding after East Timor’s independence in 2002.

But even with independence, this thesis has shown that elites gained few new skills. Rather, the terms of independence were negotiated by officials from Portugal and Indonesia under the auspices of the UN. Moreover, even after the referendum sponsored by the UN was held, UN officials in New York overshadowed the preferences and decision making of national elites. This exclusion denied East Timorese elites the opportunity to learn and to habituate themselves in making political decisions based on peaceful dialogue and bargaining. Thus, while the use of overt violence diminished, elites continued to harbour deep suspicions, encouraging their use of manipulations, subterfuge, and violence by proxy in their dealings with one another. The clearest examples involve the demonstrations that were mounted by rival elites in December 2002 and 19 July 2004. Thus, while the UN was essential for the introduction in East Timor of governing institutions and democratic procedures, relations between local elites were never reorganised in ways that would encourage their peaceful interaction within these institutions.

In consequence, tensions between elites in East Timor, while stopping short of sustained violence, continue to simmer. It is thus uncertain whether, or for how long, these tensions might be contained by the formal institutions and procedures that have been put in place. Analysis is also clouded by the fact that in the wake of independence, still more kinds of elites have appeared on the scene. New fault lines thus stem from generational membership (older and younger), geographic location (diaspora and
homegrown), and new kinds of organisational bases (political parties, state bureaucracy, security forces, business, the Catholic Church, and civil society).

Dynamics within the ‘diaspora’ group offer one illustration of the kinds of new factional identities and rivalries that have emerged. Identities within this group are further differentiated by the societies in which they were respectively socialized, whether in Portugal, Indonesia, Mozambique or Australia. These elites only began to encounter one another regularly after East Timor’s independence. They find that they possess different outlooks and levels of influence and power.

Today, the Mozambique group has been evaluated by most analysts of East Timor’s politics as politically the most powerful group, controlling the core of government and a large majority in parliament. Resorting to the political strategies it learned while in Mozambique under the rule of FRELIMO, this group often betrays authoritarian inclinations and confrontational outlooks, hence demonstrating attitudes toward democracy that appear at most to be ‘semi-loyal’. The constitution they drafted resembles that of Mozambique. This group centres on Mari Alkatiri, Secretary General of FRETILIN. Its members display unquestioning support of Alkatiri, and many of them have been duly rewarded with high positions in government. Meanwhile the ‘homegrown’ group encompasses several factions, including resistance leaders and incumbent elites. The resistance leaders trace their roots to FALINTIL and the broader clandestine movement. This faction centres on Xanana Gusmao, the current President of East Timor, and Francisco Lu Olo, the Speaker of the National Parliament and President of FRETILIN. This faction too is characterised by strong loyalties, even as its members have subsequently joined differently political parties such as FRETILIN, PD, and PSD. They also hold various high-level positions in the National Parliament and government.
Given these elites diverse origins and tensions, unmoderated by serious external guidance, whether provided by the UN or Portugal, or internal settlement or pact-making, it is little wonder that elites in East Timor still regard one another with deep suspicions, posing real challenges to their peaceful interactions, political stability, and consolidated democracy. Thus, even while so far avoiding outright warring, different elite factions remain wary of one another and doubtful over the worth of democracy. Indeed, the present-day ascendancy of elites in the Mozambique group bodes ill for East Timor’s democratic consolidation.

As noted above, analysing these challenges is complicated by the fact that East Timor’s distinctive transition to democracy lies outside the ideal-type trajectories that analysts have identified in Latin America, Southern Europe and post-Communist countries. In East Timor, the transition was precipitated mostly by external factors. Moreover, two transitions occurred simultaneously, a first to independence through the economic collapse of a foreign oppressor, and a second to democracy through the assistance of international agencies. It is difficult, then, to apply available templates to East Timor’s patterns of political change and outcomes.

Moreover, while with the departure of Indonesia and the UN, national elites moved to the foreground, it remains difficult to classify their relations. As Higley et al. have noted, the ways in which nation-states are formed impacts strongly on elite attitudes and behaviours. But the literature is silent on the how the unique way in which East Timor gained independence might produce consensual elite unity or disunity. Of course, the very extensive literature on post-Communist countries might on first blush appear to be instructive. But these countries remained shaped by long histories of independence prior to Soviet domination, and once Soviet forces withdrew, there were no systematic efforts
to create mayhem. By contrast, East Timor had never in modern times known independence before Indonesia’s withdrawal. And in seeking to get it, the country suffered horrific violence.

In this context, elites in East Timor might seem unprepared for the leadership roles they now hold. The diversity of their backgrounds and aims continues to militate against their consensual unity. And largely unconsulted by foreign officials as transitions to independence and democracy began to unfold, they were left untrained in processes of bargaining and peaceful negotiation. Thus, while outright violence has subsided, suspicions between elites remain deep-seated. Elites have never been fully restrained, then, either by their own structural integration and value consensus or the institutions that make up the regime. With respect to democracy, then, they have at most looked upon it with semi-loyalty.

Nonetheless, despite these inauspicious beginnings, it is important to underscore the fact that since independence, elites have refrained from the open warring that they once undertook. To be sure, this must be attributed in part to fears over the withdrawal of international assistance. But is must be ascribed also to the moderation of Xanana Gusmao’s leadership, as well as the willingness of other elites, however conditional, to accommodate one another under his guidance. Thus, given the complex ways and countervailing forces that have accompanied East Timor’s transitions to independence and democracy, this thesis predicts that sustained elite skirmishing, but not open warring, and semi-democratic politics, rather than ‘full’ democracy or hard authoritarianism. Much should be made clearer by the ways in which the next parliamentary election, due in 2007, is conducted.
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An anonymous former pro-autonomy supporter, who currently lives in Dili, 6 July, 2003.

An anonymous PSD member, Dili, 22 July 2003.

An anonymous PD member by telephone, Dili 12 August 2004.

An anonymous source in Dili, 23 May 2003.

Discussion with head of villages in Ossu 8 July 2003.


Discussion with traditional leaders in Uato Carabau, 12 July, 2003

Discussion with head of villages in Viqueque, 10 July 2003.