The Tragedy of
Modern Indonesian History

An
Inaugural Professorial Lecture

by

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delivered on
Thursday, 22 October 1998
5.30 pm

Central Theatre 2
Nathan Campus Griffith University
In 1991, Professor David Chandler of Monash University published his magisterial work, *The tragedy of Cambodian history*. My borrowing this powerful and moving analytical theme from one of my teachers, and a deep influence on my intellectual formation, is one way of acknowledging the debt I owe to David, to John Legge and to Jamie Mackie, who schooled me so well in, and into, history and Asia. The fact of my borrowing it, and applying it to the modern history of Indonesia, shows in a startling way how the present conditions and controls the way we appreciate, negotiate and renegotiate the past. In 1991, when Chandler published his elegant and masterly book on Cambodia, Indonesia was a raging success story. Notwithstanding the authoritarian bent of its regime, its endemic corruption, and its characteristic insensitivity to matters of human rights, Indonesia finally seemed to be on an upward path of prosperity, seemed finally to be fulfilling its eternally beckoning promise. At that time, it would have seemed laughable to characterise its modern history in terms of tragedy.

Today, however, in late 1998, to do so seems entirely appropriate. When I visited Jakarta early last June, just a couple of weeks after the resignation of President Suharto and the installation of his successor, President B.J. Habibie, the scars inflicted on the city by the tumult of the preceding weeks were still fresh—block upon block of burned-out shops and banks, the straggling, sagging banners of the student movement still rippling in the breeze, and a fearful, nervous, anxious disquiet in the air. The city's inhabitants were still in shock from the trauma of the May riots. At the same time, however, there was a palpable sense of exultation and triumph at their final release from the heaviness of Suharto's
rule. But behind that strange combination of fear, shock, nervousness, and celebration, there dwelt other and, for our purposes, more important feelings and emotions. A central one was confusion about the meaning of the recent events and about what they might presage, together with a deeper and more inchoate sense of self-doubt and uncertainty about the future. What was Indonesia? What did it value? Where was it going? What were its rules?

These were unusual questions for Indonesians to be asking. For the greater part of the previous thirty years, Suharto’s New Order had provided more or less satisfactory answers to these fundamental questions, and had ruthlessly discouraged and punished those who sought to provide answers different from the officially sanctioned ones. But if one looks a little deeper and further into Indonesia’s past, one sees these questions stubbornly and continuously crying for a hearing at the centre stage of political and cultural life. One also sees that the efforts to solve them have been almost wholly unsatisfactory and, indeed, that Indonesian leaders, almost to a man, have refrained from plumbing their depths. One sees, finally, the human toll that the determined efforts to avoid answering them have left. Why is this so? Why has Indonesia’s modern history been the site of so much ideological and philosophical stalemate, and why has the determined refusal to address these questions in a humane way caused so much emotional and physical turmoil and destruction, over so many years? Why have the mass of Indonesians, wholly undeservedly, had to suffer and endure so much? Why has Indonesia’s modern history been a tragedy?

This evening, I want to explore this problem by suggesting that the Indonesian project has been a failure—indeed, a deeply
tragic failure. In making this suggestion, I do not wish to deny or denigrate the extraordinary achievements of so many Indonesians at all levels of society over many years—the successful struggle to oust the Dutch colonisers after 1945, the creation of a single administrative infrastructure out of the ramshackle arrangements left by the Dutch, the great advances made in a common education system and in the development of technology, the securing of political unity against the odds, the development and elaboration of the Indonesian language, the amazing industry of Indonesians in achieving food security, the extraordinary tolerance, generosity, and forbearance of so many Indonesians. I do, however, want to suggest that Indonesia as a project has no soul and no spirit, and thus no deep sense of identity, purpose and trajectory. And I want to explore the reasons behind this tragic failure.

In order to contextualise my argument, I want to provide you with a quick overview of and commentary upon the political history of Indonesia, and a map of its essential features.

The nation itself was conceived unwittingly and delivered into strife and tumult. Before the turn of the twentieth century, there was no Indonesia. It had first to await the development of a Netherlands Indies, and then it was born by means of a wrenching transmogrification in the minds of a small group of middle-class Indonesians in the 1910s and 1920s. What they saw as the Netherlands Indies, they imagined as Indonesia. The history of the imagining of Indonesia in colonial times, however, is itself a sorry one. For a variety of reasons associated with space, culture, the colonial legacy and the efficiency of the Dutch apparatuses of repression, the movements which gradually brought these imaginings into focus as a modern Indonesian nation state (rather than, say, a re-established
Javanese or Sumatran kingdom, an Islamic state, or even a global workers’ paradise) never spoke much to each other, never engaged in the kind of vigorous debate and dialogue which might have moulded a clearer sense of what this Indonesian state and nation might look like or develop into. Moreover, they never had much effective (as distinct from distant, emotional and romanticised) attachment to the people they thought they represented, never thought it worthwhile to consult them, were never likely to be guided or directed by their wishes, or to be responsive to their real needs. All that the nationalist elite could agree upon was that there should be an Indonesia, and that it should, in some vague sense, be free. This foreshortened imagining was the first of modern Indonesia’s tragedies.

Three and a half years of Japanese occupation did nothing to progress this imagining. The Japanese were, like the Dutch, deeply distrustful of the politically unsettling effects of Islam, and their own agendas of systematically using the Indies as a source of war matériel and labour mean employing pre-war secular nationalist leaders like Sukarno and Hatta to legitimise their efforts in that direction. The politics of the occupation period was the politics of theatre, not of popular engagement and gritty contestation. Only in the last phase of the war did the Japanese begin seriously to offer Indonesians the prospect of sponsored independence as a means of engaging their support for the final battles against the Allies. The administrative fragmentation of the archipelago, problems with inter-island transportation, and the need to move rapidly meant that the 1945 Constitution of the Republic was essentially the work of Java-based conservative secular nationalists who leant heavily on the ideas of Dutch-trained legal experts. Islam, the Left, and the Outer Islands were effectively excluded.
The 1945 Constitution was the second and perhaps most influential of Indonesia's modern tragedies. That constitution is a short document of just thirty-seven brief articles. It was the product of Indonesian minds influenced by the Hegelian legal thought which provided the intellectual ballast of twentieth century fascism. It was a heavily paternalistic document which placed great power in the hands of the President (and few constraints on the exercise of that power), and correspondingly gave little to the parliament. It was prefaced by what was to become the state philosophy of Pancasila, the five guiding principles of the Indonesian state: belief in God, the unity of the nation, humanitarianism, popular sovereignty, and social justice and prosperity for all Indonesians. Pancasila and, more generally, the constitution itself, were important for two crucial reasons. First, they represented a contract amongst Indonesian leaders to ignore differences of ethnicity, region, religion and history in the cause of unity, and involved beating off a late challenge which sought to enforce Islamic observance amongst Indonesian Muslims. Second, they involved a strong sense of state-sponsored familism or integralism which privileged the community above the individual, emphasised duty, and provided no guarantees of individual human rights and freedoms. What emerged was a constitution for the state, not for its subjects. So odious did many Indonesians find this provisional constitution that as soon as November 1945 a convention emerged amongst the political elite to ignore its central principles and to manage the new state as a functioning democracy with a cabinet responsible to the parliament, and a weakened presidency.

The third modern tragedy of Indonesia was the disrepute into which the concept of federalism fell. This is a compli-
cated matter into which I have not the time to delve deeply tonight. Suffice to say, however, that Dutch efforts between 1946 and 1949 to cripple and circumvent the striving for Indonesian independence by means of sponsoring puppet federal states in the Outer Islands of Indonesia as counterweights to the Republic (whose greatest strength was in Java and Sumatra), and the fact that the Dutch would transfer sovereignty only to a federated state (in which the Republic was just one of sixteen units in a United States of Indonesia) gave federalism a bad name from which, within Indonesia, it is yet to recover. Once sovereignty was transferred, it took the Republic just eight months to absorb these other states so that in August 1950, a unitary Republic had emerged. Thereafter, centralism was dominant and regionalism in eclipse.

The fourth modern tragedy was the inability of the new state to curb and control its armed forces. At the moment of its creation in August 1945, the Indonesian state was faced with a spontaneous explosion of anti-Japanese, anti-colonial armed militancy over which it made only episodic and always ineffective efforts to gain the ascendancy. For most of the revolutionary period, the Indonesian army remained effectively outside the state apparatus, internally splintered, and almost wholly ineffective in the field. Its great moment came, however, after the Dutch offensive in December 1948 which captured the Republic's civilian leadership, but which, over the succeeding months, as a result of the stern guerrilla resistance of the army, was unable to wipe out the Republic itself. This crucial resistance by the army, this first effort at "saving the Republic" (from itself, as much as from its external opponents) was seminal in the army's later conception of itself and its role.
The unitary Republic established on 17 August 1950 was a parliamentary democracy, a system chosen not because it enjoyed overwhelming domestic support but because no other alternative was realistically available. It carried a heavy weight of responsibility in catering for the heightened expectations of a nation now free of Dutch colonialism but heavily bound by the Dutch legacy of a colonial export economy, a limited transport and communications infrastructure, and a vast mass of poor, uneducated peasants and urban dwellers. It faced, as well, the first signs of the baggage left over from the unresolved issues of the revolutionary period, the breakaway Republic of South Maluku, and the Darul Islam rebellion (centred in West Java but later to incorporate the Sumatran territory of Aceh), which sought the establishment of an Islamic state for Indonesia. In the end, the democratic experiment failed, because none of the numerous governments (there were seven cabinets between 1950 and 1957) could muster sufficient support amongst a severely split political elite to impose the discipline needed in the circumstances. The problems a democratic Indonesia faced in grappling with a huge raft of post-independence problems are neatly exemplified in the election results of the long-awaited first parliamentary elections of 1955. Four fifths of the vote was split between four major parties, in the following proportion:

- PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party) 22.3 per cent
- Masyumi (modernist Islamic) 20.9 per cent
- Nahdlatul Ulama (traditional Islamic) 18.4 per cent
- PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) 16.4 per cent

Moreover, three of these parties received the great majority of their vote from Java. The electoral arithmetic resulting from this pattern of voting (which roughly mirrored the situ-
ation in the previous appointed parliament) was the death knell of democracy in Indonesia. No single party, nor even any conceivable combination of parties, could ever enjoy sufficient support to take the policy directions demanded by Indonesia’s situation; those coalitions which emerged were so weakened by political corruption and the need to cater for constituencies (within which the parties themselves had but shallow roots) that policy and implementation gridlock resulted. Indonesia seemed to be drifting into decay and dissolution, a situation made all the more dangerous by increasingly raucous and rebellious demands by the Outer Islands for greater power and a greater share of the national wealth in the face of perceived domination by Java.

In this context of increasing uncertainty and confusion, Sukarno, heretofore consigned to a ceremonial role, began to assert himself. Typical of his actions about this time was a speech he delivered to delegates of youth organisations in Jakarta on 28 October 1956:

Let us be frank about it, brothers and sisters. We made a very great mistake in 1945 when we urged the establishment of parties, parties, parties .... Now that mistake is wreaking its vengeance upon us .... Do you know, brothers and sisters, what my dream is as I speak to you now? .... My dream is that the leaders of the parties would meet, would consult together with one another, and then come together to the decision of “Let us now join together to bury all parties” .... I know that the young people who are politically aware do indeed want a nation that is not split by parties and more parties. I know that they don’t support the youth groups which just follow their father parties obediently .... Exercise
the sovereignty of youth! Don’t just parrot the parti-
ties.²

At the same time, the army, after a series of internal agonies
in the early 1950s, had begun to consolidate itself under the
leadership of Nasution. It shared Sukarno’s antipathy to party
politics, and was increasing keen to carve out a real role for
itself in the politics of the nation, commensurate with its view
of its own historical role. Together with Sukarno, the army
conspired to end the period of Western-style democracy and
establish what was termed Guided Democracy. Martial law
was introduced in 1957, and in 1959, following the inability of
the Constituent Assembly to agree on the form of a new
constitution, Sukarno decreed a return of the 1945 constitu-
tion. Thereafter, notwithstanding its procedural vigour and
the progress it was making towards a more humane Indone-
sia,³ Western-style democracy was consigned to the scrapheap
as un-Indonesian.

This style of rule was presented as the means to return to a
pre-colonial golden age of Indonesian life, the era of the great
kingdoms like Srivijaya and Majapahit. In fact, it represented
just one more stage in the political diminution of Indonesia.
Real politics disappeared, to be replaced by a tense standoff
between the emerging power of the army and the authority
of Sukarno, supported by a rapidly growing communist party.
Crass and stupid sloganeering and ideologising (which often
took the form of mantras like Manipol-USDEK, NEKOLIM,
NEFOS and OLDEFOS, NASAKOM, and the Year of Living
Dangerously), grandiose monuments, thought-control cam-
paigns, rampant anti-Westernism, foreign policy adventurism
in the Irian and (especially) Confrontation campaigns, and
extraordinarily irresponsible economic management, formed
the backdrop to the drama of political contestation being played out.

What was Guided Democracy all about? From this distance, it was no more than a continuation of the abiding theme of Indonesia since its beginnings in the minds of Indonesians decades before. It was an attempt to prevent the working out of the idea of Indonesia by Indonesians, another effort to impose from above a limited vision of how to think and live and how to imagine the future. The political parties, with the exception of the PKI, were effectively excluded from politics; the communist party itself was forced to eschew a program of radical social reform in return for access to the Jakarta political stage, where it played the role of domesticated supporter of the increasingly erratic Sukarno. The army moved not just into politics, but also centrally into business activities as a result of its takeover of Dutch firms following nationalisation in 1957. What Indonesia was, what it meant, where it was heading, remained unresolved, buried in the spiraling scramble for political advantage at the capital. Nothing symbolised this paralysis of vision better than the notion of NASAKOM, Sukarno’s attempt to bring together the ideas of nationalism, religion, and communism, which was no more than a nervous holding operation, pushing them together artificially and in fact intensifying the tension between them rather than their synthesis.

The drama could have only one outcome. It came with the so-called coup attempt of the September 30 movement in 1965, which provided the army the opportunity, under the leadership of the almost unknown Major-General Suharto, to assume control and to shape, with the spilling of much blood, a New Order which was to last for more than thirty years.
The New Order was the most recent and greatest tragedy of Indonesia's modern history. Yet, even though its beginnings were drenched in the blood of the murdered generals and the cataclysm of the anticommunist pogroms of 1965-66, it did for a time hold out some promise for better things—a freeing up of politics, the re-entry of political parties and some genuine civilian political activity, a return to saner methods of economic management, and the ending of rampant corruption. Alas, such hope as had been offered was soon to be quashed. Suharto, once he had overcome his initial caution and established his ascendancy, moved to depoliticise society and then to corporatise the state.

The mature New Order was backed by the military, and became an extraordinarily centralised polity. Politics was banished, except for a brief and tightly controlled few weeks leading up to the elections in 1971, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992 and 1997. Such party activity as was allowed was channeled through two artificially constructed and corporatised parties and the giant conglomerate of Golkar, whose essential purpose was to deliver the vote for the New Order and thereby make the elections a "success". Pancasila, the ideology contrived by Sukarno in 1945 to keep Indonesians from destroying each other, was given a banal and soporific new face as the guiding ideology of the nation, the "sole foundation" of all organisations. School children, students, civil servants and other functionaries were forced to attend Pancasila courses which glorified the achievements of the New Order and exhorted their attendees to greater and more disciplined effort for the good of the nation.

Development, together with security (the one was seen as the counterpoint and necessary condition of the other), be-
came the watchwords of the regime. Thus began an almost uninterrupted period of economic growth which changed the face of the country, delivering schools, medical facilities, roads, bridges and a host of other facilities, and creating a kind of hybridised Western metropolitan super-culture which the newly wealthy middle classes, and even newly prosperous rural classes, enjoyed to the full. Indonesia became, in Andrew MacIntyre's words, "a low profile success story" which "anchored regional stability in Southeast Asia". Visitors to Jakarta in the 1980s and early 1990s stared in wonder at the rows of gleaming office blocks sprouting to the south of Jakarta's city centre, absorbing land recently occupied by sprawling and squalid urban kampungs and slums. Taxis had meters and air-conditioning, the streets were cleared of pedicabs, telephones worked, freeways snaked their way across the city, huge shopping malls burgeoned, and the sky took on a tin-grey tinge from the exhausts of cars and busy urban industry. This, at last, was development, and most Indonesian loved it. It lifted them from the grime of poverty and showed them a Promised Land of prosperity they had previously only seen or heard of in Hollywood movies.

It worked, and worked well, for a generation, so much so that political economists began dreaming up new models of development in which corruption and the virtues of connectedness were seen not only to be consonant with economic growth but even a condition of it. Behind it all, as we now see, was an abiding rottenness. The economic boom, begun after a stiff, sharp and highly successful economic stabilisation program, was fuelled first by Japanese and American investment, by sharp rises in the price of oil and, from the mid-1980s, by unrestrained foreign investment in Indonesia's rapidly developing export-oriented industries and deregulated financial
sector. It was both the creation and the plaything of the New Order elite—that collection of generals and businessmen, all under Suharto’s prebendal rule, who profited most from the new riches. In effect, they parlayed their position and connections into wealth: Generals who had served the state well received lucrative contracts from state industries and licenses from government officials; businessmen, often Indonesians of Chinese background who could present no political threat to the regime, used their sponsored status to channel investment projects into the country and develop both domestic and international markets for their products. The President’s children all became fabulously wealthy from the adept and ruthless exploitation of their incomparable position, gaining licences for toll roads, car and clove imports, and media outlets because, as their father said, they were good at business. In the meantime, the general populace prospered so well that they could tolerate the slights to their own and others’ rights which Suharto’s relentless security approach entailed. Thus, the East Timor invasion was easily accepted, as were the closures of campuses in the 1970s, the campaigns against alleged Muslim radicals in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the grisly “Petrus” executions of the early 1980s, the brutal army offensives against rebels in Aceh and Irian Jaya, and even the recent crude attempt to destroy the rise of Megawati.

By the mid 1990s, Indonesia was at its apogee. But there were increasing signs that the New Order, satiated and increasingly ossified, was unable to contain change and social currents with its earlier efficiency. Local disturbances began to break out in different parts of Indonesia; it was significant that they were mostly the result of the overflowing of tensions around issues of ethnicity and religion. Of themselves,
such disturbances were probably not especially significant, and they would most likely have been contained, at least in the short term, but for the onset on the 1997 currency crisis which, when it struck quickly and savagely in Indonesia from early December 1997 onwards, rapidly destroyed the performance legitimacy of the New Order. Once Suharto could no longer deliver material prosperity to his people, his regime collapsed. More tragically, so corrupt had the New Order system become that when the day of reckoning arrived, it came with a savagery and thoroughness—and a consequent degree of suffering—not experienced elsewhere.

So sudden has been the collapse that observers have still to take stock of what it all means. It is difficult to believe, here in October 1998, that less than a year ago Suharto seemed rock solidly in control of Indonesia, fresh from the greatest electoral triumph of his career. It is even more astounding to think that in mid-March, just seven months ago, Suharto was elected unanimously to a seventh five-year presidential term by the thousand-member People's Consultative Assembly. Ten weeks later, he was gone. The very speed of the collapse of the New Order brings one to reflect upon the essential fragility of its underpinnings, and provides us with a route to return to our larger theme.

Suharto himself was, it appears, well aware of his regime's brittleness. One reliable authority told me that, in January 1998, when Walter Mondale was assuring Suharto that six months of good IMF treatment would see Indonesia on the road to recovery, the already embattled president responded simply: “I don’t have six months”. His regime, preserved so long by its combination of unrelenting internal security coupled with the delivery of material prosperity to those who did not
rock the boat, fell so quickly because it suddenly became stunningly clear that Suharto could no longer bribe his people with the promise of prosperity and was incapable, because of the nature of his regime, of engaging in meaningful reform.

Indonesia now is in economic chaos. Much more important, however, is the fact that it is a political wasteland. Until it was so suddenly removed, Suharto’s New Order regime completely dominated the politics of Indonesia. All the political and institutional machinery was created by and made to serve the New Order and, more specifically, the person of Suharto himself. He was the indispensable and all-powerful centre of an intricately constructed network of privilege and reward. When he fell, the New Order was decapitated, and the whole political system rapidly crumbled.

The task now is to rebuild Indonesia from the bottom up. It will prove an extraordinarily difficult task, because, to put it bluntly, Indonesia’s leaders have never allowed the nation to develop its soul. Herein lies the great tragedy of modern Indonesia—the lack of anything resembling a system of shared belief and vision about the people, the nation, the state. Let me take just one example to demonstrate this tragic fact. All Indonesians, even Suharto himself, believe in democracy. But there is no shared understanding of just what democracy might mean, and how it might be operationalised in the Indonesian context. Does it mean a variant of the integralist “Pancasila democracy”? How might it incorporate elements of Islamic political thought? How might it accommodate (rather than bury, scapegoat, or ignore) minorities? How might it adapt itself to change? Recently, a team of seven political scientists drafted three new laws to guide the electoral process expected to take place in May 1999. Their laws involve a system
of single-member constituencies, a radical experiment never before tried in Indonesia. No one knows how it might work or what it might produce. No one knows how parliamentarians responsible for the first time to local constituencies might negotiate the politics of reform. No one knows how a President who will be, in effect, beholden to the parliament,⁵ might find the wherewithal to lead. There is no shared heritage of such political experiences nor any sense of how conflict and collision might be profitably channeled. No one, I imagine, would be terribly surprised if the whole experiment collapses.

There is, in other words, no sense of a shared system of beliefs about what Indonesia should or could be. Even after more than half a century of independence, the concept of Indonesia remains a blank. There are few shared national values and no clear sense of national identity. Even within discrete cultural groups—the Muslim community, for example—there are wide and deep discrepancies about what the goal might be or how it can best be achieved. What does it mean to be Indonesian? What are the core values and beliefs that might sustain a stable and prosperous political system? What form of state should the nation pursue? How might the individual relate to the total community? What model of economic development should be pursued? What role, if any, should there be for the military? What rights might individuals enjoy? In what sense might such rights be inalienable and non-negotiable?

In this lecture, I have tried to analyse why this deplorable state of affairs has been allowed to develop. In my view, the Indonesia project has been flawed from the very beginning by a refusal or inability of Indonesian leaders to confront and settle their differences. The pre-war nationalist movement
was contained, split and virtually destroyed by Dutch repression; the Japanese occupation period presented no opportunities of identifying the meaning of Indonesia, and the immediate onset of the revolution against the reimposition of Dutch colonial rule postponed the facing of these problems. In the 1950s, the selfishness of politicians and their inability to build meaningful bridges to the people they claimed to serve precluded much progress on this score (although the debates of the Constitutional Assembly in the mid-1950s did witness the emergence of some degree of consensus on important matters of value and vision, only to be destroyed by Suharto’s rush to Guided Democracy). The New Order was a highly depoliticised ideological vacuum, in which a combination of banality and brutality was accepted in return for a mess of pottage.

What, then, is to become of Indonesia? That, I am afraid to say, is a discomfortingly open question. Let me trace some possible scenarios:

(a) Cataclysm: in this view of things Indonesia will be lucky to get through to May 1999 and the promised elections without further major social unrest. Should that happen, and should the current government fall, it is difficult to see what might prevent the army, as dispirited and lacking in legitimacy as it currently is, from again attempting to assert control. An even worse case scenario would see the army as unable, because of command, logistic, and supply and equipment problems, to quell rampant unrest, with the result that Indonesia would fall into a horrifying abyss

(b) No significant change: this view would see Indonesia limp to an election which would not produce a clear outcome,
and then proceed to the election of a new President in December 1999 who would not have sufficiently wide support to run the country with the firmness and clarity the current emergency demands. Such gridlock would clearly be in the interests of many of those in the current Indonesian elite who view any kind of programmatic reform and disturbance with horror, but would result in Indonesia's more or less permanent invalidity.

(c) Reform and renewal: The election of a clearly-mandated, visionary and courageous President who would, with wide popular support, and in concert with the freely elected members of the parliament, embark on a clearly-explained and systematic program of reform and regeneration. Such a figure would be sufficiently sensitive to the wishes of the electorate and its representatives to sponsor the long-delayed and painful process of negotiating, developing and elaborating Indonesia's soul—that core set of beliefs about what the nation should be, how it might be constructed, and how it might proceed to fulfil its goals. Such a president would begin by championing the dispatch of the authoritarian and paternalistic 1945 constitution, and its replacement by one based on democratic federalism which would give a real voice to the numerous different regions of Indonesia and some real power and resources to act independently of the wishes of Jakarta. It would be one in which core individual human rights—of assembly, of expression, of civilised treatment, are clearly incorporated, and in which the rule of law is supreme.

This last scenario represents a monumental undertaking. But, ironically, Indonesia, now plumbing the depths of its current tragic circumstances, has never been better positioned to
undertake such an effort at fundamental regeneration. Its people, long denied full humanity, long suffering, long imposed-upon, yet perennially resilient and open and inventive, deserve the opportunity for a better, deeper life. If the opportunity is not seized now, the future of the Indonesia project seems bleak, and with it the future of more than two hundred million human souls.
ENDNOTES

1 New Haven and London: Yale University Press.


5 Under the proposed arrangements, the parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) will comprise 550 members—495 of them elected. This body, together with 150 regional representatives and other appointed members, will comprise the 700 member People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat), which has the power to elect (and remove) the President ("Rancangan undang-undang Republik Indonesia nomor ? tahun 1998 tentang susunun dan kedudukan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat/ Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah" (mimeo)).