Cruise infrastructure development networks: power, politics and cohesion

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Thesis submitted to the
Griffith University School of Natural Sciences
for the award of
Doctor of Philosophy

November 2017
Statement of Originality

This work has not previously been submitted for a degree or diploma in any university. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the thesis itself.

(Signed) ____________

Wendy R London, AB, MLS, JD, PG DipTour, MTour
Keywords
Cruise infrastructure, cruise tourism, media discourse analysis, network cohesion, network fragmentation, policy issue networks, ports, power, risk, social constructivism, social networks, stakeholders
Abstract

Cruise tourism is the fastest growing sector within the global leisure travel industry. This growth is manifested in the number of passengers and ships being added to the global cruise fleet each year as well as the size of ships. Also, new destinations continue to be added as many coastal cities aspire to deriving economic benefit from cruise tourism. Accordingly, destinations are obliged to consider the (re)development of new cruise infrastructure. Stakeholders within these destinations form networks, initially to advance proposals for that (re)development. These networks may be formal or informal, but each is faced with issues such as the exercise of power within the network, how stakeholders engage with each other, the existence of competing interests and the control over information. In networks where effective governance mechanisms are in place, greater network cohesion and therefore consensus can be achieved. However, where no such mechanisms exist, network fragmentation can result. Network fragmentation can give rise to risks which threaten cruise infrastructure development projects.

Previous studies on cruise infrastructure development have focused either on the impacts of cruise infrastructure on host communities and the environment or on stakeholder and community response to cruise infrastructure development. A few have considered the specific issues of cruise port economics and governance. In contrast, studies in the area of public infrastructure development, generally, have recognised that key stakeholders form networks to advance proposals for development and have described those networks. However, limited research appears to have addressed the specific topics of the formation of networks to progress cruise infrastructure development. Moreover, there appears to be an absence of research on the types or characteristics of those networks, the operation of power within them and the potential for risk where there is political debate or dysfunction.

Thus, the aim of this research is to understand how stakeholder networks influence proposals for cruise infrastructure development. In the context of this research, the term stakeholder network is used to identify the type of social network which has formed. However, the empirical research undertaken in this study informs a discussion which presents opportunities to further refine the types of networks which form to influence
such proposals. Identification of the specific type of network which has formed can assist key stakeholders effectively manage such networks.

This research uses a mixed methods approach to address this aim. It uses a media discourse analysis approach to identify the issues of concern to stakeholders over an eight-year period and to build a rich case study based on these issues. In-depth, semi-structured interviews probed stakeholders’ responses to a range of pertinent issues including the exercise of power within the decision-making process, identification of the decision-makers, sources and sharing of information, governance and risk. A qualitative approach was also used to assess the stakeholders’ roles within the network so that their perceptions of key issues, such as power, could be analysed.

Auckland, New Zealand, was chosen as the study site for this research. Auckland is a mature cruise destination which is experiencing significant growth of its cruise tourism sector. However, its cruise infrastructure requires improvements to accommodate bigger ships and more than two ships at a time. Therefore, proposals for its redevelopment are being considered. These proposals are being advanced against the backdrop of a contestable political environment and high profile competing interests.

Respondents’ perceptions revealed a network which is neither outwardly identifiable as a network nor cohesive in its organisation. On the contrary, respondents described a network characterised by, for example, the asymmetric exercise of power, the presence of competing interests, a lack of transparency in the decision-making process and the absence of effective governance. They also articulated a wide range of risks which they believed could flow from this lack of cohesion, or fragmentation. Respondents’ perceptions supported recognition of Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development network as a policy issue network, given the network’s openness, instability and the unequal contribution of and control over resources.

This research makes several original contributions. Firstly, it presents a conceptual analysis of stakeholder interrelationships and the power stakeholders exercise in relation to cruise infrastructure development. Secondly, it advances a novel framework for analysing power in relation to proposals for cruise infrastructure development. Thirdly, it
analyses empirical evidence which conveys how stakeholders perceive the exercise of power within the stakeholder networks formed to advance proposals for cruise infrastructure development. Fourthly, it applies media discourse analysis to analyse the media discourse surrounding proposals for cruise infrastructure development. This approach enables key stakeholders and researchers to construct a nuanced analysis of the key issues as well as reconstruct a cohesive narrative based on media reports. Fifthly, it differentiates between the types of networks which can form to advance proposals for cruise infrastructure development. Applied, original contributions include analyses of the characteristics of stakeholder networks which form to advance proposals for cruise infrastructure development and of stakeholder perceptions of the exercise of power within these networks. This thesis also presents empirically informed insights into the potential for risk where such networks become fragmented.

There are limitations to this research which should be recognised. Firstly, this study is based on a single case study. Secondly, a qualitative approach was used to allow for the detailed probing of stakeholders’ perceptions rather than a quantitative approach which can offer precision in describing the structure of the network. Thirdly, this research is based on an informal, open network and not one which has purposely been established. Fourthly, the number of respondents was limited by the small potential pool of respondents. Lastly, this research is limited to the proposal stage of cruise infrastructure development.

Several opportunities for future research should be considered. A social network analysis (SNA) approach can be used to provide a more precise view of the contours of similar networks and provide a means for triangulating the qualitative approach taken in this research. While this research was focused on the proposal stage for (re)development in a mature cruise destination, further research could consider other stages of development. A longitudinal study could provide valuable evidence given the protracted time period which is usually associated with large public infrastructure development projects. Another avenue includes extending this research to the broader field of cruise tourism, as destination networks seek to build a sustainable cruise tourism sector.
# Table of Contents

Statement of originality ........................................................................................................ i
Keywords ................................................................................................................................. ii
Abstract ................................................................................................................................. iii
Table of contents .................................................................................................................... vi
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................ xi
List of published and submitted papers and unpublished manuscripts included in this thesis ...... xiii
Relevant publications prior to candidature .............................................................................. xv
Assistance received during research and preparation of this thesis ..................................... xvi
List of abbreviations .............................................................................................................. xix
Glossary ................................................................................................................................. xx

## Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 2
1.2 Background .................................................................................................................... 2
1.3 Motivation for this research .......................................................................................... 3
1.4 Commercial context ....................................................................................................... 5
1.5 Contextual, theoretical and conceptual boundaries
    1.5.1 Contextual boundaries ............................................................................................ 7
    1.5.2 Stakeholders and stakeholder networks ................................................................. 7
    1.5.3 Power and risk ....................................................................................................... 9
1.6 Theoretical and conceptual overview ............................................................................ 9
    1.6.1 Power and cruise infrastructure planning and development ................................ 9
    1.6.2 The media’s role in shaping debate – a media discourse analysis approach .......... 12
    1.6.3 Stakeholder interrelationships within cruise infrastructure development networks – power, conflict and cohesion ................................................................. 15
    1.6.4 Network fragmentation and risk .......................................................................... 19
    1.6.5 Conceptual framework ......................................................................................... 23
1.7 Research design .............................................................................................................. 25
1.8 Research aim .................................................................................................................. 27
1.9 Research delimitation ..................................................................................................... 30
1.10 Approach and methods ............................................................................................... 30
    1.10.1 Conceptual paper – literature review: Chapter 2 ............................................... 30
    1.10.2 Media discourse analysis – Chapter 4 ................................................................ 30
    1.10.3 Semi-structured interviews – Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 ...................................... 31
1.11 Ethics ............................................................................................................................. 35
1.12 Thesis structure ............................................................................................................ 35
1.13 Thesis compliance ........................................................................................................ 37

## Chapter 2: POWER IN THE CONTEXT OF CRUISE DESTINATION STAKEHOLDERS’ INTERRELATIONSHIPS

2.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 39
2.2 Primary research objective and aim addressed in this paper ........................................ 39
    2.2.1 Primary research objective .................................................................................. 39
    2.2.2 Aim ...................................................................................................................... 40
2.3 Original contributions .................................................................................................... 40
2.4 Statement of contribution to co-authored published paper .......................................... 41
2.5 Published paper ............................................................................................................. 42

## Chapter 3: BACKGROUND TO THE GROWTH OF CRUISE TOURISM IN AUCKLAND, NEW ZEALAND

3.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 56
3.2 The growth of cruise tourism in Auckland, New Zealand ............................................... 56
3.3 Background and history ................................................................................................. 57
    3.3.1 The evolution of the Ports of Auckland Ltd ......................................................... 57
3.2 The start of international passenger services and Princes Wharf .................. 58
3.3 Sale and purchase of Queens Wharf ............................................................... 58
3.4 Design competition ......................................................................................... 61
3.5 Queens Wharf, The Cloud and RWC2011 ......................................................... 61
3.6 Captain Cook Wharf ......................................................................................... 63
3.7 Political flip-flop – Queens Wharf/Shed 10 becomes main cruise terminal ........ 63
3.8 Central Wharves Strategy ................................................................................. 64
3.9 Competing interests – POAL’s commercial spaces ........................................... 67
3.10 Proposed Bledisloe Wharf extensions, Marsden Wharf demolition and protests .. 67
3.11 High Court action ......................................................................................... 69
3.12 Complex and contestable .............................................................................. 69
3.4 Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development – the challenge ..................... 71

4 CRUISE INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN AUCKLAND, NEW ZEALAND: A MEDIA DISCOURSE ANALYSIS ................. 73

4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 74
4.2 Primary research objective and aim addressed in this paper ......................... 75
4.2.1 Primary research objective ........................................................................ 75
4.2.2 Aim ............................................................................................................ 75
4.3 Original contribution ...................................................................................... 75
4.4 Statement of contribution to co-authored published paper ............................. 76
4.5 Published paper .............................................................................................. 77

5 POWER, CONFLICT AND COHESION WITHIN CRUISE INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT STAKEHOLDER NETWORKS ........................................................................................................... 98

5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 99
5.2 Primary research objective and research questions addressed in this paper ...... 100
5.2.1 Primary research objective ..................................................................... 100
5.2.2 Research questions .................................................................................. 100
5.3 Original contributions .................................................................................... 100
5.4 Statement of contribution to co-authored submitted paper ......................... 102
5.5 Paper submitted for peer review ................................................................. 103
5.6 Appendix to submitted paper ....................................................................... 159
5.7 Power, conflict, a lack of cohesion (fragmentation) and risk ......................... 164

6 STAKEHOLDER NETWORK FRAGMENTATION AND RISK: CRUISE TOURISM INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN AUCKLAND, NEW ZEALAND ............................................................................................... 166

6.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 167
6.2 Primary research objective and research questions addressed in this paper ...... 167
6.2.1 Primary research objective ..................................................................... 167
6.2.2 Research questions .................................................................................. 168
6.3 Original contributions .................................................................................... 168
6.4 Statement of contribution to co-authored submitted paper ......................... 169
6.5 Paper submitted for peer review ................................................................. 170

7 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 207

7.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 208
7.2 Summary and implications of key findings ................................................... 208
7.2.1 Power ...................................................................................................... 208
7.2.2 Power and stakeholder networks ............................................................... 209
7.2.3 Fragmentation, risk and stakeholder networks ......................................... 212
7.3 Contributions of this research ....................................................................... 217
7.4 Limitations of this research ................................................................. 220
7.5 Suggestions for future research .......................................................... 221
7.6 Postscript ......................................................................................... 227

8 REFERENCES ....................................................................................... 229

APPENDICES .......................................................................................... 251
Appendix A: Ethics approval ................................................................. 252
Appendix B: Information sheet .............................................................. 254
Appendix C: Consent form ................................................................. 257
Appendix D: Semi-structured interview questions – Auckland .......... 259
Appendix E: Semi-structured interview questions – Wellington ........ 261
List of Figures

Included in this list of figures are the figures for Chapters 1 (Introduction) and 3 (Background).

CHAPTER 1

Figure 1.1: Visual representation of Chapter 2 ................................................................. 11
Figure 1.2: Visual representation of Chapter 4 ................................................................. 14
Figure 1.3: Visual representation of Chapter 5 ................................................................. 18
Figure 1.4: Visual representation of Chapter 6 ................................................................. 22
Figure 1.5: Conceptual framework – influencing proposals for cruise infrastructure
development .................................................................................................................. 24
Figure 1.6: Thesis structure ........................................................................................... 36

CHAPTER 3

Figure 3.1: MS Noordam approaching Princes Wharf .................................................... 59
Figure 3.2: MS Sapphire Princess tied-up at Princes Wharf ........................................ 59
Figure 3.3: MS Explorer of the Seas tied-up at Princes Wharf .................................... 60
Figure 3.4: Shed 10 and The Cloud .............................................................................. 63
Figure 3.5: Shed 10 frontage and The Cloud ................................................................. 65
Figure 3.6: Current cruise wharves (Princes Wharf and Queens Wharf) .................... 66
Figure 3.7: Four Central Wharves options .................................................................. 68
Figure 3.8: Photograph taken from Queens Wharf: Captain Cook, Marsden and Bledisloe
Wharves .......................................................................................................................... 68
Figure 3.9: The World, Seabourn Encore, Norwegian Star, and L’Austral ................. 71
List of Tables

Included in this list of tables are the tables for Chapters 1 (Introduction), 3 (Background) and 7 (Conclusion)

CHAPTER 1

Table 1.1: New cruise ships launching 2018-2023 ................................................................. 5
Table 1.2: Required changes ................................................................................................. 6
Table 1.3: Stakeholders ......................................................................................................... 15
Table 1.4: Framework elements ............................................................................................ 25
Table 1.5: Summary of beliefs ............................................................................................... 27
Table 1.6: Thesis research objectives and aims/research questions .................................... 29
Table 1.7: Semi-structured interview respondents ............................................................... 32
Table 1.8: Summary of research methodologies ................................................................. 34

CHAPTER 3

Table 3.1: Growth in New Zealand’s inbound cruise market .............................................. 56
Table 3.2: Cruise growth in Auckland .................................................................................. 57
Table 3.3: Central Wharves Strategy options ..................................................................... 65
Table 3.4: Timeline of significant events ............................................................................. 70

CHAPTER 7

Table 7.1: Framework elements - Auckland ........................................................................ 210
Table 7.2: Key findings ......................................................................................................... 214
Table 7.3: Implications ......................................................................................................... 215
Table 7.4: Novel contributions of this research ................................................................. 218
Acknowledgements

When I was a little girl of four or five in the 1950s, I remember standing on the 54th Street Pier in Manhattan, wearing a frilly dress, patent leather shoes and white gloves, watching what I thought was a mighty big white building edge out into the Hudson River. This building – this cruise liner - was on her way to Europe with my aunt and uncle, Judge and Mrs. Morris E. Barison, onboard. Streamers and confetti clouded the sky. We had just come back ashore after wishing them Bon Voyage. I was fascinated, and I never forgot the experience. I can’t remember which ship it was, but it very well could have been the Andrea Doria shortly before she sank, or the Nieuw Amsterdam or another one. I was totally smitten with the spectacle, the romanticism, the sheer improbability of it all, at least to a little girl. The fascination and love of ocean-going vessels have never left me, but never did I think I would become an addicted cruise traveller, or more improbably, making an academic career of cruise. But I have, and there are so many people to thank for the privilege and honour of doing so.

Rarely does one find three advisors who are so supportive. No words are sufficiently adequate to express my thanks to Associate Professor Gui Lohmann, Dr. Brent Moyle and Associate Professor Matthew Burke. Gui, Brent and Matt were always there, with huge doses of humour, support, and most importantly, a very special friendship.

I would be remiss if I didn’t mention my great PhD buddies in Team Gui. I may be 2,400 km away in distance, but that hasn’t mattered one bit. We’ve laughed together, we’ve been frustrated together, we’ve worked hard together, we’ve aspired together. For this, I need to give my very warmest and special thanks to Ambrozio Queiroz Neto, Bojana Spasojevic Sijacki, Tramy Ngo and Dung Le, each soon to realise their magnificent academic ambitions.

Special thanks also need to go to my Editorial Support Team. Felicity Willis, for her expert proofreading skills, but mostly for always “being there” through this journey, and Amanda Haisman, for her most professional book preparation skills.
None of this would have been possible, though, without the support and understanding of my gorgeous husband and magnificent travel companion, Dr. Terence Lealand (Terry, or TP). We have (literally) been to the ends of the Earth and back again and sailed all seven seas. But when on land, at home, you have nurtured my academic ambition. And that is so special, and so very very important to me. But hey, did you ever think life would unfold this way when you asked me, that day in London, back in 1994, “How could I ever take you to a small country town in the centre of the North Island of New Zealand?” As it turns out, you have also taken me to every continent, and almost to the North Pole.

But mostly and most profoundly, thanks to my parents, Dr. & Mrs. George J. London. I miss you everyday, but I know that you have been on every cruise with us, and are with me now. You instilled in me my love of learning and gave me the most incredible opportunities to follow my dreams. Yes, Mom, I have more degrees than a thermometer and I’m looking forward to adding another. You still make me squeak with laughter.
List of published and submitted papers and unpublished manuscripts included in this thesis

This thesis includes published papers that were co-authored with other researchers. It also includes papers that have been submitted and are currently under peer review. These papers were produced during PhD candidature only and comprise this thesis with results chapters as published and submitted papers. The bibliographic details for the published papers and status of the submitted and unpublished manuscripts for these papers follows:

### Published papers

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<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Paper</th>
<th>Referenced in this thesis as:</th>
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### Papers in review

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<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Paper</th>
<th>Referenced in this paper as:</th>
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Conference papers not included in this thesis

|---|
Relevant publications prior to candidature

Article


Book chapter


Report


Seminar presentations


Assistance received during research and preparation of this thesis

This thesis includes four papers (two published and two submitted for review) which were co-authored with other researchers. These papers were entirely produced during PhD candidature and comprise this thesis with results chapters as published and submitted papers. Following is a table which provides the bibliographic details of the four papers as well as detailing my responsibilities and the assistance received for each.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Status of publication</th>
<th>My responsibilities and assistance received</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Paper 1 (Chapter 2)</strong>&lt;br&gt;London, W. R. &amp; Lohmann, G. 2014, Power in the context of cruise destination stakeholders’ interrelationships. <em>Research in transportation business &amp; management, 13</em>, 24–35.</td>
<td>Published</td>
<td><strong>I was responsible for:</strong>&lt;br&gt;(a) 95% of the research required for production of the literature review&lt;br&gt;(b) 90% of the writing of this paper&lt;br&gt;(c) developing the framework for analysing power&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;A/Prof Lohmann (a) guided the writing of the theoretical section of the first draft of this paper; (b) contributed about 10% of the literature review content; and (c) reviewed the final draft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Paper 2 (Chapter 4)</strong>&lt;br&gt;London, W. R., Moyle, B.D., Lohmann, G. 2017. Cruise infrastructure development in Auckland, New Zealand: a media discourse analysis (2008–2016). <em>Asia Pacific Journal of Tourism Research, 22</em> (6), 615–633.</td>
<td>Published</td>
<td><strong>I was responsible for:</strong>&lt;br&gt;(a) conducting all data collection&lt;br&gt;(b) analysing all data and reporting their results&lt;br&gt;(c) drafting all content&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Dr Moyle provided (a) active guidance during the data analysis phase of this paper, suggesting the approach for analysis; (b) provided ongoing advice as to the structuring of the paper; and (c) advice relating to the writing style for this and other papers for publication. A/Prof Lohmann reviewed all drafts, contributing relevant comments.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Paper 3 (Chapter 5)</strong>&lt;br&gt;London, W. R., Lohmann, G., Moyle, B. &amp; Burke, M. I. 2017. Power, conflict and cohesion within cruise infrastructure development networks. Submitted to <em>Journal of Travel Research</em>, 23 November 2017.</td>
<td>In peer review</td>
<td><strong>I was responsible for:</strong>&lt;br&gt;(a) conducting all semi-structured interviews&lt;br&gt;(b) analysing all data and reporting their results&lt;br&gt;(c) drafting all content&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;A/Prof Lohmann  A/Prof Lohmann, Dr Moyle and A/Prof Burke provided comments on shaping the theoretical arguments of the paper and structuring the results. A/Prof Lohmann also attended two (of 15) semi-structured interviews conducted in Auckland as an observer, asking the occasional follow-on questions. Dr Moyle also provided general comments on each draft.</td>
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<td><strong>Paper 4 (Chapter 6)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>London, W. R., Lohmann, G., Moyle, B. &amp; Burke, M. I. 2017. Stakeholder network fragmentation and risk: Cruise tourism infrastructure development in Auckland, New Zealand. Submitted to <em>Tourism Planning &amp; Development</em>, 27 June 2017.</strong></td>
<td><strong>(a) conducting all semi-structured interviews</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>(b) analysing all data and reporting their results</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>(c) drafting all content</strong></td>
<td><strong>A/Prof Lohmann</strong> (a) attended two (of 15) semi-structured interviews conducted in Auckland as an observer, asking the occasional follow-on questions; and (b) provided assistance for structuring the paper. <strong>Dr Moyle</strong> provided assistance for the structuring of the paper and qualitative reporting. <strong>A/Prof Burke</strong> suggested an approach for structuring and reporting the results section and the framing for the discussion and conclusion.</td>
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List of abbreviations

ACIL       Auckland Council Investments Ltd
ARC        Auckland Regional Council (defunct since 2010 when the Auckland Super City was created)
ATEED      Auckland Tourism, Events and Economic Development
CBD        Central Business District
CCI        City Centre Integration (a CCO, originally known as CCIG – City Centre Integration Group)
CCO        Council-controlled organisation
CWS        Central Wharves Strategy
GRT        Gross registered tonnage, the measurement by which a ship’s internal volume capacity is measured (i.e., not weight) and by which limits on berthing are indicated in this thesis
POAL       Ports of Auckland Limited (“Ports”)
RWC2011    Rugby World Cup 2011, held in various venues around New Zealand with the final played in Auckland
SCO        Senior Council Officer (of Auckland Council)

A note about currency:

All dollar amounts are given as New Zealand dollars, unless otherwise indicated.
Glossary

**Auckland City Council**  
One of the predecessor local government councils to the current Auckland Council.

**Auckland Council**  
The current local government body for the Auckland region, formed in November 2010 from the merger of the Auckland Regional Council, Auckland City Council, Manukau City Council, North Shore City Council, Papakura District Council, Rodney District Council, Waitakere City Council and Franklin District Council merged to form the Auckland Council, creating what is descriptively known as the Auckland Super City.

**Auckland cruise infrastructure development network**  
The stakeholder network which includes key stakeholders involved in the promotion of proposals for Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development.

**Auckland Regional Council**  
The predecessor regional council to the current Auckland Council, formed in November 2010.

**Cruise destination**  
The area which encompasses the infrastructure, attractions, services and other products which are required and used by cruise ships, their passengers and their crew, including the port itself (unless explicitly excluded or the context demands otherwise).

**Cruise industry**  
Refers to (a) the cruise lines and their corporate structure, their ships and crew and the operation of their ships; and (b) industry groups.

**Cruise infrastructure**  
Includes:

(a) the building (i.e., cruise terminal) or other structure within the port area which provides (at minimum) shelter for cruise passengers and crew as well as amenities, general services, Immigration and Customs services and transportation marshalling areas, etc.; and

(b) all marine structures, including, e.g., wharves, piers and mooring structures and waterways used for the transit and berthing of curries ships within the port area.

“Cruise infrastructure” and “cruise terminal” may be used interchangeably, if the context allows.

**Cruise ship**  
A ship that carries passengers on ocean voyages for leisure, generally visiting one or more ports during the voyage.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Term</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cruise tourism</strong></td>
<td>Includes the products and services offered by a cruise destination in respect of the cruise ships, passengers and crew which visit that cruise destination.</td>
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<td><strong>Formal stakeholder networks</strong></td>
<td>Formal stakeholder networks are organised, with clearly identifiable powerful actors at the centre, and which are governed by formal rules and norms. They can be differentiated from informal stakeholder networks, also defined in this Glossary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Informal stakeholder networks</strong></td>
<td>Informal stakeholder networks are non-organised as opposed to un-organised. Their informal structures can lead to opportunities or access to resources, or conversely, erect barriers to both. They can be differentiated from formal stakeholder networks, also defined in this Glossary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marquee port</strong></td>
<td>A port which has alternately been described as a “must see” port and one which provides infrastructure to support the industry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mega cruise ships</strong></td>
<td>Cruise ships which are categorised as post- or new Panamax vessels, i.e., ships which are too long and too wide to transit the Panama Canal before its expansion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Port</strong></td>
<td>The specific area which contains the infrastructure to accommodate cruise ships and the embarkation and disembarkation of passengers and crew. In this context, the port can also include any area in a harbour or other adjacent waterway which is used by ships for mooring (at anchor or by dynamic positioning) and their tenders for transporting passengers and crew to shore.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proposal</strong></td>
<td>In the context of this study, “proposal” is used to distinguish the project conception-to-construction phase from the construction phase itself. In other words, this study investigates how stakeholders shape proposals for cruise infrastructure development and not the stakeholders’ involvement during construction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stakeholder network</strong></td>
<td>A stakeholder network is a specific type of social network. It can involve individual and organisational actors. Stakeholder networks can be either formal or informal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turnaround (or home) port</strong></td>
<td>A cruise port where passengers and crew embark or disembark their cruise ships at the start or end of the voyage, respectively.</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction
1.2 Background
1.3 Motivation for this research
1.4 Commercial context
1.5 Contextual, theoretical and conceptual boundaries
1.6 Theoretical and conceptual overview
1.7 Research design
1.8 Research aim
1.9 Research delimitation
1.10 Approach and methods
1.11 Ethics
1.12 Thesis structure
1.13 Thesis compliance
1 Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This chapter presents an overview of the research which is included in this thesis with results chapters as published and submitted papers. Section 1.2 provides the background to this research while Section 1.3 sets out its motivation. Section 1.4 outlines the commercial context. Section 1.5 discusses the contextual, theoretical and conceptual boundaries of this research. Section 1.6 comprises an overview of the literature reviews incorporated into the four included papers, explaining the intricate connection between them. Figure 1.5 is a novel conceptual framework which illustrates how social networks shape proposals for cruise infrastructure development. The research design is outlined in Section 1.7 while Sections 1.8 and 1.9 includes the research aim and research delimitation, respectively. Section 1.10 describes the approach and methods used in this research. Section 1.11, Ethics, is followed by Section 1.12, Thesis structure. Section 1.13 is a declaration of compliance with the Griffith University rules on the inclusion of papers in a thesis.

1.2 Background

Cruise tourism is the fastest growing sector within the global leisure travel industry (Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA), 2016). This growth is manifested not only in the substantial, consistent annual increase in the number of passengers but also in the number and size of ships being added to the global cruise fleet. More than 25 million passengers are expected to cruise in 2017 (Papathanassis, 2017), while a total of 44 new ships will be added to the global fleet between 2018 and 2023 (CruiseCritic (UK), 2017). Another indicator of this growth is the number of new destinations being introduced as destinations seek to derive economic benefit from cruise tourism (see, e.g., Brida, Bukstein & Tealde, 2015; Castillo-Manzano, Lopez-Valpuesta, & Alanis, 2015) and as cruise lines seek to refresh their itineraries (Rodrigue & Notteboom, 2013).

For many cities, the investment in cruise infrastructure can yield economic and social benefits. The construction of cruise terminals can foster the redevelopment of brownfield
waterfront sites, thereby contributing to urban redevelopment (McCarthy & Romein, 2012). Similarly, incorporating cruise terminals into multi-purpose waterfront developments can be attractive for investors and developers who wish to diversify their investment (Gui & Russo, 2011; McCarthy, 2003; McCarthy & Romein, 2012). The introduction of cruise shipping can prove to be economically beneficial for commercial ports seeking additional revenue streams (London & Lohmann, 2014). Cities may view new cruise infrastructure as economically beneficial, facilitating the growth of cruise tourism as well as tourism, generally (Schmalleger & Carson, 2010). Other benefits include job creation; enhanced local amenities in adjacent public spaces; increased visitor spend in adjacent shopping, hospitality or attraction areas; and opportunities for service industries (e.g., transportation, security, environmental services, etc.) (McCarthy & Romein, 2012).

However, the development of cruise infrastructure can also yield economic and social disadvantages. For example, the investment, often by local governments, in cruise infrastructure and its operation and maintenance can be costly (Lau, Tam, Ng, & Pallis, 2014; Schmalleger & Carson, 2010). The presence of cruise ships can result in the displacement or loss of commercial shipping traffic and therefore revenues (London & Lohmann, 2014). Additionally, local communities can be negatively impacted by air, water and crowd pollution (Brida & Zapata, 2009; Carić & Mackelworth, 2014; Hritz & Cecil, 2008; Maragkogianni & Papaefthimiou, 2015).

It is within this broad context that this thesis seeks to understand how stakeholder networks influence proposals for cruise infrastructure development. The specific motivations for undertaking this research are outlined in the next section.

1.3 Motivation for this research

Cruise infrastructure development is a complex exercise. One of the primary reasons for this complexity is the sheer number of stakeholders involved (Lau, et al., 2014). These stakeholders establish either formal or informal networks (Krackhardt & Hanson, 1993; Serrat, 2017) to advance proposals for cruise infrastructure development (Aaltonen & Kujala, 2010). However, controversy, conflict and contestability are often evident. The presence of characteristics such as political and geographical diversity and the presence
of competing interests can result in a lack of cohesion within the network (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2012; Lienert, Schnetzer, & Ingold, 2013; Selman, 2000). This lack of cohesion, or fragmentation, can lead to risks which can threaten the project (Boholm, Corvellec, & Karlsson, 2012; Flyvberg, 2009; Guo, Chang-Richards, Wilkinson, & Li, 2014). Network fragmentation can result from the asymmetric exercise of power and often be a symptom of or contribute to political and community opposition (see, e.g., Hindmarsh & Matthews, 2008). A lack of cohesion, or fragmentation, can be exacerbated by evolutionary changes in the structural approach to local government, i.e., a shift away from traditional bureaucratic and hierarchical government to a more inclusive, democratic network governance approach (Börzel, 1998). In this case, network fragmentation can often be attributed to a lack of effective governance on the government or policy level (Börzel, 1998).

Limited research has been undertaken which considers stakeholder interrelationships and the exercise of power within cruise infrastructure development networks. There also appears to be a dearth of research which addresses the specific issues of the management of competing interests, network cohesion, network fragmentation, and risk as a consequence of network fragmentation. The need for such research is evident, given the rapid growth of cruising over a relatively short time and the projections for that growth to continue (F-CCA, 2017). Specifically, the rapidity of this growth has compelled cruise destinations to (re)develop cruise infrastructure in a commensurately short time, often without fully understanding the political environment in which such (re)development takes place or the interests and objectives of key stakeholders. Thus, there is a risk that development may not be sustainable into the future because short-term solutions may not be able to support future demand, driving the cruise lines to by-pass unsustainable destinations. This trait, i.e., the ability to choose among cruise destinations, represents the ultimate risk for cruise destinations (London & Lohmann, 2014).

Thus, it is important for key stakeholders in cruise destinations to understand how stakeholder networks shape proposals for cruise infrastructure development. This understanding is particularly vital where proposals are advanced against the background of a contested political environment, a change in local government structure or the existence of a stakeholder network which lacks structure and cohesion.
At present, little or no empirical research appears to have been undertaken which analyses the formation and operation of stakeholder networks in the context of cruise infrastructure development. In particular, there needs to be conceptual clarification and theoretical refinement of the exercise of power, the management of competing interests and the control over and access to resources such as information in this context. This thesis seeks to address these issues.

1.4 Commercial context

As noted in section 1.2, cruise tourism is the fastest growing sector within the global leisure travel industry (CLIA, 2016). Since 1990, the number of passengers worldwide has grown from 3.7 million (Cruise Market Watch, 2014) to an expected 25.3 million in 2017 (F-CCA, 2017; Papathanassis, 2017). In order to accommodate continued growth, 44 new cruise ships will be added to the global cruise fleet from 2018 to 2023 as shown in Table 1.1. Notable among the announced new ships is the number of ships which are heavier than 100,000 GRT, i.e., 39, or 89%.

Table 1.1: New cruise ships launching 2018-2023(a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2018 7 new ships</th>
<th>2019 8 new ships</th>
<th>2020 7 new ships</th>
<th>2021 7 new ships</th>
<th>2022 9 new ships</th>
<th>2023 6 new ships (announced to date)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GRT</td>
<td>225,282</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>227,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berths</td>
<td>2,650</td>
<td>5,176</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>5,497</td>
<td>5,400</td>
<td>5,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRT</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>177,000</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berths</td>
<td>5,186</td>
<td>4,900</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>5,186</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>3,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRT</td>
<td>164,600</td>
<td>167,800</td>
<td>177,000</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>143,700</td>
<td>140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berths</td>
<td>4,140</td>
<td>4,180</td>
<td>4,900</td>
<td>5,176</td>
<td>3,560</td>
<td>3,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRT</td>
<td>154,000</td>
<td>167,600</td>
<td>168,600</td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>104,000</td>
<td>140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berths</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>4,180</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>3,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRT</td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>163,000</td>
<td>145,000</td>
<td>117,000</td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>135,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berths</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>3,560</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRT</td>
<td>117,000</td>
<td>143,700</td>
<td>117,000</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>117,000</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berths</td>
<td>5,400</td>
<td>3,560</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>2,860</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRT</td>
<td>99,500</td>
<td>133,500</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>99,500</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>113,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berths</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>3,934</td>
<td>2,860</td>
<td>2,650</td>
<td>2,860</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRT</td>
<td>55,900</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>2,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berths</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>2,860</td>
<td>2,860</td>
<td>2,860</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Cruise Critic (UK) 2017)

Note (a)
Two ships are excluded from this calculation because, as can be seen in Table 1.1, their GRT is not given. However, it can be assumed that they would also have a GRT of greater than 100,000 because of the number of passengers they will carry, i.e., 5,000 each.
The deployment of mega cruise ships has significant implications for ports. Substantial alterations to existing infrastructure must be made or new infrastructure constructed (London & Lohmann, 2014). Table 1.2 summarises many of the changes which ports are obliged to implement in order to host mega cruise ships:

**Table 1.2: Required changes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affected feature or facility</th>
<th>Examples of required changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Access to harbour/port area | • Lengthen and strengthen piers and wharves and consider use of dolphins\(^1\) and other berthing technologies  
• Ensure that mega cruise ships can transit under low bridges and power lines  
• Dredge channels, harbours and rivers to provide enough depth for the ship’s draft |
| Cruise terminal             | • Construct additional space, facilities and services for, *e.g.*,:  
  • Immigration, Customs and Security  
  • Passenger/crew and baggage check-in (embarkation) and baggage reclaim (in turnaround ports)  
  • Provide additional and adequate amenities to ensure passenger/crew safety and comfort  
  • Provide a sufficient number of gangways |
| Provisioning/supply         | • Construct adequate road access and wharf space for delivery vehicles, containers and cargo for the provisioning of mega cruise ships |
| Local transport             | • Provide an adequate marshalling area for coaches, taxis, buses and other vehicles used to transport passengers and crew |
| Safety and security         | • Implement adequate physical safety and security measures to protect passengers, crew and landside workers |
| Tendering facilities        | • Where required, provide sufficient added capacity for tendering passengers and crew to shore, including deploying local ferries and other passenger vessels where necessary to supplement the ship’s tenders |
| Environmental impact        | • Provide the necessary facilities, services and personnel to manage the additional burdens of waste, emissions, noise, crowding and the blocking of sightlines which mega cruise ships are likely to impose on the port and host destination |

The (re)development of cruise infrastructure can also motivated by the number of cruise destinations being added. Spearheading this increase are the cruise lines who seek to refresh their existing itineraries to attract repeat passengers and cities wishing to become cruise destinations or expand their cruise tourism sector (Johnson & Lyons, 2012; Teye & Paris, 2010).

\(^1\) A dolphin is a free-standing structure which enables longer ships to be tied-up using the dolphin as an extension to the wharf, rather than requiring the wharf to support the entire ship.
1.5 Contextual, theoretical and conceptual boundaries

1.5.1 Contextual boundaries
While cruise infrastructure is a critical topic within the area of tourism, this thesis focuses on key stakeholders who are part of a network which has formed to influence proposals for the development of cruise infrastructure, a type of large public infrastructure. Therefore, although the literature review in this thesis and its included papers discuss cruise infrastructure as it relates to tourism, the purpose of those discussions is to focus on stakeholders and stakeholder networks as they relate to large public infrastructure and not to the specific context of cruise tourism. In other words, this study could be replicated to investigate the development of sports stadia without considering sports tourism or large publicly-funded hospitals without considering medical tourism.

1.5.2 Stakeholders and stakeholder networks
This thesis considers power, politics and cohesion within stakeholder networks which form around cruise infrastructure development. More specifically, it incorporates empirical evidence which demonstrates how these factors influence proposals for cruise infrastructure development. Stakeholder networks are a type of social network. While there is a tendency to use the terms “social network” and “stakeholder network” interchangeably (see, e.g., Prell, Hubacek, & Reed, 2009), the discussion in this thesis purposely uses “stakeholder network” because of its congruence with the theoretical and conceptual basis of this research. In other words, this research specifically investigates the role of stakeholders, not actors in other kinds of social networks (e.g. co-workers in workplace support networks (Podolny & Baron, 1997); friends in wellness networks (Berkman, 1984); students in education networks (Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini, & Zenou, 2009); directors in boardroom networks (Alexander, 2003); terrorists in extremist global networks (Krebs, 2002); and even the millions of individuals who make up vast social media networks (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010)). Moreover, the empirical evidence included in this thesis compels further refinement of the term stakeholder network (see section 5.5). Governance networks (Börzel, 1998), policy networks (Börzel, 1998; Marsh & Smith, 2000) and policy issue networks (Young, Wang, & Lewis, 2016) are forms of stakeholder networks. This thesis considers power, politics and cohesion within the latter two, i.e., policy networks and policy issue networks (see Chapter 5). As part of this thesis’
consideration of these networks, the terms formal and informal networks are also used. Formal networks are organised networks, with clearly identifiable actors at the centre and are governed by formal norms and rules. Informal networks are non-organised networks, where all actors can pursue opportunities or access to resources, or conversely, erect barriers to both.

In addition to the boundaries discussed immediately above, it is also worth noting that while there are many theories which can be used to analyse social networks (including stakeholder networks), they are not considered because they do not directly inform the empirical evidence presented in this research. For example, actor-network theory (ANT) could be considered to be relevant, but according to Latour (1996), ANT is a broader theory, or even ontology, which seeks to explain the “very essence of societies and nature” by “rebuild[ing] social theory out of networks” (Latour, 1996, p. 369). Moreover, while agency (e.g., Stevenson & Greenberg, 2000), social exchange theory (e.g., Ramayah, Lee, & In, 2011) and collaboration theory (e.g., Jamal & Getz, 1995) can also be considered to be relevant and have been addressed to varying degrees in the tourism literature, this research focuses on a specific aspect of the cruise infrastructure development process which can be considered to be antecedent to opportunities to apply these theories. In other words, this study seeks to lay the groundwork for future research which probes how stakeholders achieve their specific goals during the cruise development process. In other words, this research seeks to foster a better understanding of who is involved in cruise infrastructure development, what relationships have been formed as a result of that involvement, where decisionmaking power lies and the risks that can accrue from a lack of cohesion within the network. From the perspective of the often lengthy life-cycle of cruise infrastructure development, this research is concerned with the proposal stage where networks first form and not at later stages when theories such as agency, social exchange and collaboration can be applied to inform discussions of the nature of the relationships between stakeholders, including how they collaborate and how resources are exchanged and information communicated.

The preceding discussion about stakeholder networks begs the question of who exactly is a stakeholder. Implicit in the discussion in this thesis is the definition of a stakeholder as any individual or group which can affect or is affected by change (see, e.g., Yilmaz & Gunel, 2009) or who has “the right and capacity to participate in the process” (Nilsson,
2007, p. 172). This definition is broader than Freeman’s (1984) which limits the relationship to a stakeholder’s interaction with an organisation. Instead, this thesis adopts the view that stakeholders can be stakeholders of each other (Frooman, 2010). Therefore, this thesis also excludes definitions relating to the legitimacy of stakeholders which are based on a finding of legitimacy solely in connection with organisations (see, e.g., Hill & Jones, 1992; Rowley, 1997).

1.5.3 Power and risk
Boundaries can also be drawn around the discussions of power and risk. Power is discussed with the specific purpose of developing a framework for describing its operation and manifestation among key stakeholders involved in or with an interest in the negotiations surrounding cruise infrastructure development. In turn, this framework informs the empirical research undertaken in this study, supporting the theoretical discussions relating to advancement of proposals for this development. Chapter 2 examines power through many conceptual lenses while Chapter 5 examines the role of power in the formation of stakeholder networks. Similarly, the discussion of risk in Chapter 6 is limited to gaining an understanding the potential effects of a lack of cohesion within a stakeholder network, i.e., an inventory of risks which can damage or even threaten large public infrastructure development projects, including cruise infrastructure. Thus, the concepts of power and risk can be considered as enabling concepts rather than the main focus of scholarly investigation in this thesis.

1.6 Theoretical and conceptual overview
This section consists of an overview of the literature reviews used to inform the published and submitted papers in Chapters 2, 4, 5 and 6.

1.6.1 Power and cruise infrastructure planning and development
Efficient, attractive and welcoming cruise infrastructure can be determinative of whether a cruise ship visits a cruise destination or not (Munro & Gill, 2006). However, cruise infrastructure can be justified or perceived in many different ways. For example, cruise infrastructure can represent showcase projects for governments seeking short-term economic and employment growth (Schmallegger & Carson, 2010) and a vehicle for regenerating city waterfront areas (Kotval & Mullin, 2010). It can also be a source of
political indecision, the focus of debate, a forum for competing interests and the target of opposition from the community and other sectors (Dredge, 2010; Terry & Smith, 2015).

There are two principal ways in which proposals for cruise infrastructure development can be promoted, *i.e.*, either the cruise line or the destination initiates the proposal. The motivations for and potential outcomes of each are different (Chapter 2). Differences are also evident in the interrelationships between stakeholders and the power they exercise. For example, the cruise lines can always exercise ultimate power by withdrawing from a destination, resulting in cruise infrastructure either being abandoned or under-utilised (Joling, 2009; London & Lohmann, 2014; Terry & Smith, 2015). On the other hand, destinations can exercise commercial or bargaining power by, for example, offering the cruise lines concessions based on long-term land leases and berthing arrangements (Wang, Pallis & Notteboom, 2014).

However, there are many variables which affect the exercise of power in the advancement of cruise infrastructure proposals including the destination’s stage of development (Papathanassis, 2017; Papathanassis & Bundă, 2016); the type of infrastructure required (Kerswill & Mair, 2015); and the ownership model adopted by the host port (Di Vaio & Romana Medda, 2010). Little, if any research, appears to have been undertaken which considers these factors against the backdrop of the exercise of power in the context of cruise infrastructure development.

Chapter 2 makes two original contributions in this context. First, it presents a conceptual analysis of power, first looking at general and tourism-specific theories of power and then at the economic power exercised by groups of stakeholders involved in cruise infrastructure development. It also discusses the risks which are inherently present in the exercise of that power. However, the analysis of power in the context of cruise infrastructure development can be a complex and difficult exercise because of the sheer number of factors involved. Therefore, Chapter 2’s second original contribution is a proposed framework which facilitates the analysis of power in the context of cruise infrastructure development. Figure 1.1 is a visual representation of Chapter 2. This figure also anticipates the topics discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 whose specific focus is the stated aim of this thesis, *i.e.*, how stakeholder networks shape proposals for cruise infrastructure development.
General theories of power

Tourism specific theories of power

Power in the context of cruise infrastructure development

Framework for analysing power

- Origin of proposal
- Stage of development
- Type of port
- Port characteristics
- Stakeholders

Risk
- Inherent in power

Risk
- As a result of asymmetric power, resulting in network fragmentation

- Chapter 3
  - Background
- Chapter 4
  - Stakeholder engagement with the community
  - A rich case study of the issues facing Auckland, New Zealand’s cruise infrastructure (re)development
- Chapter 5
  - Stakeholder interrelationships (including the exercise of power) within the social network
  - Identification of the type of network
- Chapter 6
  - Network fragmentation
- Chapters 5 and 6
  - Stakeholder networks

Figure 1.1: Visual representation of Chapter 2
(Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 in shaded boxes with dashed lines)
1.6.2 The media’s role in shaping debate – a media discourse analysis approach

Proposals for the development of cruise infrastructure can trigger political debate (Dredge, 2010) and evoke emotional responses from the community (Korbee, Mol, & van Tatenhove, 2015; Schmallegger & Carson, 2010; Terry & Smith, 2015). Both responses can be a reaction to the unwelcome exercise of power, as discussed in Chapter 2. Moreover, these reactions can occur over extended periods of time, given the length of time involved in cruise infrastructure development projects (see, e.g., Lau, et al., 2014). No previous studies appear to have been undertaken which consider the role of the media in mediating these reactions, or more specifically, how the media shapes the debate surrounding cruise infrastructure development.

Chapter 4 addresses this gap by adopting a thematic analysis approach to analyse the media discourse surrounding Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development. Thematic analysis has been used to analyse the media discourse in many contexts such as health (Washer & Joffe, 2006), public relations (Spicer, 1993), major sporting events (Kim, Lee, Mjelde, & Lee, 2014), offshore wind infrastructure (Thompson, 2005) and tourism (Imison & Schweinsberg, 2013; McLennan, Becken, & Moyle, 2014; Stepchenkova & Eales, 2011). However, it does not appear to have been applied to cruise tourism or cruise infrastructure development. Thematic analysis can prove to be a useful tool for key stakeholders, including policy-makers, for synthesising and analysing large amounts of information collected from a variety of sources over a period of time. However, this research was concerned with the narrower focus of the media discourse relating to Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development.

The aim of Chapter 4 is to explore how the media portrays the cruise infrastructure debate in a complex and highly contested political environment. The issues embodied in this aim are reflected in the over-arching themes created during the thematic analysis process, i.e., (a) cruise tourism growth in Auckland; (b) the current state of Auckland’s cruise infrastructure; (c) the political and social controversies surrounding Queens Wharf; (d) the issues relating to commercial displacement vis-à-vis POAL and cruise shipping; and (e) the emerging community distrust of and sentiments of a lack of transparency in relation to Auckland’s local government body. The reorganisation of the underlying content into these themes facilitates the telling of a cohesive narrative, or rich case study,
of the debate surrounding Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development between 2008 and 2016.

The unwelcome exercise of power was a prominent theme in this narrative. Significantly and perhaps surprisingly, there was no community or political opposition to the motivations or proposals for the (re)development of Auckland’s cruise infrastructure as there was in Darwin and the Gold Coast, Australia, respectively (see Chapter 2, section 4.2). Instead, community opposition and protest arose from community perceptions of a lack of transparency, trust and political consistency in respect of the actions of key stakeholders relating to the policies and negotiations relating to (re)development. Two prominent themes emerged from the analysis of these perceptions, as reported in the media, i.e., (a) an unwelcome exercise of power by POAL in its role as the entity with decision-making power in respect of the port’s operations (see Johnson & Orsman, 2015; Orsman 2015a); and (b) the lack of political consistency exhibited by a mayor who was seen to “back-flips” in his decisions relating to the siting of Auckland’s cruise infrastructure, succumbing to POAL’s power (Orsman, 2011a). Thus, Auckland’s story can be distinguished from other destinations such as Darwin, Australia (Schmallegger & Carson, 2010; Charleston, South Carolina, (Terry & Smith, 2015); the Gold Coast, Australia (Dupre & Bosman, 2017); and Falmouth, Jamaica (Kerswill & Mair, 2015) where the target of opposition in each case was the motivation for or the impacts of the construction of the cruise terminal itself.

Figure 1.2 illustrates how Chapter 4 contributes to the research in this thesis. It also inserts the values relevant to Auckland against the appropriate elements in the Framework presented in that chapter.
Chapter 2

Conceptual review of power

Chapter 2

Framework for analysing power

Chapter 4

Rich case study - Auckland

Chapter 4

Community engagement

Overarching themes

Origin of proposal

Initiated by the destination

Auckland’s cruise infrastructure (current situation) (see Chapter 3)

Cruise tourism growth (see also section 1.4.3.1)

Stage of development

Mature - (Re)development

Shed 10/Queens Wharf (see Chapter 3)

Type of port

Turnaround/ hybrid port

Commercial displacement (see Chapter 3)

Port characteristics

Commercial port owned by Council

Public sector

Owners/Government

Private sector

Community/business community

Infrastructure users

Governance, bureaucracy and debate

(see also Chapters 5 and 6)

Stakeholders

• Public sector

• Private sector

Chapter 5

• Stakeholder interrelationships (including the exercise of power) within the social network

• Identification of the type of network

Chapter 6

• Network fragmentation

• Risk

Figure 1.2: Visual representation of Chapter 4 (Chapters 2, 3, 5 and 6 in shaded boxes with dashed lines)
1.6.3 Stakeholder interrelationships within cruise infrastructure development networks – power, conflict and cohesion

Stakeholders involved in shaping proposals for cruise infrastructure development establish networks to advance those proposals (see, e.g., Aaltonen & Kujala, 2010). Cruise infrastructure development networks can either be formal or informal, but in each case, tend to be made up of large numbers of stakeholders who embrace a wide variety of competing interests (Lau, et al, 2014; McCarthy & Romein, 2012), as shown in Table 1.3:

Table 1.3: Stakeholders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public sector</th>
<th>Private sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Government agencies on the local, regional, state/provincial or national levels</td>
<td>• Community (Residents)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Elected officials such as local body councillors and national legislators</td>
<td>• Business community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Non-elected officials such as local body officials or senior national ministry or agency officials</td>
<td>• Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Port owners and operators</td>
<td>• Consultants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Regulatory agencies</td>
<td>• Academics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Destination management/economic development agencies</td>
<td>• Infrastructure users (i.e., the cruise lines)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Emergency, health and security providers</td>
<td>• Developers and investors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The participating stakeholders exercise power by pursuing their preferences among an array of options. The evaluation of and ultimate choice among these options depends on the stakeholders’ ability to access or control information (see, e.g., Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006; Young, Wang, & Lewis, 2016) (see also Chapter 2 for a discussion of choice). The choices, or decisions, facing stakeholders relate to a wide range of disparate issues such as determining the level of investment required (Baker & Stockton, 2013), resolving competing interests (see, e.g., Bourblanc & Blanchon, 2014; Wiewiora, Keast, & Brown, 2016) and optimising or at least protecting their individual political or economic positions (Ongolo, 2015). The resolution of these decisions will depend on how effectively the power exercised by key stakeholders can be managed in their political, financial and social negotiations and also on how the exercise of that power is perceived by other stakeholders, including the community (see Chapter 4).
Effective management, preferably driving network cohesion, depends on the management (governance) of the asymmetric exercise of power and control over and access to resources (e.g., information) within the network. Implicit in these requirements are many conceptual issues which are addressed in Chapter 5, including power and the measurement of power. Another key issue discussed in Chapter 5 is the need to identify the specific type of network which has been established. Within the stakeholder network sphere, policy is often shaped by governance networks, policy networks or policy issue networks (see, e.g., Denton, 2017; Hawkins, Hu, & Feiock, 2016). The differences between policy networks and policy issue networks are discussed in Chapter 5. Understanding how stakeholders interrelate and exercise power within these networks is particularly important as public sector governance moves from the traditional hierarchical and formal approaches of government to a broader, network approach (see, e.g., Lecy, Mergel & Schmitz, 2014; Tenbensel, 2017).

Chapter 5 also considers the measurement of power within cruise infrastructure development networks. Power can be measured through quantitative methods such as social network analysis (SNA) but there are recent calls for the introduction of qualitative or even mixed-method approaches (Bazeley, 2016; Crossley & Edwards, 2016; Edwards, 2010). SNA enables the researcher to visualise the network by reducing the data to mathematical terms which can be mapped, thereby displaying the ties between actors, but qualitative analyses allow for a reconstruction of the dynamics of complex social ties, providing a richness that is not available using SNA (Edwards, 2010; Krinsky & Crossley, 2014). Chapter 5 adopts a qualitative approach, based on respondents’ perceptions of the complex interactions between stakeholders, including those who appear on the periphery of the network but who may, in fact, be influential.

Thus, Chapter 5 provides empirically informed insights into the exercise of power within cruise infrastructure development networks. It also concludes that the characteristics exhibited by the Auckland cruise infrastructure development network render that network a policy issue network, given the definition of Auckland’s network as an open and unstable network where actors contribute unequal resources and their primary motivation for joining is change (Daugbjerg, 1997; Heclio, 1978). Consequently, Chapter 5 seeks to answer three research questions: (a) how do stakeholders involved in cruise infrastructure...
development networks perceive the exercise and impact of power within the network; (b) how does the exercise of power impact stakeholders’ ability to access information; and (c) what effect does the exercise of power and the ability to access information have on the degree of cohesion within the network.

A visual representation of Chapter 5 can be found in Figure 1.3:
**Figure 1.3:** Visual representation of Chapter 5  
(Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 6 in shaded boxes with dashed lines)
1.6.4 Network fragmentation and risk

Large infrastructure development networks are particularly susceptible to a lack of cohesion, or fragmentation (Lau, et al., 2014; McCarthy & Romein, 2012). As discussed in Chapter 6, fragmentation can occur where there is a lack of clarity around governance (see, e.g., Beach, 2008). In other words, effective governance is required to resolve or mitigate dissension or dysfunction within the network. The causes of fragmentation can include, for example, the existence of competing interests and differing professional viewpoints among stakeholders, the intervention of too many regulatory agencies within the network, the emergence of sub-groups and the presence of diverse values and beliefs (Boholm, 2008; Johansson, 2015; Lienert, et al., 2013; Selman, 2000; Turner, Polunin, & Stead, 2014). It can also occur where there is a lack of trust and reciprocity (Turner, Polunin, & Stead, 2014). Underpinning the causes of fragmentation is likely to be the gratuitous assertion of power by individual stakeholders (Flyvberg, 2009). Spatially, fragmentation can be horizontal (on the local level) or vertical (between levels of government) (Lienert, et al., 2013). Eliminating or at least mitigating network fragmentation is of critical importance because of the potential for risk which can flow from the dysfunction caused by fragmentation (Boholm, et al., 2012; De Bruijne & Van Eeten, 2007; Johansson, 2015; Lienert, et al., 2013) Many of these risks can threaten the project itself, while others can be politically, economically, environmentally, socially, technically (including construction) or legally damaging.

The empirical evidence presented in Chapter 6 demonstrates the existence of a stakeholder network which is both horizontally and vertically fragmented. Respondents’ perceptions communicated the presence of many of the causes of fragmentation listed above, on both the local and inter-governmental levels. Horizontal fragmentation was clearly evident. Most notable among the example of horizontal fragmentation was a demonstration of competing interests and a lack of trust and reciprocity between POAL and other stakeholders within the network. Respondents were also explicit in their comments relating to a clear lack of trust and reciprocity between Councillors and SCOs, and between Council and the Community. Vertical fragmentation was evident in respondents’ observations about the perceived abdication of Central Government’s presumed role in the development of a nationally significant large infrastructure project. As the empirical evidence in Chapter 6 also shows, respondents articulated many of the
risks facing the development of Auckland’s cruise infrastructure, in a setting which respondents clearly perceived to be a fragmented network.

Thus, there is a clear outcome to the first research question posed in Chapter 6, i.e., whether fragmentation within a stakeholder network can lead to or exacerbate risk which threatens public infrastructure development. Many of the risks to large public infrastructure projects identified in prior studies (see, e.g., Engel, Fischer, & Galetovis, 2002; Flyvberg, 2009; Floricel & Miller, 2001; Grimsey & Lewis, 2002; Lessard & Miller, 2000; Ng & Loosemore, 2007; Yang & Zou, 2014) were evident in this study. Therefore, key stakeholders need to understand the nuances of the impact which a social characteristic, i.e., social network fragmentation, can have on the viability of major public infrastructure development projects such as cruise infrastructure. This understanding is particularly important in highly contested political environments such as that found in Auckland where local government continues to evolve from traditional, hierarchical government to a broader, more inclusive network governance approach and where engagement with the Community is strained (see Chapter 4 and Chapter 5).

The response to the second research question, i.e., whether potential risk can be mitigated through adequate and appropriate governance, was perhaps less explicit, but equally important. The empirical evidence reported in Chapter 6 as well as prior studies have found that effective governance is necessary to thwart fragmentation (see, e.g., Boholm, et al., 2012; Guo, et al., 2014; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000) and strengthen the network’s ability to manage risk (Daugbjerg, 1997; Head, 2007).

The findings in Chapter 6 are significant, particularly in the context of a highly contested political environment such as Auckland (see Chapter 4) where an informal, unstable and open policy issue network has been established (Chapter 5). While the theoretical and conceptual discussions presented in this thesis may seem academic, they raise serious issues which need to be recognised and addressed by key stakeholders involved in the development of major infrastructure projects such as cruise infrastructure development. As prior studies have confirmed, the potential for risk in such projects is high where network fragmentation is present. Therefore, effective governance mechanisms need to be put into place to counter the negative influences which can fester in inadequately managed stakeholder networks.
A visual representation of Chapter 6 can be found in Figure 1.4:
Figure 1.4: Visual representation of Chapter 6 (Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 in shaded boxes with dashed lines).
1.6.5 Conceptual framework

Figure 1.5 represents a conceptual framework based on the discussion in this chapter. This framework, which embraces the inductive approach used to inform this research, graphically illustrates the progression of proposals for cruise infrastructure development from the origin of the proposal. The theories and concepts included in this conceptual framework are elaborated in the results chapters which follow this chapter (i.e., Chapters 2 and 4-6). Table 1.4 lists the theories and concepts, indicating the results chapter in which they are discussed.
Figure 1.5: Conceptual framework – influencing proposals for cruise infrastructure development
Table 1.4: Framework elements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework element</th>
<th>Results chapter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Origin of the proposal</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factors</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inputs</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholders</td>
<td>2, 4, 5, 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network structures</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network cohesion</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network fragmentation</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.7 Research design

The purpose of a research paradigm is to provide a foundation for judging truth claims (Seale, 1999). However, “research paradigm” is not an absolute concept regulated by specific, immutable criteria (see, e.g., Cutcliffe & Harder, 2012). On the contrary, it appears that the explosion in knowledge (see, e.g., Liebowitz & Frank, 2016) has been matched by the number of research paradigms which continue to evolve, leading Seale (1999, p. 465) to speculate that “[m]aybe we should be letting a thousand flowers bloom.” In fact, there seems to be a shift away from traditional qualitative and quantitative paradigms such as positivism, post-positivism and constructivism (Guba & Lincoln, 2005) to mixed methods (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Migiro & Magangi, 2011), less theoretical approaches (Cohen & Cohen, 2015) and context-dependent paradigms (see, e.g., Borgatti & Foster, 2003 – networks and organisational research; Fellows, 2010 – the built environment). Furthermore, Guba and Lincoln (2005) differentiate between “foundational” and “anti-foundational” relationships to truth and knowledge. According to them, foundational beliefs are those which require knowledge to be rigorously tested, devoid of human bias or pre-conceptions. On the other hand, anti-foundational beliefs are based on the premise that knowledge is shared. Positivism and post-positivism are examples of foundational belief systems, where knowledge is scientifically tested and there is only one single reality (Wahyuni, 2012). Constructivism is an example of an antifoundational belief system where knowledge evolves from the relationships among participants, or stakeholders (Guba & Lincoln, 2005).

A social constructivist approach was adopted for this research. Social constructivism is appropriate where there is a lack of empirical, observable research (Dredge, 2010; Mackenzie & Knipe, 2006). The social constructivist paradigm does not depend on the
existence of any theory but instead allows the researcher to rely on the views of participants to formulate knowledge by creating patterns of meaning (Finnigan, Daly & Che, 2013). It enables the researcher to understand and question the viewpoints and decision-making of individual participants, a fundamental component of social network research. Social constructivism also enables the researcher to add richness and understanding to the production of knowledge and to participate in the research process itself (Creswell & Poth, 2017; Goodson & Phillimore, 2004). In fact, the researcher’s views have been found to be a valuable element of the research process (House, 2005) as well as an integral part of the research (Wahyuni, 2012).

However, it is the very involvement of the researcher which requires that boundaries be put into place to protect the integrity of the research by recognising the validity and contribution of the researcher. Therefore, it is necessary to annotate the philosophical framework, or paradigm, chosen by the researcher (see Kuhn, 1996). Ontology, epistemology, axiology and methodology are accepted as the knowledge claims which can establish those boundaries (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2008). Ontology, or the view of reality created by social constructivism, is subjective. It does not pre-suppose the emergence of a single reality, but instead, assumes that multiple realities exist (Guba & Lincoln, 2005; Wahyuni, 2012). Its subjective stance differs from the ontology associated with other paradigms such as positivism, post-positivism and pragmatism which each demand an external, objective reality (Wahyuni, 2012). Within the bounds of acceptable knowledge, or epistemology, this research is also consistent with social constructivism because of its focus on subjective meanings and social phenomena (Wahyuni, 2012). More specifically, this study seeks to identify and understand the issues involved (see Chapter 2), ascertain the reality behind those issues (see Chapter 4) and determine the subjective meanings and motivations behind the research participants’ responses (see Chapters 5 and 6) (Wahyuni, 2012). Again, this approach differs from other major paradigms which require research to be observable and value-free (i.e., positivism and pragmatism). It also differs from post-positivism which, conversely, assumes that the research is value-laden and that the researcher is biased by having lived in this world. (Wahyuni, 2012). The role or value of the researcher is circumscribed by the appropriate axiology. The subjective nature of social constructivism is recognised, with its axiological belief grounded in recognition that research is “value bo[u]nd [sic],” (Wahyuni, 2012). In other words, the researcher is part of the research itself. This research is perhaps defined
by its axiology. The researcher’s intense interests in “cruise,” transport, policy and economic development have served both in the choice of topic and a keen desire to understand how stakeholders band together to oversee the growth of a successful economic sector in New Zealand.

The social constructivist research paradigm and its beliefs which govern the research presented in this thesis are summarised in Table 1.5:

**Table 1.5: Summary of beliefs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Beliefs</th>
<th>Paradigm: Social constructivist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ontology</strong>&lt;br&gt;What knowledge is</td>
<td>Subjective&lt;br&gt;Socially constructed&lt;br&gt;Potential for multiple or co-constructed realities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Epistemology</strong>&lt;br&gt;How we know what we know</td>
<td>Subjective meanings&lt;br&gt;Determine the reality behind those meanings&lt;br&gt;Identify respondents’ motivations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Axiology</strong>&lt;br&gt;The values that go into knowing we know</td>
<td>Researcher is part of the research&lt;br&gt;Value-bound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Methodology</strong>&lt;br&gt;The system under which research is conducted</td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the key methodological approaches employed in this thesis, thematic analysis (see Chapter 5), is neither dependent on nor linked to any particular paradigmatic theory (Joffe, 2012). It is, instead, a tool. Thematic analysis is consistent with social constructivism, allowing for the explication of the process of social construction (Joffe, 2012). It is therefore useful to analyse how individuals view specific issues or situations (Joffe, 2012). Onwuegbuzie and Teddlie (2003) incorporate thematic analysis as the first step of their seven stage data analysis model, a step which is used to “reduce the dimensionality” of qualitative data (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 22)

### 1.8 Research aim

Despite the significant growth in cruise tourism, it continues to be an under-researched discipline (Papathanassis & Beckmann, 2011; Papathanassis, 2017; Sun, Jiao, & Tian, 2011). Most of the research in cruise tourism appears to focus on the impacts of cruise tourism and cruise infrastructure on host communities and the environment (Hritz &
Cecil, 2008; Stewart, Dawson, & Johnston, 2015; Terry & Smith, 2015). Some studies have been undertaken on stakeholder and community responses to cruise infrastructure development (Dredge, 2010; Schmallegger & Carson, 2010) while only a few have considered the specific issues of cruise port economics and governance (see Di Vaio & Romana Medda, 2010; Gui & Russo, 2011; Wang, et al., 2014). None appear to have addressed the specific topics of the formation of stakeholder networks to progress cruise infrastructure development, the operation of power within those networks or indeed, the type or characteristics of those networks. This study seeks to redress this gap. Thus, the primary research aim of this thesis is to understand how stakeholder networks influence proposals for cruise infrastructure development. More specifically, it seeks to determine the impact of the exercise of power within those networks (Chapter 2; Chapter 5), with the specific aim of exploring why the asymmetric exercise of power may result in network fragmentation (Chapter 6) or indeed, if properly managed, in network cohesion (Chapter 5). Furthermore, the potential for risk as a consequence of network fragmentation is investigated (Chapter 6). Finally, this study identified the types of social networks which operate in the policy-making environment (Chapter 5).

Thus, the aim of this research is to analyse how social, or stakeholder, networks influence proposals for cruise infrastructure development. The research objectives and the aims addressed in the individual papers included in this thesis can be found in Table 1.6:
Table 1.6: Thesis research objectives and aims/research questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thesis research objective</th>
<th>Purpose - papers</th>
<th>Literature review section</th>
<th>Results chapter</th>
<th>Aims of individual papers</th>
<th>Method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Analyse the influence of stakeholders within stakeholder networks with respect to cruise infrastructure development</td>
<td>Develop a framework for analysing power in the context of cruise infrastructure development</td>
<td>1.6.1</td>
<td>Chapter 2 London and Lohmann (2014)</td>
<td>Analyse who exercises power, identifying the factors which may affect the stakeholders’ perception and exercise of power and which events trigger the use of power.</td>
<td>Conceptual paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand stakeholder engagement with the community through the media discourse surrounding cruise infrastructure development</td>
<td>Determine the issues which are of concern to key stakeholders in respect of Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development</td>
<td>1.6.2</td>
<td>Chapter 4 London, Moyle and Lohmann (2017a)</td>
<td>Explore how the media mediates and shapes the debate surrounding proposals for cruise infrastructure development.</td>
<td>Media discourse analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand the relationships among stakeholders in stakeholder networks which shape cruise infrastructure development</td>
<td>Evolve a framework for analysing power and control over resources within stakeholder networks</td>
<td>1.6.3</td>
<td>Chapter 5 London, Lohmann, Moyle and Burke (2017b). Under review.</td>
<td>Determine how stakeholders involved in cruise infrastructure development stakeholder networks perceive the exercise and impact of power within the network so as to facilitate an assessment of the degree of cohesion within the network and the impact of power on control over and access to information.</td>
<td>Semi-structured interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify and critically assess the potential risks faced by stakeholder networks involved in cruise infrastructure development</td>
<td>Assess the potential for risk in the absence of network cohesion</td>
<td>1.6.4</td>
<td>Chapter 6 London, Lohmann, Moyle &amp; Burke (2017c). Under review.</td>
<td>Determine whether a lack of cooperation (i.e., fragmentation) within a stakeholder network can lead to or exacerbate risk which threatens public infrastructure development.</td>
<td>Semi-structured interviews</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.9 Research delimitation
This research focuses on the proposals and decision-making processes related to Auckland’s two cruise wharves, Princes and Queens Wharves and the potential for further development on existing, adjacent commercial wharves, *i.e.* Bledisloe, Captain Cook and Marsden Wharves (*see* Figures 3.6 and 3.7). However, these proposals are dependent on POAL’s plans for future commercial expansion. More specifically, the future of Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development is dependent on POAL’s decisions relating to Bledisloe Wharf, and to some extent Captain Cook Wharf. During the course of this study, controversy surfaced over the future of Bledisloe Wharf. That controversy directly impacts the siting of any new cruise infrastructure in Auckland. Therefore, the scope of this study necessarily extends beyond the specific topic of cruise shipping infrastructure to the competing interests of POAL’s commercial shipping infrastructure.

1.10 Approach and methods
Four discrete pieces of work are included in this thesis. They are documented in four separate papers (two published and two in review). While Chapter 2 is a conceptual paper based on a substantial literature review, the other three chapters collectively adopt a mixed qualitative approach, *i.e.*, media discourse analysis (Chapter 4) and semi-structured interviews (Chapters 5 and 6).

1.10.1 Conceptual paper – literature review - Chapter 2
Chapter 2 first looks at power through different lenses (*i.e.* general theories of power and tourism-specific theories of power) and then analyses those theories in the context of cruise infrastructure development. In order to facilitate that analysis, a framework was developed which incorporates four main elements: (1) the type of port (home, port of call or hybrid); (2) stakeholders (identification of categories of interested individuals); (3) stage of development (proposed, mature or declining); and (4) the originator of the proposal for development (cruise line or destination).

1.10.2 Media discourse analysis - Chapter 4
Chapter 4 employs a media discourse analysis approach based on thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) to determine the issues of concern to stakeholders with an interest in Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development. Data were collected from 103 online media articles published between 2008 and early 2016. Articles were retrieved from the
Internet, including the archives of New Zealand’s major print, radio and television news providers and two overseas news sources. Coding was undertaken using an MS Excel spreadsheet. This exercise generated six over-arching themes, 22 main themes and 221 sub-themes. Reconstruction of these themes into a cohesive narrative produced a rich case study which was used to inform the empirical research undertaken in Chapters 5 and 6.

1.10.3 Semi-structured interviews – Chapter 5 and Chapter 6
A semi-structured interview approach was used in Chapters 5 and 6 to elicit stakeholders’ perceptions about the conceptual issues discussed in the papers contained in those chapters. Twenty-three semi-structured interviews were conducted with individual stakeholders between April and August 2015. This sample size was considered to be a sufficiently adequate, given the convention of small samples ordained by the constructivist paradigm (Hays & Wood, 2011). Respondents were selected through a variety of methods including (a) their prominence in the New Zealand media; (b) identification through their organisational websites, reports or other documents; (c) referrals from other respondents; and (d) personal knowledge (Knoke, 1993). Respondents are representative of key individual and organisational stakeholders on the local (Auckland) (n=16), national (n=6) and global (n=1) levels with an interest in Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development. Fifteen interviews were conducted in Auckland and six in Wellington. Two interviews with Auckland-based respondents were conducted by video-conferencing. The Information sheet can be found in Appendix B while Appendix C includes the Consent form which was signed by each respondent.

Table 1.7 lists the positions or roles and locations of the respondents:
Table 1.7: Semi-structured interview respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder group</th>
<th>Individual stakeholder roles or positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local focus (Auckland)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community representatives</td>
<td>• CBD residents’ association - chair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Pressure group - spokesperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Pressure group – spokesperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Chair, CBD Advisory Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>• Reporter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>• Chief Executive – business organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Chief Operating Officer, local iwi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Consultant – cruise infrastructure and general tourism expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Consultant – planning expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Managing Director, cruise wholesaler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector (elected and non-elected officials)</td>
<td>• Auckland Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Auckland Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Auckland Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Chief Executive – CCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• General Manager - CCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Tourism Manager - CCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• General Manager – Tourism, Central Government Ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representatives of over-arching industry and professional organisations</td>
<td>• CEO, national membership tourism organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Secretary, national maritime trade union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Policy Advisor – national, local government organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Chief Executive – national infrastructure association (Auckland-based)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total for each location</strong></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Eleven other individuals were approached by phone or email to take part in the study. However, they either failed to respond or declined to participate, citing, for example, political sensitivity or insufficient knowledge. Despite the absence of these eleven potential respondents, the completed interviews demonstrated a high degree of sufficiency, with no new information communicated by successive respondents (Jennings, 2005). It should also be noted that although the respondents represented a wide range of views and interests, the number the number of potential respondents with an interest in Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development is limited because of the relatively small pool of potential respondents and New Zealand’s relatively flat government structure (i.e. New Zealand has no state or provincial-wide layer of government) (Joseph, 2014).

Interviews lasted between 30 and 90 minutes and were recorded and transcribed, with supplemental notes taken during the interviews. Different questionnaires were used for Auckland- and Wellington-based respondents, respectively. Wellington respondents were either elected and non-elected officials from Central Government, or respondents in quasi-public or private sector organisations. The interview questionnaires are reproduced in Appendix D – Auckland and Appendix E – Wellington, found at the end of this thesis. The topics addressed during the interviews were initially extracted from a review of archival documents (Knoke, 1993) and from the 103 media reports retrieved and analysed for the media discourse analysis described in Chapter 4. This initial review provided background for developing questions which were used to probe respondents’ interactions with other stakeholders and the issues of concern to them within the context of this research (Knoke, 1993). The semi-structured interview responses were analysed using an open, axial and selective coding approach (Neuman, 2011). The details of the approach used in each paper and the themes which emerged in relation to each paper are described in the Methods sections of Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.

The methodology used in each paper is summarised in Table 1.8:
Table 1.8: Summary of research methodologies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 2 Analysis of power in the context of cruise infrastructure development</th>
<th>Chapter 4 Media discourse analysis</th>
<th>Chapter 5 Power, conflict and network cohesion within stakeholder networks</th>
<th>Chapter 6 Stakeholder network fragmentation and risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Research type</td>
<td>Conceptual</td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research paradigm</td>
<td>Social constructivism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Literature review Development of a framework to analyse power among cruise destination stakeholders</td>
<td>Review of documentary archives for background Thematic analysis of published media reports</td>
<td>Semi-structured interviews Review of documentary archives and published media reports to identify initial themes Refined themes using open, axial and selective coding Development of a conceptual framework for analysing power and control over resources within stakeholder networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Key stakeholders in Auckland, New Zealand, interviewed during the period April to August 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td>Literature review of academic papers and texts and online articles</td>
<td>103 published media reports retrieved from online sources</td>
<td>Auckland interviews on site: n= 15 Auckland interviews via videoconferencing: n=2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key analysis</td>
<td>Framework for analysis of power in the context of cruise destination stakeholders’ interrelationships</td>
<td>Construction of a rich case study which informs the empirical research undertaken in Papers 3 (Chapter 4) and 4 (Chapter 5)</td>
<td>Construction of a conceptual framework to facilitate analysis of the operation of power between stakeholders within policy issue networks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.11 Ethics
Ethical clearance was granted on 1 July 2014, GU Ref No: BPS/04/14/HREC. No adverse effects or ethical concerns were reported during or arising from this research. A copy of the ethics approval is included in Appendix A.

1.12 Thesis structure
Figure 1.6 provides a visual representation of the structure of this thesis:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 1 – Introduction</th>
<th>Chapter 2</th>
<th>Chapter 4</th>
<th>Chapter 5</th>
<th>Chapter 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Literature review</td>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>Analyse the influence of stakeholders within stakeholder networks with respect to cruise infrastructure development</td>
<td>Understand stakeholder engagement within the community through the media discourse surrounding cruise infrastructure development</td>
<td>Understand the relationships among stakeholders in stakeholder networks which shape cruise infrastructure development</td>
<td>Identify and critically assess the potential risks faced by stakeholder networks involved in cruise infrastructure development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature review</td>
<td>Motivation for this research</td>
<td>Research boundaries Section 1.5 and Overview Section 1.6</td>
<td>Research design Section 1.7</td>
<td>Research aim Section 1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial context</td>
<td>Section 1.3</td>
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<td>Approach and methods</td>
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**Conceptual analysis (Chapter 2) and Results Chapters (Chapters 4-6)**

- **Chapter 2 Objective**: Analyse the influence of stakeholders within stakeholder networks with respect to cruise infrastructure development
  - London & Lohmann (2014)
  - Conceptual analysis of power and framework for analysing power

- **Chapter 4 Objective**: Understand stakeholder engagement within the community through the media discourse surrounding cruise infrastructure development
  - London, Moyle & Lohmann (2017a)
  - Identified issues which inform the empirical research in Chapters 5 & 6

- **Chapter 5 Objective**: Understand the relationships among stakeholders in stakeholder networks which shape cruise infrastructure development
  - London, Lohmann, Moyle & Burke [2017b] (under review)
  - Analysed respondents’ perceptions of power within a stakeholder network

- **Chapter 6 Objective**: Identify and critically assess the potential risks faced by stakeholder networks involved in cruise infrastructure development
  - London, Lohmann, Moyle & Burke [2017c] (under review)
  - Articulated impacts of the asymmetric exercise of power, competing interests

**Figure 1.6:**
Thesis structure

- Key findings Sec 7.2
- Contributions Sec 7.3
- Limitations Sec 7.4
- Future research Sec 7.5
- Post script Sec 7.6
Thus, this thesis consists of seven chapters including an introduction which provides a background to the research context, a literature review and a description of the research environment in which this study took place. The literature review in this chapter provides a framework for bringing together the literature reviews for each of the papers included in this thesis, but invariably, there will be some duplication. Also, the literature reviews included in the individual papers comply with the individual target journals’ requirements for the structuring and formatting of literature reviews.

Following the introduction are a chapter outlining the background to this research (Chapter 3) as well as the four papers which comprise the results chapters of this thesis. As at the time of submission of this thesis, two papers have been published (Chapters 2 and 4) and two papers are under peer review (Chapters 5 and 6). All papers reflect the formatting and reference requirements of the peer-reviewed journals to which they have been submitted. Given the finite scope of the data collected for this thesis and the inter-connectivity of themes, there is some duplication among the descriptions of the study contexts (i.e., study sites), results chapters and reference lists of the individual papers. The conclusion to this thesis includes the main findings of this research along with suggestions for key stakeholders to implement them; the limitations of this research and suggestions for further research; and a brief postscript. Following the conclusion of this thesis is a consolidated Reference List which includes only the references from content which is not part of the four included papers. In other words, it includes the references from Chapter 1 (Introduction), Chapter 3 (Background) and Chapter 7 (Conclusion).

1.12 Thesis compliance
This thesis was prepared in accordance with Griffith University’s policy relating to the inclusion of papers in a thesis. This policy cannot be copied or downloaded into another document but it can be reviewed on the Griffith University website (https://www.griffith.edu.au/higher-degrees-research/current-research-students/thesis/preparation/inclusion-of-papers-within-the-thesis).
CHAPTER 2
POWER IN THE CONTEXT OF CRUISE DESTINATION STAKEHOLDERS’ INTERRELATIONSHIPS

2.1 Introduction

2.2 Primary research objective and aim addressed in this paper

2.3 Original contributions

2.4 Statement of contribution to co-authored published paper

2.5 Published paper
2 Power in the context of cruise destination stakeholders’ interrelationships

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2.1 Introduction

Chapter 2 is a conceptual paper. It examines the operation and manifestation of power among stakeholders involved in or with an interest in the commercial and political negotiations which surround cruise infrastructure development. This paper is based on a comprehensive literature review which looks at power through different lenses. The paper also includes a framework for reviewing power in the context of cruise infrastructure development. It provides the theoretical basis for exploring the operation of power within Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development network, the key theme in Chapters 5 and 6.

2.2 Primary research objective and aim addressed in this paper

2.2.1 Primary research objective

Analyse the influence of stakeholders within stakeholder networks with respect to cruise infrastructure development.
2.2.2 Aim

Analyse who exercises power, identifying the factors which may affect the stakeholders’ perception and exercise of power and which events trigger the use of power.

2.3 Original contributions

The original contributions of this paper are:

(a) A conceptual analysis of stakeholder interrelationships and the power they exercise in relation to cruise infrastructure development. This analysis shows that the exercise of power is not limited to the cruise lines as previous studies and anecdotal evidence suggest, but that power also resides with and is exercised by other stakeholders involved in influencing proposals for cruise infrastructure development.

(b) A novel framework for analysing the operation of power in the context of cruise infrastructure development. This framework represents a first attempt to provide a structured approach for identifying who exercises power within the context of the individual elements which comprise this framework.
2.4 Statement of contribution to co-authored published paper

STATEMENT OF CONTRIBUTION TO CO-AUTHORED PUBLISHED PAPER
This chapter includes a co-authored paper. The bibliographic details (if published or accepted for publication)/status (if prepared or submitted for publication) of the co-authored paper, including all authors, are:


My contribution to the paper involved:
(a) 95% of the research required for production of the literature review
(b) 90% of the writing of this paper
(c) developing the framework for analysing power

(Signed) _________________________________ (Date) 13 October 2017
Name of Student: Wendy R London

(Countersigned) ___________________________ (Date) 13 October 2017
Corresponding author of paper: Wendy R London

(Countersigned) ___________________________ (Date) 13 October 2017
Supervisor: A/Prof Gui Lohmann
2.5 Published paper

Published paper follows:


Pages 43-54 have been removed due to copyright
CHAPTER 3
BACKGROUND TO THE GROWTH OF CRUISE TOURISM IN AUCKLAND, NEW ZEALAND

3.1 Introduction

3.2 The growth of cruise tourism in Auckland, New Zealand

3.3 Background and history

3.4 Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development – the challenge
3 Background to the growth of cruise tourism in Auckland, New Zealand

3.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 commences with a brief section detailing the exceptional growth which Auckland has experienced in its cruise tourism sector, and then tells the story of Auckland’s evolution from a port city to a harbour city which embraces cruise tourism. It highlights the several proposals which have been initiated by key stakeholders with an interest in Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development and the political controversy which has accompanied those proposals. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the challenges facing Auckland’s continuing growth as a significant and strategic cruise destination. This chapter also establishes the context and chronology for the media discourse analysis and rich case study presented in Chapter 4.

3.2 The growth of cruise tourism in Auckland, New Zealand
Auckland, New Zealand, is considered to be a key hub for the Australasian and South Pacific cruising regions (ATEED, 2015). It is the country’s principal turnaround port, with New Zealand’s other cruising regions dependent on Auckland’s success as an efficient and welcoming port (Roberts, 2015). Since 1994, New Zealand has experienced exceptional growth in cruise tourism, as shown in Table 3.1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Season</th>
<th>Voyages</th>
<th>Ships</th>
<th>Total passengers</th>
<th>Total crew</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>19,400</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/2009</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>109,951</td>
<td>46,553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/2010</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>134,200</td>
<td>53,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/2011</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>136,138</td>
<td>55,561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011/2012</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>173,189</td>
<td>67,789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012/2013</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>211,400</td>
<td>82,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/2014</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>202,722</td>
<td>69,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/2015</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>201,370</td>
<td>75,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015/2016</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>267,800</td>
<td>91,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/2017</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>259,200</td>
<td>91,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/2018 (forecast)</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>282,538</td>
<td>102,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The growth in Auckland’s cruise tourism sector parallels this growth as shown in the following table. Table 3.2 shows Auckland’s cruise sector growth between 2004 and 2016/2017, the period for which statistics are available, as well as forecasts for 2020 and 2030:

Table 3.2: Cruise growth in Auckland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cruise ship visits</th>
<th>Passengers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>188,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015/2016</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>230,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/2017</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>209,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 forecast</td>
<td>120(^a)</td>
<td>&gt;250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2030 forecast</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: ATEED, 2015; Cruise New Zealand, 2016.

Note (a) Although the number of ships is smaller than the previously reported year, there will be a greater number of mega cruise ships, carrying more passengers.

The forecast arrival of more ships and bigger ships in Auckland requires a commensurate investment in infrastructure if Auckland aspires to continuing to expand as an attractive, popular port and South Pacific cruise hub.

3.3 Background and history

3.3.1 The evolution of the Ports of Auckland Ltd

Auckland’s Waitemata Harbour is home to New Zealand’s largest container shipping port (POAL, 2016), a port which shares its infrastructure with visiting cruise ships. A port was first constructed on Auckland’s foreshore in 1840 to service New Zealand’s newly-established colonial capital. Since then, the port has witnessed steady growth as both a passenger and commercial port. It has also experienced changes in its ownership. In 1871, legislation creating the Auckland Harbour Board granted ownership of the port and its land, water and infrastructure assets to the Harbour Board (POAL, 2013). In 1988, the Port Companies Act (New Zealand Government, 1988) created the Ports of Auckland Ltd. which then purchased the Auckland Harbour Board’s assets for cash and equity of $250 million (POAL, 2013). In 2005, POAL was de-listed from the New Zealand Stock
Exchange and in 2010, became wholly-owned by ACIL, an Auckland Council CCO investment company when Auckland Council was formed (POAL, 2013). Much of the port is physically located in Auckland’s CBD, sharing and seeking to retain control over its 77 hectares of prime waterfront land, or 20% of Auckland’s CBD (Schiff, 2013). POAL is one of very few commercial ports worldwide which continues to operate within a city centre (Kubiak, 2015; World Bank, 2016).

3.3.2 The start of international passenger services and Princes Wharf
International passenger services have always been a part of the port’s operations, interrupted only by World War Two when the passenger ships and the port’s docking and storage facilities were required for wartime service (POAL, 2013; University of Auckland, 2005). Princes Wharf was opened in 1929 and hosted its first ocean liners soon after the war (M. Boyd, personal communication, 17 May 2016). In January 1961, a dedicated overseas passenger terminal commenced operations on the wharf (Auckland Council, 1961). In 1998, following a period of controversy and debate, consents were granted to build a hotel and apartments on Princes wharf (Cayford, 2009). As part of this development, the cruise terminal was redeveloped and is now part of a complex of buildings which includes a luxury hotel, restaurants and cafés. The wharf itself is owned by POAL while the building complex, which is privately owned, is leased on a long-term basis to its tenants (NZIER, 2015). POAL has rights under its lease to operate the cruise terminal which is located in what was originally the meeting rooms and exhibition space of the hotel (Auckland Council, 2012).

3.3.3 Sale and purchase of Queens Wharf
Princes Wharf was designed for ships carrying 700 passengers and generally shorter than 190 metres (Cruise New Zealand, 2009). However, it has become inadequate and overcrowded because of the growth in the number of passengers and the size of the ships visiting Auckland. Figure 3.1 shows the 285-metre long MS Noordam approaching its berth on Princes Wharf while the photographs in Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the 290 metre long Sapphire Princess and the 311-metre long MS Explorer of the Seas, respectively, tied-up and over-shadowing Princes Wharf:
**Figure 3.1:** *MS Noordam* approaching Princes Wharf  
(London, 2015a)

**Figure 3.2:** *MS Sapphire Princess* tied-up at Princes Wharf  
(London, 2007)
In 2009, the ARC sought to expand Auckland’s cruise infrastructure capacity and identified Queens Wharf as an appropriate location for what would become Auckland’s primary cruise terminal (ATEED, 2015; Gibson, 2013). Because of its location within the CBD, the wharf itself was also considered to be a desirable space for public use (Cumming, 2015; Dickison, 2012). In June 2009, Queens Wharf was sold by POAL to the ARC and New Zealand’s Central Government for $40 million, with each party paying $20 million (Dearmaley, 2009). The sale and purchase agreement included a provision that the ARC would build a cruise ship terminal on the wharf at no cost to POAL, and that in return, POAL agreed to (a) allow public access to the wharf as long as such access would not interfere with cruise ship operations; (b) undertake long-term maintenance of the structure under the wharf (including dredging); and (c) pay the operating costs of the cruise ship terminal on days when a ship is in port, collecting all the revenues generated by the ship (including passenger levies) in return (Orsman, 2010b; Rudman, 2013). Additionally, POAL is entitled to occupy the wharf perimeter and control that perimeter for Customs purposes upon payment of an annual licence fee of $1.00 (Cumming, 2015).
The 2009 sale and purchase agreement also designated the historic Shed 10 as Auckland’s primary cruise terminal following the wharf’s use during RWC2011 (Waterfront Auckland, 2012), with Princes Wharf remaining as Auckland secondary cruise terminal (ATEED, 2015). Under the agreement, Waterfront Auckland,¹ which owns or controls much of the Auckland Waterfront within the CBD, receives all non-cruise related revenue (e.g., from events) from the use of Queens Wharf’s facilities, including the use of Shed 10 (Bradley, 2012; Waterfront Auckland, 2012).

3.3.4 Design competition

Soon after the sale of Queens Wharf, a design competition was launched by the then-Prime Minister who was also the Minister of Tourism. The competition sought proposals for the development of cruise infrastructure, with the intent of transforming Queens Wharf into Auckland’s premier cruise facility and multi-use space (Orsman, 2009). The design brief’s requirements included eliciting assurances that (i) there would be public access to the wharf; (ii) views of the harbour would be protected; (iii) any structure built on the wharf would pay due attention to scale and space; (iv) the wharf and any structure would be adaptable to multi-use; and (v) the project would deliver an authentic visitor experience (Hendriks, 2015). Two hundred and thirty-seven individual and 25 team entrants responded. A short-list of five entries was chosen (Hollingworth, 2009). The five short-listed finalists’ designs were heavily criticised. The ARC Chair called the designs “lacklustre, underwhelming and mediocre” (Orsman & Dorset, 2009). Notwithstanding that comment, a winner was selected. However, the winner was never announced (Television New Zealand, 2009), in part because of the fraught, complex political environment which existed at the time. This contestable political environment was in part a result of the transition from individual district and local councils and the ARC to a single, unified Super City.

3.3.5 Queens Wharf, The Cloud and RWC2011

Once the design competition was abandoned, Central Government began to lobby Auckland’s leaders to “adopt a bigger and more expensive revamp of Queens Wharf” than emerged in the design competition (Orsman, 2010a). Central Government’s

¹ A Council Controlled Organisation (CCO), now called Panuku Development, following the 2015 merger with Auckland Council Properties Ltd (Panuku Development Auckland, 2015).
suggestion would have increased the cost from the $47 million budgeted for the successful design from the design contest to $100 million, a price that would include a new cruise terminal and RWC2011 FanZone (Orsman, 2010a). However, the Auckland City Mayor stated that he would not be told by Central Government what to do, thereby alienating Central Government (Bull, 2010). The political environment continued to become even more heated when disagreement between the ARC Chair and the Auckland City Mayor surfaced. The ARC Chair was determined to build a cruise terminal on the wharf, while the Auckland City Mayor argued that the wharf should undergo a temporary “spruce-up” for RWC2011. The Auckland City Mayor also argued that a more comprehensive plan for the entire waterfront should be developed once the Super City was formed (late 2010) (Gay & Orsman, 2010). Other opponents argued that Auckland’s ratepayers should not have to pay for a new cruise ship terminal in times of economic hardship (Bull, 2010).

Central to this heated discussion was the lack of any understanding as to who would fund the $100 million project. Fifty million dollars would be required for the cruise terminal with the remaining $50 million designated for other enhancements such as strengthening Queens Wharf (Orsman, 2010b). POAL stated that it would not contribute to the cruise terminal, even though it would continue to use the wharf at little or no cost and collect all cruise-related fees (Orsman, 2010b). In February 2011, a report commissioned by Auckland Council recommended that only a “functional” terminal be constructed at a cost of between $6 and $10 million (Orsman, 2011c). Also in February 2011, the RWC2011 Central Government Minister launched a website which displayed four proposals for the redevelopment of Queens Wharf (Dickison, 2010). Ultimately, the ARC and Central Government commissioned a local architectural firm to design a temporary structure. The Cloud was erected on Queens Wharf to be used as Party Central for RWC2011 at a cost of just under $10 million (Orsman, 2011a). The Cloud remains on Queens Wharf, adjacent to Shed 10 (both of which are shown in Figures 3.4 and 3.5), the current primary cruise terminal. The Cloud is infrequently used as a cruise terminal for small cruise ships or mega yachts.
Shed 10 is the warehouse structure in the foreground (left), while The Cloud is the serpentine-looking building to the right. Both structures are on Queens Wharf. The orange-coloured building is the Ferry Building, with the Ferry Basin just in front.

**Figure 3.4:** Shed 10 and The Cloud  
(London, 2015c)

### 3.3.6 Captain Cook Wharf

Following formation of the Auckland Council in late 2010, the first Super City Mayor promised to build a $200 million, double-sided cruise terminal on Captain Cook Wharf so that two cruise ships could be accommodated at the same time. This proposal was based on the earlier advice of the 2009 Design Competition “winner.” The Mayor argued that shifting the cruise terminal from Queens Wharf to Captain Cook Wharf (to the east of Queens Wharf) would make the western side of Queens Wharf available for expanded ferry service and public use (Orsman, 2010c). However, Captain Cook Wharf is used by POAL for containers and to park imported cars (Rudman, 2011).

### 3.3.7 Political flip-flop – Queens Wharf/Shed 10 becomes main cruise terminal

In June 2011, the Mayor reversed this promise, announcing, without public discussion, that Auckland’s main cruise terminal would operate on Queens Wharf. Controversially, he further announced that the development would involve converting the century-old Shed 10 into a cruise terminal at a cost of $28.7 million, instead of the $6 million originally estimated to construct a functional terminal (Orsman, 2011c; Rudman, 2011).
Expressions of interest were sought by Waterfront Auckland (Accomnews.co.nz, 2011), despite Councillors’ claims that no investment proposal had been received by them (Orsman, 2011b). The redevelopment of Shed 10 as a cruise terminal continued to completion despite the collapse of the first construction company. Shed 10 was opened as a cruise terminal on 31 July 2013 (Radio New Zealand, 2013), with its first ship, P&O’s Sea Princess, docking on 11 October 2013 (Hobbs, 2013). Figure 3.5 shows the front of Shed 10, located on Queens Wharf, with the MS Oosterdam just visible on the right on the far side of the fence, and The Cloud on the left.

![Shed 10 frontage and The Cloud](image)

Figure 3.5: Shed 10 frontage and The Cloud (to the left) (London, 2014)

### 3.3.8 Central Wharves Strategy

The Auckland Council Mayor’s call for a waterfront strategy was fulfilled in April 2014 when Waterfront Auckland approved a development plan for Queens Wharf, but again, the path to adoption was not straightforward. Consultation had to take place first with CCI, a new CCO comprised of the chief executives of Auckland Council’s other CCOs. CCI’s involvement was deemed unnecessary by one Auckland Councillor who was the former ARC Chair. This Councillor stated that Waterfront Auckland should be delegated with the task of developing the waterfront strategy (Orsman, 2014b). Waterfront Auckland’s plan, the Downtown Framework (Auckland Council, 2014), included four...
options for the five Central Wharves, *i.e.*, Princes, Queens, Bledisloe, Captain Cook and Marsden wharves.

The four options included in the *Downtown Framework* and known as the Central Wharves Strategy are set out in Table 3.3:

**Table 3.3:** Central Wharves Strategy options

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option/use</th>
<th>Wharves</th>
<th>Use/proposed use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Queens Wharf as primary cruise facility</td>
<td>Queens, Princes</td>
<td>Primary cruise facility – can accommodate ships up to 294 metres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Also used for large cruise ships – can accommodate ships up to 320 metres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Bledisloe Wharf as primary cruise facility</td>
<td>Bledisloe, Queens, Princes</td>
<td>Primary cruise facility, can accommodate mega cruise ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(currently cargo)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Primarily used for public space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Captain Cook Wharf as primary cruise facility</td>
<td>Captain Cook, Queens, Princes</td>
<td>Primary cruise facility – extended for mega cruise ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(currently cargo)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Primarily for public space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Distributed cruise facilities (existing use)</td>
<td>Queens, Princes, Ferry terminal</td>
<td>Primary cruise facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Also used for large cruise ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Relocated from western side of Queens Wharf to east of Queens Wharf; remove Marsden Wharf and replace it with a pontoon structure for ferries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Adapted from Auckland Council, 2014; Bradley, 2014; Orsman, 2014a; ATEED, 2015; NZIER, 2015; Radio New Zealand, 2015; Slade 2015.

Thus, options 2 and 3 involve removing the cruise ships from Queens Wharf, despite the refurbishment of Shed 10. Interestingly, accompanying the description of each of the four options is a further option, *i.e.* the use of the wharf in Wynyard Quarter after 2026 (Auckland Council, 2014). Figure 3.6 shows the location of the current cruise wharves, whilst the four Central Wharves options can be found in Figure 3.7:
Figure 3.6: Current cruise wharves (Princes Wharf and Queens Wharf) (ATEED, 2015, p. 12).

Figure 3.7: Four Central Wharves options (Auckland Council, 2014, p. 75)
3.3.9 Competing interests – POAL’s commercial spaces

The four CWS options are not without controversy. Options 2, 3 and 4 involve a shuffle of the Central Wharves which would not only affect the cruise wharves (i.e. Queens and Princes Wharves), but also POAL’s commercial wharves (i.e. Bledisloe, Captain Cook and Marsden Wharves). These proposals are viewed by many key stakeholders as the start of POAL’s bid to reclaim more of the harbour (Slade, 2015). POAL claimed that reclamation was necessary because of its forecasts for growth in its cargo operations (Gibson, 2015; Thompson, 2012). In other words, POAL claimed that it would need to find additional space for commercial cargo if Captain Cook Wharf were to become a cruise wharf (Slade, 2015). This claim was supported by an NZIER report which stated that if a cruise terminal were to be built on Captain Cook Wharf, up to 5.3 hectares additional commercial space would be required on Bledisloe Wharf (New Zealand Herald, 2015; NZIER, 2015). That additional space would be found by claiming back up to 100 metres of harbour on both sides of the wharf (Orsman, 2015a; Rudman, 2015).

3.3.10 Proposed Bledisloe Wharf extensions, Marsden Wharf demolition and protests

In February 2015, Auckland Council debated the CWS. The Council decided to reverse its 2014 decision opposing any further harbour reclaims and follow CCI’s recommendations calling for an expanded ferry basin and dedicated cruise terminal on Captain Cook Wharf (as originally promised by the incumbent Mayor in November 2010), in exchange for letting POAL reclaim three hectares of harbour and demolish Marsden Wharf (Rudman, 2015). Following that debate, the two extensions to Bledisloe Wharf were approved by the Council’s planning commissioners in November 2014, without notifying the public or the Councillors. POAL claimed that the Bledisloe extensions would make Captain Cook Wharf available for greater use (as recommended in the February NZIER report) (Orsman, 2015a; Orsman, 2015d; Slade, 2015). The granting of the non-notified consents behind closed doors was exposed in an article published in the *New Zealand Herald* on 12 February 2015. The article reported that the resource consents had been granted but not notified as required by the RMA (1991) (McKeown, 2015; Orsman, 2015a).
A week later, the Auckland Mayor directed his anger at POAL when POAL started to demolish Marsden Wharf without advising Council. POAL responded, saying that it was demolishing only the northern (harbour-facing) end (Lindsay, 2015). In late March in a bid to sell its wharf extension plans to the Auckland residents, POAL said it would release Captain Cook Wharf for public use (Orsman, 2015e). POAL’s announced plans resulted in public protests (Orsman, 2015b; Johnston & Orsman, 2015; Slade & Walters, 2015). At the same time, high profile business and community leaders embarked on a campaign to lobby the Mayor and Council to stop the extension and consider the economic, social and environmental impacts of the extension (Orsman, 2015c, 2015f). Sentiment against the extensions escalated, and on 27 March 2015, three community pressure groups, including Urban Auckland, announced that they were commencing legal action in the High Court on the basis that the Bledisloe Wharf extension resource consents were awarded unlawfully (TV3 News, 2015). In May 2015, following a split vote in Council in which the Mayor cast his vote to allow the extensions, POAL agreed to halt work on the extension to one side of the wharf, but work on the extension on the other side continued, (Niall, 2015). The photo in Figure 3.8 is taken from a ship berthed at Queens Wharf. It shows Captain Cook Wharf in the foreground, Marsden Wharf in the middle with the remaining pilings following demolition of the Northern end of the wharf and Bledisloe Wharf to the far left of the photo:

![Figure 3.8](https://example.com/figure3.8.jpg)

© Wendy R. London, 2015

**Figure 3.8:** Photograph taken from Queens Wharf: Captain Cook, Marsden and Bledisloe Wharves (London, 2015d)
3.3.11 High Court action

On 19 June 2015, the High Court found that POAL’s application was fatally flawed because the consents had not been notified to the public or the Councillors, as required by the RMA (1991) (High Court of New Zealand, 2015; New Zealand Government, 1991). Therefore, the extension and reclamation work was halted (Orsman, 2015b; Walters, 2015). POAL’s response included an assertion that it could no longer accommodate mega cruise ships such as the Queen Mary 2 (345 metres long) and Ovation of the Seas (348 metres long) at the Jellicoe commercial wharf (further East, beyond the central wharves precinct) because the space is required for cargo. This decision could potentially force cruise ships to bypass Auckland altogether (Gibson, 2015). Given that the Queen Mary 2 has been accommodated at Jellicoe Wharf and that large cruise ships could also be berthed at Wynyard (Halsey) Wharf, about two kilometres from Queens Wharf (Orsman, 2015c), POAL’s argument is often viewed as a gratuitous excuse for claiming that it needs to extend Bledisloe Wharf.

3.3.12 Complex and contestable

As therefore must be evident, the Waitemata Harbour’s commercial port and cruise developments are never far from the attention of Auckland’s residents or the media (see Chapter 4). It is against this backdrop that this research seeks to understand how social networks shape proposals for cruise infrastructure development. A timeline of the significant events described in this section can be found in Table 3.4:
### Table 3.4: Timeline of significant events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1840</td>
<td>Commercial port established in Auckland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>Princes Wharf opens and hosts first ocean liners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Dedicated overseas passenger terminal opens on Princes Wharf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Consents awarded for a cruise terminal on Princes Wharf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>POAL formed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Queens Wharf sold by POAL to ARC and Central Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Queens Wharf design competition launched and abandoned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Auckland Super City formed (Auckland City)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central Government urges Auckland Council to build an iconic terminal and RWC2011 FanZone on Queens Wharf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>POAL becomes a CCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Report recommends that a functional terminal be built on Queens Wharf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Cloud built on Queens Wharf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Zealand hosts RWC2011 – Auckland hosts final</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mayor promises to build a double-sided cruise terminal on Captain Cook Wharf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mayor reverses promise to build a double-sided cruise terminal on Captain Cook Wharf, favouring Queens Wharf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Construction on Shed 10 cruise terminal commences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Relatively uneventful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Shed 10 opens as Auckland’s main cruise terminal on 31 July. First ship docs 11 October.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Waterfront Auckland approves development plan for Queens Wharf, but consultation stalled because of merger of Waterfront Auckland and Auckland Council Property Limited to form Panuku Development Auckland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Downtown Framework including four CWS options tabled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Council votes to oppose further harbour reclamations and follow CCI’s recommendations for a dedicated cruise terminal on Captain Cook Wharf (as originally proposed in November 2010).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Council planners grant POAL unauthorised, unnotified consents to extend Bledisloe Wharf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>February: Unauthorised consents exposed in February. POAL starts to demolish Marsden Wharf. POAL also said that it would release Captain Cook Wharf for public use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March: Public protests take place in March and Urban Auckland commences High Court action opposing Bledisloe Wharf extension consents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June: High Court rules in favour of Urban Auckland; work on Bledisloe extensions ceases; Port Futures Study commences</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.4 Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development – the challenge

It is evident that Auckland’s investment in cruise infrastructure has not kept pace with the growth in its cruise tourism sector (see Table 3.2) (ATEED, 2015). Neither of Auckland’s cruise wharves, i.e., Queens Wharf (main terminal) or Princes Wharf is capable of accommodating the new generation of longer and heavier mega cruise ships nor routinely, more than one ship at a time. However, four ocean-going passenger vessels have been berthed simultaneously on rare occasions. Figure 3.9 shows two cruise ships (Norwegian Star – 294 metres long and Seabourne Encore - 210 metres long), while a super-yacht (L’Austral – 142 metres long) and The World, a residential ship (196 metres long) berthed simultaneously:

Figure 3.9: The World, Seabourn Encore, Norwegian Star, and L’Austral (the mega-yacht in the foreground) (New Zealand Herald, 2017)

Consequently, pressure is mounting on key stakeholders to consider options for the further development of Auckland’s cruise infrastructure.

The next chapter, Chapter 4, recounts the narrative of the proposals for Auckland’s cruise infrastructure as told in the media from 2008 to 2016. The media discourse focuses on the debate which surrounds these proposals. Thematic, or media discourse, analysis is used
to identify the key themes in this debate, themes which inform the empirical research presented in Chapters 5 and 6, *i.e.*, stakeholders’ perceptions with respect to power; the control over and access to information; and risk. Media discourse analysis was purposely chosen as the method of analysis because of the extant, prominent coverage of the debate surrounding Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development in the media. In fact, the media proved to be the single most accessible source of public coverage about this debate and indeed, of investigative reporting. The media is also a key stakeholder in Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development network. In the specific context of this thesis, media discourse analysis provided an effective and critical way of telling the story of Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development debate.
CHAPTER 4
CRUISE INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN AUCKLAND, NEW ZEALAND: A MEDIA DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

4.2 Primary research objective and aim addressed in this paper

4.3 Original contribution

4.4 Statement of contribution to co-authored published paper

4.5 Published paper
Cruise infrastructure development in Auckland, New Zealand: a media discourse analysis

4.1 Introduction

Chapter 4 uses media discourse analysis to investigate how the media shapes public perception with respect to cruise infrastructure development. In the context of this thesis, it also provides a rich case study of Auckland, New Zealand’s cruise infrastructure development environment from 2008 to 2016, the timeframe in which the events relevant to this thesis took place. The analysis of the media discourse surrounding the ongoing debate and controversy relating to Auckland’s cruise infrastructure produced an inventory of issues which formed the basis for developing the semi-structured interview questionnaires used in Chapters 5 and 6 (see Appendices D and E). Five over-arching and 22 main themes emerged. Respondents’ perceptions relating to these themes were elicited through the semi-structured interviews in order to address the research questions posed in Chapters 5 and 6.
4.2 Primary research objective and aim addressed in this paper

4.2.1 Primary research objective
Understand stakeholder engagement with the community through the media discourse surrounding cruise infrastructure development.

4.2.2 Aim
Explore how the media portrays the cruise infrastructure debate in a complex and highly contested political environment.

4.3 Original contribution
The original contribution of this paper is the interpretation of a method which facilitates undertaking a nuanced analysis of the key issues which face stakeholders in relation to proposals for cruise infrastructure development. More specifically, this approach provides a novel method for analysing how the media shapes the debate surrounding contentious issues relating to cruise infrastructure development. It also demonstrates how the media discourse can be used to construct a rich case study of the complex environment in which large infrastructure projects such as cruise infrastructure evolve.
4.4 Statement of contribution to co-authored published paper

STATEMENT OF CONTRIBUTION TO CO-AUTHORED PUBLISHED PAPER
This chapter includes a co-authored paper. The bibliographic details (if published or accepted for publication)/status (if prepared or submitted for publication) of the co-authored paper, including all authors, are:


My contribution to the paper involved:
(a) conducting all data collection
(b) undertaking all data analysis
(c) drafting all content with assistance from Dr Moyle (2nd Supervisor) who provided advice for structuring the results as well as the article as a whole and from A/Prof Lohmann (Principal Supervisor) who provided general feedback on the content

(Signed) _________________________________ (Date) 13 October 2017
Name of Student: Wendy R London

(Countersigned) ___________________________ (Date) 13 October 2017
Corresponding author of paper: Wendy R London

(Countersigned) ________________ (Date) 13 October 2017
Supervisor: A/Prof Gui Lohmann
4.5 Published paper

Published paper follows:


Pages 78-97 have been removed due to copyright
CHAPTER 5
POWER, CONFLICT AND COHESION WITHIN CRUISE INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT STAKEHOLDER NETWORKS

5.1 Introduction

5.2 Primary research objective and research questions addressed in this paper

5.3 Original contributions

5.4 Statement of contribution to co-authored submitted paper

5.5 Paper submitted for peer review

5.6 Appendix to submitted paper

5.7 Power, conflict, a lack of cohesion (fragmentation) and risk
5 Power, conflict and cohesion within cruise infrastructure development stakeholder networks

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</table>

5.1 Introduction
Chapter 5 presents empirical evidence about stakeholders’ perceptions of the operation of power within a cruise infrastructure development stakeholder network and the effect of the exercise of that power on the control over and access to information. This evidence was used to inform a discussion of how to achieve cohesion within the network by implementing appropriate governance mechanisms to manage the emergence of asymmetric power and competing interests. Asymmetric power can also impact the network’s engagement with the community. The issues used to explore this topic were identified in the analysis of the media discourse described in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 also outlines the types of stakeholder networks which may be formed by stakeholders in a policy or governance context. This determination is important because the governance mechanisms used to manage power, competing interests and control over information differ according to the type of network. Chapter 5 identifies Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development stakeholder network as a policy issues network. The importance of network cohesion is highlighted in Chapter 6, an empirical study which identifies the risks which can accrue if there is a lack of network cohesion, or fragmentation.
5.2 Primary research objective and research questions addressed in this paper

5.2.1 Primary research objective
Understand the relationships among stakeholders in stakeholder networks which influence cruise infrastructure development.

5.2.2 Research questions
The following research questions are posed in the following paper and derive from the primary research objective set out immediately above and the relevant aims set out in Table 1.10:

RQ1: How do stakeholders involved in cruise infrastructure development stakeholder networks perceive the impact of power within the network?

RQ2: How does the exercise of power impact stakeholders’ ability to access information?

RQ3: What effect does the exercise of power and the ability to access information have on the degree of cohesion within the network?

5.3 Original contributions
Chapter 5’s original contributions are:

(a) Empirically informed insights into how stakeholders perceive the existence and exercise of power among stakeholders whose relationships are characterised by competing interests and the legacy of a traditional, bureaucratic approach to local government, in the context of cruise infrastructure stakeholder development networks.

(b) Identification and description of the types of stakeholder networks which can be formed by stakeholders involved in large infrastructure development projects, an exercise which is crucial to understanding power and how it is managed so as to avoid network fragmentation.
(c) A novel, conceptual framework for analysing power and control over resources (e.g. information) within stakeholder networks established to advance proposals for cruise infrastructure development.
5.4 Statement of contribution to co-authored submitted paper

STATEMENT OF CONTRIBUTION TO CO-AUTHORED SUBMITTED PAPER
This chapter includes a co-authored paper. The bibliographic details (if published or accepted for publication)/status (if prepared or submitted for publication) of the co-authored paper, including all authors, are:


My contribution to the paper involved:
(a) conducting all semi-structured interviews, with A/Prof Lohmann as an observer during two of the Auckland-based interviews
(b) analysing all data and reporting their results
(c) drafting all content, with feedback from A/Prof Lohmann, Dr Moyle and A/Prof Burke

(Signed) _______________ (Date) 13 October 2017
Name of Student: Wendy R London

(Countersigned) ___________________________ (Date) 13 October 2017
Corresponding author of paper: Wendy R London

(Signed) ___________________________ (Date) 13 October 2017
Supervisor: A/Prof Gui Lohmann
5.5 Paper submitted for peer review

Submitted paper follows:

Power, conflict and cohesion within cruise infrastructure development networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Journal:</th>
<th>Journal of Travel Research</th>
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<tr>
<td>Manuscript ID</td>
<td>Draft</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manuscript Type:</td>
<td>Empirical Research Articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keywords:</td>
<td>Cruise infrastructure, Cruise tourism, Network cohesion, Policy issue networks, Stakeholder networks</td>
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### Abstract:
More and more often, cruise destinations are obliged to (re)develop their cruise infrastructure to accommodate bigger and more cruise ships. Extant literature focuses on the impacts of cruise infrastructure development. This paper aims to understand the relationships among stakeholders in networks which shape proposals for cruise infrastructure development by understanding how key stakeholders within the network perceive the exercise of power and to what extent the exercise of power affects the degree of cohesion within the network. A qualitative approach was deliberately taken in this study to ascertain stakeholders’ subjective perceptions of power. Twenty-three in-depth semi-structured interviews were undertaken with key stakeholders. Auckland, New Zealand, was used as the study site for this research. Among this study’s contributions is a conceptual framework for analyzing power and control over the information within stakeholder networks.
1 Introduction

Cruise tourism is the fastest growing sector within the leisure tourism industry (FCCA 2017). In response, coastal cities across the globe, including Auckland (New Zealand), Sydney and Brisbane (Australia) and Miami (Florida), are faced with building new cruise infrastructure or redeveloping existing infrastructure to accommodate the growth in the number, size and capacity of cruise ships (Reference removed – for review ("Removed")). In addition, new destinations are being introduced as cruise lines seek to refresh their itineraries (Rodrique and Notteboom 2012) and as cities seek to capture the economic benefits of cruise tourism (see, e.g., Brida, Bukstein, and Tealde 2015).

Stakeholders who are involved in large infrastructure development projects such as cruise infrastructure form networks to facilitate development (Aaltonen and Kujala 2010). Those networks can be either formal or informal (Serrat 2017), exhibiting different degrees of cohesion.

Cruise infrastructure development involves a wide range of public and private sector stakeholders (Lau et al. 2014). However, there appears to be a lack of empirical inquiry which examines stakeholder interrelationships and the impact of power on the networks which form to advance cruise infrastructure development (Removed). Instead, existing literature relating to stakeholder involvement in cruise infrastructure development tends to focus on stakeholders’ responses to the economic, environmental and social impacts of development (Hritz and Cecil 2008; McCarthy and Romein 2012; Terry and Smith 2015). Similarly, while there is a wealth of research into social networks in tourism (e.g., Scott, Baggio, and Cooper, 2008), public infrastructure development (e.g., Aaltonen and Kujala 2010) and public policy (e.g., Klijn and Kopperjan 2012), there is little research in the context of cruise infrastructure development.
2 Literature review

2.1 Introduction

One discernible thread in previous studies is a call for additional research on the exercise of power within networks (e.g., Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Kahler 2015). Wray (2009) calls for further research into the interrelationships between legitimate and powerful stakeholders within a network, including the political context in which the network functions. Within the infrastructure development context, there are similar calls for more research into the political context in which public-private partnerships (PPPs) operate, their composition and the networked interactions of their public and private sector actors (Alexander 2012).

2.2 Social networks in the public policy domain

A social network can be comprised of individuals, organizations or both (Robins 2015). Social networks can be classified, for example, by their theoretical basis (Selman 2000); specific purpose (Wagner and Leydesdorff 2005); or sector (Kezar 2014; education; Umberson and Karas Montez, 2010; health). Within the public policy domain, social networks can be classified according to their sector or level within government or purpose (Kenis and Schneider 1991). Additionally, as shown in Figure 1, a spectrum of networks can be distinguished:

<<Please insert Figure 1 about here>>

In the public policy domain, the term ‘governance network’ broadly describes a network which functions either as a recognized alternative to hierarchical (or bureaucratic) government or as a way of describing the relationships between private and public sector actors (Börzel 1998; Marsh and Smith 2000; Thatcher 1998). In both cases,
governance networks disaggregate the traditional policy-making process (Klijn and Koppenjan 2012; Thatcher 1998). Disaggregation, however, may lead to network fragmentation as actors pursue their individual interests. Ultimately, this fragmentation can result in less efficient decision-making given that a wide range of views and competing interests are involved (Klijn and Koppenjan 2012). There are opposing views about the compatibility of governance networks with democratic institutions. The pluralist view characterizes governance networks as involving interdependent but not necessarily equitable relationships between actors who oversee policy development and its implementation (Klijn and Skelcher 2007). The opposing view characterizes governance networks as “centers of power and privilege that give structural advantage to particular private interests in the process of making or shaping public policy decisions” (Klijn and Skelcher 2007, 588).

2.2.1 Policy networks

Policy networks are considered to be a form of governance networks (Börzel 1998; Marsh and Smith 2000). They depend on the relationships between stakeholders, and as such, are considered to be a form of social network (Börzel 1998). Policy networks tend to be highly institutionalized and relatively stable, operating within established rules, values and expected forms of behavior (Kenis and Schneider 1991; Marsh and Smith 2000). Policy networks are not neutral, but instead institutionalize legacy power relations both within the network and in the broader political environment (Brockhaus, Di Gregorio, and Carmenta 2014; Marsh and Smith 2000). They arise out of actual or potential conflict among actors (Roloff 2008) but maintain cooperation within the network through resource exchange (Daugbjerg 1997; Marsh and Rhodes 2002). The tight institutional framework of policy networks gives rise to a high degree of cohesion
concerning the policy agenda and boundaries of acceptable policy, but not necessarily
to individual policies (Marsh and Smith 2000).

Power in policy networks is deemed to be structural, with rules, procedures and beliefs
favoring those actors who hold power (Brockhaus et al. 2014). Structural power
enables actors to galvanize support within the network in the face of external threats
(Daugbjerg 1997), including stakeholder views acquired in other networks which may
promote differing interests (Kennedy and Augustyn 2014; Marsh and Smith 2000;
Thatcher 1998). As a result, power within policy networks is distributed unequally,
with those participants who hold power able to influence the network’s choice of policy
and command a high degree of cohesion (Daugbjerg 1997).

2.2.2 Policy issue networks

In contrast to the relative stability of policy networks (Kenis and Schneider 1991; Marsh
and Smith 2000), policy issue networks lack stability and cohesion. The lack of
cohesion within these networks can be attributed to several factors. In the first instance,
instead of being stakeholders of a stable organization (Freeman 1984), stakeholders in
policy issue networks are often deemed to be stakeholders of each other (Frooman
2010). Secondly, policy issue networks are relatively open, whereby actors contribute
unequal resources (Young, Wang, and Lewis 2016). A third factor contributing to the
lack of cohesion can be attributed to the actors’ motivation for participating in the
network. Diverse actors often form policy issue networks because of their emotional or
intellectual commitment to change and not necessarily to the issues per se (Daugbjerg
1997; Arnold, Nguyen Long, and Gottlieb 2017). Previous studies have shown that
these actors will advance their interests when the opportunity arises, utilizing persuasion

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to achieve desired outcomes (Daugbjerg 1997). Policy issue networks may form where there is an absence of formal networks to respond to such conditions as changes in (i) existing political institutions; (ii) economic and political conditions; and (iii) ideas, values and knowledge (Thatcher 1998). They form to facilitate coordination and exchange relationships among organizations as traditional policy-making mechanisms become more fragmented (Thatcher 1998). Within the network, the public sector actor who is “most centrally positioned” will take the opportunity to pursue their own bureaucratic interests (Daugbjerg 1997, 128). Thus, policy issue networks can be distinguished from policy networks where, in the latter, cohesion is achieved because the issues and policy principles bind the actors. Table 1 sets out the main differences between policy networks and policy issue networks.

<<Please insert Table 1 about here>>

Despite the difficulties in defining policy issue networks or perhaps in response to them, there have been studies proposing an expansion of the use of the policy issue network approach (Arnold et al. 2017). One of those proposals is to incorporate broader theories of power into the analysis (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Clegg, Hardy, and Nord 1996; Kahler 2015; Thatcher 1998).

2.3 Power

2.3.1 Introduction

The literature on power is vast, fragmented and contested. Power a concept that eludes precise definition (Beckman, Khare, and Matear 2016; Salancik and Pfeffer 1977). Conceptual definitions broadly define power as “the capacity of individual actors to exert their will” (Finkelstein 1992, 506) and communicate expressions such as “power
over” others; control over outcomes or resources; and the “power to” affect outcomes (Clegg 1989; Salancik and Pfeffer 1977). On the other hand, Pfeffer (1996) argues that power is context-dependent, arising from the specific environments in which it operates (see also Brass and Burkhardt 1993; Salancik and Pfeffer 1977).

Another cluster of definitions surrounds behavioral power and social, or structural, power. Behavioral power requires the *actual* exercise of power and not just the capacity to act (Astley and Sachdeva 1984; Brass and Burkhardt 1993). In contrast, structural power is characterised as the *potential* for an actor to exercise power (Brass and Burkhardt 1993; Raven 1993). Structural power arises from three sources which are associated with social systems or organisations rather than with individuals: (1) hierarchical authority; (2) the ability to obtain and control resources; and (3) network centrality (the position or location of the actor within the network) (Astley and Sachdeva 1984; Kipnis, Schmidt, and Wilkinson 1980). Structural power confers upon powerful actors the capacity to attain the desired results through the mobilization and allocation of resources (e.g., information) and the implementation of mechanisms (e.g., rules and political norms) to constrain the decision-making powers of subordinate actors (Astley and Sachdeva 1984; Brass and Burkhardt 1993). Two forms of structural power have been identified, that is, (a) formal (hierarchical); and (b) informal (network). In the network context, power is shared (Wearing and McDonald 2002), with each actor implicitly holding the power of the other (Emerson 1962). Power will be achieved by the actor who succeeds in increasing the other actors’ dependence on him or her (Pfeffer 1996), thereby conferring on that actor a central position within the network (Scott 2017).
However, power within policy issue networks is considered to be non-structural. Instead of being derived from structures, rules, procedures or beliefs as is the case in policy networks, power in policy issue networks is derived from an actor’s capacity to control resources (Young et al. 2016). As such, no group or actor derives benefit from the network itself but instead, needs to rely on its own resources and skills “to influence policy outcomes” (Daugbjerg 1997, 129). Thus, actors who have greater access to resources and therefore the most ability to influence outcomes will be able to exercise the most power (De Schepper, Dooms, and Haezendonck 2014; Young et al. 2016). As to the nature of this power, actors’ responsibility is often divided between their organizations and the network (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001). However, they will seek to advance the positions of their own organizations. Consequently, despite the “façade of trust” (Clegg et al. 1996, 679) and “the rhetoric of networking” (Agranoff and McGuire 2001, 315), there is the potential for coercive power, or “power over” within policy issue networks (Knoke 1993).

2.3.2 Power in context: power relating to public infrastructure development

Proposals for the development of public infrastructure development projects such as cruise terminals (Schmallegger and Carson 2010), seaports (Dooms, Verbeke, and Haezendonck 2013), airports (Rawson and Hooper 2012) and railways (Ravesteijn, He, and Chen 2014) can trigger conflicts between the project owners and the community. Conflict can result from the tension between the elite economic and political status of the actors who form growth coalitions to undertake that development and the community (Lauermann and Vogelpohl 2017). More specifically, conflict can result from a failure by the elite coalition to recognize the impact of its investment in built
infrastructure on the quality of life and culture of local residents (Anttiroiko 2009; Jonas and Wilson, 1999). This perceived or real lack of concern can lead to community protest (Jonas and Wilson 1999; Lauermann and Vogelpohl 2017). Power conflicts can also be manifested as disagreements between the growth coalition and (i) groups of local residents (including activists) (Strauch, Takano, and Hordijk 2015; Terry and Smith 2015); (ii) the business community (Kerswill and Mai, 2015); (iii) the infrastructure owners; and (iv) intended tenants or users of the infrastructure (Removed). Power differences may also be evident between public sector officials and private sector technical and professional advisors (Lienert, Schnetzer, and Ingold 2013).

The growth coalition often communicates its power through booster activities such as publicizing the economic benefits of the development, an exercise which often antagonizes the community rather than securing its support (Schmallegger and Carson 2010). In the specific context of cruise infrastructure development, the lack of community consultation and engagement has been an issue in many projects around the world (see, e.g., McCarthy 2003 – Valletta, Malta; Schmallegger and Carson 2010 – Darwin, Australia; Terry and Smith 2015 – Charleston, South Carolina).

2.3.3 Measuring power

Actors who have greater access to and control over resources such as information will have greater power than other actors and therefore greater ability to influence outcomes. Thus, central to measuring power in networks is recognition of an actor’s ability to influence others, an ability which is based on the resources available to that actor (De Schepper, Dooms, and Haezendonck. 2014). For example, in the PPP context, although the aspirational objective of the public sector partner is broadly to “maximize the social
benefit” (De Schepper et al. 2014, 1213), the private sector partner, the partner who is responsible for financial management, is likely to have more power. The second criterion, control over decision-making (or, the “power of intervention”), is measured by an actor’s “ability to control the making of decisions with positive or negative effects” (Ravesteijn et al. 2014, 6). Actors who have the most power will be those who act as the decision-makers while actors on the periphery will function merely as the source and communicator of information (Astley and Sachdeva 1984).

According to Kennedy and Augustyn (2014, 188), prior studies measuring power based on resource dependence and exchange “rarely considered human and social aspects of stakeholder interaction, influence and engagement with local tourism policy development.” To address this concern, this paper adopts Frooman’s (1999) approach, that is, instead of considering the power of individual actors, power will be viewed as an attribute of the relationship between actors (Freeman 1984; Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997). This approach is consistent with policy issue networks where, for example, stakeholders can be considered as stakeholders of each other (Frooman 2010).

It is against this background that this paper aims to answer three research questions in respect of social networks in the context of cruise infrastructure development: (a) how do stakeholders involved in cruise infrastructure development networks perceive the exercise and impact of power within the network?; (b) how does the exercise of power impact stakeholders’ ability to access information?; and (c) what effect does the exercise of power and the ability to access information have on the degree of cohesion within the network? The core contribution of this study is empirically informed insights into the exercise of power within cruise infrastructure development networks. It,
therefore, advances the conceptual understanding of the management (governance) of competing interests and the control over the information within the network.

Accordingly, this paper provides a foundation for future studies which could suggest specific governance mechanisms for addressing challenges such as the asymmetric exercise of power.

Auckland, New Zealand, was selected as the vehicle for this research because of the city’s highly contested political environment, an environment which has led to continuing debate among stakeholders in respect of proposals for the redevelopment of the city’s cruise infrastructure.
3 Case study: Auckland, New Zealand

In 2017, tourism overtook dairy farming as New Zealand’s leading export earner (Tourism New Zealand 2017). Tourism’s ascendancy can largely be traced to the fact that the sector is highly organized, crafted from the country’s tradition of a well-planned approach to tourism development (see, e.g., TIANZ 2017). However, the same level of planning and development is not evident in New Zealand’s cruise infrastructure development. Thus, planners and other key stakeholders in Auckland are faced with increasing pressure to expand the city’s existing cruise infrastructure because of the tremendous growth in the number, capacity and size of cruise ships visiting the city (Removed). Between 1994/1995 and 2015/2016, the number of cruise passengers visiting Auckland increased from approximately 19,800 to 230,000 (Removed) while the number of ship visits increased from 35 in 2002/2003 to 115 in 2014/2015 (Removed). The implications of this growth are considerable for Auckland. Neither of the city’s two main cruise wharves can accommodate ships longer than 320 meters nor more than one ship at a time (Removed). As a result, some ships are obliged to moor in the harbor, often requiring the tendering of thousands of passengers to shore (Bradley 2017). Both cruise wharves share operational infrastructure with the Ports of Auckland Ltd (POAL) (Removed), New Zealand’s largest commercial port. POAL is currently owned by Auckland Council.

Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development stakeholder network involves a wide range of public and private sector stakeholders who often harbor competing interests. The stakeholders involved in Auckland’s cruise infrastructure network are shown in Figure 2.
Several proposals for the expansion of Auckland’s cruise infrastructure have been tabled since 2008. Each proposal has provoked conflict (Removed). Much of this conflict can be traced to a perceived, unwelcome exercise of power. An early example occurred in June 2009 when POAL sold Queen’s Wharf to the New Zealand Central Government and the former Auckland Regional Council (ARC), initially for use as the FanZone for Rugby World Cup 2011 (RWC2011). However, Central Government urged the Council to construct a costly, iconic cruise terminal on the wharf after RWC2011 (Removed). The Auckland City Council Mayor’s response was blunt, stating that “he was not going to be told by [Central Government] what could be built at the bottom of Queen St in Auckland” (Bull 2010). This episode also resulted in a growing distrust of the Council by the community (Removed).

Another episode occurred in 2014. Four options were tabled for expanding Auckland’s cruise ship capacity (Auckland Council 2014). Each option involved some degree of realignment of POAL’s commercial shipping infrastructure (Removed). In February 2015, a media report uncovered secret negotiations which had taken place between POAL and Auckland Council in late 2014 (Orsman 2015a). These negotiations resulted in POAL, a profit-making Council-Controlled Organization (CCO), being awarded a non-compliant planning consent to extend its Bledisloe cargo wharf (Removed). In response, vocal community protests were organized, as well as the lodging of a (successful) action in the High Court challenging the award (Removed). Underpinning these events was the perception that POAL unfairly exercised its power in its negotiations with the Council. As a result of the court challenge, POAL was ordered to stop work on its planned
extension (Orsman 2015b). However, POAL continues to assert that it cannot give up space at its cargo wharves to accommodate mega cruise ships.

It is in the context of this continuing conflict that this study empirically sought to analyze the views of stakeholders with respect to the decision-making process surrounding proposals for Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development. It also sought to characterize the network which has formed to advance those proposals so that the exercise and impact of power within that network can be assessed.
4 Method

4.1 Methods used to measure power

Power in networks can be measured using quantitative methods such as social network analysis (SNA) to determine an actor’s position (that is, the degree of centrality or power) within the network (Scott 2017). However, quantitative approaches have limitations (Prell, Hubacek, and Reed 2009). According to Thatcher (1998, 404), SNA lacks “a substantive theory of power, which would provide criteria for the selection of actors, the identification of relations, hypotheses for testing and guidance in analyzing data.” Additionally, some actors derive their influence from sources which appear to be on the periphery of the network (Prell et al. 2009). For example, a regulatory agency may not appear to be central to the network, but it can have a significant influence over the drafting, implementation and enforcement of policies (Prell et al. 2009). Therefore, approaches such as SNA “may lead to simplistic decisions about stakeholder involvement” (Prell et al. 2009, 514).

In contrast, and relevant to this study, qualitative approaches focus on eliciting descriptive information about the actors’ interrelationships within the network and establishing the substance of those relationships (Börzel 1998; Chowdhury, Chen, and Tiong 2011; Thatcher 1998). Thus, perceptual or subjective factors are also considered to be important in measuring power (Salancik and Pfeffer 1977; Smith et al. 2014; Yang 2013). Subjective approaches involve gathering informants’ perceptions of the actors’ influence and legitimacy (Prell et al. 2009; Frooman 1999). Perceptions of power will be based on an interpretation of the sources of an actor’s power, that is, (1) formal power; (2) informal power (observable from personal characteristics and personal
liaisons within the network): and (3) political power (based on control over decision-making processes) (Ravesteijn et al. 2014).

Thus, either a quantitative or qualitative approach can be used to analyze stakeholder relationships and the operation of power in the context of complex social networks (Bramwell and Meyer 2007). A qualitative approach was applied in this study because it aim to acquire a deep understanding of the stakeholders’ own views about their interrelationships within the network (Kennedy and Augustyn 2014; Prell et al. 2009) and not the structural aspects of the network. However, despite recognition of the validity of this approach, there needs to be a basis for measurement (Frooman 1999). While there are many approaches to measuring power (Ravesteijn et al. 2014), there appears to be agreement on two criteria which form the baseline for measurement, that is, (1) resource (including information) dependency; and (2) responsibility for decision-making (Kassinis and Vafeas 2006; Lehman 1975). Both are considered in this study.

4.2 Data collection

Twenty-three semi-structured interviews were undertaken with individual stakeholders between April and August 2015. Fifteen took place in Auckland, six in Wellington, and two with Auckland-based respondents by video-conferencing. Eleven other individuals were approached by phone or email to take part in the study. However, they either failed to respond or declined to participate, citing, for example, political sensitivity or insufficient knowledge. Interviews lasted between 30 and 90 minutes and were recorded and transcribed, with supplemental notes taken during the interviews.
Respondents were selected through a variety of methods including (a) their prominence in the New Zealand media; (b) identification through their organizational websites, reports or other documents; (c) referrals from other respondents; and (d) personal knowledge (Knoke 1993; Removed). They were selected because of their high level of involvement or interest in the city’s cruise infrastructure development and their ability to make decisions and effect change. These qualities were demonstrated through the documents and media reports which were collected and analyzed during the preliminary desk research phase of this study and referrals from other respondents (Knoke, 1993; Removed). Although the stakeholders represented a wide range of views and interests, the number of potential respondents with an interest in Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development is limited because of the relatively small pool of potential respondents and New Zealand’s flat government structure (that is, New Zealand has no state-wide layer of government) (Joseph 2014). While every effort was made to contact all potential respondents, the completed interviews demonstrated a high degree of sufficiency, with no new information communicated by subsequent respondents (Jennings 2005). Also, no further interviews were sought when responses revealed significant literal replication (Hillman, Moyle, and Weiler 2015).

Table 2 provides the pseudonyms and positions or roles of the respondents referenced in this paper.

<<Please insert Table 2 about here>>

The topics addressed during the interviews were initially extracted from documents and media reports (Knoke 1993). This initial review provided background for developing
questions which would be useful in probing the respondents’ interactions with other stakeholders and the issues of concern to them within the context of the proposals for Auckland’s cruise infrastructure (re)development (Knoke 1993). Thus, the questions posed to respondents sought to elicit responses relating to four core themes, that is, (a) the decision-making process; (b) power; (c) stakeholders; and (d) stakeholder use and access to information. For example, respondents were asked for their perceptions about who holds the most power concerning cruise infrastructure development and who they would approach for information or advice about cruise infrastructure development.

Interviews were analyzed by establishing patterns of meaning, that is, themes, according to respondents’ answers. Themes were progressively refined through a process of open, axial and selective coding (Lamont, Kennelly, and Moyle 2014). Open coding was used to identify and distill the key themes which were initially identified during desk research and which subsequently emerged from the interviews. Axial coding allowed for the refinement of those themes, aligning them with the research questions addressed in this study. Selective coding involved confirming the core themes and determining how the sub-themes related to those core themes (Neuman 2011), as graphically shown in Figure 3.

<<Please insert Figure 3 about here>>
5 Results

Power was analyzed in terms of the context in which it was exercised, that is, (1) political power; (2) shared and delegated power; (3) community power; (4) traditional owners’ power; (5) judicial power; and (6) the power potentially exercised by the infrastructure tenants or users (users’ power). Power, or control, over information as the primary network resource in this study is analyzed in terms of (1) transparency of information; and (2) information sources and sharing.

5.1 Power

5.1.1 Political power

There was agreement among respondents that the elected Councilors hold ultimate (actual) power concerning cruise infrastructure development, with PublicSect3 acknowledging that “[u]ltimately, it will come down to the Council and their relationship with the businesses they own, being Ports of Auckland.” SCOs (Senior Council Officers) reinforced this view. For example, PublicSect1 stated that the Councilors have ultimate “power in terms of deciding policy”, as compared with the SCOs whose power is limited to “approving plans within the planning rules.”

Respondents from the private sector and the community expressed negative sentiments about the Councilors’ power. They cited concern as to whether the Councilors could be unbiased in the exercise of their power in relation to cruise infrastructure development, given a perceived conflict of interest. In other words, PrivateSect3 noted that because all of POAL’s dividends are distributed to Council to reduce residents’ property taxes, “it will make it difficult [for the Council] to make decisions that are going to restrict or constrain growth – such as cruise.” There was also a feeling that “the Mayor and
Deputy Mayor have utterly capitulated…to what an employee [POAL] is telling them” (Community3).

Respondents generally agreed that the CE (Chief Executive) and other SCOs also exercised power. Findings revealed that the SCOs were “really running the show” (PublicSect6). Non-elected officials agreed that to exercise power, Council officers are obliged to “approv[e] plans within the planning rules” (PublicSect1). Less formal views were expressed by the private sector and community respondents. PrivateSect1 felt that the CE assumed power because he was “trying to make the best of a bad kind of governance structure and a dysfunctional governance structure, trying to do the best he can to make things happen, to make pragmatic decisions.” In this comment, PrivateSect1 was referring to the CE’s decision to lead CCI’s (City Centre Integration) governance in respect of the Downtown Framework and the Central Wharves Strategy.

Respondents from the private sector and the community felt that the CE’s exercise of power is limited “to what he can do in his remit” (Community3), that is, ensuring that the CCOs (Council-Controlled Organizations) “meet their Statements of Corporate Intent, spend their budgets, and get things done” (PrivateSect1). However, concern was expressed that by abdicating their power to the CE, Councilors effectively abdicated their responsibility to the CE whose “interest is not really in the public interest side or, or in public engagement or in all of those things,” thereby also foreclosing opportunities for “public consultations of one sort or another that are credible” (PrivateSect1).

5.1.2 Shared/delegated power

http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/jotr
Respondents’ perceptions of shared or delegated power revealed a picture characterized by uncertainty. Respondents indicated that this delegated power cannot be exercised unilaterally by any CCO or by CCI in its project management and coordination role, with one SCO explicitly stating that “Auckland Council as owner of the Port and the wharves, yet, it can’t make these decisions unilaterally and so – the Council and ATEED (Auckland Tourism, Events and Economic Development) can’t make them unilaterally” (PublicSect7). Instead, PrivateSect7 articulated the view held by respondents across all groups that this power “is shared” by (1) ATEED (economic development and tourism); (2) POAL (berthage and related services); and (3) CCI (project management), led by Council which “ultimately [has] decision-making power.”

It was also noted by one elected official that “ATEED is probably a fiercer advocate of the cruise industry in some ways than the Port company is,” with POAL only recently “[waking] up to the financial dividends that can flow out of cruise” (PublicSect4). However, an SCO questioned the extent to which ATEED is able to assert meaningful influence, given that “clearly, the future of the cruise industry is related to the Port” (PublicSect7). Despite these responses, though, there was also a perception that this delegated or shared decision-making power is exercised in silos:

Crucially [the Downtown Framework] didn’t include the Port, so the Port continued to be a law onto itself, so you had that provision, so you had a waterfront strategy which had a line around it [The Council], you had a port strategy which had a line around it [POAL] and you had a City Centre strategy which had a line around it [CCI] and they didn’t overlap. (PrivateSect1)
Possible motivations cited by respondents for acting alone included the sheer number of stakeholders involved, leading to frustration that decisions cannot be made quickly and a desire to act by those who have been marginalized. Respondents outside Council expressed their belief that decision-making power should be extended to “the broadest stakeholder group” (PrivateSect5), given that “there is a collective responsibility for all polities to be accountable for the development of cruise, so that lies with the cruise industry – the cruise lines, and local and Central Government” (PrivateSect6). However, one elected official singled out Central Government, stating that “[t]he real decision-making power is going to lie with Central Government and local government” (PublicSect4) but unfortunately, according to this respondent, Central Government abdicated its responsibility to Auckland Council.

5.1.3 Community power

The evolution of Auckland from a port city where POAL (and its predecessors) had power over the waterfront to a harbor city, where residents have an active interest in the waterfront was viewed as a turning point, compelling Council to respond to residents’ views. This realization provoked PublicSect4 to comment that “[s]o, we have moved from becoming a port city to being a city that is valuing its harbour…it’s not just a place a place to plonk infrastructure…[a]nd so, I think we are at a cross-road now.” A similar view was expressed by PrivateSect4 who bluntly stated that “it would be nice if the ratepayers had the power.” Respondents from all stakeholder groups highlighted examples of community power including Urban Auckland’s successful bid forcing stoppage of POAL’s Bledisloe Wharf extension and the well-publicized opposition to any development (such as a new cruise terminal) which would compromise the use of
Queens Wharf as a public space. PrivateSect3 observed that “there’s an enormously powerful resistance to change as you have probably seen with all the citizens’ coalitions and things against it.”

The specter of siting a new cruise terminal on Queens Wharf provoked the somewhat rhetorical question that “you might have a lot of outrage from the ratepayers who say that they’ve already paid for half of it, and now you’re going to take the other half away from us now?” (PrivateSect3). This question foreshadowed PublicSect7’s perception that potentially, the community wields greater power than other key stakeholders in the network, explaining that “there’s an enormously powerful resistance to change as you have probably seen with all the citizens’ coalitions and things against it.”

There was a sense among respondents that community protests can be expected where the democratic process has not been properly managed, citing, for example, the clandestine approach to granting the Bledisloe Wharf extension consent. Community3 stridently commented that POAL and the Council have “used legal trickery and conjuring to try and avoid any notification at all, and what have we got? We’ve got the public up in arms; they’re now attacking the Councilors bringing their actions to light.”

However, an opposite view was expressed by public sector officials who appeared to erode the perception that the community has power. Findings revealed there was a general sentiment among some public sector stakeholders that the community pressure group won its court case on “a technicality more than anything else” (PublicSect5) while another commented that “[w]e don’t really have a sense of how representative that is of the population as a whole” (PublicSect2).
5.1.4 Traditional owners’ power

Respondents recognized that power is also reposed in the local iwi, or Maori tribe. Iwi derive their power from traditional beliefs. This particular iwi is the major land owner adjacent to the port. As such, the iwi’s power was recognised in the form of its regular consultations with CCI and the presence of the Maori Statutory Board at the Council table, as expressed by PublicSect2, “when [CCI] present[s] these [options and recommendations] and have an opportunity to vote along with Councilors”. The iwi’s status as the major land owner provoked PrivateSect3 to comment that “the Bledisloe consent process…wasn’t a proper consultation, given that the iwi is ‘the major land owner or major neighbour next to the Port.’”

5.1.5 Judicial power

The impact of the Auckland High Court’s decision to halt POAL’s Bledisloe Wharf extension was interpreted differently by elected officials. PublicSect4 viewed the petition brought by the community groups as evidence of change, demonstrating high levels of community participation and power, leading PublicSect4 to comment that “I think it is changing, I think it has changed with the Court Case…[b]ut it’s also changing because there is a level of public participation.” PublicSect4 further commented that “I think the public participation in the debate is the bigger change shaper that just changing [POAL’s] chairman,” that “stoppage of wharf extension forced the Mayor to pursue the Port Futures Study which had been promised in 2013 but wouldn't have happened if there had been no legal challenge.”
However, others cynically conveyed the sentiment that the High Court decision “was a decision based on technicality,” essentially rendering the petitioners, Urban Auckland, the decision-makers (PublicSect5).

### 5.1.6 Users' power – the cruise lines

Although there was agreement that the cruise lines exercise power, there was less agreement as to whether and to what extent that power is exercised in the specific context of Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development. However, there was unanimous agreement on the proposition that cruise lines have *ultimate* power, by exercising their power to choose either to visit or bypass a destination. For example, National1 stated that “the cruise operators themselves…can simply say we’re not coming so that point, they have quite a lot of leverage ultimately.” Similarly, PublicSect5 observed that “if we can’t convince the cruise ship to come, it won’t come. So, the real question is who makes the decision – cruise ship companies.”

Respondents’ perceptions about the power exercised by the cruise lines can be plotted along a spectrum. At one end of the spectrum, several respondents either did not know whether the cruise lines are involved in Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development or argued that they need to be involved, although, once again, they recognised the cruise lines’ ultimate power. PublicSect5 went even further, asserting that the cruise lines take the view that “look, you guys, we want to come, but we’re not part of your problem.” A substantial group of respondents representing the public and private sectors as well as a cruise line representative confirmed that the cruise lines influence the decision-making process, but that they have no actual decision-making power. Among the perceptions voiced in this group, one respondent stated that the cruise lines are demanding in their
requirements despite not having decision-making power. PrivateSect3 observed that the cruise lines’ influence derives in part from their need to berth larger ships, while PrivateSect1 commented that “it would be silly for Auckland to design a cruise terminal that couldn’t work, otherwise…if they weren’t involved, that would be dumb.” A different view was expressed by PrivateSect6, a cruise line representative, who candidly stated that “we sit very well away from what is happening with that…we are part of the mechanism, because when we are called upon, we will very much be part of the discussion, but that’s not our raison d’être at all.”

5.2 Information

Two sub-themes emerged as part of respondents’ perceptions relating to information, that is, (1) information transparency; and (2) information sources and sharing. The following discussion presents those perceptions in the context of information control and dependence, two elements required to measure power within the network.

5.2.1 Information transparency

Respondents from all groups stated their concern over a lack of transparency of information, most notably with respect to the clandestine manner in which POAL and SCOs failed to disclose information which otherwise should have been notified to the public. Elected officials were critical of the SCOs who failed to tell the Mayor and Councilors about the Bledisloe Wharf extension consents, thereby attempting to exercise unilateral bureaucratic power. For example, PublicSect6 maintained that the “consents are given by Council officers, Council officers, high up in the chain of command – they’re the ones who should have told the Mayor…[r]ather than kept it secret.” Even more contentious was PublicSect4 who believed that “we’ve had
somewhat dishonest representation from the Port company, not declaring what its true plans are around that table,” specifically citing transparency of the information” as the main concern.

The findings revealed the same sentiments within the community group of respondents. These respondents expressed dissatisfaction that most of the decisions involving the Council and POAL were made behind closed-doors. This clandestine approach often generated anger, provoking Community2 to comment on POAL’s seemingly ingrained culture “of not being honest,” particularly given the fact that POAL is publicly owned. There was also a palpable sentiment that those directly involved in Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development need to be more forthcoming about their proposals and longer-term vision, including consulting with rather than telling stakeholders in the cruise tourism sector about their proposals and plans.

5.2.2 Information sources and sharing

The need for information about cruise infrastructure is a relatively “new issue” for key stakeholders such as the elected officials who are otherwise “pre-occupied with water and air quality and all those kinds of issues” (PrivateSect1). Respondents cited a variety of sources for obtaining information relevant to Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development. ATEED was cited most frequently by respondents as their source of information, a response consistent with the identification of ATEED as one of the two key recipients of delegated power in respect of all aspects of Auckland’s cruise tourism sector. PublicSect5 and PublicSect4 said that they “would go to ATEED” (PublicSect5) because they “are the people to talk to on cruise” (PublicSect4). PublicSect2 agreed, stating that “ATEED…has a very strong connection with cruise, so internally, I would
go there…but…I speak with a number of people in the cruise industry, and we have
conversations with them.” PrivateSect3 adamantly stated that “I wouldn’t ask the
Councillors - I would ask the bureaucrats rather than the politicians.”

Also apparent was an aversion to seeking information from POAL. This aversion
appeared to be based on two perceptions. The first is related to the perceived conflict of
interest mentioned earlier, with one respondent commenting that it would be impossible
to obtain accurate data and numbers from POAL. The second was based on the
perception that “Ports of Auckland are not forthcoming in that regard…because the
Ports of Auckland are owned by us through ACIL so…it would be impossible for me to
get real data and numbers out of the Ports of Auckland” (PublicSec4).

Other sources were also mentioned, including the media. While the media was
mentioned as a source of information, bias against the Council was considered to be an
issue for those respondents who identified Auckland’s main newspaper as a source of
information, agreeing that “it’s not a very helpful publication for getting unbiased
messages out” (PublicSect7).

6 Discussion

This study revealed a cruise infrastructure development network that is neither formally
constituted nor even outwardly identifiable as a network. Instead, Auckland’s cruise
infrastructure network is comprised of a large and unstable cohort of public and private
sector stakeholders who possess and exercise unequal power (Marsh and Rhodes 2002).
This network displays the properties consistent with a policy issue network (see Table
1). On a theoretical level, its evolution as a policy issue network is a reaction to change
(Thatcher 1998). Table 3 illustrates the transformative conditions which have brought these stakeholders together to promote their common goal of further developing Auckland’s cruise infrastructure.

Determining the type of network and understanding its characteristics and the reasons for its formation are crucial. This knowledge can inform effective governance strategies which will enable planners and other key stakeholders to secure cohesion within the network, thereby reducing the potential for fragmentation and risk (Removed). While cohesion in traditional bureaucratic organizations is achieved through well-understood legal or rules-based structures and self-regulating norms; cohesion within diffused, unstable networks can only be achieved through a less formalistic approach (Agranoff and McGuire 2001). Underpinning this approach are four basic qualities: leadership, common purpose, trust and mutual dependency (Agranoff and McGuire 2001).

These qualities must be communicated to and embraced by all stakeholders. In large infrastructure development networks, stakeholders may be geographically remote (for example, overseas financiers) but have the capacity to, for example, exercise power which could have a profound effect on the project (Jonas and Wilson 1999; Notteboom and Winkelmans 2002; Schmallegger and Carson 2010). The physical remoteness of these stakeholders can be particularly challenging in the context of cruise infrastructure development projects which tend to have more stakeholders than other transport terminal development projects (Lau et al. 2014).
Effective network leadership is required to eliminate or at least reduce uncertainty and weakness in the decision-making process. It is also required to reconcile the interests, values and skills of all stakeholders, whether they are central to the network or on its periphery (Li, Ng, and Skitmore 2012; Lienert et al. 2013; Notteboom and Winkelmans 2002; Ravesteijn et al. 2014). Uncertainty, weakness and competing interests emerged as pivotal issues in respect of Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development network. Uncertainty and weakness in the decision-making process were common themes articulated by respondents, while recognition (and criticism) of the competing interests and values of POAL often underpinned respondents’ comments relating to the unwelcome exercise of power. The latter is a problem which has previously been addressed in the specific context of port infrastructure projects. Notteboom and Winkelmans (2002, 5) argue that “technocratic port organizations [need] to work constructively with political managers by forming alliances of effective operating organizations.”

Another issue requiring effective leadership is encouraging stakeholders to work towards the common purpose established by the network (Prell et al. 2009), so as to foster cooperation in respect of and a mutual dependency on resources. In other words, it is no longer acceptable for stakeholders to exercise unilateral power to control access to and the distribution of resources as they did within their bureaucratic institutions. Although Council (that is, the elected officials) was perceived to have the most power because of its ownership of the infrastructure, POAL was equally perceived to hold significant power because of its direct, operational control over its substantial resources. However, it was clear from respondents’ comments that as one of the most centrally positioned actors, POAL, sought to pursue its own bureaucratic interests by exercising
its power to thwart the development required to accommodate mega cruise ships, an action it took because its plans to extend the Bledisloe wharf were frustrated (see Atkin and Skitmore 2008; Daugbjerg 1997).

Trust is a quality which is central to ensuring network cohesion and therefore the success of policy issue networks. Trust is viewed as a means of encouraging consideration of stakeholders’ competing interests, thereby encouraging them to increase their willingness to collaborate and share information (Klijn and Koppenjan 2012; Lienert et al. 2013; Ravesteijn et al. 2014). The importance of building trust, particularly among community stakeholders, has been specifically mentioned in the context of port infrastructure development. Notteboom and Winkelmans (2002) argue that it is incumbent upon port owners to build trust with community stakeholders through dialogue so that the community can gain an understanding of the port’s aims and objectives, and conversely so that the port can gain an understanding of the community’s aspirations. Failure to instill trust threatens network cohesion, in part because of the increasing influence (power) of community stakeholders within the network governance environment (Daugbjerg 1997). In other words, more attention needs to be paid to instilling trust so as to increase public participation (Atkin and Skitmore 2008) and to engage stakeholders on the periphery (Rowley 1997).

Respondents in this study confirmed an imbalance in access to and control over information. Perhaps surprisingly, though, the most-cited sources of information (ATEED and the cruise industry) were not considered to hold ultimate decision-making power. Two unexpected anomalies arose out of this result. Although respondents considered ATEED to be the champion of the cruise sector in Auckland as well as one
of the main sources of information, it was not perceived as being able to exercise any significant degree of power. Similarly, although the cruise industry was also cited as one of the key sources of information and was recognised to hold substantial economic power, this power is not exercised in the immediate context of Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development. It is, therefore, incumbent upon planners and other key stakeholders to understand the role of the cruise industry in infrastructure development.

In this study, the cruise industry was perceived as a valuable and often relied upon source of information. However, the degree to which and how the cruise lines exercise power will largely depend on their level of involvement in the infrastructure development project. In this study, the cruise lines can be considered to be peripheral stakeholders in their limited role as infrastructure users. However, where a cruise line is the owner or has a substantial stake in the cruise infrastructure development project, it will have greater apparent power (Removed), and therefore greater control over resources (including information). As such, the stakeholder will be expected to engender network cohesion by subscribing to the network governance qualities discussed above, that is, leadership, common purpose, trust and mutual dependency.

As discussed earlier, power in this study was assessed by considering the subjective perceptions of respondents. Respondents agreed that Council has the most formal or political power. However, their responses were less definitive when asked to assess the extent or type of power exercised by all other stakeholders. The mere fact of being unable to assess the extent of any stakeholder’s power can be interpreted as indicative of the lack of the certainty, a factor which can contribute to the lack of cohesion within a network. Two stakeholders, the Council’s planning officers and the traditional owners, were considered to have power although not considered to be at the centre of the
network. This latter finding justifies application of the qualitative approach, given that neither stakeholder would be seen to have power using a quantitative approach (Prell et al. 2009).

It is against this background that the following conceptual framework (Figure 4) for analyzing and managing power and control over resources can be proposed as the key contribution arising from this study.

<<Please insert Figure 4 about here>>
7 Conclusion

This study sought to examine stakeholders’ perceptions of the exercise of power in a cruise infrastructure development network. Respondents’ comments reveal a network which lacks structure and cohesion. These attributes are exacerbated by a contested political environment typified by a city council undergoing transformation from a traditional bureaucratic government model to a broader, more inclusive network governance approach. It is against this background that respondents’ observations relating to the operation of power within Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development network were linked to weakness in the decision-making process, including uncertainty as to which stakeholders hold power and the presence of diverse, competing interests. This environment appears to have contributed to more than a decade of indecision with respect to the (re)development of Auckland’s cruise infrastructure, indecision which threatens Auckland’s cruise tourism sector (Removed).

A key finding of this study is that an understanding of the operation of power within networks requires identification of the type of network which has formed to secure cohesion of the network. While policy networks are stable, cohesive networks where stakeholders exchange resources on an equal basis, policy issue networks are unstable, fragmented networks where there is an imbalance of resources and their exchange. Also, although policy networks tend to have a dominant stakeholder, efforts are made to balance that power among the networks’ participants. In contrast, power in policy issue networks is unequal and potentially unregulated. Thus, intangible mechanisms such as leadership, the identification of a common purpose, trust and mutual dependency must be introduced to ensure cohesion. Otherwise, the network will become fragmented, leading to a variety of risks (Removed).
There is a lack of previous research on the definition and characteristics of networks within the cruise infrastructure development context. The key contribution of this research is empirically informed insights into how stakeholders view the existence and exercise of power within a stakeholder network, where relationships are often characterised by competing interests and in some cases, on a traditional, bureaucratic approach to government.

### 7.1 Limitations

It should be recognised that this study took place in the midst of an ongoing, high profile and fractious debate. Furthermore, stakeholders’ responses may have been affected by their political, bureaucratic or industry position. However, these limitations are not inconsistent with the environment in which large public infrastructure projects are developed. Thus, this research should prove valuable to planners and other key stakeholders who rely on a large cohort of stakeholders to progress that development, particularly where those stakeholders may be geographically dispersed; originate in different sectors (that is, public or private); be endowed with different skills and expertise; and who represent competing interests and objectives.

While a qualitative approach was purposely taken in this study in order to ascertain stakeholders’ subjective perceptions of power, further research should be considered which adopts a quantitative approach. Additionally, both approaches should be considered in other development situations such as at different stages of development or where there are different forms of ownership or management of the port and cruise infrastructure (Removed). A comparison of the results of the two approaches would provide valuable insights into the actual structure and power attributes of the network as well as providing a map of stakeholders’ relationships. Given the protracted time period which is usually associated with
large public infrastructure development projects, it would also be useful to conduct this research on a longitudinal basis to account for potential changes in governments as well individual stakeholders. For example, surveys could be administered to coincide with local government election cycles or on a cycle during which changes in the cohort of stakeholders or changes in the economic climate are likely to occur. Another possible extension to this research would be to consider the impact of the power of non-participants on network cohesion. In other words, power can be exercised by deliberately withholding participation (Hall 2013).
References


In November 2010, eight councils in the greater Auckland area, including the former Auckland Regional Council, merged to form the Auckland Council.
**Figure 1:** Spectrum of social networks in the public policy domain
Notes:

(a) In 2012, the Ministry of Tourism was disestablished, with policy functions being assigned to the newly created super-ministry, the Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment (MBIE)

(b) ACIL (Auckland Council Investments Limited) owns 100% of POAL’s shares, on behalf of Auckland Council.

(c) In 2015, Waterfront Auckland was merged into Panuku Development Auckland, the CCO now responsible for the rejuvenation of the city of Auckland.

(d) City Centre Integration (CCI) also includes other agencies, but Waterfront Auckland, POAL and ATEED (Auckland Tourism, Events and Economic Development) are the agencies relevant to this study.

Figure 2: Stakeholders involved in Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development network
Figure 3: Themes
Figure 4: Conceptual framework for analyzing and managing power and control over resources (information)
Table 1: A comparison of the characteristics of policy networks and policy issue networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of network</th>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Stability of membership</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Power</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Nature of stakeholders’ relationships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy networks</td>
<td>- Representatives from functional or operational areas of government (e.g. health, education, etc.) - Highly restricted to designated participating entities; insulated from the general public</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>Shared approach to delivery of public sector services</td>
<td>Where one group is dominant, efforts must be made to balance that power among all members if the policy community is to function</td>
<td>All actors possess and contribute resources</td>
<td>Exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy issue networks</td>
<td>- Large number of participants - Fluctuating membership</td>
<td>Unstable</td>
<td>Limited interdependence; individuals concerned with one or more</td>
<td>Power is unequal, reflecting an unequal contribution of resources and unequal access</td>
<td>Some actors may have limited resources</td>
<td>Consultative, based on the ability to control access to and distribution of resources</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Source: Based on Marsh and Rhodes 2002.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Respondent pseudonym</th>
<th>Respondent position/role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community representatives</td>
<td>Community1</td>
<td>Residents’ association representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community2</td>
<td>Pressure group spokesperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community3</td>
<td>Pressure group spokesperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National focus</td>
<td>National1</td>
<td>Policy advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>PrivateSect1</td>
<td>Private sector consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PrivateSect2</td>
<td>Private sector consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PrivateSect3</td>
<td>Chief Operating Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PrivateSect4</td>
<td>Managing Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PrivateSect5</td>
<td>CE, Overarching business association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PrivateSect6</td>
<td>Cruise line representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PrivateSect7</td>
<td>Media representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector (elected and</td>
<td>PublicSect1</td>
<td>CCO Chief Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-elected officials)</td>
<td>PublicSect2</td>
<td>CCO Chief Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PublicSect3</td>
<td>Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PublicSect4</td>
<td>Elected Councilor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PublicSect5</td>
<td>Elected Councilor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PublicSect6</td>
<td>Elected Councilor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PublicSect7</td>
<td>Council Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformative contributing conditions</td>
<td>Manifestation in Auckland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Since the formation of the Auckland Council in 2010 (see endnote i), there has been a shift from the traditional, bureaucratic approach to government towards a broader, more inclusive democratic approach to governance.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic and technological</td>
<td>Auckland’s cruise infrastructure network formed to advance the development of cruise infrastructure which can accommodate the new generation of mega cruise ships.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideas, values and knowledge</td>
<td>Historically, Auckland was a port city where the focus of the waterfront was on supporting the port’s economic activities. More recently, the city has become a harbor city where the focus is on providing public spaces and other amenities to residents.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.6 Appendix to submitted paper

Following is an Appendix to the paper included above. It was not included in the manuscript submitted to the Journal of Travel Research because of word limitations. However, it provides further useful insights into respondents’ perceptions concerning the exercise of power in respect of Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development.
Appendix: Summary of respondents’ perceptions of power concerning Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Stakeholder group</th>
<th>Representative statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1.1 Political power</td>
<td><strong>Elected officials</strong></td>
<td>Councillors have ultimate (actual) decision-making power because it owns POAL. However, the SCOs(^{(a)}) may try to subvert that power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Councillors)</strong></td>
<td>Elected officials</td>
<td>Councillors have ultimate power as to whether the port can expand for cruise infrastructure because it owns POAL. However, POAL has decision-making power for development within the port precinct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-elected officials</td>
<td>Councillors hold power unless Central Government (CG) decides to get involved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>Councillors have ultimate power but have capitulated to POAL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>SCOs hold power. CE’s power is limited to his remit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(b) Non-elected officials (SCOs)</strong></td>
<td>Elected officials</td>
<td>SCOs hold power in the bureaucracy but over-stepped the limits of that power by, e.g., issuing the Bledisloe Wharf extension consents without telling Councillors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-elected officials</td>
<td>SCOs have power because of their capacity to approve development plans within the planning rules. CE has stepped in to lead CCI’s governance because of infighting among Councillors and in doing so has looked to the CCO chief executives for leadership. The CE’s power is limited to ensuring that the CCOs meet their targets and not to the public interest side</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>SCOs hold power. CE’s power is limited to his remit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1.2 Shared/delegated power</td>
<td><strong>Elected officials</strong></td>
<td>There needs to be a better understanding of where decision-making power lies. Decision-making power for important infrastructure lies with Central and local government, but CG has abdicated its decision-making role. Therefore, decision-making power rests with the Councillors and is being driven by the CCOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(a) General environment</strong></td>
<td>Elected officials</td>
<td>Not clear who makes or has ownership of the decisions about cruise infrastructure development. Councillors delegate power to CCOs, but delegated power cannot be exercised unilaterally. Therefore, Councillors hold ultimate power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-elected officials</td>
<td>There is a lack of confidence in decision-makers’ ability to make decisions, with their decision-making perceived as haphazard and reactionary rather than anticipatory. Councillors delegate power to CCOs but Councillors hold the power. In other words, the CCOs are not the decision-makers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>Not clear who has decision-making power. Decision-makers should include local and CG, industry and the community. Councillor delegates power to CCOs for them to exercise that power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Not clear who has decision-making power. Decision-makers should include local and CG, industry and the community. Councillor delegates power to CCOs for them to exercise that power.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decision-making will be influenced by a combination of stakeholders, including the cruise industry and Waterfront Auckland.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) ATEED</td>
<td>Elected officials</td>
<td>Council determines the policy. That policy is delivered through ATEED, which implements the plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Council’s economic development, events and tourism arm</td>
<td>Non-elected officials</td>
<td>No one owns the decisions, so ATEED has stepped in. However, it is not clear how much influence ATEED has because it cannot make unilateral decisions and because the future of Auckland’s cruise industry depends on what POAL does.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>ATEED leads proposals for cruise infrastructure development while CCI leads the execution of the proposal in terms of infrastructure. ATEED has power because cruise generates economic benefit.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) CCI</td>
<td>Elected officials</td>
<td>CCI is supposed to bring integration, but there is a perception that they are causing disintegration, and making bad decisions about cruise infrastructure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinates transformation of Auckland’s CBD</td>
<td>Non-elected officials</td>
<td>CCI will involve other stakeholders including the cruise industry so that the industry can advise as to its requirements, but CCI leads the process and makes the decisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>CCI is delegated with the responsibility of developing a long-term strategy, including the CWS (Downtown Framework).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>CCI project managers have power. They are manipulative, forcing waterfront development issues.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) POAL</td>
<td>Non-elected officials</td>
<td>POAL has decision-making power because they make the space available for the cruise ships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provides operational services for commercial and cruise shipping sectors</td>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>POAL has decision-making power concerning what goes on within its precinct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1.3 Community power</td>
<td>Elected officials</td>
<td>Power has shifted from POAL to the Community because Auckland is no longer a port city, but a harbour city where the Community cares enough about the waterfront to take action. Protestors against Bledisloe extension won on a technicality; they represent money and not the voice of all Aucklanders. There needs to be a greater sense of ownership of outcomes secured through “genuine and meaningful” community/political participation to ensure that the Community supports Council’s decisions. However, if the Community is isolated, resentment will follow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-elected officials</td>
<td>Community stopped POAL’s proposed wharf extension, not the Council, Mayor or CE. This demonstrates that the Council and SCO’s do not have as much power as they think they have. Citizens’ coalitions have the power that manifests itself as a powerful resistance to change. There is a vocal group that is intent on stopping any reclamation. There is no way of knowing whether the views of the protestors are representative of the entire population.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>Community power has been exercised by educated residents who do not see any benefits flowing from the proposed Bledisloe Wharf extension. Putting a cruise terminal on Queens Wharf that becomes a private space will provoke protest from ratepayers who have already paid for half the wharf, and now the other half is being taken away. Protests can be expected where democracy has not been managed in a way to gain public support. The community cares enough for its waterfront to take action. Community participates in decision-making, but only in a negative way through protest which puts political pressure on Council. Power should rest with broadest possible stakeholder group and not just the politicians because the broader stakeholder groups, including ratepayers, should decide that they want the cruise industry and supporting infrastructure. It is an economic development issue which will benefit the broader constituency.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Community power has been exercised with respect to the proposed port expansion, an example of protest being organised by educated residents who do not see any benefits flowing from the (proposed) infrastructure. Putting a cruise terminal on Queens Wharf that becomes a private space will provoke outrage from ratepayers who say they have already paid for half the wharf, with the other half being taken away. Protests can be expected where democracy has not been managed in a way to gain public support. The community cares enough for its waterfront to take action. Community participates in decision-making, but only in a negative way through protest which puts political pressure on Council. Influence/power should rest with broadest possible stakeholder group and not just the politicians because the broader stakeholder groups, including ratepayers, should decide that it wants the cruise industry and supporting infrastructure. It is an economic development issue which will benefit the broader constituency.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1.4 Traditional owners' power</td>
<td>Non-elected officials</td>
<td>Traditional owners have power, driven by their beliefs which include a general proscription against putting land back into the sea (i.e. reclamation). Maori Statutory Board(b) sits at the Council table when CCI presents its recommendations. The Board has the opportunity to vote. CCI consults with iwi(c) on a regular basis to discuss ongoing issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>The local iwi is opposed to harbour reclamation, but if an appropriate Resource Consent application process is followed and if it can be shown to be commercially beneficial, the iwi will not oppose it. The local iwi is not happy that consents went through without proper consultation, particularly since they are the major land owner/ neighbour next to the port.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1.5 Judicial power</td>
<td>Elected officials</td>
<td>Protestors won their court case on a technicality. The Court's decision (a) forced the Mayor to pursue the Port Futures study, demonstrating that it is all about political expediency in Auckland; (b) demonstrated that there is a high level of community interest in port development; and (c) effectively rendered the petitioners (e.g. Urban Auckland etc) the decision makers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Private sector | Courts have power, but only in terms of what can't be done and not what can/needs to be done. The media functions as the Courts’ judicial review.

5.1.6 Users’ power – the cruise lines

Elected officials | Although the cruise lines are not involved in the development (because they know there is nothing they can do), they hold the ultimate power, i.e. to decide whether to visit Auckland or not.

Non-elected officials | The cruise lines are not very involved in the provision of infrastructure, but they make demands. ATEED decides on the basis of the economic benefits.

Private sector | The cruise industry influences decisions because bigger ships need more space, a factor that drives some of the decision-making process – they need to be involved in the design. POAL and Council should have decision-making power, not the cruise lines.

Community | The cruise lines are involved because it is in their commercial interest to do so.

Notes:
(a) Senior Council Officers (SCOs) include the Chief Executive (CE) and the Chief Planning Officer (CFO)
(b) Maori Statutory Board is independent of the Council. It ensures that the views of Maori are taken into account during Council decision-making.
(c) “Iwi” is the largest social group of Maori people, where the members of that group are descended from a common ancestor and associated with a specific geographic territory.
5.7 Power, conflict, a lack of cohesion (fragmentation) and risk

The discussion in Chapters 2, 4 and 5 addressed many of the issues arising from the aim of this thesis, i.e., to ascertain how stakeholders influence proposals for cruise infrastructure development. This discussion included an analysis of the exercise of power among those stakeholders, the political climate which affects how key stakeholders are perceived by and engage with the community and the characteristics of the networks formed by those stakeholders. Auckland, New Zealand, was chosen as the study site for this analysis so that these issues could be examined in the context of a destination where a highly contested political environment continues to have a negative impact on the need to redevelop inadequate cruise infrastructure.

More specifically, Auckland’s status as a mature and popular turnaround port, where the port itself is owned by the Council, made it an appropriate study site to consider within the framework described in Chapter 2. These elements are identified and documented in the rich case study presented in Chapter 4. Furthermore, Chapter 4 provides an inventory of the specific issues and events facing Auckland during the turbulent period between 2008 and 2016. During this period, Auckland’s local government experienced a transformation from a traditional, hierarchical form of government to a broader, more inclusive governance approach. As the empirical evidence in Chapter 4 demonstrates, the continuing effects of this transformation have had an impact on the type and characteristics of the network formed by those stakeholders who have an interest in advancing proposals for the redevelopment of Auckland’s cruise infrastructure. The informality, openness and dysfunction exhibited by this network are further exacerbated by competing interests within that network. Most notably, operating within this environment is POAL, an organisation which appears not to have embraced the transformation and which continues to focus solely on its lucrative commercial operations. According to the respondents’ perceptions reported in Chapters 5 and 6, POAL’s stance has proven to be detrimental to the much-needed redevelopment of Auckland’s cruise infrastructure.

Thus, the empirical evidence documented in Chapters 5 and 6 confirms the potential existence of a fragmented network. Network fragmentation can be attributed to the lack
of appropriate governance mechanisms. Effective or adequate government mechanisms can resolve or at least mitigate negative attributes such as the asymmetric exercise of power, the presence of competing interests and a lack of transparency in the decision-making process and the provision of information. Each of these attributes was evident in the respondents’ observations reported in Chapters 5 and 6.

The consequences of a fragmented, dysfunctional stakeholder network are addressed in Chapter 6. In the context of large public infrastructure development projects, those consequences can take the form of risks which can damage or even threaten that development. In Chapter 6, the empirical evidence reveals a wide variety of risks which can damage or even threaten Auckland’s continuing growth as a popular cruise destination, thereby potentially sacrificing the economic benefits which cruise tourism contributes to the city. As discussed in Chapter 6, those risks can range from the alienation of the community to the effects of haphazard construction resulting from short-term planning. More significantly, though, a failure to provide adequate cruise infrastructure in Auckland potentially threatens New Zealand’s cruise tourism growth because of Auckland’s role as New Zealand’s principal turnaround port. The link between network fragmentation and risk is discussed in Chapter 6 along with the risks identified by respondents.
CHAPTER 6
STAKEHOLDER NETWORK FRAGMENTATION AND RISK: CRUISE INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN AUCKLAND, NEW ZEALAND

6.1 Introduction

6.2 Primary research objective and research questions addressed in this paper

6.3 Original contributions

6.4 Statement of contribution to co-authored submitted paper

6.5 Paper submitted for peer review
6 Stakeholder network fragmentation and risk: cruise infrastructure development in Auckland, New Zealand

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<td>Submitted to <em>Tourism Planning &amp; Development</em>, 27 June 2017 – under peer review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formatting information</td>
<td>This paper is included in the PDF format which has been circulated for peer review.</td>
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</table>

6.1 Introduction

While Chapter 5 analyses power in the context of achieving stakeholder network cohesion, Chapter 6 extends that research to assess the impact of a lack of cohesion, or fragmentation, within those networks. Empirical evidence is used to assess how fragmentation within a network can lead to or exacerbate a wide range of risks which can threaten large infrastructure projects such as cruise infrastructure development. This chapter also provides an inventory of the risks which can attach to proposals for cruise infrastructure development. Given the debate and political contestability surrounding Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development, it is incumbent upon Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development network to recognise the issues presented in Chapter 6 and take appropriate measure to mitigate them, measures which require network cohesion as discussed in Chapter 5.

6.2 Primary research objective and research questions addressed in this paper

6.2.1 Primary research objective

Identify and critically assess the potential risks faced by stakeholder networks involved in cruise infrastructure development.
6.2.2 Research questions

The following research questions are posed in the following paper and derive from the primary research objective set out immediately above and the relevant aims set out in Table 1.10:

RQ1: Can fragmentation within a stakeholder network lead to or exacerbate risk which threatens public infrastructure development?

RQ2: Can potential risk be mitigated through adequate and appropriate governance?

6.3 Original contributions

A substantial body of literature exists on the risks which can accrue to large infrastructure projects. There are also studies on the lack of cohesion within, or fragmentation of, stakeholder networks. However, the original contribution of this paper is to consider these issues in the context of cruise infrastructure development. More specifically, this paper’s key contributions are:

(a) An analysis, based on empirical evidence, of how stakeholders perceive the exercise of power within stakeholder networks formed to progress the development of cruise infrastructure.

(b) A determination of the causes and impacts of network fragmentation on cruise infrastructure development stakeholder networks and the potential for risk.

(c) An inventory, based on empirical evidence (i.e. stakeholders’ perceptions), of the risks which can attach to cruise infrastructure development in the absence of a cohesive network

(d) Empirically informed insights into the potentially destructive effects of a fragmented network within the cruise infrastructure development context and how risk can be mitigated through cooperation within an existing stakeholder network.
6.4 Statement of contribution to co-authored paper submitted to peer review

STATEMENT OF CONTRIBUTION TO CO-AUTHORED SUBMITTED PAPER

This chapter includes a co-authored paper. The bibliographic details (if published or accepted for publication)/status (if prepared or submitted for publication) of the co-authored paper, including all authors, are:


My contribution to the paper involved:
(a) conducting all semi-structured interviews, with A/Prof Lohmann as an observer during two of the Auckland-based interviews
(b) analysing all data and reporting their results, with suggestions from A/Prof Burke on structuring the results and presenting the conclusions
(c) drafting all content, with assistance from Dr Moyle on structuring the paper’s content
(d) reviewing and implementing general feedback from A/Prof Lohmann, Dr Moyle and A/Prof Burke

(Signed) _________________________________ (Date) 13 October 2017
Name of Student: Wendy R London

(Countersigned) ___________________________ (Date) 13 October 2017
Corresponding author of paper: Wendy R London

(Countersigned) _______ _______ _______ (Date) 13 October 2017
Supervisor: A/Prof Gui Lohmann
6.5 Paper submitted for peer review

Submitted paper follows:

**Stakeholder network fragmentation and risk: Cruise infrastructure development in Auckland, New Zealand**

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URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rthp
Stakeholder network fragmentation and risk: Cruise infrastructure development in Auckland, New Zealand

Abstract
Cities across the globe are faced with (re)developing cruise infrastructure because of the increase in the number, size and capacity of cruise ships. Infrastructure development involves stakeholder networks which embrace competing interests, potentially leading to network fragmentation and associated risks. Despite prior studies identifying the risks that can arise from network fragmentation in infrastructure development, there is little research considering this issue in the context of cruise infrastructure development. Consequently, the aim of this paper is to explore the extent to which network fragmentation can lead to risks impacting cruise infrastructure development. Twenty-three semi-structured interviews were conducted with key stakeholders in Auckland, New Zealand. Results demonstrate that network fragmentation was evident, leading to key risks. The contribution of this research is empirically informed insights into how risk can be mitigated through a governance structure which fosters cooperation. Future research should focus on identifying governance structures which can advance network cooperation.

Keywords: Cruise tourism, governance, infrastructure, network fragmentation, risk
1. Introduction

The dramatic growth of the cruise tourism sector has prompted coastal cities across the globe to develop new infrastructure or expand their existing facilities (Kerswill & Mair, 2015; London & Lohmann, 2014). More specifically, infrastructure development is required due to the addition of new ports of call and the need for existing ports to accommodate the increase in the number, size and capacity of ships (Lau, Tam, Ng, & Pallis, 2014; Rodrigue & Notteboom, 2013).

Existing literature on cruise infrastructure development tends to focus on economic development and urban regeneration (e.g., Kotval & Mullin, 2010; McCarthy, 2003; McCarthy & Romein, 2012; Ma Fan & Zhang, 2015) and on stakeholders’ responses to the anticipated or actual impacts of (re)development (e.g., Hritz & Cecil, 2008; London & Lohmann, 2014; Terry & Smith, 2015). However, there is a distinct lack of empirical inquiry into the establishment and governance of stakeholder networks which form to progress cruise infrastructure development. More specifically, there is an absence of research into the risks which can arise in relation to that development in the absence of stakeholder cooperation. Empirical studies in conceptually related areas such as destination marketing (d’Angella & Go, 2009), heritage tourism (Aas, Ladkin & Fletcher, 2005) and water infrastructure planning (Lienert, Schnetzer & Ingold, 2013) have found that a lack of cooperation, or fragmentation, within a network can create or exacerbate a wide range of risks which threaten development projects in the public sector (see also Beach, Keast, & Pickernell 2012; Chung, Hensher, & Rose, 2010).

Thus, this paper examines how network fragmentation in cruise infrastructure development stakeholder networks can lead to risk which threaten development. This study also illustrates how risk can potentially be mitigated by eliminating or at least reducing fragmentation. Auckland, New Zealand, was selected as the study site because of the presence of a highly-contested political and planning environment, an environment which has the potential to lead to an absence of cooperation and, therefore, network fragmentation. The core contribution of this study is empirically informed
insights into what measures can be taken to reduce or eliminate fragmentation in the broad political environment in which cruise infrastructure development takes place. This study also advances the conceptual understanding of the potential for risk to that development as a result of fragmented relationships. Accordingly, this paper provides a foundation for future research to be undertaken which tests these findings through, for example, social network analysis or stakeholder mapping.

2. Literature review

2.1. Stakeholders and stakeholder networks

Stakeholders involved in infrastructure development projects establish formal or informal networks (Krackhardt & Hanson, 1993) to undertake that development (Aaltonen, Kujala, Lehtonen, & Ruuska, 2010; Winch, 2004). In the context of infrastructure development, Newcombe (2003, p 842) defines stakeholders as “groups or individuals who have a stake in, or expectation of the project’s performance” and can include, for example, the project owners, the construction and design teams and funding and insurance providers (Guo, Chang-Richards, Wilkinson, & Li, 2014; Newcombe, 2003). Stakeholders who are not directly involved in the project but who may affect or be affected by it are considered to be secondary or external stakeholders (Aaltonen et al., 2010), including, for example, community groups (Castka & Prajogo, 2013).

Stakeholder networks are considered vital to successful infrastructure development because of their capacity to assemble the resources (e.g., funding, knowledge and expertise) required by the project (Beach et al., 2012). Additionally, extant literature has demonstrated that the shift from a hierarchical, bureaucratic approach to a network approach which leads to the inclusion of individuals and organisations in the decision-making process who may otherwise be excluded (Beach et al., 2012).

2.2. Governance

The control and monitoring of the management of stakeholder networks is achieved through governance (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Governance is a wider concept than government (Boholm,
Corvellec, & Karlsson, 2012). While government is considered to be an elitist, hierarchical form of governance (Johansson, 2015), governance in the public sector context is a collaborative, non-hierarchical form of policy-making which spans the public and private sectors (Boholm et al., 2012; Hall, 2011; Provan & Kenis, 2008). The purpose of network governance is to ensure that projects are successfully completed through productive engagement with the stakeholders within the network (Beach et al., 2012) and the effective use of resources available to them (Hall, 2011). Additionally, the governance of inter-organisational networks must be sufficiently robust to ensure that the relationships function efficiently (Beach et al., 2012). One important characteristic of robust governance is that risks can be identified and managed as they arise (e.g., Chilvers, 2007). However, when governance becomes less effective or fails to work, the network can become fragmented, leading to a failure to recognise potential risks or even exacerbate existing risks.

2.3. Network fragmentation

Despite the benefits of network governance, the involvement of stakeholders representing competing interests, professional contexts, perspectives, values and beliefs can lead to fragmentation of the network (Boholm, 2008; Lienert et al., 2013; Selman, 2000). Fragmentation can be either horizontal or vertical. Horizontal fragmentation occurs when there is little or no cooperation among local stakeholders while vertical fragmentation emerges where there is little or no cooperation between levels of government (Lienert et al., 2013). Table 1 includes the causes of network fragmentation within infrastructure networks which have been identified in previous studies.

<Insert Table 1 about here>

Thus, as indicated in Table 1, it is clear that the potential for risk in large infrastructure projects is high (Boholm et al., 2012; De Bruijne & Van Eeten, 2007; Johansson et al., 2015; Lienert et al., 2013), particularly given the number of stakeholders and competing interests involved (Boholm et al., 2012; Flyvberg, 2009; Guo et al., 2014). However, despite the growth of cruise tourism, there is limited research into the potential for risk related to stakeholder networks in cruise infrastructure.
development. According to Lau et al. (2014), cruise infrastructure development involves more stakeholders than other transport terminal facility development projects. Therefore, the potential for the presence of a large number of competing interests and fragmentation in cruise infrastructure development is particularly high.

2.4. Risk

Risk is a contested concept as reflected in attempts to define it (Aven & Renn, 2009; Fischhoff, Watson, & Hope, 1984; Ward & Chapman, 2003). As previous studies have demonstrated, definitions of risk differ as to the conceptual orientation of the researcher (March & Shapira, 1987). Examples of the conceptual differences are set out in Table 2.

| Table 2 |

Furthermore, risk has been described as easier to identify than to define (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002). Common to all definitions of risk, however, are the notions of value, probability and loss (Aven & Renn, 2009).

Cruise infrastructure development projects are often structured as public-private partnerships (PPPs), exposing them to risks which can affect both the public and private sector partners (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002). These risks can arise from a range of uncertainties which can be classified as either construction-specific or general risks. Construction-specific risks generally fall into five categories, that is, revenue, financial, time, design and expertise (Abdou, 1996; Akintoye, 1997; Borkowski, 2015; Ng & Loosemore, 2007). General risks can arise from any uncertainty (Ng & Loosemore, 2007). Risks can also be classified as to whether they arise from (a) external (exogenous) events, such as changes in the geopolitical environment, natural disasters, external opposition to the project and legislative or regulatory changes; or (b) internal (endogenous) events, such as fragmentation of the network, the unexpected behaviour of coalition partners and a failure to execute project delivery (Floricel & Miller, 2001). In addition, PPPs introduce the potential for risk which can arise from the
sheer complexity of the project itself (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002). Table 3 outlines examples of the potential risks associated with public infrastructure development.

<Insert Table 3 about here>

3. Study context

Auckland, New Zealand’s principal turnaround port is experiencing exponential growth in its cruise tourism sector (ATEED, 2015). From 1994 to 2015/2016, the number of cruise passengers visiting the city increased from approximately 19,800 to 230,000. This growth is placing pressure on Auckland’s planners and other key stakeholders to develop cruise infrastructure which can accommodate the number and size of cruise ships visiting the city. Larger cruise ships currently berth at the city’s main (albeit temporary) cruise terminal at Queen’s Wharf and at the secondary terminal at Princes Wharf. Smaller ships can also be accommodated at The Cloud, a temporary events centre adjacent to the Queens Wharf terminal. However, none of Auckland’s cruise wharves is capable of accommodating ships longer than 320 metres or more than one ship at a time, thereby requiring some ships to moor in the harbour (London, Moyle, & Lohmann, 2017). Although Queens and Princes wharves are dedicated cruise wharves, they share some operational infrastructure with the Ports of Auckland Ltd (POAL), New Zealand’s largest commercial port. POAL is owned by Auckland Council and is one of the few ports in the world to operate within a city’s central business district (Kubiak, 2015; World Bank, 2016) (see POAL, Auckland, [Google Maps], 2017).

Responsible for the operation and continuing development of Auckland’s cruise infrastructure and the promotion of its cruise tourism sector is dispersed among several agencies on both the national and local levels, as illustrated in Figure 1. Other stakeholders include the cruise lines, over-arching business, professional and trade organisations, private consultants, the media and the community. Together with the public sector agencies displayed in Figure 1, these stakeholders form the core of Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development network.
Several proposals for the further development of Auckland’s cruise infrastructure have been tabled since 2008 (see, e.g., Auckland Council, 2014; Orsman, 2010). However, despite the city’s positive and welcoming stance towards cruise tourism, each proposal has provoked robust debate (London, Moyle, & Lohmann, 2017). An early indication of these competing interests became apparent in June 2009 following the sale of Queens Wharf by POAL to New Zealand’s Central Government and the former Auckland Regional Council (ARC).1 Central Government’s interest in its share of the purchase of Queens Wharf was the use of the wharf for Rugby World Cup 2011 (RWC 2011), but it urged the Council to construct an expensive, iconic cruise terminal on the wharf after RWC 2011. Controversy emerged with respect to key stakeholders’ competing visions for Queens Wharf, including the design and cost of any future cruise terminal and the demand for public access to the wharf (London et al., 2017). This proposal exposed significant hostility between Central Government and Auckland Council in the form of an unwelcome assertion of power by Central Government and a growing distrust of Auckland Council by the community (London et al., 2017).

Another high profile episode of the debate surfaced in 2014 when four options for expanding Auckland’s cruise ship berthing capacity were tabled (Auckland Council, 2014). Each of the four options included in the Central Wharves Strategy (CWS) involved some degree of re-alignment of POAL’s commercial shipping infrastructure, thereby further exacerbating the competing interests between POAL and other key stakeholders (London et al., 2017). The extent of POAL’s interests became apparent in February 2015 when a media report uncovered secret negotiations which had taken place between Auckland Council and POAL in late 2014 (Orsman, 2015). These negotiations initially resulted in POAL being awarded a non-compliant planning consent to extend the Bledisloe cargo wharf (London et al., 2017). However, this episode attracted vocal community protests and a High Court action which resulted in a stoppage of work on the extension. As a result, POAL continues to assert that it cannot give up space at its cargo wharves to accommodate mega cruise ships, forcing them to moor in the harbour and thereby potentially compromising Auckland’s ability to manage the

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1 In November 2010, eight local councils in the greater Auckland area merged to form the Auckland Council.
growth of its cruise tourism sector. It is POAL’s refusal to accommodate mega cruise ships which potentially threatens Auckland’s position as a turnaround port.

It is in the context of this discussion that this paper seeks to answer the following research questions:

RQ1: Can the lack of cooperation (i.e., fragmentation) within a stakeholder network lead to or exacerbate risk which threatens public infrastructure development?

RQ2: Can that potential risk be mitigated through adequate and appropriate governance?

4. **Methodology**

4.1. **Research design**

In order to understand the views of the wide range of respondents interviewed, a social constructivist approach was adopted (Dredge, 2010; Mackenzie & Knipe, 2006). Social constructivism does not depend on the existence of any theory but instead allows the researcher to rely on the views of participants to formulate knowledge by creating patterns of meaning. Adoption of this approach enables the researcher to understand the viewpoints of individual participants as well as the interrelationships between participants with respect to their individual interests and collective decision-making. Once the relationship between the researcher and the participant is recognised, the researcher’s interpretation of the data and any bias which the researcher introduces can be acknowledged and understood (Dredge, 2010).

4.2. **Data collection**

Twenty-three semi-structured interviews were conducted between April and August 2015. Fifteen interviews were conducted in Auckland, six were conducted in Wellington and two were conducted by videoconference. Eleven other individuals were approached to take part in the study. However, they either failed to respond or declined to participate, citing, for example, political sensitivity or insufficient knowledge. Interviews lasted between 30 and 90 minutes (Boholm et al., 2012; Lienert et
al., 2013; van der Kolk & Schokker, 2016). Interviews were recorded and transcribed, with supplemental notes taken during the interviews.

Respondents represented a wide range of stakeholders. They were selected through a variety of methods, including (a) their prominence in the New Zealand media (London et al., 2017); (b) identification through their organisational websites, reports or other documents; (c) referrals from other respondents; and (d) personal knowledge. Respondents were initially selected because of a high level of involvement in Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development as demonstrated through the documents and media reports (London et al., 2017) which were collected and analysed during the preliminary desk research phase of this study. Every effort was made to contact all potential respondents by email and telephone. Table 4 provides a breakdown of the number of respondents interviewed by sector and location, while Table 5 provides the pseudonyms and characteristics of the respondents referenced in this paper:

4.3. Data analysis

The topics addressed during the interviews were initially extracted from the media reports identified by London, Moyle, and Lohmann (2017). Interview questions sought to elicit respondents’ perception of (a) who holds the decision-making power with respect to the development of Auckland’s cruise infrastructure; and (b) the decision-making process related to that development. Respondents were also invited to comment on the risks associated with Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development and to provide suggestions as to how those risks could be mitigated. The completed interviews demonstrated a high degree of sufficiency, with no new information communicated by subsequent respondents (Jennings, 2005).

Interviews were analysed by establishing patterns of meaning according to respondents’ answers. More specifically, themes were created to allow for the categorisation of responses which gave evidence of network fragmentation. Open coding was used to identify and distil the key themes
which were initially identified during desk research and which subsequently emerged from the interviews (Neuman, 2011). Axial coding was then used to refine and organise the open codes while preserving the intended meaning of the content conveyed by the respondents. During this stage, appropriate codes were created, revealing that risk was considered to be both a specific, discrete issue and an issue implicit in the core themes. Themes were further classified according to whether the evidence of network fragmentation was mentioned in relation to Central Government, local government or by other stakeholders. Table 6 shows the classification of the themes.

<Insert Table 6 about here>

At the same time, categories were created to articulate the risks which were mentioned in conjunction with the cited evidence of network fragmentation.

5. Results
The aim of this article is to ascertain whether stakeholder network fragmentation can lead to or exacerbate the risks of cruise infrastructure development. The first part of this section addresses a series of network fragmentation and governance issues while risk is discussed in the second part.

5.1. Network fragmentation

5.1.1. Lack of leadership
Respondents provided clear evidence of a lack of cooperation or cohesion within the network. A lack of leadership at Central Government level was cited as one reason for the lack of cohesion, prompting respondents to articulate the need for Central Government to act “as a coordinator, as a leader, across New Zealand” (Prescott, PR2). However, there was uncertainty about how Central Government’s role should be defined. Corbin (CO3) felt that Central Government is simply unable to define its own role with any clarity, thereby exacerbating existing perceptions of the lack of leadership:
I think Central Government is incredibly involved, but it’s involved by thinking that it isn’t involved…it’s making a mess of it. One of the worse ways to govern is to think that you shouldn’t, not bother. But obviously, meddling, over-meddling, is bad, too. There’s a balance to be struck. (Corbin, CO3)

On the other hand, there was considerable uncertainty about who should take responsibility for cruise infrastructure at the Central Government level (i.e., the Minister of Transport or the Minister of Tourism), with a feeling that cruise infrastructure would fall between the two: “I would really hope that the Ministry of Transport, in particular, would be advising the Minister, but of course, maybe it falls between Transport and Tourism” (Corbin, CO3). There was also a feeling that although there has been significant advocacy at Central Government level with respect to cruise tourism issues, Reece (OA1) observed that “I would expect Government to lead, but in my experience, they don’t lead – they follow.”

The perceived lack of understanding and leadership at the Central Government level was compounded by the absence of clear understanding as to who leads the development of Auckland’s cruise infrastructure at the local level. The lack of leadership appears to be systemic, with Preston (PR4) observing that a former Mayor’s indecision and “flip-flops” resulted in a dilemma for the Council itself who “doesn’t know which way is up.” Preston (PR4) further stated that the Deputy Mayor “has tried to step up through the Auckland Development Committee over the last couple of years to try to get it to carry some leadership responsibility,” while Audley (PA4) thought that “Auckland Council, through its CCOs is leading this.”

5.1.2. Lack of a national strategy

In contrast to the comments advocating leadership at the national level, there did not appear to be concomitant support for a national cruise infrastructure strategy. Evidence of vertical network fragmentation was signalled in the observation that “with most national strategies…the national interest isn’t the same as the local or regional interest” (Reuben, OA3). Reuben (OA3) added that any attempt to impose a national strategy would be rejected, given that the ports are owned by their
respective Councils who will always seek to protect their independence. This independence was viewed not only as a contributing factor to a lack of cooperation, but also as a threat to key stakeholders’ positions, with the imposition of any such strategy viewed as being:

way too political for any government to take on, but to me that is really the essential content because having a discussion in Auckland about the cruise industry without talking about the port is disingenuous, really, because one really pre-supposes the other or leans upon the other so, and it’s the same thing nationally. (Audrey, PA3)

5.1.3. Political expediency and instability

Political expediency, including the election cycle and the threat of political opposition, was a prominent issue that emerged from the data. For example, there was a demonstrable belief among private sector and community respondents that decision-making by politicians can be compromised by political motivations, resulting in a predisposition to pursue short-term gain at the expense of the bigger picture. For instance, it was noted that “the only thing that forced [the Mayor’s] hands [to undertake the Port Futures Study] is the legal action against the Port,” (Colin, CO1). This was evident throughout the findings, advancing the view that a threat of legal action can provoke political stakeholders to act in their own, political interest.

5.1.4. Dysfunctional planning environment/competing interests

Respondents were generally critical of Auckland’s planning environment, particularly with respect to the perceived lack of coherent planning for the city’s waterfront. Short-term gain and a failure to adjudicate the network’s competing interests were two key issues cited by respondents. Criticism was voiced over Auckland’s propensity to pursue short-term gain for the benefit of specific projects rather than planning for the future or for the “integrated whole,” simply stating that the needs of “the cruise industry [are] an integral part of that whole story” (Reece, OA1). However, despite the establishment of City Centre Integration (CCI), a Council agency charged with bringing the Council’s CCOs
together “to make coherent integration” (Austin, PA6), Audley (PA4) felt that CCI’s intervention in respect of cruise infrastructure was ineffective.

More far-reaching, though, were comments signalling a lack of cooperation, thereby resulting in a failure to recognise and marshal the resources of the network’s stakeholders. Aubrey (PA1) criticised the agency responsible for the city’s waterfront, stating that its plans for the whole waterfront were developed in isolation and “didn’t reflect the whole of Council thinking.” Aubrey (PA1) also stated that although there was an attempt to introduce a broad approach to the further development of Auckland’s waterfront, it was this respondent’s belief that the CWS is too narrow in scope. Moreover, this respondent commented that the inclusion of the CWS in the Downtown Framework (Auckland Council 2014) was done “with the purpose of being provocative.”

Fragmentation of the network was also evident in respondents’ comments relating to POAL’s observed assertion of power, effectively dividing the network by circumventing the Council’s planning consent procedures. Mel (ME1) bluntly stated that POAL’s actions were due to POAL’s status as an independent, commercial (albeit Council-owned) business which “operate[s] sort of in isolation to the wider city interests although that’s now been challenged [by the court action].” Mel stated that POAL’s commercial objectives are “increasingly becoming a conflict between their commercial business and the city’s wider interests in the waterfront.” Recognition of POAL’s commercial objectives was clear in Austin’s (PA5) comments that it is “paid to be a port [and not] worry about the harbour and the aspirations of the people of Auckland, seascapes and landscapes …they are there to get on and make money.”

These comments reflect key findings that stakeholders involved in Auckland’s waterfront development have a tendency to pursue their own, and often competing, interests. This independence and its consequent impact on the network appears to have compromised Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development. For example, Reg (OA2) observed that cruise infrastructure “doesn’t make sense to the port alone, but it does make economic sense to the wider community because of the benefits.” According to Connor (CO2), the lack of collaboration between Auckland Council and POAL exemplifies a long-standing problem which has foreclosed efforts to adopt any long-term

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2 Waterfront Auckland now incorporated into Panuku Development, the agency responsible for the city’s urban regeneration as a whole.
planning vision, an issue which has threatened many public infrastructure projects not only in Auckland but across the globe. However, this view was tempered by Audley (PA4) who acknowledged that POAL is beginning to recognise at least some of the economic benefits of cruise tourism, commenting that POAL “has only slowly woken up to the financial dividends that can flow out of cruise.”

5.1.5. Inefficient/inadequate governance

Respondents also identified inefficient or inadequate governance as a barrier to the further development of Auckland’s cruise infrastructure, particularly where the presence of intense, competing and seemingly intractable interests was seen to be a threat to (a) cooperation as each stakeholder seeks to advance their own agenda without any intervention on the network governance level; and (b) communication within the network as the network becomes more dispersed. Reece (OA1) acceded that some comprehensive planning may be being undertaken, but if so, “it’s being extremely poorly communicated across the networks broader than that initial group.” Reg (OA2) echoed this view, commenting that governance alone is unlikely to solve the problem of a lack of communication, warning that there is still the potential for risks such as added expense, disruption and the loss of economic opportunities.

5.1.6. Lack of transparency/trust

Evidence of a lack of cooperation or fragmentation was also apparent in respondents’ comments relating to a lack of transparency in respect of POAL’s actions, especially among stakeholders from within the wider community. Connor (CO2), reflecting on the secretive, non-compliant process whereby POAL was granted consents to extend Bledisloe Wharf, felt that “[POAL is] not equal in the law…[t]hey are above everyone else…[t]hey have their own special law.” This respondent added, “[t]he public should be made aware of [the plan to extend Bledisloe Wharf],” that it “should be notified [as part of the planning consent process] and there should be some input.” However, these views were not confined to POAL’s actions and behaviour, but also to other actors within the broader decision-making process. For example, Reg (OA2), Reece (OA1) and Mel (ME1) were critical of the
way the CWS (Auckland Council, 2014) was managed, noting that there is community opposition, particularly with respect to the proposed expansion of the Port. Reg (OA2) further argued that the public needs to be consulted with respect to developments which affect the port, observing that “the need to have a proper cruise facility has sort of been lost in the murk of the whole debate.”

5.1.7.  Lack of inclusiveness

(i)  The cruise lines

As primary users of cruise infrastructure, the cruise lines can be considered central to any cruise infrastructure development network. However, two reasons were cited which militate against the cruise lines’ full participation in the network. First, Auden (PA2) expressed the view that decisions about cruise infrastructure development should be made by local, key stakeholders. Auden (PA2) commented that the cruise lines expect Auckland to sort out its own problems, saying that the cruise lines will take the position that “we are not part of your problem.” However, according to Reg (OA2), the cruise lines have unwittingly found themselves in the middle of the “argument between the Port and its owner, the Council.” The second reason, also articulated by Reg (OA2), relates to both the structure and organisation of the cruise lines themselves. Reg (OA2) commented that despite the fact that the cruise lines may have sales offices in New Zealand, the physical distance of the cruise lines’ decision-makers from New Zealand and their reluctance to share information effectively renders them passive network participants. However, Austin (PA6) said there was also a view that there has been no direct, ongoing consultation with the cruise lines, recognising that “the cruise lines have a view…they have been briefed, but not consulted.” Whether there was a conscious failure to include the cruise lines or a reluctance on their part to be included, Reg (OA2) expressed the view that the “cruise industry needs [to] be an integral part of that whole story.”

(ii)  The community/ratepayers

Another recurrent theme was the failure of the Council (including the CCOs) to embrace Auckland’s ratepayers within the network. For example, criticism was voiced about the failure to consult the ratepayers over the negotiations which involved a complex basket of property swaps affecting the
waterfront, adjacent public spaces and the siting of cruise infrastructure. Preston (PR4) commented that “the public are being short-changed in the transactions which are occurring.” Similarly, Aubrey (PA1) said that Waterfront Auckland (see footnote 2) did not reflect “whole of Council” thinking, leading to “knee-jerk decisions for cruise ship infrastructure or port expansion to enable a greater discussion to occur which would take the whole waterfront and all of its users into account rather than just one organised sector group.”

5.2. Risk

During the interviews, respondents articulated a variety of risks which potentially can affect Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development. Respondents were aware of the risks which a lack of network cohesion or cooperation, that is, network fragmentation, has on Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development. These risks ranged from the paramount risk of a loss or reduction of New Zealand’s cruise tourism sector to alienation of the community. For example, Reg (OA2) expressed alarm that a lack of leadership or coordination could potentially lead to economic risk nationally because “if Auckland fails to provide a facility…cruise ship[s] may not come to New Zealand at all, so every other [port] in New Zealand [will] miss out.” Reece (OA1) argued that the aversion to taking a leadership role is “all probably about risk,” expressing the general sentiment that risk will accrue if the relevant Ministry fails to adopt a “clear sort of statement of being or intent or direction… in terms of approvals and decisions and political momentum behind it.” On a local level, Reece (OA1) said that the risks flowing from fragmentation include the dangers of haphazard construction of infrastructure and the drive for short-term gain, thereby potentially compromising the needs of all stakeholders. He added that “out of desperation, we have to resolve this situation.” On the community level, Reg (OA2) and Preston (PR4) felt that a failure to engage with the community was seen to risk their support for cruise infrastructure development. Table 7 summarises the risks cited by respondents:

<Insert Table 7 about here>
6. **Discussion**

It is clear from this study that the development of cruise infrastructure capable of accommodating the increase in the number, size and capacity of cruise ships visiting Auckland is a key economic issue for the city. However, the debate surrounding proposals for this development reveals a lack of cooperation, or fragmentation, within the stakeholder network. As this study shows, horizontal and vertical fragmentation can have a destructive impact on the development of complex, large-scale public infrastructure projects, including greater exposure to risk. It is therefore important for planners and other key stakeholders to understand how fragmentation can arise in stakeholder networks. This understanding is particularly important given the main characteristics of network governance, that is, that it is collaborative and non-hierarchical, involving both public and private sector actors (Hall 2011; Provan & Kenis 2008). In order to avoid horizontal fragmentation, it is imperative that Councils and other public sector bodies which have adopted a network governance approach implement an appropriate governance structure. In this study, respondents’ comments suggested that a traditional, hierarchical government culture still exists between Auckland Council, its CCOs and other local organisations involved in the city’s waterfront development. With respect to vertical fragmentation, a lack of leadership and unwelcome assertions of power from a higher level of government can result in a fragmented network. Both types of fragmentation can contribute to risk. Key stakeholders and planners also need to understand that these risks can extend beyond the extant project. For example, in circumstances such as those found in this study, the effects of vertical fragmentation potentially result in significant risk for other stakeholders. In this case, a failure by Central Government to provide policy leadership supporting Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development could result in cruise ships avoiding New Zealand altogether.

Given the potential for far-reaching economic risk as well as direct risks to large scale public infrastructure development such as cruise infrastructure, it is incumbent upon planners and other key stakeholders to find ways to thwart fragmentation. Adequate governance is vital, given that successful
stakeholder participation in infrastructure development projects requires strong relationships between and a muting of competing interests among stakeholders in the network (Beach et al., 2012; Boholm et al., 2012; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). Implementation of a governance framework which includes rules, values and expected forms of behaviour can eliminate or at least reduce fragmentation by helping key stakeholders understand the relative power of the stakeholders, the resources they contribute to the network and the extent to which they agree to be bound by the outcomes (Head, 2007). Governance mechanisms which eliminate or reduce fragmentation also strengthen the network’s ability to manage risk (Daugbjerg, 1997; Head, 2007). Furthermore, stakeholders need to understand that instead of being a threat to their individual interests, the network governance structure can provide them with a stronger environment in which to consider risk because the presence of other stakeholder viewpoints can be beneficial (Johansson, 2015). However, this change in attitude may be difficult for local government stakeholders who originate from traditional hierarchical bureaucratic structures where collaborative support is not available (Head, 2007).

Examples of such mechanisms include (a) developing a shared knowledge base; (b) reaching agreement on a long-term strategic vision; and (c) demanding transparency. In this study, the absence of a shared knowledge base appears to have contributed to network fragmentation. POAL’s failure to take into account the goals and beliefs of all stakeholders profoundly alienated community stakeholders (Dooms, Verbeke, & Hanzendonck, 2013). At the same time, it was clear that community stakeholders lacked detailed knowledge and experience about the port’s requirements for the day-to-day efficiency of its operations and its long-term development plans (Boholm et al., 2012). This study highlights the importance of sharing relevant information to reduce the potential for network fragmentation. Key stakeholders also need to ensure that they focus on the longer term strategic vision rather than on short-term gains. Focusing on short-term gains can also contribute to fragmentation (Domínguez, Worch, Markard, Truffer, & Gujer, 2009). For example, influential or important stakeholders such as POAL may seek to use their power to further their short-term, operational objectives, thereby forsaking network cooperation (Beach, 2008; Lienert et al., 2013). A common theme amongst respondents in this study was a lack of transparency, particularly with respect to POAL’s covert attempt to gain consents for its commercial port expansion. Community
engagement is particularly crucial in seaport and airport development projects given the impact on and relationship of these projects with the urban community (Dooms et al., 2015; Flyvberg, 2009). The unilateral actions of a powerful stakeholder in this study illustrate the need for the implementation of governance rules which demand transparency, thereby mitigating against the significant risk of community alienation and fragmentation of the wider network.

Thus, adequate governance is required to ensure that stakeholders cooperate to identify and mitigate risk (Beach et al., 2012; Dooms et al., 2013; Johansson, 2015; Sharpe, 2004). However, the identification of risk in a political environment is not a precise exercise, but instead depends on the extant technical, economic, organisational and political culture (Boholm & Corvellec, 2011; Boholm et al., 2012). In this context, risk identification becomes a collective action, so that if the network becomes fragmented, the ability to identify and manage risk becomes weakened. Also, risk management may be threatened by stakeholders who have the most power (Flyvberg, 2009; Head, 2007) and who seek to override legal protections (Johansson, 2015). Governance policies need to be adopted which ensure that no single stakeholder overrides existing planning or other legal protections. For example, in this study, POAL sought to assert its power and undermine the planning consents process by engaging in secret negotiations with Auckland Council. By doing so, POAL subjected the entire network to potential risks, including the loss of public trust (Flyvberg, 2009; Rhodes, 1996). Therefore, the adopted governance structure must also anticipate and mitigate against the possibility that planning authorities whose culture is still entrenched in traditional hierarchical structures may adopt a defensive posture, opting to become less transparent. If such positioning continues, the threat of further loss of public trust will continue. Figure 2 illustrates the factors which may contribute to network fragmentation, the risks which can arise from that fragmentation and strategies for mitigating that risk:

7. Conclusions
This study sought to examine the impacts that a lack of cooperation within stakeholder networks has on cruise infrastructure development. Results demonstrated that network fragmentation can be traced to eight main factors, allocated among three main stakeholder groups, that is, Central Government, local government and other stakeholders (see Figure 2). These factors were noticeably evident in the debate which continues to surround Auckland’s cruise development, thereby likely to give rise to risks which can affect this development as well as undermine the network’s engagement with the community. More specifically, this study considered the relationship between weak governance and risk.

A key finding of this study is that fragmentation of Auckland’s cruise infrastructure network threatens Auckland’s ability to (a) continue to realise economic gains from its cruise tourism sector; and (b) sustain its increasing popularity as a premier turnaround port and cruise destination (ATEED, 2015). While there appears to be agreement among key stakeholders that further investment in cruise infrastructure is urgently required, there is also recognition that the highly-charged public debate between stakeholders exposes Auckland’s cruise sector to considerable risk.

Given the lack of previous research on the formation and governance of stakeholder networks in respect of cruise infrastructure development, the key contribution of this research can be considered to be its empirically informed insights into the potentially destructive effects of a fragmented network. Additionally, it demonstrates how risk can be mitigated through cooperation within an existing network.

7.1. **Limitations**

It should be recognised that this study took place in the midst of an ongoing, high profile and fractious debate. Furthermore, stakeholders’ responses may have been affected by their political, bureaucratic or industry position. However, these limitations are not inconsistent with the environment in which planners, consultants and other advisors involved in large scale infrastructure development projects function. This research should prove useful to enable them to recognise the particularly wide range of competing interests present in cruise infrastructure development networks as a precedent to identifying and managing potential political, economic, social and development-specific risks.
7.2. Future research

Future research could focus on applying quantitative methods to map the stakeholder network. This would allow the researcher to visualise the network’s structure, including an assessment of where power is concentrated and whether that concentration of power is a factor in exposing the network to risk. It would also provide more precision in determining whether factions in the network are present. Such an approach, if monitored longitudinally, could also lead to an understanding of the changes in the cohort of stakeholders and how individual stakeholder’s interests may change throughout the project’s lifecycle (Aaltonen et al., 2010; Beach et al., 2012), given that cruise infrastructure development takes place over a protracted period. This analysis could result in the use of different governance strategies to manage the same stakeholder over the tenure of the project (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001). Each of these extensions to this study can contribute to a better understanding of the fabric of cruise infrastructure development networks with a view to predicting their potential exposure to risk and how that risk can be managed.
References


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Figure 1: Key stakeholder agencies involved in Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development

Notes:
(a) In 2012, the Ministry of Tourism was disestablished, with policy functions being assigned to the newly created super-Ministry, the Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment.
(b) In 2015, Waterfront Auckland was merged into Panuku Development Auckland, a CCO responsible for rejuvenation of the city of Auckland.
(c) Ports of Auckland Ltd is owned by Auckland Council Investments Ltd (ACIL) which in turn is owned by Auckland Council.

URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rthp
Figure 2: Factors which may contribute to network fragmentation, resulting risks and mitigation strategies
Table 1. Causes of network fragmentation

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<th>Context</th>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>Lack of clarity around:</td>
<td>Beach (2008)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• the definition of governance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• how external stakeholders should be managed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large-scale PPPs</td>
<td>The long elapsed time of large-scale projects means that the cohort</td>
<td>Beach et al. (2012); Newcombe (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of stakeholders who form the network are likely to change over time,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>with some stakeholders having only a short-term interest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispersed networks</td>
<td>The geographical remoteness of one or more stakeholders (e.g., cruise</td>
<td>Hustedde (2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>lines and Central Government may not have a presence in the community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>where the infrastructure is being built</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All infrastructure projects</td>
<td>Changes in or to government or legislation</td>
<td>Steenhuisen, Dicke, &amp; Bruijn (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Application of a burdensome number of regulations and policies</td>
<td>Johansson (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incompatibility with other stakeholders in the network</td>
<td>Newcombe (2003); Steenhuisen et al. (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A fragmented bureaucratic structure involving many agencies on many</td>
<td>Johansson (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>different levels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A fragmented knowledge base</td>
<td>El-Gohary, Osman, &amp; El-Diraby (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gratuitous assertions of power by individual stakeholders</td>
<td>Flyvberg (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Factions within the network organise themselves with the intent of</td>
<td>Steenhuisen et al. (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dividing the network by asserting their own power and thereby</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>circumventing the network’s governance scheme</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Conceptual orientations affecting the definition of risk

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Classification of the perceived impact of the</td>
<td>• Hazard,</td>
<td>Slovic (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>risk</td>
<td>• Consequence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Threat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of usage, i.e., common (everyday) or</td>
<td>• Common usage– everyday</td>
<td>Pizam et al. (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>systematic (scientific)</td>
<td>• Systematic usage - scientific</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conceptual viewpoint</td>
<td>• As a negative concept</td>
<td>Hillson (2002); Aven &amp;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• As an affirmative choice arising out of uncertainty</td>
<td>Renn (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevant sector or context</td>
<td>• Financial</td>
<td>Bernier &amp; McCarville (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Project/time-based</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Psychological</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Physical</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Social</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Functional</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3. Examples of risks which can attach to public infrastructure development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Construction-specific risks</th>
<th>General risks</th>
<th>PPP-specific risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Revenue</strong></td>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
<td>• Refusal by public sector actors to work with private sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Competition</td>
<td>• War</td>
<td>• Shifting of excessive risk to the private sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>• Changing political landscapes, including nationalisation</td>
<td>• Unreasonable expectations by the private sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Inflation</td>
<td>• Political interference</td>
<td>• Reluctance of actors to work in the PPP environment (e.g., banks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Unrealistic financial structure affecting cash-flow</td>
<td>• Sovereign risk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cost overruns</td>
<td><strong>Legislative/compliance</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Creditworthiness</td>
<td>• Failure to comply with regulations (e.g., labour, environmental)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Inability to service debt</td>
<td>• Unexpected new legislation or regulation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The imposition of onerous penalties</td>
<td>• Refusal by government to grant permits</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time</strong></td>
<td><strong>Commercial</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Delay</td>
<td>• Poorly drafted contracts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Design</strong></td>
<td>• Inadequate insurance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Poorly drafted specifications</td>
<td>• Inefficient tender process</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Overly technologically complex</td>
<td><strong>Social/labour</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Poor materials</td>
<td>• Susceptibility to organised or individual opposition from local groups, economic development agencies and influential pressure groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expertise</strong></td>
<td>• Court challenges from pressure groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Poor project management</td>
<td>• Strikes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Disorganised project team</td>
<td>• Accidents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Unduly heavy workload</td>
<td><strong>Economic</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Poor suppliers</td>
<td>• Unexpected economic downturn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of understanding of technology</td>
<td><strong>Unexpected events</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Withdrawal of a coalition partner or financial institution</td>
<td>• Climate change</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Natural disaster</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Unexpected geological activity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Engel, Fischer and Galetovis (2002); Flyvberg (2009); Floricel and Miller (2001); Grimsey and Lewis (2002); Lessard and Miller (2000); Ng and Loosemore (2007)
Table 4. Semi-structured interview respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Local focus (Auckland) n</th>
<th>National focus n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community representatives</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector (elected and non-elected officials)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representatives of over-arching industry and professional organisations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5. Table of pseudonyms of respondents referenced in this paper

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Sector/organisation</th>
<th>Respondent’s sector/status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aubrey</td>
<td>PA1</td>
<td>Public sector (elected and non-elected officials) - Auckland</td>
<td>Chief Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auden</td>
<td>PA2</td>
<td>Public sector (elected and non-elected officials) - Auckland</td>
<td>Elected official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audrey</td>
<td>PA3</td>
<td>Public sector (elected and non-elected officials) - Auckland</td>
<td>Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audley</td>
<td>PA4</td>
<td>Public sector (elected and non-elected officials) - Auckland</td>
<td>Elected official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augusta</td>
<td>PA5</td>
<td>Public sector (elected and non-elected officials) - Auckland</td>
<td>Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austin</td>
<td>PA6</td>
<td>Public sector (elected and non-elected officials) - Auckland</td>
<td>Elected official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colin</td>
<td>CO1</td>
<td>Community representative</td>
<td>Resident’s association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connor</td>
<td>CO2</td>
<td>Community representative</td>
<td>Pressure group Chair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corbin</td>
<td>CO3</td>
<td>Community representative</td>
<td>Pressure group Spokesperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mel</td>
<td>ME1</td>
<td>Media</td>
<td>Reporter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natalie</td>
<td>PN1</td>
<td>Public sector (elected and non-elected officials) – National</td>
<td>General Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prentice</td>
<td>PR1</td>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>Sales Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prescott</td>
<td>PR2</td>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presley</td>
<td>PR3</td>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>Managing Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preston</td>
<td>PR4</td>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priscilla</td>
<td>PR5</td>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>Chief Operating Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reece</td>
<td>OA1</td>
<td>Over-arching body</td>
<td>Chief Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reg</td>
<td>OA2</td>
<td>Over-arching body</td>
<td>Chief Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reuben</td>
<td>OA3</td>
<td>Over-arching body</td>
<td>Policy advisor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6. Themes evidencing network fragmentation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Government</th>
<th>Local government</th>
<th>Other stakeholders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of leadership and understanding</td>
<td>• Lack of leadership</td>
<td>• Lack of transparency and trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of a national strategy</td>
<td>• Political expediency</td>
<td>• Lack of inclusiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Dysfunctional planning environment/ differing aims and objectives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Inefficient/inadequate governance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rthp
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk category</th>
<th>Consequences of network fragmentation</th>
<th>Potential risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial and investment</td>
<td>Network fragmentation threatens the network’s ability to develop and understand the business case where each stakeholder seeks to promote its own interest (Reuben, OA3; Prescott, PR2).</td>
<td>A lower than anticipated return on investment and over-capitalisation because of a failure to take into account all stakeholders’ views and interest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Design and operation             | Network fragmentation can threaten the network’s ability (including the cruise lines and POAL) to ensure that the planned infrastructure meets the needs of its users with respect to (Reece, OA1; Audrey, PA3; Colin, CO1; Natalie, PN1):  
  - Terminal design and services, including passenger and crew access; adequate space for regulatory services (e.g., Immigration, Customs and Bio-Security) and support services (e.g., transportation, baggage and provisioning services); and ancillary services (e.g., toilets, rubbish collection, tourism information services, etc.)  
  - Port infrastructure (including wharves and seawalls) which can support increasingly heavier and bigger ships  
  - Interaction with the CBD and other infrastructure projects (including transport) to facilitate passenger access to and from the waterfront  
  The cruise ships will go elsewhere, resulting in economic/investment loss to New Zealand’s cruise sector                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| Regulatory                       | A lack of cooperation and an understanding of the economic contribution of the cruise sector by Central Government regulatory authorities can potentially result in unnecessary port costs, direct taxes (Auden, PA2; Presley, PR3) or onerous visa requirements (Auden, PA2) being imposed.                                                                                                                                                                    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| Future planning                  | A fragmented network will result in individual stakeholders engaging in short-term planning (including building something which is inadequate or has a limited life-span (Audley, PA4; Priscilla, PR5) rather than focusing on long-term, inter-generational planning (Prescott, PR2).                                                                                                                                                   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| Policy/governance                | Lack of leadership can lead to fragmentation which threatens not only Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development but also the viability of other ports if Auckland (as New Zealand’s principal turnaround port) fails to develop adequate cruise infrastructure (Reg, OA2; Reuben, OA3).                                                                                                                                                        | Alienation of community                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| Environmental/social             | A lack of cooperation can compromise the city’s ability to manage environmental impacts (e.g., noise, air, sea and crowd pollution); surface transportation pressures; and the visual impact of new infrastructure and the ships berthed there (Colin, CO1).                                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| Competition/promotion            | A lack of support from all key stakeholders (including Central Government) will threaten Auckland’s aspirations to become the principal South Pacific cruise hub (Audley, PA4; Priscilla, PR5) as well as its (and the rest of New Zealand’s) continuing growth as a desirable cruise destination (Augusta, PA5; Auden, PA2; Prescott, PR2).                                                                                                                                                  | Sydney will emerge as the South Pacific cruise hub, resulting in economic/investment loss to New Zealand’s cruise sector                                                                                                                                                           |
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

7.1 Introduction

7.2 Summary and implications of key findings

7.3 Contributions of this research

7.4 Limitations of this research

7.5 Suggestions for future research

7.6 Postscript
7 Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

This chapter summarises the key findings and contributions of this research. It also outlines the limitations of the current research and provides suggestions for further research. The last section very briefly updates the events and issues which are discussed in this thesis.

7.2 Summary and implications of key findings

7.2.1 Power

As noted in Chapter 2, the literature on power is broad and complex (London & Lohmann, 2014), with numerous theories used to describe the nature of relationships among individuals, and between individuals and organisations (see, e.g., Clegg, 1989; Lukes, 1974; Wearing & McDonald, 2002). Within the context of this thesis, two theoretical approaches were found to be particularly relevant. Lukes’ (1974) concept of two-dimensional power is useful to describe the choices which cruise destinations and cruise lines make with respect to cruise infrastructure development (London & Lohmann, 2014), while Clegg (1989) makes it possible to frame this research in terms of the organisations and agencies that are the repositories of power. In this study, key stakeholders who represent a variety of organisations vie for the opportunity, or power, to impose their preference or choice on seemingly less powerful stakeholders. Thus, for example, a port can choose whether or not to accommodate cruise ships at wharves dedicated to non-cruise usage (see, e.g. Chapter 4) while the cruise lines can decide whether commercial wharves are appropriate and decide either to visit or abandon that port (London & Lohmann, 2014). In both cases, the stakeholder which seeks to make the indicated choice (respectively) is deemed to exercise its perceived power over other stakeholders.

One of Chapter 2’s key contributions is a conceptual analysis of how power is exercised and received by stakeholders involved in cruise infrastructure development. This analysis shows that the exercise of power is not limited to the cruise lines as previously believed, but that power also resides and is exercised by other stakeholders who are involved or have an interest in cruise infrastructure development. Section 7.2.2 examines the exercise
and receipt of power in the specific context of stakeholder networks while section 7.2.3 discusses the potential for risk if, for example, asymmetric power is present.

### 7.2.2 Power and stakeholder networks

The advancement of proposals for the (re)development of cruise infrastructure is a complex exercise involving many political (Dredge, 2010), construction (Lau, et al., 2014), environmental (Korbee, et al., 2015), social (Terry & Smith, 2015) and other challenges. It is within this complex environment that this thesis seeks to understand how stakeholder networks influence proposals for cruise infrastructure development. Those networks can be either formal or informal (Aaltonen & Kujala, 2010; Krackhardt & Hanson, 1993; Serrat, 2017), but in each case invariably involve many stakeholders representing a wide spectrum of diverse interests (Lau, et al., 2014). The number of stakeholders and interests involved makes the analysis of power in this context difficult. Accordingly, one of the first exercises in this study was to construct a framework to provide a structured approach for analysing the exercise of power among stakeholders involved in cruise infrastructure development. This framework examined the principal elements which should be taken into account by key stakeholders faced with managing investment in cruise infrastructure (re)development. By analysing these elements separately (i.e., the type of port; the affected stakeholders; the destination’s stage of development; the port’s characteristics; and a determination of whether it is a cruise line or the destination that initiates a proposal for (re)development), key stakeholders should be able to determine how power is exercised or received, taking into account that power is not uni-dimensional, but instead, is influenced by a variety of factors and interests.

Applying these elements to this study, Auckland can be characterised as a significant, mature turnaround/hybrid port which needs to expand its cruise ship capacity to support the growth of cruise tourism in New Zealand. The port is owned by the local council. Since approximately 2008, several proposals for expansion of the port’s cruise wharves have been advanced by key stakeholders in local government, but each proposal has been met with debate, exposing a high level of political dysfunction in the decision-making process (see Chapter 4). Thus, this case study exposes the power contests which can occur between a council-owned port and its local government body owner in respect of proposals for the (re)development of cruise infrastructure. Table 7.1 summarises the
characteristics relevant to Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development, based on the framework developed in Chapter 2:

Table 7.1: Framework elements - Auckland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework element</th>
<th>Auckland’s characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of port</td>
<td>Turnaround/hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholders</td>
<td>Key stakeholders include a wide range of public and private sector individuals and organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage of development</td>
<td>Mature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port characteristics</td>
<td>• Commercial port, with two dedicated cruise wharves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Owned by local council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Independent board of directors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin of proposals</td>
<td>The destination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As revealed in Chapter 4, Auckland’s power contests take place in an informal network comprised of key stakeholders involved in or with an interest in Auckland’s cruise infrastructure (re)development. The media discourse analysis undertaken as part of this research identified five over-arching and 22 main themes, revealing how the media, a key stakeholder within the network, exercised its power to shape the debate surrounding proposals for Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development. According to the thematic analysis undertaken in this study, most of the media’s attention (i.e. the manifestation of its power in reporting), was focused on the Shed 10/Queens Wharf debate, exposing controversies over the wharf’s ownership and access as well as tensions among Auckland Council’s leadership, and the Council and Central Government. POAL’s unwelcome exercise of power and lack of accountability and transparency emerged as significant sub-themes. These sentiments were further reinforced by the overwhelming number (106 negative, 1 positive) of sub-themes which revealed the perceptions of negativity underpinning how the Council and POAL engaged with the community.

It was this contestable political environment which was tested in the empirical research undertaken in this study and reported in Chapters 5 and 6. More specifically, the research undertaken in Chapter 5 sought to assess how key stakeholders involved in Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development networks perceive the impact of power within the
network and on their ability to access information. It also sought to ascertain what impact that exercise of power had on the degree of cohesion within the stakeholder network. Responses to questions related to these aims provided empirical evidence which implicitly confirms the legitimacy of the framework developed in Chapter 2. In other words, analysing the exercise and receipt of power among stakeholders who form a stakeholder network can validly and productively be undertaken by examining this exercise of power in the context of the framework elements, enumerated in column 1 of Table 7.1, above. Respondents unanimously recognised the value of cruise tourism to Auckland, a popular and critical turnaround port. However, they were highly critical of the asymmetric power exercised by Council-owned POAL, an observation which extended to a palpable feeling of a lack of trust (particularly by respondents representing the wider community) in that organisation. Community respondents expressed the view that the asymmetric power exercised by key stakeholders responsible for decision-making manifested as disregard for the community and its interests and objectives. Also, there was significant criticism of Central Government’s attempt to use its power to impose a cruise infrastructure solution on Auckland, as well as the unilateral power exercised by various elected and appointed public sector officials to advance their particular proposals or ideas.

Thus, respondents’ observations of the exercise of power in the decision-making process relating to Auckland’s proposals for cruise infrastructure development confirmed the analysis undertaken in Chapter 4, that the control (power) over the decision-making process and information is asymmetric within Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development stakeholder network, leading to a lack of cohesion within that network. On a conceptual level, the characteristics articulated by respondents describe a policy issue network (see Chapter 5). The importance of this finding to key stakeholders is indisputable. In everyday terms, “build it and they will come” is an increasingly undesirable position. Informal networks of stakeholders simply uniting around an issue or a desire for change will exacerbate characteristics such as disputed leadership (Li, Ng, & Skitmore, 2012; Lienert, et al., 2013; Notteboom & Winkelmans, 2002; Ravensteijn, et al., 2014), a degradation of trust (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2012); and the inability to work towards a common purpose (Prell, et al., 2009; Lienert, et al., 2013; Ravensteijn, et al., 2014). Each of these emerged in the observations of respondents reported in Chapter 5,
leading to a fragmented network (see, e.g., Boholm, 2008; Lienert, et al., 2013). Also present in such situations is the potential for risk that can damage or even threaten development of large public infrastructure such as cruise infrastructure (see, e.g., Beach, Keast, & Pickernell, 2012; Chung, Hensher, & Rose, 2010; Lienert, et al., 2013). This potential is discussed in section 7.2.3.

The research undertaken in this thesis has prompted the development of a novel, conceptual framework for analysing power and control over resources within stakeholder networks established to advance proposals for cruise infrastructure development. Figure 4 in Chapter 5 incorporates the elements for analysing power discussed in Chapter 2, including the formation of stakeholder networks to advance such proposals. It then shows the different effects which the two types of stakeholder networks discussed in Chapter 5, i.e., cohesive (formal), policy networks and fragmented (informal), policy issue networks can have on potential risk exposure for cruise infrastructure development. It is clear from this conceptual framework that it is incumbent on key stakeholders to adopt effective governance mechanisms to ensure that proposals are based on stakeholder consensus.

### 7.2.3 Fragmentation, risk and stakeholder networks

This thesis recognises the conceptual difficulties in defining risk (see, e.g., Aven & Renn, 2009; Fischhoff, Watson, & Hope, 1984; Ward & Chapman, 2003). Accordingly, it subscribes to the notion that risk is in fact easier to identify than to define (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002). In the context of construction, or in this case, cruise infrastructure construction or (re)development, two categories of risks were identified. Construction-specific risks include revenue, financial, time, design and expertise related risks (Abdou, 1996; Akintoye, 1997; Borkowski, 2015; Ng & Loosemore, 2007) while general risks can arise from any uncertainty (Ng & Loosemore, 2007). These risks are likely to be exacerbated in relation to cruise infrastructure development projects given their inherent complexity, characterised by the demands of the public-private sector model and the involvement of an unusually high number of stakeholders over a protracted period of time (Beach, et al., 2012; Grimsey & Lewis, 2002; Lau, et al., 2014; McCarthy & Romein, 2012; Newcombe, 2003). For example, the cohort of key stakeholders is likely to change over a period of years (see, e.g., Floricel & Miller, 2001) generating a lack of continuity while other key stakeholders may be geographically remote (Hustedde, 2014). Changes
in government or legislation over the prolonged duration of the project can also lead to risks which damage or threaten the project (Steenhuisen, Dicke, & Bruijn, 2009).

As discussed in Chapter 6 and acknowledged in section 7.2.2, the potential for risk in infrastructure development projects can be heightened where stakeholder networks lack effective governance mechanisms and therefore become fragmented. Fragmentation (i.e., a lack of cohesion), which is a characteristic of policy issue networks (see, e.g., Daugbjerg, 1997; Thatcher, 1998), can damage or even threaten infrastructure development projects. Moreover, the potential for risk can be even greater where there is both horizontal and vertical fragmentation (Lienert, et al., 2013). The empirical evidence reported in Chapter 6 demonstrates that both exist in this study. A legacy culture of hierarchical, silo-like bureaucracy (see, e.g., Börzel, 1998) foreclosed effective communication among stakeholders with respect to Auckland’s waterfront development (including the series of proposals for cruise infrastructure development), thereby creating an environment of distrust and dysfunction among key stakeholders within Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development stakeholder network. This transformation resulted in weaknesses in the decision-making process, uncertainty as to which stakeholders hold power and a titanic struggle between competing interests. Political expediency and a dysfunctional planning environment were also mentioned, representing further indicators of horizontal fragmentation. Vertical fragmentation was demonstrated by the lack of leadership within the local government body, and the unwelcome assertions of power from Central Government. Permitting this environment to persist can result in a fragmented network, leading to a host of risks which can prove to be damaging for both the stakeholders and the project, or indeed, threaten the project itself (see, e.g., Beach, et al., 2012; Dooms, Verbeke & Haezendonck, 2013; Flyvberg, 2009; Johansson, 2015).

It was clear from respondents’ comments during the research conducted in this study that there is a belief that the fragmentation of Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development stakeholder network could lead to a broad range of risks, thereby posing a severe economic threat to Auckland’s role as New Zealand’s principal turnaround port. On a conceptual level, this finding provides empirically informed insights into the potentially destructive effects of a fragmented network. Conversely, it demonstrates how risk can be
mitigated if effective governance mechanisms are put into place which can engender cooperation within the stakeholder network.

Table 7.2 presents the key findings of this research with respect to these issues while Table 7.3 describes the implications of these findings and offers suggestions for their resolution or management.

Table 7.2: Key findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Key findings</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Power and stakeholder interrelationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Media discourse: the media’s role in shaping proposals for cruise infrastructure development</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Media discourse analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Power, conflict and network cohesion</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Network fragmentation and risk</td>
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## Table 7.3: Implications

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Implications of key findings</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| 2 Power and stakeholder interrelationships | An understanding of the dynamics of stakeholder interrelationships and stakeholders’ exercise of power is crucial for key stakeholders and planners, including port owners who are faced with decisions regarding their short-, medium- and long-term planning with respect to cruise infrastructure development. This understanding can serve to inform decision-making where, for example, ports are faced with:  
  - diverting resources away from their commercial shipping activities and need to understand the cruise lines’ expectations and choices;  
  - making an appropriate level of investment in cruise infrastructure based on an analysis using the framework found in Chapter 2;  
  - evaluating the potential for risk, taking into account the framework found in Chapter 2, enabling the decision-makers to quantify the possible choices which can be made; and  
  - negotiating with and understanding a de-territorialised industry such as the cruise industry which is likely to be based off-shore |
| 4 Media discourse: the media’s role in influencing proposals for cruise infrastructure development | Acknowledgement of the finding that the media can play a significant part in influencing proposals for cruise infrastructure development can ensure that decision-makers and other key stakeholders forge amicable relationships with the press.  
This research found that the media’s active role (as a stakeholder within the cruise infrastructure development network) can be sustained over a period of time, and not just related to reporting specific, isolated issues stemming from the infrastructure development project. As such, media reporting can have a significant impact on how cruise infrastructure development is perceived by the decision-makers and the wider community, providing support in some cases and fuelling debate in others. |
| 4 Media discourse analysis | Media discourse analysis can be a useful tool for policy-makers, decision-makers and other key stakeholders involved in large-scale public infrastructure projects which take place over an extended timeframe and involve numerous competing interests. Media discourse analysis can help them:  
  - frame their positions with respect to the decision-making process and their engagement with the community, through their official communications channels and the media; and  
  - produce a rich narrative of the issues and events associated with and arising out such infrastructure development projects, enabling those actors to attain a deep understanding of those events and issues and also, to triangulate the detail provided with other information sources |
| 5 Power, conflict and network cohesion | Key stakeholders not only need to (a) understand and recognise the procedural differences in the decision-making process resulting from the shift from the traditional, bureaucratic approach to government to the network governance approach, but also (b) acquire a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics of the interrelationships among stakeholder network members to be able to:

- confront and manage competing interests;
- ensure that relevant information is shared and not dominated by powerful stakeholders;
- ensure that all information and its communication is transparent; and
- promote positive engagement with the community |

| 6 Network fragmentation and risk | Understanding the type of stakeholder network which has formed will help key stakeholders develop and implement strategies to secure cooperation, or cohesion, within these networks, particularly in the case of large and widely dispersed cruise infrastructure development stakeholder networks. Policy networks tend to be stable and cohesive, where stakeholders exchange resources (including information) on an equal basis despite the potential existence of one or more powerful stakeholders. However, effective governance mechanisms can increase stability (cohesion) into policy issue networks by:

- mitigating against network fragmentation;
- resolving the imbalance of power; and
- ensuring equal access to resources, including information

Effective governance mechanisms need to be based on intangible factors such as leadership, the identification of a common purpose, trust and mutual dependency. |

|  | Key stakeholders need to implement adequate governance mechanisms to ensure that stakeholders cooperate to identify and mitigate risk. Underpinning these mechanisms must be an understanding and effective management of:

- the underlying technical, economic, organisational and political culture of the stakeholder network, including any remnants of an entrenched bureaucratic culture; and
- the competing interests which may be present |
7.3 Contributions of this research

As previously noted in section 1.8, the cruise tourism sector continues to be under-researched despite its continuing exceptional growth (see, e.g., (Papathanassis & Beckmann, 2011; Papathanassis, 2017; Sun, Jiao, & Tian, 2011). Existing research in the context of cruise infrastructure development predominantly focuses on topics such as the impacts of cruise infrastructure on communities and the environment (Hritz & Cecil, 2008; Stewart, Dawson, & Johnston, 2015; Terry & Smith, 2015) and stakeholder and community responses to cruise infrastructure development (Dredge, 2010; Schmallegger & Carson, 2010). There are also several studies which address the process of selecting new cruise ports of call and establishing the locations of new cruise terminals (see, e.g., Lau, et al., Ma, Fan & Zhang, 2015; 2014; Wang, et al., 2014), but only a few which address the specific issues of cruise port economics and governance, topics which are discussed in terms of existing cruise infrastructure (see, e.g., Di Vaio & Romana Medda, 2010; Gui & Russo, 2011; Wang, et al., 2014).

The research presented in this thesis extends these topics. It presents conceptual-theoretical, methodological and applied research which focuses on the stakeholder networks which are involved in influencing proposals for the cruise infrastructure development projects alluded to in the previous paragraph. By doing so, this thesis makes important, new contributions to the field of cruise tourism research. Table 7.4 sets out the novel contributions of this research.
Table 7.4: Novel contributions of this research

<table>
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<th>Type of contribution</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
<th>Chapter</th>
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| Theoretical/conceptual| As highlighted in this thesis, the (re)development of cruise infrastructure is a complex exercise which requires decisions to be made on every aspect of infrastructure development. However, as argued by Lau, et al. (2014), cruise infrastructure development is particularly complex, in large part because of the number of stakeholders involved. These stakeholders are often geographically dispersed, and represent public and private sector interests which can be in conflict. Thus, this thesis contributes:  
  - a conceptual analysis of stakeholder interrelationships and the power stakeholders exercise in relation to cruise infrastructure development (Chapter 2):  
  - an analysis, based on empirical evidence, of how stakeholders perceive the exercise of power within the stakeholder networks formed to advance proposals for the development of cruise infrastructure (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6).  

These contributions are based on a novel framework for analysing the operation of power in the context of cruise infrastructure development. This framework provides key stakeholders and planners with a structure for analysing the exercise of power in relation to proposals for cruise infrastructure development. Thus, instead of treating the (re)development project as the singular focus of decision-making, the framework identifies the key elements which should be considered separately so as to be able to analyse and evaluate stakeholders’ exercise of power with respect to or in the context of each element.  

The research presented in Chapter 5 extends this framework by developing a conceptual framework for analysing power and control over resources (e.g. information) within policy issue networks established to advance proposals for cruise infrastructure development. Figure 4 in Chapter 5 clearly represents this conceptual framework.                                                                                      |         |
Methodological

Although thematic analysis has been used in other contexts to analyse the media discourse surrounding relevant issues in those disciplines (see, e.g., Baroutsis & Lingard, 2017 – education; McLennan, et al., 2014 – tourism and mining; Sengers, Raven & Van Venrooij, 2010 – energy) it has not been used in relation to the media discourse surrounding the (re)development of cruise infrastructure. This thesis describes a novel approach utilising thematic, or more precisely, media discourse analysis to enable key stakeholders to identify and construct a nuanced assessment of the key issues which face stakeholders in relation to cruise infrastructure (re)development.

Also novel in this thesis is the use of media discourse analysis to construct a rich case study detailing the complex environment in which proposals for cruise infrastructure development are promoted. This approach allows the researcher to construct a cohesive narrative which incorporates texture and critical insight into intricate and politically fraught sequences of events (in this study, the various proposals promoted between 2008 and 2016 for Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development). Media discourse analysis will prove to be invaluable to researchers who are investigating the political context in which significant decisions are being made. This approach can assist the researcher to reconstruct a cohesive narrative from sources such as a collection of media articles which report on the phenomenon being researched. It proved to be a particularly useful tool in this study where a succession of proposals for cruise infrastructure development were entertained over an extended timeframe.

| Applied | As is evident from this thesis, there appears to be a lack of prior studies which identify and describe the types of stakeholder networks surrounding proposals for cruise infrastructure development. | Chapter 5 |
| Previous studies have demonstrated the exercise of asymmetric power among stakeholders in informal stakeholder networks. In contrast, this thesis makes an original contribution by analysing empirically informed insights into how stakeholders perceive the exercise of power, including asymmetric power, in informal stakeholder networks formed to promote proposals for cruise infrastructure development. Moreover, this study examines this exercise of power in an environment which is characterised by a shift from traditional, bureaucratic government to a broader, network approach. |

This thesis presents empirically informed insights into the potential for risk where cruise infrastructure development networks are fragmented. Furthermore, while there is a substantial body of literature on the risks which can accrue to major infrastructure development projects, there do not appear to be any studies which focus on and empirically identify the risks which stakeholders perceive can accrue to cruise infrastructure development. Thus, this thesis determines the causes of network fragmentation and the potential for risk as a result of that fragmentation, topics which have not been previously addressed in the context of proposals for cruise infrastructure development. | Chapter 6 |
7.4 Limitations of this research

There are limitations to this research which should be recognised. Firstly, this study is based on a single case study. The case study approach is considered to be a robust method for uncovering the detail relating to current phenomena and particularly to answer the explanatory “how” and “why” questions about that phenomena (Yin, 1994). A single case study approach was adopted for this research to explain how stakeholder networks influence proposals for cruise infrastructure development. It allowed for the detailed exploration of a series of themes which emerged from the media discourse analysis conducted in respect of Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development (Chapter 4). Thus, in this sense, the events described in this research can be considered to be limited to a localised series of episodes, and not replicable across other cases or necessarily capable of extracting general conclusions (Zainal, 2007). However, the evidence derived from these episodes allows for the evolution and application of theories which can assist other researchers to explore how stakeholder networks shape proposals for cruise, or other large infrastructure, development. These theories relate to (1) stakeholder interrelationships; (2) the exercise of power within stakeholder networks; (3) the characteristics and types of stakeholder networks which form in this context; and (4) risk, each of which is crucial for determining the role and influence of stakeholder networks in this context. This analysis can also prove to be particularly useful in studies which seek to examine phenomena in highly contested political environments where there has been a shift from the traditional forms of bureaucratic government to a broader, network governance approach.

Secondly, a qualitative approach was purposely chosen for this research to allow for detailed probing of stakeholders’ perceptions with respect to the key issues such as power. This subjectively based approach is considered to be important in measuring power (Finkelstein, 1992; Pfeffer, 1996; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974; Smith, Halgin, Kidwell-Lopez, Labianca, Brass, Borgatti, 2014). However, it does not offer precision as to identification of all the central and peripheral actors who are part of the network or their quantifiable status or power within the network (Scott, 2017).
Also, this research is based on an informal stakeholder network, *i.e.*, an unstructured and unregulated cohort of stakeholders whose common interest is the promotion of proposals for Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development, and not, for example, on a formal stakeholder network purposely established to promote proposals for cruise infrastructure development.

With respect to the respondents themselves, while saturation appeared to be achieved during the semi-structured interviews, eleven individuals declined to participate in the study. While it is unlikely that these individuals would have been able to contribute a substantial amount of additional information, it should be borne in mind that all views are not necessarily represented. Also, it is worth mentioning that the cruise line respondent interviewed in this study represents a cruise line which is eager to work with and is supportive of the destination. Several respondents mentioned another cruise line which appears to be more difficult to deal with during negotiations. Thus, the inclusion of respondents from other cruise lines may produce different perceptions on how the cruise lines perceive their role, and accordingly, how they are perceived to exercise power within the network.

Lastly, it should be noted that this research is limited to the proposal stage of cruise infrastructure development.

### 7.5 Suggestions for future research

Although a qualitative approach was purposely taken in this study to ascertain stakeholders’ subjective perceptions of power, consideration should be given to undertaking further research which adopts a quantitative, or SNA, approach. SNA would assist in overcoming some of the limitations discussed in Section 7.4. It would provide more precision in identifying the actors who comprise a stakeholder network and allow the researcher to quantify power and provide a means for triangulating the qualitative approach taken in this research. Furthermore, it would also address the stated limitation of a single case study, *i.e.*, the difficulties in generalising conclusions from a single case, by providing another method to allow for triangulation of the results (Zainal, 2007). SNA can be used to reinforce the perceptions of the respondents included in this study.
Also as discussed in Section 7.4, this research was focused on the proposal stage of cruise infrastructure (re)development in a mature but rapidly growing cruise destination which easily attracts new ships and new cruise lines. In this respect, underlying the debate surrounding Auckland’s cruise infrastructure (re)development may be a tinge of complacency. Further research should be conducted in destinations representing other stages of the cruise destination lifecycle (see Chapter 2, Section 3.3). Therefore, consideration should be given to undertaking a similar study in a new destination as well as, perhaps, a less popular or declining destination (see, e.g., Brida, Chiappa, Meleddu, & Pulina, 2014). Also, destinations in different regions should be considered, as well as destinations whose ports operate or are owned under models different from that which exists in Auckland (i.e. public sector ownership by a wholly owned Council entity). For example, results could be compared with cruise destinations where the cruise infrastructure is either wholly or substantially owned by the cruise lines.

Another possible extension to this research would be to conduct (and extend) this research over a longitudinal period, given the protracted time period which is usually associated with large public infrastructure development projects such as cruise infrastructure. For example, surveys could be administered to coincide with local government election cycles or during a cycle in which changes in the cohort of stakeholders or the economic climate are likely to occur.

As noted above, this research considers the proposal stage of cruise infrastructure development. Future research should consider extending the concepts presented in this research to the specific issues which comprise all phases of cruise infrastructure development. For example, during the media discourse analysis which is described in Chapter 4, considerable attention was paid in the media to the abandoned contest for the design of a new cruise terminal. The contest was abandoned for political reasons, triggered by deep-seated tensions between Central and local government. This episode highlighted how a failure to subordinate political interests to the potential economic and social benefits for the city can jeopardise large infrastructure projects such as cruise infrastructure. It demonstrated how individual interests can prevail if there is a lack of appropriate governance mechanisms. Future research is necessary to ascertain governance mechanisms which can be implemented by stakeholder networks, and
especially informal policy issue networks such as those described in this study, to manage competing interests and mitigate the impact of purely politically-motivated decisions.

Mature, new and potential cruise destinations need to be able to evaluate whether and to what extent investment in new or redeveloped cruise infrastructure can provide economic benefits for their communities or whether the risks associated with that infrastructure will outweigh any potential benefit. Studies exist which identify the risks which can threaten a destination’s cruise tourism sector, generally. There are also studies which identify the risks which can attach to large public infrastructure development projects including cruise infrastructure. However, no studies appear to exist which link the prudence of investing in cruise infrastructure (or the level of prudent investment) to the risks which can accrue to the destination’s cruise sector if the appropriate levels of investment are not made in infrastructure. This study produced a list of risks which respondents believed could affect Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development as a result of political indecision and dysfunction. However, while many studies forecast the future growth of cruise tourism, there needs to be a detailed, a scenario planning approach could be taken to identify the potential risks to and their impact on that growth. Potential risks could affect the level of investment in new or redeveloped cruise infrastructure. For example, climate experts can provide information on weather changes which could ultimately impact itineraries. In other words, rising sea levels are already threatening some popular and even growing cruise destinations, making their infrastructure redundant.

A lack of appreciation of the potential economic benefit can also often be traced to the port’s lack of understanding about the crucial role which turnaround ports such as Auckland play in cruise itineraries. Auckland is a two-day sail from the next nearest turnaround port. It is also the closest turnaround port to many of the South Pacific Islands, popular with New Zealand, Australian and overseas cruise passengers. Auckland’s ability, and willingness, to provide cruise infrastructure which can accommodate mega cruise ships, as well as small- to medium-sized cruise ships, will be determinative of its ability to continue to grow not only as one of Australasia’s turnaround ports, but also as a marquee port for the South Pacific and the growing Southeast Asia market. Therefore, research into Auckland’s cruise infrastructure development network should be expanded to embrace stakeholders who have an interest in expanding Auckland’s capacity as a marquee port. This research could prove to be invaluable as other established turnaround
ports such as Sydney (Australia) face increasing capacity problems in respect of their cruise infrastructure and navigational access (e.g., low bridges and shallow navigation channels),

There also needs to be a clear understanding of the strategic role of turnaround ports such as Auckland. For example, all ports in New Zealand are dependent on Auckland for providing turnaround services (e.g., immigration, passenger check-in and access to air connections), yet, there is no national cruise strategy or policy in New Zealand and therefore no consideration of the potential for and mitigation of risk on a national level. Studies have been taken in other regions which address the issue of cruise port regionalisation (see, e.g., Gui & Russo, 2011) and others which describe a high level of cooperation among regional ports (see, e.g., Lemmetyinen, 2009), but no such attempts or indeed studies have been undertaken in Australasia to ascertain the relative position and role of ports (such as Auckland) with respect to other ports.

A significant issue which is increasingly confronting port owners, and which was a major albeit implicit factor in this research, is the port owner’s attitude towards cruise shipping. In this study, POAL maintained that it could not release space on its cargo wharves for cruise shipping because of its need to park imported cars and handle containers and other cargo. Underpinning this view is an apparent lack of understanding about the economic benefits which cruise shipping can generate. The singular opinion of POAL in this study was counteracted by other respondents who recognised the greater values of hosting cruise ships. This debate is not limited to Auckland. Proposals for cruise infrastructure in other cities often reveal the tensions between key stakeholders in respect of the use of port facilities. As this study found, these tensions can be traced to a lack of understanding about cruise shipping. For example, accommodating cruise ships in a turnaround port such as Auckland can yield significant economic benefits for the wider business community. Ports are in a particular advantageous position to work with the business community to source and facilitate the delivery of goods and services to visiting cruise ships. This provisioning can include a wide range of products and services ranging from fresh local foods to office supplies to routine ship repairs and maintenance. The creation of cohesive stakeholder networks, which include representatives from the wider business community, can yield significant benefits for local businesses. Mechanisms need to be understood and put into place for maximising the potential economic benefits of
visiting cruise ships, especially in strategically positioned turnaround ports such as Auckland which is, as noted above, a two-day sail from the next nearest turnaround port able to provision visiting ships (i.e. Sydney). Some research has been undertaken with respect to provisioning supply chains (see, e.g., Véronneau & Roy, 2009) and to estimating the gross value of a ship’s direct spend to a destination (see, e.g., Dwyer & Forsyth, 1996), but no studies have been undertaken which identify and quantify the economic benefits which can accrue to the wider business community. More precisely, further research could map the network of businesses which can supply to the cruise ships, identifying clusters of businesses for the supply of goods and services. Emphasising local supply offers potentially substantial benefits for destinations such as New Zealand where there is evidence that the cruise lines are relying less on air-freighting provisions from their central, offshore warehouses. Instead, they are increasingly sourcing goods such as fresh meat and vegetables locally as passenger tastes become more demanding and the increase in cruise traffic makes it more cost efficient to do so. Any such research needs to recognise that the relevant stakeholders in destinations need to work together to maximise opportunities for local businesses, recognising that cruise tourism is not just about cruise passenger and crew spend, but also about potentially significant spend by the ship itself.

Ports often fail to understand or ignore the strategic economic and financial role of cruise shipping within their own portfolios of services until they are forced to consider other revenue streams. This scenario is currently playing out at Port Taranaki, 365 kilometres south of Auckland. Port Taranaki is the only navigable, deep water port on New Zealand’s west coast. Until recently, it has experienced exceptional revenue growth through its oil, gas, logging and container cargo business. However, each of these sectors has experienced a downturn, both in terms of a weakening in the sectors themselves and the competition from other ports in New Zealand. Thus, Port Taranaki is now investigating the potential for hosting cruise ships on a regular basis, as an additional revenue stream. The addition of cruise shipping has economic potential for the greater Taranaki region in which Port Taranaki is located. However, as with all ports considering cruise tourism for the first time, realising the benefits that cruise tourism can yield, and indeed, the risks which can accrue, will require the cooperation of and meaningful engagement with a wide range of stakeholders who have little or no experience in or understanding of cruise tourism. While it is within most ports’ capabilities to construct a passenger-ready
gangway to allow passengers to disembark from their cruise ships and erect a marquee for protection against the elements, more needs to be done to ensure a sustainable and financially viable cruise sector. Therefore, research should be undertaken which not only identifies the relevant stakeholder network in those destinations but which also addresses what is required to create a port environment which is attractive for passengers, realistic in terms of attracting ships and sustainable in terms of investment. In this very important context, ports and port owners need to suppress their competing interests and be willing to share information and other resources.

Another key issue in this study was the tension between the community and the Council over the usage of scarce and desirable waterfront spaces. This is perhaps one of the most persistent and controversial issues for cities contemplating the construction of cruise infrastructure. Many studies have considered this issue by focusing on the desirability of or repugnance directed at such development (see, e.g., McCarthy & Romein, 2012; Terry & Smith, 2015). However, none appear to have analysed the proactive role of stakeholder networks in identifying, promoting and putting into place the appropriate mechanisms for realising the economic benefits and considering the risks which can accrue from cruise infrastructure development. While this observation presupposes a shift from traditional, bureaucratic government to the broader, network governance approach, it is a shift which many cities are experiencing. Moreover, communities, such as Auckland, are becoming increasingly aware and protective of their waterfront assets. The identification of actors who can participate in a proactive and cohesive stakeholder network is a fundamental exercise, particularly in cities which lack cruise tourism management resources. Thus, further studies should consider using SNA to identify the key stakeholders, determine the potential linkages between them and other stakeholders within the network and map the information flows among the actors. SNA can also facilitate identification of the stakeholders who are likely to have the most influence in shaping proposals for future cruise infrastructure development.

Thus, there is tremendous scope for undertaking further research on the intervention of stakeholder networks in the context of cruise infrastructure development.
7.6 Postscript

The data for this research was collected between April and August 2015. Several events have occurred since then which are relevant to this research:

- **Ovation of the Seas** continues to make port calls to Auckland but has been obliged to moor in Auckland Harbour because of the lack of progress on Auckland’s cruise infrastructure (re)development. These visits are full-day port calls and not turnaround port calls, thereby obviating the need for terminal facilities to process embarking and disembarking passengers and crew and their luggage. However, the tendering exercise is complex and takes time.

- The Port Futures Study delivered its report to the Auckland Council in July 2016. It includes three short-listed options. Option 1 involves limiting Auckland’s port to its current precinct. Option 2 involves allowing the port to grow in its current location. Option 3 involves moving the port to a new location within the Auckland region (Port Futures Study, 2016). However, the report recommends that the cruise infrastructure should be “retained and improved in Auckland’s city centre” (Port Futures Study, 2016, p. 5).

- In late August 2017, POAL announced that it would no longer seek to reclaim any land from the harbour (Orsman, 2017).

- Queens and Princes Wharves continue to be used to accommodate cruise ships.

- On 23 November 2017, Auckland Council announced that two mooring dolphins will be constructed 80 metres from the end of Queens Wharf, allowing for the berthing of mega ships such as **Ovation of the Seas** and **Queen Mary 2**.

- Also on 23 November 2017, New Zealand Cruise Association (formerly Cruise New Zealand) Chief Executive Officer, Kevin O’Sullivan, says that because of the decision to build the mooring dolphins, Auckland is well-positioned to become a major cruise hub for the South Pacific.
• On 27 November 2017, it was confirmed that the mooring dolphins would be attached to Queens Wharf with an 85 metre walkway (for wharf workers) instead of being unobtrusively free-standing, thereby effectively extending Queens Wharf into the harbour and generating criticism that Council approved a wharf extension instead of genuine dolphins.
8 REFERENCES
8 References

Included in this list of references are the references for Chapters 1 (Introduction), 3 (Background) and 7 (Conclusion). The references for Chapters 2 and 4-6 can be found in those chapters, respectively.


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APPENDICES

A   Ethics approval
B   Information sheet
C   Consent form
D   Semi-structured interview questions – Auckland
E   Semi-structured interview questions – Wellington
Appendix A: Ethics approval

Please note that this communication was received as an unformatted .TXT document and has been formatted to include in this thesis.

GRiffith University human research ethics committee
30-Jun-2014

Dear Mrs London,

I write further to the additional information provided in relation to the provisional approval granted to your application for ethical clearance for your project "NR: Cruise infrastructure development: proposals, politics and power" (GU Ref No: BPS/04/14/HREC).

The additional information was considered by Office for Research.

This is to confirm that this response has largely addressed the comments and concerns of the HREC.

This decision is subject to:

Please provide signatures for sections F1A and F2 of the expedited ethical review checklist. Please scan the signed form and return to the Office for Research as an email attachment.

However, you are authorised to immediately commence this research on the strict understanding that these matters are addressed and that you provide details of how they were addressed.

Please note that failure to provide a timely response to these matters may result in this authorisation being suspended or withdrawn. The standard conditions of approval attached to our previous correspondence about this protocol continue to apply.

It would be appreciated if you could give your urgent attention to the issues raised by the Committee so that we can finalise the ethical clearance for your protocol promptly.

Regards

Dr Kristie Westerlaken
Policy Officer
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Bray Centre, Nathan Campus
Griffith University
ph: +61 (0)7 373 58043
fax: +61 (07) 373 57994
email: k.westerlaken@griffith.edu.au
Researchers are reminded that the Griffith University Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research provides guidance to researchers in areas such as conflict of interest, authorship, storage of data, & the training of research students. You can find further information, resources and a link to the University's Code by visiting http://policies.griffith.edu.au/pdf/Code%20for%20the%20Responsible%20Conduct%20of%20Research.pdf

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This email and any files transmitted with it are intended solely for the use of the addressee(s) and may contain information which is confidential or privileged. If you receive this email and you are not the addressee(s) [or responsible for delivery of the email to the addressee(s)], please disregard the contents of the email, delete the email and notify the author immediately.
Appendix B: Information sheet for invited respondents

Information sheet

PhD Topic: Cruise infrastructure development: a social network approach

Contact:  
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Griffith Institute for Tourism  
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Email: wendy.london@griffithuni.edu.au

Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed as part of my PhD research.

About my research  
The aim of my research is to examine the interaction of stakeholders who are part of a social network which forms (either formally or informally) in a destination in respect of cruise infrastructure development. This exercise is expected to achieve two objectives:

• Foster a better understanding of who is involved in cruise infrastructure development, what relationships have been formed as a result of that involvement and where decision-making power lies; and

• Provide insights into how strategic opportunities for cruise infrastructure development are recognised and how they can be exploited. It will also highlight any actual or potential risks and suggest strategies for their management.

This analysis is important because it is also expected to have value for managing the process of planning for infrastructure development across a wide range of sectors.

In this particular research, cruise infrastructure development will have both a day-to-day and strategic impact within a destination. For example, the port, local residents and the business community will be affected by the presence of cruise ships and passengers during port days whilst the development of new cruise infrastructure will have an impact on the community and greater region during planning and construction and as part of the region’s longer-term economic development planning. I have chosen Auckland because of its role as New Zealand’s principal turnaround port and the need to expand its cruise infrastructure.

The interview  
As per my original email, I would welcome the opportunity to spend about an hour with you to elicit your views and any information you can provide to support my research. I am more than happy to interview you at a time and location convenient to you, or by Skype or telephone.

Our discussion will be based on questions posed by me, and if acceptable to you, I will tape our conversation. As soon as possible following our meeting, I will send you a one-page summary of our conversation, comprised of my interpretation of the key messages. I will then be more than happy to make any changes you require to the summary as long as I receive those changes
within two weeks following your receipt of that document. You can also ask to withdraw any or all of your comments within that two week period. Once I have analysed the information from all the interviews I will conduct as part of my research; I will forward to you your feedback in the form of a written summary of my key findings. Those findings will form part of my thesis and are also likely to be published in the form of conference proceedings, academic journals and books and industry publications.

**Privacy and confidentiality**
All of your source information (in any form) will be securely retained by me in password protected files (digital data) or in a locked file cabinet (hard copy data) until I have submitted my thesis. Thereafter, the university will retain the information for a period of five years and then will be destroyed by them.

Given the nature and scope of the research, interviewees are likely to be identifiable. However, if you do not wish your name to be included in my research, I can either use just your title or role or a pseudonym. If you do not wish to be identifiable at all, I will try to disguise your identity.

**Consent**
If the information above is acceptable to you, may I please ask you to sign the accompanying consent form and return a copy to me (by email, or hard copy to Wendy R London, 16 Hunter Street, Hawera 4610, New Zealand), keeping a copy for yourself.

**Compliance**
Please note that this research complies with all requirements of both Australian and New Zealand privacy laws and regulations and has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee at Griffith University. The approval number is BPS/04/14/HREC. If you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of this research or the researcher, please contact

Manager - Research Ethics
Griffith University Human Research Ethics Committee
Phone: +61-7 3735 4375 | Email: research-ethics@griffith.edu.au

All information is confidential and will be handled as soon as possible.

**Contact details**

Please find following my contact details and those of my Supervisors. Please feel free to contact us at any time:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Researcher (PhD Student)</th>
<th>Principal Supervisor</th>
<th>Co-Supervisor</th>
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<td>Dr Matthew Burke</td>
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<td>Skype: bdmoyle</td>
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<td>Skype: wlondon</td>
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Following below is a short “About me” so that you have some idea of my background and keen interest in the cruise tourism sector.

Thank you in advance, and I look forward to hearing from you.
Kindest regards

Wendy R London, PhD Candidate

Griffith Institute for Tourism
Griffith University – Nathan

About Wendy London
I am a tri-national (US/UK/NZ) who has lived in Hawera, New Zealand since 1994, having grown up in the United States and then lived in the Netherlands, England and Australia. In 2007, I decided to give up my career as an IT lawyer to follow my passion, cruising. In 2010, I completed a Masters at Otago University on economic risk in the New Zealand cruise sector, and am now pursuing a PhD (externally), at Griffith University. As a cruise passenger, my husband and I have enjoyed more than 500 days at sea on 28 cruises (and still counting) to every continent. I also do occasional free-lance writing and blogging about cruising for an international readership.
Appendix C  Consent form

Cruise infrastructure development: a social network approach
Consent form

Research team:

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My consent:

By signing below, I confirm that I have read and understood the letter of introduction/information sheet provided to me by the researcher and in particular have noted that:

- I understand that my involvement in this research will include an interview of approximately 30 to 60 minutes at a time and location convenient to me
- I agree to allow the interview to be audio-taped
- I understand that my participation is voluntary and I understand that I can withdraw my participation at any time
- I understand that any information provided by me will be reported anonymously unless otherwise explicitly authorised by me in writing
- I agree to make myself available for further comments if required
- I understand that the researcher will provide me with a one-page summary of key findings as soon as practicable after the interview
- I understand that all information gathered in this research will be kept confidentially and securely by the student researcher until her thesis is submitted and then by the university for a period of 5 years
- I understand that this research has been approved by the Griffith University Human Research Ethics Committee and that I can contact the Manager, Research Ethics, at Griffith University Human Research Ethics Committee on 3735 4375 (or research-ethics@griffith.edu.au) if I have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the project
- I understand that I have had any questions answered to my satisfaction, that I can contact the research team with any further questions and that full contact details have been provided to me
My signature below signifies my agreement to participate in the project:

Participant’s name: ___________________________ Date: _____________________

Participant’s signature: ______________________________________________________

Participant’s email address (for copy of key findings): ____________________________
Appendix D: Semi-structured interview questions – Auckland

My research broadly relates to who makes the decisions with respect to cruise infrastructure development, and how they are made, specifically by the networks which form to make those decisions. Auckland is my case study because of the developments which are occurring at this time. The questions which follow refer to the existing cruise facilities at Princes and Queens Wharves, and the discussions surrounding Bledisloe, Captain Cook and Marsden Wharves.

(1) Can you please briefly describe your involvement – either directly or indirectly - in the development of cruise infrastructure, port operations or development or cruise tourism in Auckland? For approximately how long have you been involved?

(2) Who do you think are the decision-makers with respect to the development of cruise infrastructure (and where relevant, more broadly, port infrastructure and wharves)?

(3) How are decisions made and what happens once those decisions are made?

(4) Who else is involved in this process – i.e.:

(a) are the cruise lines involved, and if so, what is the nature of their involvement?

(b) is Central Government involved, and if so, what is the nature of their involvement?

(5) Who do you think holds the power with respect to the decision-making process in Auckland?

(6) Who do you think holds the most power with respect to cruise infrastructure development?

(7) Who would you go to for (more) information and/or advice about cruise-specific infrastructure development issues?

(8) How is information about cruise infrastructure development shared and how are decisions communicated?

(9) Are there any formal governance structures in place with respect to cruise infrastructure development? If so, what are they? If not, do you think there should be? Do you think there should be an overarching body - either on the local or national level (such as Cruise New Zealand) – who has responsibility specifically for cruise infrastructure development?

(10) Do you think the current mechanisms for consultation is adequate process and/or do you think there should be a separate consultation process for cruise infrastructure?
(11)  Do you think there are any risks associated with the development of cruise infrastructure development and if so, do you have any ideas how they could be mitigated?

(12)  Is there anything else you would like to add?

**VOICE RECORDER TURNED OFF**

(13)  Can you think of any other people and organisations who have or might have an interest in cruise infrastructure development with whom I should meet?
Appendix E: Semi-structured interview questions – Wellington

My research broadly relates to who makes the decisions with respect to cruise infrastructure development, and how they are made, specifically by the networks which form to make those decisions. Auckland is my case study because of the developments which are occurring at this time. The questions which follow refer to the existing cruise facilities at Princes and Queens Wharves, and the discussions surrounding Bledisloe, Captain Cook and Marsden Wharves.

(1) Can you please briefly describe your involvement – either directly or indirectly - in the development of cruise infrastructure, port operations or development or cruise tourism in Auckland? For approximately how long have you been involved?

(2) Who do you think are the decision-makers with respect to the development of cruise infrastructure (and where relevant, more broadly, port infrastructure and wharves)?

(3) How are decisions made and what happens once those decisions are made?

(4) Who else is involved in this process – i.e.:

(a) are the cruise lines involved, and if so, what is the nature of their involvement?
(b) is Central Government involved, and if so, what is the nature of their involvement?

(5) Who do you think holds the power with respect to the decision-making process in Auckland?

(6) Who do you think holds the most power with respect to cruise infrastructure development?

(7) Who would you go to for (more) information and/or advice about cruise-specific infrastructure development issues?

(8) How is information about cruise infrastructure development shared and how are decisions communicated?

(9) Are there any formal governance structures in place with respect to cruise infrastructure development? If so, what are they? If not, do you think there should be? Do you think there should be an overarching body - either on the local or national level (such as Cruise New Zealand) – who has responsibility specifically for cruise infrastructure development?

(10) Do you think the current mechanisms for consultation is adequate process and/or do you think there should be a separate consultation process for cruise infrastructure?
(11) Do you think there are any risks associated with the development of cruise infrastructure development and if so, do you have any ideas how they could be mitigated?

(12) Is there anything else you would like to add?

**VOICE RECORDER TURNED OFF**

(13) Can you think of any other people and organisations who have or might have an interest in cruise infrastructure development with whom I should meet?