

From Commonwealth Responsibility to the National Interest: Australia and Post-War Decolonisation in Southeast Asia

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Abstract

This article re-examines the drivers of post-war Australian foreign policy in Southeast Asia. The central argument is that the motive of Commonwealth responsibility has not been given sufficient explanatory weight in interpreting Australia's post-war engagement with Southeast Asia under both Australian Labor Party (ALP) and Liberal-Country Party (Coalition) governments. The responsibility expressed by Australian policy makers for the decolonisation of the Straits Settlements, Malayan Peninsula, and British Borneo Territories cannot be adequately understood within a Cold War ideological framework of anti-communism. Nor can it be explained by the instrumental logic of forward defence. The concept of responsibility is theorised as a motivation in foreign policy analysis and applied to Australian involvement with British decolonisation in Southeast Asia between 1944 and 1971. The article finds that in its approach to decolonisation, Australia was driven as much by normative sentiments of responsibility to the Commonwealth as it was by instrumental calculations of Cold War strategic interest. This diminished with the end of Indonesia's 'Confrontation' of Malaysia in 1966 and subsequent British commitment to withdraw from East of Suez. Australia's policy discourse becomes more narrowly interest-based after this, especially evident in Australia's negotiations with Malaysia and Singapore over the FPDA from 1968-71.

Keywords: Australian foreign policy, decolonisation, Southeast Asia, Commonwealth of Nations

Introduction: Challenging Australia's Foreign Policy Traditions

The history of Australia's foreign and security policy has been interpreted through two main traditions. These traditions are closely identified with the progressive and conservative sides of Australia's domestic politics. The internationalist, 'middle power' tradition is associated with the centre-left Australian Labor Party (ALP), while the 'power and interest-based', 'great and powerful friends' tradition, is characteristic of conservative Liberal-Country Party (Coalition) governments.¹ Internationalism emphasises an outward-looking, activist foreign policy agenda, with cooperative policies grounded in 'Australia's identity as an *independent*, medium-sized power located *in* the Asia-Pacific region'.² It privileges multilateralism and

Australia being a 'good international citizen' through constructive participation in international organisations and a rules-based international order. By contrast, the conservative tradition focuses on bilateralism and alliance diplomacy with the United States as furthering Australia's national interests. The fear of abandonment and dependence commonly associated with the 'great and powerful friends' tradition has been the subject of sustained criticism since the Vietnam War era.³

The post-war ALP government of the prime minister Ben Chifley (1945-9) is credited with founding the internationalist tradition in Australian foreign policy.⁴ Internationalism is particularly associated with the role of the external affairs minister, Herbert Vere Evatt (1941-9) in the establishment of the United Nations (UN) in 1945. The origins of Australia's 'engagement' with Asia are also typically located in the Chifley government's support for Indonesian decolonisation, and Canberra's inclusion in the 1949 New Delhi Conference of Asian nations on the question of Indonesian independence.⁵ Most writers on the period agree that Evatt was instrumental in forging an active and independent Australian foreign policy, one that privileged Australia's national interests rather than those of the British Empire.⁶ The internationalist treatment of the history of Australia's foreign policy was developed during the Bob Hawke (1983-91) and Paul Keating (1991-6) periods of ALP government, along with the discourse of engagement with Asia.⁷

The foreign and defence policies of the Coalition government of Sir Robert Menzies (1949-66), Australia's longest-serving prime minister, are retrospectively seen through the prism of Cold War geopolitics as inexorably leading to Canberra's misguided involvement in the Vietnam War. In this view, the smaller states of Southeast Asia were simply used by Canberra as part of its 'forward defence' policy,

the purpose of which was to keep Britain and especially the United States directly involved in the region to contain Chinese communism. Australia's dependence meant that it adopted the strategic outlook and priorities of its great power allies, particularly the hegemonic United States (US), at the expense of forging genuine relationships with decolonising Asian states.⁸

In reflecting these two traditions, most studies of Australia's post-war foreign and security policies posit a sharp break between the Chifley and Menzies governments. Characteristic of this, David Lee writes that with 'the change of government in December 1949 came sweeping changes to Australian foreign policy'.¹² A fresh reading of the archival sources, reveals however, a major continuity between the two governments. Both governments repeatedly expressed a similar notion of 'responsibility' to the British Empire and Commonwealth in their regional policies toward Southeast Asia, suggesting less divergence than the literature maintains. As a part of this, Australia assumed significant responsibilities in the decolonisation and nation-building of former British dependencies, whether directly in a security sense as in Malaya, and later Malaysia, or with the provision of aid and technical assistance through the Colombo Plan.

This article re-examines conceptions of Australia's place in the world, and the nature and drivers of Australian foreign and security policy, in the aftermath of the Pacific War (1941-5) until the conclusion of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) (1971-present) between the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore. My central argument is that the motive of Commonwealth 'responsibility' has not been given sufficient explanatory weight in interpreting Australia's post-war engagement with Asia under both Labor and Coalition

governments from 1944 until the mid-1960s. Australia's assumption of greater Commonwealth responsibilities in the region, partly because of Britain's post-war resource constraints, led to a deep involvement in Southeast Asian decolonisation, which transcended narrow security interests. The responsibility felt by Australian political elites to assist in the orderly decolonisation of the Straits Settlements, Malayan Peninsula, and British Borneo Territories, cannot be adequately understood within a Cold War ideological framework of anti-communism. Nor can it be fully explained by the instrumental logic of forward defence. The evidence suggests that in its approach to Southeast Asian decolonisation, Australia was driven as much by normative sentiments of responsibility to the British Commonwealth as it was by instrumental calculations of Cold War strategic interest. The article takes a Weberian approach in considering motives as context-specific reasons or justifications for action, rather than efficient causes.¹³ I do not claim that Commonwealth responsibility was the sole motivation, but that it was a central consideration among a mix of factors for both ALP and Coalition governments.

This sense of Commonwealth responsibility began to decline in the 1960s, and markedly from 1966 with the advent of the Suharto regime in Indonesia and the ending of Sukarno's Confrontation policy against Malaysia, which concluded the British decolonisation process in Southeast Asia.¹⁴ The acceleration of Britain's withdrawal from East of Suez announced in January 1968, and the ongoing war in Vietnam ushered in a more narrowly interest-based regional outlook on the part of Australian policy makers. This was intensified with the Nixon administration's (1969-74) Guam doctrine that Washington's Asian allies would have to shoulder more of the burden of providing for their own security. This change of outlook is particularly

evident in the policy discourse of the Gorton Coalition government (1968-71) compared with its predecessors, and in negotiations for the FPDA that superseded Australia's association with the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreements (1957-71).

The article thus challenges the assumptions of Australia's foreign policy traditions in a number of ways. Conceptually, the internationalist tradition foregrounds a set of broadly liberal norms through which Australia's interests are pursued, while the 'great and powerful friends' tradition emphasises the pursuit of security interests that reflect the strategic concerns of Australia's great power allies, particularly the United States. The evidence presented in this article suggests that at least in Australian approaches to post-war decolonisation in Southeast Asia, the reverse was the case. For the Chifley ALP government, perceptions of security interests in Australia's 'near north' informed and structured its Commonwealth responsibilities. For the Menzies Coalition government, its British Commonwealth responsibilities sometimes took precedence over US conceptions of strategic interest in Southeast Asia until the mid-1960s.

Empirically, the article locates the origins of Australia's Commonwealth responsibilities, and consequently, its forward defence policy, in the late-1940s period of the internationalist Chifley ALP government. The stated principles of the ALP government's post-war foreign and security policy gave primacy to the UN and the collective security mechanism of the Security Council. This was to be supported under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter by British Commonwealth regional security arrangements in Australia's 'near north', in which Canberra would take a leading role.¹⁷ The Chifley government's post-war policies in Australia's region sought to prevent a resurgence of Japanese aggression or guard against any similar pattern of

invasion threat from Asia.¹⁸ The internationalist narrative of the history of Australia's foreign policy privileges the former of these principles. The evidence suggests that the latter should be given much greater emphasis.

The primary vehicle for maintaining security in Australia's 'near north' was the ANZAM (Australia, New Zealand and Malaya) Agreement (1950-71), the British Commonwealth defence planning arrangement in Southeast Asia. The formal origins of ANZAM date from mid-1947, after the concept was developed at the 1946 conference of Commonwealth prime ministers in London. Australia assumed primary responsibility for planning in the ANZAM area in 1950.¹⁹ Under Menzies, Australia's military deployments to the Malayan Emergency (1955) and Indonesian Confrontation (1965) were undertaken under ANZAM auspices as part of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve (CSR). Australia's forward defence policy was not due to subservience to US Cold War priorities in Southeast Asia.²⁰ As this article demonstrates, the United States never agreed with the ANZAM concept and saw little value in it. To Washington it was a relic of Empire, the Pacific War and the Chifley government's enduring fear of Japan. But as a Commonwealth initiative, ANZAM allowed the Menzies government to engage with a decolonising Southeast Asia during the Cold War within a familiar British Commonwealth normative and practical framework. There was a close Commonwealth identification with the decolonising British dependencies in Southeast Asia, which Menzies' oft-cited 'imperial imagination' could readily accommodate.²¹

The article proceeds through five sections. The first briefly provides the conceptual underpinnings of the relationships between interests and norms, before introducing responsibility as an under theorised motive in foreign policy analysis. It

then establishes the grounds for responsibility within the British Commonwealth. The second section locates Australia within a decolonising Southeast Asian region. It examines shifting regional definitions from 1944 and how Australia saw itself in relation to Asia. The third shows that despite its 'internationalism', it was the Chifley ALP government that established the policy theme that Australia carried a special responsibility for this area on behalf of the British Commonwealth. Section four examines the Menzies era of the 1950s. It demonstrates through the examples of ANZAM and Australia's military commitments to Malaya (1955) and Borneo (1965), that during this early period of the Cold War, responsibility to the Commonwealth remained an important driver of policy independently of the US relationship. Through an examination of Australian policy discourse around the British withdrawal from East of Suez and negotiation of the FPDA, the final section shows how Australia's normative claims of Commonwealth responsibility, had, by the late-1960s, given way to a narrower, interest-based outlook on the region.

Norms, Responsibility and the British Commonwealth

Norms for behaviour can be defined as the principles, standards and rules, both substantive and procedural, which prescribe or proscribe social action in situations of choice, by carrying a moral obligation that they ought to be followed.²² Norms reflect intersubjective consensus about appropriate behaviour for a given identity in particular social contexts.²³ The conceptual separation between self-interest and norms rests on their instrumental and non-instrumental characters. Instrumental actions are contingent, future-oriented and concerned with the achievement of outcomes. Normative behaviour, by contrast, is relatively rigid, process-oriented and non-instrumental,²⁴ in that the anticipated consequences of normative action are

not reducible to utility or means-ends consistency. These logics of action have been dichotomised in the literature as 'logics of expected consequences' versus 'logics of appropriateness', with the former traditionally dominating the latter as an explanatory device in International Relations (IR) and foreign policy analysis.²⁵

While conceptually distinct, the two logics are not mutually exclusive in practice.²⁶ That there is always an element of self-interest in state behaviour does not preclude that a normative element can also inhere in such behaviour.²⁷ March and Olsen advance four interpretations of the relationships between the two logics of action: that the logic holding greater clarity, or precision, in situational context will dominate decision-making; that the weaker of the logics refines decision-making based on the stronger; that the relationship between the two logics is developmental in that instrumental action will become rule-based over time; and that the logics are sequential, in that one structures the field of action of the other.²⁸ As suggested above, the last of these perhaps holds the greatest salience in the period under consideration here. But the purpose of this article is not to systematically identify the balance between, or the sequencing of norms and interests in Australia's foreign policy decision making. Rather, it is to demonstrate that norms, which carry moral obligations, held greater significance during this period than is generally afforded in the literature.

Responsibility is a normative concept defined as 'the obligation to fulfill certain duties, to assume certain burdens, to carry out certain commitments'.²⁹ Or, put another way, obligation 'is the owing of a duty; and behind it, claiming the performance of that duty, is responsibility'.³⁰ As a political concept, responsibility is a duty owed to someone or some organisation, and as Ewing writes, a 'political

organization is indeed largely a system of responsibilities'.³¹ The term responsibility is relatively recent historically and surprisingly under theorised as a political concept. It dates from the late-eighteenth century and the development of parliamentary and republican systems of 'responsible government'.³²

The grounds of political responsibility lie in '*cultural responsibility*', in that the 'political responsibilities of nations reflect and protect the cultural values of societies'. This cultural responsibility 'provides the connection by which political and moral responsibility influence each other'. According to McKeon, a 'responsible community reflects a tradition of responsibility based on the character of the community', and is 'responsive to the requirements of common values and of the common good'.³³ Responsibility is thus normative rather than self-interested as it is dedicated to the *common* good defined according to a set of cultural values. Applied to communities in the plural, the notion of responsibility implies interdependence, 'where independent communities assume responsibilities with respect to each other', and 'constitute a kind of inclusive community'. Responsibility within this broader inclusive community is based on common values and a common rationality.³⁴ For the self-governing Dominions, the organic, intangible bonds of the British Commonwealth were an independent community of values with a common rationality, to which responsibility was felt to be owed.

The 1931 Statute of Westminster established the Commonwealth of the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, the Irish Free State and Newfoundland, within the British Empire. Their 'free association' and 'unity' was symbolised 'by a common allegiance to the Crown'.³⁵ With Indian independence in 1947 and establishment of the Republic of India in 1950, the

'British' label was omitted in favour of the term Commonwealth of Nations, although there was never any formal, constitutional title for the British Empire or Commonwealth.³⁶ But the bond between the British settler dominions and the UK, particularly Australia and New Zealand as the most 'British' of the self-governing Dominions, remained very strong. In 1955, Hall argued that 'the New Zealander or the Australian often feels he is more Commonwealth-minded and more British than the British'.³⁷ Unlike India and other non-British member-states, Australia and New Zealand felt 'obliged to make common cause with Britain'.³⁸

Writing in 1961, Jennings likened the British Commonwealth to 'a mutual protection society',³⁹ while Bull later described it as 'a transnational community'.⁴⁰ Hall used the metaphor of a 'family' with 'unity of spirit and identity of purpose' to describe the loyalty of the members of the Commonwealth to one another, and 'their solidarity in vital matters of common concern'.⁴¹ There were no formal alliance obligations in the Commonwealth, with responsibilities 'imposed not by one nation on another, but by each nation on itself'. Nor were the obligations necessarily mutual. They existed partly in a member's 'own interest, but partly also because sentiment would insist on it'.⁴² Hall states that the 'feeling of responsibility was not merely for the good government of the local territory, or country; it extended to the whole family of the Commonwealth'.⁴³

In a 1950 speech, Menzies argued that despite the membership of India as a republic, the 'Australian relationship to the United Kingdom, to Canada, to New Zealand, to most of the British Commonwealth countries, is structural or organic'.⁴⁴ Among the 'British peoples' of the Commonwealth, there was 'an instinctive unity of feeling' that 'displays itself instantly in times of trial'.⁴⁵ Menzies emphasised

sentiment over interests, in reiterating the Commonwealth association as one of 'common duty and common instinct'.⁴⁶ Ward summarises that 'these sentiments underlined Menzies' sense of the innate, organic and inviolable nature of the bonds uniting the British world'.⁴⁷

The interplay between interest and sentiment in Menzies' foreign policy outlook is a theme canvassed in the literature.⁴⁸ However, the more diffuse notion of sentiment has not been theorised as a norm of responsibility and systematically analysed against the evidence as it is here. And while ALP leaders Chifley and Evatt did not speak of the British Empire and Commonwealth in the same sentimental idiom as Menzies, their statements examined below carry similar normative connotations. The remainder of the article moves into an empirical analysis of the conceptual themes introduced here. The following section locates Australia within a decolonising Southeast Asia before analysing the Chifley government's claims of responsibility for the area on behalf of the British Commonwealth.

Australia's Region in Foreign and Security Policy, 1944-9

For the ALP governments of the 1940s, the invasion threat from Japan drastically altered Australia's sense of security and its place in the world, and the Southwest Pacific war theatre continued to provide a frame of reference for their sense of Australia's region. The archival record shows that from the Second World War until the consolidation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967) in the early-1970s, Australia, under both ALP and Conservative governments, saw itself, and was viewed by its neighbours, as geographically a part of what we now term Southeast Asia. During the war, the Pacific theatre was subdivided into the Southwest Pacific and three further North, South and Eastern Pacific sectors. The

Southwest Pacific theatre sector comprised the Australian continent, eastern Indian Ocean, and what is now recognised as insular Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Timor-Leste and the Philippines), in addition to New Guinea in Melanesia.⁴⁹ This understanding of Australia's region continued in various guises in the immediate post-war years and endured until the late-1960s.

After the tide had turned against Japan in 1943, Australia confirmed this understanding of its region in the January 1944 Australia–New Zealand Agreement, sometimes termed the ANZAC Pact. There are a number of controversies associated with this Agreement, but for the purposes of the argument developed here, the ANZAC pact is significant in that it contains an explicit definition by the Australian government of its region and place in the world. The Treaty stated that 'within the framework of a general system of world security, a regional zone of defence comprising the wartime South West and South Pacific areas shall be established and that this zone should be based on Australia and New Zealand, stretching through the arc of islands north and northeast of Australia, to Western Samoa and the Cook Islands.⁵⁰ The geographical area designated in the Treaty included insular Southeast Asia, Melanesia and Western Polynesia. Washington later privately labelled this 'an Anzac Monroe Doctrine for the Southwest Pacific'.⁵¹

It was never intended that Australia would defend this area unaided, but it needed to be kept from the control of any potentially hostile power.⁵² Establishing Australian bases in the 'island screen' to the north was a theme Evatt continued to pursue in the aftermath of the war.⁵³ The Southwest Pacific theatre was dissolved on 2 September 1945, and post-war responsibility for administering this area, with the exception of the Philippines, was transferred to the British Commonwealth. The

experience of the war and Australia's more independent security outlook meant that it would have to engage more deeply with whatever political entities emerged in Southeast Asia. In the late-1940s, Australian defence planning continued to focus on the former Southwest Pacific war theatre, which, with some revision, would become the ANZAM region.⁵⁴

Australia and Commonwealth Responsibility in Southeast Asia

The Menzies Opposition criticised the Chifley government and Evatt in particular, for ignoring Australia's region for a preoccupation with the new UN organisation.⁵⁵ On my reading, this criticism was largely overstated. De Matos makes the point that Evatt's policy outlook was characterised by a deep tension between his 'long-term suspicion and fear of Japan' on the one hand, which kept him focused on the Asia-Pacific, and his 'international liberalism' and 'dedication to the United Nations' on the other.⁵⁶ In the immediate post-war years, the Chifley government's dedication to the UN was tempered by British Empire loyalty, uncertainty about Washington's intentions in the Western Pacific, and a visceral concern for security and stability in the region to Australia's immediate north. For these reasons, Evatt sought a British Commonwealth sphere of influence across the Malayan archipelago and islands of the Southwest Pacific in which Australia would predominate, which De Matos labels 'vaguely neo-imperialist'.⁵⁷

Reynolds demonstrates that rather than championing the rights of small states in the UN as the internationalist interpretation holds, Evatt actually sought the special status for Australia of a 'security power' in post-war arrangements. In this, the British 'Fourth Empire' after the war was crucial to Australia.⁵⁸ Waters recognises the enduring value of the British Empire to Evatt and Chifley, but argues that they

were nationalists first, 'determined that Australia would have the freedom to act ... in the postwar world' independently of British interests or Commonwealth unity. I agree with Waters that Evatt and Chifley overestimated British power after the war,⁵⁹ but it is perhaps more accurate to interpret that the Chifley government sought to further Australia's security interests, especially in the Asia-Pacific, through the material, institutional and political resources of the British Commonwealth, rather than in opposition to it, or independently of it.

Despite his later mythologising as an internationalist, it was Evatt who initiated the theme between 1944 and 1946 that Australia and New Zealand 'as the main centres of civilisation' carried a 'special responsibility' for the security and welfare of the Southwest Pacific and South Pacific areas on behalf of the British Commonwealth.⁶⁰ It was the 'two British Pacific Dominions' that 'must uphold Western civilisation in this part of the world'. Their 'responsibility' could not 'be abdicated'.⁶¹ Chifley said, "'Australia today has become the great bastion of the British-speaking south of the Equator. Strategically and economically our country has assumed a position in the Pacific on behalf of the British Commonwealth on Nations"'.⁶² Bongiorno makes the point that in his regional foreign policy approaches 'Evatt drew on a narrative of empire in which he had a large emotional and intellectual investment'.⁶³ In this he was consistent with the ALP prime ministers, John Curtin (1941-5) and Chifley.⁶⁴

Both Britain and Australia recognised that Australia and New Zealand would carry a much greater and immediate responsibility for Commonwealth political affairs and security interests in Asia and the Pacific, due to the UK being weakened by the war.⁶⁵ The September 1947 *Appreciation of the Strategic Position of*

Australia stated that the 'recent war has reduced the military and economic strength of the United Kingdom considerably'. It was necessary that 'Australia should make greater efforts for self-sufficiency and also contribute to the military and economic strength of the British Commonwealth than in the past. By virtue of her geographical position, Australia should assume increased responsibilities in British Commonwealth matters in the Indian Ocean, South East Asia and the Pacific'.⁶⁶ In August 1948, the US State Department confirmed, 'Australia sees herself as spokesman for the British Commonwealth and senior member of the Anzac partnership in all matters relating to the Pacific area'.⁶⁷

By March 1946, the Empire defence concept that gave rise to ANZAM had been instigated. This was further developed at the 1946 conference of Commonwealth prime ministers held in London in April and May.⁶⁸ In advance of the conference, Evatt told the Australian Parliament 'that an entirely new concept in British Commonwealth relations' was now emerging, which reconciled 'full dominion autonomy with full British Commonwealth co-operation'. It involved the 'possibility of a dominion acting in certain regions or for certain purposes on behalf of the other members of the British Commonwealth, including the United Kingdom itself'. It was nearly at a stage where 'a common policy can be carried out through a chosen dominion instrumentality in an area or in relation to a subject-matter which is of primary concern to that dominion'.⁶⁹ According to Reynolds, this was 'a blueprint for the Fourth Empire', to which Evatt and the Chifley ALP government were fully committed.⁷⁰

Decolonisation and Commonwealth Responsibility during the Cold War

For the Menzies Coalition government elected on 19 December 1949, it was the Cold War in East Asia that drove regional policy rather than the ALP government's enduring fear of Japan. Reflecting this, the external affairs minister, Percy Spender's (1949-51) rhetoric on taking office was different in tone and content from that of Evatt. It was projected outwards into the region, in contrast to Evatt's customary attitude of defensiveness vis-à-vis a resurgent Japan. For example, on 3 January 1950 Spender said, 'Australia, which with New Zealand, has the greatest direct interest in Asia of all Western peoples, must develop a dynamic policy towards neighbouring Asian countries. We should give leadership to developments in that area'.⁷¹

Leadership in Asia was given policy expression through two initiatives, the Colombo Plan and ANZAM Agreement. The Colombo Plan was a Commonwealth development initiative originally offered to former British colonies in South Asia, and to the remaining British dependencies of Malaya and Borneo. It was subsequently extended to include all South and Southeast Asian states throughout the 1950s. The Plan was drafted at a meeting of Commonwealth foreign ministers held at Colombo from 9-14 January 1950, the first such meeting to include the newly independent Asian states of India, Pakistan and Ceylon.⁷² Spender remarked on 3 January prior to attending the Conference that "Commonwealth relations strikingly manifest the movement of the world's centre towards the East. The location of the conference at Colombo reflects the importance attached to this area".⁷³ The Plan was an umbrella scheme to assess development needs identified by the recipients and to provide technical assistance, education and training. Aid funding and delivery were then arranged bilaterally between donors (Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) and the recipients.⁷⁴

Spender was instrumental in providing the political impetus for formulating and implementing the Plan, which was launched in July 1951,⁷⁵ although its intellectual contours lay in the final years of the previous ALP government.⁷⁶ Australia's motives for taking a leading role in the Plan involved both normative commitments and longer-range strategic interests. Raising living standards in South and Southeast Asia was viewed as an obligation by the Australia government,⁷⁷ with Canberra's political objectives for the Plan defined as attaining 'Commonwealth solidarity and Asian-Western friendship'.⁷⁸ Indian Finance Minister, Chintaman Deshmukh, in commenting on Australia's contribution to the Colombo Plan in 1952, said "the significance of such friendly assistance far transcends its material value".⁷⁹ Socio-economic development in the region would in turn lessen the attractiveness of socialist ideology and protect against communist subversion.⁸⁰ By demonstrating Australia's commitment to Southeast Asia in this way, Spender also sought to attract greater US involvement. This came to fruition when Washington's aid program in Southeast Asia was associated with the Colombo Plan in late 1950 and the US formally entered the Plan as a donor country in 1951.⁸¹

Australia's direct responsibilities for Commonwealth security in Southeast Asia, which is the main focus of this article, were discharged primarily under the umbrella of the ANZAM agreement. ANZAM denoted the Commonwealth zone of defence in Asia, in which Australia carried planning responsibility from 1950.⁸² ANZAM covered a wider sweep of geography than is suggested by its title. It was defined as 'an area of the South West Pacific and Indian Oceans including Malaya, Sumatra, Java, Borneo, New Guinea and Australia and New Zealand. It does not include Burma, Siam, Indo-China, the Philippines or countries north of these'.⁸³ The

Malayan area thus included the Malay Peninsula, Indonesia and all of insular Southeast Asia, and surrounding waters of the South China Sea, including the Gulf of Thailand, except for the Philippine Islands. The agreement gave British recognition to the areas of responsibility claimed and delineated earlier by Australia in the 1944 ANZAC Pact. Australia's 'special role' in this decolonising region through ANZAM was reiterated throughout the first half of the 1950s, along with the recurring theme of its Commonwealth responsibilities. In March 1953, the Menzies government stated quite explicitly that the purpose of the ANZAM arrangement was to recognise this 'special role'.⁸⁴

The British Commonwealth connection and ANZAM responsibilities in Southeast Asia remained of high importance to Australia independently of its Cold War security interests and relationship with the United States, which was formalised in 1951 with the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Security Treaty. This can be seen in that Washington always remained unconvinced of the strategic value of ANZAM because any overt aggression from communist China would need to be halted much further north. If the Malayan Peninsula were being threatened by a Chinese land invasion, this would mean an unlikely last ditch stand by Commonwealth forces at the Songkhla Position on the thin Kra Isthmus in southern Thailand, effectively signifying the collapse of the 'free world' position in mainland East Asia.⁸⁵ The report from the June 1956 ANZAM Staff Meeting in Singapore explicitly stated that there 'is little chance of ANZAM alone being able to fulfil its strategic function in war, because the United States does not agree with the present ANZAM concept'.⁸⁶

Also, by the mid-1950s, Cold War tensions in Southeast Asia had become

focused on internal communist subversion. Lacking naval capacity, defence planners did not consider an external invasion of the Malayan area by communist forces realistic. In a Cold War strategic sense, ANZAM's traditional defence-planning focus was largely redundant compared with the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) (1954-77), which dealt with both overt aggression and subversion, covered all the countries directly concerned, and most importantly, also included the United States.⁸⁷ Washington considered ANZAM 'misdirected and ill-intentioned', with a practical lack of capability to carry out its plans, and consequently with an implicit and unwelcome reliance on US assistance in 'forces and materiel'.⁸⁸

Lee notes that Washington was interested in defence planning in this area only under the umbrella of SEATO and more generally, ANZUS.⁸⁹ The Eisenhower administration's policy was that in the event of war in East Asia, holding operations would be conducted in such peripheral areas as Malaya, while 'a massive counter stroke' was taken directly against the Chinese mainland – in all likelihood nuclear, and therefore only subject to planning in a very general sense.⁹⁰ Lee argues that this devaluing of the ANZAM concept was the origin of the Australia's 'turn' to the United States.⁹¹ My point here is to emphasise that rather than contributing meaningfully to US Cold War strategy, Australia's security responsibilities to the Commonwealth through ANZAM, served to foster a deep Australian involvement in the British decolonisation process across the Malayan Peninsula and archipelago.

In the context of decolonisation in Asia, scholars have made the implausible argument that in the mid-1950s Australia was faced with a sharp choice 'between joining an emerging pan-Asian regional solidarity that gained expression at Bandung in 1955, and fitting into the rigid, hub-and-spokes security architecture centred on

the United States and containing communism'.⁹² Yet, attendance at the April 1955 Bandung Conference, which instigated the non-aligned movement, was not the Australian government's choice to make, despite criticisms at the time by the former secretary of the External Affairs Department, John Burton (1947-50).⁹³ The idea for a conference of Afro-Asian nations was announced in December 1954 by Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan. Of these, only Indonesia resolutely opposed inviting Australia ostensibly because of Canberra's support for the continuing colonial status of West Irian and its position in East New Guinea.⁹⁴

Had Australia pushed for an invitation, this would have been supported diplomatically by India, although it is doubtful whether this would have overcome a veto by Jakarta.⁹⁵ While not explicitly anti-colonial or anti-'white', the common denominator binding the thirty participants from Asia, the Middle East and North Africa was deemed by Canberra to be 'a common feeling, shared in varying degree, of being dispossessed, of having a smaller share of the world's wealth and privileges than they were entitled to, on a basis of population, need, or merit'.⁹⁶ The pros and cons of pressing for inclusion at this and any similar future meetings were debated within the Australian government.⁹⁷ But a country with Australia's history and institutions was not a natural fit for a meeting based on this rationale,⁹⁸ despite its Commonwealth connections and close relationships with a number of participating non-communist regional states. There was also very little 'pan-Asian solidarity' at Bandung as the primary sources show, rather a number of mutually suspicious camps: Indonesia and the 'non-aligned' countries; the PRC and communist states; and the non-communist states of Asia, some Western-aligned, some not.⁹⁹ As

Finnane points out, 'some of those countries were at war with each other within a few years of agreeing at Bandung to the principle of "coexisting peacefully"'.¹⁰⁰

In the 1950s, it was responsibility to the British Commonwealth that provided the normative framework for Australia's involvement with Asian decolonisation and nation building, rather than anti-colonial, rights-based notions of self-determination. Canberra's military deployments to the Malayan Emergency and to Borneo in the 'Confrontation' between Indonesia and Malaysia were also taken reluctantly and belatedly,¹⁰¹ suggesting duty or obligation to Britain and the Commonwealth were important motivating factors, rather than direct threats to Australia's Cold War defence interests.

The decision in 1955 by Australia to commit ground forces alongside Britain against the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and its Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) guerrillas during the Emergency (1948-60) was undertaken under ANZAM auspices and as part of the SEATO area.¹⁰² Australian air assets had been involved since 1950.¹⁰³ The deployment of the CSR was met with some protest by the small Labour Party of Malaya, and more importantly by some United Malays National Association (UMNO) branches, particularly in Singapore, on the grounds that it was unnecessary because there was an amnesty in place toward the communist insurgency, and that the presence of foreign forces would retard plans for *Merdeka* (independence).¹⁰⁴ But Malay leaders and local newspaper opinion generally welcomed Australia's direct involvement. Leader of UMNO and the post-independence prime minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, defended the Commonwealth assistance publicly on number of occasions, most notably in a forty-five minute speech in Singapore in October 1955.¹⁰⁵

The continued deployment of the CSR in the independent Federation of Malaya in 1957 required that Australia be formally associated through an exchange of letters accompanying the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA). This was renewed in 1963 as the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement to cover the expanded territory of the new Malaysia with the incorporation of the Borneo territories of Sarawak and Sabah in the face of Indonesian and Filipino opposition. Wah makes the point that AMDA and the later FPDA were 'not so overtly identified with the system of Cold War alliances that centred on the American security role'. Rather, they 'are more readily identified with the process of colonial disengagement'.¹⁰⁶ These defence agreements recognised the direct and shared security responsibilities of the British Commonwealth countries, primarily the UK, Australia and New Zealand, with postcolonial Malaysia.¹⁰⁷ This is not to suggest that Australia viewed the problems of Malaysian decolonisation in isolation from the regional Cold War context, and indeed, 'public justification for the dispatch of Australian ground forces ... tended to emphasize the regional threat from communism'.¹⁰⁸

Australia's intensifying involvement in the security of the decolonising Southeast Asian states in the late-1950s reflected the recognition, at least in elite policy circles, that while Australia had considered itself geographically as part of Asia during and since the war, these ties were becoming deeper. Australia still considered itself a 'Western' country, but 'aware that in the long run' its 'future is more intimately bound up with Asia than with Western Europe'.¹⁰⁹ In a June 1958 *Sydney Morning Herald* article, the Coalition minister for external affairs, Richard Casey (1951-60) wrote that geographically 'Australia is an Asian country'. This geographical position gave rise to political ramifications in a decolonising region: 'we have to

develop policies which take full account of our desire to maintain friendly relations with our Asian neighbours. We can no longer take the passive attitude towards them that we took when their affairs were guided by our European allies'.¹¹⁰ A large portion of this task was undertaken under Commonwealth auspices, with the mutual understanding that Britain expected Australia and New Zealand 'to accept an increasing role and responsibility in South East Asia'.¹¹¹

This Commonwealth responsibility was again evident in Australia's direct security role in opposing Indonesia's Confrontation of the formation of Malaysia. Between 1963 and 1966, Indonesia sought to destabilise the new, expanded Malaysian Federation, with a view to breaking it up and absorbing the Borneo territories. Infiltration and cross-border raids by 'volunteers' began in early 1963. Indonesian regular forces joined them in 1964. In January 1965, the first Australian combat forces were introduced, again as part of the CSR. On 25 September 1963, Menzies announced to Parliament Australia's in-principle commitment to support Malaysia's 'territorial integrity and political independence' from 'armed invasion or subversive activity'. This was justified according to the Commonwealth values of 'mutual confidence and a golden rule of mutual obligation'. Menzies stated: 'Malaysia the new nation is here. The processes of its creation have been democratic ... We have publicly and unambiguously said that we support Malaysia which is, never let it be forgotten, a Commonwealth country, just as our own is'.¹¹²

Because the Federation government could not defend the larger area of the offshore Malaysian Borneo territories on its own, there was anticipated to be little Malayan public feeling against the deepening of Commonwealth involvement in 1963.¹¹³ Despite Menzies' statement above, reluctance to become involved in

Borneo was much more evident on the part of Australian decision makers than any resistance to the idea in Kuala Lumpur.¹¹⁴ Canberra recognised that with the waning of UK interests in the area, deeper involvement by Australia might antagonise Jakarta and could possibly lead to similar infiltration and conflict in New Guinea.¹¹⁵ Goldsworthy argues that for Australian policy makers, 'there was the felt obligation to help Britain defend its post-colonial construct Malaysia against Indonesia's Confrontation',¹¹⁶ where British policy was in tension with Washington's Cold War strategy in the region of not 'unduly antagonising Sukarno and pushing him further into the hands of the Indonesia Communist Party'.¹¹⁷ In this case, Australia's Commonwealth responsibilities overrode the Indonesia relationship and US Cold War priorities. The acting prime minister, John McEwen 'expressed disappointment' that Indonesia was 'persisting in this policy of military "confrontation"'. But he said that the Australian Government 'is quite clear as to its obligations to Malaysia, a free and independent nation and a fellow member of the Commonwealth, and ... firm in respect of its responsibilities'.¹¹⁸

East of Suez, the FPDA and the National Interest

The withdrawal by 1971 of most British military forces and concomitant strategic influence from Asia was the logical outcome of the post-war decolonisation process. It marked Britain's transformation from global empire into a European power. The British decision to withdraw from East of Suez followed a series of defence expenditure reviews and was prompted by the Sterling crisis of 1966-7.¹¹⁹ The initial UK Cabinet Decision made by Harold Wilson's Labour government (1964-70) in April 1967 was 'to reduce our forces in Malaysia/Singapore by half by 1970-71 and to withdraw all our forces from the mainland of Asia (save Hong Kong) by 1975-76'. The

Wilson government was acutely aware of the disappointment this would cause in Washington and among the non-communist Asian states, but particularly the severe blow this would be to Australia: that 'we are already planning for a virtually total withdrawal from South East Asia' while the Australians 'are still heavily engaged in Vietnam'.¹²⁰

As soon as the decision of the British Cabinet was clear, Australia mobilised its diplomatic resources to oppose or at least slow down the UK withdrawal. Menzies' successor as the prime minister of Australia, Harold Holt (1967-8), was soon in London. In a meeting with Wilson on 13 June 1967, Holt gave an account of the Cold War strategic context in East Asia and reiterated that the United States viewed the Malayan area as a Commonwealth responsibility. Any unequivocal statement of British withdrawal by the mid-1970s 'would have a shattering effect on Commonwealth relations in the area, on Australia and New Zealand in particular and generally throughout the Far East'.¹²¹

Despite strong representations by Canberra and Washington, on what became 'known as "Black Tuesday" in the UK Ministry of Defence', 16 January 1968, the timetable for complete British withdrawal from Asia (except for Hong Kong) was brought forward to 31 March 1971.¹²² In visiting Australia on 12 January 1968 to explain the change of policy, the minister of state for foreign affairs, George Thomson¹²³ met with the prime minister, John Gorton, who succeeded Holt after his disappearance in December 1967, the external affairs minister, Paul Hasluck (1964-9), and other senior Australian ministers. Thomson registered 'the end of an era and the end of British power on a decisive global scale'.¹²⁴ The UK record of the meeting indicates that Gorton and Hasluck 'expressed great dismay'; with Gorton saying that

Australia could not accept the decision, while recognising that 'the British Government had to do what was dictated by British interests'.¹²⁵

What is striking about Australian policy discourse around the British withdrawal announcement in 1968 is the lack of confidence expressed that Canberra could or should take over residual British responsibilities in the ANZAM area. This is in stark contrast to Australian claims in the late-1940s and 1950s of a 'special responsibility' for the Malayan area on behalf of the British Commonwealth, and that Australia should take an important, even leading role in Southeast Asian affairs. For example, on 7 February 1968, Hasluck said to the foreign minister of Indonesia, Adam Malik at a meeting in Jakarta, 'that Australia could not possibly take over the place of the British; we did not have Britain's special historical relationship with or obligations to Malaysia and Singapore; nor was it within our capacity'.¹²⁶ Along similar lines, the minister of defence, Allen Fairhall (1966-9) said in Parliament on 2 May that 'nobody imagines that Australia could, or should, take over the present British role or commitments in Malaysia/Singapore. These grew out of Britain's position as a colonial power.'¹²⁷

This change of Australian attitude - from Commonwealth responsibility to a more limited conception of the national interest - in the wake of the British decision was quickly noted in Malaysia and Singapore. The Australian high commissioner at Kuala Lumpur reported that the previous 'sentimental view that Australia would be ready on [the] basis of past association, to accept unilateral commitment to [the] "automatic" defence of Malaysia' had been replaced by the understanding that 'Australia's future defence undertakings will be based on calculations of national interest in light of requirements of regional situation'.¹²⁸ From Singapore, it was

reported that while 'Lee and his Ministers said categorically that they want Australia to stay in Singapore and Malaysia ... they understand that Australia cannot be expected to come in to fill the place left by the British'.¹²⁹

These statements provide a concise summary of the evolution during the late-1960s of Australia's changing attitude towards the Commonwealth countries of Southeast Asia, from the claims of responsibility evident in the Chifley and Menzies-eras to a narrower, more interest-based outlook. This was reinforced by the establishment of ASEAN in 1967, which signalled a postcolonial, cultural definition of region that excluded Australia. This form of regional consciousness had been developing throughout the 1960s, and by late in the decade had become more salient for Malaysia and Singapore than Commonwealth sentiments.¹³⁰

Gorton reinforced this change in Australia's disposition in a meeting with Wilson at 10 Downing Street on 7 January 1969. Gorton said that he 'believed most Australians were disinterested in the Commonwealth as such. They were far from disinterested in Britain, to which the attitude of Australians would long - he believed for always - be unique in quality. The same was to some extent true of the other "old" Commonwealth countries. But in regard to the "new" Commonwealth Australia's attitude was essentially bilateral and regional'.¹³¹ Gorton's statements here reflect the 'new' Australian nationalism attributed to him by commentators of the time.¹³² Britain's efforts throughout the 1960s to join the European Economic Community (EEC) at the expense of the imperial preference system, in combination with post-war changes to the demographic composition of Australian society eroded the traditional view of the country as a 'loyal outpost of British culture and British civilisation'.¹³³ International norms of anti-racism and postcolonial nationalism that

accompanied the rapid decolonisation of the 1950s and 1960s also exerted 'moral pressure on the White Australia policy',¹³⁴ which was dismantled in the early 1970s. These economic, social and normative changes ushered in a more independent sense of Australian national identity.

This moving away from a special relationship with the Commonwealth is also pointedly evident in negotiations between Australia, Singapore and Malaysia over the 1971 FPDA. In these talks, Australia was concerned to demonstrate that its approach was now part of a balanced regional strategy rather than a Commonwealth responsibility.¹³⁵ Australia's language and position in negotiating the FPDA are markedly different to its earlier claims of Commonwealth responsibility surrounding the 1955 deployment of forces to the CSR. Any Australian force deployments would be 'a contribution to wider regional security in relation to communist pressures'.¹³⁶ Australian forces based in Malaysia and Singapore would also be available in support of SEATO obligations to Thailand.¹³⁷ Such deployments could not appear to be directed against other powers, particularly the Philippines and Indonesia. Australia was 'not stepping into British shoes and Australian forces will not fill the role played in the past by British forces. With the British departure the primary and direct responsibility for the defence of Malaysia and Singapore will rest not with any outside forces but with the two Governments concerned'.¹³⁸ The FPDA entered into effect on 1 November 1971 as an undertaking to consult in the event "of any form of armed attack externally organised or supported, or the threat of such attack against Malaysia or Singapore".¹³⁹

The ANZAM arrangement was still technically in place at the close of the 1960s. The effect of the British withdrawal was its replacement in 1971 by a loose

'tripartite agreement' between the UK, Australia and New Zealand 'to be known informally as ANZUK'. ANZUK would be 'almost exclusively consultative', and unlike ANZAM, it would not have an integral role in the defence planning of the countries concerned.¹⁴⁰ The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) summarised in 1971 the causes of the decline in the Anglo-Australian 'special relationship' in four factors: 'a natural divergence of interests, Australia turning to South East Asia and the Pacific, and the United Kingdom turning inward and to Europe'; the 'now almost certain British entry into the EEC on terms that did not appear to take Australia as fully into account as it might have done'; that the colonial 'son has grown up and become somewhat assertive; and the mother a little resentful at her diminished responsibility and authority'; and finally, and most relevant for the argument advanced here, 'the diminished significance of the Commonwealth, at least as a political entity, and the deathpangs of Britain's imperial heyday'.¹⁴¹ The end of British decolonisation in the Southeast Asian region removed the central tenet of Australia's normative responsibilities in Southeast Asia, clearing the way for a more instrumental conception of Australia's regional interests from the late-1960s.

Conclusion

The article has sought to emphasise the importance of normative motivations in the historical interpretation of foreign and security policy making. A systematic analysis of the motive of Commonwealth responsibility in Australian post-war approaches to decolonisation in Southeast Asia reveals that the foreign policy traditions typically used as interpretative frames for this period are flawed. This study has shown that the Chifley ALP government sought to protect Australia's security interests in Southeast Asia through claiming a British Commonwealth responsibility for the

region. On the other hand, for the Menzies Coalition government, its British Commonwealth responsibilities structured its conception of regional interests, which were sometimes in tension with US Cold War priorities. For both governments, the norm of Commonwealth responsibility was an important motivating factor.

From the immediate post-war period until the mid-1960s, Australia's engagement with the decolonisation process in Southeast Asia was driven not only by Cold War defence interests, but also by strong normative sentiments of Commonwealth responsibility. This is evident in the Colombo Plan, ANZAM defence planning arrangement, and Australia's participation in the CSR in Malaya and Borneo. The origins of the ANZAM Agreement, Australia's close engagement with Southeast Asian decolonisation during the Cold War, and the conditions for Australia's early 'forward defence' deployments are located in the Chifley government's view, derived from its wartime experience, of Southeast Asia as Australia's region and Commonwealth responsibility.

It was Evatt, associated with the 'internationalist' tradition of the ALP, who asserted Australia's responsibilities for the region on behalf of the British Commonwealth in the immediate aftermath of the war. This was continued by the Menzies Coalition government, which, along with its familiar Cold War rhetoric, consistently emphasised in the 1950s and 1960s Australia's Commonwealth responsibilities in Southeast Asia. This demonstrates that there is much more continuity between the foreign and defence policies of the two governments than is typically portrayed in the literature on Australia's foreign policy traditions. Under Menzies, Australia's commitment to ANZAM and Malaya in the face of Washington's scepticism, and military deployment to Borneo in tension with US Cold War strategy,

and at the risk of open conflict with Indonesia, are not consistent with instrumental calculations of strategic interest or subservience to US priorities.

Australia's sense of Commonwealth responsibility, which had become increasingly reluctant by the mid-1960s, evaporated relatively quickly with the end of Indonesia's Confrontation of Malaysia in 1966 and the retrenchment of British global power with the 1967 commitment to withdraw from East of Suez. Australia's policy discourse features a more instrumental focus on its independent national interests after this time and explicit denials of any residual Commonwealth responsibilities in Southeast Asia. This is especially evident in the rhetoric of the Gorton Coalition government in negotiations with Malaysia and Singapore leading up to the conclusion of the FPDA in 1971.

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Notes

¹ The Country Party was re-named as the National Party of Australia in 1982. On Australia's foreign policy traditions, see Josh Frydenberg, Melissa Parke and John Langmore, 'The Liberal/Labor Tradition' in Daniel Baldino, Andrew Carr and Anthony

J. Langlois (eds.), *Australian Foreign Policy: Controversies and Debates* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2014), 19-38; Michael Wesley and Tony Warren, 'Wild Colonial Ploys? Currents of Thought in Australian Foreign Policy', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 35, 1 (2000), 9-26; Owen Harries, *Benign or Imperial? Reflections on American Hegemony* (Sydney: ABC Books, 2004), 78-83; and Joan Beaumont, Christopher Waters, David Lowe, with Garry Woodard, *Ministers, Mandarins and Diplomats: Australian Foreign Policy Making, 1941–1969* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2003), 16.

² Meg Gurry, 'Identifying Australia's "Region": From Evatt to Evans', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 49, 1 (1995), 17, emphasis in original.

³ On the theme of abandonment and dependence, see Allan Gyngell, *Fear of Abandonment: Australia in the World since 1942* (Melbourne: Black Inc., 2017); Bruce Grant, *The Crisis of Loyalty: A Study of Australian Foreign Policy* (London: Angus and Robertson, 1972); and Coral Bell, *Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1988).

⁴ See David Lee and Christopher Waters (eds.), *Evatt to Evans: The Labor Tradition in Australian Foreign Policy* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1997); and David Lee, *Search for Security: The Political Economy of Australia's Postwar Foreign and Defence Policy* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1995), 73-4.

⁵ Julie Soares, 'Engaging with Asia: The Chifley Government and the New Delhi Conferences of 1947 and 1949', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 57, 4 (2011), 495-510; David Fetting, 'J.B. Chifley and the Indonesian Revolution, 1945-1949', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 59, 4 (2013), 517-31; see also

Fetling, 'An Australian Response to Asian Decolonisation: Jawaharlal Nehru, John Burton and the New Delhi Conference of Non-Western Nations', *Australian Historical Studies*, 45, 2 (2014), 202-19.

⁶ Christopher Waters, 'Conflict with Britain in the 1940s', in David Lowe (ed.), *Australia and the End of Empires: The Impact of Decolonisation in Australia's Near North, 1945–65* (Geelong VIC: Deakin University Press, 1996), 69-70; Peter Edwards, *Prime Ministers and Diplomats: The Making of Australian Foreign Policy 1901–1949* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1983), 140; and Keith Waller, *A Diplomatic Life: Some Memories*, Australians in Asia Series No. 6 (Nathan, QLD: Centre for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations, 1990), 6.

⁷ Mark Beeson and Kanishka Jayasuriya, 'The Politics of Asian Engagement: Ideas, Institutions, and Academics', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 55, 3 (2009), 368-70.

⁸ See, for example, discussion of these themes in David McLean, 'Australia in the Cold War: A Historiographical Review', *The International History Review*, 23, 2 (2001), 299-321; and Peter Edwards, 'Foreign Policy, Defence and National Security', in J.R. Nethercote (ed.), *Menzies: The Shaping of Modern Australia* (Brisbane: Connor Court Publishing, 2016), 93-122.

¹² Lee, *Search for Security*, 107.

¹³ Max Weber, trans. A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), 98-9.

¹⁴ Pemberton points out, the 'end of Confrontation' had the 'important effect' of reducing 'the basis for close co-operation with Britain, which had always acted as a

brake on Australia's closer accommodation with America. It allowed Australia to concentrate more on helping the US in Vietnam'; Gregory Pemberton, *All the Way: Australia's Road to Vietnam* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 332. Woodard notes, the 'British relationship remained far more important than is generally conceded right up to the time an Australian battalion joined the Vietnam war alongside the Americans, but without the British'; Gary Woodard, *Asian Alternatives: Australia's Vietnam Decision and Lessons on Going to War* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2004), 2. A similar point is made by Derek McDougall, 'The Malayan Emergency and Confrontation', in Carl Bridge (ed.), *Munich to Vietnam: Australia's Relations with Britain and the United States since the 1930s* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1991), 139.

¹⁷ House of Representatives, *Official Hansard*, No. 46, 15 Nov. 1946, 18th Parl., 1st Sess., 1st Period, 346-7.

¹⁸ Neville Meaney, 'Australia, the Great Powers and the Coming of the Cold War', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 38, 3 (1992), 324.

¹⁹ Cabinet Minute, Decision No. 683, 24 March 1953, 'Submission No. 407 - Pacific Defence Arrangements - Memorandum by Ministers for External Affairs and Defence', National Archives of Australia (NAA) A1838/TS687/1, Part 3; Department of Defence, *ANZIM to ANZUK - An Historical Outline of ANZAM*, Historical Monograph No. 96 (Canberra: Department of Defence, 1992); see also Alastair Cooper, 'At the Crossroads: Anglo-Australian Naval Relations, 1945-1971', *The Journal of Military History*, 58, 4 (1994), 699-718. The military organisation was known as the ANZAM Chiefs of Staff, consisting of the Australian chiefs of staff and

representatives from the UK and New Zealand, but 'acting through the Australian Higher Defence Machinery'; UK Commonwealth Relations Office, 'The ANZAM Region', 29 Nov. 1951, NAA A1838/TS687/1, Part 1

²⁰ Reynolds, *Australia's Bid for the Atomic Bomb*, 152.

²¹ Frank Bongiorno, 'The Price of Nostalgia: Menzies, the "Liberal" Tradition and Australian Foreign Policy', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 51, 3 (2005), 414; see also P.J. Boyce, 'The Bonds of Culture and Commonwealth in Southeast Asia', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 2, 1 (1971), 71-2.

²² Andrew Hurrell, 'Norms and Ethics in International Relations' in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations* (London: Sage, 2002), 143.

²³ Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996), 22; Vaughn P. Shannon, 'Norms are What States Make of Them: The Political Psychology of Norm Violation', *International Studies Quarterly*, 44 (2000), 300; and Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security' in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 54.

²⁴ Jon Elster, *The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 98-9.

²⁵ James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, 'The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders', *International Organization*, 52, 4 (1998), 949-54.

²⁶ Shannon, 'Norms are What States Make of Them', 298.

²⁷ Chris Brown, 'Ethics, Interests and Foreign Policy' in Karen E. Smith and Margot Light (eds.), *Ethics and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 22-3; Gregory A. Raymond, 'Problems and Prospects in the Study of International Norms', *Mershon International Studies Review*, 41, 2 (1997), 218; Richard K. Herrmann and Vaughn P. Shannon, 'Defending International Norms: The Role of Obligation, Material Interest, and Perception in Decision Making', *International Organization*, 55, 3 (2001), 621-3.

²⁸ March and Olsen, 'The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders', 952-4.

²⁹ Paul Ricoeur, trans. David Pellauer, *The Just* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 12.

³⁰ Clyde Eagleton, *The Responsibility of States in International Law* (New York: New York University Press, 1928), 3.

³¹ A.C. Ewing, 'Responsibility Toward Oneself and Others', *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 11, 39 (1957), 51.

³² Richard McKeon, 'The Development and Significance of the Concept of Responsibility', *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 11, 39 (1957), 23-4.

³³ McKeon, 'The Development and Significance of the Concept of Responsibility', 25.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 26.

³⁵ *Statute of Westminster*, 1931.

³⁶ J.E.S. Fawcett, *The British Commonwealth in International Law* (London: Steven & Sons, 1963), 1.

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- ³⁸ J.D.B. Miller, *The Commonwealth in the World*, 3rd edition (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., 1965), 54.
- ³⁹ Ivor Jennings, *The British Commonwealth of Nations* (London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1961), 89.
- ⁴⁰ Hedley Bull, 'Britain and Australia in Foreign Policy' in J.D.B. Miller (ed.), *Australians and British: Social and Political Connections* (Sydney: Methuen, 1987), 103.
- ⁴¹ Hall, 'The British Commonwealth', 251.
- ⁴² Jennings, *British Commonwealth of Nations*, 94.
- ⁴³ Hall, 'The British Commonwealth', 253.
- ⁴⁴ Robert Menzies, 'The British Commonwealth of Nations in International Affairs', Roy Milne Memorial Lecture, Adelaide, 26 June 1950 (Sydney: Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1950), 4.
- ⁴⁵ Menzies, 'The British Commonwealth of Nations in International Affairs', 15.
- ⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 25.
- ⁴⁷ Stuart Ward, *Australia and the British Embrace: The Demise of the Imperial Ideal* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2001), 21.
- ⁴⁸ See Bongiorno, 'The Price of Nostalgia', 400-17; Ward, *Australia and the British Embrace*; and David McLean, 'From British Colony to American Satellite? Australia and the USA during the Cold War', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 52, 1 (2006), 72-3.

⁴⁹ 'Directive to the Supreme Commander in the Southwest Pacific Area', Appendix A in 'History of Establishment of Southwest Pacific Area', Department of Defence Co-Ordination, 24 Nov. 1942, NAA A5954/569/4

⁵⁰ 'Australian-New Zealand Agreement', 21 Jan. 1944, New Zealand Treaty Series 1944, No. 1, NZ Department of External Affairs (DEA), Wellington, NAA A989/1944/630/5/1/11/16

⁵¹ Policy Statement of the Department of State, 18 Aug. 1948, *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, 1948, Vol. VI, The Far East and Australasia, doc. 1.

⁵² 'Australia-New Zealand Conference: The Defence of the Southwest Pacific Region', Statement by The Rt. Hon. J. Curtin, M.P., Prime Minister of Australia, Canberra, 18 Jan. 1944, NAA A816/104/301/1; 'Defence in the Pacific', *The Times*, 19 Jan. 1944, NAA A2937/160/28/2/44; and 'Australian and New Zealand Interests in World Organisation', Australian-New Zealand Conference, Wellington, Oct. 1944, NAA A989/1944/630/5/1/11/16

⁵³ Alan Renouf, *Let Justice be Done: The Foreign Policy of Dr H.V. Evatt* (St Lucia, QLD: University of Queensland Press, 1983), 144-6; Wayne Reynolds, 'Dr H.V. Evatt: Foreign Minister for a Small Power' in David Day (ed.), *Brave New World: Dr H.V. Evatt and Australian Foreign Policy 1941-1949* (St Lucia, QLD: University of Queensland Press, 1996), 153-4; and Ken Buckley, Barbara Dale and Wayne Reynolds, *Doc Evatt: Patriot, Internationalist, Fighter and Scholar* (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1994), 226, 232.

⁵⁴ 'Report by the Joint Planning Committee at Meeting held on Friday, 25th June, 1948, Report No. 28/1948 - The Zone Vital to the Security of Australia', 25 June 1948, NAA A5954/1628/3

⁵⁵ See, for example, Senate, *Official Hansard*, No. 9, 2 March 1949, 18th Parl., 2nd Sess., 2nd Period, 798-831. On this theme, see David Lowe, *Menzies and the 'Great World Struggle': Australia's Cold War 1948-1954* (Sydney: UNSW Press, 1999), 20-21; and Lowe, 'Divining a Labor Line: Conservative Constructions of Labor's Foreign Policy, 1944-49' in David Lee and Christopher Waters (eds.), *Evatt to Evans*, 62-74.

⁵⁶ Christine De Matos, *Imposing Peace & Prosperity: Australia, Social Justice and Labour Reform in Occupied Japan* (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2008), 5, 28-9.

⁵⁷ De Matos, *Imposing Peace & Prosperity*, 23.

⁵⁸ Wayne Reynolds, *Australia's Bid for the Atomic Bomb* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2000), 25, 31-2.

⁵⁹ Christopher Waters, *The Empire Fractures: Anglo-Australian Conflict in the 1940s* (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 1995), 18-19.

⁶⁰ 'Statement to Parliament 10th February, 1944 on the Australia-New Zealand Agreement by the Rt. Hon. Dr. H.V. Evatt, Minister for External Affairs', 10 Feb. 1944, NAA A1066/P145/183; and 'Dr. Evatt's Statement in House of Reps. 8.11.46.', 8 Nov. 1946, NAA A1838/380/1/9

⁶¹ 'For the Press: Reply by Dr. Evatt in Debate in House of Representatives on Australian-New Zealand Agreement', 30 March 1944, NAA CP13/1/19

⁶² Quoted in Reynolds, *Australia's Bid for The Atomic Bomb*, 46-7.

⁶³ Frank Bongiorno, “‘British to the Bootstraps?’ H.V. Evatt, J.B. Chifley and Australian Policy on Indian Membership of the Commonwealth, 1947-49’, *Australian Historical Studies*, 125 (2005), 20.

⁶⁴ James Curran, *The Power of Speech: Australian Prime Ministers Defining the National Image* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2006), 28, 35-6.

⁶⁵ See excerpt from article in *Sunday News*, Singapore, 7 July 1947, NAA A1838/TS382/8/2/1/Part 2; ‘Appreciation of the Strategical Position of Australia, September, 1947’, NAA A816/14/301/352; ‘The Strategic Position of Australia - Review by the Chiefs of Staff Committee: Conclusions of the Council of Defence’, 20 April 1948, NAA A816/14/301/352; ‘Australia and Singapore’, *The Straits Times*, Singapore, 21 March 1947, NAA A1838/TS382/8/2/1, Part 2; and ‘Dr. Evatt’s Statement in House of Reps., 6.6.47’, 6 June 1947, NAA A1838/380/1/9

⁶⁶ ‘An Appreciation by The Chiefs of Staff of the Strategical Position of Australia’, Sept. 1947, NAA A5954/1628/3

⁶⁷ Policy Statement of the Department of State, 18 Aug. 1948, *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. VI, The Far East and Australasia, doc 1.

⁶⁸ Department of Defence, *ANZIM to ANZUK*.

⁶⁹ House of Representatives, *Official Hansard*, No. 11, 1946, Wednesday, 13 March 1946, 17th Parl., 3rd Sess., 2nd Period, 191.

⁷⁰ Reynolds, *Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb*, 40.

⁷¹ Quoted in ‘Australia’s Role in S.E. Asia’, *The Age*, 3 Jan. 1950, NAA A1838/381/3/1/1, Part 1

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