Ghana’s Foreign Policy Post-Independence:
A study of Kwame Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanism

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Abstract

This thesis employs the norm entrepreneurship approach to explore Ghana’s foreign policy during the post-independence era, with a particular focus on the country’s first President Kwame Nkrumah’s policy of Pan-Africanism. Pan-Africanism may be defined as the idea of protecting Africa’s self-determination, and promoting a sense of consciousness and group solidarity amongst people of African origin. This thesis critically examines Nkrumah’s leadership in the post-independence period, and the way in which his Pan-African ideal and legacy has continued to influence Ghana’s foreign policy engagement in the African region.

In tracing the evolution of Ghana’s foreign policy under Nkrumah, two main cases are examined — Ghana’s peacekeeping engagement in the 1960–1964 Congo mission and the creation of a continental bloc, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. Norm entrepreneurship theory provides new insight into Nkrumah’s attempts to reinforce, articulate, and communicate his vision of Pan-Africanism. Buoyed by his success post-Ghana’s independence, Nkrumah continued to present himself as a crucial vehicle for protecting Africa’s political and economic independence.

The concept of Pan-Africanism was vital in assisting Nkrumah articulate and champion Ghana’s path to achieve independence. It served to establish his leadership and his political networks. However, his devotion to the promotion of the Pan-African norm during his Presidency compromised his foreign policy choices and decisions; it was also paradoxical in view of the increasingly authoritarian leadership style he adopted in Ghana.

This thesis presents the complexity of post-independence foreign policy decision making and the influence of the post-colonial narrative. Leaders such as Nkrumah considered themselves as the redeemers of Africa’s political and economic vulnerability from its colonial experiences. This thesis finds that, in contrast to the positive experience associated with his independence movement for Ghana, Nkrumah could not build the same kind of vision, engagement, and networks necessary for successful promotion of a Pan-African region. Despite Nkrumah’s own foreign policy failures in the Congo and OAU’s formation, as well as his sudden departure after a military coup, Nkrumah’s Pan-African vision is still promoted as an important foreign policy legacy by Ghana’s politicians, public servants, military, and academics. I argue that this legacy endures because the independent, post-colonial narrative matters as much as the promotion of geopolitical and material interests. The struggle for independence and the right to independent self-determination was not just a geopolitical fight; it was a deeply personal one in the case of Nkrumah and the Ghanaian population.
Statement of Originality

This work has not previously been submitted for a degree or diploma in any university. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the thesis itself.

Charles Asante
14 December 2018

Disclosure

This research was conducted with human ethical clearance protocol GU 2016/291. I have kept the names of respondents confidential in accordance with their preferences. I can give the names of all respondents to an examiner upon request.
Acknowledgements

Dedicated to my late mother Ama and my late sister Yaa.
To my wife Ewurakua, and children Nhyira and Nana Kwame.

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15MSP</td>
<td>15th Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABAKO</td>
<td>Alliance of the Bakongo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACO</td>
<td>Alien Compliance Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRC</td>
<td>Armed Forces Revolutionary Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AYA</td>
<td>Ashanti Youth Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAA</td>
<td>Bureau of African Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAA</td>
<td>Council on African Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONAKAT</td>
<td>Confederation des Association Tribales du Katanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>Convention People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CYO</td>
<td>Committee on Youth Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERP</td>
<td>Economic Recovery Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNTC</td>
<td>Ghana National Trading Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>GYO</td>
<td>Ghana Youth Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBL</td>
<td>International Campaigns to Ban Landmines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFA</td>
<td>International Friends of Abyssinia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAHC</td>
<td>Joint African High Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAIPTC</td>
<td>Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LECIAD</td>
<td>Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGBT</td>
<td>Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFJ</td>
<td>Movement for Freedom and Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>Congolese National Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAACP</td>
<td>National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAL</td>
<td>National Alliance of Liberals</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCBWA</td>
<td>National Congress of British West Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCD</td>
<td>National Commission for Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDC</td>
<td>National Democratic Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NLC</td>
<td>National Liberation Council</td>
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<td>NPP</td>
<td>New Patriotic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>National Redemption Council</td>
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<td>NUGS</td>
<td>National Union of Ghana Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>Preventive Detention Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNDC</td>
<td>Provisional National Defence Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>People’s National Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>POGR</td>
<td>President’s Own Guard Regiment</td>
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<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Progress Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRAAD</td>
<td>Public Records and Archives Administration Department (Ghana)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMC</td>
<td>Supreme Military Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>TUC</td>
<td>Trades Union Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAR</td>
<td>United Arab Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>UGCC</td>
<td>United Gold Coast Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGFC</td>
<td>United Ghana Farmers’ Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIA</td>
<td>Universal Negro Improvement Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIGOV</td>
<td>Union Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMEER</td>
<td>United Nations Mission on Ebola Emergency Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>United Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WANS</td>
<td>West African National Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASU</td>
<td>West African Students Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>YPM</td>
<td>Young Pioneer Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>YWCA</td>
<td>Young Women Christian Association</td>
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Introduction

Background

The end of World War II saw the emergence of newly independent states following the end of imperialism across the globe, especially in the African continent. Territories, including the Gold Coast (Ghana), Nigeria, Kenya, Egypt, Nyasaland (now Malawi), Sierra Leone and the Gambia, remained under the British colonial rule as did Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Guinea and Mali under French colonial rule (Krasner, 1999). However, within two decades many of these territories gained independence. During this period, there was a wave of political reawakening throughout Africa. Individuals, exposed to education and experiences in the (democratic) Western world, returned home to fight for political and sovereign independence (Smith & Jeppesen, 2017). Sovereign independence was particularly vital to the decolonisation struggle (Smith, 1998; Shivji, 2003; Kieh, 2018; Mashingaidze, 1981).

In the International Relations (IR) scholarship on post-colonial statecraft and foreign policy engagement, it has been argued that this period was primarily characterised by two purposes: the protection of newly independent sovereignty and to secure territorial control (Krasner, 1999; Herbst, 2000; Young, 2001). The fight for independence from (mostly) British and French colonial rule has been presented as sometimes peaceful (e.g. Ghana and Nigeria) and sometimes not (e.g. Kenya, South Africa and Algeria) (Krasner, 1999; Smith & Jeppesen, 2017). In West African states like Ghana and Nigeria, despite some protests, independence was non-violent and the political transition was peaceful (Krasner 1999). However, in East and North Africa — particularly Kenya, Algeria and Morocco — the independence struggle was characterised by brutality and armed resistance (Smith & Jeppesen, 2017; Krasner, 1999). By the late 1960s, a majority of African territory was independent of colonial rule; 42 sovereign nations were admitted to the UN General Assembly (Anghie, 2004; Smith & Jeppesen, 2017; Ajaegbo, 1984).

After sovereign independence had been achieved, the next struggle was territorial control for the governing administration. For newly independent states, the post-colonial era required navigating Cold War realpolitik to secure power and resources during a period where the United States and the USSR were vying for access to key ports, bases and resources during their arms race (Shilliam, 2011; Birmingham, 1995).
Newly independent African states were compelled to navigate a new international order where they were still uncertain and vulnerable to powers greater than themselves. There were few examples of the foreign policy frameworks of newly independent states in this new international order emerging from World War II (Radice, 2008; Van Walraven & Abbink, 2003). How should a post-colonial state enter the Bretton Woods system? What should be the foreign policy values and objectives of a post-colonial leadership new to positions of influence and power?

There has been limited research on the process of foreign policy statecraft, and the role of leadership, in post-colonial Africa (Smith & Jeppesen, 2017; Grovogui, 2013; Young, 2004). However, according to Kets de Vries, Sexton and Ellen (2016), and Chabal (1992), leadership is key to understanding the emergence of post-colonial states’ foreign policy in Africa, and how they used (or wielded) their new power. Ghana and its independence leader, Kwame Nkrumah, is a particularly interesting study to complement the small amount of research on independent African foreign policy. Nkrumah was a key leader of Ghana’s independence movement, which peacefully achieved independence from British rule in 1957. Nkrumah, who then became President, is idolised today as an icon for African self-determination and independence. In the words of the African historian Ali Mazrui:

Nkrumah’s greatest bequest to Africa was the agenda of continental unification. No one else has made the case for continental integration more forcefully, or with greater sense of drama than Nkrumah. Although most African leaders regard the whole idea of a United States of Africa as wholly unattainable in the foreseeable future, Nkrumah even after his death has kept the debate alive […] through the continuing influence of his ideas (cited in Kumah-Abiwu & Ochwa-Echel, 2013, p. 123).

Similarly, as White (2003) writes:

Given Ghana’s preeminent position as the first independent African territory to be freed from colonialism, it became a symbol of hope [for Africa]. As the principle figure in Ghana’s … liberation, Kwame Nkrumah became the personification of that hope … ‘Kwame Nkrumah is Africa and Africa is Kwame Nkrumah’ (p. 100).

This thesis is a critical examination of the role of leadership in shaping a newly independent state’s foreign policy. This thesis seeks to understand why individuals such as Nkrumah become idolised and, in the case of Ghana, examine why his ideas and actions continue to shape Ghana’s foreign policy rationale today. This is a story of Ghana’s foreign policy in its early years of independence. I trace the ideas and events that shaped the foreign policy
leadership of President Nkrumah, seeking to understand the relationship between the ‘independence leader’ and his country’s emergence from colonial rule. I examine the crafting of Ghana’s foreign policy values, norms, and objectives as a post-colonial story. The ideas held by the individual, in this case Nkrumah, were a strong influence on the post-colonial state. His ideas — as much as geopolitical and material interests — shaped Ghana’s foreign policy choices. The struggle for independence and the right to independent self-determination was not just a geopolitical fight; it was deeply personal in the case of Nkrumah. As this thesis will demonstrate, Nkrumah’s personal ideology exerted immense influence on Ghana’s foreign policy actions in the 1950s and the 1960s.

In examining Ghana’s post-independence foreign policy, and the influence of leadership, this thesis seeks to contribute to the contemporary literature on post-colonial statecraft. It seeks to add another dimension to how post-independence states, specifically, the independence experience of their leaders, influenced their decisions when seeking to maintain sovereignty and power. The struggle for independence had a decisive, sometimes tragic, impact on the decisions that leaders such as Nkrumah adopted when devising domestic and foreign policy concerning territorial integrity.

**Research Question**

This thesis is guided by a primary question, and a related secondary question. First, how do norm entrepreneurs transition from independence movements to government? Second, why does the Pan-African norm endure in Ghana?

**Research Background**

There has been limited research on the relationship between the struggle for independence, the normative influence of leadership, and the creation of foreign policy in post-colonial Africa (see Gallagher, 2018; Van Walraven, 1999). In terms of the scholarship on Africa in the post-colonial period, the IR literature has tended to focus on the geopolitical impact of newly independent states claiming territorial sovereignty and the consequence of their emergence in the international system (Krasner 1976; Englebert 2000; Tarzi 2000). These are important works that guide the approach in this thesis.

Stephen Krasner’s (1981; 1999) work is particularly influential. His research focuses on the emergence of newly independent states in the post-World War II period. Krasner argues that post-independence foreign policy was primarily made to secure sovereignty and safeguard
territorial integrity; but he also notes that newly emerging states were fighting for equality and influence in an international system not of their making (Krasner, 1981).

Using the example of the states that emerged from the former British colonies, Krasner (1999) notes foreign policy was made to frustrate the still pervasive influence of European imperialism, especially in the 1950s and 1960s. This sometimes led to unlikely alliances amongst the leaders on the continent to counter what they saw as ‘colonial threats’ to their internal sovereignty (Krasner, 1981; 1985). Acharya (2007) concurs with this, arguing that the experience of colonialism was why post-colonial African states often resisted international laws and norms as ‘external interference’ (p. 647). According to Abi-Saab (1962) and Muschik (2018), upholding sovereignty was a crucial, non-negotiable goal of these newly independent states — especially after their persistent fight for liberation.

However, there were paradoxes and hypocrisy in post-colonial leadership and foreign policy. Young (2004) found that while the post-colonial African states were strong in rhetoric on their commitments to independence and the pursuit of economic independence, their development agenda, bureaucracy, class-ethnic privilege, and local administrative structures were often modelled on the legacy and standards of their colonisers and Western states models (Young, 2004). Ajayi (1982), Young (2004) and Grovogui (2013) observe that amongst these newly independent African states, especially in the middle of the twentieth century, political power was predominantly wielded by the leaders — sometimes brutally. Similar to colonial times, small ruling elites positioned themselves as independence champions and then used their state power to grab economic resources, which (further) widened the wealth gap between the leaders and the population (Beblawi, 1987; Collins, 2017; Mohan, 1968). Ajayi (1982) and Lazarus (1986) observe that the governments in the newly independent states were obsessed with protecting their political independence, and did little to strengthen domestic cohesion or improve the lives of those on whose behalf they claimed to have fought for independence.

This negative appreciation of the conduct of most of the post-colonial African states led Robert Jackson (1990) to ask whether the structures they inherited is the reason for these states’ inability to efficiently govern their people. Examining the sovereignty of new post-colonial states and statecraft, Jackson (1990) has argued that most of the newly emerged post-colonial African states only achieved what he defines as ‘negative sovereignty’, that is, freedom from foreign intervention (p. 1). For a state to flourish and thrive it must also achieve ‘positive sovereignty’ — not only territorial sovereignty and political independence, but also the capacity of governments to ensure the provision of essential needs of their populace (Jackson, 1990; also cited in Linklater, 2005, p. 102). Linklater (2005) observes that the effect
of the attainment of sovereignty by independent African states was only a continuation of territorial control as held by the colonial elites beforehand. The governing elites just replaced the leadership of a system that deprived individuals of their freedom and led to (more) violations of human rights in these states in the post-independence era. But this time, according to Jackson (1990), foreign policy positions became more fixated on non-interference with sovereignty. Post-colonial states would protest even at the most minimum level of external interference.

However, the paradox between the independence struggle and the weak, despotic, corrupt rule that followed is less easy to grasp (Deng, Kimaro, Lyons, Rothchild & Zartman, 1996). Miller (1990) points out that these new states emerged on the foundations of ideals held by leaders who strongly desired freedom against colonisation. In the same vein, Krasner (1981) traces the promise of post-colonial independence movements and points out that most of the movements presented a new kind of governance and a foreign policy that was anti-colonial and anti-chauvinist, which resonated with the masses. Was it the international system they entered — characterised by rivalry and hierarchy — that explains why these states reverted to neocolonisation?

Solingen (2013) contends that the internal governance struggle emerged more strongly in the post-independence period as states were exposed to Cold War realpolitik geopositioning and bargaining. States had to participate in an international system where they were not equals; their regimes were most vulnerable to fragile state-building processes and economic downturns, and leaders mistook dictatorship as an indication of stable rule (Solingen, 2013).

At this point, we may observe two main camps that begin to emerge to explain the influence of statecraft and leadership in post-colonial African states. The first group, introduced above, presents the choices made by leaders as rational and responsive to the international system within which they were located (i.e. Krasner, 1999; Jackson, 1990; Young, 2004; Grovogui, 2013). These leaders are making decisions within domestic and international systems not of their own making; they maximise notions of statehood, sovereignty, power and economic gain to survive. They mimic the colonial powers and structures because the system remains hierarchical and vulnerable to the Cold War expansion of realpolitik. The second camp, which I examine below, concurs with the above but identifies the importance of ideas. The post-independence movement and the ideologies fuelling this movement were primary, if misguided motivations, for decisions taken.

Karen Mingst (2003) has examined the influence of individual actors and their role in shaping the policies of post-independence states. Mingst argues that the personal ideals of
leaders underpinned the decisions made by these newly independent states, and that the nationalist ideas and beliefs of political leaders should not be disregarded in foreign policy analysis. According to Mingst and Arreguin-Toft (2013), post-colonial leaders sought significant influence because they were still ‘fighting’ for their states’ existence. Their experience and challenge in forging independent political institutions evolved in periods of contestation and/or crisis. Foreign policies of independent states were fashioned by events (in both national and international domains), interests, and equally important, the normative positions of their political leaders, specifically the founding elites (Mingst, 2003; Finnemore & Goldstein, 2013). Shared experiences created shared norms (shared expectations amongst a community of members, see Finnemore 1996b, p. 22), and the ideas that inspired the independence struggle reinforced the identity — the entrepreneurship — of the post-independence leaders and their foreign policy. These leaders were the norm entrepreneurs and their quest for independence was a change to prior understanding of who could hold sovereign power in the international system. Post-colonial leaders conflated their achievements and saw themselves as the guardians of the new norm of sovereign independence (Mingst, 2003). Therefore, the choices of these leaders, the changes they individually underwent, and their experiences in the early years of independence are vital periods to study in order to understand how the ideas they heard influenced behaviour — in this case, how the normative advancement of post-independence statecraft influenced foreign policy decisions (Katzenstein, 2005).

We can see from above that different institutional explanations are emphasised when explaining the foreign policy statecraft that emerged in post-colonial Africa. The nature of the international system, and its precondition for sovereign independence to gain membership, has led to one set of explanations that depict post-independence states as ‘rational’ self-interested actors. The alternative explanation does not dispute the influence of material considerations — but argues for equal consideration and focus on the influence of ideology in framing the foreign policy actions of these post-colonial states. The power of the ideology behind the post-colonial movement was, as Mingst (2003) notes, strong. This is why we have seen states adopt policies that was not consistently ‘rational’, and sometimes self-destructive to their economic and political advantage (Finnemore & Goldstein, 2013). Nevertheless, I do not suggest that this study should be a sympathetic study of leadership. As Francis Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild and William Zartman argued in 1996, post-colonial African states sometimes used statecraft in ways that failed to protect their people against atrocious crimes or situations, and led to the rise of human rights abuses, especially in the post-colonial period. This history makes it even more important to study how and when the ideology behind the
post-colonial movement — to be free and independent — failed. This thesis is a critical examination of the role of leadership in shaping a newly independent state’s foreign policy. This thesis seeks to understand why individuals such as Nkrumah become idolised and, in the case of Ghana, examine why his ideas and actions continue to shape Ghana’s contemporary foreign policy rationale.

**Importance of the Case: Ghana and Nkrumah**

Why Ghana? To date, a majority of the literature on post-colonial states has focused on countries including India, Venezuela, Indonesia, Malaysia, and African states including Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, and Algeria (see Finnemore & Goldstein, 2013; Krasner, 1999; Young, 2012). Ghana has received minimal attention in IR literature for a number of reasons (exceptions are Mohan, 1969; Gerits, 2015; Gallagher, 2018). It is a small state located on the West Coast; its independence transition was relatively peaceful; and it is in the same continent with bigger geopolitical states whose independence ‘mattered’: Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt and Algeria. But Ghana’s normative legacy under Nkrumah is often discussed as an influence on Africa’s foreign policy identity (see Smith & Jeppesen, 2017; Fuller, 2014a; Vitalis, 2013). Crucially, Ghana’s independence struggle has been re-evaluated as a ‘tipping point’ for the independence struggles that followed. As Young (2012) argues ‘Ghanaian independence was decisive in creating a sense of the inevitability of imminent decolonization, which was not present…earlier’ (p. 3). Hence, Ghana is an important case because it meets some of the literature’s expectations about post-colonial foreign policy — power and sovereignty, the rational decision-making choices before a small African state on the West Coast surrounded by larger, influential post-independence states — but it challenges them too. Nkrumah was not the leader of a powerful state; yet, he had big ambitions and a vision of Africa that dominated Ghana’s foreign policy. This ambition came to dominate Ghana’s foreign policy decisions, its trade relationships, and the country’s own political stability. To this end, I want to understand where Nkrumah’s vision of a Pan-African foreign policy came from and the impact it had on Ghana’s foreign policy engagement in the post-colonial era.

I am conducting a single case study that explores the leadership of Nkrumah and his legacy regarding Ghana’s foreign policy. The case of Ghana’s post-colonial story illustrates clearly the tensions in the literature between macro (international system) and micro (individual leadership) explanations. There is growing consensus on Ghana’s political history concerning
this very charismatic and strong individual who played a very important role in the post-colonial struggle for independence on the African continent (Gerits, 2015; Gallagher, 2018). At the same time, he was an individual who was quite flawed and made decisions that compromised Ghana’s economic growth and emergence of democratic governance post-independence (Thompson, 1969b). It was important for Ghana to protect and maintain its sovereignty as a small state that was not particularly strong in a geopolitical sense in the West African region. But Nkrumah’s ambition for Ghana as the promoter of Pan-Africanism (one United States of Africa) was beyond its economic and geopolitical influence despite the character of one strong individual.

This thesis aims to explore why Nkrumah had this strong normative ambition for Ghana’s foreign policy engagement, despite any ‘rational’ understanding of Ghana’s power to redefine African geopolitics. As Smith and Jeppesen (2017) argue, Ghana under Nkrumah’s leadership sought to bring a wave of political change and influence in the struggle for independence in Africa. The ideas he championed have created an almost mythical personality in the context of discussions on Ghana’s political history and its foreign policy agenda. In examining the case of Ghana/Nkrumah, this study is inspired by the norm entrepreneurship approach.

The Norm Entrepreneurship Approach

In this thesis, I use norm entrepreneurship as a framework in tracing the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah as he transitioned between independence movement and government. This approach helps in tracing the power of a post-colonial leader’s ideas in shaping the foreign-policy decision making of his state. As a constructivist method, the significance here is about the introduction of ideas that change the behaviour of states (Krook & True, 2012). So, the idea is that states engage in actions and policies that are seen to be acceptable. These ideas or policies do not just come from nowhere; they come from individuals and social movements (see Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Nadelmann, 1990). Here, we have an independence movement on the continent of Africa being led by a very charismatic individual — Nkrumah. He was a leader with a vision (an idea) which he attempted to persistently champion. Therefore, the conceptual framework underpinning this study — norm entrepreneurship — is to serve as a roadmap in tracing what this political leader did in post-colonial Ghana and Africa. This approach is critical in understanding the political trajectory of Nkrumah, especially how he
transitioned from a non-state actor (outside formal institutions) to a state actor (Ghana’s President), and how he endeavoured to influence normative advancement.

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), and Davies and True (2017) note that in promoting new norms, entrepreneurs attempt to frame the problem, build networks, create organisational platforms and capture political opportunities. By using these approaches to norm entrepreneurship, the thesis illustrates how Nkrumah’s leadership inspired a wave that swept across the African continent. Simply put, this framework will help to understand how Nkrumah articulated the pan-African idea of independence and unity in his attempt to rescue the African continent from colonial powers — particularly between the 1950s and 1960s. Furthermore, it shows the alliances he formed, as well as the organisational platforms (domestic structures) he needed to advance this agenda of pan-Africanism. The norm entrepreneurship framework identifies how entrepreneurial actors try to seize windows of opportunities, and therefore this thesis relates it to developments during Nkrumah’s leadership in the subsequent chapters. This research has found that although Nkrumah succeeded in using the first three — framing, networking and using organisational platforms — he failed to effectively manage the last (political opportunities), a shortcoming that eventually led to the end of his leadership in 1966.

Ghana’s Post-Colonial History and How it Has Been Understood

To what extent is Ghana’s identity within African regional politics understood through the lens of Kwame Nkrumah’s influence as its first post-independence leader? As discussed earlier, IR scholarship has not particularly engaged with Ghana’s political and foreign policy evolution since its independence. The majority of literature on African post-independence states focus on their foreign policy decision-making as being influenced by external powers (namely the US and USSR) during the Cold War; the desire to assert sovereign independence; and a race to economically develop and expand (often derailed by foreign interference and power grabs by the political elite) (Ajayi, 1982; Collins, 2017). The role of individual leaders has been given less attention as an explanation. However, in the small collection of literature on Ghana’s political history, the majority of scholarship points to the legacy of Nkrumah (Saaka, 1994). Kuma-Abiwu (2016) and Bluwey (2002), for example, argue that Nkrumah’s rule is the only way to explain the history of Ghana supporting post-colonial independence and its regular participation in peacekeeping operations.

The risk with this analysis, however, is that Nkrumah then becomes a hero against the colonisers and the ‘West’ — whose pre-eminence overshadows the consequences of his actual
leadership in Ghana. Norm entrepreneurship scholarship presents a method by which to critically engage with political elite narratives. Norm entrepreneurship focuses on why particular individuals and events are associated with particular norms; it promotes (re)tracing the events and individuals to ‘deconstruct’ the narrative. The constructivist method requires that we retrace the evolution of ideas, individuals, networks, and events often grouped together to explain why a norm exists, why it is rational, and how it should inform actors’ behaviour and engagement (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; 2001; Davies & True 2017). In this thesis I examine how the idea of Pan-Africanism — defined as the promotion of African union, self-determination, a sense of consciousness and group solidarity — has been closely associated with Nkrumah and continues to influence Ghana’s foreign policy identity today.

Ghana’s political history, particularly its foreign policy, has been symbolised as a pioneer in the Pan-African fight for liberation from colonialism, a strong advocate of African integration, and today, it is used to explain Ghana’s position as a peacekeeping country and a strong advocate of humanitarian interventions (Gerits, 2015). However, Ghana is also a country that had its foremost leader removed through a coup d’état and consequently, endured several years of military rule. This narrative is rarely told when speaking of Ghana’s legacy as a peacekeeping state, and thus, we need to critically examine how this contradiction in Ghana’s own history and foreign policy has evolved. Below, I present contemporary scholarship on Ghana’s foreign policy evolution and identify two primary narratives: the contribution of the political elite and the legacy of hegemonic militarisation.

The first is an understanding premised on the influence of the political elite, specifically its first President (Nkrumah), as an overshadowing individual in Ghana’s political history that created little space for critical thought able to challenge elite governing institutions. This narrative presents and attaches Ghana’s post-independence foreign policy around the myth of Nkrumah, who is considered the centre of the country’s post-colonial story and engagement with the greater African region and the world. I will then contrast this narrative with the militarisation narrative, from those who contend that Ghana’s foreign policy objectives remain very much characterised by the military coups that followed (because of) Nkrumah’s rule.

The role of the political elite (The Nkrumah factor)

The first collection of literature recognises the significant role the political elite, such as Kwame Nkrumah, has played in framing Ghana’s political history over the years. Thus, this group of scholarly works portrays Ghana’s political history from the perspective of how political elites have shaped the turn of events in Ghana since independence. In other words,
this pool of scholars traces the foreign policy engagement of Ghana to Nkrumah. In his book, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 1957–1966*, W. S. Thompson (1969) argues that following Ghana’s independence, ‘competing elite groups with different interests’ attempted to influence the foreign policy as well as politics of the country (p. 15). These political elites, as Owusu (1972) observes, are the ‘Big Men’ or leading political figures who wield substantial power when in political office. The ‘Big Men’ policy-making process is a legacy of Nkrumah and it continues to influence the country’s public policy decision-making process (Burton & Higley, 2001).

In Ghana, scholars who primarily associate Nkrumah (or the political elite) with Ghana’s political history believe that his legacy has made Ghana a beacon of hope and inspiration for the independence of other African states as well as a symbol of Pan-Africanism (Ignatova, 2017; Feit, 1968). In other words, Ghana is seen as a model of political liberation and Pan-African unity in Africa. The arguments are, for the most, uncritical of elite-led politics and decision making in Ghana. As Apter (1968) broadly states, Ghana is represented as ‘a symbol: to the British, of their liberalism; to the Americans, of anti-colonialism; to Negro Americans, of a change in attitude toward their historical and cultural past… In Africa, … [as] a freedom from [colonialism]…’ (p. 757). According to Oppong and Oppong (2003), Ghana’s attainment of independence, as well as its ‘leading’ role in the struggle for liberation of the African continent from colonialism, are attributable to Nkrumah’s leadership. Lumsden (1980) argues that Ghana’s political history has been dominated by its former President, Kwame Nkrumah, whose efforts eradicated colonialism from the country and caused a political reawakening in Africa.

Similarly, Buah (1980) wrote that Ghana achieved ‘historic recognition’ in Africa and across the globe because its political elite — Nkrumah — showed ‘dedication to the cause of the liberation struggle’ and delivered a deep-seated sense of nationalism to Ghana, Africa and amongst the black world.

The narrative of the benevolent ‘political elite’ justifies the ‘Big Men’ continued position of influence over the people and reaffirms their own mythical image (Svanikier, 2007; Owusu, 1972; Miller, 1974; Osei, 2015). In the final report on Ghana’s democracy and governance assessment, Fox, Hoffman, Anyimadu, and Keshishian (2011) note that Ghana’s political history has been dominated by the political elite, first led by Nkrumah, who captured leadership positions with supreme political power. Challenging foreign policy decisions and direction is almost impossible under these conditions. Khadiagala and Lyons (2001) show the extent to which elites use their own networks to create personal political opportunity which influences larger domestic and foreign policy decisions.
The ingrained promotion of elite political networks in Ghana has resulted in very little critical reflection and analysis of Ghana’s foreign policy choices. Fuller (2014a) notes that Ghana’s political history is nearly always associated with the legacy of the political elite, particularly Nkrumah. The narrative is always positive and self-promotes Ghana’s role in African independence politics. Ghana under Nkrumah is described as ‘laying’ the foundation for political nationalism in Africa (Fuller, 2014a). As van den Boogaard (2017) notes, Nkrumah’s leadership is always presented as the reason why Ghana holds a ‘significant position’ in the narrative of the historical struggle against colonialism throughout Africa. Yakohene (2009), Owusu (1989) and Apter (1968) all refer to the significance of Ghana as the first Sub-Saharan African country to have attained political independence, and link this achievement to Nkrumah. Austin (1970) argues that during Nkrumah’s leadership Ghana was the pioneer of political change on the continent of Africa. To this end, the significance of Ghana’s political history during the post-colonial era has led Asante (1997) to argue that Nkrumah’s legacies ‘continue to haunt successive governments to this day’, because Nkrumah was determined, passionate and committed (pp. 29–31).

Aryeetey and Kanbur (2017) have recently observed that Ghana’s independence identity was achieved on the basis of a strong ideal of a leader who had ‘tenacity of purpose and strong desire’ to lead the entire Africa into a period of political change (p. 3). Yakohene (2009) points out that Ghana’s political history traces its roots to the leadership role played by Nkrumah, whose foreign policy attempted to liberate and integrate the African continent and, as a result, made Ghana influential in both African and international affairs. Mazrui (1995) argues that in any discussion of the political history of Ghana, its Pan-African identity and projects concerning African independence and unity, ‘Kwame Nkrumah is immortalized’ (p. 35). In support of Mazrui’s claim, Oppong and Oppong (2003) argue that Nkrumah ‘remains a hero’ in Ghana and the entire African continent (p. 11). They go on to argue that because Ghana broke free from the shackles of colonialism, it led (and continues to lead) — through its significant contribution of troops to UN peacekeeping missions — the fight for freedom across Africa (Oppong & Oppong, 2003).

The significance of Nkrumah’s leadership is often aligned with Ghana’s contribution of troops to international peacekeeping operations, through United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) missions (Aning & Edu-Afful, 2017; Uzonyi, 2015). Today, Ghana is the tenth largest contributor to UN peacekeeping missions, and the fourth largest contributor to AU missions (Aning & Edu-Afful 2017). According to Aning (2007), ‘[o]ne of the countries with a respected and enviable tradition for peace operations internationally is Ghana’ (p. 133).
Similarly, the former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan (2000) stated that ‘Ghana’s sterling record in peacekeeping since the early 1960s deserves to be celebrated’ (p. i).

This significant contribution has been associated to Nkrumah’s legacy by today’s political and academic elite. Aning and Edu-Afful (2017) contend that throughout the history of Ghana, consecutive regimes after Nkrumah have ‘not wavered’ and they have all continuously showed commitment in responding to the call for peacekeeping operations. The legacy of Nkrumah is often referred to, specifically Ghana’s first participation in the United Nations peacekeeping mission in 1960 to 1964 in the Congo (Kotia, 2015; Coleman, 2011).

Franke (2006), Victor (2010), and Levine (2016) all refer to Ghana’s peacekeeping role, especially in other African states in crisis, as a key part of its foreign policy inspired by the Pan-African ideas established by its first President, Nkrumah. Levine (2016) notes that Ghana’s identity is characterised by its involvement in international peacekeeping missions, a foundation that was laid by the country’s first leader Kwame Nkrumah in the post-independence period. Despite the internal military unrests in Ghana, Levine (2016) argues that Ghana’s participation in peacekeeping operations, especially in Africa, helped the Ghanaian troops to ‘resolve’ internal skirmishes. Adebajo (2003) contends that Ghana’s contribution to peacekeeping operations has been at the centre of Ghana’s political history and foreign policy dating back to the government of Kwame Nkrumah in the 1960s, particularly concerning the quest for African independence and unity through involvement in the Congo crisis.

Collectively, scholarly works have pointed to the legacy of its first post-independence leader, Nkrumah, and his first participation in the Congo peacekeeping mission, as an important turning point for Ghana’s foreign policy identity (Svaniker, 2007). To this end, Nkrumah has been presented as a leader who inspired, made decisions that influenced Ghana’s position in the African region, and whose legacy endures to this day. Ghana’s foreign policy is still premised on the basic tenets laid down by Nkrumah (Debrah, 2002). Former Ghana Defence Minister Addo-Kufour (2015) argues that ‘[d]ecades after his death Nkrumah continues to be a hero [in Ghana and] to many on the African continent and in the Diaspora’ (p. 223). In academic scholarship on Ghana, the names of Nkrumah and Ghana are closely intertwined in discussions on Ghana’s role in international relations.

**Militarisation**

The second narrative is that Ghana’s successive phases of military rule have been pivotal in defining its foreign policy rationale. Namely, the cycle of internal military unrest in Ghana drove its participation in peacekeeping operations in order to minimise the risk of internal
conflict (Levine, 2016). The narrative may be Ghana’s contribution to protect African values and sovereignty, but the reality is that troop commitment reduces the risk of internal military coups and crisis (Levine, 2016). This particular scholarship focuses on what I shall call the ‘hegemonic militarisation’ narrative, that has shaped and defined Ghana’s identity. Nkrumah is presented as the more appealing story of Ghana’s post-independence because the reality is that for almost two decades, Ghana has endured a succession of five military overthrows or coups (Gambles, 2000; Ayee, 1997).

Ghana has been rightly identified by scholars such as Apter (1968), Yakohene (2009) and Owusu (1989) as the first African country (south of the Sahara) to obtain independence, and a strong promoter of African liberation and unification. However, Oppong and Oppong (2003) note that Ghana was also one of the first countries post-independence to experience the military overthrow of an elected regime. Ghana was a country that had its leader removed through a coup and as a result, went through a long period of military regimes (1966–1981). As Gyimah-Boadi (2008) notes, Ghana — the doyen and pacesetter of African independence history — had become a militarised state, characterised by inept, corrupt and unconstitutional military governments (Yakohene, 2009; Mensah, 2010). Presenting the Nkrumah legacy and peacekeeping engagement as a legacy of the pan-African ideology was useful for successive repressive military regimes.

Despite the hegemonic militarisation of Ghana during this period, Ball (1981) argues that what is important to note about each government removal in Ghana is that they were all still being driven by the political elite’s attempts to interfere with (and influence) appointments and promotions within the army. Officers would then mount coups to wrest control and reassert their authority (Ball, 1981; Gyimah-Boadi, 1994). However, the military always (unsurprisingly) justified their actions in the context of saving Ghana — and used Nkrumah’s language of ‘restoring’ its post-colonial ‘independence’ and autonomy from the political elite (Hutchful, 1997). The military successively used the Nkrumah independence narrative because when it was first deployed by the military in the 1966 coup against Nkrumah it was believed to be true (Svanikier 2007). The first period of militarisation in Ghana’s political history was driven by the conduct of a corrupt political elite led by Nkrumah, who was deemed to be a risk to the survival of the Ghanaian state. This narrative of the military as both saviour and oppressor originates from the legacy of Nkrumah’s rule — who is also paradoxically viewed as both a freedom fighter and oppressor. These rival but intertwined narratives require further examination. This thesis seeks to provide a critical understanding of Nkrumah’s normative
legacy: the narratives around the events and ideas that are attached to his legacy and his foreign policy engagements as Ghana’s first President.

The literature on post-colonial foreign policy focuses heavily on rational explanations — state sovereignty and the accumulation of power explain most actions, with ideas and leadership as secondary considerations that are thus lesser driving forces. Ghana provides an interesting case because it contradicts the narrative. It had little geopolitical power but sought great geopolitical influence. Leadership is still regarded as the most important feature of Ghana’s political legacy, despite this leadership leading to a military coup that was supported by most of the population. There are contradictions in Ghana’s own narrative of its foreign policy legacy. The Ghana literature has focused heavily on the influence of ‘big man’ politics — the Nkrumah factor — and his legacy in ending existing colonial power structures (see Utas, 2012; Price, 1974). But there is little critical analysis of the fact that he perpetuated power structures that privileged a small elite over the majority. Nor is there strong evidence of critical analysis of the contradictory position of Ghana’s large contribution to peacekeeping missions to promote pan-African ideals of independence and self-rule, when its own recent history privileged military rule and ‘big man’ politics.

Clearly ideas matter. Ghana’s elites — whether the military or political elite — used Nkrumah’s ideas to persuade and legitimise their actions. To date, there has been little critical examination of Nkrumah’s ideas, his leadership, or his actions as an entrepreneurial actor in the post-colonial period. Nkrumah is an interesting choice to examine the relationship between state interests and individual ideas because of his personal transition. Nkrumah transitioned from a non-state norm entrepreneur of an independence movement to a state leader who championed a pan-African union of sovereign states. He led a state that was amongst the first to gain independence and amongst the first to descend into successive military takeovers. Nkrumah’s leadership is presented today as the reason for Ghana’s foreign policy engagement and positions on matters such as peacekeeping contributions.

This thesis will deconstruct the narrative of Nkrumah’s leadership and how his ideas have continued to shape Ghana’s foreign policy.

Understanding Nkrumah’s Normative Legacy

The review of the literature indicates that in the political history of Ghana there has been more emphasis on the influence of elite figures in shaping the country’s foreign policy, especially its first Presidential leader Kwame Nkrumah. There is consensus in the analysis above that the
legacy of Nkrumah, as an individual, remains significant in explaining Ghana’s foreign policy choices. Even during Ghana’s military experience from 1966 to 1981, the dominance of political elitism was used to both justify and coerce. As noted above, Nkrumah’s leadership itself paved the way for the country’s first military overthrow but at the same time, his language and his ideals are often used, to this day, to justify Ghana’s foreign policy choices.

Debrah’s claim that regimes after Nkrumah followed ‘the traditional foreign policy of Ghana’ (Debrah, 2002, p. 28), is a reference to the foreign policies laid down under Nkrumah’s government. These policies include upholding the independence (or sovereignty) of Ghana; promoting cooperation or integration with other African states; and active membership and support for African regional groupings (Debrah, 2002). Asante (1997) maintains that Nkrumah’s legacy continues to exist. The danger, highlighted by Bretton in 1966, was that the myth surrounding Nkrumah’s ascent as the independence leader would overshadow his conduct as a political leader. When we look at the Ghanaian literature on the history of its foreign policy, we see Bretton’s point — the majority of the scholarship takes an uncritical view of Nkrumah and his legacy. Because of the military coups that followed his leadership, he has come to be considered as a mythical, almost heroic independence leader whose wisdom should continually inform Ghana’s political choices (Haynes, 1992, p. 44).

This thesis conducts a much-needed critical examination of Nkrumah and his impact on Ghana’s foreign policy. Although Nkrumah was a significant norm entrepreneur, he was also a flawed one. Moreover, in examining Nkrumah’s legacy, I add to the literature to date that seeks to explain how post-independence countries in Africa came to create their foreign policy agenda. I argue that Nkrumah reveals the paradox whereby these individuals manage a transition from political rebels — outsiders who were being oppressed by colonial regimes — to sudden heroes with immense unchecked power because of the persuasive force of their ideas. It is important to trace how leaders manage this unique transition from norm entrepreneurs to flawed political leaders. There is no leader who more clearly illustrates this paradox than Nkrumah.

By and large, the above review has explored two main schools of thought on Ghanaian foreign policy to date. First, there are scholars who understand Ghana primarily from the angle of Nkrumah’s influence and associate him solely with Ghana’s post-independence foreign policy direction. These scholars maintain that Ghana’s achievement and position in Africa and the world regarding Pan-African independence and continental unity, as well as its role in various interventions, are largely premised on the legacy of Nkrumah or the political elite.
These scholars almost mythologise Nkrumah as the symbol of anti-colonialism and guarantor of African independence.

The second collection of scholarship, however, notes that Nkrumah’s rule and influence led to a series of military coups (Svanikier, 2007). Militarisation may primarily explain the state’s engagement in peacekeeping operations today, and the rhetorical use of Nkrumah’s language is just that — it has no meaning other than to persuade those listening that military governments are no threat to surrounding sovereigns. However, the persuasive power of Nkrumah’s language points to the impact and legacy of Kwame Nkrumah in how Ghana sees itself and is seen in its region. In order to understand why and how Nkrumah crafted this status, it is important to not just analyse the role of norm entrepreneurship in post-colonial contexts, but also, to critically examine why post-colonial leaders like Nkrumah and their ideas are continually used by political elites to exert influence on a country’s foreign policy, even today.

**Methodology**

In my critical assessment of a leader, his legacy and his influence in a state in the post-colonial period, I have conducted historical analysis to trace how an individual has transitioned from a non-state norm entrepreneur to a state norm entrepreneur and his role in shaping his country’s foreign policy. Historical analysis helps to ‘seek implications or relations of events from the past and their connection with the present’ (Lune & Berg, 2017, p. 159). Again, conducting historical analysis helps to ‘assess past activities and accomplishments of individual [actors or states]’ in order to gain an understanding of the context and meaning of these particular events and actions (Lune & Berg, 2017, p. 159). In effect, to deconstruct the historical narrative of Nkrumah’s leadership and entrepreneurship, and how his pan-African ideas have continued to influence Ghana’s foreign policy, discourse analysis has been used. This is described by Gray (2018) as analysis centred on ‘how both spoken and written language is used in social contexts’ (p. 704). In this way, the writings, discussions and speeches of Nkrumah are explored to understand the power of the idea of pan-Africanism in his domestic and foreign policy engagements. Similarly, the thesis examines the endurance of the pan-African norm in speeches and writings of Ghanaian leaders in the post-independence period. This analysis brings significant insights pertaining to the consequence and importance of the legacy of the man who has been considered as the most influential person in the political history of Ghana.
Even though Nkrumah failed as a political leader in the earlier stage of Ghana’s post-independence era, what the thesis identifies is the endurance of his ideas.

I have also used a qualitative single case study to provide a comprehensive discussion of how leadership affects the choices of post-colonial states. According to Yin (2003, p. 1), the case study approach ‘contribute[s] to our knowledge of individual, group, organizational, social, political, and related phenomena’. The single case study method or approach examines a single case comprehensively; it gives a detailed or holistic account of a specific phenomenon or subject (Gray, 2018; Lune & Berg, 2017). In this way, the importance or purpose of using the single case is that it allows the researcher to explore in greater depth the events or experiences of individuals (George & Bennett, 2005; Creswell, 2014). The single case method helps to discover the ‘interactions of significant factors characteristic of this [particular] phenomenon, individual, community, or institution’ (Lune & Berg, 2017, p. 171).

In tracing the history of Nkrumah — his legacy and his leadership — I have also used a wide range of primary and secondary literature. I accessed biographies and primary materials that were available from that period. I made use of Nkrumah’s own writings, as well as interviewed people who knew him personally. The Parliament of Ghana research library also gave me access to materials on Nkrumah’s foreign policy directives, particularly his Pan-African policy initiative. I have also made use of electronic databases. For example, I sourced significant documents on formative years of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) from the African Union’s website. Similarly, I obtained speeches of Ghanaian leaders and reports from the websites of Ghanaian media houses including Graphic Corporations and Myjoyonline.com, and political parties. I also obtained reports and historical documents from websites of the UN and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

I have drawn on archival documents or materials including Nkrumah’s post-colonial foreign policies, meetings and Pan-African engagements in Africa in his quest for continental independence and unity, which I obtained from the Public Records and Archives Administration Department (PRAAD) in Accra, Ghana. These documents show Nkrumah’s correspondence or communications with other African leaders as part of his attempts to promote his ideal of continental integration. However, the challenge here was that some of the documents were not well organised and sorting them out was time consuming. I also utilised Pan-African archival documents and Nkrumah’s written memoirs from the George Padmore research library and the Du Bois Pan-African Centre in Accra, Ghana, in order to gather detailed accounts of the leadership of Nkrumah as well as his foreign policy direction in post-colonial Ghana. These documents brought to light his over-commitment to the course of Pan-
Africanism and his early relationship with other Pan-Africanists such as Padmore and Du Bois. Likewise, the archival documents gave me access to a majority of Nkrumah’s speeches and interactions as the President of Ghana between 1957 and 1966 — particularly those pertaining to his organised Pan-African Conferences in Ghana and intervention in the Congo political crisis — and his speeches at meetings of the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU). I also accessed materials on presidential speeches from electronic media sources.

Furthermore, I obtained materials on Ghana’s first peacekeeping operation under Nkrumah’s regime specifically during the Congo case, 1960–1964, from the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre (KAIPTC) Library and the University of Ghana libraries including the Balme Library, Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD) Resource Library and the Institute of African Studies Library. From these sources, I also explored the biographical accounts of Nkrumah’s life and his period as the first President of the newly independent state, Ghana. The documents also helped me to explore the political history of Ghana, in particular, how Ghana’s foreign policy has been built on the foundations laid down by Nkrumah over the years. These historical documents were essential in tracing nods of norms of pan-Africanism especially in the speeches and writings of successive Ghanaian post-independence leaders.

In addition, I conducted follow-up interviews (semi-structured) to clarify timelines and positions, particularly amongst Ghanaian scholars and government officials (both past and present), on this idea of leadership and its importance in foreign policy. The use of semi-structured interviews, as Gray (2018) explains, is to help ‘probe for more detailed responses’ from my interviewees. These interviews gave significant insights into the story of the man whose legacy and influence has widely dominated the history and foreign policy rationale of Ghana. I recorded and transcribed the interviews, and have them on file. The only interview that was not recorded was the one conducted at the office of the President — where recording was disallowed by the law enforcement agents for ‘security reasons’. The interview transcripts were analysed for evidence of pan-African discourses in Ghana’s political history, as well as to demonstrate the enduring success of Nkrumah’s norm diffusion across successive governments. The research has identified that successive government have articulated traits of Nkrumah’s ideas (this is discussed in Chapter Seven). The interviewees/respondents include academics, Ghanaian foreign policy experts, officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, Ministry of Defence, and the office of the President of Ghana. In particular, within the Foreign Ministry I interviewed directors, policy experts and ambassadors — both past and present. All requested anonymity. As noted earlier, this approach was to help
elucidate an understanding of leadership and its significance with respect to foreign policy. Other interviewees include Members of Parliament in the Foreign Affairs Committee, particularly minority and majority whips (representatives), as well as erstwhile emissaries who had personally served in the Nkrumah-led government or had witnessed his leadership.

A number of the interviews were obtained through snowballing, that is, one interviewee recommended or personally linked me to another person who could be of help to speak on the subject. I sourced some of the interviewees through correspondence with media houses that had their personal contacts. All the interviews were conducted in English as this is the official language of Ghana, which made it easier for me to communicate with respondents. The duration of the interviews was between half hour and one hour. I took notes during and after the interviews to avoid loss of key information and for record keeping. Prior to the interviews, I contacted some of the respondents directly and in some cases, particularly with government officials, I had to book appointments through their receptionists, secretaries and personal aides. I also contacted political party executives to link me to some interviewees. One high-ranking former government official — Ghana’s long-serving foreign minister — declined to speak to me and insisted I bought a book he has written on Ghana’s foreign policy. Likewise, the special assistant to a former president told me ‘the old man’ has stopped granting interviews to students.

In examining norm entrepreneurship in a post-colonial state, the framework used is a constructivist approach in that I am tracing events and an individual response to these events. I am examining the individual’s use of rhetoric, their decisions, and their networks in supporting their response to events as they unfolded. I am not proposing that the importance of institutional explanations like power and sovereignty should be challenged. I am critically analysing whether ‘rational interests’ alone explain Ghana’s foreign policy decisions in the 1950s and 1960s. I am suggesting we re-examine how Nkrumah constructed Ghana’s post-independence foreign policy and take into consideration the uniqueness of his position as a leader of a post-colonial state. By acknowledging the uniqueness of this moment in time, I will engage the norm entrepreneurship approach to chart how an individual leader metamorphosed from non-state actor to state actor, and his role in influencing his country’s foreign policy trajectory.

By using a constructivist approach, this study will be exploring how the idea of pan-Africanism evolved from anti-slavery campaign to political nationalism. I am also tracing the entrepreneurship of Nkrumah from an independence movement to government and how the pan-African idea shaped his policies and endured over time. As already noted, norm
entrepreneurship centres on why individuals and events are linked with particular norms or ideas. It also retraces these events and individuals in order to ‘deconstruct’ the narrative. Importantly, the constructivist method requires a tracing of how these ideas evolve, how individuals, their networks, as well as events are brought together to describe the existence of a norm, why it is rational, and how it influences the behaviour and engagement of a particular actor (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). The constructivist method is imperative in understanding how state behaviour is influenced by the ideas, norms, values, beliefs and identities of leaders or actors (Wendt, 1999; Mingst, 2003; Checkel, 1998). Put differently, this method consists of exploring how state interest is shaped by ‘elite beliefs, identities, and social norms’ (Mingst, 2003, p. 76). Also, Checkel (1998) maintains that using this method involves ‘exploring how social structures interact with and fundamentally affect the identities of these agents [entrepreneurial actors]’ (p. 343).

In understanding the rationale behind the actions and engagements of states, it is important to take into consideration ideas and the construction of social values and what matters as a society. This thesis is about the evolution of ideas in the 1900s — the emergence of the independence movement at the time. This is important for understanding the choices made by these less powerful post-independence states. What is important according to Mingst (2003), Wendt (1999; 1994) and Katzenstein (1996) is that in IR ideas matter. That is, in post-independence states, leadership (entrepreneurial actors’) ideas matter; these ideas shape their interests, identity and decisions. Therefore, conducting research about Ghana using a constructivist approach is to understand where this idea of pan-Africanism comes from and how it matters in affecting foreign policy making. The case of Ghana in post-colonial Africa is a clear illustration of how and why ideas matter. It thus requires that we take a step back and think about what ideas, values, and what direction Nkrumah was arguing this newly independent state should take. The only method that allows us to trace this narrative is constructivism. To this end, this approach is used in Ghana’s case by tracing how the pan-African idea of self-determination and unity shaped Nkrumah’s identity and behaviour as a post-colonial leader and how it became central to his domestic, as well as foreign policy choices as Ghana’s President. The constructivist approach helps to understand the basis of Kwame Nkrumah’s pan-African idea and how it influenced the foreign policy of post-independence Ghana. It helps to retrace how Nkrumah’s engagements were ‘constructed’ by the ideas and beliefs he promoted.

Notably, the majority of analysis on Ghana has followed the realist and liberal approaches to date (see O’Malley, 2015; Gerits, 2015; Thompson, 1969b; Mohan, 1969). A lot
of the focus has been about the power play that was part of the Cold War — Ghana (Nkrumah’s) engagement on the continent has been understood as being motivated by the desire for power in Africa; and that Nkrumah was not particularly wedded to any ideas and beliefs. Similarly, the argument has been that this is a product of a post-colonial state that was attempting to achieve economic advantage. For me, there are striking flaws in the argument. First, Ghana is not a country that was engaged in power play with the Cold War forces — United States and Soviet Union. Ghana’s pan-African engagement was not consistent with power politics — the country was not desiring to be all-powerful at the expense of other states. Besides, Nkrumah took decisions that were not in accordance with the way we think about the superpowers and balance of power in the realist sense. Nkrumah did not actually play the Cold War very well; he made decisions that were inconsistent and contradictory (see Chapter Five). So, this was not in pursuit of power — political or military. Ghana did not have the resources and military capability to compete with these superpowers.

The second problem is that it was not in pursuit of strong economic ties — Ghana was not pursuing economic advantage over the other independent states. There were real inconsistencies in the design of its economic policy and in the relationships Nkrumah built in the region at the time. But one thing that was consistent and explicit in the foreign policy of this post-colonial state was the power of ideas — especially the power of the idea of safeguarding the independent sovereignty and unification of the African continent. Unlike the aforesaid position that focuses on power from the material lens — political, military and economic — the constructivist approach understands power in terms of ideas, identity and beliefs (Smith, 2001; Wendt, 1999; Mingst, 2003; Checkel, 1998). These, as the study finds, were crucial drivers of the pan-African independence movement that caused a surge of political nationalism in the 1900s.

**Thesis Argument**

Nkrumah saw himself as the only one with the vision to champion African independence. In this thesis I argue that unlike other positive examples of norm entrepreneurialism, Nkrumah’s norm entrepreneurship did not end positively. In applying a norm entrepreneurship framework to his policy of pan-Africanism, I find that despite his efforts, Nkrumah was unable to form inclusive coalitions – he refused to modify his ideals to achieve consensus, and he lacked the coercive power to meet his ambition. Moreover, the effect of colonialism was that the institutions remained quite similar throughout the post-colonial years. The values, structure
and approach of colonialism changed very little. This explains, in part, the ‘big man’ political rule as much as it also explains Nkrumah’s failure as a norm entrepreneur. The institutional design could not permit the type of Pan-Africanism he envisioned. Nkrumah entered a structure — a bureaucratic, political, and regional structure — that was still colonial. This had an effect on what areas he could affect or change and what he could accomplish.

According to former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, ‘many of our own African leaders are tempted to revert to the bad old Big Man rule [or politics]’ (Annan, 2016). He argued that supporting this system leads to ‘a political culture that simply encourages autocrats and dictatorships’ (Annan, 2012). The structure of Ghana’s foreign policy is still very much defined by the power of this individual leader, Nkrumah. The consequences and the relevance of his ideology need to be re-examined.

Structure of the Thesis

The thesis covers seven chapters and a conclusion. Chapter One presents an overview of the scholarship on the norm entrepreneurship approach. It presents the analytical contribution of normative ideas and their relationship to leadership (norm entrepreneurs). This chapter is divided into three main sections. Section One explains the meaning of norms and adopts Finnemore and Sikkink’s\(^1\) definition of norm as a shared and accepted standard of suitable behaviour, a generally acknowledged definition in the IR field. The second section of the chapter provides a discussion of the concept of norm entrepreneurship, tracing how norm entrepreneurship has been understood and explained in the literature. Importantly, it shows how the concept has been discussed primarily from three categories: the moral group (non-state actors’ perspective), the policy (norm) entrepreneurship position and finally, the state-led norm entrepreneurship position. It will be noted that entrepreneurial actors could be both state and non-state actors, or individuals who transition from non-state to state actors and promote new standards of behaviour. The actors persuade the ‘masses’ to accept their advocated new norms. The importance of this discussion is to help identify the actors who propel the emergence of new norms. Section Three explains the identity, function and mode of operation of a norm entrepreneur. Of note is that, in order to push for normative change, norm entrepreneurial actors take advantage of organisational platforms, windows of opportunities and networking opportunities with like-minded individuals or groups. I use the above

framework to trace a leader’s transition from non-state entrepreneur (outside formal institutions) to state entrepreneur; how this leader understood and dealt with this transition, as he eventually influenced the turn of events in both domestic and international affairs in the post-colonial period.

Chapter Two provides an overview of the current literature on the idea or notion of Pan-Africanism. The aim here is to trace the discussion of the genealogy of Pan-Africanism and the emergence of a norm of continental independence. I point to the (unlikely) significance of a crop of African students living and studying in Britain in the 1930s and 1940s, and their involvement in the 1945 Movement. It was here that the idea of Pan-Africanism (its significance to indigenous Africans) emerged. As will be noted, a majority of the scholarship points to the fact that the idea of Pan-Africanism became widespread in discussions amongst nineteenth and twentieth centuries African-Caribbean and African-American scholars in the course of the fight against segregation in the United States of America. The Pan-Africanism promoted in Britain in the 1945 Movement was quite different but related to that earlier history. The chapter is divided into three sections. Section One provides a definition of the concept of Pan-Africanism in the current literature; it establishes that there is no established definition of the idea but what is common in the scholarship is a sense of unity amongst people of African descent to fight for freedom from the shackles of colonialism. The second section traces the genealogy of Pan-Africanism to underscore how the idea evolved from earlier thinkers outside the African continent, but was later crystallised into a vehicle for political nationalism especially across the African continent by actors who formed alliances to push their cause. This is to emphasise the role of norm entrepreneurial actors or leaders in influencing the promotion of the idea of Pan-Africanism, which ultimately metamorphosed into a norm of political nationalism. Section Three provides an overview of the significant Pan-African movements or conferences from the late nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century. Therefore, I present the discussion of these Pan-African meetings from the Sylvester Williams’ era to the Du Bois’ era to provide a historical overview of how the independence movements emerged. A point of note here is that amongst all the Pan-African conferences, the 1945 Manchester Congress became the most prominent because of its impact on the African independence struggle and the involvement of Africans who used the platform for normative change on the continent upon their return home. Included in the third section is the entry of these Africans into the Pan-African Movement and how they contributed to the 1945 Fifth Pan-African Congress. A prominent figure amongst the Africans is Nkrumah, whose entrepreneurial role will be discussed in the remainder of this thesis. He articulated the idea of Pan-Africanism and
a sense of independence in Africa at a time when there was an absence of voices articulating this clear vision.

Chapter Three presents Nkrumah’s story from non-state norm entrepreneur to state norm entrepreneur. This chapter is important because it builds on the norm entrepreneurship approach presented in Chapter One to chart Nkrumah’s emergence as an entrepreneurial actor. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section presents a historical overview of Nkrumah’s formative years. I show how his understanding of Ghana’s independence was shaped by his interaction with key thinkers in the Pan-African Movement. The second section examines Nkrumah’s exposure to Pan-Africanism in the United States and Britain. I trace how Nkrumah, as an emerging norm entrepreneur, harnessed networks through African student groups as platforms for normative advancement. Through these associations, Nkrumah established contacts with future African leaders who also later went to their respective countries to support the fight against colonialism. Nevertheless, frictions started surfacing as other students were against Nkrumah’s call for collective support for political independence in African states. Nkrumah had to resolve these competing ideas in his leadership role in the 1945 Pan-African Congress in Manchester. It explains how Nkrumah harnessed the political opportunities he had obtained after the Manchester Congress to lay the foundation for articulating the idea of Pan-Africanism and to ensure African continental independence. In this way, Nkrumah maintained his window of opportunity through the West African National Secretariat, which was built to unite Africans in the pursuit of independence. The final section explores Nkrumah’s political activism specifically following his return to his homeland (Ghana) and his success as the first President of Ghana after independence in 1957.

Chapter Four presents a historical background of the Ghanaian state under Nkrumah’s presidency in the post-independence period, tracing his relationship (as a leader) with the newly independent state (Ghana). In particular, it explores the domestic dynamics of the political, economic and social situation of Ghana during the Nkrumah-led administration. This chapter examines the internal developments in Ghana at the time Nkrumah continued to follow his Pan-African project. It, therefore, covers the post-colonial period from 1957 to 1966. The chapter illustrates how this individual, Nkrumah, who had transitioned to a state norm entrepreneur, exercised excessive power and assumed a mythological position as leader of Ghana. Yet, this grandiose façade ultimately led to his downfall. The first section of this chapter presents an overview of the political situation in Ghana under Nkrumah’s leadership, highlighting his choices as a norm entrepreneurial actor, including the implementation of detention policies and constitutional reforms, which made him an authoritarian leader. Section
Two examines the domestic, economic and social situations under Nkrumah’s presidency. As he wielded so much power or control, there were threats to his personal security as cases of corruption in his government were on the ascendancy. This, together with the declining economic situation, provided crucial impetus for the internal dilemma, as well as failure of his regime.

Chapter Five examines Nkrumah’s Pan-African foreign policy in practice. It examines the case study of Ghana’s intervention in the Congo political crisis between 1960 and 1964. This case is often presented in the literature as a decisive illustration of Nkrumah’s Pan-African foreign policy in practice. The chapter is divided into two main sections. Section One examines the Congo crisis. It traces the historical background of the crisis. The second section discusses the intervention in the course of the Congo conflict — the engagements by the United Nations Operations in the Congo, as well as Ghana’s (military) involvement, will be discussed. Ghana was consistent with the supply of troops for the UN operation owing to Nkrumah’s insistence that this mission be used as an opportunity to safeguard the independence of African states, as well as promote his ideal of continental unity. However, I also chart how the Congo case was the beginning of Nkrumah’s weakening influence as a norm entrepreneur on the African continent. Nkrumah’s diplomatic involvement was actual controversial and eventually, contradicted his own Pan-African narrative. Nkrumah’s diplomatic failures and miscalculations proved detrimental to his influence in the Congo situation. This jeopardised the Pan-African project. Furthermore, the conduct of Ghana’s representative (Djin) and Ghana’s Chief of Defence Staff (Alexander) frustrated Nkrumah’s authority at home and abroad.

Chapter Six discusses Ghana and the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). It traces Nkrumah’s attempt to use the creation of the OAU to promote his ideal of Pan-Africanism, which was premised on the political integration of African states — uniting all African states under a centralised government. Nkrumah’s position generated constant opposition from his contemporaries. In the chapter, I present the contrasting point of view of other African leaders regarding the need for economic cooperation but sovereign independence. Such leaders, it will be observed, wanted respect for the sovereignty of individual states as well as non-interference in the internal affairs of other African states. These differences are worth considering in that they show the struggle that Nkrumah faced as a norm entrepreneur in the compromise between his ambition and positive relations with his network of allies. The chapter illustrates how Nkrumah’s refusal to support his contemporaries progressively weakened his influence on the OAU discussions. At home, there were growing
internal agitations as Nkrumah was perceived to be sacrificing his time and the limited resources for the attainment of his Pan-African goal, which was failing. The chapter has two sections. Section One provides a discussion of the disagreements that emerged regarding how African unity should be realised. Two main opposing camps will be presented — the Casablanca and Monrovia blocs. It will be noted that even in Nkrumah’s group, the Casablanca, the majority of the members did not practically support his proposed ideal of African unity. The second section examines the creation of the OAU, whose structure and constitution was a clear departure from what Nkrumah sought. Nkrumah lost the OAU battle as his influence on the continent significantly waned.

Chapter Seven examines the demise of Nkrumah and contrasts this with the continued legacy of his ideas in Ghana’s foreign policy. The chapter argues that in spite of Nkrumah’s leadership predicament and his subsequent demise, his ideas and legacy have unrelentingly permeated Ghana’s foreign policy. Even after his death, Nkrumah is considered an influential and mythical figure regarding Ghana’s foreign policy rationale and political orientation. The chapter is divided into three main sections. Section One briefly discusses the end of Nkrumah’s regime, highlighting the military and police officers’ attempt to overthrow Nkrumah’s government to save the country. The second section examines the four significant stages of rule in Ghana’s political history after the coup. These stages are particularly important facets to consider in tracing the legacy of Nkrumah. It will be observed that a consistent trend in the endeavours of subsequent leaders following Nkrumah’s regime was that none of these leaders passionately pursued the Pan-African project like Nkrumah did, but they would evoke the language when they wanted to promote regional economic integration, or legitimatise involvement in peacekeeping operations. In the final section, informed by interviews with academics and policy practitioners within Ghana, I discuss why Nkrumah’s legacy continually shapes Ghana’s foreign policy and the consequence of this influence.

In the Conclusion of this thesis, I conclude that Nkrumah’s continued influence in Ghana’s foreign policy today is the consequence of its post-colonial experience. Nkrumah was the norm entrepreneur for Ghana’s independence from colonial rule. This unique achievement under his rule has led to an inability to disassociate Nkrumah’s contribution as an independence leader from the story of his actual rule and its consequences. Nkrumah and his advocacy for Ghana’s independence awakened and drove independence movements across the continent. His legacy in the early years of the independence movement is what Ghanaians today hold with regard. The reverence held for Nkrumah and the Pan-African ideal illustrates the power of ideologies and traits of political leaders, especially the legacy of founding elites (Mingst, 2003).
Introduction

In International Relations (IR), there are enduring debates about the notion of norm entrepreneurship, its identity, function and mode of operation. Admittedly, various scholarly works on the evolution of the concept of norm entrepreneurship have brought to the fore significant insights. This chapter identifies three focal areas of the enduring debates on the concept of norm entrepreneurship: non-state actors as norm entrepreneurial agents, entrepreneurs looking at specific policy direction (or intervention), and the state as an entrepreneurial actor. As this chapter will present, most literature assumes that the norm entrepreneur remains as one of these identities during the norm life cycle — their identity is fixed as the non-state actor, the policy entrepreneur, or the state entity. In this chapter I ask: what happens when the identity of the norm entrepreneur changes as their institutional location changes? This chapter serves as a springboard for understanding norm entrepreneurship in transition — when the individual may start as a non-state actor (and outside formal institutions) then transitions to lead a formal state institution with the power to influence national and regional norm advocacy.

The chapter is divided into three sections. The first engages with a definition of norms within IR literature. Section Two explores a discussion of the literature on the meaning of norm entrepreneurship. Here, I will present three types of norm entrepreneurship in the scholarship: the non-state actor position, the policy implementation position, and the state actor position. Each identity the literature portrays has particular normative influence and significance. However, what is less understood is whether normative influence is affected by changes to the institutional location of the norm entrepreneur during the norm life cycle. I make the case that, in the post-colonial context, we need to explore the unique impact of non-state actors’ transition to state entrepreneurs, and consider the consequence of this in foreign policy behaviour and choices. Section Three discusses the identity, function and operationalisation of a norm entrepreneur.
What are Norms?

Thomson (1993) observes that norms are an accepted standard of behaviour. Axelrod (1986) extends this definition to define a ‘norm’ as a collectively accepted standard of ‘values and behaviour’ in social systems. Finnemore (1994, p. 2) presents norms as ‘a set of intersubjective [shared] understandings readily [evident] to actors that makes behavioural claims on those actors’ (cited in Florini, 1996, p. 364). In the IR field, Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998, p. 891) definition is one of the most widely accepted definitions of a norm as a ‘standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’.

Finnemore and Sikkink state that the intersubjective understanding, beliefs and principles with respect to behavioural standards inform the ‘structure, order, and stability’ of both national and international politics (1998, p. 894). These shared principles or beliefs infuse into the domestic settings like ‘structures’ and influence the desirable behaviour of states (Legro, 1997; Thomson, 1993). Finnemore and Sikkink note that the new standard of behaviour is successfully created (or built) in the domestic setting through the role of a norm entrepreneurial actor. Payne (2001) agrees, contending that societal intersubjective standards of behaviour echo a ‘legitimate social purpose’ that originates from an entrepreneurial actor. Krook and True concur, noting that the ‘norms form structures that shape interactions among states and non-state actors, although originating in the initiatives of purposive actors’ (Krook & True, 2012, p. 104). Shared norms, beliefs or principles begin from a connection between actors and the system (Joachim, 2003). This notwithstanding, Florini (1996, p. 376) contends that novel standards of behaviour ‘must fit coherently with other existing norm[s]’. That is, the existing context or ambience for new norm diffusion is significant (Shawki, 2011a). Given that these scholars generally point to norms as new standard of behaviour, it is, therefore, important to trace where new norms come from and who introduces the new standard of behaviour in a community. The following section provides a discussion of where we can locate who may be a norm entrepreneur.

What Is Meant by the Concept of Norm Entrepreneurship?

In scholarly literature, there are different understandings of who can be a norm entrepreneur and where they must be located to be successful. Researchers within IR have identified the actions and preferences of state and non-state actors as having equal influence in the formation of norms (Davies & True, 2017). The practice of norm entrepreneurship is that particular actors can encapsulate principled beliefs and ideas and then target these to an appropriate audience.
(Black & Hwang, 2012). This process has been understood primarily as one that we think about as regarding an external actor (non-state actor) pushing against a state and its existing norms and existing structures. It should be stated that although IR theories have highlighted norm diffusion through ‘mechanistic and automatised’ methods, the role of the agents or the main actors behind norm transmission has been underemphasised (Bucher, 2014). Yet, it is important to explore different scholarly approaches to understand the concept of norm entrepreneurship. Inspired by the constructivist framework, norm entrepreneurship focuses on the emergence of ideas and their significance in the study of IR, contending that ‘norms form structures that shape interactions among states and non-state actors’ — although emerging from the drive of purposive actors (Krook & True, 2012, p. 104).

Three types of approaches have been identified to date for the explanation of norm entrepreneurship. One understanding of norm entrepreneurship in IR emphasises the importance of the non-state actor as a particularly influential actor for redefining new standards of behaviour (Bjorkdahl, 2008). In this scenario, norms are transmitted by either individual entrepreneurial actors or advocacy social groupings. The second approach explains the concept as policy implementation; that is, the capacity to implement the normative change the audience or public wish to see. On the other hand, the third type of approach, state actor position, sees the role of the state as the underpinning factor in explaining norm entrepreneurship.

**The non-state actors and norm entrepreneurship**

The first understanding of norm entrepreneurship comes from research focused on non-state actors. These include individuals, civil society organisations, multilateral institutions (transnational advocacy networks), and non-government organisations whose significance is that they suggest novel standards of behaviour that challenge power and institutions, namely state practices (Acharya, 2004; Florini, 1996; Risse, 2007). They consider norms as moral standards that can be affected through advocacy (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). The most important unifying force that binds this group is their networking ability (Bob, 2009a). These actors collectively work towards finding solutions for a problem through the environment of shared ideas, beliefs, principles or norms and a mechanism of fostering an understanding of these standards (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). As Carpenter (2007) puts it, the entrepreneurial actors are inspired to start an activism crusade for an idea or norm and engage other persuasive strategies, such as framing to promote an understanding of the idea or norm.

Therefore, they may act as a liaison between their domestic setting and the international level and as Shawki (2015) puts it, entrepreneurial actors may ‘have one foot in the
transnational community and one at home’ (p. 761). During this particular process of norm diffusion, these individual norm entrepreneurs or advocacy groups can serve as a channel of normative change between the national and international community. They may spread principled ideas and standards from national to transnational levels and vice versa. This is, as a result, a bandwagon effect of the norm — where global norms are accepted by a group of people who then consider them as appropriate standard and push for their further diffusion (Krook & True, 2012). This underlies the interplay between global and national norms (Acharya, 2004). Again, the international actors may encompass individual entrepreneurial actors or social movements (Acharya, 2004). Social movements include activism groups and organisations that collectively promote normative change (Benford & Snow, 2000; Rao, Morrill & Zald, 2000; Brysk, 1993).

In relation to their methods, the non-state entrepreneurs may resort to networking, framing, persuasion, as well as engaging states by moral appeal (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). The dynamics relating to these non-state normative actors and how they engage structures and processes in pursuing their agenda is key (Halliday & Osinsky, 2006). First, the non-state actors may adopt collective means by building networks or coalitions through which the new norms are diffused (McAdam, McCarthy & Zald, 1996). Norm entrepreneurs could employ an alliance of relatives, allies and other social movements and advocacy networks in affecting the normative change (Shawki, 2011b). Moreover, alliances by entrepreneurial actors in norm diffusion make the process effectual in that they become united and build powerful links, which facilitates steady communication between them and the public (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).

The non-state entrepreneurs encompass aggrieved normative actors who are seeking to shape both national and international standards by networking with influential agents in transnational organisations with the goal of promoting their norms (Bob, 2009b). Again, the actors could be external individuals or social movements supporting an aggrieved group to push for normative change in a particularly state; hence, these entrepreneurs who promote new norms may not necessarily be included in the aggrieved group but only support the campaign as a result of their deep-rooted shared principles, ideas or norms (Bob, 2009a). These actors are noted for swift dissemination of information via transnational networks, which they do by engaging other advocates within the association (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). They mutually explain the existing predicaments, their remedy, as well as the need for the public to support the campaign towards the normative change (McCammon, Newman, Muse & Terrell, 2007). What is particularly important about the non-state norm entrepreneurship role is that it provides a platform for those subjected to marginalisation to take the opportunity and work together
with advocacy bodies to change the normative status quo (Bob, 2009b). A case in point is the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People’s (NAACP) promotion of the ‘Operation bike week justice’ campaign on 24 May 2017 in South Carolina to promote and protect human rights (fairness and equality) amongst the Black community and to check any acts of discrimination against tourists in Myrtle Beach in the United States. It was a campaign to ensure that black people and tourists are treated with decorum and respect and again that laws are enforced equally\(^2\). In Chapter Two we will return to the history of the NAACP, an advocacy civil rights organisation formed in 1909 by W. E. B Du Bois and other African-Americans, and its contribution to the post-colonial independence movement.\(^3\)

Consequently, this network group (either non-governmental organisation or international activism groups) diffuses the novel standards to national and global institutions (Bob, 2009a) through the ‘boomerang’ approach; thus, seeking the support of external agents especially when government officials are adamant about normative change (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). For instance, Swiebel’s research on the campaign by Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) advocacy groups across the globe to fight for equal rights and respect for its members (Swiebel, 2009) demonstrates the role of advocacy groups in championing an idea. Over the past decades, the LGBT Movement has endeavoured to campaign against segregation and prejudice in employment (Woodford, Atteberry, Derr & Howell, 2013; Swiebel, 2009; Ryan & Rivers, 2003). The LGBT Movement’s principled idea of global recognition and acceptance was first presented to the European Union (EU) Parliament in the 1980s and by September 2003 the European Union Commission had agreed to grant LGBT freedom of movement to member states, although this was dependent on the standards of behaviour of respective states (Swiebel, 2009). Hence, this social group had an idea (advocacy against discrimination) to promote, but they needed to cooperate with state institutions — embodied in the EU Parliament — for the realisation of their idea to push against resistant states.

Second, non-state entrepreneurs use a persuasive approach in advancing their normative agenda. In other words, as Bob (2009b) maintains, the non-state actor initially conceives protests as challenging an existing standard of behaviour and subsequently persuades states, organisations, individuals or groups to agree to a new standard or norm. The norm entrepreneur and these organisations or advocacy groups then disseminate the new norm,

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which gradually must be internalised or implemented in the national context (Bob, 2009b). Similarly, Keck and Sikkink (1998) point out that non-state norm entrepreneurs disseminate or spread their principled norms through persuasion; that is, coercing their audience to accept their standards as the appropriate ways of doing things. Rushton (2008, pp. 98–99) argues that actors are often motivated by a desire ‘to use persuasion to convince a critical mass of the members of the [state] that the principled idea in question is a legitimate behavioural claim—effectively, that it forms one of the rules of proper conduct in that [state]’. The new standard of behaviour being introduced by these non-state norm entrepreneurs could be very successful when it is considered to be parallel with the state’s or group’s intersubjective inclinations or beliefs (Busby, 2000). Put differently, normative activism will be effective if the new standard agrees with the general desire of the people (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). However, it should be noted that the norm entrepreneur also promotes a standard of behaviour which is seemingly ‘morally appealing, familiar and good, and that agrees with the values and beliefs, identities and practices of the advocate’ (Sikkink, 1991, cited in Bjorkdahl, 2008, p. 138).

Third, non-state entrepreneurs in their promotion of new norms engage states through moral appeal. Shawki (2011c) argues that moral appeal could be made by lobbying state bureaucracies to support their advocacy. Thus, they need the support of state agents in order to promote a particular norm, belief or idea (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Their main aim is to impact policy making by bringing to the fore novel standards, ideas and understandings in national discussions and to coerce the government and the public to accept the norm or idea (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Keck and Sikkink argue that these entrepreneurial actors specifically intensify their impact by contributing to ‘changing perceptions that both state and societal actors may have of their identities, interests, and preferences, to transforming their discursive positions, and ultimately to changing procedures, policies, and behaviour’ (1998, p. 3). Bjordahl (2008) maintains that actors may engage tactful approaches including negotiations with influential state officials to ensure that the new norm has impact on the audience within a state. Thus, normative changes become materialised through domestic backing (Busby, 2000).

According to Sikkink (1998), although the norm entrepreneurs work in unison through transnational advocacy networks to initiate the normative change, they must also engage state agents to embed their agenda. This supports Bob’s (2009a) assertion that statecraft is influential in the adoption of a new norm. Non-state actors, as mentioned earlier, establish networks and collaborate with aggrieved agents from both national and international levels as well as other civil society organisations in order to push forward an agenda (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Sikkink, 1993; Smith, 2005). But, at some stage, non-state entrepreneurial actors must engage
government and other powerful state agents to influence transmission of new standards (Sikkink, 1993; 1998; Borzel & Risse, 2010).

An example of norm advocacy activity that reflects this dynamic is the international advocacy group, International Campaigns to Ban Landmines (ICBL). ICBL aims for a world devoid of antipersonnel landmines, and works to ensure that every continent is conducive for landmine survivors to enjoy satisfying lives (Shawki, 2011b; 2010a; Price, 2008). It was officially started by a group of non-governmental organisations in October 1992, which included Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, as a way to forge international consensus on the fight against antipersonnel landmines (Hansen, 2004; Goose & Williams, 2004). These groups, together with human rights organisations, children’s groups and medical and humanitarian relief organisations (Goose & Williams, 2004), advocated for the drafting of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, a global accord that prohibits ‘the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of antipersonnel mines and places obligations on countries to clear affected areas, assist victims and destroy stockpiles’.

Consequently, this group collaborated with governments and state representatives to reach an agreement to ensure adherence to the ban on landmines (Hansen, 2004). Between 28 November and 1 December 2016, during the 15th Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty (15MSP), about 100 officials of countries across the globe together with representatives of ICBL met in Santiago, Chile to promote the campaign for a landmine-free world (International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 2016). In this way, the ban on landmines has ‘eventually become the prevailing standard of appropriateness’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998) in international politics.

Finally, the non-state actors engage framing as a method to promote the novel norms. Shawki (2011b) maintains that these non-state entrepreneurs, despite their international connections, must strategically get involved in domestic affairs, take advantage of the prevailing political openings and tactically frame (explain or interpret) the issue to persuade their audiences and promote their agenda of norm diffusion. Therefore, framing is imperative in the quest to push for normative modification, in that it enables the social movements, individual actors and organisations engaged in norm advocacy to explain the impact and significance of their campaign (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Mintrom & Luetjens, 2017; Benford & Snow, 2000; Buechler, 2000). Furthermore, Shawki (2010b) maintains that the framing process helps entrepreneurial actors to identify the root of an issue and come out with

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an appropriate solution through the formulation of proposed action to resolve the challenge. In doing so, they frame or reinterpret the issue to the understanding of the people (Bjorkdahl, 2008). Non-state norm entrepreneurs understand their role as affecting behavioural standards at both domestic and international levels (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). By this, they reinterpret and rename (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998) concerns or problems so that they are understood and accepted by the wider audience, through awareness creation and attract their involvement in transmitting the norms (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). As Keck and Sikkink argue, these entrepreneurial actors pursue the objective of bringing ‘new ideas, norms, and discourses into [states] policy debates, and serve as sources of information and testimony’ (1998, p. 3). Sikkink (1993) maintains that cooperation by non-state actors — especially with other domestic (local) advocates — is significant as a result of their contribution towards the interpretation (framing) of the new norms within the domestic setting, which is essential in norm diffusion. That is, domestic advocates provide useful information to non-state actors, which helps the latter in framing the problem (Sikkink, 1993; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Acharya, 2004). Framing, according to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) is significant in that ‘the linkages between existing norms and emergent norms are not often obvious and must be actively constructed by proponents of new norms’ (p. 908). Therefore, framing appears to be a cardinal method that helps normative actors to communicate their messages or norms to their target audience and to gain support for effective changes in standards of behaviour. Acharya (2004) argues that by framing, the non-state entrepreneur ensures that new norms are transmitted ‘using language that names, interprets, and [explains] them’ (p. 243).

The aforesaid scholarship, in spite of discussions on the individual norm entrepreneur, organisations and social movements, seldom questions the position of the bureaucrats, policy agents and the state that is assumed to be influential in the process of normative change (Davies & True, 2017; Bucher, 2014). Marsh and Jones (2017) maintain that IR scholars have underemphasised the influence of individual state actors or ministers of foreign affairs in the foreign policy making agenda (p. 542). However, these non-state norm entrepreneurs, who shape the foreign policies of regimes through the creation of new norms, could have national and international platforms including influential activists in the government (Nadelmann, 1990).

In general, as Swiebel (2009) argues, apart from entrepreneurial actors using transnational groups and other social movements to make their requests, they may also employ ‘the necessary political support to see their demands go through the internal decision-making process and reach the outcome they desire’ (p. 21). Therefore, this underpins the point that for
these non-state actors — civil society movements, non-governmental organisations, transnational advocacy networks and other social movements — to be successful the supporting role of bureaucracy or policy implementers is worth considering in the discussion of norm entrepreneurship. However, even if those movements or advocacy groups are successful, we still need some sort of policy change of state-led capacity to implement the change we wish to see or effect. This brings our discussion to the second type, that is, norm entrepreneurship within policy implementation and how these actors can advance the normative project within the state.

**Policy implementation approach**

In contrast to non-state actors entrepreneurship scholarship, studies of norm entrepreneurship via policy implementation locate their influence for normative change within organisations (Mintrom, 2000). Policy norm entrepreneurship is understood as the significance of actors who seek to change public policy within the state (Kingdon, 2003; Hammond, 2013; Mintrom, Salisbury & Luetjens, 2014). Their concerns are threefold: the idea, the policy, and its implementation (John, 1999). Policy (norm) entrepreneurship requires bureaucrats (either in or out of government, part of the legislative branch of government), or policy think tanks to suggest and then affect normative change to policy making (Mintrom & Luetjens, 2017; Weissert, 1991). Mintrom (1997a) argues that ‘policy [norm] entrepreneurs constitute an identifiable class of political actors [whose] presence and actions can significantly raise the probability of legislative consideration and approval of policy innovations’ (p. 738). Policy entrepreneurs can and do work in tandem with others (outside the official government structure) (Roberts & King, 1991) and within the jurisdiction of government (Golan-Nadir & Cohen, 2017) to promote policy change.

The motivation of a policy norm entrepreneur is contested. Mintrom (2000) and Arnold, Nguyen Long and Gottlieb (2017) contend that the motivation behind policy entrepreneurship or norm diffusion transcends the personal gratification of the actors because networking or collaborations predominantly inform the actions of these entrepreneurs. However, others identify competing interests. They may not be content with the status quo and want to ensure the realisation of new standards in policy making (Golan-Nadir & Cohen, 2017). Hopkins (2016) states that personal incentives and ambition often inspire policy entrepreneurial actors.

Personal ambitions may also motivate non-state actors, but what should be clarified here is that the key difference between this type and the non-state counterpart is that while the
first advocates for a particular idea that may change the structure of policy delivery, the latter group usually wants to promote (innovative and even moral) change within existing structures.

These policy entrepreneurial actors employ their political connections and capabilities to push forward their ideas and principles at various sectors either domestic or global (Mintrom & Luetjens, 2017). Huitema and Meijerink (2010) underscore key approaches employed by policy entrepreneurs in affecting normative policy changes, which include elements of the strategies used by the earlier type. They observe that implementing policy (norm) entrepreneurship involves actors developing novel norms or standards, which are different from the existing ideas. In other words, like the non-state norm entrepreneurship, policy entrepreneurship employs persuasion, building networks and problem framing. As Mintrom and Luetjens (2017) concur, policy entrepreneurs disseminate new ideas by persuading their audience, collaborating and networking with like-minded agents or groups.

Importantly, policy entrepreneurs introduce innovative ideas or policies to politicians or policy makers through persuasion. Kingdon (2003) and Mintrom (2000) contend that the political system through which norms or policies are adopted and implemented is given consideration by collective discussion with the people and sometimes policy entrepreneurial actors persuasively compel the audience to accept the new norms. Rogers (1995) observes that, in the process of norm diffusion, the policy entrepreneur does not necessarily present anything totally novel, since the introduction of existing standard within a novel framework can be sufficient. In effect, the policy type maintains that norm entrepreneurship is characterised by the capacity to find and combine principles and understandings from diverse backgrounds as well as normative actors, to influence policy change (Mintrom & Luetjens, 2017). Actors of policy diffusion have the capability to argue, persuade and influence policy makers (Mackenzie, 2004). To influence change in policies, Mintrom (1997a) suggests that policy entrepreneurs work towards ‘identifying problems, networking in policy circles, shaping the terms of policy debates, and building coalitions’ (p. 739). These are significant in reinforcing policy innovation (Hopkins, 2015). But the problem identified by actors should be in the interest of policy makers and relevant to the decision-making agenda (Mintrom, 1997a). This supports the contention that ‘…the most basic prerequisite of public deliberation is that the members of the community [and policymakers] agree to focus the debate on some issues of general interest’ (Majone, 1988, p. 160).

Moreover, forming networks is an important driver especially for actors working within government to promote policy change (Zhu, 2012; Mintrom, 1997b). Doing this helps them to form connections with other policy think tanks through which they can learn new approaches
to promote and implement their specific policies (Mintrom, 2013; 1997). These networks also enable them to lobby through government officials in order to impact the policy making process (Kingdon, 2003; Mintrom, 1997b). Policy entrepreneurs also take advantage of the networking window to influence the terms of policy debates because it helps them to understand the existing policy and informs them on how to push forward their proposed policy or agenda in order to reach the wider public (Beland & Cox, 2016; Mintrom, 1997a). Also, actors build coalitions to promote a particular policy and they do that through diplomacy and political engagements (Mintrom, 2013; 1997b). That is, in order to give effect to a norm or policy, policy entrepreneurs rely on instruments including government policy makers and utilising networks or advocacy alliance with people in executive or legislative positions. Through these networks, they are acquainted with the principles, beliefs, and problems of the people as well as an understanding of the existing policy in order to efficiently realise the desired changes (Mintrom & Norman, 2009).

Mintrom and Norman (2009) note that policy entrepreneurial actors maintain alliances with individual and professional connections who are either in or out of the targeted region where the normative change will be affected. These are also sources of new ideas and information to be used as a starting point for implementing their policy (Burt, 2000). For instance, policy entrepreneurs in academia could rely on experts from their respective institutions, schools or departments for support to promote their ideas (Mintrom, 2013). The policy entrepreneurs form advocacy networks by appreciating the existing principles, beliefs and ideas of the people in the national setting; they also promote policy change by managing the problems facing others (Mintrom & Norman, 2009). In doing so, these policy entrepreneurs establish strong bonds by effectively working with other people to influence the standard of behaviour (Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Meier, 1995). The entrepreneur understands and appreciates the significance of forming alliances with either other individuals or organisations to promote the needed policy change (Mintrom & Vergari, 1996). Thus, these actors of policy change establish activism alliances with the aim of translating their intersubjective principles, beliefs or standards into the national agenda (Mintrom & Vergari, 1996).

Although policy entrepreneurs need to establish advocacy alliances (or networks) with like-minded representatives in accomplishing normative objectives, Huitema and Meijerink (2010) argue that they also engage a third approach: framing or interpreting the problem and

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5 According to Sabatier (1988, p. 139), these are ‘people from variety of positions…who share a particular belief system — that is, a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions — and who show a non-trivial degree of co-ordinated activity over time’.
making it known to the public. It is important for actors to build on problem framing to explore political opportunities or openings, which is crucial for inducing policy changes in the decision-making process (Huijtema & Meijerink, 2010). Policy entrepreneurs might be able to persuade decision makers through framing or defining the problem, and they should clarify the appropriateness of their idea by creating a connection between their alternative policy and the existing one (Roberts & King, 1991). In other words, for an effective policy innovation, actors should endeavour to convince policy makers and other groups within the executive, however, as Mintrom and Vergari (1998) argue, successful policy entrepreneurs are actors who are able to persuade the relevant others that the implementation of those policies and their acceptance into the decision-making agenda will generate greater results and statecraft than the existing standards. Mintrom (1997a) concludes that if policy entrepreneurs frame the problems well and present a sound justification to policy makers, they may gain better access to influence the decision-making activity.

A case in point of policy entrepreneurship is the role played by the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group in the campaign to push for climate change policy as clearly illustrated by Mintrom and Luetjens (2017). The C40 formed in October 2005 refers to a group of mayors of major cities in the world (including London, Melbourne, Seoul and Houston) who promoted the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (Mintrom & Luetjens, 2017; Reckien et al., 2014). It was established through the initiative of Ken Livingstone (former Mayor of London), who in 2005 organised in London a meeting of delegates from leading 18 cities across the globe to deliberate on policies to help fight global warming (Roman, 2010; Schreurs, 2008; Lee & Van de Meene, 2012). The C40 cities employed eco-friendly collaborative measures regarding the regulation of energy use, public transportation and the promotion of green (environmentally friendly) cities by lobbying their implementation in their respective government levels, with the aim of minimising the emission of carbon gas (Kern & Bulkeley, 2009; Rosenzweig, Solecki, Hammer & Mehrotra, 2010).

In the main, Nadelmann (1990) argues that policy entrepreneurs (either national or international agents) have the ability to shape the policies of government and he maintains that actors may operate from within or outside governments of states. For Mintrom and Luetjens (2017), the concept expatiates on ‘energetic actors who work with others in and around policymaking venues to promote significant policy change’ (p. 1). Their research is shaped by the dynamics of how entrepreneurs significantly bring about policy change (Davies & True, 2017).
Policy entrepreneurship encompasses structures of policy actors who ‘play important roles in the generation, dissemination, and evaluation of [norms as well as] ... policy formation and implementation’ (Sabatier, 1988, cited in Mintron & Vergari, 1996, p. 421). Policy entrepreneurial actors are also characterised by the ability to lead by example; thus, they themselves take the norm or new standard and operationalise it to test its practicability (Mintrom & Norman, 2009). The implementation of the norms by actors, according to Pace (2007), influences the policy direction of statecraft. However, Pace argues that norm entrepreneurs, who hold strong principles and ideas, persuade and transform standards of states that are premised on their individual desires. It could be noted from the discussion that attempts to promote policy innovation (or normative change) are vitally connected to the influence of the state. The following section discusses the state actor type of norm entrepreneurship.

**State-led norm entrepreneurship**

In spite of the significant role played by non-state actors as well as policy entrepreneurs in leading normative change, it appears that scholars focused on these two types of norm entrepreneurs have paid little attention to the state as an important agent in the cycle of norm diffusion. Yet, it can be inferred from the discussion that these groups of entrepreneurial actors have to ultimately cooperate and engage with the state to promote normative change. As the actors pursue the implementation of their principled ideas, they still need the key powerful political figures at the executive level to give them the platform and support they need. This brings into the discussion the last type, which is centred on the state as an essential actor in influencing normative change. For the purpose of this discussion, I will call it the state-led (or state actor) type of norm entrepreneurship.

Unlike the other two types, where ideas and specific policy interventions were purposely promulgated by an individual, group or social movement and particular policy bureaucrats respectively, this third typology is basically about state interest in championing a shared principle or government with implementation of a particular foreign policy idea (Finnemore, 1996b). Essentially, state entrepreneurial actors affect normative change at the national level; their main agenda is to capitalise on platforms such as national apparatus or structures to influence their respective publics (audiences) to accept different beliefs, principles or norms (Carpenter, 2014). The aim of the entrepreneur here is to identify a challenge and organise people on the backdrop of a new norm to find a solution, although this should be a collective kind of understanding (Carpenter, 2014). These shared norms shape states’ national and international interests (Reus-Smit, 1999). Carpenter adds that these entrepreneurial actors
may involve particular states with an agenda of promoting and solidifying their national values and norms in international politics (Carpenter, 2007). The powerful political actors’ main focus is to shape the normative framework of states (Carpenter, 2013).

Sikkink (1998) observes that states’ conscious efforts towards normative change are driven by a deep-rooted standard of behaviour and the quest to persuade others to accept it. It should be stressed that these new standards are parallel with the state’s principles, ideas, traditions, and identity (Bjorkdahl, 2013). Significantly, state actors promote new standards of behaviour that might compete with particular norms that either give them power, change their power or redefine their power. As Bjorkdahl maintains ‘the promotion of a new norm is a combative, competitive process, which posits emerging norms’ (2008, p. 139), implying that the new standards being advocated by the state contend with existing norms. This supports Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) statement that new ideas, beliefs, principles, and standards do not emerge out of nowhere but have to compete with already existing norms and identities. The key actors within this category may include state officials — influential politicians, political parties or people in the executive (holders of political power) who take an active role in foreign policy decision-making (Finnemore, 1996b; Flockhart, 2006). They work within government to attain normative changes using state structures (Ingebritsen, 2002; Hetcher, 2000). The state, however, may collaborate with other like-minded states, policy experts, non-governmental or multilateral organisations and social movements to promote the new norm with the state coordinating and directing affairs (Ingebritsen, 2002; Finnemore, 1996a). For the purpose of this project, state-led entrepreneurial actors include state agents that are responsible for the framing, coordination, organisation and implementation of a specific national policy idea (Bjorkdahl, 2008; Finnemore, 1996b). However, I do not include in my definition non-state actors or agents who work outside the jurisdiction of government (or the state). Nevertheless, non-state actors may collaborate with state actors.

Christine Ingebritsen (2002) has contested the rare acknowledgement of the impact of the state in her work that explores the position of Scandinavian states in the promotion of an internationally accepted standard of behaviour, i.e. normative change. She argues that in international politics, states ‘play a role in strengthening global codes of appropriate behaviour referred to as “norms”’ (Ingebritsen, 2002, p. 11). Also, the appreciation of ethical or normative foreign policy is essential to state actors (Bulley, 2014). Ingebritsen discusses the state-led norm diffusion process, with particular emphasis on the state as a norm entrepreneur. This notion of explaining the norm entrepreneurship concept underlines that the state as an actor is
committed to framing principles or novel norms efficiently, craves to promote specific beliefs and politically implements them through leading officials (Rushton, 2008).

Highlighting a state-led move towards climate change, Jordan and Huitema (2004) argue that states act as entrepreneurial agents to invent and diffuse new policies as well as evaluate their impacts on the public. Similarly, Williams (2002) has illustrated Britain’s role in attempting to promote the norm, i.e. ethical foreign policy during the administration of Tony Blair with the aim of shaping global politics. However, in the case of dominant states and their leaders, as Young (1999, p. 807) argues, ‘the need for entrepreneurship arises from the occurrence of bargaining impediments that threaten to prevent parties from realizing joint gains’. States are determining forces in the transmission of novel standards of behaviour because, as Shawki (2014) argues, they support other non-state actors such as individuals, organisations, and civil society movements in accomplishing normative change. Davies and True (2017) maintain that ‘powerful state agents can (also) be moral norm entrepreneurs and explicate the foreign policy acts that make them significant agents of international socialisation’ (p. 1).

Zwingel (2012) observes that both state and non-state actors are powerful and significant elements in helping to internalise new norms. Zwingel adds that states react to standards of behaviour (norms) through their establishments and domestic policies. She further notes that these new norms thrive on the existing national normative context. In other words, states should be credited for the internalisation of new principles, standards or norms, instead of being considered obstinate players that hold onto existing norms and delay diffusion of new norms (Risse & Sikkink, 1999). The continuous realisation of normative change involves domestic efforts (or actions) of states (Risse & Sikkink, 1999). As Risse-Kappen (1994) maintains, the effectiveness of standards of behaviour executed by international ‘non-state actors’ will be worthwhile on national policy through the implementation actions of the state system (cited in Risse & Sikkink, 1999). What is central to Risse-Kappen’s (1994) submission is that he recognises the state as the building block in the transmission of norms.

The state actor category claims that states are socially created and entrenched in a context to enhance the diffusion of standards or norms through ‘modernization, learning and imitation’ with a structural underpinning (Krook & True, 2012, p. 106). Acharya (2004) concludes that state actors are active players in norm transmission because they borrow and modify international ‘norms in accordance with their preconstructed normative beliefs and practices’ (p. 269). In so doing, states as entrepreneurial agents are vehicles for internalising new norms (Shawki, 2016).
Broadly speaking, approaches that characterise state-led entrepreneurship comprise framing, networking and persuasion. In norm diffusion, according to Bjorkdahl (2008), states influence the standards through processes such as framing, persuading broader audiences and by seizing the windows of opportunity to establish networks with other states and entities.

As mentioned earlier, the framing of norms, according to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) involves a ‘reinterpretation or renaming’ procedure, which is a central scheme employed by the state entrepreneurial actor to attract the attention of a wider audience at the national level. Finnemore and Sikkink add that as novel means of communicating their norms and enhancing their internalisation, actors encounter existing powerful standards or principles, therefore creating comparable alternate opinions in terms of suitability and significance. The process of framing is essential (Acharya, 2004) since ‘the linkages between existing norms and emergent norms are often not obvious and must be actively constructed by proponents of new norms’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 908). However, focusing on the significance of framing in norm diffusion, Mintrom and Luetjens (2017) observe that the process identifies state actors as operational raconteurs that create an opportunity for people to understand the principles or ideas.

The second approach is networking during normative advocacy. That is, state entrepreneurs diplomatically communicate the new norms by forming networks with allies and the public to coerce them to accept and internalise the new standards of behaviour (Bjorkdahl, 2007). These networks (or coalitions) are built through discussions and bilateral cooperation, as state entrepreneurs attempt to advance new norms (Bjorkdahl, 2008). By this, actors may recognise particular like-minded states, as well as gather support in achieving normative change; also, this process provides an opportunity for the state entrepreneur to identify possible opposition (Bjorkdahl, 2008). Besides, the networks help the state actors to pressurise their target audience to accept the novel standard being promoted (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998).

In addition, Bjorkdahl (2008) argues that persuading and gaining the backing of the target audience within the state strengthens the process of normative change. By this method, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) maintain that state entrepreneurs may also endeavour to coax other states to embrace new standards of behaviour in the quest to realising a particular normative agenda. Notably, state entrepreneurial actors endeavour to create an institution to accommodate the novel principle so as to ensure that it remains in existence (Bjorkdahl, 2007). Although the approach of institutionalising the new norms promotes their sustainability, Franck (1992) maintains that such normative context should monitor acceptance by the wider audience as well as the level of legitimacy, which is significant in the diffusion exercise.
An example of state-led norm entrepreneurship is evident in the call for the establishment of the contemporary 1998 Rome Statute (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998). The impetus behind the Statute was cooperation by states in the UN General Assembly to uphold, maintain and promote humanitarian intervention (Goodliffe, Hawkins, Horne & Nielson, 2012; Arsanjani, 1999). Prior to the adoption of the 1998 Rome Statute, these states had called for punitive measures (by a court) against heinous acts inflicted on humanity and all forms of human right abuses (Melandri, 2009; Hwang, 1998). The acceptance of the Rome Statute was initiated between 15 June and 17 July 1998 during the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court in Rome, Italy. At the meeting, representatives from 160 states accepted the principled idea of promoting the fight against genocide or crime against humanity (Arsanjani, 1999; Ronzitti, 1998).

Overall, we have three types of norm entrepreneurship and they are all really good for explaining actors who do not move outside of their institution or their identity. But in the post-colonial context, identity and institutions were fluid. People were non-state actors—dependence fighters, who then became part of the state. They sought to change the structure, and then became part of it. How we can explain that transition within the norm entrepreneurial framework will be illustrated in the rest of this thesis. The following section highlights the identity, function and mode of operation of a norm entrepreneur.

How Do We Understand the Identity, Function and the Operationalisation of a Norm Entrepreneur?

The norm entrepreneur identifies the unsatisfied desires of people and advocates for ways of meeting them, not losing sight of the dangers involved (Mintrom & Vergari, 1996). They do this by working in tandem with individuals, groups and bodies with the essential expertise and means to accomplish the norm diffusion (Mintrom & Vergari, 1996). Hence, the entrepreneurial actor is recognised as an instrumental policy making agent who promotes the introduction of new behavioural standards or principles within domestic settings (Mintrom & Vergari, 1996). However, these norms ‘must compete with other norms and perceptions of interest’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 897). Besides, norm entrepreneurs exist within structures that determine what is possible; the existing institutional structures essentially influence the promotion of novel norms by actors (March & Olsen, 2011).

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Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that the norm entrepreneur establishes a connection between the new principles or norms and the existing ones, so as to communicate a convincing message that goes beyond the domestic political setting. These entrepreneurial actors create standards of behaviour that become significant to the national policy (Nadelmann, 1990). Their main agenda is to influence policy making outcomes (Arnold, 2015). In effect, norm entrepreneurs, as argued by Adut (2004), are agenda setters who endeavour to affect changes in the shared norms of states. Significantly, a stimulus for the entrepreneurial actor to promote diffusion and internalisation of the new norms is an ‘organisational platform’ together with the alliance of advocacy by individuals or organisations [social movements] (Zwolski & Kaunert, 2011; True & Mintrom, 2001). In this way, the entrepreneur teams up with victimised groups and maintains contact with them; hence, as Krook and True (2012, p. 107) put it in the ‘boomerang effect’ illustration, ‘activists can gain access, leverage and information that they would not have had on their own, thereby instigating dramatic changes in the scope and recognition of...[the] norms’.

Entrepreneurial actors take advantage of political prospects by altering wider normative settings (Mintrom & Luetjens, 2017). They create tactics for disseminating the new standards of behaviour to the public so that these supporters will accept the norms (Mintrom, 2000). By this, they establish novel openings and organise like-minded groups or individuals to promote the diffusion of new standards (Mintrom & Luetjens, 2017). However, norm entrepreneurs should always factor in the feasibility of the policy they intend to disseminate, which means that normative actors should gather germane verification and present the ideas or norms diplomatically and convincingly in order to win broader group influential enthusiasts to support the normative modification (Mintrom & Luetjens, 2017). Tellingly, normative change does not happen spontaneously. The process involves innovation, transmission and appraisal of the impacts or consequences of the norm changes and the level of acceptability by the public (Jordan & Huitema, 2014).

Mintrom (2000) highlights underpinning features that describe entrepreneurial actors, whom he calls ‘policy entrepreneurs’. He observes that normative change makers should be ‘creative and insightful’; thus, entrepreneurs must be innovative in shaping policy outcome. Again, actors should be ‘socially perceptive’; thus, they must envisage challenges and identify appropriate ideas for policy making (Mintrom, 2000; 1997a). Norm entrepreneurs are characterised by the ability to ‘mix in a variety of social and political settings’; that is, they should be in a position to proactively have access to valued materials for affecting normative modification (Mintrom, 2000, p. 60). Moreover, actors should have the capability to ‘argue
persuasively’, which implies presenting their reasons for normative change consistently (Mintrom, 2000). The entrepreneurial actors (either individuals, organisations, advocacy groups or states) should demonstrate a sense of readiness ‘to lead by example’; thus, they must conform to the standards they intend to promote (Mintrom, 2000, p. 60).

It should be reiterated that norm entrepreneurs influence the national policies through the introduction of novel standards of behaviour (Bjorkdahl, 2008) and by structures that ‘resonate with broader [shared] understandings’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 897). Therefore, the diplomatic tactics of norm diffusion include discussions and formation of alliances with individuals of similar values with the aim of organising people for norm advocacy (Bjorkdahl, 2008).

**Conclusion**

The issue of norm entrepreneurship is multifaceted. The aforesaid discussions highlight three different types of norm entrepreneurship. Many scholarly research works have described the concept based on the different levels of implementation. It is considered by the first type as normative change affected by non-states actors, whereas the second type understands it as policy implementation influenced by policy bureaucrats. The third type largely lays emphasis on the role of the state in shaping normative change.

Significantly, these types display some striking similarities. The three positions highlight that norms are transmitted through effective alliances either by individuals, organisations or amongst states. Again, norm entrepreneurs should appreciate that norms do not emerge in a vacuum and, therefore, it is imperative to consider existing standards or the normative context. Additionally, it is clear that all the groups seemingly admit the significant role of the state as the ultimate platform in the implementation and acceptance of normative change.⁷

Despite the above, the scholarship also highlights some major differences. The non-state position, for instance, lays much emphasis on the influence of transnational groups, individuals and social movements in shaping significant normative change. However, for scholars like True and Mintrom (2001), policy bureaucrats or experts are worth considering for discussions on successful norm entrepreneurship. Yet, other scholars like Acharya (2004), Ingebritsen (2002), and Bjorkdahl (2008), argue that states play a greater role in norm implementation.

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⁷ It should be noted here that this is only when the norms are relevant to the international society of states as there would, of course, be norms at different levels that do not require the state to be involved much or at all.
entrepreneurship in international politics. Regardless of the disparities in views, it appears that all the categories point to the combined influence of both external (non-state) and domestic (state) agents in bringing about normative change. This supports Zwingel’s (2012) position that both state and non-state agents are influential elements in norm entrepreneurship. In light of this, it is essential to trace a leader’s transition from non-state entrepreneur (outside formal institutions) to state entrepreneur, and also discuss how he managed this trajectory of transition.

Generally, this thesis seeks to examine Kwame Nkrumah’s personal transition and the impact that this had on his ideas of foreign policy. What is important about his journey, I argue, is that he did not appear to take into account the institution in which he was located as being significant for communicating his ideas. But what must also be considered, as the next chapter discusses, is the idea that post-colonial independence was novel and transformative. It required dismantling hundreds of years of institutions and rule.

Therefore, using the above explanations outlined by the scholarship, I am going to combine both the non-state (moral) and state approaches to norm entrepreneurship to tell a story here. The story is about the role of the identity, ideas, beliefs and principles of an individual (Nkrumah), who started activism as an outsider (or non-state entrepreneur); later became an influential leader of a country (Ghana); and on the African continent promoted the idea of Pan-Africanism to shape policies on independence, humanitarian intervention and institutional structure at the national, regional and international levels. The next part of the story will explain his transition from the non-state agent or entrepreneur to state leader; what he sought to do within the structural confines of an independent state; and then how he sought to be a norm entrepreneur in influencing continental and international politics. In other words, it traces how Nkrumah, as a norm entrepreneur, sought to promote an understanding of Pan-Africanism during the final years of colonialism, which would continue to inform his understanding of Ghana’s foreign policy and obligation to the Pan-African project while President. The years as a non-state agent influenced his understanding of independence.

Two cases illustrate his unique appreciation of Pan-Africanism and its influence on Ghana’s foreign policy: the 1960s Congo intervention and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The thesis will also explore Nkrumah’s relationship with post-independence Ghana in order to appreciate the impact of his ideas and his leadership. To these ends, the following chapters will help to explore the flaws as well as the legacy of Nkrumah as a norm entrepreneur.

By integrating the norm entrepreneurship framework, the findings generated from the discussion above are the frame that will be utilised in the later chapters of the thesis to trace Nkrumah’s entrepreneurial trajectory. As highlighted above, a norm entrepreneur usually
frames an issue, builds networks, organises platforms and captures political opportunities for normative advancement. These are key vehicles in the trajectory of entrepreneurial actors as they try to successfully affect normative change (see Kingdon, 2003; Davies & True, 2017). It should be restated that problem framing by norm entrepreneurs means that they persistently and actively articulate ideas and beliefs as appropriate standards of behaviour and ensure that they resonate with the masses (see Acharya, 2004; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Nkrumah framed the idea of pan-Africanism as the most effective approach to reinforce self-determination and integration. Second, network building by entrepreneurial actors involves forming alliances with like-minded individual actors and states so as to persuade the larger public to adopt the new norms (see Bjorkdahl, 2008). In Chapter Three of the thesis, as will be seen, Nkrumah built networks with the African Students in the United States and Europe. Further, he formed alliances with independence movements on the African continent to oppose colonialism.

Organisational platforms are significant structures by which norms are promoted. For Nkrumah’s normative cause, the organisational platform included the domestic structures he needed in order to carry out his regional engagement. These platforms are primarily constructed to advance the normative change (see Nadelmann, 1990; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). For example, as this study shows in Chapter Three, Nkrumah created a Bureau within Ghana’s Foreign Ministry through which his pan-African ideal was to be promoted. Capturing political opportunities implies the seizing of the political environment by norm entrepreneurs to bring about normative change (see Carpenter, 2014; 2006). In the pan-African mission, Nkrumah had both the domestic and regional environment or opportunities to seize in order to accomplish his vision. In other words, capturing political opportunities requires that the individual actor — Nkrumah — effectively finds and utilises domestic opportunities as well as regional opportunities in the promotion of norms. This frame is about grasping the moment and the existing political situation to persuade the wider public to accept a particular norm (see Davies & True, 2017).

In this research, I argue that Kwame Nkrumah engaged in the first three practices — problem framing, building networks and organising platforms very quickly in the early stages of his presidency within Ghana. So, in Chapter Three in particular, we see that he had a clear idea of the problem when he became the leader of Ghana. He built networks and achieved independence. He also had an organisational platform through the creation of the Bureau of African Affairs, which was solely dedicated to this pan-African enterprise. Clearly, by end of Chapter Three, we see how Nkrumah successfully applied the first three practices of
entrepreneurship outlined in the above framework. However, the challenging stage for him as a leader was capturing political opportunities to promote his vision (that is, the fourth practice discussed above). As a result, in chapters Four, Five and Six, I am going to demonstrate where there were domestic opportunities and where there were regional opportunities — and how those crucial opportunities were lost. Nkrumah could not manage these windows of opportunities effectively. And I am going to explain why those opportunities were lost in the early post-independence period.

The next chapter provides a genealogy of the idea of Pan-Africanism and, specifically, it traces the African independence movements’ entry into the Pan-African Movement. The chapter explores the origins of Pan-Africanism and traces how African students, individuals like Nkrumah, joined the movement which became embedded in indigenous African political nationalism and the struggle for independence. This chapter will bring to the fore the historical underpinnings of the Pan-African norm and the significance of its attachment to Nkrumah and the independence movements in Africa.
Chapter Two

A Review of the Literature on Pan-Africanism

Introduction

The previous chapter presented three ‘conventional’ types of norm entrepreneurship: the non-state actor, the policy implementation actor, and the ‘state’ actor position. Rarely does the identity of the norm entrepreneur change. The norm entrepreneurship literature understands the identity remaining the same throughout the norm life cycle. My contribution to this literature considers what happens when the identity of the norm entrepreneur changes during the norm life cycle. In the case of the independence movements in Africa, norm entrepreneurs who advocated for independence from colonial rule underwent a dramatic transition. They went from independence fighters to state leaders in the space of a decade. This thesis explores how this transition occurred with one individual, Kwame Nkrumah. In order to understand the significance of this transition from colonialism to independence, we need to understand why Nkrumah attached so much importance to the Pan-African ideal as part of his independence struggle and to his foreign policy ambition in his first decade of rule as Ghana’s first President.

This chapter follows the idea of African solidarity that emerged from intellectuals from the Caribbean and United States during the early twentieth century. By the end of World War I, the movement had metamorphosed into a norm of African sovereignty and solidarity. As more African students and intellectuals engaged with the movement during the 1920s and 1930s, by the time of the 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress, many who attended this Congress would later return to the continent to act as norm entrepreneurs in their fight to make their countries and the continent sovereign.

The awakening of Pan-Africanism amongst African independence leaders led to, argues Thompson (1969a), the independence struggles that then took place in the African continent. In this chapter, I will not delve into the nuances of the slave trade and its attachment to the Pan-African Movement. I will discuss the anti-colonial protests led by the Pan-African Movements from 1900 to 1945. In this chapter, the history of the Pan-African movements is charted from early thinkers such as Sylvester Williams, Marcus Garvey, W. E. B. Du Bois, and George Padmore. Then I pay particular attention to how Kwame Nkrumah and other Africans became
part of the movement during their sojourn in the United States and Britain. Subsequent chapters will elaborate on how these ideas continued to resonate within Africa through the efforts of Nkrumah. This chapter, therefore, builds on the norm entrepreneurship framework and shows how these pan-Africanists framed or presented Pan-Africanism as the best chance for the collective movement against slavery, discrimination and colonialism. In constructing and promoting the idea of Pan-Africanism, the chapter identifies the building of international networks and organisational platforms through pan-African alliances, meetings and movements.

The chapter traces the genealogy of the Pan-African movements as steps to promoting the idea of African solidarity for self-government and against racial discrimination. To begin with, I will review literature on the meaning of the idea of Pan-Africanism as articulated by various scholars. Then, I will trace the history of the norm and how its movements from 1900 to 1945 endeavoured to keep the spirit of Pan-Africanism alive as a response by Africans and African diasporas to colonialism and their struggle for African emancipation. In the final section of this chapter, I will explore the First (1919), Second (1921), Third (1923), Fourth (1927) and Fifth (1945) Pan-African congresses and present how their respective objectives were deliberately attached to the movements for ‘African’ self-determination (not individual country self-determination). I argue that it is particularly important to note that many of the African independence leaders, including Nkrumah, were present as students in North America and Europe during the Pan-African Movement. This chapter provides a genealogy of Pan-Africanism and establishes why this concept was influential in the thinking of independence leaders such as Nkrumah. Their location in this movement gave them language that could articulate why their continent should be free of colonial rule and what form of federal political institution they could establish to ensure independence.

Definition of the Concept of Pan-Africanism

Scholarly works regarding the meaning of the concept of Pan-Africanism are centred on a sense of homogeneity and the idea of solidarity amongst people of African descent (Manyeruke, 2016). However, there are enduring debates over the specific meaning of Pan-Africanism. In the book, *Pan-Africanism: A short political guide*, Colin Legum (1965) observes that despite using the word Pan-Africanism, there is no uniform definition associated with the concept. These debates are evident in the plethora of definitions given by researchers in the field under discussion.
The imprecise definition for Pan-Africanism underscores the fact that the concept ‘has taken different forms at different historical moments and geographical locations’ (Adi & Sherwood, 2003, p. vii). To this end, Emerson (1962) explains Pan-Africanism as the belief that Africans and people of African descent are spiritually connected, have a similar historical past, and these elements should bring them together as a unified group to fight for a better life. This historical affinity is attributed to their colonial past and the emergence of slave trade, which led to the dispersion of Africans worldwide (Williams, 2007). Esedebe (1980, p. 14) notes that Pan-Africanism demonstrates ‘a political and cultural phenomenon which regards Africa, Africans and African descendants abroad as a unit, and aims at the regeneration and unification of Africa and the promotion of a feeling of solidarity among the people of the African world’ (cited in Asante, 1995, p. 724). Thus, it is an idea and belief that people of African origin are united and share a similar historical experience. The AU Echo (2013) explains Pan-Africanism as an ideology and crusade that inspires collective identity, harmony and responsibility amongst Africans and people of African descent. Again, Pan-Africanism can be understood as ‘the acceptance of a oneness of all people of African descent and the commitment to the betterment of all people of African descent’ (cited in Adogamhe, 2008, p. 7).

Immanuel Geiss broadly extends the definition of Pan-Africanism to include intellectual and political movements among Africans and [African Americans] who regard or have regarded Africans and people of African descent as homogenous, [therefore, creating a sense of] racial solidarity and a new self-awareness and causes [African Americans] to look upon Africa as their real ‘homeland’, without necessarily thinking of a physical return to Africa. (Geiss, 1974, p. 3)

This definition of ‘intellectual and political movements’ in part relates to the earlier members of the Pan-African campaign who were predominantly intellectually and politically inclined, such as Sylvester Williams, Cyril Lionel Robert James (hereafter C. L. R. James), Du Bois and Marcus Garvey (Sherwood, 2012; 2011a; Appiah, 1999). Geiss adds that these movements were premised on the formation of advocacy networks to ensure promotion of shared solidarity and cooperation amongst Africans and people of African ancestry in the Caribbean and United States.

Contrary to Geiss’ assertion that Pan-Africanism is a political movement, Legum argues that it is rather ‘a movement of ideas and emotions’ (1964, p. 190). Yet, the idea of Pan-Africanism and its related movements, according to W. E. B Du Bois, are an embodiment of

Similar to Geiss’ definition, Appiah (1999) considers Pan-Africanism as a political activity or agenda that is geared towards uniting Africans both on the continent and outside the continent (Africans in the diaspora). Clarke (1988) adds that the concept of Pan-Africanism is a global crusade by all people of Africa as well as Africans in the diaspora, who believe in shared purpose and have common bonds as a result of colonial experiences, and endeavour to jointly develop a sense of African-centred tradition and fight for respect, dignity, and pride. Walter Rodney (1974) argues that the idea of Pan-Africanism seeks to collectively find a resolution to challenges facing Africans in the framework of a political campaign. This could be attributed to the proposition that all people of African origin worldwide share similar culture and as a result, it is imperative for them to unite and advocate for the emancipation and improvement in the lives of Africans globally (Chrisman, 1973). Yet, Adi and Sherwood (2003) and Young (2010) observe that Pan-Africanism was not a shared identity but a crusade — African solidarity was the vehicle that propelled political nationalism amongst Africans vis-à-vis the struggle for political independence by African countries, especially during the middle of the 1950s and 1960s.

Pan-Africanism, according to Horace Campbell (1996, p. 90), encapsulates a ‘struggle for emancipation through diverse means; seeking unity and expressing the common purpose of fighting white domination and restoring African community’. This African community includes all people across the world with African origin (Oloruntoba-Oju, 2012). These definitions are, therefore, not different from Du Bois’, noting that Pan-Africanism is a belief and collaboration amongst all people of African ancestry with the desire to promote their liberation from racial discrimination and colonialism (Du Bois, 1933).

Martin (2012) and, earlier Chrisman (1973), explain that the concept of Pan-Africanism should be defined as evolving in its meaning according to the region’s political, cultural, and economic experiences. That is, from a cultural perspective, it is the idea and belief of regaining the pride, history, ideals and culture of people of African descent, both on the continent of Africa and in the diaspora (Eze, 2013; Martin, 2012; Osei-Nyame, 1999). What remains consistent, from the political perspective, is that Pan-Africanism is strongly associated with the emancipation of all people of African descent (Martin, 2012). The economic underpinning of Pan-Africanism parallels the fight against colonial activities as well as neo-colonialism — all
forms of economic exploitation on the African continent which foreshadow balkanising or partitioning the African continent amongst the European countries (Martin, 2012; Chrisman, 1973). From a more contemporary perspective, Manyeruke (2016) and Uzoigwe (2014) argue that Pan-Africanism encapsulates the crusade by Africans to be emancipated from colonialism and neo-colonialism, but also promote a continental grouping or African Union.

I define Pan-Africanism as a normative principle — it was a collection of political and cultural principles that created and promoted a sense of consciousness and group solidarity amongst people of African descent on the African continent to seek independence from colonialism, and recently, to promote African values and interests.

The next section of the chapter highlights the genealogy of the idea of Pan-Africanism tracing it from ancient times to the post-World War II period. It should be noted, however, that the principle originated from the Caribbean and the United States, following agitations by people of African descent against the slave trade and racial discrimination before its later diffusion to the African soil. The movement started as an anti-slavery campaign and a campaign for African identity before it gradually metamorphosed into a movement for African continental self-determination and eventually a political norm of anti-imperialism, unity and self-government after the huge participation of Africans. This section charts why and how this transition occurred.

**Origins of Pan-Africanism Thought**

Scholarly research on the origin of the concept of Pan-Africanism (and its associated movements) has been explored by the likes of Colin Legum, Peter Esedebe, George Shepperson, Marika Sherwood, Imanuel Geiss, Olayiwola Abegunrin, amongst others, who think the idea originated from ancient times. Yet, Abegunrin (2016a) maintains that there is no precise understanding of the exact origin of the idea of Pan-Africanism given that scholarly works derive their arguments from accounts by Africans in the diaspora. This means that people outside the African continent originally conceived the idea. It should be noted that, although Logan (1965) maintains that the notion of African solidarity or idea of Pan-Africanism was first envisaged by Henry Sylvester Williams, a West Indian (Trinidadian) legal practitioner, most scholars regard Du Bois as the ‘father’ of the Pan-African movements (Romero, 1976; Mazrui, 2005), an accolade George Padmore bestowed on him especially because of his contribution to the Pan-African movements (Efrat, 1967).
Nevertheless, it can be inferred that Williams was a forerunner who prepared the grounds for the proliferation of Pan-African activities in the 1900s. Geiss (1969) notes that in spite of the post-World War II prevalence of Pan-African activism especially in the wake of the nationalist activities in Britain and Africa, its antecedents could be traced earlier than the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This supports Abegunrin’s point that there was an expression of the Pan-African idea in the United States by African-Americans — especially in the eighteenth century — in response to segregation against people of African descent (Abegunrin, 2016a).

In his book, Pan-Africanism: Exploring the contradictions: Politics, identity and development in Africa and the African Diaspora, William Ackah (2016) argues that the idea of Pan-Africanism was originally coined by Sylvester Williams. Yet, traces of Pan-African consciousness were evident in the latter part of the nineteenth century especially following calls for the elimination of slave trade (Prah, 1999; Nantambu, 1998), which Clarke (1991) reiterates as ‘by the end of the nineteenth century the former slaves began to understand what had happened to them and from the Caribbean the concept of Pan-Africanism was born’ (p. 100). This supports Thompson’s claim that the idea of Pan-Africanism was precipitated by a protest to slavery, colonial activities as well as racial discrimination experienced by people of African descent (Thompson, 1969a). Bolaji (2015) adds that the sense of African consciousness and struggle for emancipation by the African states as well as the Pan-African belief of united Africans was informed by the dispersion of Africans through slavery to the United States and Caribbean to work in plantations. This supposed bond between people on the African continent and Africans in the diaspora could be linked to the belief that people of African origin regard Africa as their homeland; specifically, it is a place where the ‘Black Race’ began (Abegunrin, 2016a).

In the nineteenth century, however, there was not a great deal of conceptualising Pan-Africanism, although the idea and belief of African solidarity was in existence with clarion calls for the end of slavery and discrimination against blacks in the works of Sylvester Williams and Du Bois (Crutcher, 1963). Oloruntoba (2015), however, argues that there was a drive in the late nineteenth century to connect Africans at ‘home’ (in Africa) to those in the diaspora. This concern was discussed, at first, in opposition to the ‘partitioning’ of the African continent.

The balkanisation of Africa emerged after the Berlin Conference of November 1884–February 1885, where African states were partitioned and occupied by the Europeans. Based on this and other factors such as racial discrimination and the slave trade, Africans decided to protest leading to the 1900 Pan-African Conference. See more from Uzoigwe, 2014.
by campaigners such as Sylvester Williams, Du Bois and Garvey who began to campaign for a rebirth and awakening of African pride and identity (Hill, 2015; Tondi, 2005; Legum, 1964).

Outside of the Americas, there was also a movement by Africans to unite as a group and campaign against European colonisation, which in 1897 led to the establishment of the African Association in Great Britain under the leadership of Sylvester Williams⁹ (Adi & Sherwood, 2003). To this effect, the association primarily aimed at:

[Encouraging] a feeling of unity, to facilitate friendly intercourse among Africans in general; to promote and protect the interests of all subjects claiming African descent … by circulating accurate information on all subjects affecting their rights and privileges as subjects of the British Empire and by direct appeals to the imperial and local government. (cited in Geiss, 1967, p. 725)

Adi (2012) argues that it was the embodiment of alliances of émigrés based in Britain from Africa, as well as African Americans who had sought asylum owing to the prevalence of racial segregation in the United States. This Association, led by Henry Sylvester Williams, paved way for a meeting in 1900 to find solutions to, as they put it, ‘the problem of the twentieth century… the problem of the colour line [in respect of safeguarding] civil and political rights for Africans and their descendants throughout the world’ (Adi & Sherwood, 2003, p. viii; Du Bois, 2006, p. 16). This Pan-African agenda was later amplified by Du Bois as

The idea of one Africa to unite the thoughts and ideals of all native peoples of [Africa] belongs to the twentieth century … Here various groups of Africans, quite separate in origin, became so united and so exposed to the impact of new cultures that they begin to think of Africa as one idea and one land. (cited in Thompson, 1969a, p. 23)

Scholars such as Geiss (1969), Thompson (1969a), Andrain (1962) and Sherwood (2011a) identify the roots of Pan-Africanism and its movement to the campaign led by Sylvester Williams. However, Legum (1965), Efrat (1967), and Asante (1995) argue that Du Bois masterminded the Pan-African Movement as an international concept, branching out to include the people of African descent living in Africa.

Shepperson (1960) and Ackah (2016) add that apart from the commitment of Sylvester Williams and Du Bois, Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) established in 1914 had conceived and promoted a Pan-African belief in Jamaica with the aim of fighting against colonial tendencies on the African continent. Garvey’s UNIA propagated

⁹ This group was a prelude to the 1900 Conference.
their maxim — the need to protect the liberties of people of all racial backgrounds — on a return to Africa. This became a profound sentiment amongst the African-Americans, especially those in the Caribbean. On the other hand, Du Bois contended that he stood for renaissance of the Africans regarding their culture and values as a step towards the complete liberation of the continent of Africa (Legum, 1965; Hill & Pirio, 1987; Garvey, 1986). Like Du Bois, Garvey’s UNIA also instigated global racial awareness amongst Afro-Americans and Africans (Shepperson, 1960). It was this consciousness which contributed to the renaissance amongst African-Americans in the United States to rise against racial discrimination and abuses as well as demand equal rights and respect, then called the ‘Harlem Renaissance’ (Shepperson, 1960). As discussed in Chapter Three, Nkrumah often witnessed these meetings by the Harlem Movement during his school days at University of Pennsylvania in the United States, and he refers to these meetings as an important introduction to Pan-Africanism during his formative years. However, Garvey’s Pan-African contribution was short-lived — he died in 1940 — and this movement was not present at the 1945 Congress (Shepperson, 1960; Marks & Trapido, 2014). Du Bois’ engagement with the Pan-African Movement was particularly significant because of his work in organising five congresses from 1919 to 1945 (Shepperson, 1960). The Pan-African conferences are discussed in the next section.

The Pan-African Movements/Conferences

The Pan-African Movement, in the words of Du Bois, was ‘aimed at an intellectual understanding and cooperation among all groups of African descent in order to bring about the industrial and spiritual emancipation of the Negro people’ (cited in Abegunrin, 2016a, p. 1). The political genesis of the Pan-African Movement can be identified within two political movements — the Williams and Du Boisian trends. Shepperson (1960, p. 306) observes that ‘Du Bois’s role as a pioneer of Pan-Africanism’ was in the organisation of five Pan-African conferences which he engineered in 1919 (Paris), 1921 (London), 1923 (London and Lisbon), 1927 (New York), and 1945 (Manchester).

The Williams’ 1900 London Conference was organised to expose the plight of Africans in British colonies (Sherwood, 2012; Hooker, 1974; Rukundwa & Van Aarde, 2007). Geiss (1969) notes that the 1900 meeting was predominantly attended by African-Americans and Afro-West Indians, with just a few Africans. It was not largely attended — just 38 delegates

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10 Harlem is in Manhattan, New York.
were present. Although Williams’ dream of Pan-African Association was short-lived, he established a journal (*The Pan-African*) to spread ‘information concerning the interests of the African and his Descendants in the British Empire’ (cited in Sherwood, 2012, p. 108).

Uzoigwe (2014) argues that despite the ‘failure’ narrative of the 1900 London Conference, Sylvester Williams’ initiative in holding the conference paved the way for the Pan-African crusade. In his memoir on the Pan-African Movement, Du Bois (1974) acknowledged that ‘It was not, however, until 1900 that a black West Indian barrister, H. Sylvester Williams, of Trinidad… called together a “Pan-African” Conference. This meeting attracted attention, put the word “Pan-African” in the dictionaries for the first time…’ (p. 1). In furtherance of this, Abegunrin (2016c) argues that the contention about Du Bois’ 1919 Congress being the first movement was because of the impression he made after that Congress in the minds of Western journalists and scholars present, who thereafter largely acknowledged him as the driving force behind the Pan-African Movement.

The death of Sylvester Williams after the 1900 Conference led to a shift of direction to Du Bois, who had participated in the conference and had concluded that the challenges of the twentieth century Pan-Africanism struggle should be tackled mainly through protests (Karioki, 1974; Appiah, 2015). By 1914, the start of World War I, the idea of Pan-African Movement had been relegated to the background. The stirring of African solidarity and a sense of consciousness towards the fight against prejudiced repressions amongst the blacks across the world would not appear until 1919 — with the creation of Du Bois’ Pan-African movements and Marcus Garvey’s crusade during the post-First World War era (Adi, 2008).

The following outline traces the Du Bois-led Pan-African congresses from 1919 to 1945 and discusses the introduction of future African leaders onto the Pan-African stage, although they had conceived the idea of African political nationalism prior to the 1945 Congress. Essentially, these Africans became the trailblazers of a normative shift of Pan-Africanism amongst indigenous inhabitants of the continent of Africa after the post-World War II period. It should be noted that the cardinal building blocks of this latter political movement were their networks and ability to organise themselves which rejuvenated the drive for African independence.

**The First Pan-African Congress (1919)**

The first Pan-African Congress was held in Paris in 1919. While built on the foundations of the Williams’ 1900 Conference (Geiss, 1974; Efrat, 1967; Ta’a, 2014), the Paris Conference is largely why Du Bois is credited with creating the Pan-African movements or congresses.
In the words of Legum (1965), ‘For almost half a century [Du Bois] dominated the Pan-African movement’ (p. 24). Du Bois indicated his Pan-African intention in the following statement:

As I face Africa I ask myself: what is it between us that constitutes a tie that I can feel better than I can explain? Africa is, of course, my fatherland ... the real essence of this kinship is its social heritage of slavery; the discrimination and insult; and this heritage binds together not simply the children of Africa, but extends through yellow Asia and into the South Sea. It is this unity that draws me to Africa. (cited in Legum, 1965, p. 24; Appiah, 1985, p. 33)

Ackah (2016) and Geiss (1974) maintain that the Du Bois-led 1919 Paris Congress was the ‘First Pan-African Congress’ organised to advocate for the freedoms of Africans as well as a medium to help eliminate slavery and colonialism in Africa. It was an opportunity for Africans to fight for the attainment of self-governance and end European involvement in the affairs of African states. Yet, Geiss (1969) argues that the 1919 Congress lacked the ‘younger generation’ of Africans who would connect it to emerging political nationalism on the continent. It is also worth remembering that prior to the Congress, as a step towards Pan-African solidarity, Du Bois’ National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP) assigned him to Paris as part of the preparations for the Congress (Geiss, 1974; Contee, 1972). Du Bois12, also known as the ‘Father of Pan-Africanism’ because of his contribution to the movements, was one of the key founders of the NAACP in 1909 (Adi & Sherwood, 2003). Again, Du Bois created a journal for propagating the activities of the NAACP and the Pan-African campaign called The Crisis (Du Bois, 1920). It is noteworthy that the NAACP prior to the 1919 Congress was involved in Pan-African undertakings by supporting the struggle against race prejudice concerning African-Americans in the United States (Meier & Bracey, 1993; Contee, 1972).

Adi and Sherwood (2003) observe that although Du Bois was primarily assigned to France by the NAACP to study how the African-American combatants were treated in the United States army, he used the opportunity to hold the Pan-African Congress. More so, Du Bois was in France as a delegate for the NAACP during a post-First World War peace conference by European and American leaders in the French city of Versailles, where he

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11 The NAACP was founded in 1909 to prevent human right abuses such as racial discrimination against the African Americans in the United States and to promote respect for the Black Community.

12 Du Bois was an American and a key member of Pan-Africanism. He was born in Massachusetts but died in Accra, Ghana (Adi & Sherwood, 2003).
implored President Woodrow Wilson of the United States to investigate how African soldiers were treated in France as well as ensuring that the Africans were given independence from European colonisation (Adejumobi, 2001). The peace conference was a meeting to end the World War I attended by leaders of the United States, Britain, France and Italy (Abegunrin, 2016c). In response to Du Bois’ appeal, President Wilson issued a communiqué stating that there should be ‘an absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based on the principle that the interests of the population must have equal weight with equitable claims of the government’ (cited in Adejumobi, 2001, p. 2). Du Bois had earlier expressed his Pan-African agenda during a speech, underlining that it was necessary to ‘Let the British Nation, the first modern champion of Negro freedom, hasten to… give, as soon as practicable, the rights of responsible government to the Black Colonies of Africa and the West Indies’ (cited in Logan, 1965, p. 90). This, according to Geiss (1974), highlights Du Bois’ plan to hold the Pan-African Congress in Paris in that since 1900 he had expressed concerns about Pan-African issues.

Prior to the Congress and as part of the preparations, Du Bois formed a connection with Senegal’s representative Blaise Diagne — who had also been a French government official during the post-World War I period (Geiss, 1974; Langley, 1969). Again, Diagne was a colonial spokesperson for French territories and friend of the French Prime Minister, Georges Clemenceau (Legum, 1965; Henry, 1959). It appears this alliance was to take advantage of the political opportunity (or have a political platform) in France to promote the Pan-African Conference. The French President was quoted to have informed Blaise Diagne, ‘[d]on’t advertise the Congress…but go ahead’ (cited in Legum, 1965, p. 28).

The Pan-African Congress, which took place between 19 and 21 February 1919 in the Grand Hotel, Boulevard des Capucines (Paris), had 57 representatives from European colonies in Africa, African-Americans in the United States and the Caribbean (Abegunrin, 2016c; Geiss, 1974). Although Du Bois was the Chairman and main architect of the Congress, Geiss (1974) observes that the political influence of Diagne in France supported Du Bois’ organisation of the Congress. In addition to that, Contee (1972) notes that Diagne’s ‘voice carried great weight within the official circles of the French Government’ (p. 21). Yet, Legum (1965) argues that in spite of its extensive resolution, the emancipation of the African states was not underscored. Rather, the Congress’ resolution called for global law to safeguard the aboriginals of the colonial states, elimination of the slave trade across the African states and globally, and finally

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13 He was official Under-Secretary of Colonies and Commissioner General of African-French soldiers.
the indigenes of African states should be allowed to take part in their administration in consonance with their developmental goals or level of development (Legum, 1965).

In addition, the Congress maintained that countries such as Abyssinia (present-day Ethiopia), Liberia and Haiti should be fully recognised and respected as sovereign states (Geiss, 1974). Although both Du Bois and Diagne wanted progressive self-government of the people of Africa, they had diverse economic opinions regarding the balkanisation of Africa (Contee, 1974). While Diagne backed the French traders’ ‘economic exploitation’ of the African continent, Du Bois was completely against that, though this discrepancy did not prevent their collaboration in holding the 1919 Pan-African Congress (Contee, 1972). Du Bois also established acquaintances with the African community in the capital of France (Paris) together with the sovereign regimes of Liberia, Ethiopia and Haiti (Contee, 1972). The French-speaking Africans, however, had gained French citizenship, which made them concentrate on the adoption of French culture rather than campaigning against French colonial powers (Thompson, 1969a). Furthermore, Du Bois reckoned that the Congress was a platform to establish a permanent Pan-African secretariat based in Paris, which he believed was ‘to compile the history of the [Africans], to study [their] present situation … to publish articles, pamphlets, and a record of the congress, and to promote [cultural values of Africans]’ (Geiss, 1974, p. 236).

Consequently, after the Paris Pan-African Congress, Du Bois and his team identified an important platform to form a worldwide Pan-African group, known as the Pan-African Association, as a step towards promoting the idea of shared solidarity for the development of Africa and prevention of economic exploitation of the continent and its people (Geiss, 1974; Contee, 1972). It appears, as Contee (1972) maintains, that Du Bois envisioned the organisation of a subsequent Pan-African meeting because the Association’s leadership was given the mandate to oversee preparations for the second Pan-African Congress and to serve as a vehicle for projecting the activities of the Pan-African Movement, as will be discussed later. However, Du Bois continued to facilitate and organise advocacy and administrative duties of the Pan-African group, thus making the Association a machinery for propagating information on the resolutions (information clearing house) of the Pan-African Congress (Contee, 1972). Du Bois’ impact on the 1919 Pan-African Congress was echoed by Nnamdi Azikiwe, the former Nigerian President and an important Pan-Africanist, who observed that Du Bois’ ‘founding of the Pan-African Congress in 1919, in Paris, was a signal for the historic struggle by African

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14 Also reiterated in the resolution of the 1945 Congress.
nationalists which led to the political emancipation of this [African] continent’ (cited in Contee, 1972, p. 28). However, Sherwood (2012) states that the 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress and its associated political activism in Africa laid the foundation for independence of the African continent. Austin (2008) similarly points out that the Pan-African Congress of 1945 inspired nationalist activities in Africa, which were instrumental in liberating Ghana and subsequently other African states.

The 1919 Congress, Geiss (1967) argues, ‘for the first time’ brought together Africans from Anglophone and Francophone states, although the delegates were predominantly Afro-Caribbean. This step promoted the development of unity amongst indigenous Africans and Africans in the Caribbean (Rodney, 1974). However, Adi and Sherwood (2003) maintain that the significance of the 1919 Congress was short-lived especially regarding the realisation of its resolutions, leading to the call for another Pan-African Congress in 1921. Efrat (1967) notes that the 1919 Congress was aimed at influencing the peace conference in France to grant African states the opportunity to govern themselves and enhance their development without external involvement.

Significantly, it can be noted that despite the collective commitment of the 1919 Congress to rally support in fighting slavery and colonialism, the movement was light on its outcomes with respect to the call for independence of African states. This could be attributed to the internal scuffles between the organisers of the Congress as well as financial challenges. Again, the lack of wider representatives from the African continent at the Congress might be a factor. Yet, the role of networks established by Du Bois and Blaise Diagne as well as other delegates regarding the organisation of the 1919 Congress is noteworthy. Nevertheless, Legum (1965) notes that the independence of African states should have been the major highlight of the Congress. At the 1919 Congress, the idea of Pan-Africanism was still less emphatic on the immediate independence of Africans.

The following section provides an overview of the Second Congress held in 1921. It should be stated that throughout these stages, the principle of Pan-Africanism was yet to become a norm of continental emancipation championed by Africans themselves, owing probably to the fractional African representation and the absence of key actors who would in the future mobilise it on the continent. It was still a diasporan concept being promoted by intellectuals outside the African continent.
The Second Pan-African Congress (1921)

The second Pan-African Congress was held in London in 1921 with subsequent gatherings in Brussels and Paris (Geiss, 1974; Logan, 1965; Efrat, 1967) with the primary aim of ‘[discussing] segregation, the racial problem of Black Americans, and South Africa… and the methods of cooperation among the peoples of the African world’ (cited in Abegunrin, 2016b, p. 24). In this regard, Du Bois met with prominent delegates of the ‘Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society’ as well as the Labour Party of Britain including Norman Leys, Leonard Woolf and Beatrice Webb (Geiss, 1974). Yet, according to Geiss, there was contention regarding the Congress as Du Bois defied the recommendation by Reverend Harris (Secretary of the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society) to hold the Congress in August 1921. As part of preparations for the 1921 Congress, Du Bois formed a Pan-African Association with the support of Gratien Candace and Isaac Beton, who was an educationist from Martinique but was teaching in Paris to oversee the organisation of the Congress (Geiss, 1974).

However, Logan (1965) maintains that few African delegates participated as the majority of the representatives were from non-African states including the Caribbean and the United States. During developments to the Congress, Du Bois, in order to ensure better African representation this time, maintained contact with African states, something that had been lacking during the earlier Congress in Paris (Geiss, 1974; Efrat, 1967). Geiss (1974) and Abegunrin (2016c) observe that at the 1921 Congress, over ‘one-third’ of delegates were from the African continent (Gold Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Congo, Malagasy, Angola, Sao Tome, and South Africa), while the rest were African-American and African-Caribbean. And yet, Logan (1965) argues that language disparities during the Congress were a major challenge worth highlighting. He notes that during his presentation of the resolution in English, Du Bois mentioned ‘that the land in Africa ought to be returned to the commune’ (p. 96). But Diagne, Chairman of the Congress, understood the term ‘commune’ to mean radical insurgency (Logan, 1965).

Consequently, Logan (1965) from his personal accounts as a witness remarks that there was tension between Diagne and Du Bois during the session in Paris, although he did not elaborate further on the aftermath. In his statement at the Congress, Du Bois highlighted the Pan-African Movement from the earliest time of the 1900 Conference, noting the financial constraints and other challenges the group had overcome; he, therefore, regarded the Congress as an opportunity for Africans to unite and find solutions to their challenges (Abegunrin, 2016c). Ironically, the European countries at the meeting declined to engage in the discussion
on the challenges faced by Africans in their respective colonies since they considered such discussions to be radical campaigns (Abegunrin, 2016c). This, Abegunrin maintains, was no different to the earlier Congress, especially as it continued the demands for eliminating discrimination against Africans and slavery, as well as a gradual independence of Africans. However, Mboukou (1983) argues that the Congress at this stage was not heavily focused on the independence of African states — especially as it involved a smaller number of indigenous Africans compared with the Manchester Congress. The Congress resolved that:

[T]he League of Nations [should] create a division within its International Bureau of Labour to protect and supervise African Labour relations in order to eliminate involuntary servitude, inadequate pay and harsh working conditions; In the interest of gradual self-government within Africa, … at least one African [should] be placed on the Mandate Commission of the League of Nations … (cited in Abegunrin, 2016c, p. 26)

In spite of the resolution outlined by the Du Bois-led Congress, Abegunrin observes that Diagne opposed its submission because he regarded the demands (in the resolution) as very radical, leading to misunderstanding at the Congress. Yet, the Congress came to a closure in September 1921 with the proposal to promote the fight for African self-determination (Abegunrin, 2016c).

Geiss (1967) mentions that the Congress was faced with financial constraints and skirmishes between French-speaking and African-American representatives, especially as a result of demand for affiliation dues by Beton to facilitate the activities of the Congress. Furthermore, there was disagreement between Beton and Candace because of the former’s proposal that the financial burden of the group should be borne by the African-Americans in the United States, leading to the latter’s resignation from the association in 1922 (Geiss, 1974). The onus later laid on Beton to superintend the organisation of the Third Congress, though without financial support (Geiss, 1974). In this regard, Beton issued threats of resignation from the group and to prevent the holding of a subsequent Congress until the financial status of the group changed (Geiss, 1967). Nevertheless, Geiss notes that the resignation of Beton coupled with internal tensions within the Pan-African organisations and financial difficulties did not pose a serious danger to the movement, hence, the emergence of the third Pan-African Congress in 1923.

Two things are worth mentioning in the history of the Second Congress. First, Du Bois maintained his networks with individuals and groups such as Candace, Beton and Diagne, and the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society. Second, the Congress was still calling for
the same better conditions for Africans in the European colonies and gradual independence, though not with the same intensity as the 1945 Congress (discussed later). More so, it sought to promote unity amongst Africans and help fight racial discrimination. Yet, African representation was poor at the Congress just like the previous Congress. Another missing link in the movement at this stage was the call for an African union as a prelude to African continental sovereignty (Geiss, 1969). All in all, Legum (1965) reiterates that the 1921 Congress demonstrated a primary request by a group of intellectuals on behalf of all people of African descent with the goal of campaigning for independence for states under colonialism as well as a growing interest for subjugated people on the African continent and the diaspora.

In light of the above discussion, the next section examines the Third Pan-African Congress as a step towards the emergence of a Pan-African norm connected with a political movement concerned more with African independence and promoted by Africans themselves.

**The Third Pan-African Congress (1923)**

Upon the resignation of Beton as Secretary of the organisation of the Third Congress, Du Bois stepped in to support the Pan-African Movement in the United States through correspondence with participants and arrangements for venues (Geiss, 1974). Abegunrin (2016c), however, maintains that a significant task of the Pan-African Association after the 1921 Congress was to organise a Third Congress. Between 7 and 8 November 1923, Du Bois and the Pan-African Association held the Third Pan-African Congress in London with a succeeding session in Lisbon to discuss the way forward for the movement and the plight of the Africans (Appiah, 1999; Geiss, 1974; Abegunrin, 2016c; Drake, 1959). It appears Du Bois chose London for the first session because of the large presence of people of African descent as well as financial challenges. Delegates at the Congress were from 11 states including the Gold Coast (now Ghana), Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Britain, France, United States, Caribbean, amongst others (Geiss, 1974). Other participants were from the British Labour Party such as H. G. Wells, Harold Laski and Sidney Oliviers (Abegunrin, 2016c).

Du Bois expressed at the Congress that apart from the movement for safeguarding the respect of the African peoples and ensuring fair treatment by the Europeans, the Congress was also to serve as an agent for diffusing information pertaining to challenges faced by Africans across the world (Geiss, 1974). He emphasised in his report that ‘it had not been possible to hold all the sessions in Lisbon, Portugal as was originally planned for all sessions but for financial difficulties the first session was held in London’ (cited in Abegunrin, 2016c, p. 29). However, Geiss observes that the Lisbon Pan-African Congress was not different from the
London meeting as it did not chalk up much success in terms of its goal of African liberation. It was a repetition of previous agenda and a call for Africans to achieve self-government, noting that it was time ‘for Africans to have a voice in their own Governments’ (cited in Legum, 1965, p. 29). In addition, Abegunrin (2016c) observes that the 1923 Congress proposed the formation of Pan-African committees in the United States, Europe, Africa and Caribbean with a secretariat in Paris in order to ensure continuity in the activities of the Movement. Although the Congress had decided to hold another meeting in 1925, it was futile because of financial constraints and internal wrangling amongst members; for instance, whereas Blaise Diagne wanted development of African states within the colonial structure, the other members including Du Bois desired gradual independence and departure from colonialism (Abegunrin, 2016c).

The 1923 Congress was largely preoccupied with a narrower objective — self-determination for Africans and the elimination of European colonial subjugation. However, Coleman (1958, p. 78) argues that Du Bois and the Movement were not forthright with their fight for independence of Africans (cited in Mboukou, 1983, p. 277). Interestingly, the 1923 Congress underlies a gradual change in the trend of the idea of Pan-Africanism with the goal shifting more narrowly towards independence movement, rather than just anti-slavery and anti-African segregation. And yet, there were few African delegates and a lack of emphasis on African unity. This, Mboukou (1983) maintains, was ‘because the links with political organisations of emergent African nationalism were weak’ (pp. 191–192). This is what makes the 1945 Congress significant in that it provided impetus for political nationalism in Africa, although at this stage the idea of Pan-Africanism was seemingly the pursuit of independence, and it was yet to gain the momentum for a return to the African continent.

The following section discusses the Fourth Congress and its role in transforming the idea of Pan-Africanism into an independence movement. It should be clarified that the notion of protecting the African pride and values and safeguarding the rights of Africans was still being reinforced, but the primary focus of the Movement was undergoing changes (towards political independence) especially after the 1920s with the involvement of Africans. This saw Africans from the African continent becoming key actors in the Movement, although this was initially characterised by a predominance of Afro-Americans and Afro-Caribbean (Schramm, 2010).
The Fourth Pan-African Congress (1927)

After decades of challenges since the 1900 meeting regarding financial difficulties and internal crisis between the French Blaise Diagne and Du Bois, it appeared the Pan-African dream had lost the drive and energy (Abegunrin, 2016c). Furthermore, the initial plan to hold the Congress in 1926 in the Caribbean was defeated by inadequate financial and material support (Geiss, 1974). Similarly, the withdrawal of Francophone’s Diagne decreased the movement’s political support since he was very influential in the group (Abegunrin, 2016c; Geiss, 1974). The European powers also opposed the revolutionary approach adopted by the Movement, which was also a deterrent to the Congress, especially in Europe (Abegunrin, 2016c). In that light, however, Du Bois had to finally turn to a group of Black Women who revived the Movement in 1927 by organising and financing the fourth Pan-African Congress in Harlem, New York (Abegunrin, 2016c; Geiss, 1974). It should be noted here that this women group, called ‘The Circle for Peace and Foreign Relations’, was led by Addie Hunton (an Afro-American activist) formerly with the NAACP (Abegunrin, 2016c; Geiss, 1974). Again, Hunton was a member of the Young Women Christian Association (YWCA) team that worked to give humanitarian assistance to African American soldiers in France during World War I (Abegunrin, 2016c).

The fourth edition of Pan-African congresses was held in 1927 in New York, United States (Appiah, 1999). Logan (1965) reveals that the Congress presided over by Du Bois was also partly funded by a cocoa farmer, Chief Amoah III from the then Gold Coast (Ghana) and over 208 representatives participated in the Congress. Amongst the participants were representatives from the United States, Caribbean, Europe, Asia and Africa — including Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Nigeria (Du Bois, 1974). Like previous meetings, the Fourth Congress proposed that Africans ought to have ‘[a] voice in their own government; native rights to the land and its natural resources; modern education for all children; the development of Africa for the Africans and not merely for the profit of Europeans …’ (Du Bois, 1974, p. 10). Also, the Congress resolved that the United States should stop its annexation of Haiti and restore self-government to the Haitians (Abegunrin, 2016c). Hence, it could be stated that the call for independence was emerging as the consistent message associated with the Pan-African Movement at the time, though not with as high a momentum as the subsequent Congress. Again, African representation was slightly better than the earlier meetings (Abegunrin, 2016c; Geiss, 1974).

It needs to be mentioned that the activities of the Pan-African Movement declined after the 1927 Congress until the Manchester 1945 Congress because, as Karioki (1974) notes,
World War II and its associated economic crunch instigated a financial burden on the organisation of congresses for that time and as a result, members were concentrating on their individual survival. Additionally, Abegunrin (2016c) states that prior to the 1945 Congress, Du Bois planned to hold another congress in 1929 in Tunisia but financial difficulties ruined that agenda. Nevertheless, the movement later gained impetus in 1945 through the efforts of Padmore, Nkrumah, Kenyatta, and C. L. R James amongst others who organised the Manchester Congress (Abegunrin, 2016c).

The aforesaid discussion shows that the 1927 Congress characterised the emergence of an independence movement amongst people of African descent, though it struggled until the 1945 Congress. It also provided a metamorphosed movement from anti-slavery to self-government. In spite of its earlier challenges, Du Bois’ alliance with the Women’s Association contributed to the success of the New York meeting, especially after the drive and enthusiasm had diminished amongst members of the Movement. Of note is that the literature points to the gradual incorporation of the African students in Europe, which increased their representation.

Yet, although the Movement for independence had taken off, it could not gather the necessary driving power due to the lack of people who could mobilise the masses (movement) and take it back to Africa. This is probably attributed to the branches of the Movement that were still part of the anti-slavery campaign that had started before the 1945 Congress. It only gained full momentum for African nationalism after the post-World War II period, specifically during and after the Manchester Congress because of the African personalities involved — people who had the passion for continental self-determination and were ready to return to Africa shortly and spread Pan-Africanism as a norm of African independence advocated by indigenous Africans. In what follows, I briefly examine the significance of the entry of Africans into the Pan-African Movement, which made them important players in the 1945 Congress.

**Africans’ entry into the Pan-African Movement**

As indicated above, from the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries, the driving forces behind the concept of Pan-Africanism were the intelligentsia from the Caribbean and United States including Sylvester Williams, Du Bois and Garvey. At this point, what Pan-Africanism meant for indigenous Africans was not really evident; this was coupled with the lack of high levels of participation by African delegates at the Congresses. As Mboukou (1983) puts it, these Africans ‘were not an integral component of the executive bodies that defined both goals and objectives of the Pan African Movement’ (p. 280). However, after the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, through international networks with the African Students’ Association (in
United States and Canada), the National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA), the West African Students’ Union and other African associations, the black African faithful sought to mobilise and promote a sense of progressive moral change (Schramm, 2010; Geiss, 1974; Nkrumah, 1957a). This stems from their connections (or networks) with the anti-slavery campaign started by their Afro-Caribbean and Afro-American colleagues, and the need to protect the rights and dignity of people of African descent worldwide (Abegunrin, 2016c; Adi, 2012). Thus, as far back as the 1920s and 1930s, most of the student groups had shown traces of anti-slavery and anti-colonial endeavours, though with less impetus (Thompson, 1969a; Eluwa, 1971; Saunders, 2012).

Yet, it was the 1945 Congress that made a great difference because of the African personalities involved (Abegunrin, 2016c). For example, as early as November 1926, Joseph Casely-Hayford (leader of NCBWA) had called for collaboration so as to make the African associations clearing houses for information on racial discrimination, as well as advocacy bodies for Africans (Thompson, 1969a). Nevertheless, it was the African entrants in the 1945 Congress who revived the African sense of self-determination (Abegunrin, 2016c, Mboukou, 1983). Relatedly, despite the fight against economic exploitation, the Africans also wanted to promote a transnational moral course against racial segregation and maltreatments worldwide, especially in the European colonies in Africa (Schramm, 2010). As Nadelmann (1990) observes, moral changes are accomplished through the role of international alliances and entrepreneurial actors. Notably, the full inclusion of these Africans subsequently shifted Pan-Africanism from the ideas stage into the realm of norms during the post-World War II period (Thompson, 1969a).

It should be mentioned that some of these Africans who took significant roles in the 1945 Congress, apart from Kwame Nkrumah (Congress’ Secretary) also included Jomo Kenyatta (Assistant Secretary of the Congress) and the South African writer Peter Abrahams (Publicity Secretary of the Congress) (Martin, 2012; Schramm, 2010; Shepperson & Drake, 2008). Nkrumah and Kenyatta were students in Britain but soon returned to Africa to lead their countries as forerunners of independence, although Peter Abrahams lived and worked in Britain as a journalist (Adi, 2012; Kodjo & Chanaiwa, 1993). Their positions in the Congress marked the beginning of a transfer of ownership (regarding Pan-Africanism) to indigenous

15 There were other strands of Pan-Africanism developing within Africa at the same time as the external emergence of the ideas outside Africa, for example, by the South African political leaders educated in colleges such as Fort Hare in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It was not that Pan-Africanism was simply a norm that emerged from the diaspora outside Africa and was then transferred or localised into Africa by graduates returning from abroad.
Africans, a status that was previously possessed by personalities from the Caribbean and United States. Again, several African students across Europe participated in the Congress. However, amongst these Africans, Thompson (1969a) and Abegunrin (2016c) observe that it was Nkrumah who keenly propelled the normative shift of the idea of Pan-Africanism on the African continent, which stirred up a reawakening of a sense of political nationalism for independence amongst Africans — especially on the back of his country’s (Ghana) liberation and the subsequent stimulating impact vis-à-vis the revitalisation of African independence and unity throughout the continent.¹⁶

The following section explains the Fifth Pan-African Congress and how it shaped the movement and enthusiasm towards the call for African independence. Significantly, the Congress laid the platform for transforming the idea of Pan-Africanism into a norm for African sovereignty and unity. As stated earlier, before the 1945 meeting which was attended by numerous African representatives, Pan-Africanism was still an idea, but the African inclusion in the Fifth Congress eventually made it a norm of African independence — particularly through the efforts of the prospective African leaders who returned to Africa to push for independence and continental solidarity, a momentum that had been lacking in preceding campaigns.

**The Fifth Pan-African Congress (1945)**

Attempts to collaborate and fight for the independence of Africans (outside the African continent) started in 1900 eventually ended in the 1945 Fifth Pan-African Congress (Schramm, 2010; Anderson & Herr, 2007; Nimako, 2010). It also marked a transition of the Pan-African fight for emancipation from the diaspora to the continent of Africa and into the hands of its future leaders (Harris, 1995). In addition, the 1945 Congress, as Uzoigwe (2014) articulates, was different from the earlier congresses in that, albeit the new leadership and energetic student leaders, it was radically organised especially on the back of the involvements of Padmore and Nkrumah, as well as other revolutionary African students’ communities. Significantly, it was the first time Africans became main actors on the Pan-African stage, an activity that was previously undertaken by Africans in the diaspora (Schramm, 2010; Legum, 1975). Furthermore, Nkrumah (1957) argues that ‘it was this Fifth Pan-African Congress that provided the outlet for African nationalism and brought about the awakening of African political consciousness. It became, in fact, a mass movement of Africa for the Africans’ (p. 54).

¹⁶ The personal significance of Nkrumah’s participation will be discussed in Chapter Three.
Nkrumah’s observation, Schramm (2010) notes, could be the result of Africa’s massive representation at the Congress. These Pan-Africanists saw parallels between Africans and people of African descent in respect to history and interests as foreshadowed by slavery, black inferiority, racial exclusion and imperialism (Adi & Sherwood, 2003). The United States in the wake of these Pan-African activities had earlier also provided preparatory ground for most of these African students including Nnamdi Azikiwe and later Nkrumah (Martin, 2012). Apart from the role of religious groups like the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, which was actively involved in the Pan-African movements, the exchange of ideas also helped to shape the outlook of these students, especially during periods of increased agitation against racial segregation in the United States (Adi & Sherwood, 2003).

Karioki (1974) argues that although Du Bois took an active part in the 1945 Congress, he was just a figurehead in that ‘political leadership of Pan-Africanism had passed to a younger [and vibrant] generation — Kwame Nkrumah …, Jomo Kenyatta …, and George Padmore’ (p. 4). Young (2010) similarly stresses that the organisational role of Padmore and Nkrumah during the Fifth Pan-African Congress ‘engaged Pan-Africanism at a defining moment’ (p. 145) as a result of its related political nationalism in Africa (Sherwood, 2012). Put differently, the Congress marked a paradigm shift from an era of protests to a more radical period of nationalistic activities on the continent of Africa (Young, 2010).

In spite of the active Pan-African activities in the 1920s, as indicated above through the efforts of Du Bois and organisations such as the NCBWA17 (Gocking, 2005; Adi, 2000; Eluwa, 1971), and student groups like the West African Students Union (WASU)18, by the 1930s and early 1940s Pan-African activism was less attractive because of heightened colonial activities in Africa by the Europeans (Asante, 1995). However, Asante (1995) observes that the post-World War II period in the 1940s witnessed a reinvigoration of the Pan-African Movement through the commitments of Nkrumah (Ghana) and Padmore (leading Pan-Africanist from Trinidad) in Britain — and also the activities of Alioune Diop (of Senegal) in France. Diop was part of the Pan-African activities; he started the ‘cultural’ group ‘Presence Africaine’ (based on the values of Pan-Africanism) in Paris to protest European colonisation and promote African cultural values (Suret-Canale & Boahen, 1995; Harris, 1995). It appears that the period preceding the 1945 Pan-African Congress, as Thompson (1969a) argues, is

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17 NCBWA was a nationalist movement geared towards supporting a united Africa, starting from West Africa (see Eluwa, 1971).

18 WASU as a group in 1940 sent a petition to the Colonial Secretary, insisting that ‘it is the desire of the people of West Africa to become, remain and form a definitely distinct and integral political unit’ (Thompson, 1969, p. 51). It comprised students from West Africa who were studying in Britain.
characterised by the gradual fizzling out of the Marcus Garvey Movement, with Du Bois at his peak and the eventual take-over by students’ involvement, which introduced future African leaders into the protest activity.

Like Garvey’s UNIA, C.L.R James prior to the 1945 Conference had established the International Friends of Abyssinia (IFA) in 1935 whose members included George Padmore and Jomo Kenyatta (Bogues, 2011a). Austin (2008) and Rogers (1955) maintain that the alliance amongst African-Americans, African-Caribbean and Africans such as Du Bois, Padmore, C. L. R. James, Ashwood Garvey, and Ras Makonnen in conjunction with prospective African leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah, Peter Abrahams (South Africa), Nnamdi Azikiwe (Nigeria), Wallace Johnson (Sierra Leone), Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya), supported the Manchester Congress. This group’s goal was to advocate against the annexation of Ethiopia by Italy under Benito Mussolini (Bogues, 2011a; Lake, 1995). Harris (1995) mentions that in Britain, Makonnen (from Guyana) owned shops where most of these African students were employed to support their education. Here, meetings and discussions were held by the aforementioned Pan-African activists, as well as students studying in Britain (Harris, 1995). Other African delegates included Obafemi Awolowo (Nigeria), Raphael Armattoo (Togoland) and Garba Jahumpa (Gambia) (Abegunrin, 2016c).

As a precursor, with respect to preparations for the 1945 Pan-African Congress, the Pan-Africa journal was established with the support of Kenyatta, Padmore and Makonnen (Shepperson & Drake, 2008; Harris, 1995). This team of Pan-African advocates eventually united to form the 1944 Pan-African Federation that promoted the organisation of the 1945 Congress (Harris, 1995). The Congress was classified as a more active phase of the Pan-African Movement with respect to a rebirth of political nationalism on the African continent (Harris, 1995) because of the organisational efforts put in by Nkrumah, Padmore, Kenyatta, Du Bois and Leopold Senghor, which prepared the grounds for the struggle for independence amongst African states (Mazrui, 1993). This, Shepperson and Drake (2008) describe as a significant foundation and landmark of the 1945 Congress in that it prepared African leaders like Nkrumah and Kenyatta who in 1957 and 1963 gained independence for the Gold Coast (Ghana) and Kenya respectively. These Africans established networks with both African students in Europe and the Afro-American and Afro-Caribbean Pan-Africanists like Padmore and Du Bois (Thompson, 1969a).

Consequently, at this stage the idea of Pan-Africanism had been changed from the hitherto anti-slavery campaign to a call for self-government and unity. It became a norm underpinning the independence enterprises of these Africans who returned to their countries.
after the Congress. To this end, it needs to be emphasised that, as Hargreaves (1996) points out, the post-World War II Congress marked a remarkable stride in their journey towards African emancipation because it was politically right for the collapse of empire, especially the colonial powers. Similarly, most of the attendees were people or individuals who would steer the independence movements on the African continent through networks with other African associations like the West African National Secretariat (discussed in Chapter Three). These individuals, after decades of pushing the African agenda, took advantage of the post-World War II period and networks to revive African consciousness towards independence and unity. Again, it could be noted that most of these student leaders\(^\text{19}\) saw the Congress as the opportune time to mobilise themselves for the Pan-African fight for self-determination. Importantly, although the student groups started the call for respect for the black African, the presence of African personalities in the 1945 Congress’ executive body was key, as its impact gave the Pan-African Movement the needed momentum for independence and brought a new dimension towards uniting all Africans for continental sovereignty (Abegunrin, 2016c; Geiss, 1974; Thompson, 1969a).

Concurrently, the 1945 Congress received support from their Pan-African colleagues in Paris, France, including Leone Damas (French Guyana), Leopold Senghor (Senegal) and Aimé Fernand David Césaire (Martinique) (Austin, 2008). This Francophone group through the Presence Africaine spread and influenced political nationalism and eventual campaigns for self-government amongst French colonial states in Africa (Austin, 2008). The IFA (see above) was subsequently changed to the International African Service Bureau with Padmore as the leader (Bogues, 2011a). Padmore, Du Bois and Nkrumah were instrumental in the organisation of the Manchester Conference of 1945, which is regarded as the most successful Congress (Trehwela, 1988; James, 2015).

Eventually, the Congress (chaired by Du Bois) was held in Manchester, Britain, and was attended by representatives in the region of 200 from across the globe including Africa, United States and the Caribbean (Thompson, 1969a). The most significant resolution outlined by the Congress included recognition of the independence of Liberia, Haiti and Ethiopia, a request for immediate independence of the other African states, elimination of colonial activities and racial discrimination and the need for solidarity amongst all states under the ambience of ‘United States of Africa’ (Thompson, 1969a; Abegunrin, 2016c). Geiss (1969)

\(^{19}\) Like Nkrumah, who had started political nationalism as a student in the United States prior to the emergence of the 1945 Congress.
observes that the 1945 Manchester Congress was the most significant and historic assembly in the chronicle of Pan-Africanism. This, according to Uzoigwe (2014), could be attributed to the dominance of African participation. Hence, the 1945 Congress determined:

To secure equal opportunities for all colonial people and coloured people of Great Britain… [and demanded] that discrimination on account of race, creed or colour be made a criminal offence by law … if the Western world is still determined to rule mankind by force, then Africans, as a last resort, may have to appeal to force in the effort to achieve freedom … (cited in Uzoigwe, 2014, p. 223)

Although French politicians like Blaise Diagne and later Sourou Apithy (Dahomey, present-day Benin) participated in the Pan-African activities, as Henry (1959) observes, between 1946 and 1958 (Nkrumah’s Pan-African continental struggle), little is said about Francophone African politicians in the Pan-African Movement. Emerson (1962), however, points out that Pan-Africanism and its associated conferences and movements were dominated by the Anglophone Africans and Afro-Caribbean because of the continuous connection between French-speaking African leaders and France, which had detached them from their African tradition and values. Yet, leaders like Senghor and Diop associated themselves with the Pan-African protests and supported the campaign for independence for African states (Emerson, 1962). It needs to be noted, however, that this protest by the French Africans in support of the Pan-African struggle was heightened especially in the 1950s following the successful Manchester Congress (and Nkrumah’s reawakening of Pan-Africanism in Africa) as a campaign against the French culture of ‘assimilation’; it supported the notion of self-government in order to protect their African culture and roots. Unlike previous congresses where Africans were poorly represented and sidelined in the decision-making body, Mboukou (1983) states that the 1945 Congress gave Africans greater representation as well as made them a significant component of the executive committee. Apart from adopting the Gandhian tactics of peaceful (non-violence) activism (Andrain, 1962; Sastri & Srinivasachari, 1966), it was a demonstration of political nationalism as a launch pad for independence in Africa (Mboukou, 1983; Bogues, 2011b).

Meanwhile, it was within this post-World War II period that the British Labour Party won the general elections, therefore raising the expectations (for independence) of the Pan-Africanists (Thompson, 1969a; Nkrumah, 1957a). This group, especially the Africans, hoped

\[A system by which the French absorbed their colonies into the dominant French culture. However, by the 1950s, French-speaking African states rose against that idea as they tried to protect their Negritude. See Karioki (1974).\]
the Labour politicians\textsuperscript{21} would be more supportive and cooperative in their course for independence (Thompson, 1969a; Nkrumah, 1957a). However, after several meetings and petitions to get the Labour Party’s support for immediate independence of the colonies had proved futile, the Pan-Africanists decided to rely on their networks as a group to facilitate their aspiration for independence, which was fortified by the Congress (Thompson, 1969a). Nkrumah (1957) maintains that ‘…I regret that our hopes in the Labour Party were completely dashed into pieces’ (p. 58).

Admittedly, the 1945 Manchester Congress marked the movement of the Pan-African crusade to Africa, with Nkrumah being the driving force (Abegunrin, 2016c; Momoh, 2003). More importantly, the Congress assembled student unions and intelligentsia as well as trade unions to unite and advocate for political independence of Africans across the globe and ensure that people of African descent in the United States, Caribbean, Europe and Africa were treated fairly and respected (Abegunrin, 2016c).

It follows that the timing of the 1945 Congress was very momentous and politically significant, especially in the wake of the breakdown of empires and the end of World War II. However, it should be reiterated that something phenomenal was happening — people from Africa who were studying in Europe and the United States joined the independence movement and later went back to the African continent to agitate for independence through political nationalism, which hitherto was lacking in the movement. These were future leaders of Africa who did not stay in Britain after the Congress because of their passion for African sovereignty, hence promoting Pan-African normative change (independence) on the continent. Moreover, these Africans took the idea of Pan-Africanism and made it their own tool for fighting for self-government in Africa.

It should be mentioned that the 1945 Congress highlighted two significant points: first, the transformation of the idea of Pan-Africanism into a continental norm of independence; and second, unlike the previous congresses, for the first time, Africa had the most delegates including people who had the enthusiasm and drive to mobilise the masses for independence struggle on the continent. It shows people with an African-centred identity who premised their activities on networking. To this end, it was significant because it supported the concept that solidified the eventual independence of Africa.

As noted, Pan-Africanism started as an anti-slavery movement championed predominantly by Afro-Americans and Afro-Caribbean. However, after years and series of

\textsuperscript{21} Other than the Conservatives.
competing congresses and cycles, it transformed into a norm of independence (or independence movement). Although this was not the first time Africans were attending the congresses, the impact of the African delegates at the Manchester assembly makes it significant — solidifying the idea of Pan-Africanism into a norm of continental sovereignty and unity. These Africans were soon-to-be leaders of the continent who would take the idea back to Africa after the Manchester Congress and affect normative change in the political landscape of the continent. As Schramm (2010) puts it, the 1945 Congress is different from preceding meetings because it had a huge African constituent and a radical approach to demanding independence for Africans. It was, therefore, the African representation that made Pan-Africanism a norm and made it significant in the political struggles on the continent.

Conclusion

This chapter has traced the idea of Pan-Africanism and its advocates from the early thinkers in the Caribbean and the United States in the late nineteenth century to the African independence leaders in the 1950s. Despite the name, Pan-Africanism was not originally owned and promoted by indigenous Africans. The above review has shown that the roots of Pan-Africanism emerged in two movements: the Sylvester Williams’ abolition of slavery movement (Abegunrin, 2016a; Thompson, 1969a; Sherwood, 2011a; 2012), and the W. E. B Du Bois’ period of Pan-African mobilisation when Du Bois led five different Pan-African meetings championing an end to colonial rule in Africa (Legum, 1965; Efrat, 1967; Asante, 1995).

The idea of Pan-Africanism emerged originally as an anti-slavery renaissance movement pioneered in the Caribbean and United States. What this movement meant, and could provide, for indigenous Africans and their political independence did not really start to emerge until after the Fourth Congress in 1927. It was not until 1945, however, at the Fifth Pan-African Congress, that Africans started to claim ownership of the movement, its agenda, and agitate for significant normative change: political independence from colonial rule and unity to achieve this outcome in Africa. The 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress (and its earlier meetings) brought forth a new generation of African nationalist activists who, with this training and experience, returned to the continent in the late 1940s and early 1950s to lead the struggle for independence and unity. It was this experience of the Pan-African Movement in the USA and UK that contributed to one of the leading African participants, Nkrumah’s strong commitment and principled belief in the anti-colonial campaign and unification of Africans.
and people of African descent. Nkrumah was present at the Manchester Congress where, unlike the earlier congresses, there was a radical agenda adopted for the immediate self-determination of African states.

Likewise, it was the 1945 Congress that propelled Africans on the stage (previously the congresses were dominated by American and Caribbean activists). Pan-Africanism became an African-owned concept by 1945, and it meant something different from its anti-slavery origins. Nkrumah was part of a movement that now championed independence as a crucial remedy for Africa’s political and economic susceptibility to colonisation. Individuals such as Nkrumah were vital to this change in focus and agenda of the Pan-African Movement.

Overall, in this chapter, there is a clear articulation of the problem, the creation of networks and organisational platforms for the pan-African normative cause. Pan-Africanism was promoted by these activists as a crucial tool across the Americas and Africa in the fight against slavery, racial segregation and colonisation. By this, networks were formed which brought together like-minded intellectuals to drive the campaign. Also, organisational platforms were strengthened through the pan-African movements and meetings, with the climax being the Manchester Congress. These congresses became larger advocacy platforms for promulgating the idea of pan-Africanism — characterised by an unstoppable wave of political nationalism across Africa.

The following chapter charts Nkrumah’s emergence as a norm entrepreneur within the Pan-African Movement. It explores his formative years in the US and the UK, his activism within the Pan-African Movement, and then traces his return to Ghana after the 1945 Pan-African Congress. Again, on the back of this Pan-African norm of African continental independence and unity, this chapter and the next argue that independence of colonial rule was a radical idea in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s. Individuals such as Nkrumah were vital norm entrepreneurs in claiming and diffusing the idea of a right to independent African states. The challenge for Nkrumah, as the next chapter reveals, is the transition from a non-state norm entrepreneur, whose activism challenged state authority, to a state leader, who must realise the responsibility of leadership with the ambition of Pan-Africanism.
Chapter Three

The Emergence of Kwame Nkrumah as a Norm Entrepreneur

Introduction

Chapter Two provided a review of the scholarship on the genealogy of Pan-Africanism, which highlighted the idea originally propagated in the nineteenth century by intellectuals from the United States and Caribbean. This struggle against slavery and racial segregation paid little attention to indigenous African independence. However, with time, through networks amongst African students studying in the United States and Britain, particularly those who participated in the 1945 Manchester Congress (including Kwame Nkrumah), there was a transfer of ownership of the idea to Africans as Pan-African thought changed from its anti-slavery and anti-racial roots to a norm of African continental self-determination and unity.

This chapter traces Nkrumah’s emergence as a norm entrepreneur, presenting Nkrumah’s path to become a leading activist for Ghana’s independence and champion of Africa’s independence from colonial rule. The chapter is divided into three sections: the formative years of Kwame Nkrumah, his intellectual experiences overseas (in the United States and Britain), and his eventual return to Ghana. The chapter charts Nkrumah’s unique story from non-state norm entrepreneur championing against colonial rule to, within the space of a decade, becoming President of an independent state.

This chapter follows Nkrumah’s personal transition, guided by the norm entrepreneurship framework presented in Chapter One. This framework has four stages: problem framing, network building, organisational platforms, and capturing political opportunities. In the first section, Nkrumah’s formative years, I demonstrate how Nkrumah’s understanding of Ghana’s colonial legacy was influenced by contact with leading thinkers in the Pan-African Movement who promoted this cause as the most effective means to achieve the right to independence for all African territories. In the second section, I explore Nkrumah’s exposure to the concept of Pan-Africanism in the US and Britain. I demonstrate how he personally sought to build networks and communicate Africa’s independence as a Pan-African vision, which was essential for achieving independence and unity across the continent. This
chapter details how Nkrumah sought to build networks and organisational platforms around the combined vision of Africa’s independence from colonial rule and the ambitious project of a Union of African states. I examine how Nkrumah increasingly sought out opportunities to communicate and promote himself in this independence movement. Nkrumah took on leadership platforms in Britain, in particular the Secretary for the Pan-African Movement, and assisted with the organisation of the 1945 Pan-African Manchester Congress.

In the third section, I examine his political activism upon his return to Ghana in 1947. After his return to the Gold Coast (Ghana), Nkrumah continued to promote Ghana’s independence as part of a larger project of Pan-Africanism — a continental struggle for independence and unity. In tracing Nkrumah’s actions within the United Gold Coast Convention and Convention People’s Party, we see his continued efforts to advocate the independence struggle. This chapter concludes with an examination of why, even after establishing Ghana’s independence and himself as President, Nkrumah continued to promote Pan-Africanism as the final struggle in the post-independence period, which led to him hosting two Accra Conferences the Conference of Independent African States and the All-African People’s Conference — and the establishment of Ghana’s Bureau of African Affairs.

**A Brief History of Nkrumah’s Formative Years**

Francis Nwia Kwame Nkrumah, the founding father of Ghana’s independence and first President of the country, was born in a village called Nkroful (Nzima) in the Southwest of the then Gold Coast (present-day Ghana) on 21 September 1909 (Nkrumah, 1957a; Nugent, 2009; Adi & Sherwood, 2003). His father was a goldsmith and his mother a trader (Nkrumah, 1957a). The Gold Coast was then part of the British colonial empire until 1957 when Nkrumah gained independence for the country (Miller, Vandome & McBrewster, 2009; Gocking, 2005; Hopkins, 1966). Baptised a Catholic, Nkrumah’s primary education (at the Roman Catholic School) was supported by a priest from Germany, Father George Fischer, through whom Nkrumah and his mother joined the Catholic Church (Nkrumah, 1957a; Sherwood, 1996; Anderson & Herr, 2007).

In 1926, Nkrumah enrolled in the Accra Government Training College (now Accra College of Education) to be trained as a teacher (Nkrumah, 1957a; Sherwood, 1996). Soon after the death of his father, Nkrumah had the opportunity of meeting Dr Kwegyir Aggrey, then...

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22 The Gold Coast was administered by a British governor appointed by the Queen (British Monarch).
assistant vice-principal of the Prince of Wales College (now Achimota Senior High School), who, according to Nkrumah, initially stirred up his ideological perspective and sense of political nationalism (Nkrumah, 1957a). Nkrumah notes in his autobiography that:

To me [Nkrumah] he [Aggrey] seemed the most remarkable man that I had ever met and I had the deepest affection for him. He possessed intense vitality and enthusiasm and a most infectious laugh that seemed to bubble up from his heart, and he was a very great orator. It was through him that my nationalism was first aroused’. (Nkrumah, 1957a, p. 14)

In addition, Nkrumah maintains that ‘he [Aggrey] was strongly opposed to racial segregation in any form… [especially against Africans]’ (Nkrumah, 1957a, p. 14). Similarly, according to Nkrumah, during Aggrey’s Sunday sermons, he told his students that all people of African origin are united (Biney, 2011). This, therefore, shows that during the developmental years of Nkrumah, it was Aggrey who first laid the basic Pan-African lessons regarding a sense of African nationalism and unity, which stayed with him as he grew up (Dodoo, 2012; Kumah-Abiwu & Ochwa-Echel, 2013).

It should be noted that Aggrey (indigenous to then Gold Coast) was educated in the United States, where he established contacts with Du Bois and the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP); he was an activist against African exploitation and racial discrimination (Jacobs, 1996). As a result, Nkrumah observes that his relationship with (and respect for) Aggrey made him develop the thought of continuing his education in the United States, especially because he (Aggrey) was schooled in the United States (Nkrumah, 1957a). Notably, Aggrey was exposed to Pan-Africanism early on in the United States; as discussed in Chapter Two, this was an important location for the Pan-African Movement in the late 1800s and early 1900s.

After graduating from training college in 1930, Nkrumah was employed at the Roman Catholic Junior School at Elmina23 as a primary school tutor (Nkrumah, 1957a; Timothy, 1955). In 1931, Nkrumah was made the Head of another Roman Catholic Junior School in Axim (Timothy, 1955; Nkrumah, 1957a). There, he started preparing for the London Matriculation, in a quest to study in Britain, but performed poorly in Latin and mathematics (Nkrumah, 1957a; Biney, 2011). Nkrumah also used his free periods to form the Nzima Literature Society, a group designed to train people from his community (Nkrumah, 1957a).

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23 Elmina is a town in the central region of Ghana. It was the place where the Portuguese settled when they first arrived in the country in 1471.
This platform helped him to meet Mr S. R. Wood (an indigene of the Gold Coast), who was then Secretary of the National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA)\(^2^4\) (Nkrumah, 1957a; Biney, 2011). Mr Wood was a nationalist and advocate of African emancipation and Nkrumah mentions that it was Wood who initially introduced him to politics through discussions about the history and politics of the Gold Coast (Biney, 2011; Addo, 1999; Nkrumah, 1957a). Wood also later wrote a reference letter for him [Nkrumah] to study at Lincoln University in the United States (Nkrumah, 1957a; Biney, 2011; Geiss, 1974). In 1935, Nkrumah gained admission to study at Lincoln University (Holden, 2004; Geiss, 1974).

Furthermore, as a young teacher, Nkrumah observes that his encouragement to study in the United States was informed by his meetings with then Nigerian writer, Nnamdi Azikiwe, who was educated at Lincoln University (Biney, 2011; Nkrumah, 1957a). Significantly, Nkrumah’s desire to travel to the United States was to improve his education. No doubt, he was inspired by the people he was mixing with, such as Aggrey and Azikiwe, who were African graduates from the United States familiar with the Pan-African Movement, which was growing in numbers and strength at the time with many young Africans being sent to America to study (Jacobs, 1996; Okon, 2014). Most of these students were exposed to periods of anti-racial campaigns and racial discrimination against the African-Americans in the United States, as well as Pan-African activities by Du Bois and the NAACP (Biney, 2011). As stated earlier, Aggrey, for instance, formed contacts with the African-American Pan-Africanist Du Bois for whom he had great admiration (Jacobs, 1996).

It needs to be reiterated that in the formative years, Nkrumah was exposed to a seemingly Pan-African consciousness, which could be attributed to his relationship with his teacher (Aggrey) who inspired Nkrumah significantly. But, at this point Nkrumah’s sense of Pan-Africanism had not gained the impetus for African continental independence. However, his migration to the United States introduced him to the Pan-African stage as he established connections with African-Americans and African-Caribbean and was exposed to discussions on racial segregation as well as developments in the African colonies (Geiss, 1974; Tunteng, 1973). This informed his evolution into a supporter of the Pan-African Movement.

Eventually, Kwame Nkrumah commenced preparations towards his schooling in the United States in 1935 with funding from his uncle and his personal savings (Biney, 2011; Nkrumah, 1957). In October 1935, Nkrumah arrived in Harlem, New York (a predominantly African-American community) and he started Lincoln University the same year (Nkrumah, 24 NCBWA has already been mentioned in Chapter Two.)
1957; Holden, 2008). In 1939 Nkrumah completed Lincoln University with Bachelor of Arts, majoring in economics and sociology (Martin, 2012; Biney, 2011; Nkrumah, 1957a). Nkrumah later continued his studies with a Master of Science degree in Education and Master of Arts degree in Philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia, where he graduated in 1942 and 1943 respectively (Martin, 2012; Nkrumah, 1957a).

In 1945, Nkrumah left the United States for London, England, to read law as well as complete his doctorate degree at the London School of Economics (Biney, 2011; Rooney, 2007; Nkrumah, 1957a; Geiss, 1974). He arrived in London in late May, where he was received by George Padmore25, a London-based West Indian writer and Pan-African advocate; and Joe Appiah, a Ghanaian law student in London (Biney, 2011; Afari-Gyan, 1991; Geiss, 1974; Nkrumah, 1957a). In October 1945, Nkrumah joined the London School of Economics for his Doctor of Philosophy candidature but withdrew, and a year later he enrolled at the University College of London, yet could not complete his studies because of financial difficulties and involvement in political activities (Biney, 2011; Nkrumah, 1957a). In the same period, Nkrumah helped to organise the Manchester Pan-African Congress (discussed below).

In 1947, Nkrumah was solely engaged with Pan-African activities in London and, as a result, had to give up his plans of completing his doctoral education (Rooney, 2007; Biney, 2011). While preparing for another conference during the post-Manchester Congress era, Nkrumah received a letter from Ako Adjei, which was an invitation from the Gold Coast to return home and support the leadership of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC)26 (Rooney, 2007). At this time, Nkrumah’s motivation was at an opportune moment and platform; he had desired to return to the Gold Coast (Ghana) and support the masses with his Pan-African cause of independence (Afari-Gyan, 1991; Biney, 2011; Nkrumah, 1957a). However, he was initially quite uncertain about the political situation in the Gold Coast and whether his Pan-African idea of independence and unity would be easily accepted by the people, especially the Executive Committee of the UGCC (Afari-Gyan, 1991; Nkrumah, 1957a).

More importantly, the invitation coincided with Nkrumah’s commitment to preparations for the proposed West African National Conference (Biney, 2011; Nkrumah, 1957a). Also, through extensive discussions with a lecturer at Oxford University, Tony Maclean, who had visited the Gold Coast Colony, Nkrumah keenly wanted to familiarise

25 Padmore’s friendship and support for Nkrumah’s Pan-African objectives led to the establishment of the George Padmore Library in Accra (Ghana) as a memorial and resource centre for Pan-Africanism.

26 The first political party formed in the Gold Coast (Ghana).
himself with the political situation in his homeland (Biney, 2011; Nkrumah, 1957a). Maclean told Nkrumah about the activities of the leaders of the UGCC and how their political philosophy differed from that of Nkrumah’s Pan-African vision of African independence and unity (Nkrumah, 1957a; Biney, 2011). These were businessmen and lawyers, who Nkrumah believed would be reactionary to the radical struggle for independence of Ghana and Africa (Nkrumah, 1957a; Biney, 2011; Afari-Gyan, 1991). Nevertheless, Nkrumah was persuaded by Dr Joseph Boakye Danquah, a significant member of the UGCC, to accept the position and return to Ghana, which he did later in 1947 (Biney, 2011; Nkrumah, 1957a; Okon, 2014).

The following section examines Nkrumah’s exposure to Pan-Africanism during his stay in the United States and Britain. I trace his quest to establish networks and communicate his Pan-African vision of promoting the independence and unity of African states.

**Nkrumah’s Exposure to the Idea of Pan-Africanism**

Notably, Nkrumah’s education and stay in the United States was during the period of increased racial segregation and white domination against African-Americans (Botwe-Asamoah, 2005). As this section will reveal, Nkrumah’s understanding of Pan-Africanism and what it meant to him, as a young African male, was affected by living in this period of history. Nkrumah came to understand the independence of African people as vital to end colonialism and achieve continental unity.

It needs to be mentioned that Nkrumah’s journey to the United States in 1935 was via an American visa granted through Britain (Nkrumah, 1957a; Biney, 2011). While transiting in Liverpool, Nkrumah heard about the invasion of Ethiopia by the Italian leader Mussolini27, which according to him stimulated his political nationalism (Nkrumah, 1957a; Clarke, 1974; Mazrui, 1967). Nkrumah wrote that he felt, ‘[his] nationalism surged to the fore; [he] was ready and willing to go through hell itself, if need be, in order to achieve [his] object’ (Nkrumah, 1957a, p. 27).

The invasion of Ethiopia was deemed a significant event amongst Pan-Africanists at the time and to this day (Biney, 2011). Africans and people of African origin regarded Ethiopia as a symbol of hope, dignity and solidarity, because together with Liberia, these two territories had not been colonised (Biney, 2011). Therefore, Italy invading Ethiopia was considered an

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27 Mussolini was the leader of the Italians during the Italian-Ethiopian War.
attack on the pride and dignity of the African people. I argue that this nationalistic reawakening, or rather, Pan-African independence awakening, becomes a tipping point for Nkrumah’s commitment to African continental political nationalism as well as revolutionary activities.

Therefore, travelling to live in the United States for almost a decade, coupled with the Pan-African exposure, only broadened Nkrumah’s intellectual capacity, and strengthened his political idea of African independence and unity (Biney, 2011). Significantly, Nkrumah’s early life in the United States overlapped with the period when African Americans started to form solidarity movements and links to their African origins from the slave trade in the wake of Pan-African activities and literature from Du Bois and Garvey (see Chapter Two). Nkrumah’s Lincoln schoolmate Beverley Carter, an African-American and former United States Ambassador to Tanzania, describes Nkrumah as ‘thoughtful, reflective and considerate […] Nkrumah was talking about Pan-Africanism throughout his later years at Lincoln. He talked about the independence of the then African colonies in a way that made many think of him as a dreamer’ (cited in Biney, 2011, p. 15).

His engagement in formal scholarship also reflected his growing interest in Pan-Africanism, linking it to the anti-imperial movement (Biney, 2011; Botwe-Asamoah, 2005). Outside of university, Nkrumah sought informal education in political nationalism and African unity at the Harlem Streets forums, where like-minded students and non-students met to deliberate on issues of racial discrimination, colonialism and African liberation (Clarke, 1974; Nkrumah, 1957a). These intellectual discussions were patronised by people like Carlos Cook, originator of Garveyian (Marcus Garvey) fashioned African Pioneer Movement (Clarke, 1974; Nkrumah, 1957a). Cook was also a speaker at the Harlem Streets forums, influencing Nkrumah and the other followers with talks on African liberation and unity and the need to protect the rights of African-Americans (Clarke, 1974). Another speaker at the Harlem Streets forums was Suji Abdul Hamid, an advocate for black workers in Harlem (Clarke, 1974; Nkrumah, 1957a). Nkrumah was regularly visiting Harlem after school hours to catch a glimpse of political activities, which led to his love for the ideas of Marcus Garvey’s Pan-Africanism (Nkrumah 1957). In particular, it was through some of these Pan-African meetings that Nkrumah mixed with Caribbean Pan-Africanists such as C. L. R James (Martin, 2012; Biney, 2011).

28 Later in 1960, Nkrumah reiterated the significance of Ethiopia to Africa in a speech noting that ‘Ethiopia, because of her existence as an ancient and free state in Africa and the oldest continuously independent country in our continent, has always stood as a symbol of our political aspirations as a people. Ethiopia in our minds has stood for African freedom … We always felt that so long as Ethiopia remained free there was hope that we too would be free’ (Nkrumah, 1997, cited in Poe, 2003, p. 65).
Nkrumah’s early years in the United States were very significant for his Pan-African philosophical foundations and it was particularly crucial that he was present when there was an atmosphere of growing unity amongst the Africans and African-Americans towards a common goal — Pan-Africanism (Biney, 2011; Clarke, 1974). As discussed in Chapter Two, the changing definition of Pan-Africanism at this time was also vital in shaping Nkrumah’s thinking, crystallising his own contribution to this concept. While Nkrumah was in the United States, his attendance at the Harlem Streets forums was in addition to attendance at a newly formed African student group, the African Students Association, which was composed of students from various countries in Africa living in the United States (Clarke, 1974; Nkrumah, 1974; Keith, 1958). The sense of harmony and responsibility for their continent stemmed from the Italian invasion of Ethiopia (mentioned earlier) coupled with the evolution of Pan-African teachings of the earlier African-American and African-Caribbean Pan-African intellectuals (Clarke, 1974; Thompson, 1969a; Poe, 2003).

Significantly, Nkrumah also acquainted himself with the works of Marcus Garvey (Nkrumah, 1957a; Biney, 2011; Dagnini, 2008). According to Sherwood, while in New York, Nkrumah attended Pan-African gatherings held by Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association (cited in Biney, 2011), although Nkrumah did not mention this in his autobiography. Yet, Nkrumah admits that his fervour was stirred by the literature on ‘Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey’29 published in 1923 (Nkrumah, 1957a, p. 45; Biney, 2011, p. 18). This book is a collection of Garvey’s philosophical thoughts that promote African nationalism; it highlights a sense of African consciousness, respect and pride (McDuffie, 2015; Biney, 2011; Garvey, 2012).

Meanwhile, Nkrumah’s Pan-African experiences and ideas gained from his relationship with the various organisations were recorded, as well as how these could be applicable in the occurrences in the African states. He began to write the manuscript named ‘Towards Colonial Freedom’,30 which was published after he left for London (Akussah, 1994; Legum, 1965; Nkrumah, 1957a). Nkrumah’s manuscript draws attention to the evils associated with colonialism, as well as his pursuit of independence and unity of the African continent (Nkrumah, 1957a). Moreover, this manuscript formed the greater part of Nkrumah’s thoughts while he earlier transited through London for a visa to the United States (noted above) (Biney, 2011; Clarke, 1974).

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29 This piece comprises philosophical thoughts written by Garvey, which highlight African nationalism.
In effect, the United States laid a pivotal foundation in Nkrumah’s exposure to Pan-Africanism, as he interacted with like-minded advocates, especially during the Harlem meetings. As a Ghanaian government official relates, ‘Nkrumah’s ideas were not shaped in isolation. He had interactions with other Pan-Africanists while in the US’ (Government Official 8, 2016). Nkrumah’s network-building in the United States as he communicates Africa’s independence is described next.

Building Networks — Nkrumah and the African Students Association

As mentioned in Chapter One, norm entrepreneurs employ networks as tools to ensure that their new norms resonate with the masses. Nkrumah’s ideological commitment to African independence from colonial rule and the ability to discuss this concept amongst Pan-African scholars and activists continued at the University of Pennsylvania (Biney, 2011). There, he helped with the formation of the African Studies Section of the University, through which the African Students Association evolved; the aim of the group was to unify students of African descent to campaign against colonialism in Africa (Adi & Sherwood, 2003). In 1942, Nkrumah insisted the African Students Association membership be broadened to include all Africans, which he accomplished (Adi & Sherwood, 2003; Nimako, 2010). At the group’s annual meeting, Nkrumah was nominated as leader, and he held that post until he went to Britain in 1945 (Martin, 2012; Adi & Sherwood, 2003; Nkrumah, 1957a). This, by and large, marked the beginning of young Nkrumah from a student and scholar of Pan-Africanism to a leader who began to build a network of like-minded Pan-African activists.

Moreover, Nkrumah’s coalition of networks (in the Student Association) included, amongst others, his colleagues from Africa: Ako Adjei, K. A. B. Jones-Quartey, Asuogo Udo Idiong and Abdul Karim Disu (Biney, 2011). Nkrumah, together with Ako Adjei31 and Jones Quartey32, published the group’s official mouthpiece, known as the African Interpreter (Biney, 2011; Nkrumah, 1957a). This was to be a clearinghouse of information on events and rallies for the African community (Nkrumah, 1957a). Aside from disseminating this information to Africans expatriates, the paper was also geared towards creating a sense of nationalism, as well as unity, amongst the African students (Nkrumah, 1957a; Adi & Sherwood, 2003; Biney, 2011). However, nationalism and independence were concepts that created different understandings, resulting in early tensions in the group between the Nigerian and Gold Coast

31 Ako Adjei became Interior Minister in Nkrumah’s administration.
32 Quartey was in the Institute of Extra-Mural Studies at the University College, Ghana.
members (Biney, 2011; Nkrumah, 1957a). Some of the Nigerians, including Ozuoma Mbadiwe and Nwafor Orizu, were in support of territorial independence and maintained that various colonies should be left to fight for themselves without continental solidarity; they opposed collective responsibility amongst African states towards the fight for independence (Biney, 2011; Nkrumah, 1957a).

Conversely, Nkrumah and his Gold Coast colleagues believed that African independence and unity could only be achieved collectively (Nkrumah, 1957a; Biney, 2011). Nkrumah revealed that ‘we believe that unless territorial freedom was ultimately linked up with the Pan African movement for the liberation of the whole continent, there would be no hope of freedom and equality for the African and for people of African descent in any part of the world’ (Nkrumah, 1957a, p. 44). He added that ‘[the] idea of [continental] unity, which, of course, I strongly supported, became the accepted philosophy of the African Students Association’ (cited in Biney, 2011, p. 20).

Another point of departure between Nkrumah and the other students in the association regarding his coalition of networks, was the former’s position on extending the membership of the group to include non-students (Nkrumah, 1957a; Biney, 2011). Nkrumah argued that the portside workers from Africa residing in America should be made members of the group because they were students who had deserted their education for financial reasons but might resume studies after they had had their financial difficulties resolved (Biney, 2011; Nkrumah, 1957a). Although some of the West African members in the association were hesitant, Nkrumah was persuasive, arguing that with such solidarity, they could strengthen their networks, as well as the Pan-African objective of African independence and unity (Nkrumah, 1957a; Clarke, 1974). Hence, these networks he coalesced and united, became platforms for Pan-African independence movements.

Nkrumah also established networks with other political organisations including the Council on African Affairs (CAA), the Committee on Africa, the Committee on African Students, and the NAACP33, amongst others (Nkrumah, 1957a; Geiss, 1974). This, according to Nkrumah, was to enable him to acquire organisational skills, which later became significant in his alliance with the Pan-African Movement (Nkrumah, 1957a; Thompson, 1969a). Again, Nkrumah states that ‘I knew that when I returned to the Gold Coast I was going to be faced with this problem. I knew that whatever the programme for the solution of the colonial question

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33 NAACP’s aim is to ‘ensure the political, educational, social, and economic equality of rights of all persons and to eliminate raced-based discrimination’. See www.naacp.org (accessed 10 October 2017).
might be, success would depend upon the organisation adopted’ (Nkrumah, 1957a, p. 45). Nkrumah further mentions that through his familiarity with these organisations, he learned how revolutionary movements operated (Nkrumah, 1957a). In 1944, through this alliance, Nkrumah participated in the CAA’s gathering, which discussed the challenges of the African continent (Geiss, 1974). However, as stated earlier, Nkrumah’s stay in the United States ended in early 1945 when he left for Britain to continue his Doctor of Philosophy studies at the London School of Economics (Biney, 2011; Nkrumah, 1957a; Akussah, 1994).

Significantly, it can be argued that Nkrumah’s exposure to the period of racial discrimination in the United States, the discussions on the streets of Harlem and the networks he formed with African students and other Pan-Africanists, to a large extent shaped and strengthened his political outlook. Therefore, it appears that travelling to Britain was an opportunity to strengthen his already existing networks with Pan-Africanists whom he had met in the United States. Relatedly, the presence of alliances of African students and other Pan-Africanists in London made the place the central arena for networks amongst indigenous Africans, African-Americans and African-Caribbean, where issues and ideas on Pan-Africanism were shared and diffused (Biney, 2011). For example, Nkrumah’s network building in the United States played a considerable part in his connection with Padmore (in London) because before he arrived in Britain, C. L. R. James (a Pan-Africanist whom Nkrumah had met earlier in Harlem) had recommended him to Padmore (Nkrumah, 1957a; Geiss, 1974; Martin, 1972). Nkrumah’s relationship with James started during the former’s attendance at the political gatherings held in Harlem, United States (see above). James recalls that ‘…We could observe that, behind his [Nkrumah’s] easy style, his primary concern was the independence and freedom of African people’ (cited in Biney, 2011, p. 26).

Overall, Nkrumah’s norm entrepreneurship informed his networking with students, non-students, and other associations to ensure the promotion of Africa’s independence and unity. This coalition of networks, as well as issues discussed during Pan-African events as organisational platforms, became a significant foundation for his normative endeavour. By this, Nkrumah had an ‘informal’ leadership role in his student networks in the United States, especially on the back of his considerable involvements with the African Students Association. The networks created the platform for his journey to Britain where he also established contacts with like-minded people in the Pan-African Movement. Nkrumah’s seizure of platforms (and networking) in Britain (the Manchester Congress) and the subsequent West African National Secretariat is examined next.
Kwame Nkrumah and the 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress

As indicated in Chapter One, the essential quality of norm entrepreneurs is the ability and commitment to investing their resources to promote a specific objective (Kingdon, 2003). Hence, Mintrom & Luetjens (2017) maintain that they take advantage of an opportunity to mobilise and lead others in their quest to accomplish their goal. Building on his networking and organisational platforms, as he sought to promote and consolidate the fight for Africa’s self-determination, Nkrumah’s contributions to the 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress will be presented.

According to Thompson (1969a), the chronicle of Pan-Africanism ‘is incomplete without a consideration of Nkrumah’s contribution — a factor which was crucial for the resurgence of Pan-Africanism [especially on the African continent]’ (p. 89). As noted in Chapter Two, the Manchester Pan-African Congress and earlier meetings brought forth a new crop of African nationalist activists such as Nkrumah, who had the training and experience, and later returned to the continent to lead the struggle for independence and unity (Adi, 2000; Biney, 2011). The Congress has been discussed in the preceding chapter, but some aspects concerning Nkrumah’s considerable leadership, as a norm entrepreneur, are worthwhile to underline here. As Mazrui (1993) observes, it was at this Congress that Africans like Nkrumah had the opportunity to play important leadership roles in the organisation.

Moreover, in London, Nkrumah’s drive for Pan-Africanism remained persistent as he joined the West African Students’ Union (WASU) (Nkrumah, 1957a), particularly as most of these African students were future leaders who would, after the Congress, return to their individual countries (Mazrui, 1993). Nkrumah became the Vice-President of WASU, which increased his prominence on the Pan-African stage because of his active involvement in the group (Geiss, 1974). The Union’s goals included to seek the welfare of students and to also continue the fight for African independence (Afari-Gyan, 1991; Nkrumah, 1957a).

Subsequently, Nkrumah together with George Padmore, T. R. Makonnen and Peter Abrahams, who also became his flatmates, organised the Fifth Pan-African Congress in Manchester in 1945 (the origins of which was discussed in Chapter Two) (Anderson & Herr, 2007; Biney, 2011; Nimako, 2010; Nkrumah, 1957a). It is noteworthy that Nkrumah’s leadership involvements in the 1945 Congress strengthened his contacts with like-minded future African leaders such as Obafemi Awolowo, Jaja Wachuku, and H. O. Davies (Nigeria),

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34 Some of these Africans were part of the African Students Association who worked with Nkrumah in the United States.
Wallace Johnson (Sierra Leone), Garba-Jahumpa (The Gambia), Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya), Hastings Banda (Nyasaland, present-day Malawi), and Peter Abrahams (South Africa) (Biney, 2011).

At the end of the Manchester Congress, the Pan-African Federation formed a working Committee with Nkrumah and Du Bois, as General-Secretary and President, respectively (Abegunrin, 2016c). Through the Congress, Nkrumah and Du Bois highlighted key programmes on commitment towards the independence of the African continent, which were accepted by the Congress (Legum, 1965; Nkrumah, 1957a). The Committee set up a Pan-African Congress headquartered in London to serve as source of networking and information for future political movements in Africa (Abegunrin, 2016c). They also made a call on the students, non-students and other activists to rise and promote the call for independence and unity of African states (Nkrumah, 1957a; Legum, 1965). Nkrumah was also behind the drafting of the popular ‘Declaration of the Colonial Peoples of the World’, a document prepared to promote the independence and unity of African states (Adi & Sherwood, 2003; Sherwood, 2011b). In the words of Nkrumah (1957) ‘...it was this Fifth Pan-African Congress that provided the outlet for African nationalism and brought about the awakening of political consciousness. It became, in fact, a mass movement of Africa for the Africans’ (p. 54). Besides, as Afari-Gyan (1991) concludes, Nkrumah’s contacts and collaboration with Padmore and Du Bois, during the 1945 Manchester Congress, deepened his ‘theoretical’ and empirical experience and exposure, thereby greatly informing his political revolutionary activities, which propelled Ghana’s journey to liberation from British colonial rule.

By the end of his time in Britain, Nkrumah was solid on his Pan-African vision, as he had also reinforced his networks; thus, independence was linked to Pan-Africanism in his networks and activities. Also, Nkrumah used the Manchester Congress as an opportunity to promote this normative drive subsequently through the West African National Secretariat, as discussed below.

**Nkrumah and the West African National Secretariat**

In order to ensure continuity and implementation of the plans from the 1945 Pan-African Congress towards the struggle for independence, Nkrumah and Wallace-Johnson with the support of Padmore, established in London the West African National Secretariat (hereafter WANS) in early 1946 (Sherwood, 2012; Thompson, 1969a; Geiss, 1969). Thompson (1974a) notes that the main objective of the group was to support the movement in its efforts to gain independence for West African states and, subsequently, the entire African continent.
Sherwood (2012) observes that the WANS aimed at fostering unity amongst West Africans by informing them about the need to push for independence through their monthly journal, *New African*. Therefore, the slogan of the journal was ‘For Unity and Absolute Independence’ (cited in Sherwood, 2012, p. 111). To this end, the main objectives of the *New African* included maintaining connections with other like-minded associations and providing information on situations in the African colonies, promoting a sense of unity amongst Africans, and finally, working together to ensure the attainment of independence from the colonial powers (Geiss, 1969).

Nkrumah maintained contacts with his fellow African student colleagues and the intelligentsia by travelling to France to hold discussions with Africans in the French National Assembly such as Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Sourous Apithy, Leopold Senghor and Lamine Gueye35 (Thompson, 1969a; Geiss, 1969; Nkrumah, 1957a). Similarly, Nkrumah notes that he continued to hold meetings with the French representatives with the goal of pushing forward the notion of West African unity and political nationalism, especially by involving African students in the United States and Europe (Nkrumah, 1957a). Nkrumah’s plan was to use the platform of West African unity as a launch pad for continental unity (Sherwood, 2012; Adi, 2000; Commander, 2007).

According to Sherwood (2012), WANS in conjunction with WASU held a conference in September 1946, which brought together over one hundred African delegates, including students and members of trade unions, to consider the independence of their respective states. The conference connected both French-speaking and English-speaking West Africans to ‘[approve] the resolutions of the Manchester Congress and demanded immediate and absolute self-government’ (cited in Sherwood, 2012, p. 112). This group, Geiss (1969) observes, was short-lived after the departure of Nkrumah (Sherwood, 2012) — as mentioned earlier, soon after his role in the WANS, in November 1947, Nkrumah returned to the Gold Coast (Ghana) to pursue his Pan-African ambition (Biney, 2011; Afari-Gyan, 1991; Nkrumah, 1957a).

The following section charts Nkrumah’s return to Ghana and how he captured political opportunities to promote independence, which he achieved, starting from the United Gold Coast Convention and later forming his Convention People’s Party. But Pan-Africanism continued; he held conferences and created an institution (Bureau of African Affairs) to keep it going.

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35 These personalities later became leaders of the Ivory Coast (now Cote d’Ivoire), Dahomey (now Benin) and Senegal respectively.
Nkrumah’s Return to Ghana

Nkrumah and the United Gold Coast Convention

In 1947, Nkrumah had drawn inspiration from his participation as Secretary in the Manchester Congress, his networks abroad and organisational platforms. Against this backdrop, he sought to capture political opportunities upon his return to Ghana in the country’s struggle for independence, as a springboard for continental sovereignty and unity (Olaosebikan, 2011; Austin, 1961). Meanwhile, the UGCC had been formed in August 1947 ‘to ensure that by all legitimate and constitutional means the control and direction of the Government shall within the shortest time possible pass into the hands of the people and their chiefs’ (Nkrumah, 1957a, p. 69). Its founders were lawyers and businessmen, such as George Grant (Chairman), Francis Awoonor Williams, Dr Joseph Boakye Danquah, William Ofori Atta, Ashie Nikoe, John Ayew, R. S. Blay, and J. W. de Graft Johnson (Rosberg, 1970; Nkrumah, 1961; Austin, 1961).

The busy schedules of these professionals made it obvious that they needed a vibrant and experienced personality to strengthen the group and draw the grassroots closer to the party (Rosberg, 1970; Nkrumah, 1961; Austin, 1961). As a result, on 29 December 1947, the leaders of the party appointed Nkrumah as General Secretary (Rosberg, 1970; Nkrumah, 1961; Austin, 1961). On 20 January 1948, he met with the Working Committee of the UGCC and presented his programme of action for that period (Biney, 2011; Hargreaves, 1996; Nkrumah, 1957a).

Nkrumah highlighted that ‘Vigorous Convention weekend schools should be opened wherever there [was] a branch of the Convention. The political mass education should begin at these weekend schools … [there should be] organised demonstration, boycott and strike — our only weapons to support our pressure for Self-Government’ (Nkrumah, 1957a, p. 72).

In February 1948, Nkrumah gave his first speech in Accra where he outlined the programmes of the UGCC to the public (Nkrumah, 1957a; Biney, 2011). He also spoke on the theme ‘The Ideological Battles of Our Time’, strengthening the enthusiasm of the people towards independence (Nkrumah, 1957a). Nkrumah notes that ‘after I had finished I realised more fully than ever before, from the reaction of the crowd, that the political consciousness of the people of the Gold Coast had awakened to the point where the time had come for them to unite and strike out for their freedom and independence’ (Nkrumah, 1957a, p. 76).

However, between February and March 1948, a group of veteran soldiers embarked on demonstrations to express their complaints to the British colonial administration, which was simultaneously met with a boycott of European goods in the Gold Coast (Biney, 2011;
Nkrumah, 1957a; Okoth, 2006). Nkrumah and other members of the UGCC, who later became known as the ‘Big Six’ and included Obetsebi Lamptey, Ako Adjei, William Ofori Atta, J. B. Danquah, and A. E. Akuffo-Addo, were arrested and imprisoned for allegedly having masterminded the skirmishes (Okoh, 2006; Hargreaves, 1996). The Watson Commission formed by the British administration to investigate the causes of the riots, invited Nkrumah for interrogation (Biney, 2011; Holden, 2004; Arden-Clarke, 1958). Before the Commission, however, Nkrumah did not hide his Pan-African inclination, stressing that upon his arrival to the Gold Coast (Ghana) he observed that there was a lack of a sense of West African solidarity in the fight for independence (Nkrumah, 1957a).

After Nkrumah’s release, he mobilised and connected with the youth, leading to the establishment of the Committee on Youth Organisation (CYO) in August 1948 (Biney, 2011; Nkrumah, 1957a). The CYO was an embodiment of the Ashanti Youth Association (AYA) and Ghana Youth Organisation (GYO) (Nkrumah, 1957a). These groups were nationalist movements founded by Nkrumah to support the Pan-African struggle for independence for the country (Biney, 2011). The CYO, which replaced all these youth organisations, primarily became the youth wing of the UGCC with Komla Gbedemah and Kojo Botsio, as Chairman and Secretary, respectively (Biney, 2011).

In September 1948 Nkrumah also established a newspaper called the *Accra Evening News* (Biney, 2011; Nkrumah, 1957a). On a daily basis, the *Accra Evening News* kept educating the people on the challenges associated with colonialism and the urgent need to work towards the attainment of independence (Nkrumah, 1957a; Biney, 2011). The slogan of the paper was ‘[w]e prefer self-government with danger to servitude in tranquillity … We have the right to govern ourselves’ (Nkrumah, 1957a, p. 94).

**Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party and the Pan-African Idea of Independence**

In 1949, Nkrumah broke away from the UGCC and incorporated the CYO into his new political party, the Convention People’s Party (CPP), which was formed to represent a revolutionary group to advocate for Ghana’s independence (Biney, 2011; Nkrumah, 1957a). Nkrumah’s separation from the UGCC could be attributed to ideological disparities as reflected in the UGCC’s slogan ‘Self-Government within the shortest possible time’ juxtaposed with his CPP’s ‘Self-Government Now’ (Biney, 2011; Nkrumah, 1957a). A critical look at the two catchphrases of the UGCC and CPP establishes their strikingly opposing political viewpoints. That is, unlike Nkrumah, who wanted independence for Ghana (and Africa) as soon as possible, the founders of the UGCC wanted to achieve independence gradually (Biney, 2011). The
followers of the CPP were more radical and youthful, and included street boys and both the educated and the uneducated (Biney, 2011; Nkrumah, 1957a). While the UGCC neglected these people who formed the masses, Nkrumah acknowledged that they were a powerful force and, therefore, believed that mobilising them would help in the fight for the independence of the Gold Coast (Gocking, 2005).

Furthermore, in promoting his Pan-African vision, Nkrumah made use of newspapers including the *Accra Evening News*, *Morning Telegraph* and *Daily Mail*, with publications on political activism to persuade the public to express their frustrations towards British colonial activities (Gocking, 2005). Consequently, Nkrumah was summoned before the traditional authorities in Accra for inciting violence in the country (Biney, 2011; Nkrumah, 1957a). Yet, Nkrumah maintained that he was going to use all legal actions to attain independence for the Gold Coast; he underlined ‘the adoption of all legitimate and constitutional means by which we could attack the forces of imperialism in the country’ (Nkrumah, 1957a, pp. 111–112).

In January 1950, the political campaign for independence led to a ban on public gatherings and the newspapers founded by Nkrumah were also banned from operating with the offices shut down by British government officials (Biney, 2011; Nkrumah, 1957a). At the CPP headquarters, its Secretary, Kojo Botsio, was apprehended on 17 January 1950, while the office was vandalised with most of their documents destroyed (Gocking, 2005; Nkrumah, 1957a). Nkrumah was also later arrested, prosecuted and imprisoned for masterminding the revolutionary activity (Gocking, 2005; Nkrumah, 1957a). While in prison, Nkrumah had his party registered for the February 1951 election and he vied for the Accra Central seat (Meredith, 2005; Nkrumah, 1957a).

Nkrumah won the elections with 22,780 votes out of the total votes of 23,122 (Nkrumah, 1957a). Following Nkrumah’s victory, the British Governor (Arden-Clarke) released him from prison on 12 February 1951 to become leader of government business (Biney, 2011; Gocking, 2005; Nkrumah, 1957a). By 1952, after constitutional reform, Nkrumah was made Prime Minister by the British administration (Nkrumah, 1957b). In 1954, a second general election was held to increase the Ghanaian representation in the Legislative Assembly (Gocking, 2005; Nkrumah, 1957a; 1961). The CPP defeated the Northern People’s Party gaining increased membership in the Assembly (Gocking, 2005).

In 1956 prior to Ghana’s independence, another election was held, which included the Convention People’s Party, National Liberation Movement, Northern Peoples Party, amongst others (Gocking, 2005). The CPP, with Nkrumah’s influence and Pan-African advocacy for immediate independence, became the most popular and widely accepted party in the country.
(Hargreaves, 1996). At the end of the voting, the CPP won the majority of the votes and, by this, the British colonial administration led by the Secretary of State Lennox-Boyd released a proposed constitution for Ghana, which made room for the country’s independence granted on 6 March 1957 (Hargreaves, 1996; Nkrumah, 1957a; Hodgkin, 1957; Wilburn, 2012). This marked a significant moment of one part of Nkrumah’s Pan-African normative goals — independence of Ghana as basis for advocating regional sovereignty and unity. Nkrumah stated that ‘We have done the battle and we again re-dedicate ourselves not only in the struggle to emancipate other countries in Africa, our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent’ (Nkrumah, 1967a, p. 4). For Thompson (1969a), Ghana’s independence was a demonstration of hope for the independence of Africans because of the Pan-African drive of Nkrumah. Therefore, Nkrumah advanced his Pan-African advocacy through the Accra conferences and the Bureau of African Affairs, which are described next.

**Nkrumah and the Conference of Independent African States**

Nkrumah’s quest to promote normative change regarding independence and unity for the African continent was set in motion with the maiden Accra Conference of Independent African States on 15 April 1958 (Abegunrin, 2016c; Geiss, 1974). This Pan-African meeting held on the African continent through the efforts of Nkrumah and Padmore was meant to find a collective solution to some of the fundamental challenges facing Africans, especially concerning the independence of other colonies and maintaining unity amongst African states (Geiss, 1974; Thompson, 1969a). Abegunrin (2016c) argues that the April Conference represented an attack by Africans against colonialism and reiterated a Pan-African demand for self-determination and unity.

The Accra Conference was patronised by a network of government officials from the independent states within West and North Africa including Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Ethiopia, Morocco, Sudan, the United Arab Republic (UAR),36 and Tunisia (Thompson, 1969a; Legum, 1965). Nkrumah, who chaired the conference, noted in his welcome address that it was necessary for the independent states to unite and support the rest of Africa to gain independence (Poe, 2003). Nkrumah observed that it was ‘the first time in history that representatives of independent sovereign states [were] meeting together with the aim of forging closer links of

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36 United Arab Republic was a short-lived union comprising Egypt and Syria.
friendship, brotherhood, cooperation and solidarity between them’ (cited in Biney, 2011, p. 136).

Significantly, the submissions made at the Accra Conference were similar to the goals of the 1945 Pan-African Congress, which were focused on ensuring shared responsibility towards the emancipation of the African colonies and promoting unity, dignity and hope for Africans and people of African descent (Biney, 2011; Geiss, 1974; Thompson, 1969b). The conference marked a revival and reinforcement of Pan-African political activities (or nationalism) in Africa because it underlined the desire of an independent state (Ghana) and its leader to support other dependent states in their struggles for political emancipation, which was to become an opportunity for a continental unity (Botwe-Asamoah, 2005). Similarly, it underscored the collective responsibility of independent states to unite and directly help secure the independence of the whole African continent, which demonstrated the core idea of post-World War II Pan-Africanism independence and unity (Legum, 1965). Particularly, Nkrumah seized Ghana’s independence as a political window of opportunity to promote his Pan-African normative objective of African self-determination and unity (Biney, 2011; Kodjo & Chanaïwa, 1993). Also, it was the hope of Nkrumah ‘to establish a diplomatic network to support his efforts to liberate the rest of the continent’ (Thompson, 1969a, p. 57).

Through the Conference Nkrumah maintained relations with Sekou Toure (of Guinea), which subsequently led to the creation of Ghana-Guinea Union in late 1958 (Thompson, 1969a). Nkrumah supported Toure to gain independence from the French; an approach towards accomplishing his Pan-African objective (Thompson, 1969a; Austin, 1964). The French leader, Charles de Gaulle, withdrew French support from the Guinea colony owing to the refusal of Sekou Toure to accept a proposition for decentralised power to French speaking states within a context of a Union of French colonies (Austin, 1964; Biney, 2011). Consequently, the absence of French aid to Guinea created financial challenges. This is when Ghana stepped in and assisted Guinea with a loan of 10 million British pounds sterling (Austin, 1964; Biney, 2008). Therefore, during his administration, Nkrumah was spending money on other states as part of his plans to accomplish his objectives. A Ghanaian government official noted the following:

He [Nkrumah] spent colossal sums of money to support other African states with the aim of promoting unity among Africans. The rationale behind Ghana supporting or

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37 I am quoting from the text. I am not endorsing the gender language. It is important to note that this language of relationships was deliberately used to invoke a sense of closeness — and that is why I have kept the language. It illustrates that Pan-Africanism was a project aimed at diminishing distance in the African continent.
sacrificing its resources for the benefit of other states on the continent was to ensure their independence in order to work in unity (Government Official 4, 2016).

During the affirmation to complete the Ghana-Guinea Union, Nkrumah and Toure noted that such cooperation formed the core of the Union of Independent African States as a prelude to continental unity (Kah, 2011; 2012; Botwe-Asamoah, 2005). Nkrumah considered this (Ghana-Guinea Union) from a broader perspective, as a way of extending his support towards the formation of a united continental body (Boateng, 2003; Legum, 1965). Later, Nkrumah formed an alliance with Malian President Madibo Keita, who became part of the Ghana-Guinea Union with Nkrumah as the leader (Boateng, 2003).

**Nkrumah and the All-African People’s Conference**

In furtherance of the April 1958 Conference of Independent Africa States and to heighten the Pan-African fight for continental independence and unity, Nkrumah called for the All-African People’s Conference on 5 December 1958 in Accra (Abegunrin, 2016c; Legum, 1965; Rahman, 2007). Unlike the earlier conference, this assembly was all-inclusive, comprising non-governmental organisations, heads of political and trade unions, cooperative groups, youth and women’s associations from various African states (Biney, 2011).

Nkrumah established a committee comprising of Ghana, Nigeria, Egypt, Morocco and Somaliland to oversee the arrangement of the Conference, which also involved leaders whose countries were under colonial rule (Abegunrin, 2016c). About 200 representatives were present at the second Accra Conference with the hope of helping liberate other states under colonial control and ensuring the unification of Africa (Nkrumah, 1961; Biney, 2011). Of note is that participants included Felix Moumie (Cameroon), Ntau Mkhehle (Botswana), Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia), Patrice Lumumba (Congo), Hastings Banda (Malawi), Holden Roberto (Angola), amongst others (Abegunrin, 2016c; Hoskyns, 1959).

Moreover, for the first time, representatives from English-speaking, French-speaking, Portuguese-speaking, and Arabic states on the African continent attended it (Abegunrin, 2016c). In this regard, the main agenda for the gathering was based on collectively working towards the eventual elimination of colonial activities on the African continent; adopting non-violent but non-cooperating ways to gain independence for other states; establishing a permanent secretariat to oversee nationalist campaigns on the continent; and finally working towards the attainment of a united African continent (Abegunrin, 2016c; Nkrumah, 1961). Abegunrin (2016c) and Geiss (1974) remark that the Accra conferences epitomised the
movement of Pan-Africanism from overseas to the African promised land. In his speech at the Conference, Nkrumah reiterated his Pan-African normative objective:

… As I have always declared, even before Ghana attained her present sovereign status — the independence of Ghana will be meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of Africa. We have not moved from this premise nor shall we budge one jot from it until the final goal [independence and unity] has been reached.  

Additionally, speaking at the Conference (on behalf of Du Bois), Shirley Graham-Du Bois agreed that ‘If Africa unites, it will be because each part, each nation, each tribe gives up a part of the heritage for the good of the whole. That is what union means; that is what Pan-Africanism means …’ (cited in Abegunrin, 2016c, p. 40).

The effect of the All-African People’s Conference was significant in that it brought various political nationalists across the African states together in order to collectively champion the goal of Pan-Africanism (Biney, 2011). Following the Conference, Nkrumah held a meeting with President Tubman of Liberia and President Sekou Toure of Guinea on 19 July 1959 in Sanniquellie, a town in Liberia, to discuss the issue of continental independence and unity (Biney, 2011). The leaders proposed that there would be a Community of Independent African States to ensure unity amongst all sovereign states, as a step to support other states that were under colonial rule (Biney, 2011; Nkrumah, 1961). Although at the Sanniquellie meeting the three leaders finally endorsed the proposal, at the initial stages Tubman, unlike Nkrumah and Toure, wanted economic cooperation instead of Nkrumah’s drive for political union (Biney, 2011).

It can be observed that, at this point, Nkrumah, as a norm entrepreneur, had fully transformed Pan-Africanism from an idea of anti-slavery and anti-racial discrimination into a norm of African continental agenda of independence and unity. In what follows, the role of the Bureau of African Affairs in advancing Nkrumah’s Pan-African crusade will be discussed.

The Bureau of African Affairs and Nkrumah’s Pan-African Agenda (1959)

Nkrumah’s vision to pursue a foreign policy that actively promoted Pan-Africanism led to the establishment of an office dedicated to this task — the Bureau of African Affairs (BAA) under Ghana’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Edozie, 2012; Walters, 1997). Significantly, the creation of the Bureau of African Affairs in 1959 followed the demise of Nkrumah’s Pan-African

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38 Obtained from Ghana’s Public Records and Archives Administration Department (GH/PRAAD/RG 7/1/183).
colleague, George Padmore, who was in charge of African Affairs under Nkrumah’s government in September that same year (Thompson, 1969b). Thus, in order to continue with the Pan-African agenda, Nkrumah transformed Padmore’s office as Advisor to the Prime Minister (on African Affairs) into the Bureau of African Affairs (Thompson, 1969b). To this end, Nkrumah acted as the director of the Bureau, while Padmore’s assistant, Aloysius K. Barden, became his Secretary (Grilli, 2017). However, in May 1960, the BAA gained statutory approval and Nkrumah appointed Welbeck and Barden as its Chairman and Director, respectively, while John Tettegah, T. R. Makonnen, Mbiyu Koinange, Tawiah Adamafio, and Andrew Djin were board members (Thompson, 1969b; Ahlman, 2012).

The BAA became a clearinghouse of information, an investigative body on African matters, as well as a hub for holding meetings with colleague African heads of state (Grilli, 2017; Botwe-Asamoah, 2005). It maintained and extended the Pan-African objective of continental sovereignty and unity across the continent (Ahlman, 2011). In so doing, the BAA was committed to running literacy and advocacy programmes for emigrants (Ahlman, 2011). Again, the Bureau opened research libraries on subjects related to African Affairs, as a campaigning approach towards promoting the goal of Pan-Africanism on the continent. It operated hostel facilities for up-and-coming political nationalists (or freedom fighters) throughout Africa (Ahlman, 2011). Some of the political activists included Patrice Lumumba of Congo, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Felix Moumie of Cameroon, and Thomas Mboya of Kenya (Ahlman, 2010). Likewise, through the Bureau, Nkrumah provided financial support to students who migrated to Ghana from other African states to receive secondary school education (Ahlman, 2011).

Furthermore, the Bureau reinforced its quest for Pan-Africanism on the African continent by supporting other independence movements with financial aid, political assistance and other humanitarian help, such as military and administrative training (Grilli, 2017; Gerits, 2015). For example, Ahlman (2011) describes how members of the independence movements and political emigrants from neighbouring African states, who came to Ghana without permit, were granted a visa by the Bureau as well as stipend and clothes, while families of these emigrants were all supported. The Bureau’s press department produced brochure materials to support pro-independence political parties in the Congo that were all geared towards the promotion of Pan-Africanism (Gerits, 2015; Grilli, 2017). By 1960, through the Bureau, Nkrumah had formed an alliance with political activists in other African states, including the above-mentioned, to help promote his Pan-African policy (Grilli, 2017).
Nkrumah also tasked the Bureau with the organisation of courses pertaining to continental independence and unity for both Ghanaians and other Africans (Grilli, 2014). In 1962, the Bureau commenced its ‘Read about Africa’ advocacy campaign on independence and unity, with the objective of reviving political nationalism, especially amongst independence movements. It also assured the provision of copies of Nkrumah’s speeches and pamphlets to other states who wanted them (Ahlman, 2012). The Bureau strengthened its advocacy campaigns through publications such as the *Voice of Africa*, *African Chronicler*, *The Freedom Fighter*, and the *Pan-Africanist Review* (Ahlman, 2012). According to a former officer of the Bureau, Kofi Batsa (1985, pp. 37–38), ‘[i]n the Bureau of African Affairs we regarded ourselves as being the factory of the ideas of Kwame Nkrumah’ (cited in Ahlman, 2012, p. 347).

Generally, as already mentioned, after the independence of Ghana, Nkrumah held two significant Pan-African gatherings in Accra — the Conference of Independent African States and the All-African People’s Conference — to persuade his contemporaries on the norm of African sovereignty and unity. These conferences were organised at a time when there was an emergence of newly independent states across Africa. Again, through the Bureau’s training programmes in Accra, Ghana (noted above), Nkrumah maintained contacts with these emerging political nationalists. Therefore, the conferences and Bureau became means for reinforcing the sense of Pan-Africanism and a training platform for these political nationalists. To this end, Nkrumah became a particular champion of former Belgian Congo and the soon-to-be elected Senator Patrice Lumumba, who was a participant at the Accra All-African People’s Conference (Meredith, 2005; Torrent, 2016). Nkrumah’s continued support for Lumumba during the Congo crisis will be discussed in Chapter Five.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has traced the norm entrepreneurship of Ghana’s first President Kwame Nkrumah by providing a history of his transition from a non-state entrepreneur to a state entrepreneur in the struggle for African self-determination and unification.

Nkrumah’s exposure to Pan-Africanism whilst a student in the United States and Britain was particularly formative: networks were built and participation in discussions during Pan-African gatherings in Harlem (United States) influenced his appreciation of his own identity as a political actor. His role in the African Students Associations was a springboard for his entry into the Pan-African Movement. Nkrumah continued to expand his Pan-African thinking and networks after moving to Britain in 1945, which strengthened his earlier exposure and
experiences. The networks and organisational platforms he harnessed in Britain helped him share ideas with like-minded colleagues, and led to his participation in the crucial Manchester Pan-African Congress.

As Thompson (1969a) contends, Nkrumah’s identity as an advocate of Pan-Africanism did not really solidify until the Manchester Congress of 1945, which first linked the idea of colonial independence with African nationalism. It was through this Conference that Nkrumah’s sense of Pan-African consciousness gained full momentum, underpinning his campaign for Ghana’s independence. The movement helped him to maintain contacts not only with like-minded Pan-Africanists from United States and Caribbean, but also Africa, some of whom later became part of the independence movement. His subsequent collaboration with the West African Students Union and West African National Secretariat laid the groundwork for continental cooperation.

After returning to the Gold Coast (Ghana), Nkrumah split away from the UGCC to form a populist radical party, the CPP, with the aim of accelerating Ghana’s independence and promoting his continental vision. As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue, during the process of norm diffusion, the understanding and standards attached to the norm are filtered by domestic structures and already existing standards, which can lead to significant changes regarding its acceptance and understanding. This can be observed with Nkrumah’s radical Pan-African norm of independence, which had to adjust to a group of domestic intellectuals in the Gold Coast who wanted Ghana’s independence, but did not want Pan-Africanism.

Nkrumah accommodated these concerns during the collective pursuit of independence, which was achieved for Ghana in 1957. After Ghana’s independence achievement, Nkrumah expanded his ambition to the Pan-African project. Nkrumah held the Conference of Independent African States and All-African People’s Conference to advance the Pan-African mission of continental sovereignty and unity. Within Ghana’s government, Nkrumah established the Bureau of African Affairs to strengthen networks with other independence leaders, and emerging political activists like Patrice Lumumba. The creation of the Bureau was crucial in the lead up to the Congo intervention and the pursuit of his Pan-African vision in the draft Organisation of African Unity (OAU) discussions. Immediately, the creation of the Bureau to serve Nkrumah’s personal whim indicated troubling domestic leadership practices and processes.

By applying the four approaches — problem framing, network building, organisational platforms and seizing political opportunities, this chapter has sought to establish Kwame Nkrumah as a norm entrepreneur. To this end, Nkrumah had communicated his vision of pan-
Africanism as the most effective vehicle for attaining independence and unity. Again, Nkrumah at this stage had established networks with other political activists through the pan-African independence movement across the African continent. Similarly, by the end of this chapter, it is clear that Nkrumah had established an organisational platform through which his idea could be promoted. That is, as the leader of Ghana, Nkrumah had in place the domestic structures such as the Bureau of African Affairs for his normative enterprise. Therefore, what he needed in the stage of successful completion of his entrepreneurship, was to find those opportunities to advance his cause. Yet, this stage of capturing political opportunities post-independence became a challenge for him. In subsequent chapters I will present these political opportunities available and show how Nkrumah lost them in the end. In Chapter Four, I describe the domestic environment or opportunities available to Nkrumah. Furthermore, I show in Chapter Five and Chapter Six, how Nkrumah lost the regional political environment available for his normative advancement.

The following chapter examines the Ghanaian state under Nkrumah’s government during the post-independence period (1950s and 1960s). I chart the political, social and economic decisions, and their consequences, during the early years of Nkrumah’s leadership.
Chapter Four

The Ghanaian State
(Post-Independence Period, 1950s–1960s)

Introduction

The previous chapter traced Nkrumah’s transition from a non-state norm entrepreneur championing for an independent Ghana, to a state actor, whose post-colonial ambition grew and extended to promote the idea of a union of independent African states. President Nkrumah attached his leadership and Ghana’s foreign policy ambitions to the achievement of this goal in the early years of his Presidency. The question, explored in this chapter, is to what extent was Nkrumah’s ambition for Pan-Africanism shared by his fellow Ghanaians? Nkrumah clearly set out to build and promote a Pan-African network, as the end of the last chapter discussed. However, in contrast to the independence movement for Ghana, the Pan-African vision appeared to have less ideational pull amongst his domestic constituents and political partners, as this chapter will demonstrate.

This chapter presents an overview of the domestic dynamics and political developments in the newly independent state (Ghana). It charts Nkrumah’s focus on creating a Pan-African vision with himself as the leader, while there were domestic crises taking place in his country. The chapter details the internal affairs of Ghana, under Nkrumah’s government, between the periods of 1957 and 1966. The chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section examines the political situation in Ghana from the early days of the country’s political independence and traces how Nkrumah was managing internal affairs of his newly independent state while also seeking to maximise his Pan-African engagements. I will highlight that while Nkrumah was promoting a regional vision of independent, free African states, he was adopting policies at home that curtailed freedom and civil rights with the introduction of policies such as the Preventive Detention Act and constitutional amendments that controlled opposition with a view to preserve his leadership role as President. The increased wielding of excessive power led to Nkrumah becoming more deeply unpopular within his own country.

Section Two of the chapter will identify the internal economic and social developments in Ghana between 1957 and 1966. Here, I examine Nkrumah’s attempt to affect economic and
social transformation so as to promote rapid development. However, what occurred was hastily adopted policies, which weakened Ghana’s post-colonial economy and had particularly grave repercussions on the people. It will be observed that Nkrumah’s policy mismanagement of the country, his personal corruption, and his effort to circumvent the power of the security machinery of the country, all triggered his removal as the President of Ghana in 1966.

This chapter is concerned with understanding the domestic environment that Nkrumah was neglecting, and sometimes harming, in his pursuit of the Pan-African ideal. In the chapters that follow, I look at two cases where Nkrumah actively pursued the Pan-African vision in his foreign policy. This chapter focuses on the harm and neglect he was inflicting on his own people whilst advocating for the emancipation of Africa. There is no doubt he was committed to the Pan-African vision and saw this organisation as necessary for an independent African union that could be protected from future colonisation. However, what is not clear is why he did so at the cost of Ghanaians. This chapter seeks to explain why, despite the myriad internal challenges faced and caused by Nkrumah’s government, he persistently promoted his Pan-African idea and why this endeavour has endured today as the strongest legacy of Nkrumah’s leadership.

In effect, this chapter presents a discussion of the fourth dimension of Nkrumah’s norm entrepreneurial approach — seizing political opportunities within his newly independent state. As already mentioned in the previous chapter, Nkrumah carried out problem framing, built networks and established organisational platforms immediately following Ghana’s independence. However, in order to reinforce his normative ambition, he required the domestic windows of opportunities — the domestic or internal political venues and environment to set the stage for his continental project. Tellingly, as the chapter identifies, Nkrumah could not handle these opportunities well and eventually, under his presidency, his strategy backfired.

**Kwame Nkrumah’s Administration: The Domestic Political Situation in Ghana (1957–1966)**

As mentioned in the previous chapter (Three), Nkrumah led the Gold Coast to gain independence in 1957 and he became the first leader of the newly independent state of Ghana. However, he immediately sought to control any political opposition and enforce the authority of his party, the Convention People’s Party (CPP), with the introduction of the *Avoidance of Discrimination Act* in December 1957 (Gocking, 2005). The passing of this Act by Nkrumah’s government was driven by his attempt to prevent the organisation of the leading opposition,
including Dr Busia, Dr J. B. Danquah and R. R. Amponsah, Dr J. Hutton-Mills, J. A. Braimah, Mrs Nancy Tsiboe, Joe Appiah and others, who had formed a joint opposition party called the United Party (UP)\(^{39}\) (Gocking, 2005; Austin, 1964). This Act detailed the permissible activities and organisation of regional and ethnic political groups; the criteria were strict so as to limit any opportunity for political organisation amongst groups.

Furthermore, Nkrumah’s government introduced the *Preventive Detention Act* (PDA) on 18 July 1958 (Gocking, 2005). This Act permitted the detention of an individual for a period of five years ‘without the right of appeal to the courts’ for behaviour regarded as ‘detrimental to the defence and security of the country as well as its foreign relations’ (Gocking, 2005; Asante, 1969; Rothchild, 1960). The introduction of the PDA was a response to rumours of an assassination conspiracy by the opposition against Nkrumah and his CPP government officials (Apter, 1968; Ameh, 2006; Gyimah-Boadi & Rothchild, 1982). However, in effect the PDA became an instrument adopted by Nkrumah’s regime to ‘empower the Government to imprison, without trial, any persons suspected of activities prejudicial to the State’s security’ (cited in Austin, 1964, p. 380).

Both Acts deliberately sought to curtail and even eliminate the political opposition (Buah 1998); it was also a blunt government tool introduced to overcome ‘CPP leaders… growing impatience with the ordinary machinery of law’ (Austin, 1964, p. 381). As of late 1958, 38 people in the opposition United Party were apprehended under the PDA for alleged assassination plots, including Attoh Okine, K. Y. Attoh, Ashie Nikoe, and Dzenkle Dzewu (Biney, 2011; Gocking, 2005; Austin, 1964). In December, the same year, R. R. Amponsah and Modesto K. Apaloo, all of whom were leading members of the opposition, were accused of treason by Nkrumah’s government (Davidson, 1973; Austin, 1964; Biney, 2011). A commander in the Ghana army, Captain Ahwaitey, had witnessed Amponsah and Apaloo seeking military assistance to overthrow the government (Davidson, 1973; Biney, 2011). However, a commission of inquiry set up by the CPP-led government and headed by Justice Granville Sharp unanimously rejected the alleged conspiracy by the two members of the opposition to oust the government on the back of insufficient evidence (Biney, 2011). In sum, Buah (1998) observes that in practice the PDA ‘was applied indiscriminately, occasionally on mere suspicion, and to terrorise and victimise people who had no means of redress’ (p. 189).

\(^{39}\) The members of the UP came together to form the party to act as the main opposition to Nkrumah’s party but they couldn’t match the government of Nkrumah’s CPP with respect to finances, representatives and organisation. See more in Austin, 1964.
Essentially, the CPP government was most occupied in the post-independence years with fortifying their dominance and control across the country at the expense of their opposition (Austin, 1964). This reach extended into control of labour and agriculture organisations — the two main industries of Ghana at the time. The government sponsored the United Ghana Farmers’ Council (UGFC) (Beckman, 1976; Marshall, 1976; Gyimah-Boadi, 1990), and the Trades Union Congress (TUC), the key umbrella organisation for trade union activities in Ghana (Austin, 1964). The TUC was made a centralised structure under the control of the CPP government in accordance with the newly adopted 1958 Industrial Relations Act (Finlay, 1968; Austin, 1964; Sackeyfio-Lenoch, 2017). The selection and appointment of government officials was solely under the control of Nkrumah, who also personally regulated their emoluments and determined when and under what conditions these appointees were to be disciplined (Bretton, 1966). Breaking convention with the Westminster system, Nkrumah also made government appointments personally and directly accountable to the CPP government (Bretton, 1966).

At the same time, Nkrumah’s government strengthened its control and power in the rural areas, especially over the traditional rulers (or chiefs) (Rathbone, 2000a; Biney, 2011; Bretton, 1966). Nkrumah withdrew the recognition of certain chiefs in the country to increase competition amongst the chiefs for his permission to continue to exist and hold land (Rathbone, 2000b). According to Gocking (2005), Nkrumah’s government would withdraw recognition of a chief to foil any opposition from the traditional figures. To this end, the government officially recognised pro-Nkrumah chiefs, and chiefs suspected to be allies of the opposition had their recognition as traditional rulers withdrawn (Rathbone, 2000b; Gocking, 2005). For example, the CPP government withdrew the recognition of the paramount chief of Akyem Abuakwa (Okyehene), Ofori Atta because he was considered a robust critic of the government (Rathbone, 2000a; Legum, 1958). Ofori Atta was accused of refusing to accept the rulings of the country’s legitimately appointed appeals commissioner for traditional legal disputes (Rathbone, 2000b). He was charged with ‘[impeding] the Government in the execution of its lawful duties’ (Rathbone, 2000b, p. 113). Rathbone (2000b) argues that the withdrawal of the formal recognition of Ofori Atta ‘was to be a lesson for any chief who chose to maintain public opposition to the government’ (p. 113).

Meanwhile, the government established the *Stools Land Act*[^41], which stipulates that the payments of rents, royalties and land administration matters, which hitherto were administered by the chiefs, were to be placed directly under the control of the central government (Biney, 2011). To this end, the traditional rulers lost control of revenues from their traditional lands and the chiefs’ ‘independent political influence’ was practically undermined (Rathbone 2000b). In October 1958, the paramount chief of the Ashanti region of Ghana briefed the Kumasi State Council of Chiefs stating that the creation of the Act was ‘a catastrophe [that had] befallen the chiefs of Ashanti’ (cited in Biney, 2011, p. 84). Then in 1959, the government formally introduced the ‘Chiefs (Recognition) Bill’ which gave the government power to legally remove chiefs (Gocking, 2005). In effect, with the enactment of this law, the tenure of traditional office was now subject to the will of the CPP government (Boateng, 2003; Dunn & Robertson, 1973). Again, the duties performed by chiefs were to be in accordance with directives from Nkrumah’s government (Boateng, 2003). Furthermore, in order to secure power over the legal machinery, the *Constitutional (Amendment) Act* of 1959 ‘transferred the office of the Attorney General from the public-service category to that of a political appointee directly responsible to Nkrumah’ (Bretton, 1966, p. 48).

In 1960, the government organised a plebiscite to decide whether the country should have a republican constitution (Gocking, 2005). Many are of the view that this was a deliberate move by Nkrumah to create a republican government, which would generate more power for the President (Boateng, 2003; Botwe-Asamoah, 2005; Biney, 2011). However, it is also true to point out — as Nkrumah did — that a republican government for Ghana was the fulfilment of its complete sovereignty from the British with the end of sovereign power being held by the British head of state (Biney, 2011). Electorates were given the opportunity to decide on the government’s proposal for a republican constitution as well as the Presidency, with Nkrumah and J. B. Danquah (of the opposition party, United Party), as the main presidential candidates (Biney, 2011; Gocking, 2005). It should be observed here that the majority of the leaders of the United Party opposed Nkrumah’s constitutional changes, as well as his candidature as President in the plebiscite; however, at the same time, one of their key leaders, Dr Busia, was out of the country and a majority were imprisoned under the PDA or unable to assemble opposition to Nkrumah within the community (Austin, 1964).

[^41]: Stool Land encompasses ‘a land or an interest in, or right over, a land controlled by a stool or skin, the head of a particular community or the captain of a company, for the benefit of the subjects of that stool or the members of that community or company’. See more [https://opencontentghana.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/office-of-the-administrator-of-stools-lands-act-1994-act-481.pdf](https://opencontentghana.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/office-of-the-administrator-of-stools-lands-act-1994-act-481.pdf) (Accessed on 28 November 2017).
Ultimately, it was decided that Dr Danquah would be sponsored by the opposition group to contest Nkrumah in the national plebiscite (Biney, 2011). As noted in Chapter Three, Danquah was a founding leader of the first political party in Ghana (United Gold Coast Convention) and it was upon his invitation that Nkrumah returned to the country. At the end of the plebiscite, Nkrumah had an overwhelming victory with 88.5 percent supporting the call for republican constitution, while the opposition gained 11.5 percent (Biney, 2011). Similarly, Nkrumah obtained 89.1 percent against Danquah’s 10.9 percent in the presidential contest (Austin, 1964; Biney, 2011). There are two ways to interpret this overwhelming result. The first is that the elections were rigged. The second position, put forward by Austin (1964), is that ‘[i]n view of its power and prestige as governing party the CPP would no doubt have succeeded in persuading the electorate … to endorse the leader’s desire for a republic’ (p. 395). To some extent this is true; Nkrumah had successfully reduced the opposition’s message and representation across the country by 1960. The country’s Republican Constitution came into force in the same year (1960) and it entailed a number of inclusions that cemented Nkrumah’s rule. The 1960 Republican Constitution included Article 55: ‘Special Powers for the First President’, which Nkrumah used to extend his personal power and the authority to discipline state officials and party members (Addo, 1967). The Constitution transferred responsibility of the Ghana armed forces from the British Head of State to the President of Ghana (Biney, 2011). Furthermore, the President cemented his power to appoint and sack the Chief Justice, judges of the Supreme Court, and members of the judicial service (Gocking, 2005).

The 1960 Constitution gave the President exclusive authority to oversee the appointment of the judges of the country’s supreme courts (Boateng, 2003). Against this background, judges’ tenure of office was dependent on Nkrumah’s political decisions (Bretton, 1966). The judicial service also came under the control of Nkrumah with the adoption of the Judicial Service Act of 1960, which gave the President the power to appoint positions in the judicial service as well as the authority to discipline judges and district magistrates (Uche, 1966). It should be noted that by this stage, the President had the power to practically enact, administer and enforce any laws he wished due to the monopoly of the CPP in Parliament (Asamoah, 2014; Biney, 2011).

The Preventive Detention Act (PDA) had weakened political opposition and this led to the monopoly of CPP seats in Parliament (Bretton, 1966). For example, the country’s National Assembly Act stipulated that during an election to Parliament, a person was to be disqualified from contesting if the PDA ‘Order was in force against [the person] or had been in force at any time within five years preceding the election’ (Bretton, 1966, p. 51). As a result, a
parliamentarian’s seat was considered vacant in a situation where the PDA had been issued against him or her (Bretton, 1966). In light of that, Nkrumah had the advantage of removing certain opponents from Parliament by just issuing a PDA against them (Gocking, 2005; Bretton, 1966).

By 1961 however, contentions and disunity began to emerge within Nkrumah’s political party (Biney, 2011). Certain members of the party were amassing large personal fortunes from corruption activities (Biney, 2011). In an address in early 1961, Nkrumah recognised that the internal rivalry and factions in the party were a result of members of Parliament whom he described as ‘a new ruling class of self-seekers and careerists’ (cited in Austin, 1964, p. 403). He stated that ‘[a]ny Party Member of Parliament who wishes to be a businessman can do so, but he should give up his seat in Parliament’ (cited in Austin, 1964, p. 403). Nkrumah advised parliamentarians to refrain from using their constituencies as their personal properties and further cautioned he would dismiss members of the party (legislators) who were using their offices to accumulate wealth through bribes, and who helped their relatives to occupy official positions of influence (Biney, 2011).

As a result, on 1 May 1961, Nkrumah as the party’s chairperson took over the duties of the party’s General Secretary from Tawiah Adamafio (Austin, 1964; Botwe-Asamoah, 2005). He also transferred Komla Gbedemah from the post of Finance Minister to Health (Biney, 2011). More importantly, on 28 September 1961, Nkrumah took further actions against leading members of the party who had used their position to amass wealth, including Gbedemah, Kojo Botsio, S. Y. Yeboah (then Commissioner for the Brong Ahafo region of Ghana), E. K. Dadson and W. A. Wiafe, who were ministerial secretaries, and Ayeh Kumi, Executive Secretary of the Development Secretariat; were all relieved of their posts (Austin, 1964). In addition, other officials such as Krobo Edusei, Communications and Transport minister; E. K. Bensah, Minister of Works; A. E. Inkumsah, Minister of Interior; C. de Graft Dickson, Minister of Defence; E. H. T. Karboe, Commissioner for the Easter Region; and J. E. Hagan, Commissioner for the Central Region, were all requested to surrender their properties (Austin, 1964). However, these actions by Nkrumah led to further rivalry, especially between himself and CPP member, Komla Gbedemah, who disputed the charges against him and also condemned the application of the Preventive Detention Act to CPP members (Austin, 1964). Gbedemah noted that ‘[i]f we are to learn from experience, this [PDA]… would soon show

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42 For example, some leading members of the party were accused of material acquisition by the youth wing of the party as they taunted ‘one man, one house’, ‘one man, one car’ instead of the ideal slogan ‘one man, one vote’ (Biney, 2011).
that the liberty of the subject is extinguished for ever. Today, there are many people whose hearts are filled with fear, fear even to express their convictions’ (cited in Austin, 1964, p. 406).

In 1962, concerns with widespread corruption in Nkrumah’s government remained (Gocking, 2005; Kofele-Kale, 2006). For example, the wife of an official in government Krobo Edusei was found to have bought a gold-embossed bed from the United Kingdom to the tune of three thousand British pounds, which generated heightened public protest against corrupt government officials (Biney, 2011). As Gocking (2005) puts it, at the time corruption ‘stretched all the way from the very top to the lowest echelons of the society’ (p. 135). In addition, Omari (1970) maintains that under Nkrumah’s regime, corruption was common not only amongst politicians, ‘but [among] those who held various degrees of power in the civil service… in corporations, in political parties, in traditional authorities…’ (cited in Werlin, 1972, p. 251). Against this background, Nkrumah promptly warned that all corrupt government officials would be punished by imprisonment between five and ten years with hard labour (Biney, 2011). And yet, in practice, ‘these laws were never rigorously enforced’ unless they were useful against a political opponent (Biney, 2011, p. 91). With such tight assembly laws, assassination attempts became the option for the opposition to ensure change of government (Gocking, 2005).

In August 1962, the first assassination attempt was made against Nkrumah when he travelled to the Upper Volta (present-day Burkina Faso) to discuss trade cooperation with President Maurice Yameogo (Shepherd, 1962; Davidson, 1973; Fuller, 2014b). On returning to Accra en route to the border town of Kulungugu, a grenade was thrown by an assassin. Although Nkrumah escaped, a schoolboy was killed with several others wounded (Shepherd, 1962; Davidson, 1973; Asamoah, 2014). The police and security intelligence attributed the bomb explosion to an ‘inside job’, although there was no evidence as to which member of his entourage might have masterminded it (Davidson, 1973). Subsequently, several bomb explosions were recorded in the capital Accra (Fuller, 2014b). On 8 January 1963, there was another bomb explosion at the Accra Sports Stadium, where the President had addressed members of his party; four persons were killed and 85 people were wounded (Biney, 2011). On this occasion, the Nkrumah-appointed police unit found evidence that pointed to the opposition (Davidson, 1973). The leader of the opposition National Liberation Movement, Obetsebi Lamptey,43 was arrested and imprisoned for orchestrating the bomb attack in Accra

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43 He was part of the founding members of the United Gold Coast Convention and later became part of the ‘Big Six’ together with Nkrumah prior to Ghana’s attainment of independence. See previous Chapter Three.
(Biney, 2011). The police service established that Obetsebi Lamptey had provided grenades, as well as paid the assassins who threw them (Davidson, 1973). Nkrumah-appointed Chief Justice, Arku Korsah, found Lamptey and six other accomplices guilty. All seven were imprisoned for life at the Nsawam Prisons, where Lamptey died shortly thereafter of cancer of the liver (Davidson, 1973).

Following the Kulungugu explosion, certain members of Nkrumah’s team, such as Tawiah Adamafio (Minister of Presidential Affairs) and Ako Adjei (Foreign Minister), were also arrested for allegedly masterminding the attempted assassination on the President (Botwe-Asamoah, 2005; Austin, 1964). Consequently, a special court was established to investigate the bombing explosion in Kulungugu headed by Ghana’s Chief Justice, Sir Aku Korsah, and two other judges of the Supreme Court, W. B. Van Lare and Akuffo Addo (Gocking, 2005). Eventually, 12 persons were tried, all former affiliates of Nkrumah bar one: Tawiah Adamafio; Ako Adjei; Coffie Crabbe, Executive Secretary of the CPP; R. B. Otchere, official of the United Party; and Yaw Manu, a government clerk (Biney, 2011; Austin, 1964). Five were found guilty of sedition and were sentenced to death. Otchere who pleaded guilty, and the remaining herein, Adamafio, Ako Adjei and Crabbe, were all acquitted of their involvement in the assassination attempt at Kulungungu (Gocking, 2005; O’Brien, 2000).

Following the verdict by the court, Nkrumah was annoyed and dismissed the country’s Chief Justice Sir Korsah on 11 December 1963 (O’Brien, 2000; Bretton, 1966; Davidson, 1973; Austin, 1964). Nkrumah’s refusal to accept the ruling by the judges led to his call for a constitutional amendment by which he could nullify the acquittal (Davidson, 1973). To this end, the Ghana National Assembly (House of Parliament) approved the Law of Criminal Procedure, which authorised the President to annul any decisions of the Supreme Court; thus, on 25 December 1963, Nkrumah nullified the decision by Sir Korsah (Austin, 1964; Gocking, 2005).

In the same month, Nkrumah took advantage of the political assassination attempts and announced another referendum to be held between 24 January 1964 and 31 January 1964 to attach two new amendments to the country’s Constitution (Austin, 1964; Gocking, 2005). The first change would be to ‘invest the President with power in his discretion to dismiss a Judge of the High Court at any time for reasons which appear to him sufficient’ (cited in Austin, 1964, p. 413); the second amendment was to permit only ‘one national party in Ghana [and]
that the one national party shall be the Convention People’s Party’ (cited in Austin, 1964, p. 413).

Meanwhile, shortly before the constitutional amendment referendum, another assassination attempt was made on Nkrumah. On 2 January 1964, the police officer on duty at the Flagstaff House (official seat of government of Ghana) in Accra, Constable Seth Ametewee, attempted to kill Nkrumah by firing five shots at him (Davidson, 1973; O’Brien, 2000; Fuller, 2014b; Tunteng, 1973). Although Nkrumah escaped the assassination, two shots killed his personal bodyguard, Salifu Dagarti (Biney, 2011). The impact of this assassination plot increased Nkrumah’s suspicions, which led to purging in his security team, specifically the superior ranks of the police, as well as other security forces (Baynham, 1985b; Bretton, 1966). In that regard, six days after the attack on his life, the Police Commissioner, E. R. T. Madjitey; the Assistant Police Commissioner, S. D. Amaning; as well as other eight senior police officers were apprehended and detained on the grounds of orchestrating Nkrumah’s assassination (Austin, 1964).

Ametewee (the alleged assassin) was sentenced to death by hanging for the killing of Dagarti (Biney, 2011). Following the attack was also another series of arrests under the Preventive Detention Act against people suspected of masterminding Nkrumah’s assassination; J. B. Danquah of the opposition, and M. K. Awuku, superintendent of the police force, were both arrested and detained (Austin, 1964). Danquah later died at the Nsawam prison near Accra (Gocking, 2005). Moreover, Nkrumah reorganised his security forces by adding to the regular police force the President’s Own Guard Regiment (POGR), which comprised ex-service men to support duties at the Flagstaff House (Baynham, 1985b).

In addition, Nkrumah attempted to wield control over the academia (O’Brien, 2000). He pressurised the authorities of the University of Ghana to permit him as the President of the country to administer the programmes taught within the school; he insisted on controlling matters relating to admissions, staff appointments, as well as the organisation of academic programmes (Gocking, 2005). In January 1964, Nkrumah officially wrote to the University requesting the school to adhere to his directives, but the authorities refused (Bretton, 1966). In the following week, a member of the CPP, N. A. Welbeck, led a mob of party supporters through the university campus, vandalising properties with the aim of intimidating students

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44 It should be observed that by this time most of Nkrumah’s opponents had either been detained or left the country (Gocking, 2005).
and the academy to bow to the power of the President and allow him to administer the policies of the university (Austin, 1964; Bretton, 1966).

Towards the end of January 1964, the scheduled referendum for constitutional amendment was held (Austin, 1964). Out of a total of 2,877,464 registered voters, the number of voters that supported the proposed changes [‘Yes’ voters] was 2,773,920, while 2452 voted against it [‘No’ voters] (Biney, 2011; Austin, 1964). However, Austin (1964) maintains that during the referendum ‘Malpractices were reported as being so widespread that … [t]he most common device used by the party officers was that of sealing (or removing) the “No” box’ (p. 414). Likewise, Davidson (1973) argues that ‘such results [did] not come from an honestly conducted referendum… the CPP became Ghana’s only political party by the assistance of electoral fraud’ (p. 193). By this, Nkrumah had more political power and his party, the CPP, became the dominant party whilst the minority in Parliament and the opposition United Party were ultimately undermined (Owusu, 1970; Bretton, 1966; Austin, 1964).

In July 1965, Nkrumah fired the Chief of Defence Staff (Major-General Stephen Otu) and Major-General Joseph Ankrah on the grounds of plotting to oust his government after military intelligence revealed a coup plot (Baynham, 1985b). The two officers were respectively replaced by Brigadier Aferi and Lieutenant-Colonel Barwah (Baynham, 1985b).

In addition, Nkrumah continued to affect statutory changes; he restructured the High Court with a Special Criminal Division to handle cases concerning the security of the President and the presiding judge was responsible to him (Bretton, 1966). Furthermore, Nkrumah included a 12-member jury to the Division so as to facilitate their work; members of the jury were his loyal followers mainly selected from the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute at Winneba in the central region of Ghana (Bretton, 1966). The Ideological Institute was a school for the CPP, which was geared towards promoting Nkrumah’s Pan-African policy. First, it provided training for members of the CPP as well as civil servants on the Pan-African ideology of Nkrumah; second, it became a vehicle for training independence movements across Africa to champion the cause of Pan-Africanism (Grilli, 2017; Owusu, 1970).

Nearly ten years after independence, Nkrumah had become the sole administrator of the country regarding decision making about government policies and engagements, with excessive power and control. The opposition were almost extinguished; and it was this situation that later fuelled his overthrow in a political coup (Mahoney, 1968; Davidson, 1973; Apter, 1968). It could be observed that Nkrumah wielded too much power, the country’s political system was compromised with ineffective or non-existence of proper electoral process in his party’s structure; he appointed and dismissed officials (Owusu, 1970; Davidson, 1973). In
effect, all the aforesaid undermined the leadership of Nkrumah as the President of the newly independent state (Ghana). Significantly, by 1965, Nkrumah’s government was becoming unpopular amongst the people (Price, 1971; Gocking, 2005).

The following section provides an overview of the economic and social situation during Nkrumah’s government. It points out certain significant projects undertaken by Nkrumah, such as developments in the areas of agriculture and industries, and also highlights the weaknesses associated with his pursuit of rapid economic and social transformation, which caused suffering amongst the people within his country who had supported his vision of an independent Ghana only ten years earlier.

**Kwame Nkrumah’s Administration: Domestic, Economic and Social Developments in Ghana (1957–1966)**

In the words of Dr Jonathan Frimpong, then deputy governor of the Bank of Ghana,

> By 1965 it had become very desperate and I remember we decided to write a memorandum to Nkrumah to tell him the true state of affairs of the economy. I had written that the reserves were only 500,000 pounds. He looked at me and said ‘Ah! You didn’t check your typing! You left a few zeros!’ I said ‘No sir, there are no zeros left’. This is 500,000 pounds — all we have … When Nkrumah heard this he actually shed tears … He broke down completely when he knew that Ghana was in fact poor. (cited in Biney, 2011, p. 95)

Significantly, the CPP administration, under Kwame Nkrumah, by 1958 had introduced a programme regarding the economic and social development of the newly independent state. In this light, Nkrumah’s government drew up its 5-year development plan projected at 120 million British pounds sterling (Boateng, 2003; Buah, 1998). Specifically, this plan encompassed areas such as agriculture, establishment of industries, transport and communication, as well as provision of social services, predominantly education, health, electricity, and water (Buah, 1998).

It should be noted that by then the Nkrumah-led government had inherited a budget surplus of 200 million pounds sterling from the British colonial administration (Rimmer, 1966; Buah, 1998). Apart from that, the CPP administration was depending on revenues from cocoa, which at the time was the country’s leading export earning product and the mainstay of the country’s economy (Anaman, 2006; Buah, 1998). Ghana was also benefitting from its mineral wealth such as timber (Biney, 2011; Buah, 1998). Consequently, in order to enhance
agriculture especially regarding cocoa production, in the 1950s Nkrumah’s government created new experimental farm stations to facilitate the training of agricultural officers and farmers in the country. In addition, farmers were given seeds and subsidies to enhance their cultivation (Buah, 1998). To support the farmers with credit facilities, the CPP government created an agricultural credit bank and cooperative societies; the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board, which commenced during the colonial era, was used to promote the marketing of the country’s main agricultural commodities such as cocoa, coffee, shea-nut and others (Buah, 1998).

The government had a dominant presence in enterprises and the economy. The government attempted to develop the industrial sector by creating the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation as an umbrella body for state-owned enterprises to oversee the manufacturing and marketing of goods including matches, canned foods, pharmaceutical products, textiles and others for both export and domestic consumption (Buah, 1998). Other state companies such as the State Hotels Corporation were established to manage the various hotels and guesthouses across the country to support national tourism (Buah, 1998). The prices of essential goods in the country were set by the state (Boateng, 2003). Major road networks were also upgraded, examples included the Accra-Kumasi highway; Tema motorway in the capital Accra; and Accra-Takoradi-Axim-Tarkwa road. Other railways including the Sekondi-Takoradi through Kumasi to Accra were all built to facilitate the transportation of mineral resources from the rural areas to the cities (Buah, 1998). Within this period, the Black Star Line (presently State’s Shipping Corporation) was established to support the industrial sector (Biney, 2011; Buah, 1998).

By early the 1960s, in the domain of education, the government established the University of Cape Coast to provide an avenue for the training of graduate teachers for schools; the free textbook programme was also created to supply educational books to these schools (Buah, 1998). Nkrumah’s government introduced the Education Act of 1961, which made education free and compulsory for all children of school age (Akyeampong, Djangmah, Oduro, Seidu & Hunt, 2007). Free and compulsory schooling had a purpose: Nkrumah used education as a tool to promote his ideas. He built two main institutions, the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute (mentioned above) and the Young Pioneer Movement (YPM), to promote his ideas and teachings to the next generation (Biney, 2011). Like the Ideological Institute, the latter movement was created to provide political education to the youth of the country with regard to Nkrumah’s ideas (Biney, 2011). That is, at both the start and end of school, all the students enrolled were expected to make a pledge:
To live by the ideals of Osagyefo Kwame Nkrumah, Founder of Ghana, initiator of the African personality; to safeguard by all means possible the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state of Ghana from internal and external aggression, and to be in the first ranks of men fighting for total liberation and unity of Africa … (cited in Biney, 2011, p. 102)

Relatedly, the already existing University of Ghana, which was hitherto started by the British colonial administration, commenced an adult education programme administered under the extramural department (present-day Institute of Adult Education) in the areas of economics, government, geography, history, and literature (in English) to help civil servants upgrade themselves (Buah, 1998). In addition, the government together with the Department of Social Welfare and Community Development, sponsored education in health and sanitation for people in the rural communities (Buah, 1998).

However, the country’s economy was struck by a setback following the fall in the price of cocoa on the international market, which had a repercussion on the government’s revenue necessary to cover its nation-wide investment and spending (Gocking, 2005). As already noted at the time, cocoa was the main foreign exchange earner and source of revenue generation for the country and, therefore, a decline in global market prices affected the development plan of the CPP government. To this end, the government drew heavily on its reserves as well as increased taxation (Biney, 2011). In July 1961, instead of reducing its spending or expenditure, Nkrumah’s administration employed an approach of increasing taxes on consumer goods so as to generate extra revenue for the country (Rimmer, 1966; Austin, 1964). Hence, the government introduced the purchase tax, as well as a compulsory five percent levy, which was taken from incomes over 120 pounds yearly (Austin, 1964; Gocking, 2005). This policy led to an increase in prices of goods and services, which affected both skilled and semi-skilled workers (Gocking, 2005; Austin, 1964). The initial attempt by government officials in September 1961 to collect the taxes triggered major strike action amongst transport workers in Accra and Kumasi, and amongst the workers of port and railways in Sekondi-Takoradi (Boateng, 2003; Asamoah, 2014; Gocking, 2005). The strike led to violence between the protesters and the police officers, with government officials travelling back and forth (Accra to Sekondi-Takoradi) attempting to mediate and imploring the workers\(^\text{45}\) to return to work (Austin, 1964). The strike continued for a couple of weeks, until the strikers were compelled to get back to work by Nkrumah’s government (Austin, 1964).

\(^{45}\) These workers were part of Nkrumah’s (trade union).
At the time of the strike, President Nkrumah was visiting Europe to attend the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in Belgrade (Gocking, 2005; Austin, 1964). On his return, Nkrumah believed the opposition was behind the strike action because the protesters had also called for the country’s Republican Constitution to be amended — calling for an end to the supreme powers and control held by the President (Austin, 1964). J. B. Danquah (of the opposition United Party) also argued that the strike was a sign that Ghanaians had lost confidence in the CPP administration (Biney, 2011). As a result, the leaders of the striking workers and certain market women, who were believed to have assisted the strikers, were all apprehended in October 1961 (Austin, 1964). Again, other members of the opposition including Danquah, Joe Appiah, S. G. Antor as well as P. K. K. Quaidoo (erstwhile CPP trade minister) were all detained on suspicion of orchestrating the strike (Gocking, 2005).

The weakening economy led to the government’s decision to revise its economic policy. On 11 December 1961, a Second Development Plan (1961–1964) was adopted but then promptly abandoned by the government in that it believed the Plan replicated the inaccuracies of the First Development Plan (Rimmer, 1966; Gocking, 2005; Biney, 2011). The government then commenced the drawing of a Seven-Year Development Plan to make the state the dominant owner and regulator of the economy regarding production, enterprises and corporations (Gocking, 2005). The Ghana National Trading Corporation (GNTC) was formed in 1961, and made the leading importer and distributor of all commodities in the country (Owusu, 1970; Boateng, 2003). The mining of most of the mineral resources including gold and diamond in Ghana became state-owned, while the building and construction sector was nationalised into the State Construction Corporation (Boateng, 2003). Sectors like banking and insurance, as well as industrial development were taken over by the state and as a result, as of 1965, 22 private enterprises were owned and controlled by the state (Gocking, 2005). The Bank of Ghana and the Ghana Commercial Bank were created by the state to take over the financial sector (Boateng, 2003).

Additionally, state farms (State Farms Corporation) were established, with Workers’ Brigades formed to work on these farms to remedy food supply shortages (Boateng, 2003). In 1965, an estimated three million acres of arable land in Ghana were given to the state farms, yet only 40,000 acres were essentially utilised. Most of the government officials in charge of monitoring the farms only concentrated on the capital, rather than visiting the rural

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46 These economic policies underline Nkrumah’s socialist shift or the significance of socialist influence. In his autobiography, Nkrumah stated that ‘I am a non-denominational Christian and a Marxist socialist…’ (Nkrumah, 1957a, p. 12).
communities where the farms were predominantly based (Boateng, 2003). Corruption practices also hindered these farms as the CPP officials and party members sometimes took farm produce for their personal consumption (Kraus, 1969).47

Notably, the policies of government continued to have serious repercussions on the country as there were shortages in basic imported goods including sugar, rice, soap, drugs, milk, and parts of cars (Bretton, 1966). As a result, few traders who had some of these commodities either hoarded or increased their prices (Gocking, 2005). Long queues were formed at the Accra Sports Stadium in order to ‘purchase single packets of sugar’ (Gocking, 2005, p. 135). Due to poor management, the state farms as well as industries started failing and in 1965, Ghana’s external reserves declined considerably (Aryeetey & Fenny, 2017). According to the 1965 Annual Report of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Ghana’s external reserves which earlier stood at 530 million dollars (in 1957) had dropped to below 70 million dollars in 1965 (IMF, 1965).

Coupled with the economic and social hardships, Nkrumah continued to strengthen and exercise his power indiscriminately in the face of increased opposition and public anger. His constitutional amendments and policies were unpopular amongst the people, but because of fear of detention and loss of the small revenue they had, people were intimidated and mostly remained silent. However, by 1966, the security officers — the military and police — acted and staged a successful coup. In the midst of Ghana’s economic, social and political decline, however, Nkrumah continued to travel and promote a foreign policy based on his ideal African Union of states. In the chapters that follow, I attempt to make sense of this disjuncture between what he advocated in his foreign policy with what he was doing to his own country. The decline of Nkrumah’s administration and the successful coup attempt are then discussed in Chapter Seven.

**Conclusion**

This chapter examined the Ghanaian state under Nkrumah’s leadership in the post-independence era. It traced the internal dynamics in the newly post-independence state while the President pursued his Pan-African project in the region. This chapter provided a bleak history of the political, economic and social developments in Ghana under President

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47 It should be pointed out that competition from private businesspersons was prevented; e.g. to eradicate potential competition to the country’s State Fishing Corporation, Nkrumah asked an entrepreneur to oversee the Fishing Corporation so that his company would be merged with the state’s. However, after he refused the government’s proposal, he was not given license to operate his personal fishing business (Gocking, 2005).
Nkrumah’s administration between 1957 and 1966. From the outset Nkrumah sought to control his opponents and enforce his vision of Ghana post-independence. Both the Avoidance of Discrimination Act and the Preventive Detention Act became tools for suppressing the opposition and abuse the rights and liberties of the people. After the republican referendum, Nkrumah’s quest to affect constitutional amendments provided him the power to both appoint and dismiss traditional leaders, judges of the Supreme Court, and the military. These measures were indicative of creeping authoritarian rule, especially when he moved in 1964 to make Ghana a one-party state while he wielded supreme control and power.

Section Two of the chapter demonstrated that despite Nkrumah’s call for an independent union of states, the corruption within his own government and the promotion of socialist economic policies propelled Nkrumah’s demise. By the end of his rule, Ghana was impoverished. In Chapter Seven we examine the consequence and legacy of Nkrumah’s quest for excessive power, coupled with his deep but distracting involvement in African affairs.

In general, this chapter has retraced Nkrumah’s attempt as a norm entrepreneur to seize the windows of opportunity in Ghana to advance his pan-African vision. I showed Nkrumah’s domestic environment — the moments and venues he had as tools for his normative advancement. However, as can be seen, this opportunity quickly fell apart. Unlike positive entrepreneurialism, Nkrumah neglected his domestic environment. He could not seize the moment and use the internal opportunities available to him effectively. Rather, his abuse of power, as well as state resources undermined his efforts and attempts to rally the support of the wider Ghanaian populace for the realisation of his pan-African undertaking. This significantly created strong opposition to his administration and precipitated his failure and demise (see Chapter Seven).

Nkrumah continuously and keenly pursued his Pan-African vision in spite of the domestic difficulties his administration (and country) encountered, as the next chapter (Five) will illustrate. The chapter will first examine the creation and implementation of Nkrumah’s post-independence Pan-African foreign policy, followed by a close examination of a case often presented as an illustration of Nkrumah’s support for Pan-Africanism in practice: the 1960 Congo crisis. The chapter traces the emergence of Ghana’s peacekeeping ‘intervention’ identity with the Pan-African vision. Nkrumah presented the Pan-African vision as the crucial platform that justified sending in troops to assist another African country in political crisis. At the time, and to this day, this was (is) a controversial position amongst post-independence African states. It proved to be controversial then and further complicated by Nkrumah’s own contradictory position when support for Lumumba became a threat to his own political career.
Chapter Five

Kwame Nkrumah’s Pan-African Foreign Policy:
The Congo Intervention

The uniqueness of our foreign policy was that we had a president who wanted to use the platform to propagate the idea of Pan-Africanism. He was championing African unity.

(Government Official 10, 2016)

Introduction

This chapter will chart the advancement of Nkrumah’s Pan-African foreign policy project and argue that it sought to accelerate the normative agenda of African continental unity in a significant sphere — the promotion of independence and African identity. Specifically, the chapter explores the action that Nkrumah took to see Pan-Africanism realised by approving Ghana’s intervention in the Congo crisis. The Congo case, this chapter argues, illustrates Nkrumah’s ambition to accelerate the vision of Pan-Africanism and how that came at a crucial time for regional politics amongst the emerging independent African states. However, unlike his previous approach to the Ghanaian independence movement, Nkrumah encountered a number of conceptual and practical difficulties in promoting the objective of continental unity.

Significantly, the chapter mainly covers the turn of events in the Congo between 1959 and 1964. The chapter evaluates Ghana’s Pan-African intervention in the Congo crisis. Therefore, it is structured as follows: the first section traces the Congo crisis in detail. I will briefly explore the historical background of developments in the country prior to its independence to trace the roots of the crisis. I will also discuss the country’s attainment of independence and the eventual outbreak of political crisis.

Section Two traces the interventions during the Congo crisis. The section discusses intervention by the United Nations’ (UN) forces and Ghana, as well as diplomatic involvements by Ghana’s President Nkrumah and its resultant controversies (and failure). Notably, Nkrumah’s influence in the conflict declined after the death of Lumumba in 1961. There is no

48 For the purpose of clarity regarding the origin of the Congo crisis, I will trace it to the nineteenth century.
doubt that Nkrumah’s initial engagement in the Congo mission was led by his personal beliefs and conviction of Pan-Africanism as the solution to Africa’s political and economic vulnerability as it transitioned out of its colonial past. However, in practice Nkrumah did not always pursue this vision in the Congo case, which undermined his Pan-African project in the larger region.

I trace Nkrumah’s norm entrepreneurship during the Congo mission as he persistently attempted to frame the pan-African engagement in Congo as part of the broader vision of continental independence and unity. Again, as will be observed, Nkrumah continued to strengthen his networks and organisational platforms to drive this cause. It is worth reiterating that at this stage Nkrumah had quickly built alliances with the African states, as well as created domestic structures in Ghana so as to make the Congo mission an African enterprise. He therefore set out to capture the political opportunities available for persuading the African states to accept his pan-African vision. This chapter will show the existing political opportunities — that is, the regional environment in Africa at the time. I show how Nkrumah tried to get regional momentum and attachment to this normative cause. But, as the chapter will highlight, Nkrumah could not effectively manage this regional political environment — he lost this opportunity.

The Congo Crisis and Ghana’s Attempted Pan-African Intervention

In the wake of Ghanaian independence, Nkrumah turned to the creation of an independent continent that would then be unified as a federation of African states (Boateng, 2003; Gocking, 2005; Nkrumah, 1970; Addo-Fening, 1972). Based on his experience in achieving Ghanaian independence, Nkrumah channelled his attention, as well as Ghana’s newly independent foreign policy resources, to the achievement of this vision of Pan-Africanism (Biney, 2011; Rooney, 2007; Nkrumah, 1965; Austin, 1964). Notably, Nkrumah did not speak of Ghana’s independence as being completed and significant until there was the complete emancipation and unity of the entire African continent (Nkrumah, 1967b). As Schramm (2010) argues, ‘[u]nder Nkrumah’s presidency Ghana became a focal point of the Pan-African Movement, and the Pan-African ideology formed the basis of much of Ghana’s foreign as well as domestic policy’ (p. 62).

As discussed in Chapter Three, Nkrumah’s Pan-African foreign policy direction underpinned the two Accra conferences through which he built networks with individual independence activists like Lumumba of Congo. In particular, it was this connection with Lumumba that led to Nkrumah’s involvement in the Congo crisis. The Congo intervention was
meant to be the practical demonstration of how Pan-Africanism could support newly independent states. Instead, it was the first of two failures by Nkrumah to define and diffuse the norm of Pan-Africanism across the African continent. The Congo affair showed first, that Nkrumah himself was inconsistent in supporting the norm when it threatened Ghana’s independence; second, he had no domestic or regional network of support for the agenda; and finally, geopolitically, Nkrumah was weak.

The Congo political crisis, and Nkrumah’s intervention, was a crucial moment for testing how far Nkrumah was willing to go to realise his ambition of a Pan-African state. Below, I trace Nkrumah’s involvement and consider why he characterised the Congo crisis as a ‘prerequisite’ for African unity. I examine the controversy that his position created amongst post-independence African states, and the consequence that this crisis had on the regionalism debate amongst newly independent African states (see Chapter Six).

**Brief historical background of the Congo crisis**

To examine the Congo crisis, it is significant to briefly place the unfolding political events into historical perspective. Located in Central Africa, the former Belgian colony, Congo (also known as Democratic Republic of the Congo) today shares borders with South Sudan, Central African Republic, Angola, Zambia, Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. Prior to Belgian colonial rule, the Congo was under the personal rule (or possession) of the Belgian King Leopold II in 1885, immediately after the Berlin Conference, which endorsed the partition of Africa amongst European powers (Lefevre, 2008; Hochschild, 1998). Apart from promulgating the division of African territories, the Conference highlighted an agreement by the Europeans to protect the indigenous populations of the colonial African states, to educate the people, to improve their wellbeing, as well as to collaborate in the fight against slavery in these states (Thompson, 1969a).

And yet, King Leopold’s 23 years’ rule in Congo was characterised by horrific maltreatment and atrocities, including the removal of limbs as punishment to meet plantation quotas, mass violence and killings of the indigenous Congolese population by the Belgian colonialists (Thompson, 1969a; Fletcher, 2002). Traditional rulers in Congo who opposed his leadership were either murdered or threatened (Ewans, 2003). As a result, a transnational advocacy group, the Congo Reform Association, headed by Edmund Morel and Roger Casement (both Europeans), led a campaign to expose the colonial exploitation under King Leopold’s reign in the Congo (Ewans, 2003; Gondola, 2002). By 1903, the Congo Reform Association presented a report to the international community highlighting the abuses in
Congo, which generated criticisms against King Leopold and a call for the Belgian government to take possession of the colony (Gondola, 2002; Moore, 2001). Consequently, after two years of negotiations between the Belgian government and King Leopold, the latter (monarch) sold the Congo colony to the former, which meant that the Belgian government gained complete control over the Congo in 1908 (Nkrumah, 1967b). Thus, 1908 marked a transition from the monarch (Leopold) to the Belgian government.

From 1908 to the summer of 1960, Congo was under the Belgian political administration, which was characterised by violence and economic exploitation of the Congolese people (Ewans, 2003; Gondola, 2002). For example, in the 1920s and 1930s, the Belgian government established railways to facilitate mining activities in Katanga and the minerals (copper, gold and tin) were later exported to Europe (Gondola, 2002; Lyman, 2004). Also, a chunk of the profits from mining was flown out of the Congo coupled with huge taxes imposed on the indigenous population (Lefevre, 2008). Administration of Congo was never devolved to the indigenous population, they were subjects of mutilation, forced labour and segregation with most top-rank positions especially in the political administration and military, occupied by Belgian officials (Nkrumah, 1967b).

However, the emergence of nationalist associations within various ethnic enclaves between the 1940s and the 1950s led to increased protests for colonial liberation from the Belgian government (Gondola, 2002). It should be noted that because the formation of political organisations at that time were not legally possible, the Congolese opted for ethnic associations to push for colonial freedom, although these associations were changed into political parties prior to independence. These movements were reinforced particularly with the entry of a crop of highly educated Congolese, some of whom later became political leaders in the country (Gobbers, 2016). The educated group (Évolué) that gave momentum to the already existing ethnic associations in the run-up to the Congo independence was led by Patrice Lumumba and other members including Joseph Kasavubu, Moise Tshombe, Antoine Ngwenza, Cyrille Adoula and Jean Bolikango (Gondola, 2002). The major ethnic association that was later transformed into a political party to facilitate their quest for immediate independence from the Belgians was the ABAKO (Alliance of the Bakongo) (Gondola, 2002; Tull, 2010). However, this was not an inclusive party; the ABAKO group was formed in 1951 by Edmond Nzeza-Nlandu to ensure unity and promote the culture of the Bakongo (or Kongo) population, a major ethnic group in Congo (Gondola, 2002).

In the middle of the 1950s, members of the ABAKO chose Joseph Kasavubu (indigenous to the Bakongo) as its political leader (Kanza, 1994). Meanwhile, in order to
promote unification amongst different ethnic groups in the fight for independence from the Belgians, Patrice Lumumba also led a breakaway group with members of the Congolese Évolué to form the Mouvement National Congolais or Congolese National Movement (MNC) in 1958 (Namikas, 2013; Kanza, 1994). Unlike the ABAKO, which was dominated by the Bakongo ethnic group, the MNC was an amalgamation of all tribes including some members of the Bakongo ethnic group, as well as other ethnic groups in the Congo (Ndikumana & Emizet, 2003).

Similarly, Moïse Tshombe, indigenous to the mineral-rich Katanga province and a member of the Congolese Évolué, also unified the local communities within Katanga to form the party, CONAKAT (Conféderation des Association Tribales du Katanga) (Gobbers, 2016). The central object of CONAKAT included repossessing the mineral industry of Katanga province from the Belgians as well as protecting the identity of the people of Katanga (Gobbers, 2016). Notably, it was these three political leaders, Kasavubu, Tshombe, and Lumumba, who became the main candidates in the Congolese elections.

Subsequently, the drive for Congolese independence gained momentum after December 1958, when MNC leader Patrice Lumumba and other Congolese politicians were invited to attend the All-African People’s Conference in Accra, Ghana (see Chapter Three) (Thompson, 1969b). However, Joseph Kasavubu (of ABAKO) could not attend the Accra Conference because he did not have complete travelling documents (Kanza, 1994). It needs to be noted that although prior to the Conference Lumumba’s key ambition was independence for the Congo, it was the Accra Conference that introduced a Pan-African element to his Congolese nationalism (Vellut, 1965; Thompson, 1969a). After returning from the Accra Conference, Lumumba addressed a crowd of about 7000 people in the capital of Congo, Leopoldville, regarding the resolution of the Pan-African Conference, echoing that the people of the Congo should not consider independence as a gift from the Belgians, but as a basic entitlement (Kanza, 1994).

On 4 January 1959, following Lumumba’s speech, there emerged mass political revolts in the Leopoldville province; European residents were attacked, and several properties were damaged (Gondola, 2002). As a result, on 13 January 1959, the Belgian administration issued a statement on plans for Congolese independence, which would be phased in gradually (Kanza, 1994; Houser, 1987). This announcement was not accepted by the two major political groups, the MNC and ABAKO, who demanded immediate independence from the Belgian government.

49 Present-day Kinshasa, the Congolese capital.
and issued threats of continuous mass protests and political agitation (Gondola, 2002). In January 1960, the Belgian government held a meeting in Brussels with the Congolese politicians (including Lumumba, Kasavubu and Tshombe) to discuss the proposal for independence (Kanza, 1994). During the discussion, Lumumba was persuasive regarding a date for the country’s liberation and a total takeover of the administration of Congo by its indigenous people (Gondola, 2002). After the meeting, the Belgian government approved 30 June 1960 as the official date for Congolese independence (Gondola, 2002).

As part of the transition process, in May 1960 the Belgian government introduced an interim constitution for the Congolese, La Loi Fondamental, or Basic Law to govern the future administration of the Congo (Gibbs, 2000; Hoskyns, 1963). Furthermore, between 11 and 25 May 1960, a general election was held to choose the leaders of Congo with Lumumba emerging as the winner (Nkrumah, 1967b). By 24 June 1960, a coalition government was formed with Lumumba as the Prime Minister, Kasavubu as the President, while Tshombe became Chairperson of the Provincial Council of Katanga (Nkrumah, 1961). Subsequently, on 29 June 1960, Congolese leaders and Belgian government signed an agreement, which highlighted that Belgian soldiers could help maintain law and order in Congo at the request of the Congolese government (UN, 1996). The independence of Congo and its ensuing political crisis is described below.

### Congo independence and political crisis (1960–1964)

On 30 June 1960, Belgium officially granted independence to the people of Congo (Houser, 1987). Yet, the indigenous population were left in extreme poverty, while the Belgian administration did not detach itself from its former colony (Rooney, 2007). The Congo armed forces (Force Publique) was still commanded by the Belgian Commander-in-Chief General Emile Janssens (Young, 1966; Welch, 1967), who refused to improve the welfare of the African indigenous troops (O’Malley, 2015). The army commander maintained that independence may have led to the withdrawal of Belgium colonialists, but it would not lead to an improvement in the working conditions of the Congolese soldiers (O’Malley, 2015). Against this backdrop, on 5 July 1960, the Congolese soldiers rebelled and requested that Belgians should be removed from the country’s army; this marked the beginning of violent political turmoil that spread across the entire country (Kaplan, 1967; Ohaegbulam, 1969).

The Congolese troops arrested their European counterparts in the army, while the European civilian populace was threatened to leave the country (Kanza, 1994). Then, on 6 July 1960, the revolt extended to other parts of the country, especially the capital Leopoldville
where European shops and properties were looted, European women were deliberately targeted for rape by the African troops, and those who resisted the demands of the soldiers were severely beaten (Gondola, 2002). In the Katanga province, the mutiny by the Congolese forces claimed the lives of six Europeans including the Italian deputy emissary; this heightened situation led to the migration of European civilians to neighbouring African states (Gondola, 2002). In response to the political pandemonium and killings, especially against the Europeans, the Belgian government dispatched its soldiers to protect Europeans in the country and their properties from further attacks, while several European civilians were airlifted to their countries (Biney, 2011). However, while Kasavubu accepted the Belgians’ involvement, Prime Minister Lumumba condemned the intervention by the Belgians and demanded that their soldiers’ involvement should be limited to safeguarding the Europeans in the Congo (Gondola, 2002).

On 11 July 1960, in the wake of the crisis, the leader of the Katanga province Moise Tshombe attempted a secession from the main Congo so that they could become a sovereign province under his (Tshombe’s) administration (Gibbs, 2000; Hughes, 2003). The mineral wealth of Katanga meant it was a huge source of revenue generation for the Congolese government and therefore the attempted withdrawal would jeopardise the country’s economy (Gibbs, 2000). At the same time, the Belgian troops had disarmed the Congolese soldiers in Katanga and taken possession of the town (Gibbs, 2000). Kanza (1994) argues that the Belgian government’s interest in seizing the Katanga province was a deliberate attempt to maintain control over Congo.

Hughes (2003) contends that the Western powers, especially Britain and United States, both had economic and political interest in the Congo Katanga region’s mineral wealth and were supporting Tshombe (in collaboration with the Belgians) to push for a withdrawal so that they could fracture Congo’s self-determination movement and protect their economic investment. It should be stressed that, as of July 1960, British and American investors, as well as the Belgian administration, had huge shares in the Katanga mining industry and keeping control of the region and Congo would protect their interests (Hughes, 2003; Gibbs, 1991). In addition, the United States government was importing greater portions of its cobalt and tantalum (for the aerospace industry) from Katanga and supported the Belgian presence in the Congo in order to ensure their continued access to materials necessary for the space and weapons race against the USSR (Soviet Union) (Gibbs, 1991; Gondola, 2002). Hence, the Americans envisaged that a withdrawal by the Belgians would derail their economic interests in the Congo (Gondola, 2002).
In response to the attempted secession by Katanga and the involvement of the Belgians, Lumumba, who wanted to protect the political identity and independence of Congo, condemned Belgium for not restricting its engagements to the protection of European lives and properties per their earlier programme (Collins, 1993; Gondola, 2002). Again, the Belgian forces did not initially seek the permission of the Congolese government prior to the intervention, which violated the treaty they signed prior to Congo independence (Collins, 1993). As a result, on 12 July 1960, the Prime Minister Lumumba and the President Kasavubu signed a letter requesting military aid from the UN to prevent Katanga’s secession, and to protect the country’s territory against Belgian or any other foreign invasion (Abi-Saab, 1978).

On 13 July 1960, the UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, called a meeting of the UN Security Council under Article 99 of the UN Charter, which authorises the Secretary-General to notify the Security Council on any situation that he considers as a threat to international peace and security (UN, 1996). The UN Secretary-General proposed the creation of a United Nations peacekeeping corps (United Nations Operation in the Congo) to intervene in the Congo in order to maintain stability in the country, as well as ensure the withdrawal of the Belgian forces (Gibbs, 2000; O’Brien, 1962; Dorn & Bell, 1995). At the same time as they awaited the dispatch of the UN forces, the government of Congo (under Lumumba) requested Ghana to provide military assistance (Kanza, 1994), a decision which could be attributed to the relationship the Ghanaian government built with their contemporaries in the Congo during the Accra Conference (Mohan, 1969). The diplomatic involvement of the Ghanaian government will be discussed further in the subsequent section. As will become apparent, the intervention by the United Nations forces and Ghana in the Congo crisis became enmeshed in this struggle between independence, political representation, and nationalism.

Intervention

United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) and Ghana’s involvement (July 1960–June 1964)

In mid-July 1960, the first batch of United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) forces were deployed to the Congo with the mandate to maintain law and order, and facilitate the retreat of the Belgian troops from the country (Abi-Saab, 1978; Dayal, 1976; James, 1996). It should be noted here that as specified by the Secretary-General’s principles guiding the composition of UN forces in Congo, troops from African states were to form the core of ONUC
(UN, 1996). In that regard, African countries such as Ghana, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Morocco and Mali jointly offered to assist the UN forces in the Congo operation (Gibbs, 2000).

The ONUC mandate began initially with an advance contingent of forces from Tunisia deployed to Leopoldville, Stanleyville and other provinces of Congo, followed subsequently by troops from Ghana, Mali, Ethiopia, Guinea, Morocco, Ireland, India and Sweden (UN, 1996). The peacekeeping mission was later joined by Indonesia, Libya and Egypt (or United Arab Republic) (Abi-Saab, 1978). These forces were to be led by Ralph Bunche, designated as Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Swedish General, Carl von Horn, as Commander of ONUC (Gibbs, 2000; Lyman, 2004). However, during its period in the Congo, increasing breakdown of law and order saw ONUC’s mandate modified to also include safeguarding the territorial integrity and independence of Congo, preventing the recurrence of conflict and securing the withdrawal of Belgian or any external troops from the country (Bellamy, Williams & Griffin, 2010; James, 1994; Cleaver & May, 1995).

During the first week of the Congo turmoil, Ghana’s (British-national) Major General Alexander acted as the Commander of the UN forces before the arrival of Carl von Horn in Congo (Schmidl, 1997; Findlay, 2002). He initially ordered the ONUC forces to disarm the Congolese forces in Leopoldville, which Lumumba’s government opposed, raising concerns that Alexander’s actions were pro-Belgian (Thompson, 1969b; Schmidl, 1997). It is worth noting that when Alexander arrived in Leopoldville, he persuaded Ralph Bunche (Hammarskjold’s representative) that ONUC disarming the Congolese troops would prevent the Belgian troops from doing so and help avert further worsening of the situation in Congo (Thompson, 1969b). However, after Lumumba’s refusal to allow further disarmament, Bunche revoked Alexander’s command (Kanza, 1994). This led to a rift between Alexander and Bunche with the former describing the latter as professionally inefficient and incompetent (Abi-Saab, 1978; Dayal, 1976). Yet, in spite of Alexander throwing ONUC into confusion, he remained at the post as Nkrumah’s Chief of Defence staff50 (Botwe-Asamoah, 2005) and as Thompson (1969b) argues, Nkrumah’s failure to recognise at this early stage the serious repercussions of a British officer (Alexander’s)51 attempt to lead an operation in an African state where the government had no confidence in him contributed to his (Nkrumah’s) eventual failure in the Congo intervention.

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50 In Nkrumah’s book Challenge of the Congo (1967, p. 39n), Nkrumah mentions that he finally fired Alexander in 1961 for the difficulties he created in the Congo, although it was already too late.

51 According to Nimako (2010), General Alexander acknowledged that he ‘often found it difficult to act on Nkrumah’s orders without feeling that [he] might be hurting British interests’ (p. 66).
Particularly for the African contributing states like Ghana, the Congo operation was a platform for a newly independent country and its allied forces with other African states to commit troops to a fellow country, with Ghana initially assisting ONUC with 8800 troops out of the 19,929 contingents (Aning & Edu-Afful, 2017). According to Nwaubani (2001), Ghana contributed the ‘largest single national contingent’ to ONUC’s initial deployment. Initially, the Ghanaian troops in ONUC were mainly in charge of maintaining law and order in Leopoldville, especially the house of Patrice Lumumba, while the Tunisian and other African troops were responsible for the Kasai province (Kotia, 2015; Schmidl, 1997).

Ghana’s support also came through non-military contingents including medical doctors, engineers and civil servants (Thompson, 1969b). These civilian personnel were to fulfil other tasks as instructed by the UN, such as assisting the Congolese government in humanitarian, administrative, and technical duties (Aning & Edu-Afful, 2017; UN, 1996). Arguably, what made Ghana’s contribution to ONUC noteworthy and very significant juxtaposed with other states, was that Nkrumah wanted to use the Congo crisis to champion his vision of Pan-Africanism, African independence and unity, and as such advocating for continental intervention would prevent foreign elements which might hinder his objective (Thompson, 1969b; Botwe-Asamoah, 2005). Thus, ‘[a]s the leader of the first [Sub-Saharan] African colony to achieve independence’, Nkrumah was keen to use the Congo intervention as an opportunity to lead a Pan-African crusade for African unity (Akinsanya, 1976, p. 514).

On 17 July 1960, in the midst of ONUC deployment of troops to regions of Congo, Prime Minister Lumumba and President Kasavubu issued a joint statement demanding an immediate withdrawal of the Belgian troops from Katanga, threatening that should the UN fail to act in enforcing their withdrawal within two days, the Congolese government would seek assistance from the Soviet Union (Abi-Saab, 1978; McNemar, 1967). This suddenly propelled the Congo in a state of rapid insecurity, and the ONUC intervention into a pivotal Cold War face-off between the US and USSR (Lyman, 2004). As mentioned earlier, the Katanga province of Congo was of both political and economic interest to Belgium and its Western allies because of its mineral wealth. Therefore, Lumumba and Kasavubu’s attempt to approach the Soviet Union (Russia) for support became a great concern to the Belgians and the Western powers, particularly the US and UK, as they feared the likelihood of possession and influence by the Soviet Union in Congo (Mazov, 2007; Rooney, 2007).

Meanwhile, the administration of Moïse Tshombe in the Katanga province, as well as the Belgian forces in Congo, sought the support of the United States who wanted to stop the influence of the Soviet Union in the Congo crisis (Kaplan, 1967). In July 1960, the Belgian
forces had remained in Katanga, with Belgium and its Western allies continuing to contribute financial and technical aid to the mineral-rich province (Gondola, 2002). On 3 August 1960, Tshombe made it clear that he would prevent the deployment of any UN troops to the Katanga province (Abi-Saab, 1978). Yet, Lumumba kept seeking assistance and diplomatic support from newly independent African states to call for the speedy withdrawal of the Belgian troops and prevention of the secession of Katanga (Abi-Saab, 1978).

On 9 August 1960, UN Security Council Resolution 146 authorised the Secretary-General to demand an immediate withdrawal of Belgium forces from Katanga (UN, 1996). Tshombe relented and gave permission to ONUC to enter Katanga. However, this had conditions that suited the Western bloc: the UN forces to Katanga must exclude troops from the Communist countries (such as the Soviet Union), and the UN must not get involved in Katanga’s internal political and administrative matters (O’Brien, 1962). By 12 August 1960, after negotiations between Hammarskjold and Tshombe, the ONUC troops were deployed to Katanga to ensure the withdrawal of the Belgian forces and, as a result, military bases in the province and all parts of Congo were under UN force command (Abi-Saab, 1978; Doss, 2014). But the ONUC deployment did not completely remove all of the Belgian troops, as regular Belgian officers remained to protect the Katanga province (Gondola, 2002; Doss, 2014).

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Lumumba, concerned by the inability of ONUC to implement the full mandate, decided to formalise assistance from the Soviet Union (O’Brien, 1962; Legum, 1976). Consequently, in late August 1960, with military and technical support from Russia, Lumumba attacked the Katanga and Kasai regions of Congo (Klinger, 2005). To this end, on 5 September 1960, President Kasavubu — with the backing of US ambassador Timberlake and Hammarskjold’s executive assistant Andrew Cordier — announced on radio Brazzaville that Lumumba had been sacked (Abi-Saab, 1978; Kanza, 1968). On 6 September 1960, the UN officials commanded the Ghanaian troops to refuse Lumumba access to radio Leopoldville in response to Kasavubu’s announcement (O’Brien, 1962; Gijs, 2016). According to Gibbs (1995), the United States still supported Belgium’s possession of Katanga and, therefore, cooperated with Belgium to remove Lumumba, due to their concerns about his growing relationship with the Soviet Union. However, on 13 September 1960 the Congolese Parliament voted on the matter of Lumumba’s dismissal and gave complete executive powers to Lumumba (O’Brien, 1962). On 14 September 1960, a senior officer in the Congolese army, Colonel Joseph Mobutu Sese Seko, captured power through a coup and dissolved Parliament (Rooney, 2007). Mobutu, identified as an ally of the United States and Belgium, reinstated Kasavubu as the President after ousting Lumumba (Weissman, 2014; Kabwit, 1979).
On 15 September 1960, the UN troops protected Lumumba from an attempted arrest by Mobutu and his forces (Klinger, 2005). The UN troops reinforced security around the compound of the overthrown Prime Minister, who was then being held in Leopoldville (Klinger, 2005), where he stayed until 28 November 1960 (Gondola, 2002). Lumumba left Leopoldville, still under the ONUC protection, for Stanleyville so as to meet his party supporters (Dayal, 1976). On the way, he was arrested by Mobutu and his forces and imprisoned at Thysville (near Leopoldville), then transferred to Elizabethville (in Katanga) and later executed, which was made public on 13 February 1961 (Sternat, 1978; Mazrui, 1968; O’Brien, 1962).

During the political crisis in Congo, the UN reinstated the Congolese Parliament as a step towards the establishment of legitimate regime (Dayal, 1976; Klinger, 2005). After the coup and then Lumumba’s death, some states — especially African states including Egypt (United Arab Republic), Mali, Libya, Morocco, Algeria and Guinea — threatened to withdraw their troops from ONUC because of the UN failure to prevent the Prime Minister’s assassination (Klinger, 2005).52 It was Ghana’s President who persuaded these African states not to remove their forces from the Congo (Dayal, 1976; Akinsanya, 1976). A situation, explained by Thompson (1969b), as Nkrumah’s attempt to maintain his position of influence and significance in the Congo affairs and the UN mission, which he considered possible by keeping Ghanaian troops in ONUC. The significance of this decision will be discussed in the subsequent section.

On 21 February 1961, the Security Council passed Resolution 161 mandating the ONUC troops to use force ‘as a last resort’ to stop civil war and ensure the removal of all Belgian and other foreign forces, military aid and advisers who were not under the aegis of the UN in the Congo (Gondola, 2002; Abi-Saab, 1978).

Subsequently, the UN monitored the creation of a new Congolese government of national unity on 2 August 1961, which retained Kasavubu as President and former senator and member of Lumumba’s party, Cyrille Adoula, as the Prime Minister (UN, 1996). By 24 August 1961, the Congolese government enacted a law in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 161 to speed up the removal of foreign military forces from Congo, especially in Katanga (Klinger, 2005). Between late August and 21 December 1961, the UN intensified its presence in Katanga and negotiated with Tshombe to sign a peace agreement by which he was

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52 See more in Chapter Six.
to acknowledge the central government’s authority in the entire Congo, including Katanga, and end the withdrawal of the mineral-rich province (UN, 1996).

After negotiations for lasting peace with Tshombe had failed, in August 1962, Hammarskjold’s successor, U Thant, reopened talks with the leaders by proposing programmes for national reconciliation, which would ensure equal shares of the country’s revenue between the central government and Tshombe’s Katanga province (UN, 1996). Following the programme of national reconciliation, UN experts drafted a constitution for Congo and the central government and announced amnesty for Tshombe in November 1962 (UN, 1996). However, Tshombe did not accept the plan for reconciliation and the surrender of the Katanga province, leading to the UN Secretary-General’s request that the central government should stop Katanga’s exportation of copper and cobalt (UN, 1996). In response, Tshombe challenged the UN position and in December 1962 he launched an attack on UN troops in Katanga (Klinger, 2005). As a result, in January 1963, the UN forces took control of Katanga and arrested Tshombe, restoring peace in the region (Abi-Saab, 1978; Klinger, 2005). In the ensuing period after the end of Katanga’s secession, ONUC remained in the Congo to prevent the outbreak of civil war and maintain law and order until the forces were finally withdrawn on 30 June 1964 (Bellamy et al., 2010).

The Ghanaian leader and his government during the Congo crisis (specifically between 1960 and 1961) appreciated the Congo intervention as significant because how it was resolved would threaten Ghana’s quest for continental unity. The death of Lumumba (who had initially strengthened Nkrumah’s position of influence) coupled with other practical challenges had serious impact on Nkrumah’s influence in the Congo crisis, and diminished regional support for his Pan-African ideal. Nkrumah’s (Ghana) diplomatic involvement in the Congo mission is described next.

**Nkrumah’s diplomatic involvement and its controversies (1960–1961)**

The revival of colonialism in the Congo is sufficient evidence and warning of the treacherous character of imperialism and its menace even to independent states … Together with [all African states], we are carrying on the struggle for the

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53 He died in a plane crash in September 1961, on his way to meet Tshombe for a ceasefire (UN, 1996).

54 Following the end of UN operations in 1964, political instability resurfaced when Mobutu staged another coup against the Congo government in 1965. This marked the genesis of his 30 years’ dictatorship regime in Congo. There were concerns that Mobutu was supported by the United States and its allies (Bellamy et al. 2010).
[independence] and unity of Africa and shall continue until every inch of African soil had been liberated …

During the Congolese crisis, Nkrumah’s government argued that Ghana’s participation in the mission was important because Congo represented the destiny of all African countries wanting to gain independence, political freedom, and strengthen African unity on the continent (Biney, 2011). Nkrumah maintained that if the continent relegated the emancipation of Congo to the background, the independence of all Africans and the Pan-African goal of united Africa would be jeopardised (Mohan, 1969). He further stated that ‘[i]f we allow the independence of the Congo to be compromised in any way by the imperialist … forces, we shall expose the sovereignty and independence of all Africa to grave risk … It is incumbent on us to take our stand by our brothers in the Congo’ (Nkrumah, 1967b, p. 29). A Ghanaian government official describing the country’s intervention in Congo stated that:

… Nkrumah saw what was happening in the Congo as a general continental issue. We also saw it as an opportunity to promote unity in Africa. That was why even before resources could be allocated for the operation, Ghana was the first country to send troops to intervene in the Congo crisis. Thus, even if the United Nations had not intervened, Ghana would have sent troops because of our belief in Pan-Africanism.

(Government Official 1, 2016)

By and large, the Congo intervention was a crucial moment for Nkrumah’s Pan-African enterprise and as another government official reaffirmed, during the crisis Ghana was prepared to ‘support financially or materially as well as contribute troops or soldiers to support’ (Government Official 2, 2016).

It is worth mentioning that in the context of the Congo intervention, this was Ghana’s first ever intervention as an independent state. Nkrumah soon realised that attempts to influence the crisis could not rival the forces of the Cold War’s Eastern and Western blocs (United States and Russia). Moreover, Ghana did not have the financial capacity or resources to influence the trajectory of the Congo crisis (Thompson, 1969b). Because of Ghana’s small state status and influence, it is important to consider what ambition led to Nkrumah’s decision to be politically and militarily engaged in the Congo crisis. As will be seen, the Congo mission was underpinned

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55 Selected speeches of Kwame Nkrumah, compiled by Obeng, 1961, p. 78.

56 I am quoting from the text. I am not endorsing the gender language. It is important to note that this language of relationships was deliberately used to invoke a sense of closeness — and that is why I have kept the language. It illustrates that Pan-Africanism was a project aimed at diminishing distance in the African continent.
by Nkrumah’s Pan-African motivation and how he aligned peacekeeping intervention with the large project of African political independence and unity.

After the outbreak of the Congo crisis and upon the request of the Congolese government for Ghana’s assistance (Kanza, 1994), Nkrumah on 11 July 1960, sent an advanced party including Lieutenant Colonel Otu, Ambassador A. Y. K Djin and Major General Alexander (Nkrumah’s Chief of Defence staff, who was of British descent) to the Congolese capital Leopoldville to assess the political situation (Thompson, 1969b; Abi-Saab, 1978). By 13 July 1960, Nkrumah’s government had pledged its military and technical support to the Congo intervention, and promised medical personnel, engineers and civil servants to Congo (Nwaubani, 2001; Dayal, 1976). In an official statement to Lumumba, Nkrumah stated that ‘I am willing and anxious to help you in any way I can, even to the extent of sending you a battalion of my own army as part of the United Nations Organisation…’ (Nkrumah, 1967b, p. 20). Additionally, on 19 July 1960 upon the request of the UN Secretary-General for another batch of troops, Ghanaian commercial airlines suspended flights in order to transport ONUC troops to Congo (Thompson, 1969b).

Furthermore, in July 1960, Nkrumah set up an ad hoc group within his own administration, called the Congo Coordinating Committee, which was to deal specifically with government operations in the Congo crisis (Thompson, 1969b). This group comprised Richard Quarshie (senior official in the Foreign Ministry) as the Secretary, and Kweku Boateng (then Minister of Information) as the Chairman (Thompson, 1969b). The committee organised technical assistance for the Congo operation, as well as facilitated official communications regarding Ghana’s involvement in the crisis (Thompson, 1969b; Gerits, 2015).

In the following weeks, Nkrumah became very active and passionate about the Congo intervention as Ghana was the main supplier of soldiers to Congo (Kotia, 2015; Bloomfield, 1963). Moreover, Lumumba who had already established acquaintance with Nkrumah at the Accra Conference57, on 8 August 1960 revisited Accra (upon his return from New York) to discuss the Congo situation with the Ghanaian leader.58 In Accra (on the same day), Nkrumah had a discussion with Ghana’s National Assembly on the Congo crisis and argued that his independent country’s position must be to ensure that the Congo operation was Africanised, reiterating that African states had the responsibility to assist in resolving the Congo crisis under the auspices of the United Nations and it should be devoid of any foreign intervention

57 See Chapter Three.
58 Nkrumah’s comment on the Congo situation. Obtained from the Public Records and Archives Administration Department of Ghana (GH/PRAAD/RG/17/1/443).
Again, the government of Ghana restated its full support to the government of Congo in the form of military assistance (Nkrumah, 1967b). Nkrumah cautioned that the attempted withdrawal of the Katanga province from Congo could derail the goal of unity and lead to the division of Africa — again reiterating his concept of Africa as one in the independence struggle (Rooney, 2007). Nkrumah was clear in this speech on the importance of solidarity and independence, but he was also articulating a vision of a united Africa, a Pan-African struggle that must be fought against external political influence. In the words of a Ghanaian policy think tank:

Nkrumah felt that things were getting out of hands. He also felt strongly that the Western powers were not ready to support Ghana’s intentions of going to the Congo.

(Think tank 3, 2016)

At the same time, Nkrumah and Lumumba signed the Ghana-Congo Agreement (a proposed regional platform of cooperation for the two states), which was to lay the foundation for a future African continental unity bloc (Iandolo, 2014). By this, Nkrumah and Lumumba underlined their commitment to work together with the independent African states for the formation of United African States (Nkrumah, 1967b). The agreement highlighted that

in conjunction with other independent African States, that in the event of the UN failing to affect a total and unconditional withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo as a whole, [Ghana and Congo] will establish a Combined High Command of military forces to bring about a speedy withdrawal of these foreign troops from the Congo.

(cited in Biney, 2011, p. 142)

While Thompson (1969b) argues that the Ghana-Congo union could never have materialised, owing to the pressure from foreign elements in the Congo intervention, I contend that the Union was more than a political statement. It signified Nkrumah’s commitment to whoever was the legitimate political representation of Congo and his ambition to support those who supported his Pan-African vision.

Between 25 and 30 August 1960, Ghanaian delegates and their colleagues from other African states gathered in Leopoldville for discussion on the Congo crisis, a meeting that was the result of Lumumba’s request for African assistance after the failed UN mission (Kotani, 1964; Mohan, 1969). However, in contradiction to Nkrumah’s promises above, the Ghanaian delegation together with the other states insisted that they would only support through the UN forces (Mohan, 1969). Notably, prior to the meeting (which was at the ministerial level),
Nkrumah had written to Djin to ‘impress tactfully upon Lumumba and Kasavubu the importance and absolute necessity for them to co-operate with the United Nations in securing our objective in the Congo …’ (Nkrumah, 1967b, p. 32) and ‘… that African solidarity … is not sufficient unless it is backed by the United Nations’ (cited in Thompson, 1969b, p. 137). Different interpretations of this exist. One is that Nkrumah had by then realised that Ghana, given its small state status, did not have the military capacity or resources and could only play their part in attaining the Pan-African objective through the UN (Thompson, 1969b).

For example, when the UN command ordered the Ghanaian troops to prevent Lumumba from using radio Leopoldville on 6 September 1960 (see above), it created a rupture in relations between Lumumba and Nkrumah (Rooney, 2007). Lumumba made several efforts to gain control of the broadcasting station and the UN forces, mostly Ghanaian troops, denied him entry (Thompson, 1969b). Lumumba accused the Ghanaian government of betrayal and expressed his disappointment at the hostility by the Ghanaian troops (Nkrumah, 1967b). In response, Nkrumah apologised to Lumumba and sent a letter to Hammarskjold underlining the attempt by the UN command to use Ghanaian troops against Lumumba and the legitimate regime of Congo (Nkrumah, 1967b). However, as Abi-Saab (1978) observes, the use of the radio station in Leopoldville by Lumumba posed the risk of extending the war to other parts of the country, which was the reason behind the UN decision. As such, the letter could be interpreted as a face-saving measure for Nkrumah, given his earlier stated reasons for being in ONUC — to support Lumumba. There is little evidence that Nkrumah actively sought to work against the continuation of the UN mission and certainly little suggestion that he was willing to fight for Congo’s independence alone. This backlash, which undermined Nkrumah’s understanding of the deployment at the time, could also be attributed to his dual commitment to work through Lumumba and the UN in attaining his Pan-African objective in the Congo mission (Thompson, 1969b).

Nkrumah had diplomatic difficulties in the Congo mission particularly pertaining to an emerging rift between his diplomat and Chief of Defence staff, Ghanaian Ambassador in Leopoldville Djin and General Alexander, which frustrated his influence and policy in the Congo intervention (Biney, 2011). The rift was the result of Djin’s failure to recognise the limits of his jurisdiction and that the Ghanaian troops were not to take orders from him, since they were under the control of the ONUC (Dayal, 1976). Notably, Nkrumah had initially briefed Djin to assist Lumumba so that he (Nkrumah) could maintain his influence on the Prime Minister, which would facilitate his Pan-African objective (Thompson, 1969b). Rather, Djin interfered with the duties of the Ghanaian troops who were part of the UN command and
Alexander, in turn, threatened Djin (Dayal, 1976). For instance, Djin constantly persuaded Colonel Otu and Colonel Ankrah to perform duties without orders from General Alexander and the UN officials (Dayal, 1976). Again, when Lumumba planned to seek assistance from the Russians, Nkrumah told Djin to discourage him owing to the serious implication on his policy of Africanising the intervention (Thompson, 1969b). Yet, Djin refused to comply with Nkrumah’s order because of concerns that Alexander was acting for the Belgians and their Western allies (Thompson, 1969b). In effect, Nkrumah’s appointees flouted his programme of an African intervention within the context of the UN without foreign elements (Biney, 2011). There was also the challenge of language barrier. Djin, for example, could not speak French, making interaction between him and Lumumba and the Congolese officials rather challenging (Thompson, 1969b). It also made the execution of his diplomatic tasks difficult since French was/is the main official language of the Congolese (Thompson, 1969b).

Ghana (Nkrumah’s) intervention in the Congo crisis was diminished by interference from powerful external forces, especially the United States and the Soviet Union (Russia), as each party attempted to protect its personal interest in the Congo (Rooney, 2007). For example, in September 1960, Nkrumah together with his fellow presidents from Guinea, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt worked to reconcile Lumumba and Kasavubu to restore what they saw as the legitimate political administration in Congo (Nwaubani, 2001). In the same month, the United States frustrated this effort of mediation by Nkrumah and the other African leaders with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) boss Dulles stating that they (United States) would eliminate Lumumba from any political position in Leopoldville or any other part of Congo (Nwaubani, 2001).

As already mentioned, the United States considered Lumumba as pro-Russia owing to concerns that he had contacted them (Russians) for support in the Congo situation, which may lead to penetration and probable takeover of Congo by the communist bloc, and, therefore, attempted to remove him from power. Within the UN, key actors such as Clare Timberlake, US Ambassador to Congo; Ralph Bunche, special representative of the Secretary-General; and Andrew Cordier, Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General — who were all Americans — saw the function of ONUC as keeping Russian influence out of the Congo crisis (O’Brien, 1962; Gibbs, 2000), which was supported by the UN Security Council Resolutions. Against this background, in order to keep the Congo intervention out of the Cold War forces, Nkrumah on 23 September 1960 at the UN General Assembly appealed to the Secretary-General to
Africanise⁵⁹ the Congo intervention by allowing mainly the independent African states to resolve the impasse under the auspices of the UN (Dayal, 1976). Nkrumah argued that ‘… the problem in the Congo is an acute African problem which can be solved by Africans only … Let these African states act under the canopy of the United Nations and produce effective results’ (Nkrumah, 1961, pp. 267–268).

Crucially, Nkrumah saw his inability to influence the Congo crisis as threatening the Pan-African normative advancement — an African intervention organised by a continental union was exactly what was needed in his mind to restore the Pan African ideal (Mohan, 1969; Rooney, 2007). Nkrumah knew that foreign interference could derail his normative ambition with respect to continental unification, hence his interest in sidestepping the intrusion of any Western country in the affairs of the Congo (Biney, 2011). It was, therefore, on the back of preventing any external involvement, which would derail his normative agenda, that Nkrumah and Lumumba requested for African involvement during the Accra meeting in 1960.

A second interpretation is that although Nkrumah chalked up some successes such as convincing other African state contributors to remain in ONUC (see above), he had very little control of the situation. By this point, particularly after Lumumba’s death, Nkrumah’s objective was to remain on good terms with the other African states that had contributed to the mission, so he did not experience loss of face at home. A withdrawal by the African states would undermine Nkrumah’s programme of Africanising⁶⁰ ONUC and his larger political ambition of a regional African bloc (Mohan, 1969; Nkrumah, 1967b). If the African contributors dropped out of the ONUC mission, it would have paved the way for foreign troops to intervene — a failure of his Pan-African vision of continental independence and unity (Mohan, 1969). Nkrumah, therefore, cautioned the other states not to withdraw on the condition they continued to operate within the UN even though ‘[they] may be faced with a situation in which [they] will find some of the African troops still serving under the United Nations in the Congo and most probably collaborating with the imperialists in the Congo’ (Nkrumah, 1967b, p. 110).

As noted above, for Nkrumah, the involvement of Ghanaian soldiers in the ONUC strengthened his influence in the UN mission, and therefore pulling out his troops from ONUC would derail the promotion of his Pan-African vision (Biney, 2011). But clearly, at this point, Nkrumah had no regional alliance of support for the realisation of his Pan-African policy,

⁵⁹ The intervention should be handled by only Africans without non-African elements.
⁶⁰ Ensuring that ONUC was dominated mainly by African troops, which would eventually eliminate foreign elements from the Congo enterprise.
particularly as he stood alone during the decision to withdraw troops from ONUC. Nkrumah’s position laid the foundation for contestation amongst the African leaders, hence deepening the disunity between African states and impeding the Pan-African purpose in the lead-up to the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU, see Chapter Six). Again, it could be observed that states such as Ghana, Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Mali, Morocco, and Guinea, were in support of Lumumba against President Kasavubu (Thompson, 1969b). As a result, following the death of Lumumba, division emerged between the Nkrumah-led group, who refused to recognise Kasavubu as President, and states such as Tunisia, Liberia and the erstwhile French colonial African states that fully supported Kasavubu’s administration in Congo (Collins, 1992; Thompson, 1969b; Rivkin, 1965). This rift remained during the formative period of the OAU, and will be discussed in the next chapter.

Nkrumah’s Pan-African intervention in the Congo was increasingly exposing the little control he had within his own state. General Alexander (of British descent) did not share Nkrumah’s partisan support for Lumumba (Rooney, 2007; Schmidl, 1997; Welch, 1972). Biney (2011) observes that Alexander’s initial actions, especially as commander in the UN operations (disarming the Congolese troops), were quite suspicious. Thus, it was revealed that ‘Alexander made himself particularly obnoxious to Congolese politicians and soldiers alike, soon after the Ghanaians first arrived, by his unilateral decision to disarm the soldiers of the Force Publique’, an action which the UN stopped at the request of Lumumba (Mohan, 1969, p. 388). It was later suspected (especially by the Lumumba government) that Alexander was working in the interest of Belgium (Rooney, 2007). In a letter sent by Ghana’s ambassador Djin to Nkrumah in September 1960, he (Djin) mentioned that Ghana’s reputation ‘had been run down to its lowest ebb by General Alexander’s intrigues’ (cited in Nkrumah, 1967b, p. 47). As Thompson (1969b) notes, Alexander’s primary role (as Nkrumah’s Chief of Defence staff) was to help maintain law and order in the Congo crisis, as well as help Nkrumah maintain influence in ONUC and the Congo affairs. However, it could be argued that Alexander’s actions frustrated Nkrumah’s goal (Botwe-Asamoah, 2005; Noer, 1984). For example, as mentioned above, Alexander’s initial disarming of the Congo troops created hostilities between him and Lumumba as well as amongst the leadership of ONUC, specifically as he challenged the capability of von Horn in disarming the Congolese troops (Botwe-Asamoah, 2005; Thompson, 1969b).

Meanwhile, back home in Ghana, there were concerns that Nkrumah was spending so much time and resources on the Congo affairs (Buah, 1998; Addo, 1967, also see Chapter Four). Significantly, the military, in addition to the opposition, were gaining momentum with
their argument that Nkrumah should concentrate on domestic affairs (Buah, 1998). Major Akwasi Afrifa, one of the senior Ghanaian officers who served in ONUC (and later coup leader, then head of state in 1969), opposed the ‘constant interference by Kwame Nkrumah and his aides in the internal problems of the Congo’ (Afrifa, 1966, cited in Welch, 1972, p. 209). Similarly, the opposition accused Nkrumah of sacrificing Ghana’s security by mobilising the armed forces for the Congo cause (Thompson, 1969b). Joe Appiah (of the opposition United Gold Coast Convention) thought Nkrumah should approach his African ambition slowly (cited in Thompson, 1969b, p. 144).

Finally, the Nkrumah government’s persistent support for Lumumba eventually led to the attempted expulsion of Ghana from ONUC by President Kasavubu (Vellut, 1965). After Lumumba’s overthrow, Mobutu reinstated Kasavubu as President, who began a personal task of identifying and blacklisting pro-Lumumba individuals (Dayal, 1976). Because of the increasing opposition from Kasavubu, Ghana’s two representatives, N. A. Welbeck and Djin, were officially recognised by Kasavubu as ‘persona non grata’ (unwanted person) in October 1960, and were accused of persistently involving themselves in Congolese domestic affairs (Dayal, 1976). But Nkrumah challenged Kasavubu’s decision against the Ghanaian officials as unconstitutional and stated that Congo needed the presence of the Ghanaian contingent in Leopoldville to prevent foreign intervention (Nkrumah, 1967b). However, the United Nations officials — upon the request of the UN Secretary-General, who was addressing a request by Kasavubu — reassigned the Ghanaian contingent from the capital Leopoldville to the remote Kasai region in November 1960 (Kotia, 2015).

Subsequently, Nkrumah’s influence in the Congo crisis continued to decline and his diplomatic relations came under further pressure. Kasavubu’s earlier declaration of his diplomats as unwanted led to an evacuation order, and the closure of the Ghanaian mission in early 1961, though Ghana still maintained its troops in ONUC until 1964 (Thompson, 1969b; Vellut, 1965; Kotia, 2015). During the March 1961 UN General Assembly, Nkrumah again proposed an all-African intervention in the Congo crisis and requested that foreign involvement should be halted, however it was ignored by the members of the UN General Assembly (Nkrumah, 1961).

In general, it can therefore be argued that Nkrumah was unsuccessful in the Congo intervention since the magnitude of the situation was beyond his control and that as a leader of a small newly independent state, he lacked the military and financial resources to solve a crisis that had gained international magnitude, hence limiting his quest to influence the turn of events in Congo. Besides, his representatives frustrated his policy in Congo because of rifts between
them. Nkrumah’s reluctance to withdraw Ghanaian troops from ONUC, following the decision by the other African states, deepened the disunity and made him unpopular amongst his contemporaries, which led to creation of factions on the continent. This presented significant risk to his quest to maintain a broader network for the pan-African normative drive — as this was an essential approach to his norm entrepreneurship. Similarly, the contentions associated with his involvement and relationships with participating African states threatened his efforts to capture the existing political window of opportunity. However, amidst the struggles, he maintained his vision (and the idea) of creating Pan-African continental unity.

Conclusion

This chapter traced the course of events during the 1960–1964 Congo mission, particularly Nkrumah’s Pan-African foreign policy engagement in the Congo political crisis. The Congo case was identified by Nkrumah as the crucial ‘test case’ to promote his vision of Pan-Africanism. He sought to promote, as he had successfully done during Ghana’s independence, a similar story of Congo needing to be rescued by Pan-African forces, so that Congo could claim its political and economic power of independence from foreign forces. However, his position was soon undermined due to personal controversies and inconsistencies in his own position on how the Pan-Africanism norm applied to the Congo case.

First, the Congo operation highlighted that Nkrumah was inconsistent in supporting the Pan-African norm when it threatened his own political career. Nkrumah had earlier pledged support for Lumumba even if the UN had not intervened, but when it was clear he did not have the support of major powers such as the US and UK, he reversed that decision and called for cooperation with the ONUC.

Second, Nkrumah had no domestic or regional network of support for the Pan-African vision or agenda. Domestically, there were concerns in the newly independent Ghana that he was overly focused on advancing his Pan-African project at the expense of internal matters. Regionally, Nkrumah’s decisions and positions continued to create disputes even amongst his college of African leaders. For example, the decision to remove African troops in ONUC, as well as supporting Lumumba, set the stage for divisions between post-independence African states. Nkrumah’s challenge was that he relied completely on Lumumba and, therefore, after the death of Lumumba his influence in the Congo crisis diminished, and his policy backfired.

Third, Nkrumah was also weak geopolitically, which was evident in the fact that he could not outmanoeuvre the forces of the Cold War, the US and USSR. Clearly, he was the
leader of a small state with limited financial resources and military strength to stop the Western powers. Hence, in practical terms, Nkrumah had very little influence and control, which he failed to appreciate.

In furtherance of the above, Nkrumah surrounded himself with British officers, such as General Alexander, whose opposition to Nkrumah’s Pan-African interventionist policy and interference in military affairs created rifts and distrust. Nkrumah (and Lumumba) viewed Alexander as only following his own agenda to protect the interest of the Belgians and their British allies. To some extent this was true. Although Nkrumah had a Pan-African vision of uniting the African states, his decision to install Alexander in the Congo undermined his own Pan-African policy position (Thompson, 1969b). It could also be argued that Nkrumah’s choice of a Briton as his Chief of Defence meant he could not entrust his security to his indigenous Ghanaian officers. This too undermined his influence as a Pan-African leader who normally would promote indigenous African officers to senior roles. Again, Nkrumah’s unwillingness to pull out Alexander from the Congo amidst concerns weakened his position of influence and authority. Likewise, the Ghanaian ambassador to Leopoldville Djin’s interference with ONUC was a challenge to Nkrumah’s diplomatic efforts in Congo. Djin showed naivety with respect to involving himself in ONUC. Therefore, this highlights that like Nkrumah, his men on the ground could not detach diplomatic duties from military engagements (ONUC).

Again, Nkrumah misunderstood issues regarding military deployment to a UN peacekeeping mission. Nkrumah confused the role of the UN mission with his own diplomatic ambition, which complicated the situation and actually diminished his authority. In effect, Nkrumah had practical challenges regarding how to implement his policy in the Congo crisis; he misunderstood and miscalculated the functions of ONUC. Nkrumah attached the credibility of the Pan-African mission to ONUC and here too, this strategy failed. The mission and the troop contributions to the mission had to, at least, appear impartial, but Nkrumah often attached his diplomatic overtures to the ONUC mission. He also, at times, sought to intervene to contradict the ONUC mandate.

Overall, Nkrumah’s intervention in the Congo crisis was not only an expression of geopolitical weakness or failed attempt to manipulate the Cold War actors, but an impassioned belief in the need to protect the Pan-African cause of liberation and unification of the continent. Amidst the struggles within the Congo mission, what remained constant was Nkrumah’s Pan-African vision of defending Africa’s political identity, independence and unity. However, here too, his position became compromised when, at the end, Nkrumah politically abandoned Lumumba and supported the forces mobilising against him. We can only make sense of the
inconsistencies and contradictory decisions and positions that Nkrumah adopted during the Congo crisis if we understand his personal ambition and motivation in promoting the norm of Pan-Africanism. When he saw Lumumba become a liability to his greater regional ambition of Pan-Africanism, Nkrumah abandoned him.

In sum, this chapter has re-examined the norm entrepreneurial trajectory of Nkrumah through the Congo mission. Clearly, Nkrumah articulated his plan for promoting his pan-African ideal in the Congo as an embodiment of the larger regional project. He attempted to maintain networks with the African states coupled with his organisational platform in order to eliminate foreign involvement. Nkrumah created a committee to particularly support his engagement in the Congo operation. As the chapter has shown, all these approaches were adopted by Nkrumah to promote his combined pan-African vision. However, we see that the Congo mission and its controversies underlined the fact that Nkrumah failed to properly seize and utilise the available regional political opportunities or moments. Having earlier led Ghana’s independence struggle successfully, Nkrumah could not use his experience and influence to effectively harness the political situation and environment in Africa at the time as a driving force to accomplish his vision. Indeed, as has been mentioned above, his contradictory positions and decisions jeopardised his normative endeavour.

It should be emphasised that while Nkrumah’s personal Congo intervention may not have succeeded, he did find supporters for his Pan-African vision. The Congo crisis and Lumumba’s assassination did awaken the desire for the newly independent African states to seek regional security in forming a continental union. As the Congo intervention was ongoing, Nkrumah continued to advance the cause of continental unification embodied by the creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The next chapter, Chapter Six, traces the reception of Pan-Africanism during the creation of the OAU. Again, we see Nkrumah’s attempt to use the OAU draft process to organise support for Pan-Africanism. Furthermore, we see, his ideas and ambition in contest with alternative approaches to the question of African unity and sovereign independence, and ultimately, we see Nkrumah’s declining influence.
Chapter Six

Kwame Nkrumah and the Creation of the Organisation of African Unity – An Embodiment of Pan-Africanism

When we [Ghana] gained independence in 1957, Dr Nkumah made a very significant statement, which has formed the cornerstone of Ghana’s foreign policy. He expressed his commitment to the principles of the liberation of Africa, Pan-Africanism and the fact that we were going to be supporting the drive for the liberation of the African continent. Hence, that meant that we had committed ourselves to the political emancipation of African states or Africans and the ending of colonial exploitation and that we were also going to work towards continental unity.

(Government Official 5, 2016)

Introduction

The preceding chapter described how Nkrumah’s Pan-African foreign policy shaped his intervention in the Congo crisis. His ambition to promote the Congo situation to the Pan-African Movement was threatened by his own weakened leadership, diminished authority and influence as the crisis gained momentum; his misunderstanding of the function of the ONUC; and the geopolitics of the Cold War.

Nonetheless, the Congo situation continued to be used by Nkrumah as an example of why Pan-Africanism was the answer to geopolitics and the continental struggle for unity. The formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was occurring at the same time as the Congo political crisis, and Nkrumah’s quest was that the new organisation be created as a platform to represent a Pan-African continent. However, Nkrumah again experienced significant challenges in promoting his vision of continental unity.

As this chapter will discuss, at the same time as his influence in the Congo affair was diminishing, Nkrumah was determined that the Congo situation should not diminish the importance of his Pan-African vision. Yet, Nkrumah’s credibility, authority and position of influence continued to weaken as he pushed for the attainment of his Pan-African vision on the continent. Significantly, his vision of Pan-Africanism came to be seen as a threat to the sovereignty of individual states. A decade earlier, Nkrumah’s vision of Pan-Africanism meant
independence and political autonomy from colonial rule; now his vision was seen as another form of colonialism with a centralised government that could pose a threat to the sovereignty and interests of respective states. Nkrumah’s contemporaries wanted a gradual approach to African unity based on sovereign non-interference in their domestic rule and their foreign policy decisions.

This chapter will examine Nkrumah’s attempt to promote his Pan-African vision of the OAU and its ultimate failure. The chapter mainly covers the period between 1961 and 1964. The first section will describe the continental cleavages (or divisions) in the lead up to the establishment of the continental organisation, the OAU. I present the discussions held amongst the two ‘rival’ groups at the Casablanca and Monrovia conferences and reveal that in fact, these conferences were in sync with each other. Nkrumah was the only individual creating this sense of ‘rivalry’ between the two blocs. Both groups supported an incremental adoption of Pan-Africanism with agreement to prioritise the coordination of economic and technical cooperation. By the time of the Lagos meeting in 1962 to discuss the formal cooperation amongst the African states, there was consensus that sovereignty and non-interference was more important to these newly independent states than unity. Most significantly, in light of the Congo crisis, Nkrumah was unable to present a model of Pan-Africanism that seemed more secure, and he increasingly lost the support of his own Casablanca ‘bloc’.

The second section explains the formation of the OAU as a regional cooperation bloc, but one that respected the sovereignty of its membership. The section follows the proceedings in the lead up to and at the Addis Ababa Conference, which eventually led to cooperation and agreement for the formation of the OAU. The OAU was not Nkrumah’s model of political union under a federal government. In the remainder of the chapter I chart the backlashes and struggles Nkrumah faced as he attempted to promote his idea of African unity before and during the Conference; and how he again lost because his refused to compromise the Pan-African ideal of a united Africa (with himself as President) and recognise that sovereign non-interference was more important to newly independent states in the midst of a Cold War.

By and large, this chapter will show how Nkrumah struggled to achieve his objective of continental unity due to his fickleness when it came to his dedication to pan-Africanism. Contrary to effective norm entrepreneurship, Nkrumah could not maximise the existing political opportunities. Clearly, as the preceding chapters have illustrated, he endeavoured to create networks and organisational platforms — though with difficulty. His actions detached the majority of independent African states from him. As this chapter presents, a key challenge to
the completion of his entrepreneurship at this stage, like the earlier Congo case, is the capturing of the regional environment to advance his normative change.


*Background*

The Congo intervention deepened the rifts between the newly independent African states. Significantly, as mentioned in the previous chapter, states such as Ghana, Egypt (then United Arab Republic), Mali, Guinea and Morocco, would become the Casablanca Group in the OAU negotiations. These countries had backed the Lumumba government and following the demise of Lumumba, refused to recognise Kasavubu as the leader of Congo (Thompson, 1969b; Mortimer, 1970). In contrast, Liberia, Tunisia and the French colonies in Africa supported the government of Kasavubu in the Congo (Armah, 2004). These states formed the Monrovia group in the OAU negotiations (White, 2003). These divides remained during the negotiations of the OAU Charter. Of course, both camps were in favour of African regionalism, but as discussed below, what separated them was the best institutional structure to attain unity in managing regional foreign policy cooperation and engagement with claims to sovereignty, non-interference and independence (Markakis, 1966).

The following section describes the emerging continental disunity prior to the creation of the OAU. I will explore how the two positions on the structure of the OAU emerged respectively as the main opposing camps at the Casablanca Conference and Monrovia Conference. I will then discuss what negotiations took place at the Lagos meeting, which led to the formal adoption of the OAU Charter in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 1963.

*The Casablanca Conference (January 1961)*

As the Congo crisis still continued, the pro-Lumumba states held the Casablanca Conference in January 1961 (Namikas, 2013; Meyers, 1966). The conference, hosted by Morocco, was attended by Ghana, United Arab Republic (Egypt), Guinea, Mali, Libya and Algeria (Pick, 1961; Namikas, 2013; Williams, 1961; Mazrui, 1975). Ghana, Morocco, United Arab Republic and Algeria were respectively represented by their heads of state (Armah, 2004).62 The

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61 The former French colonies were part of a community called the Brazzaville Group that had met in December 1960 in Brazzaville (Congo) and agreed to maintain their close relations with their former colonial rulers — France. They included countries like Ivory Coast, Senegal, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Cameroon, etc.

62 Libya’s foreign minister attended.
invitation was restricted to pro-Lumumba states (Roberts 1961; Akinsanya, 1976); and unsurprisingly, the two main issues discussed at the Conference were the Congo crisis and the question of whether to form a regional political union of African states (Legum, 1965).

Specifically, regarding the Congo crisis, the conversation was on the proposed withdrawal of the African troops in ONUC (Kloman, 1962; Kohn & Sokolsky, 1965). On the matter of withdrawal, Ghana stood alone on its position to stay against the desire to withdraw by the other six states (Namikas, 2013; Legum, 1965). President Gamal Abdel Nasser from Egypt, and Sekou Toure from Guinea, recommended that they should withdraw their troops from ONUC and put them directly under a pro-Lumumba government, but Nkrumah opposed this idea on the grounds that having African troops in the mission was vital against the control of the ONUC operation by Cold War forces (Bidwell, 2010). Nkrumah maintained that withdrawing the Ghanaian troops ‘would constitute a betrayal not only of the Congo but also of the African revolutionary cause’ (Nkrumah, 1967b, p. 105). He argued that African withdrawal would pave the way for foreign elements to intervene in the Congo (Nkrumah, 1967b). In the words of Legum (1965), ‘[by] all accounts [Nkrumah] took a tremendous hammering from many of the other delegations because of his attitude. But in the end his view prevailed’ (p. 51). However, Nkrumah’s position was a compromise on the protection of Lumumba’s independence government. This dispute illustrated that there were genuine disagreements amongst the delegates on how best to achieve independence and unity at the same time for the region (Legum, 1965; Ismael, 1968).

The formation of a regional organisation for newly independent African states was also discussed (Kohn & Sokolsky, 1965). These states became known as the Casablanca Group, and were also given the nomenclature ‘radicals’, because of their radical approach to the pursuit of decolonisation and African continental unity (Akinsanya, 1976). That is, the Casablanca group were considered to be more forceful or actively militant in their pursuit of, or position on, the Pan-African vision of African independence and unity, especially as they wanted an immediate continental unification (Endeley, 2009).

In furtherance of an institution that supported continental unification, the Casablanca Conference also considered the idea of a political union as a step to promote Pan-Africanism on the continent (Ismael, 1968). It should be noted here that the consideration of a political union appeared to be a compromise by the other states to protect the sense of unity of purpose shared by the participating states (Ismael, 1968). Nkrumah was particularly vocal in calling for
a political union\textsuperscript{63}, or integration, of African states (Ayittey, 2010; Gocking, 2005). Nkrumah’s political union would promote all African states uniting ‘under one federal government’ (Nkrumah, 1961, p. xii). However, the other members of the Casablanca group were less convinced by this central government model. Yet, they still sought a high degree of integration: a ‘common market, a common military high command, a cultural committee, and an economic-development bank’ (Gocking, 2005, p. 129). The tension even here was which integration should be promoted first. For instance, the Egyptian delegates were primarily concerned with economic cooperation; on the other hand, Nkrumah wanted the political union with economic integration to be folded into a larger federal structure (Ismael, 1968; Akinsanya, 1976).

In his speech at the closing session of the Casablanca Conference, Nkrumah again stated his radical political view, stressing that ‘Your Majesty [King of Morocco], Excellencies, let us unite, for in unity lies strength, and as I see it, African states must unite or … disintegrate individually. The future of Africa lies in political union, a political union in which the economic, military and cultural activities will be co-ordinated …’\textsuperscript{64} Nkrumah added that ‘Ghana has declared her stand in no uncertain terms. We have provided in our republican constitution for the surrender of our sovereignty, in whole or in part, in the wider interests of African unity’ (Nkrumah, 1963\textsuperscript{a}, p. 149). However, by the end of the Conference, Nkrumah remained alone in his support of a federal government structure (Francis, 2006). President Modibo Keita of Mali posited that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of individual African states should be respected (Francis, 2006). Sekou Toure, President of Guinea, argued that ‘[t]he unity so much desired by all Africans [would] not be achieved around any one man or any one nation … Not only must there be no interference in the internal affairs of any state by another, but each must help solve the other’s problems’ (Toure, 1962, p. 150).

At the end of the Conference, the attending states adopted the ‘Casablanca Charter’ or ‘African Charter of Casablanca’, which underlined the basic proposals or agreement reached by member states pertaining to the quest for African unity (Makinda & Okumu, 2008; Endeley, 2009; Pondi, 1989). In the Charter, the members agreed on cooperation in economic, social, and cultural domains but were silent on Nkrumah’s political union (Endeley, 2009). The Charter noted that ‘We, the Heads of African States, meeting in Casablanca from January 3rd to January 7th 1961, conscious of our responsibilities towards the African Continent, proclaim our determination to promote the triumph of liberty all over Africa and to achieve its unity …’

\textsuperscript{63} Nkrumah argued in his book \textit{Africa must unite} that the African political union would include uniting all African states under ‘a central unifying political authority’ (1963, p. 148).

\textsuperscript{64} Obtained from Ghana’s Public Records and Archives Administration Department (GH/PRAAD/RG 17/1/239).
The Charter proposed greater cooperation amongst all African states, as well as a concerted effort to harmonise their political, economic and social policies, so as to accelerate the ultimate amalgamation of the entire continent (Endeley, 2009; Dumor, 1991; Nkrumah, 1967b). To this end, the Charter affirmed the ‘[members’] will to intensify [their] efforts for the creation of an effective form of cooperation among African States in the economic, social and cultural domains’ (cited in Nkrumah, 1967b, p. 106). Crucially, the Charter affirmed member states’ support for African states that were under colonial rule by providing aid and any other humanitarian assistance to help eliminate activities of colonialism and neocolonialism, as well as prevent the presence of all foreign troops (or elements) from the continent (Endeley, 2009; Nkrumah, 1967b).

The Casablanca Charter also proposed — as a compromise to Nkrumah’s call for a political union — to create an African Consultative Assembly, which would include delegates from all African states (from independent states and representatives from colonies) (Thompson, 1969b; Nkrumah, 1967b; Rooney, 2007). The African Consultative Assembly was to hold meetings regularly to discuss the programme for African unity (Thompson, 1969b; Rooney, 2007). As part of measures in forming the Consultative Assembly, member states of the radical group created a Political Committee, Economic Committee, Cultural Committee and a Joint African High Command (Armah, 2004; Dumor, 1991). The various heads of state formed the political committee, which was to coordinate collective policies of its member states, while the Economic Committee encompassed the ministers of finance of member states (Armah, 2004; Nkrumah, 1961). The Economic Committee was to ensure economic cooperation and technical collaboration amongst African states (Nkrumah, 1967b). Education ministers represented the Cultural Committee to preserve and promote the cultural heritage of African states (Legum, 1965). The Joint African High Command (JAHC) encompassed the chiefs of defence from the member states to ensure joint defence in protecting the independence of African states (Dumor, 1991; Nkrumah, 1961).

The Casablanca Conference (or Charter) agreed that high level representatives from these Committees would meet every three months to work out shared agendas and the process towards the proposed organisation (Thompson, 1969b). However, it appears that the final wording in the Charter of the Casablanca Conference did not lay emphasis on Nkrumah’s suggestion for political union with one federal government, though the call for African unity was echoed. The Egyptian leader, Nasser, concluded that the Conference was ‘an historic event incarnating African unity and the common anti-imperialist struggle’ (cited in Bidwell, 2010, p. 110). On his part, Nkrumah observed that the Conference ‘laid the foundations for political
unity of the African continent’ (cited in Bidwell, 2010, p. 110), but even he could not claim it was the start of a Pan-African charter. Finally, in a joint communiqué, the Casablanca group reiterated their efforts ‘to help in eliminating all foreign, profiteering elements in the Congo: to prevent any further foreign intervention …’ (Nkrumah, 1967b, p. 108).

Significantly, several scholars have argued that the Casablanca Conference had little impact (Roberts, 1961; Legum, 1965; Kloman, 1962; Akinsanya, 1976). Nkrumah had funded many of these states to attend the conference; he had been an advocate for their independence, and yet even this could not buy him votes for the political union framework. In the words of Thompson (1969b) ‘Nkrumah failed to realize that small conferences and groups which he dominated could only in the end lose to the large ones’ (p. 201). Ultimately, Nkrumah’s concept of political union under one federal government backfired because even those at the meeting considered his approach an unacceptable surrender of their respective sovereignties, which having been hard won was now something they were reluctant to share (Thompson, 1969b). As Armah (2004) concludes ‘the emphasis by Nkrumah on the submergence of individual African sovereignties into a single union government of Africa, created suspicion as regards the motives of those who loudly advocated the ideals of unity and Pan-Africanism’ (p. 105).

Overall, the Casablanca Conference achieved two outcomes: the attending states agreed not to withdraw their troops from ONUC and they agreed to a structure of regional organisation. Yet, on the question of African unity, the Conference Charter did not agree to political union; rather, it echoed other African states’ support for cooperation in economic, social and cultural areas.

In effect, by 1961, Nkrumah’s Pan-African vision was only supported by himself. It would become only harder for his vision to gain support with the emergence of a second group — outside of his control and influence — on the continent: the Monrovia Group. The 1961 Monrovia Conference and its approach to the subject of African unity is discussed below.

**Monrovia Meeting (May 1961)**

In 1961, the creation of the Casablanca group deepened the disunity that already existed after disagreement following the events in Congo (Thompson, 1969a). In order to halt the rifts and bring states together to discuss the end of colonial networks of trade and the need for new modes of regional economic and technical cooperation, four African leaders — Leopold Sedar Senghor (of Senegal), William Tubman (of Liberia), Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (of Nigeria), and Sylvanus Olympio (of Togo) — called for a conference of independent African heads of state and government in the capital of Liberia, Monrovia in May 1961 (Pondi, 1989; Armah,
The four leaders claimed that they wanted to ensure their Conference had complete representation and they invited all the members of the Casablanca group. An invitation was extended to Guinea and Mali to be co-sponsors of the Conference (Thompson, 1969a). However, all seven countries declined the invitation (Thompson, 1969a). At the time, Toure (Guinean President) and Keita (Malian President) argued that their decline was due to the short notice of the meeting (Legum, 1965). But, as Thompson (1969a) points out, the decision by the organisers to elevate two smaller countries out of the seven Casablanca states, neither the most vocal of the group to date, indicated that the organisers of the Monrovian Conference were determined to set the agenda and, especially, they did not want Nkrumah’s contribution to the discussion (Thompson, 1969a).

According to Biney, it was Nkrumah’s uncompromising position against the Monrovia Group that fuelled the rivalry and created this idea of a competing vision of African unity (Biney, 2011). As the West Africa newspaper puts it ‘Dr Kwame Nkrumah believes effective co-operation [could] only follow some kind of political union. Sir Abubakar Balewa of Nigeria and President Tubman of Liberia both believe that the political union, if ever it comes, can only grow out of co-operation in many other ways’ (cited in Rooney, 2007, p. 291). Nkrumah was unwilling to compromise (Padelford, 1964). No doubt more frustrating for Nkrumah was that, from the numbers alone, it appears there was more support for the Monrovia Group than Casablanca. The seven states of the Casablanca group did not attend, but the Monrovia Conference was still attended by 20 independent African states: Liberia, Nigeria, Tunisia, Sierra Leone, Cameroun, Chad, Congo Republic (Brazzaville)65, Dahomey (present-day Benin), Ivory Coast (Cote d’Ivoire), Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Malagasy Republic (present-day Madagascar), Upper Volta (present-day Burkina Faso), Togo, Tunisia, the Central African Republic, Gabon, Ethiopia and Libya (Kloman, 1962). The delegates comprised 16 heads of state and four senior ministers (Howe, 1961). This event was the single largest meeting of African states since the wave of independence began after World War II (Endeley, 2009).

The main resolutions at the Monrovia Conference included a proposal for the 20 states to vote as a bloc during UN meetings (Howe, 1961). This political union in other multilateral venues was an important moment after the disunity following the Congo. The states all agreed

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65 There are two Congolese countries in Central Africa — Congo Brazzaville and Democratic Republic of the Congo (which was in the centre of the 1961 crisis).
that each state shall be considered as equal — one member one vote — irrespective of their population size or wealth, and as such, there would be no interference in the internal affairs of other states as well as respect for territorial integrity of all African states (Howe, 1961). This was a dramatic departure from the political union vision of Nkrumah. Monrovia advocated absolute sovereignty and the norm of sovereign non-interference (Kohn & Sokolsky, 1965).

The Chairman of the Conference, President Tubman of Liberia, maintained that ‘[t]he sense of oneness should be deeply rooted in the breast of every African’ (cited in Legum, 1965, p. 53); this should be reinforced by economic cooperation and respect for sovereignty (Adrain, 1962). Similarly, the Nigerian Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafewa argued that his country stood for ‘practical steps in economic, scientific and cultural co-operation’ (cited in Cervenka, 1977, p. 176). Regarding the Congo crisis, member states declared their support for the UN involvement in restoring law and order and highlighted their support and recognition of the Congolese central government under Kasavubu (Endeley, 2009; Legum, 1965). However, the condemnation of the murder of Patrice Lumumba was ultimately removed from the final resolution (Legum, 1965).

At Monrovia, in a similar fashion to the outcome of the Casablanca Conference, it was agreed that regional organisation would be primarily centred around economic cooperation, and it was decided that a commission of technical experts should be formed to facilitate a programme for economic integration (Howe, 1961). In this regard, a group of technical experts from member states were to meet in July 1961 and propose to the leaders of the Monrovia Group the establishment of Commissions for Economic Affairs, Health and Social Matters, and Transport and Telecommunications (Elias, 1965; Thompson, 1969a). However, unlike the Casablanca meeting, there was no discussion of a federal political union — no discussion of a Parliament or whether there should be a collective move to federalise matters such as defence, legislation, and foreign policy as envisioned by Nkrumah (Thompson, 1969b).

The Monrovia bloc supported Pan-African unity, but they defined it as a social norm rather than a proscribed norm that required institutions to give it effect. This group contended that it was more practical to strengthen regional cooperation through dialogue and meetings, rather than hurriedly uniting all African states under a centralised government (Pondi, 1989). The Monrovia group repeatedly maintained that economic cooperation must be the first approach towards African unity (Ismael, 1968).

What is most ironic is that under Nkrumah’s influence, the Casablanca group did not attend the Monrovia Conference, despite the fact that the outcomes from both conferences were actually quite similar. By this point, the rivalry for a Pan-African vision was only held by
Nkrumah. He had lost the fight on this point and yet, he remained unable to see it. Meanwhile, back in Ghana, the country’s absence at the Monrovia Conference raised domestic concerns about the judgement of Nkrumah. For instance, Joe Appiah, Ghana’s minority spokesperson on foreign affairs, noted that ‘[w]e have tried to blaze that torch on the continent of Africa that others might follow. But when all that has been done [and] we find ourselves now damned, the vilified, not by Europeans but by Africans, then it is time we sit up and take stock of ourselves …’ (cited in Thompson, 1969b, p. 200). In reply, Nkrumah’s deputy defence minister Puplampu argued that ‘other states do not have a long enough vision to see the dream which we cherish of the ultimate union of all African states. We do not seek to antagonise; we seek to make friends, but we seek to make friends in the cause of African unity’ (cited in Thompson, 1969b, p. 200).

Ultimately, Nkrumah’s campaign to promote his vision of Pan-Africanism was lost because it compromised sovereign states’ new-found independence and his own position was inconsistent. First, the Congo case — happening at the same time as these conferences — revealed that Nkrumah was not always consistent in his opposition to international interference. His position lacked consistency because, as Chapter Four and Chapter Five demonstrate, his own position was weakening within his state; his own military contradicted his orders, and he had to make significant concessions to both the USSR and the United States to prevent Ghana’s (further) economic decline. States were observing this inconsistency in Nkrumah’s actions and it was not attracting more support for his Pan-African position. Second, it was clear that each group approached sovereignty as sacrosanct. The Monrovia group underscored in their declaration the ‘principle of non-interference [and] respect for territorial integrity’ (cited in Legum, 1965, p. 56). Even the Casablanca group were clear on their position on African unity in reducing Nkrumah’s call for political union to something they would consider in the future, and consistently cited their sovereignty as non-negotiable (Legum, 1965; Francis, 2006). Nkrumah’s argument lost grounds not just in the Monrovia group, but amongst his Casablanca contemporaries.

On that score, in the lead up to the creation of the OAU, at the Lagos conference, most of the independent African states had declared (Monrovia group) or indicated (Casablanca group) their opposition to a Pan-African federal union and that the OAU was going to be a regional organisation of independent African states that would promote the respect for sovereignty as well as non-interference in the internal affairs of member states.
In furtherance of the step towards a continental union, a Conference of African States was held in Lagos, Nigeria in January 1962 (Rooney, 2007; Lewis, 1963; Holmes, 1962). This Conference, hosted by the Nigerian Prime Minister Tafewa Balewa (of the Monrovia bloc) was to help resolve the long-standing differences between the two blocs on the continent so as to reinforce cooperation amongst African states (Balewa, 1962; Ismael, 1968).

The Casablanca bloc was invited, however the states declined the invitation and decided to boycott the Lagos Conference following a meeting by their foreign ministers in Accra (Elias, 1965). In a joint communiqué, the Casablanca group argued that they were not informed about arrangements for the meeting, which had deprived them of effective preparations (Biney, 2011; Thompson, 1969b). Moreover, the group expressed their dissatisfaction regarding Balewa’s refusal to invite one of their members, the provisional government of Algeria, because it had not by then attained full independence (Biney, 2011). This resulted in deepening the disunity between the Casablanca and Monrovia groups (Biny, 2011), and significantly, it was another lost opportunity to promote the Pan-African norm and build networks around the norm (see Chapter One).

The Lagos Conference was attended by heads of state and foreign ministers including the same participating states at the previous Monrovia meeting, with the inclusion of Congo and Tanganyika66 (Kloman, 1962). The other states that participated in the Lagos Conference included Nigeria (the host), Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Dahomey (present-day Benin), Ethiopia, Gabon, Ivory Coast (present-day Cote d’Ivoire), Liberia, Libya, Malagasy Republic (present-day Madagascar), Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Tunisia, and Upper Volta (present-day Burkina Faso) (Armah, 2004).

In the meantime, delegates at the Conference discussed proposals for the reaffirmation of decisions made at the Monrovia Conference (Endeley, 2009). The main subject that dominated the Conference was discussion on cooperation amongst African states (Mushkat, 1970). In particular, at the Monrovia Conference they agreed to create a general secretariat to act as the main administrative body and proposed the establishment of a Council of Ministers to facilitate interstate cooperation in the economic, technical, social, and cultural domains (Thompson, 1969a; Elias, 1965). The Conference, in the main, approved a draft Charter for the

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66 Tanganyika merged with Zanzibar to form present-day Tanzania.
Inter-African and Malagasy States Organisation67 to eventually achieve economic cooperation (Endeley, 2009; Thompson, 1969a; Aluko, 1973; Emerson, 1962). The Charter also proposed the formation of an Assembly of Heads of State and Government as well as an organisation to coordinate economic policies of African states and resolve disputes (Armah, 2004). Furthermore, the Conference incorporated into the Charter the principles underlined at the previous conference in Monrovia, including respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, equality of all states on the continent and non-interference in the internal affairs of another African state (Mushkat, 1970). Like the Monrovia Conference, the member states at the Conference agreed on fostering cooperation premised on ‘non-acceptance of any leadership’ (Thompson, 1969a). In his address, the leader of the Nigerian delegation Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe observed that:

… there is one basic difference … It is the conspicuous absence of a specific declaration on the part of the Casablanca states of their inflexible belief in the fundamental principles enunciated at Monrovia regarding the inalienable rights of African states, as at present constituted, to legal equality … To self-determination … and to safety from interference in their internal affairs through subversive activities engineered by supposedly friendly states. (cited in Armah, 2004, pp. 102–103)

These basic principles espoused by the Monrovia group, as will be seen later, were encapsulated in the OAU Charter. Again, the Lagos Conference underlined the desire by the states to create a regional structure, and with his absence, there was not even any discussion of Nkrumah’s proposed Pan-African unity structure. The focus in Lagos was on how to achieve cooperation but also retain commitment towards the principles of respect for states’ sovereignties and non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states (Mushkat, 1970).

In spite of its success in bringing together 20 independent African states and providing key principles for cooperation in the lead up to the creation of the OAU, the Lagos Conference, from the onset, could not resolve the existing rift between the Monrovia and Casablanca blocs (Thompson, 1969a). This could be attributed to the boycott by the Casablanca states, as a result of the decision by the Monrovia Conference sponsor (President Balewa) to leave out Algeria. As already mentioned, Balewa did not invite the Provisional Government of Algeria because, at the time, the latter had not attained full independence (from the French) and, as such, could not be part of a Conference of only independent African states (Elias, 1965). The second reason

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67 It was a sub-regional organisation formed to promote cooperation between independent Francophone and non-Francophone states in Africa.
given by the Casablanca members at the time for their withdrawal was that they were not given prior notification about the Conference, which prevented them from making the needed preparations. This was acknowledged by Emperor Haile Selassie (of Ethiopia) in his concluding remarks at the Lagos Conference:

We must express our regret that representatives of the Algerian Provisional Government are not numbered in our midst, and that their absence has caused a number of other nations … to decline invitations extended to them … we cannot but feel that our tasks are made more difficult because several African nations are unrepresented in these halls. (cited in Thompson, 1969a, p. 175)

As a result, in order to end the rifts between the two main groups and strengthen African unity, Haile Selassie called for another Conference in his country, Ethiopia, which eventually led to the creation of the Organisation of African Unity (see below).

Significantly, the Lagos Conference stressed the need for cooperation between African states, but this cooperation was primarily economic-focused; the overriding condition for this cooperation was that there had to be respect for sovereignty of African states and non-interference in the internal affairs of another African state (Makinda & Okumu, 2008).

The following section details the formal creation of the Organisation of African Unity and Nkrumah’s final effort to use the organisation’s creation to embody a Pan-African ambition. I also highlight how Nkrumah’s influence continued to weaken amongst his contemporaries as he attempted to promote his vision of Pan-African continental unity, which was by that point contrary to the purpose and organisation of OAU. I then consider why Nkrumah continued to unsuccessfully pursue this path.

Formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)68: An Embodiment of Pan-Africanism on the African Continent

… I am convinced that the forces making for unity far outweigh those which divide us. In meeting fellow Africans from all parts of the continent I am constantly impressed by how much we have in common. It is not just our colonial past, or the fact that we have aims in common, it is something which goes far deeper. I can best describe it as a sense of one-ness in that we are Africans. In practical terms, this deep-rooted unity has shown itself in the development of Pan-Africanism … (Nkrumah, 1963a, p. 132)

68 Now African Union (AU).
Following the Lagos Conference, Kwame Nkrumah continued to advocate for inclusion of the Casablanca contribution to Pan-African unity by meeting with Sekou Toure (of Guinea) and Emperor Haile Selassie (leader of Ethiopia), who was hosting a conference of African leaders to be held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to finalise the organisation (Biney, 2011). In the words of Legum (1975), the idea of OAU was mainly inspired by Nkrumah, who was on bad terms with many of his contemporaries, but … his romantic idealism and dynamic ambitions provided the kind of challenge which compelled the entire continent’s attention … to the need for an organisation that would seek to harmonise relations between young states emerging from their colonial experience (p. 208).

It is worth considering this quote. Nkrumah opposed attendance, his own and that of his allied states, at conferences to discuss the OAU that did not promote his vision of a Charter that sought the (ultimate) political union of African states. By the time of the Addis Ababa Conference, he had lost this battle of ideas about what form of organisation the OAU should adopt. It was to be, primarily, an organisation unified around integrated economies amongst sovereign states. However, with Nkrumah’s support, the Casablanca Group expressed their interest and willingness to attend the Conference (Biney, 2011).

Nkrumah attended the conference with the intention of upholding the idea that ‘African Unity is, above all, a political kingdom which can only be gained by political means. The social and economic development of Africa will come only within the political kingdom, not the other way round’ (cited in Biney, 2011, p. 145). In a memorandum to his colleague African leaders regarding the proposed Conference in Addis Ababa, Nkrumah attempted to reconcile the two opposing groups on the view of African unity, stating that:

All these [meetings] … were clear manifestations of the desire to achieve African Unity, which is the goal to which all of us greatly aspire. Indeed, there is a general feeling throughout Africa today that development into separate political or economic groupings is unfortunate … For this reason, I am convinced that we the leaders and people of Africa have a duty, at this serious and crucial moment … to adopt concrete measures that can unite us all. (Nkrumah, 1973, p. 230)

Consequently, before the Addis Ababa Conference in 1963 (which would introduce the OAU), and after the Congo crisis, despite his own growing domestic political turmoil, Nkrumah sent out envoys to the capital cities of all African states to have discussions with the leaders regarding the subject of African unity under the OAU (Thompson, 1969a). Nkrumah published
and disseminated, on the day of the Addis Ababa Conference, a book titled *Africa Must Unite*, which he employed as a tool to promote his ideal version of Pan-Africanism (Thompson, 1969a; Biney, 2008). Unsurprisingly, as will be seen, these attempts proved futile since his idea of political union could not win the support of his African leaders. His attempt to engage had come too late, and his narrative of Pan-Africanism was no longer persuasive in light of the Congo failure, his own growing political crisis at home, and his pursuit of economic engagement with foreign governments including the United States and the USSR (Biney, 2011).

In the book (*Africa Must Unite*), Nkrumah maintained his Pan-African objective stressing that:

> [t]he fact that I speak English does not make me an Englishman. Similarly, the fact that some of us speak French or Portuguese does not make us Frenchmen or Portuguese. We are Africans first and last, and as Africans our best interest can only be served by uniting within an African Community. (Nkrumah, 1963a, p. 217)

Here, Nkrumah was consistent: since independence, he had maintained that African politics had to be organised around Pan-African identities to challenge colonial dominance over political structures in Africa (Biney, 2011; Ayittey, 2010). He further pointed out that ‘Our objective is African Union now. There is no time to waste. We must unite now or perish’ (Nkrumah, 1963b, para. 4). By this, at the time of the Conference, the delegates were conversant with his radical Pan-African viewpoint regarding continental unity (Thompson, 1969a; Martin, 2012; Newfarmer, 2017). And yet, his persistent advocacy did not change the turn of events at the Conference since delegates did not want his political union idea.

Eventually, on 25 May 1963, the African Conference (also known as the Addis Ababa Conference) hosted by Ethiopia’s Haile Selassie brought together 31 independent African states (including the Casablanca and Monrovia groups) to primarily discuss the subjects of African unity and decolonisation of the continent (Cervenka, 1977; African Union Handbook, 2015). These states were represented by their heads of state and government (Cervenka, 1977; Kamal, 1973; Smertin, 1987; Austin & Nagel, 1966).

In his opening address, Haile Selassie stated that ‘… What we require is a simple African Organization through which Africa’s single voice may be heard … We need an organization which will … promote the study and adoption of measures for common defence

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and programmes of co-operation in the economic and social field’ (cited in Cervenka, 1977, p. 5). In turn, Nigerian Prime Minister Balewa in his address opposed Nkrumah’s idea of political union, emphasising that ‘Nigeria’s stand is that, if we want unity in Africa, we must first agree to … respect one another. There must be acceptance of equality by all States …. They are all sovereign and their sovereignty is sovereignty’ (cited in Cervenka, 1977, p. 7).

Notably, Nkrumah’s allies in the Casablanca group did not support his idea of political union at the Conference; he again stood alone amongst the Casablanca bloc. The President of Mali, Keita maintained that ‘[t]he colonial system divided Africa, but it permitted nations to be born. Present frontiers must be respected and sovereignty of each state must be consecrated’ (cited in Francis, 2006, p. 20). According to President Nasser, ‘African Unity cannot be achieved overnight’ (cited in Francis, 2006, p. 18). On the issue of decolonisation, President Ben Bella of Algeria argued that ‘Let us all agree to die a little [sic] so that the peoples still under colonial domination may be free and African Unity may not be a vain word’ (cited in Cervenka, 1977, p. 7). Similarly, the President of Tanzania Julius Nyerere noted that ‘In our approach to the final liberation of Africa we are all agreed without a single exception that the time for mere words is gone … that from now on our brethren in non-independent Africa should be helped by independent Africa’ (cited in Cervenka, 1977, p. 8). Nyerere also called for a ‘step-by-step’ process to the achievement of African unity (cited in Francis, 2006). The positions of these leaders, especially Nasser, who was part of the Casablanca bloc, appear to undermine Nkrumah’s authority and influence at the Conference.

However, after several discussions, member states at the Conference agreed to reject foreign elements as well as colonial rule on African indigenous population; also, colonial powers were to speed-up the process of decolonisation (Thompson, 1969a; Adebajo & Landsberg, 2001). During the meeting, Nkrumah sought to influence the delegates with his passion and idea of a united continent (Thompson, 1969a). As pointed out in Chapter Three, after the Manchester Pan-African Congress, it was through Nkrumah that Pan-Africanism gained momentum as a norm for indigenous African independence and unity. To this end, as Thompson (1969a) observes, during preparations for the formation of the OAU, Nkrumah ‘was the only African leader who had assimilated and preserved fully the ideas [of African unity]’ (p. 182). In addition, Ayittey (2010) argues that in championing Pan-Africanism on the African continent, the OAU deepened the cause of Nkrumah.

In the end, the Conference adopted the name, Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and opened its membership to all states on the African continent (Rooney, 2007; Biney, 2011; Legum, 1975; Markakis, 1966). Thus, the OAU was officially created on 25 May 1963 with
its headquarters in Addis Ababa with the object of promoting Pan-African unity and solidarity amongst African states, as well as improving collaboration and endeavours towards the attainment of improved livelihood of Africans (Thompson, 1969a; Nkrumah, 1973; Dugard, 1967; Welch, 1991). In the words of Haile Selassie, the idea behind the OAU was to ‘[establish] … a single African organization through which Africa’s single voice may be heard … a single institution to which we will all belong, based on principles to which we all subscribe’ (Selassie, 1963, p. 285).

The Conference adopted the OAU Charter, which was premised on the basic objectives underpinning the organisation (Francis, 2006; Dumor, 1991; Binaisa, 1977). Broadly, the five main objectives outlined in the Charter included: promoting the unity and solidarity of the African States; coordinating and intensifying their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; defending their sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence; eradicating all forms of colonialism from Africa and promoting international cooperation; and having due regard for the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  

Against this backdrop, all member states were expected to acknowledge each other’s sovereign equality; non-interference in the internal affairs of member state; respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and its inalienable right to independent existence; peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation; unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring states or any other states; and complete dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories. By these, member states were to harmonise their policies in domains such as: ‘political and diplomatic cooperation; economic cooperation, including transport and communications; education and cultural cooperation; health, sanitation and nutritional cooperation; scientific cooperation; cooperation for defence and security’ (cited in Thompson, 1969a, p. 184). The Charter also embraced institutions such as Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Council of Ministers, and General Secretariat and Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration to facilitate the implementation of the objectives (or resolutions) of the OAU (Dumor, 1991; Thompson, 1969a).

The creation of the OAU was an agreement between the Casablanca and Monrovia charters to cooperate; yet, it was not what Nkrumah envisioned (Francis, 2006; Legum, 1975;  

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Kah, 2012; Shivji, 2006). Primarily, the agreed OAU Charter underlined the core principles espoused by the Monrovia group, with no mention of Nkrumah’s political union (or federal union of African states). However, the Casablanca group’s proposal to remove the right of colonial powers to interfere in the political institutions of newly independent states was included in the OAU Charter, and this was a nod to the Congo experience (Francis, 2006; Makinda & Okumu, 2008). To this end, Nkrumah lost the battle for his ideal Pan-African political union of African states following his failure to convince (or influence) his contemporaries who were keen on cooperation that would ensure the protection of their sovereignty as well as non-interference in their domestic affairs. However, Hoskyns (1966) argued that the establishment of the OAU showed a ‘strong continental commitment to unity, based on racial consciousness, and the common experience of colonialism’ (cited in Francis, 2006, p. 24).

As such, Nkrumah’s vision of promoting a federal union government for Africa did not hold, but the idea of unity amongst independent African states did carry through. As Emperor Haile Sellassie recognised: ‘[t]hrough all that has been said and written and done in these years, there runs a common theme. Unity is the accepted goal … We are determined to create a union of Africans’ (cited in Thompson, 1969a, p. 182).

In general, what is evident is that Nkrumah’s attempt to seek a political union or a United States of Africa under a centralised government backfired as his influence on the continent continued to diminish following the Congo crisis, his own domestic troubles, and his strategic failure to engage with the OAU drafting process. To this end, it could be said that even though the creation of the OAU was a statement of independent African cooperation, Nkrumah lost the OAU Charter battle.

The following section explains the pushback that Nkrumah faced as he attempted to push for political integration or union especially pertaining to his (attempted) amalgamation of part of Togo with Ghana and his sheltering of political refugees from neighbouring state Ivory Coast. It underlines Nkrumah’s miscalculation and misunderstanding vis-à-vis his idea of Pan-African unity and the sovereignty of African states. These issues also probably contributed to Nkrumah’s failure to successfully attain his goal of Pan-Africanism.
Pan-African normative internalization: Backlashes to Nkrumah’s vision of Pan-African Unity (1963–1964)

The formation of the OAU as a symbol of continental unity highlighted the diminishing of Nkrumah’s influence as well as the weakening of his own radical suggestions to strengthen Pan-Africanism through a political union (United States of Africa).

To begin with, the most important backlash to Nkrumah’s approach to strengthening the African unification agenda could be attributed to his troubled relationship with neighbouring Togo (Biney, 2011; Thompson, 1969b). Notably, as part of plans to reinforce his Pan-African enterprise, Nkrumah attempted a call for the political union of Togo with Ghana, which was opposed by then Togo President Sylvanus Olympio (Biney, 2011; Rooney, 2007; Thompson, 1969b). Rather, Sylvanus Olympio desired unification with the former French colonies (or states) as well as a West African grouping (sub-regional cooperation) with neighbouring Nigeria and Dahomey (present-day Benin) (Biney, 2011; Rooney, 2007). It should be clarified here that Ghana and Togo have historical affinity regarding an ethnic group known as the ‘Ewe’, who are found in both countries (Thompson, 1969b). The Ewes in Ghana and Togo have similar language and are culturally related (Francis, 2006). Nkrumah argued that the unification of both countries would be a step towards the elimination of artificial boundaries created by colonial powers and the strengthening of the goal of African union (Thompson, 1969b). However, this was appraised by others as a cynical move by Nkrumah to expand the sovereign borders of Ghana.

Furthermore, Nkrumah’s sheltering of political refugees in Ghana from neighbouring Ivory Coast also weakened the Pan-African ‘unity and solidarity’ argument (Biney, 2011; Rooney, 2007; Adebajo & Landsberg, 2001). During the Addis Ababa OAU conference in 1963, the question of émigrés from Sanwi (Ivory Coast) arose between Nkrumah and Ivorian President Felix Houphouet Boigny (Biney, 2011; Thompson, 1969b). The Sanwi was an ethnic community living along the border between Ghana and the Ivory Coast (Biney, 2011; Thompson, 1969b). The community had gradually moved to Ghana seeking asylum from the Ivory Coast (Biney, 2011). Nkrumah had attempted to negotiate with Houphouet Boigny to unite the Sanwi community in Ghana with their counterparts in Ivory Coast (Thompson, 1969b). Nkrumah argued that ‘the existence of refugees in nearly all the Independent African States is a manifestation of the artificial barriers imposed by the imperialists and colonialists upon Africa, thereby creating disunity’ (cited in Biney, 2011, p. 147). However, the Ivorian
leader rejected any integration between the Sanwi in Ghana and those of the Ivory Coast as a creeping expansionist move by Nkrumah (Biney, 2011; Thompson, 1969b).

At the July 1964 OAU meeting by African heads of state and government in Cairo, Egypt, tensions again arose on how to approach the question of African unity between Nkrumah and President of Tanzania, Julius Mwalimu Nyerere (Biney, 2011; Agyeman, 1975; Chacha, 2002). Nyerere gave a speech opposing Nkrumah’s persistent radical position for a political union of African states. In his speech at the Cairo gathering, he stressed that the Pan-African objective of United States of Africa could only be attained by a piecemeal (or gradual) approach and that:

it has not been given to us human mortals to simply will things into existence. Between our willing of an end and the achievement of that end there is a process. This process is sometimes long and sometimes short, and indeed the greater the objective the longer may be the process. (cited in Biney, 2011, p. 148)

Contesting Nkrumah’s radical position, Nyerere further argued that ‘To rule out a step by step progress towards African Unity is to hope that the Almighty will one day say, “Let there be unity in Africa”, and there shall be unity’ (cited in Biney, 2011, p. 148).

By this stage, it is worth noting that Nkrumah, who attended this conference, had begun to recognise the fact that his influence was diminishing and, moreover, his own domestic power was becoming more tenuous (as Chapter Seven will discuss). Nkrumah further exposed the extent to which his Pan-African vision could be compromised for political expediency when, in 1965, he agreed to repatriate political refugees to Houphouet-Boigny (Ivory Coast), Maurice Yameogo (Burkina Faso), and Hamani Diori (Niger) (Biney, 2011). This agreement was made, Rooney (2007) argues, to appease internal frictions within Ghana concerning the refugee settlements, rather than because it was safe for these refugees to return.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has sought to explore how Nkrumah’s credibility and authority diminished as he attempted to push the idea of Pan-Africanism on the African continent between 1961 and 1964. The first section traced the evolution of the pro-political union, the Casablanca group of states, and pro-economic union group, the Monrovia group of states, in the lead up to the establishment of a Pan-African organisation on the continent. The emergence of these factions began at the time of the Congo intervention, and division was largely along the lines of pro-Lumumba and pro-Kasavubu support. However, as this chapter charts, Nkrumah sought to
maintain this division even when it became clear that states within the Casablanca group were moving close to the Monrovia group’s position on the question of state sovereignty and non-interference, and economic cooperation but not unification.

Eventually, in May 1963, the two blocs agreed to attend a meeting hosted by Haile Selassie in Addis Ababa to resolve the question of African regional cooperation and what institutional form it should adopt. The OAU was created on 25 May 1963. There is no doubt that the attempt to strengthen the unity and cooperation amongst African states was to compete against the rise of Cold War divisions, which had the potential to recreate colonial enclaves and empires. In this sense, the idea of Pan-Africanism had crystallised beyond anti-slavery and anti-imperialism to be the assertion of an African institution ruled by independent African leaders. This idea was something that we can trace back to Nkrumah’s influence and ideology (Thompson, 1969a). However, Nkrumah’s own inconsistent engagement with the OAU drafting process, and preoccupation of his domestic political vulnerability further diminished his opportunity to contribute to OAU identity and values after its formation. Nkrumah’s continuous drive for a central government for Africa (United States of Africa) became an irritant to other African leaders, and he himself ended up making concessions in the OAU which undermined the unity and solidarity vision of his Pan-African ideology.

Overall, this chapter has traced Nkrumah’s norm entrepreneurship through the OAU negotiations. From the above discussion, we could see that Nkrumah was consistent in framing the ideal of pan-African unity. Also, he had the networks and organisational platforms to support this vision. However, for the completion of his normative change, Nkrumah needed to effectively seize the political moment and environment. I have shown that the frame of capturing political opportunities was not functioning well in Nkrumah’s normative cause. Nkrumah attempted to gather regional allies and support for his pan-African ideal, but as the chapter has demonstrated, he failed to capture the political environment. Rather, his effort was weakening the network he had built. As noted above, successful norm entrepreneurs effectively identify and use political opportunities available for advancing a particular norm. The regional meetings presented crucial moments and political venues for Nkrumah’s normative cause, but he could not handle the negotiations properly and ultimately lost these opportunities. Nkrumah failed to use the meetings and OAU discussions as a launch pad to build momentum for accomplishing his vision. He lost the regional impetus and attachment required for norm promotion.

The following chapter explores the final years of Nkrumah’s leadership in Ghana, explaining how, despite his downfall, and despite these foreign policy failures identified in
Chapter Five and Six, the Pan-African legacy continued to inform and define Ghana’s foreign policy.
Chapter Seven

Kwame Nkrumah’s Demise and Foreign Policy Legacy

Introduction

By the end of Chapter Six, Nkrumah’s efforts towards the promotion of his Pan-African version of a continental organisation had failed. The majority of independent African states wanted cooperation that would protect their sovereignty, as well as the assurance of respect for non-interference in their internal affairs. Similar to the Congo intervention and his position on the OAU, there was also growing distrust of Nkrumah’s motives within Ghana. This chapter charts his personal demise but finds, at the same time, that his idea of a Pan-African collective identity was not rejected by the military leaders that took his position, nor has it been rejected by the political leaders who have gone on to fill senior political positions in Ghana. This chapter seeks to explain the endurance of Nkrumah’s ideas despite the political failure of the individual.

It should be reiterated here that by examining Nkrumah’s norm entrepreneurialism, the previous chapters have shown how he continuously framed the idea of Pan-Africanism, establishing alliances and organisational platforms to facilitate his normative cause. These frames were promptly adopted by Nkrumah in his regional engagements. Obviously, he struggled to seize domestic and regional political windows of opportunities. We saw that his decisions and policies in both national and regional engagements gravely affected his leadership, thus undermining the success of his entrepreneurial trajectory. In spite of that, as this chapter will illustrate, Nkrumah’s normative entrepreneurialism has left a significant legacy in Ghana’s foreign policy making. This chapter will show that 60 years later — i.e. post-independence, his ideas still have traction in the policy making community in Ghana.

This chapter provides a discussion of the demise and foreign policy legacy of Nkrumah in Ghana. The first section traces the end of the government of Nkrumah in 1966. It will be observed that Nkrumah’s mismanagement of the country, rapidly adopted policies, corruption, and his miscalculation and interference with the security machinery of the country, all triggered his removal as the President of Ghana. Section Two surveys the crucial stages of rule in Ghana’s post-independence period with the first, second, third and fourth republics, highlighting what each administration sought to achieve in their own foreign policy directions.
and domestic developments. We see here a consistency of the Pan-African vision promoted by Nkrumah: strong advocacy of economic integration at the regional level; advocacy and consistent support for sovereign independence; and participation in peacekeeping missions presented as being in support of Nkrumah’s original Pan-African project. The final section of the chapter provides an explanation of Nkrumah’s legacy in the words of Ghana’s contemporary politicians, public servants, and academics (through semi-structured interviews conducted in Accra). These discussions illustrate how his legacy and influence still dominate discussions on Ghana’s foreign policy. I argue that the endurance of Nkrumah’s ideas reveals that foreign policy decisions and positions are, of course, based on national interest but the legacy of an independence leader has a particular influence in the character of post-colonial foreign policy decision making.

**Nkrumah’s Demise (the End of Nkrumah’s Administration) — 1966**

By 1966, Nkrumah’s political and economic decisions had laid the grounds for his decline as the President of Ghana. The trigger, in hindsight, was Nkrumah’s decision to sideline the military. Nkrumah created the President’s Own Guard Regiment, and at the same time, pursued the military, accusing them of orchestrating the assassination attempts on his life (see Chapter Four). Colonel Africa (one of the leaders of the coup) later stated that, ‘[t]he dismissal of … senior [officers] by Kwame Nkrumah was one of the major factors that led to the coup …’ (cited in Price, 1971, p. 366). The President’s Own Guard Regiment was formed to protect the Flagstaff House, yet they were given direct orders by the President, creating a division between the Guard and the regular army, who considered them as threat to their existence (Baynham, 1985b; Biney, 2011).

At the same time, Nkrumah was channelling most of his attention, and the country’s resources, on the African unification project and neglecting the domestic affairs of his state (Miller et al., 2009). When Nkrumah did take interest in Ghana’s domestic affairs it was autocratic and nihilistic. As noted in Chapter Four, upon assumption of office as President of the newly independent country, Nkrumah immediately sought too much power and control to prevent his demise. The introduction of the Preventive Detention Act extinguished his opposition as well as violated the rights of the citizenry (Boateng, 2003; Buah, 1998). Through the indiscriminate implementation of the Act, most members of the opposition United Party and the National Liberation Movement were arrested and detained (Boateng, 2003). As Colonel Afrifa observed:
I am not a lawyer to interpret the provisions of liberty … Among others are the freedom of worship, of speech and of the press, the right or peaceable assembly. Equality before the law, just trial for crime … Under Nkrumah these principles were repudiated every day … The press was censured and distorted with propaganda. The right of criticism was denied. Men were detained and even sent to gallows for holding honest opinions. They could not assemble for a discussion … (cited in Asante, 1969, pp. 81–82)

Second, the widespread corruption especially amongst his officials coupled with his mishandling of the economy (economic mismanagement), led to heavy taxation on already poor citizens (Gocking, 2005; Kofele-Kale, 2006). The heavy taxation fuelled strikes and shortages of essential goods, thereby making him unpopular amongst the people (Buah, 1998).

On 24 February 1966, a group of military officers of the Ghana armed forces broadcast that they, together with the police, had ousted the government of Kwame Nkrumah (Boateng, 2003; Harvey, 1966; Aluko, 1975; Austin, 1970). At the time, Nkrumah was out of the country on a peacekeeping mission in Hanoi, Vietnam (Buah, 1998; Bretton, 1966). Nkrumah was visiting Vietnam upon the invitation by the country’s leader Ho Chi Minh to help broker an end to the Vietnamese civil war (Biney, 2011). Nkrumah was informed about the coup in (then) Peking, as he was waiting for the plane to Hanoi (Davidson, 1973). Most damaging for Nkrumah was that this was not a coup organised by disgruntled low paid soldiers. This was a coup from the ‘top-brass’; the main organisers of the overthrow included senior officers of the Ghana army and police. Amongst them were Lieutenant Colonel E. K. Kotoka, commandant of the second infantry regiment in Kumasi; J. W. K. Harley, then commissioner of police; B. A. Yakubu, deputy commissioner of police; Colonel A. A. Afrifa, staff officer of the second infantry regiment in Kumasi; A. K. Deku, head of the criminal investigation department of the Ghana police; and General Ankrah, who had been earlier dismissed by Nkrumah (Biney, 2011; Price, 1971; Boateng, 2003; Kraus, 1969).

Importantly, the public reception to the coup was not grief for Nkrumah but relief. The military cited issues of abuse, corruption, the creation of a one-party regime, the misuse of state resources, economic failure, and the undermining of traditional leaders as reasons for their actions (Boateng, 2003; Ninsin, 1991). The public agreed (Gocking 2005). The entire overthrow was completed in 24 hours. Nkrumah’s statue mounted outside Ghana’s House of Parliament was destroyed, and songs were chanted by demonstrators on the streets, indicating their support for the overthrow of Nkrumah (Gocking, 2005). In the wake of the coup being staged, only a small unit of the officers stationed at the Flagstaff House briefly attempted to resist, however they were quickly overcome by the military (Apter, 1968; Davidson, 1973).
During the course of the coup, the organisers freed Nkrumah’s detainees (Gocking, 2005; Apter, 1969). In their radio report, the coup plotters justified their actions saying that:

We lived our lives perpetually afraid of prison, poverty, and unaware of our future … And this beloved country of ours was plunged into a dark night of misery and suffering. Nkrumah and his henchmen became rich, confident, and lorded it over us with all the ruthless instruments at their disposal: security forces, prisons, and torture. (cited in Apter, 1968, p. 787)

In the same vein, the opposition and the traditional leaders, who had been aggrieved by the Nkrumah government, supported the actions of the military and police officers (Bretton, 1966). None of Nkrumah’s own followers, such as his youth groups, attempted to resist the military and police revolution72 (Bretton, 1966). In effect, Nkrumah’s personal political monopoly in the country was completely extinguished (Bretton, 1966).

To ensure no one would question the (il)legality of the coup, the military deliberately revealed Nkrumah’s own corruption. He had amassed personal assets that included an estimated 454,000 pounds sterling in several Ghanaian banks and 170,000 pounds sterling in Switzerland (Davidson, 1973). In a country as impoverished as Ghana had become due to his economic mismanagement, this alone finished any affection for Nkrumah.

Following his overthrow, Nkrumah sought asylum in Conakry, Guinea on 2 March 1966, where President Sekou Toure made him the co-President of the country (Gocking, 2005; Biney, 2011). It is worth recalling that Ghana had maintained close relations with Guinea owing to the Pan-African unity created through the Ghana-Guinea Union endorsed by Nkrumah and Toure (see Chapter Three). Nkrumah lived in Guinea for five years, where he was involved in writing and publishing his manuscripts and books. He continued to hope that he would eventually return to Ghana and regain power (Davidson, 1973; Biney, 2009). From Conakry, Nkrumah continued to present himself as the only leader who could protect the Ghanaian population’s independence. In 1969, for example, Nkrumah made a call on Ghanaians to organise a strike to express their resentment concerning the military and help free Ghana from the control of neo-colonialism (Biney, 2011). His ambition to return never eventuated (Biney, 2009). In late 1971 Nkrumah was flown to Bucharest, Romania, for medical treatment where he later died of cancer on 27 April 1972 (Buah, 1998).

72 In the end, the leaders of the coup established the National Liberation Council (NLC) to take over from the deposed CPP government; Major General Ankrah, who was dismissed by Nkrumah, got reinstated into the army as Lieutenant-General (Biney, 2011).
Four Stages of Rule in Ghana’s Political History: A Brief Overview

Following the country’s independence in 1957 and military coup in 1966, Ghana experienced a chequered turn of events. I present four key phases of Ghana’s political history post-independence (Morrison, 2004), four different republican administrations and their foreign policy priorities. Tracing what happened after Nkrumah’s regime helps us estimate to what extent the country’s first President’s policy or political legacy has cut across different political and military regimes.

The First Republic (1960–1966)

After the overthrow of the first republic regime (1960–1966) under President Nkrumah, the military and police formed the National Liberation Council (NLC), which ruled between 1966 and 1969 (Oppong & Oppong, 2003). The new military administration was led by J. A. Ankrah (Chairman) and J. W. K Harlley as Deputy Chairman; other members included Major General Afrifa and Colonel Kotoka, who were all part of the overthrow of Nkrumah (see above) (Hettne, 1980; Gocking, 2005). The NLC administration was primarily concerned with the weakening economy and introducing a process for the administration of a (very) corrupt state (Hettne, 1980).

The economy was the NLC’s main priority and they immediately sought financial aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to solve the country’s economic crisis. The NLC government received a loan of approximately 36 million US dollars from the IMF (Boafo-Arthur, 2007a; Gocking, 2005). In addition, infrastructure projects that had been started by the Nkrumah government, such as the Accra-Tema Motorway were stopped (Oppong & Oppong, 2003). A gold refinery in the Western region of the country that was almost completed and due for opening in June 1966 was also cancelled (Oppong & Oppong, 2003). Likewise, the number of foreign missions, ministries, and administrative districts was reduced so as to cut down government expenditure (Hettne, 1980; Gocking, 2005). In spite of these measures, food production continued to decline, and the retrenchment of Nkrumah’s extensive bureaucracy saw the unemployment rate increase (Oppong & Oppong, 2003).

In the area of foreign policy, echoes of Nkrumah remained. Asante (1997) observes that the NLC acknowledged ‘Ghana’s traditional role in African affairs particularly in the anti-colonial struggle’ (p. 37). Asante further states that ‘[t]he central theme of Nkrumah’s African policy was accepted as national policy’ (p. 37). The NLC certainly pursued a foreign policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other African states. To smooth over fractious
relations with neighbouring states, the NLC repatriated political refugees who had been accommodated during the Nkrumah era (Gocking, 2005). However, the concept of continental unity was promoted when seeking economic cooperation and trade (Boafo-Arthur, 1989).

In 1968, the NLC gave the country’s Electoral Commission the mandate to hold a general election in order to return the country to civilian government (Gocking, 2005). In the late August 1969 elections, the Progress Party (PP) headed by Dr Kofi Abrefa Busia won against the National Alliance of Liberals (NAL), which was led by Komla Gbedemah (a key member of the former Nkrumah government) (Drah, 1993; Sandbrook, 1996). After the elections, the NLC transferred power to the civilian government, paving the way for what was formally referred to as the Second Republican administration (Agyeman-Duah, 1987; 1990). Ghana’s second republic regime under Busia had its inauguration in October 1969 (Bennett, 1972; Oppong & Oppong, 2003; Morrison & Hong, 2006).


The Busia-led second republic retained some officials from the previous military (NLC) government like Victor Owusu, Minister of Foreign Affairs (who then became Attorney General and Minister of Justice) and J. H. Mensah as Finance Minister (Boafo-Arthur, 2007a; Gocking, 2005). Like the Nkrumah government, the Foreign Minister would speak on the ‘[t]otal emancipation of the continent from colonial domination was and still is a cardinal principle of Ghana’s foreign policy’ (cited in Asante, 1997, p. 39). However, unlike Nkrumah, Ghana was now supporting the OAU position on economic cooperation: ‘[t]he present government is dedicated to the cause of African Unity. We believe that a political union of African states is a desirable objective but unlike Nkrumah regime, we think it is necessary to lay the proper foundations first through functional co-operation particularly at the regional level’ (Foreign Minister Owusu cited in Asante, 1997, p. 39).

However, Ghana’s acceptance of the OAU principle of non-interference in the affairs of other states was more controversial when the republic government passed the Alien Compliance Order (ACO). The ACO requested all émigrés who were living and working in Ghana without permits to get the documents within two weeks or leave Ghana (Owusu, 1972). The application of this Order had serious repercussions on people from neighbouring West African states such as Nigeria, Togo, Burkina Faso, Mali, Cote d’Ivoire, and Niger, leading to

73 The PP and NAL were respectively metamorphosed versions of the United Party and Convention People’s Party.
the mass deportation of these Africans (Drah, 1993; Oppong & Oppong, 2003). For example, as of April 1970, approximately 150,000 of these West African migrants — mostly traders, labourers, and artisans — were forced to return to their home countries (Gocking, 2005). Neighbouring states were enraged and saw this measure as too harsh, especially by a country identified as a crusader of Pan-Africanism (Boafo-Arthur, 2007a). Nevertheless, the soaring economic challenges — increased prices of essential goods and high unemployment — meant the Busia administration held firm against regional criticism (Drah, 1993).

In July 1971, the government failed to increase the minimum wage of workers and instead introduced a special tax called National Development Levy in order to generate revenue for projects in rural areas (Drah, 1993). The government retrenched 568 civil servants on the grounds that their loyalty for the regime was deemed suspicious (Gocking, 2005). Nkrumah’s portraits and the use of any mantra related to his party (CPP) were all proscribed under the new 1971 Criminal Code (Amendment) Act (Drah, 1993). This Act was in response to a campaign by the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS) to grant Nkrumah amnesty in Ghana so he may be ‘treated as an elder statesman, honoured for his past achievements… and encouraged to live in retirement at home’ (cited in Gocking, 2005, p. 160). Journalists such as Cameron Duodu of the Daily Graphic and Kofi Badu of the Spokesman newspapers, both critical of the government, were penalised, the former sacked and the latter imprisoned (Gocking, 2005).

In the midst of the worsening economic challenges and growing public resentment, on 13 January 1972 when Busia was out of the country, the second republic was ousted by the military in a coup led by Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong (Hansen & Collins, 1980; Oppong & Oppong, 2003; Young, 1996). Within three years, a second military government, the National Redemption Council (NRC) headed by Kutu Acheampong, was in charge of Ghana (Zeff, 1981; Hettne, 1980).

The new government suspended Parliament and banned all political parties in the country (Oppong & Oppong, 2003). The NRC government was made up of seven officers of the Ghana army and one civilian E. N. Moore74 (Drah, 1993; Gocking, 2005). Notably, almost immediately after the coup, the NRC reaffirmed Nkrumah’s African-centred foreign policy (Hettne, 1980).

At a press conference in the same month as the coup, January 1972, Acheampong declared that ‘[o]ur foreign policy will first of all be based on a vigorous and dynamic African policy’ (cited in Asante, 1997, p. 41). During the Acheampong regime, Ghana revived its

74 Moore was a defence counsel during the trial pertaining to the Kulungugu grenade attack on Nkrumah.
involvement with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Liberation Committee, which led to Ghana hosting the Committee’s gathering in early 1973; Ghana pledged to organise the African liberation struggle through the establishment of the Liberation Information Centre in Accra in the 1970s (Boafo-Arthur, 1989). The government of Ghana gave 50,000 US dollars to freedom fighters in Guinea-Bissau in 1974 to support the struggle for independence (Boafo-Arthur, 1989).

However, in 1975 the government was hit by the worsening economic situation with a shortage of essential imported consumer goods, which led to Ghanaians queuing to buy basic food. The transportation system was failing and production in the agricultural and industrial sectors was waning; a fall in the prices of cocoa increased smuggling of the commodity to neighbouring countries as well as a mass flight of Ghanaians, including teachers and medical doctors, to other African countries (Oppong & Oppong, 2003). On the back of these economic challenges and in the quest to resolve the mounting challenges, Acheampong called for a restructuring of the NRC to comprise the army, the police and civilians under a new name known as the Supreme Military Council (SMC) in what became the Union Government or UNIGOV (Harris, 1980; Tordoff, 1994). In 1978, after the creation of the SMC, a member of the Council and second in command to Acheampong, General Frederick William Kwasi Akuffo, called on Acheampong to step down in what became known as the palace coup (Oppong & Oppong, 2003). Between 1978 and 1979, the SMC II (led by General Akuffo) attempted to fix the declining economy by devaluing the Ghana currency by 58.2 percent (Oppong & Oppong, 2003). The policy did not last long, when on 4 June 1979, a group of junior officers in the Ghana armed forces led by Jerry John Rawlings overthrew the administration (Drah, 1993; Lumsden, 1980; Hutchful, 1979; Pinkney, 1997).

Rawlings established the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), which ruled the country for three and half months (Agyeman-Duah, 1987; Hansen & Collins, 1980; Oquaye, 2000). The AFRC pledged its commitment to eliminate corruption, and promote probity and public accountability through a ‘house-cleaning exercise’ — a euphemism for its approach to deal with people who were linked to corruption in the country (Hettne, 1980). On 16 June 1979, General Acheampong and General Utuka were executed for alleged crimes (Oppong & Oppong, 2003). Then other senior military officers including General Akuffo were executed by the AFRC (Oppong & Oppong, 2003). On 24 September 1979, the AFRC transferred power to a constitutional civilian regime headed by Dr Hilla Limann of the People’s National Party (PNP), which marked the beginning of what was officially called the Third Republic (Drah, 1993; Tordoff, 1994).
**The Third Republic (1979–1981)**

As mentioned earlier, Hilla Limann became the President of the Third Republic after the Rawlings-led coup and ruled the country between 1979 and 1981. The continued economic mismanagement inherited from its predecessors, which had led to decline in production, and poor infrastructural development coupled with the fall in price of the country’s main export (cocoa) saw this government adopt (more) drastic economic measures (Leith & Soderling, 2000; Gocking, 2005). To encourage international investment, trade liberalisation was encouraged and the currency (cedi) was devalued (Drah, 1993). At the same time, the government attempted to meet the demands of workers by raising the minimum wage from 4 cedis to ten cedis (Gocking, 2005). This only served to place pressure on business, however, and with inflation well over a hundred percent in 1981, factories retrenched their workers as they had no overdraft to purchase raw materials for production (Drah 1993).

However, again on the foreign policy front, we see the third republican government hark back to the policy of the Nkrumah government. President Limann in his foreign policy statement argued that the administration’s ‘foreign policy draws much of its inspiration and guidance from the ideals of our past history particularly as broadly outlined by the President of our First Republic’ (cited in Asante, 1997, p. 44). President Limann supported the creation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) protocol, which was to facilitate the free movement of people and goods across the West African sub-region (Asante, 1997; Boafo-Arthur, 2007a).

However, students’ groups such as the NUGS mounted pressure on the government calling for a solution to the worsening economic situation (Drah, 1993). In 1981, in the midst of the economic crisis, civil society groups as well as university students, union workers, soldiers, and the intelligentsia, formed an alliance to protest against the government (Gocking, 2005; Drah, 1993; Rothchild & Gyimah-Boadi, 1981). Then, on 31 December 1981, Rawlings and his military colleagues staged their second coup to overthrow the Limann government (Agyeman-Duah, 1987; Baynham, 1985a; Haynes, 1992; Gyimah-Boadi, 1981).

Rawlings promised the people another ‘house-cleaning’ exercise. He suspended Parliament, banned all political parties, and created the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) (Agyeman-Duah, 1987). In the PNDC, Rawlings was the Chairman, Brigadier Nunoo-Mensah, Chief of Defence Staff, and Brigadier Arnold Quainoo became the Commander of the Ghana army (Gocking, 2005). The National Defence Council was formed to act as an advisory
body of the PNDC, while the Electoral Commission was renamed the National Commission for Democracy (NCD) (Gocking, 2005).

During its years in power, the PNDC government was characterised by heinous crimes as well as economic and political problems (Agyeman-Duah 1987). For example, on 30 June 1982, three judges of the High Court — Justices Sarkodee, K. A. Agyepong and Cecilia Koranteng Addow — were killed. These killings were believed to be retribution from Rawlings for their overturn of rulings brought before them by the AFRC75 (Leith & Soderling, 2000; Gocking, 2005). The economy continued to decline, with shortage of essential commodities, hoarding of goods for high prices, and a high rate of unemployment. Poverty and economic stagnation worsened in 1983 when the country went through a long period of drought and famine (Oppong & Oppong, 2003).

By this point, references to Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanism had declined and the government’s main preoccupation became the economic challenges, which in turn influenced foreign policy choices (Jeffries, 1982; Asante, 1997). The PNDC sought to deepen economic cooperation with Eastern Europe, the People’s Republic of China, Cuba and North Korea (Boafo-Arthur, 1989). Rawlings (again) echoed that the challenges faced by Ghanaians were attributed to colonialists, particularly Britain and the United States, who prior to independence had exploited the African continent (Oppong & Oppong, 2003). However, in practice, the government sought the advice and funding of the Paris-based IMF and the Washington-based World Bank (Adedeji, 2001). The PNDC government also sought to improve its relations with Western bloc countries, such as the United Kingdom and United States (Asante, 1997). The World Bank initiated the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) with Ghana (Adedeji, 2001). As part of the ERP, the cedi was devalued but prices offered to agricultural producers were increased to boost production (Gocking, 2005). However, in 1989, the cedi continued to depreciate with one US dollar exchanged for 650 cedis, and the economic situation did not improve (Oppong & Oppong, 2003).

In 1990, a group called the Movement for Freedom and Justice (MFJ), led by Professor Adu Boahen and other elements from the previous First, Second and Third Republican governments, emerged to put pressure on the government for a multi-party democracy (Gocking, 2005). In 1992, a new Constitution was adopted and the ban on political parties was lifted, paving the way for general elections in December 1992 (Adedeji, 2001; Morrison, 2004). The PNDC was metamorphosed into the National Democratic Congress (NDC) led by

75 The AFRC was transformed into the PNDC.
Rawlings, who won against the main opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) led by Adu Boahen (Morrison, 2004; Ayee, 2002). In January 1993 Rawlings was inaugurated as the constitutionally elected President of the Fourth Republic of Ghana (Adedeji, 2001).

The Fourth Republic (1993–Present)

It should be noted here that these two main political parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP), have governed Ghana since the commencement of the Fourth Republic in 1993. Between 1993 and 2000 Ghana was governed by the NDC, led under Rawlings (Whitfield, 2009). Following his inauguration, President Rawlings stated that the foreign policy focus under his government will ‘continue to be the maintenance of friendly relations with immediate neighbours and indeed all the […] countries of Africa’ (cited in Asante, 1997, p. 47). Similarly, in their manifesto, the NDC notes that ‘Ghana’s foreign policy will continue to be that of positive neutrality. We will also emphasise economic diplomacy. The commitment to peace and security in [Africa] is paramount in our inter-regional diplomatic relations’ (National Democratic Congress Manifesto, 2016, p. 76). The NDC manifesto also makes a commitment to support African ‘continental integration by introducing elements of the [African Union] Agenda 2063 into [their] national development’ (p. 76). Ghana also returned (echoing its intervention in the Congo) to diplomacy in regional conflicts through mediation and intervention roles (Aning & Edu-Afful, 2017).

Ghana, under Rawlings’ government, supported the creation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990 (Aboagye, 1999). This regional collection of states — including Ghana, Nigeria, Gambia, Sierra Leone and Guinea — formed a peacekeeping group deployed to restore law and order during the Liberian crisis in the 1990s (Aboagye, 1999; Adebajo & Rashid, 2004; Kotia, 2015). President Rawlings in September 1994 hosted a meeting in Akosombo, Ghana, to discuss a ceasefire agreement between the warring factions in the Liberian crisis (Addo, 2005). In the same period, Ghana was hosting more than 50,000 refugees from Liberia [and Sierra Leone] (Birikorang, 2007).

In neighbouring Togo, however, Ghana’s intervention was unwelcome (Birikorang, 2007; Sanusi & Adu-Gyamfi, 2017). In the early 1990s, the outbreak of conflict in Togo had led to Ghana hosting about 135,000 Togolese refugees (Birikorang, 2007). Ghana placed its

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76 A programme to accelerate the execution of previous and current continental initiatives for integration and development. See more https://au.int/en/agenda2063.
military on standby to intervene in the crisis (Birikorang, 2007). The Togolese government, in turn, threatened to bomb Ghana’s main source of electricity supply, the Akosombo Dam, should the Ghanaian military intervene (Gocking, 2005). However, in mid-1990s, President Rawlings met with the Togolese President Eyadema in Togo for bilateral talks and reconciliation, which led to the reopening of Ghana’s consulate, and arrival of Ghana’s ambassador in Lomé (Gocking, 2005; Berry, 1994).

Domestically, between 1993 and 2000, Ghana’s economic situation did not improve. The cedi continued to depreciate against the US dollar, and the price of the country’s main export at the time (gold) dropped from approximately 390 US dollars to below 350 US dollars per ounce (Gocking, 2005). Under the 1992 Constitution the President could only serve two terms in office and, therefore, Rawlings could not contest in the elections. Rawlings honoured the Constitution and the NPP’s presidential candidate, John Agyekum Kufuor, won in the 2000 elections against Rawlings’ Vice-President Professor John Evans Atta Mills (Smith, 2002; Oppong & Oppong, 2003). Between 2001 and 2008, Kufuor and the NPP governed Ghana.77

The foreign policy of the NPP continued to prioritise economic cooperation and regional relationships. In Chapter Fifteen of their manifesto, the NPP stated that ‘Our foreign policy will be one of the principal agents of Ghana’s economic resurgence … The NPP will prioritise the development of economic opportunities in our foreign policy’ (New Patriotic Party Manifesto, 2016, p. 157). While neither the NPP nor NDC evoked Nkrumah’s obvious and persistent pursuit of African political unity, both the NPP and NDC would refer to the ‘ideal’ of Pan-Africanism when discussing the African continent’s vulnerability to Cold War geopolitics and resource exploitation. In his speech at a conference organised by the Legon Centre for International Affairs in 2002 (in Accra), President Kufuor stated that his government intended to ‘pursue a foreign policy aimed at restoring the dignity of the Africa[n] people’ (Kufuor, 2002, p. 7). Similarly, Foreign Minister Hackman Owusu-Agyeman noted that the Kufuor-led government would promote ‘vigorous efforts to rekindle the project of Pan Africanism’ (Owusu-Agyeman, 2002, p. 16).

Kufuor paid continuous visits to neighbouring West African states including Togo, Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria to strengthen bilateral and multilateral relationships amongst this West African bloc (Owusu-Agyeman, 2002; Boafo-Arthur, 2007b). Ghana opened its borders with Togo and Cote d’Ivoire to facilitate the ECOWAS protocol of

77 Kufuor’s first term in office was between 2001 and 2004. However, he was re-elected to govern from 2005 to 2008.
free movement of goods and persons within the West African sub-region (Kufuor, 2002). On 18 August 2003, Ghana again hosted the Liberian warring factions to sign the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which paved way for a Transitional Government of Liberia (Obi, 2009). Between 2003 and 2004, President Kufuor held meetings with the then Ivorian leader, Laurent Gbagbo, and former Ivorian Prime Minister, Alassane Ouattara, to promote peace during the Ivorian crisis (Sanusi & Adu-Gyamfi, 2017; Bah, 2012; Dadson, 2008). This time under President Kufuor, the NPP government was silent when the Togolese military installed President Eyadema’s son (Faure Gnassingbe) as President after his death (Birikorang, 2007). Civil society organisations in Ghana called on Kufuor to condemn the Togolese situation, but this time the Ghana President remained (unusually) silent on Togo’s political situation (Birikorang, 2007).

In January 2009, the NDC under Professor Atta Mills returned to power. President Mills, unlike his predecessors, was notably less engaged with external politics in the region. For example, between 2010 and 2011, during the political crisis in neighbouring Cote d’Ivoire, the government of Ghana remained silent regarding the issue of intervention (Sanusi & Adu-Gyamfi, 2017). In the face of the crisis, speaking on Ghana’s position at a press meeting in Accra, President Mills stated that Ghana was minding its own business; Ghana would not interfere in the internal affairs of Cote d’Ivoire or support military intervention in the country’s crisis (Sanusi & Adu-Gyamfi, 2017; Monyane, Sibawu, Molapo & Twala, 2014). There were mixed views on the reasons for President Mills’ decision, and the discussion in Ghana was about how unusual it was for a Ghanaian President to adopt no position on a neighbouring country’s political situation. According to Aning and Edu-Afful (2017), Ghana’s position of non-involvement was because the country was over-committed to several peacekeeping missions within sub-Saharan Africa. Another view was that Ghana did not want to jeopardise its economic investments in Cote d’Ivoire, unable to ascertain which way the political outcome would swing (Charbonneau, 2012). In 2012, President Mills died while in office and his Vice-President John Dramani Mahama succeeded him as Ghana’s President, winning the presidential elections in the same year and continuing the NDC’s second term in government (Sithole, 2012).

During the Mahama presidency, Ghana adopted a more proactive foreign policy position in its region, a familiar return to Ghana’s ‘usual’ outward facing foreign policy position (Sanusi & Adu-Gyamfi, 2017). In 2013, Ghana provided support towards peacekeeping operations in Mali by deploying its troops as part of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali [MINUSMA] (Aubyn, 2015).
addition, as part of efforts to eradicate the Ebola disease in 2014 in neighbouring countries such as Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia, Ghana hosted the coordination centre for the United Nations Mission on Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) (Enemark, 2017; Mahama, 2015). In his state of the nation address in February 2015, President Mahama gave his commitment to the pursuit of a foreign policy that would seek to create integration in the West African sub-region where economic development could be improved through the promotion of economic cooperation (Mahama, 2015).

In December 2016, President Mahama and his NDC were defeated in the country’s general elections by the NPP led by Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo. The latter was inaugurated in January 2017 to become the fifth President under Ghana’s Fourth Republic (Dillard, 2017; Graham, Gyampo, Faanu & Yobo, 2017). The Akufo-Addo-led NPP government’s foreign policy, detailed in the party’s 2016 manifesto, again echoed emphasis on the primary pursuit of regional and international economic cooperation. Yet, at the silver jubilee celebration of Ghana’s Fourth Republic on 7 January 2018, President Akufo-Addo stated that ‘our obligation to the unity and integration of the region and continent remains intact, in pursuit of our historic Pan-African vocation’ (Akufo-Addo, 2018).

After the demise of Nkrumah, no government that followed has shown the same geopolitical interest in Pan-African unity that Nkrumah articulated. The Acheampong military government came closest to emulating Nkrumah’s African-centred foreign policy, but his ambition was more at the sub-regional level and directed towards economic integration (Western Africa). However, the Pan-Africanism concept remained a useful rhetorical tool often used by Ghana’s leadership to make the case for economic integration and cooperation. Moreover, it came to define the region with which Ghana engaged — its neighbouring region of post-colonial West African neighbours — and the type of coordination sought: minimal ‘foreign interference’, and coordinated economic and political cooperation to manage disputes and facilitate integration.

As Ghana has pursued regional ties and regional cooperation — a consistent pattern despite political upheavals — it remained a consistent contributor to peacekeeping missions on the continent. The consensus is that this contribution has been so persistent because of its economic rewards (Aubyn & Aning, 2015). However, this could be said of many small countries keen to pursue pecuniary reward for troop contribution. Ghana is quite unique in its number and consistency of troop contribution. One explanation, that stems from Nkrumah’s influence, is that ‘participation in peacekeeping offers Ghana a mechanism to exert influence in world affairs and enhance its image and prestige in the international system’ (Aubyn &

The Foreign Policy Legacy of Nkrumah

You cannot really discuss the realities of Ghana’s foreign policy today without assessing the role of Kwame Nkrumah, not only because he was the founder of the country but during his administration, Africa was in the front and centre of the foreign policy of the newly independent country, Ghana … He did not just say it, he showed it in everything he did, and I will argue that to a large extent the vision and focus of Ghana’s foreign policy under Nkrumah, many elements of it have continued. So, a strong commitment to Africa and a focus on West Africa and the rest of Africa in general … the main components and ideas of Nkrumah’s foreign policy have informed Ghana’s policy right up till now in various ways. (Government Official 9, 2016)

What followed Nkrumah’s government was decades of coups, military rule and ‘big man’ politics (Nugent, 1995). There is no doubt Ghana remains beleaguered by decades of strong military state rule. However, despite the dominance of military rule during its ‘three republics’ phases of government, the foreign policy identity is still very much attached to the Nkrumah legacy, one that by all measures failed Ghana’s people but gave the state elevation in the foreign policy arena. This thesis has been concerned with how we reconcile this paradox — the diffusion of Nkrumah’s Pan-African norm against its failure in implementation.

When I interviewed people or officials who were crafting Ghana’s foreign policy in government today, as well as academics in think tanks who contribute to the crafting of Ghana’s foreign policy priorities, I observed continual, constant references to Nkrumah and his legacy. Whether I was discussing Ghana’s engagements in multilateral institutions, particularly its peacekeeping role, or the intervention in Liberia and its support for the creation or emergence of the continental body the African Union (AU, which replaced the OAU in 2002), it is Nkrumah’s legacy that would continually come up. The perception was strong that Ghana’s foreign policy is still premised on Nkrumah’s vision, ideas, and his understanding of Ghana’s role in Africa and the world. Across these areas, it was striking the way they talked about Nkrumah’s legacy and sometimes the way they talked about his legacy was at odds with other explanations they would give about why Ghana’s position was what it was. In other words, they do it even when there is evidence contradicting their view, as I present below. But this shows the power of his ideas, of this sense that Ghana’s foreign policy decisions and
identity since the independence era are still very much linked to the ideas that surrounded its struggle for independence.

I will illustrate this below by examining the main areas that were discussed in the interviews. These include Ghana’s engagements with regional multilateral institutions and peacekeeping; its role in the intervention during the Liberian crisis, how it was understood and how it recalled the Congo experience in the post-colonial period; then, its contribution to the creation or emergence of the AU and the continuation of the OAU experience.

Since the Congo mission, Ghana has made peacekeeping in Africa a fundamental aspect of its foreign policy (Levine, 2016; Victor, 2010; Williams, 2009). What emerged from the interviews is that Ghana’s role in peacekeeping on the continent has been attributed to the sense of solidarity or unity traced to the Nkrumah era. That is, participation in peacekeeping is strongly connected with the legacy of Nkrumah in the 1960s, particularly during the Congo intervention. Despite the contradictions and ultimate failure to protect what I associated with Nkrumah’s engagement in the Congo mission in Chapter Five, Ghana’s involvement in the Congo mission has taken on an almost legendary status amongst Ghana’s foreign policy elite today. The idea of Pan-Africanism and the desire to reinforce unity amongst African states is presented as the persistent driver shaping Ghana’s peacekeeping engagement. This undertaking helps to promote regional peace and security in the wake of several conflicts on the continent. For example, some government officials stated that:

Pan-Africanism has been a driving force. That is, African unity … Hence, if an African country is on fire, you can’t sit unconcerned. You have to play a role in quenching it. This informs Ghana’s support during conflict or political turmoil in other African countries. (Government Official 6, 2016)

Ghana has been one of the key contributors towards support for other African countries in crisis. We have sent troops for peacekeeping in the Congo and other countries. We do this in the spirit of African solidarity. All these could be linked to the ideological foundation established by our first President Kwame Nkrumah. So, Nkrumah’s ideology, though was started in the 1960s, it is still working at present. (Government Official 7, 2016)

This was supported by one Ghanaian think tank who maintained that ‘It has been an historical legacy that we have become champions of peacekeeping operations … The niche created by Nkrumah was … my neighbour’s problem is equally mine’ (Think tank 1, 2016).78 In this way,

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78 Also reiterated by another respondent (Government Official 3, 2016).
as the interviews presented, succeeding governments of Ghana believe just as Nkrumah did, that they have to provide support to other African states when the need arises particularly during grave situations in the pursuit of integration. The idea of solidarity is deep-rooted in Nkrumah’s Pan-African legacy and often mentioned as a reason in justifying Ghana’s intervention in another African country.

… the Nkrumah idea of ‘being our brother’s79 keeper’ still permeates the way that we all think and irrespective of the government that is in power, we always respond in the affirmative to UN or AU’s call for support on the continent. I don’t know a single occasion when the government of Ghana has refused to provide troops. Example, not even in a single critical election year did we turn down the request to provide troops. We always say ‘Yes’ which is a very good way to look at Ghana’s foreign policy on peacekeeping. (Think tank 2, 2016)

Furthermore, the interviews indicated that Ghana’s policy regarding participation in peacekeeping, especially in African countries, has Nkrumah’s Pan-African idea — a sense of connectedness and togetherness towards other states — as cornerstone. It was noted that even after the death of Nkrumah, the need to intervene during conflicts in order to create a stable environment for cooperation with other African states has been very important.

Ghana is a member of the international community and therefore, some of the decisions made by government regarding participation in peacekeeping are influenced by our membership. For instance, Ghana was key in forming regional groups for intervention and the basic idea was regional integration; foster relations among various African countries and in the long run the continent as a whole. (Government Official 5, 2016)

However, another government official argued that peacekeeping or intervention in other African states eventually safeguards the stability of Ghana’s security. The official speaking on the objective of Ghana’s engagement in intervention or peacekeeping stated that although the exercise strengthens solidarity, ‘[t]he rationale is also to combat the spillover effect of these crisis in other African countries’ (Government Official 7, 2016). Paradoxically, it was also echoed that in spite of these regional conflicts spilling over to Ghana, which may destabilise the country, since the early post-independence period Ghana has not been indifferent to crisis across the African continent because of the Pan-African foundation laid by Nkrumah with

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79 I am quoting from the text. I am not endorsing the gender language. It is important to note that this language of relationships was deliberately used to invoke a sense of closeness — and that is why I have kept the language. It illustrates that Pan-Africanism was a project aimed at diminishing distance in the African continent.
respect to faith in united Africans and solidarity. For example, a government official observed that:

What happens to other African states concerns all of us. It is in this context that over the years Ghana has been involved in cross-border security and other support in many areas. Ghana has shown solidarity … In the post-colonial era, it is important to say that Pan-Africanism has spearheaded our support for one another as African states. (Government Official 8, 2016)

Furthermore, it should be noted that the respondents made references to the point that Ghana’s intervention in crises on the African continent underscores its continuous commitment to the African project, which was started by Nkrumah. As a result, successive governments’ foreign policies, according to the interviews, have not departed from that sense of commitment and responsibility towards the African continent. This was stated by a Ghanaian think tank:

Surprisingly, successive governments even the military have all kept faith with the Nkrumah legacy and pledge to supporting interventions during conflicts in Africa … No single government has discarded the idea of commitment to Africa — African solidarity, African development, peace and African stability. They have all been committed to it and demonstrated practical support for Africa … They have all helped with maintaining peace and conflict resolution in Africa. (Think tank 4, 2016)

Significantly, all the interviews echoed a relationship between Ghana’s support for peacekeeping and furthering the African cause — promotion of territorial integrity and sovereignty. Again, the legacy of Nkrumah continuously empowers the country’s foreign policy on intervening in Africa. Even if this language is rhetorical (and there was evidence those interviewed saw it only as a rhetorical device), it is one regularly referenced when Ghana participates in UN, AU, or ECOWAS peacekeeping missions and attempts conflict resolution and mediation efforts.

One think tank suggested that a significant persistent component of Nkrumah’s legacy in Ghanaian politics today pertains to his foreign policy on the African enterprise: the strengthening of solidarity and integration. He highlighted that:

Today it doesn’t matter which government comes to power, they try to maintain the basic elements of Nkrumah’s foreign policy which includes Pan-African unity, African solidarity and regional integration … the idea or legacy of Nkrumah was so powerful which exerted such a powerful influence on subsequent regimes. (Think tank 6, 2016)
However, similar to Nkrumah’s Pan-African vision, Ghana’s foreign policy has also retained an element of national interest, which is at odds with the Pan-African solidarity norm. One interviewee acknowledged that ‘… whereas during Nkrumah’s time, the interventions were to further African solidarity, later interventions have a bit of African solidarity but also to stop refugees from coming here [Ghana]’ (Think tank 6, 2016). As a government official explained ‘[t]he unity, economic development, preservation of the stability of the continent; these drive our intervention decisions’ (Government Official 5, 2016). These contradictions are less readily discussed, which reveals both the power of Nkrumah’s legacy but also the discomfort Ghana’s political elite continues to experience with acknowledging its foreign policy dissonance.

In spite of the legacy of Nkrumah as a central impetus for Ghana’s peacekeeping engagements, it is also important to consider the alternative explanations not so readily raised in interviews. Scholars have suggested that preoccupying the military with peacekeeping missions prevents further internal mutinies — an ever-present concern in the face of Ghana’s history of successive military revolts (Victor, 2010; Aning, 2007; Dwyer, 2015; Crook, 1990). Victor has argued that this ‘diversionary’ motive keeps the troops overseas and thwarts domestic networks (by the military) that may facilitate military overthrows. In the words of a former commandant of the Ghana army, General Emmanuel Erskine, plans for an extension of the deployment period of the Ghanaian troops on peacekeeping operations abroad in 1981 was due to the fear ‘that to send the troops home might act as a catalyst for exacerbating the already difficult and uncertain situation in Ghana’ (cited in Victor, 2010, p. 220). Peacekeeping engagements, according to Levine (2016), were also used to keep the troops busy in order to avoid plotting of revolts in Ghana during the Rawlings’ military period. As mentioned above, Aubyn and Aning (2015) also point to the fact that Ghana’s involvement in peacekeeping in Africa is driven by economic need. They observe that peacekeeping activities bring financial benefits to Ghana, particularly the country’s armed forces and the police service through recompense packages given by multilateral institutions. Again, Aning and Aubyn (2013) state that Ghana’s contribution to peacekeeping in Africa has a security reason because (as mentioned in the interviews) it prevents a possible spread of the skirmishes into Ghana, especially conflicts in neighbouring states.

Despite the ‘logic’ of the above explanations, Ghana’s foreign policy practitioners consistently put forward the persistence of the Nkrumah Pan-African solidarity as explanation. This legacy has endured despite its obvious paradox with Ghana’s own prioritisation of national interest under Nkrumah and since.
I argue that we can only understand this if we take seriously the momentous change that Nkrumah’s ideas brought to post-colonial Africa. As Murithi (2008) clarifies, despite Nkrumah’s demise, ‘the dream and vision he espoused did not die with him’. In Ghana and most of sub-Saharan African states in the 1950s to the present day, statecraft and geopolitics have been pursued to achieve national interest often viewed through the self-interest of ‘big man politics’. In this thesis, however, I have also taken seriously the legacy of post-colonialism and its independence leaders. Despite Nkrumah’s failure, he changed how the people thought about their power and role in the African region. This personal ambition of the leader (Nkrumah) was crucial — for he promoted the conviction that African ideas and voices mattered too and that is what holds true in Ghana’s foreign policy vision today.

Conclusion

This chapter followed the demise of Nkrumah’s leadership, but it also traced the legacy of his ideas pertaining to Ghana’s foreign policy in the post-colonial period. The chapter revealed that materially, his leadership choices can only be described as controversial (at best), yet, his ideas remain constant in Ghana’s foreign policy. The overthrow of Nkrumah was underpinned by the fact that he became unwanted amongst the people and, crucially, the military after years of corruption, abuse of power, economic crises, and fatally, the dismissal of military officers. His efforts to assist other countries with their independence missions made him — at the time — an object of ridicule within Ghana. This laid the foundation for his downfall in February 1966 by aggrieved military and police officers, supported by the impoverished and disillusioned Ghanaian population.

Section Two of this chapter then turned to the phases of rule in Ghana after Nkrumah. Ghana has experienced four different republican governments with intermittent military takeovers. Each government has, with varying consistency, followed the foreign policy established by Nkrumah’s regime. In other words, subsequent leaders continue to frame Ghana’s foreign policy under the shadow of Nkrumah (Debrah, 2002). Even though Nkrumah’s Pan-African ambition held less interest to the political leadership that followed, successive presidents have used Nkrumah’s language and ideas in their attempts to persuade regional states to commit to more economic integration and cooperation. They also reiterated the idea of sovereign African states independence from ‘foreign interference’; and justified the participation in humanitarian interventions in the region to the Ghanaian population.
The final section discussed the legacy of Nkrumah viewed by those holding office or advising political administrations in Ghana today. In the interviews the power and legacy of Nkrumah often entered the discussion unprompted. Ghana’s participation in peacekeeping, regional cooperation arrangements in West Africa, even the formation of the African Union in 2002, are all attributed to the legacy laid down by the Nkrumah government, especially the promotion of the Pan-African ideal as a foreign policy. The country’s role in regional institutions continues to be associated with Nkrumah’s legacy. Contradictions and flaws in logic were pushed aside, or explained as contextual to time and place.

On the whole, this chapter has demonstrated that despite Nkrumah’s failure to successfully complete his normative entrepreneurship by capturing the available political moments in Ghana and Africa, his legacy in foreign policy making in Ghana has remained. In other words, as described in previous chapters, we saw that Nkrumah articulated his vision, built networks and established organisational platforms to drive his ambition. But the difficulty for Nkrumah was he could not effectively utilise the political opportunities that existed. As a result, he faced challenges in accomplishing his pan-African vision. However, what this chapter has identified is the fact that after six decades of the country’s independence, Nkrumah’s idea of Pan-Africanism continues to significantly influence policy making by successive governments. Nkrumah’s legacy in Ghana’s foreign policy making lives on.

In the Conclusion, I turn to the significance of Nkrumah as a norm entrepreneur, and the legacy of his ideas and influence in shaping Ghana’s foreign policy decisions today.
What is the legacy of the post-colonial foreign policy in Ghana today? Despite Nkrumah’s chequered leadership, and his pursuit of Pan-Africanism that was strongly rejected in the 1960s, he is revered as the ‘father’ of Ghana’s foreign policy. The foreign policy scholarship within Ghana uncritically presents Nkrumah’s advocacy of Pan-Africanism in the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) proceedings and the intervention in the Congo as the foundations of Ghana’s support for regional cooperation and participation in peacekeeping operations. The lived reality of his foreign policy leadership — corruption, failed intervention, contradictory and harmful positions on regional cooperation — contributed to Ghana’s poverty, the military revolt that led to the 1966 coup, and Ghana’s exclusion from crucial drafting discussions on the formation of the OAU. How do we explain this disconnect between the narrative in Ghana and the reality?

I argue that Nkrumah’s continued influence in Ghana’s foreign policy today — the narrative told of his ‘legacy’ is the consequence of the post-colonial experience. Nkrumah was the norm entrepreneur for Ghana’s independence from colonial rule. This unique contribution of his rule has led to an inability to disassociate Nkrumah’s contribution as an independence leader from the story of his actual rule and its consequence. This reluctance to critically reflect on the legacy of his leadership demonstrates the power of the idea of self-determination. Nkrumah and his advocacy for Ghana’s independence awakened and drove independence movements across the continent. His legacy in the early years of the independence movement is what Ghanaians hold with regard today. The reverence held for Nkrumah illustrates the power of ideologies and traits of political leaders, especially the legacy of founding elites (Mingst, 2003). These legacies, as Katzenstein (2005) argues, reinforce the domestic identities of emerging states. However, the consequence of Nkrumah’s legacy is reluctance to critically examine his leadership and the consequences of his leadership in Ghana today. Nkrumah has become a myth, but his leadership was flawed. It is important to acknowledge this because his individual legacy continues to have massive influence in Ghana.

This thesis set out to critically examine Ghana’s foreign policy in the post-independence era, focused on the legacy of Kwame Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanism. Scholarly research on post-colonial Africa, and Ghana in particular, often discusses ‘Nkrumah’s legacy’ — his decolonisation efforts and pursuit of regional unification. His legacy is being re-
examined in international relations (IR) research on international systems (Gallagher, 2018). In this research, I argued that the significance and continuity of Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanism is because he was one of the few post-independence leaders to have attempted to fervently articulate and diffuse an independent African foreign policy in the Congo independence struggles, and during the formative years of the OAU. His attempts failed. The Congo mission did not succeed in preventing the end of Lumumba’s rule and the OAU did not pursue a regional governance structure. At the same time, the domestic crises from Nkrumah’s leadership led to Ghana’s first (of four) coups in 1966. Yet, Nkrumah’s legacy as an independence leader remains. This research has demonstratively applied the concept of norm entrepreneurship to Nkrumah’s political trajectory. Thus, his framing of the issue — promulgating pan-Africanism as the most significant force for Africa’s self-determination and unity — has been examined in conjunction with the building of networks, organisational platforms and capturing of political opportunities.

In Chapter Two and Three I discussed why and how Nkrumah from the onset considered himself to be the only advocate and redeemer of Africa’s self-determination — with his articulation of the problem, creating networks, organising platforms, the attempted seizure of political opportunities and powering of independence movements on the continent during the 1950s and 1960s. He elevated himself as a particular champion of the African independence struggle. However, contrary to positive instances of norm entrepreneurship, Nkrumah could not maintain effective networks (or alliances) to support his normative advancement — instead his position was often creating controversies and divisions amongst his contemporaries. Nkrumah was unwilling to modify his Pan-African ideal in order to reach consensus in articulating his vision. As noted particularly in Chapter Three, Nkrumah quickly engaged the first three approaches of his entrepreneurialism — that is, by end of the chapter, he had quickly articulated his pan-African vision, built networks and established organisational platforms to propel his normative enterprise. It was argued that the fundamental challenge Nkrumah encountered as a norm entrepreneur was the effort to seize the available political opportunities. He achieved the first three frames immediately post-independence. But he lost the domestic and regional moments to successfully complete his normative cause.

In Chapter Four I discussed how the outcome of colonisation was that institutions were similar in the post-colonial period — although the values, structure and approach changed slightly. This marks the entry of ‘big man’ rule (Annan, 2016; Diamond, 2008) and its contradiction with Nkrumah’s role as a champion of independence. Nkrumah could not or would not recognise the fact that this institutional design would not permit the Pan-Africanism
he articulated. He found himself in a bureaucratic, political and regional structure that was still colonial. Rather than setting out to change the structures, Nkrumah secured his own rule. Notably, as the President of Ghana, Nkrumah had the domestic environment in the newly independent Ghana, which he could have utilised to support his regional pan-African undertaking. The chapter contended that Nkrumah could not effectively find and use the domestic political opportunities available for his normative entrepreneurialism. He struggled to mobilise domestic attachment and support for his vision. The challenge Nkrumah faced could be attributed to his conflicting policies and dictatorial tendency, which drew strong resentment from the Ghanaian population. Ironically, while he was preaching against oppression by Western colonial forces, in his own state there were cases of similar abuses. Therefore, his domestic driving force — the political environment — backfired on him.

Big man politics was very influential in post-colonial (post-independence) Africa, and the findings of this thesis are that Ghana’s foreign policy was fashioned by Nkrumah’s ideology but underlying it is a reverence for big man rule. Paradoxically, Nkrumah’s values in Ghana’s independence movement – the fidelity to rule of law, civic and political liberalism – was abandoned by Nkrumah himself very early into his Presidency. This research has confronted the myth of post-colonial leadership within Ghana.

In Chapter Five and Chapter Six I critically examined two cases where Nkrumah’s ‘legacy’ is often referred to as ‘tipping points’ in Ghanaian foreign policy literature: Ghana’s first peacekeeping engagement in the Congo and the role of Ghana in the OAU formation. What were Nkrumah’s norm entrepreneurial attempts in promoting Pan-Africanism as a vehicle for protecting Africa’s independence and unity through two main cases? In these two cases, I sought to retrace how Nkrumah successfully applied the framework of norm entrepreneurship — problem framing, network building, organisational platforms and capturing political opportunities. However, the findings were that his attempt to capture the political moments and venues was weakened. I argue that Nkrumah was overall unsuccessful in affecting his normative change. As the chapters demonstrate, in contrast to effective entrepreneurship, Nkrumah lost the regional political windows of opportunity required for the completion of his entrepreneurship. He failed to accomplish his aspiration because he was inconsistent regarding commitment to the promotion of Pan-Africanism. Clearly, Nkrumah framed what his ideal pan-African identity would be in the Congo mission and the OAU negotiations. Again, he tried to maintain alliances with other states, as well as procuring organisational platforms particularly through meetings with like-minded leaders and states.
And yet, when it came to capturing the regional political environment — he just lost it. He could not rally regional momentum and a coalition to advance his objective.

In the Congo case, the thesis has shown that Nkrumah encountered immediate practical challenges in the pursuit of his vision of Pan-Africanism. The Congo crisis is significant because it was Ghana’s first continental project and was to become a crucial launch pad for Nkrumah to reinforce coalitions to promote his vision of Pan-African unity. However, it was a practical demonstration of Nkrumah’s flawed ambition. The chapter identified three reasons for Nkrumah’s failure to articulate and proselytise the norm of Pan-Africanism during the Congo project, including inconsistencies in his approach, lack of domestic and regional support, and Ghana’s geopolitical weakness in the emerging Cold War era. Nkrumah refused to acknowledge any of these and the consequence was that his leadership at home, and his regional influence, had significantly weakened by the time of the OAU discussions.

Nkrumah was certainly committed to realising his Pan-African vision in the new regional organisation and considered the OAU suitable to provide a key political window of opportunity for a continental unification that would be safeguarded from colonisation and neocolonisation. This research has sought to explore why in the face of Ghana’s internal challenges, Nkrumah continuously promoted the norm of Pan-Africanism and was relentless in his African cause — Nkrumah believed that this was the solution to ‘rescue’ Africa from political and economic susceptibility.

The early period of the creation of the OAU was essential in underlining the inconsistencies and controversies characterising Nkrumah’s normative advancement. Pan-Africanism was initially understood as the solution to Africa’s independence struggle — but, in the event of the Congo operation and the lead up to the OAU establishment — other African states increasingly considered Nkrumah’s Pan-African tactics regarding unification as an avenue that would threaten their sovereignty. Unlike Nkrumah’s Pan-African unity which advocated for unification under a federal leader, the other African states wanted a form of integration that would protect their sovereignty and ensure territorial non-interference, whereas Nkrumah’s Pan-African unity advocated for unification under a federal leader (Nkrumah clearly envisioned himself as the leader).

Nkrumah’s persistent Pan-African vision of continental independence and integration set the stage for division amongst the post-colonial African states pertaining to negotiations on the structure of the OAU which led to two main camps — the Casablanca and Monrovia. In the Casablanca group, Nkrumah again stood alone in advocating for a political union of states under a centralised leader (federal structure) whilst the majority of the other states in this bloc
preferred a cooperation model across economic, social and cultural domains. By contrast, the Monrovia bloc wanted gradual regional organisation focused almost entirely on economic cooperation. The Casablanca bloc, who were meant to be Nkrumah’s allies, had by then observed his actions in the Congo and were increasingly turning away from any model that included Nkrumah leading the discussions. By the time of the Addis Ababa Conference in 1963, which officially introduced the creation of the OAU, the majority of the African states were clear that they would not agree to any union that compromised their sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Even after the formation of the OAU Nkrumah still held that cooperation amongst the independent African states through the OAU structure should create a ‘Centralized Continental Union and give effective protection to our sovereign Independence’ (Nkrumah, 1973, p. 260). This statement by Nkrumah was not just rhetoric — it highlights his inconsistencies and contradictions as well as the need to re-evaluate the ‘legacy’ that Ghana presents today of Nkrumah’s leadership. Clearly, Nkrumah’s Pan-African proposal failed. The majority of the African states did not share his position; and the OAU Charter was silent on Nkrumah’s political unity and was emphatic on the protection of sovereignty and non-interference in the territory of member states.

Nkrumah not only lost the OAU identity battle, but his influence and impact in Ghana was continuously undermined by these foreign policy failures. As discussed in Chapter Seven, back home in his own state the political and economic crisis his government had created pointed to his eventual demise. In less than ten years, Nkrumah had pivoted from the champion of the African independence identity to a damaged presidency with little respect from powerful states in the OAU. It should be noted that at this point of his normative political trajectory, Nkrumah was no longer the post-independence warrior. He had lost both domestic and regional opportunities, support and influence to promote his normative change. That affected his power, his interest and it also affected the way others saw him. Hence, his identity changed and affected the success of his ambition. Despite these controversies and weaknesses surrounding Nkrumah’s attempted diffusion and articulation of the Pan-African vision, Chapter Seven shows that what has persisted is the legacy of his championing independence and solidarity amongst post-independence African states: Africans contributing to the resolution of their own problems. This legacy has remained significant in informing foreign policy direction and decision-making rationale in post-independence Ghana. The thesis has identified the enduring power of Nkrumah’s Pan-African idea decades after his death. This therefore highlights the power of norms even in the face of contestation and opposition (see Florini, 1996). Nkrumah’s
normative drive was weakened but his idea of Pan-Africanism has transcended governments in Ghana. Furthermore, as noted above, the relevance of Nkrumah’s legacy and its endurance today could be attributed to the fact that he in particular strongly and passionately championed the idea of Pan-Africanism. Amongst his pan-African contemporaries on the continent and subsequent Ghanaian leaders, as the study has shown, it was Nkrumah who keenly promoted Pan-Africanism.

In the same way, Nkrumah’s pan-African legacy has persisted on the African continent. Today, there are nods to Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanism in discussions on strengthening and accelerating the process of African integration and cooperation on the continent. For example, in the AU Journal, there is consideration of the need to move towards a federal African Union government — the United States of Africa (African Union, 2006). However, this Union will not have a single leader. Rather, it will be presided over by heads of state and governments of all African states or their delegates (African Union, 2006). In addition, the increased role of the AU in collective peacekeeping mission on the continent since the 1990s, according to Adebajo and Landsberg (2001), could be attributed to the enduring values of Nkrumah. It is also worth noting that the African Union’s proposed Agenda 2063 underlines a recognition and revival of Nkrumah’s legacy of Pan-Africanism. This initiative is aimed at attaining ‘a concrete manifestation of the Pan-African drive for unity, self-determination, freedom, progress and collective prosperity pursued under Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance’.

**Significance of the research**

This study has explained why this particular advocate of African independence, solidarity and integration — a flawed norm entrepreneur — has maintained significant influence in post-colonial Ghana. The study, particularly Chapter Seven, has underlined the power and influence of ‘big man’ politics in Ghana and how this narrative leads to a retelling of events. From a personal perspective, I felt this growing up in such an environment, where the political elite (and founding fathers), specifically Nkrumah, are revered and celebrated. Nkrumah is regarded as a hero for his achievements in Ghana’s independence struggle and decolonisation undertakings on the African continent, but his failures were never mentioned. It is rare to challenge the legacy of post-independence political leaders in West Africa. During my interviews, there was always broad consensus that Nkrumah’s legacy should not be

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80 See more [https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview](https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview).
underestimated. Yet, while it was never clear how much the people I interviewed believed this, they always said it pointing to Nkrumah’s legacy in Ghana’s peacekeeping and regional negotiations.

Given this strong inclination for Nkrumah’s ideas, his legacy underscores the power of post-colonial leadership. Certainly, Nkrumah’s contribution towards the Pan-African campaign caused a wave of collective movements, first his independence campaign in Ghana, and then across Africa. This study has focused on Nkrumah’s leadership and demonstrates the influence of founding political elites or big man politics. This study has also highlighted the challenges associated with big man political rule. In sum, the thesis therefore builds on the existing scholarship on the influence of the ideas of founding elites in post-independence states’ foreign policy choices (see Mingst, 2003), as well as the production of domestic identities of emerging post-colonial states (see Katzenstein, 2005). Further, this thesis is significant because it links these ideas to the perpetuation and reproduction of ‘big man’ political rule.

For Ghana to emerge truly independent, it is important to take a step back and reconsider the story of Ghana’s Pan-African foreign policy under this post-independence leader. Although Nkrumah’s influence was imperative, it is also important to look at his conflicting positions and failures. The myth of ‘big man’ politics in Ghana should be reconciled with the consequences of big man politics. Big man politics still permeates post-colonial African states, it remains powerful in the political decision-making process, in public policy, and in academic scholarship. These practices reject critical analysis and block the representation of young scholars, especially women, from contributing to politics, policy and political debates.

Ghana must move the story forward — acknowledging that while we may value Nkrumah for what he did in propelling Ghana’s independence struggle — it does not mean we cannot also critically look at the consequences of his style of leadership. In the introduction I noted that Ghana, when mentioned in the IR scholarship, is regarded as a peaceful, small state that contributes a significant number of peacekeepers. It was also the birthplace of the UN’s seventh Secretary-General. This thesis has shown a different early history of Ghana. Ghana’s early foreign policy years were like those of any other post-independence state — seeking the accrual of material wealth and positioning for power in the international system — but ideas and legacy were also on Nkrumah’s agenda as he sought to change the international system in Africa. He wanted to transfer the independence achieved for Ghana across to all of Africa and in doing so, he made mistakes that costed the acquisition of wealth and power for Ghana. Ghana
then spiralled into coups and violence from 1966 to 1981. We can only make sense of these decisions if we treat the power of his ideas seriously (Katzenstein, 2005). Nkrumah, to a fault, relentlessly promoted a Pan-African political union and championed for an independent post-colonial Africa.

The study has shown that leadership in post-colonial African states continues to have huge influence on domestic institutions and organisations. As the thesis has revealed, Nkrumah’s influence and ‘legacy’ are associated by politicians, diplomats, academics, even the military, when discussing the legacy of Ghana’s foreign policy choices. Despite Ghana spanning different political administrations, few challenge Nkrumah’s ‘values and ideals’ — even the military administration that overthrew Nkrumah evoked his ‘Pan-African’ language. As one Ghanaian policy think tank noted in an interview on Nkrumah’s ideals and how they inform Ghana’s foreign policy — ‘Every government that came to power has stuck to them’ (Think tank 5, 2016). Nkrumah has become a mythological personality in the political story of Ghana.

Finally, Nkrumah’s legacy of being the champion of Africa’s independence movement is not his legacy, it is the people of Ghana and African people’s legacy. People fought for independence, not only their leaders. Reclaiming the role of people in fighting for independence is linked to the people today reclaiming their right to critically engage with public policy and political processes. In future research I would like to study in more detail the independence movements led by people prior to and immediately after colonisation in West Africa: Ghana, Sierra Leone, The Gambia and Nigeria. I intend to study the legacy of people and the need to recapture their stories to empower democratic populations’ demands of their politicians and political institutions. In order to break free of the ‘big man’ legacy that is imposed on populations — to this day — there is a need to retell this history, to research the bravery of ‘ordinary’ people who fought and challenged colonial rule.

My future research in Ghana intends to study the organisation of its bureaucracy and the institutional legacy of colonial rule. Although this research has mainly centred on Nkrumah, the lessons of Ghana’s over-reliance on individual elites has affected the establishment and development of independent bureaucratic institutions. For Ghana to progress critical and independent institutional practices with ethnic and gender diversity within their organisations, as envisioned by its people post-independence, there needs to be a re-evaluation of the structures and institutions that continue to support big man rule.
Appendix: Primary Research (Interviews)

Government Official 1, Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy, University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana. 10 May 2016.
Government Official 9, ANC Mall, Accra. 30 September 2016.
Think Tank 1, Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana. 19 May 2016.
Think Tank 2, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), Accra, Ghana. 15 June 2016.
Think Tank 3, Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana. 28 June 2016.
Think Tank 4, Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy, University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana. 2 September 2016.
Think Tank 5, Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College, Accra, Ghana. 22 September 2016.
Think Tank 6, Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG), Accra, Ghana. 7 October 2016.
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