On unfolding present and past (rock art) worldings
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ABSTRACT
This paper is set out to unfold present and past (rock art) ontologies or ‘worldings’. It aims to present different modes of identifications, and the often intricate relationships between humans and other-than-humans from a relational perspective, with the hope of challenging our western perception of the world. It presents some thoughts on how different ontologies are unfolded through artworks and material culture, and how these worldings differ from one another.

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Introduction
This and the following special issue of Time and Mind (2019 issues 2 and 3) presents articles that draw their inspiration from the global phenomenon of rock art, and how this has been used to express and unfold different human cognitions and perceptions of the world. It aims to explore different rock art worldings, the often intricate relationships between humans and other-than-humans from a relational perspective that can tend to challenge our western perception of the world. This opening article presents some thoughts on how different ontologies, or modes of identification, are unfolded through artworks and material culture, and how these worldings might differ from one another. The purpose is to hopefully help the reader make the following case studies more comprehensible.

Four modes of identification
In his Mayor Opus ‘Beyond nature and culture’, Descola (2013) presents a fourfold discourse of ontologies, or modes of identification, encompassing animism, totemism, analogism and naturalism.

An animistic worlding advocates a continuity between the souls of human and other-than-humans, and asserts a discontinuity between bodies, between different beings ‘clothing’ (Figure 1). Following Descola (2013, 129–143), a number of hunter-gatherer societies in America, Siberia and Southeast Asia
exemplify these modes of identification. Animists endow other-than-human beings, such as plants, animals, trees, lakes, celestial phenomena and other parts of their physical environment, with subjectivity. To this list, we might add past ancestors who are perceived as continuing to act and communicate with

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<td><strong>Similar interiorities</strong> (soul essences are identical and all members of a class conform to one type)</td>
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<td><strong>Totemism</strong> Australian model</td>
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**Figure 1.** Different modes of identification. *Animism* claims that there is only one culture but many different natures, because all beings are the same on the inside but different on their outsides – through their clothing. *Naturalism* turns this notion on its head and claims it is only one nature and many cultures. *Totemism* states that a being is the same both on the inside and on the outside, while *analogism* claims that beings differ on both these points. Source: Descola (2013), 233.
the living. Because all living things share the same spiritual essence ‘animated beings are engendered . . . by one another . . . life is the temporal process of its ongoing creation’ (Ingold 2000, 113). To access these spiritual properties, people engage in personal and reciprocal relationships with other-than-human beings, and, not least, through exchanges of different sorts, such as friendship, seduction, and sometimes also hostility. The ultimate illustration of the trust and sharing of life forces between human and other-than-humans is when an animal ‘gives itself’ to a hunter, and how a hunter respects and accords a ritual protocol to safeguard its renewal (Ingold 2000, Chap. 1, see Brightman 1993; Nadasdy 2007; Villerslev 2007, among others).

Most animic worldings state that human and other-than-human beings share the same origin. Animals are then explained as ex-humans. Before the sockeye salmon of the northwest coast of British Colombia became a fish, for instance, they lived among humans as ordinary people. After breaking certain taboo, they were transformed into their current ‘clothing’ and thereafter forced to live in the sea as ordinary ‘humans’ do in houses, and in families as wives and husbands do with their children. Once a year they return to their origin to breed, and the humans then welcome them back as their sisters and brothers. The sockeye salmons share the same spiritual essence as their sisters and brothers (Boas 2001; Descola 2010), they act as humans, and the only thing that differs is their clothing – and their perspectivism (Figure 2).

![Figure 2](image-url) Figure 2. Following an animic worlding, the only thing that differs between a human and a non-human being is its clothing. Animic rock art (and other such artforms) focus on posture, movement, behaviour and an animal’s disguise, and sometimes portray the prey when it gives itself to their sisters and brothers. Here exemplified with an animated reindeer from Bøla, North-Trøndelag, Norway. (Photograph by Gustaf Hallström, now in the Research Archive at Umeå University, published with their kind permission.)
An animic worlding asserts that other-than-human beings possess the same subjectivity as humans – acts, moral codes, rights and wrongs, ceremonies and rituals, kinship rules, and life-worlds. More importantly, these beings engage themselves with humans, but human and other-than-human beings live parallel lives which in many ways are intertwined.

Following from this, different ‘clothing’ brings different perspectives on the world. By shifting costume, humans can take on other-than-human ways of perceiving the world. They will then perceive other humans as animals and animals as humans, which also admit them to intra-act with other-than-human beings. And vice versa, when other-than-human beings take on human clothing they can intra-act with humans (Viveiros de Castro 1998, 2012, see also Brightman 1993; Ingold 2000, 111–131, among others). Whether you see one or the other depends on your perspectivism.

Totemism conveys different worldings, though it cuts through the boundaries of species (Descola 2013, 144–171). According to my understanding of this highly contested notion, all totemic worldings share animic traits. Animism can exist without totemism, but totemism cannot exist without animism (e.g. Sahlins 2014). The difference being that in totemism beings share a totem, being human or other-than-human as a plant, animal, or some other creature, and all beings are affiliated and assert the same physical conformation, substances, temperament and behaviour ‘by common origin localized in space’ (Descola 2014, 275). Or simply put: ‘The totemic world is essential, the animic world dialogical’ (Ingold 2000, 114).

Descola turned against Claude Lévi-Strauss’ definition of totemism, and especially what Lévi-Strauss (1964) called ‘the totemic illusion’. Descola (2014, 275) does not see totemism as originating from an attempt to classify the world, but through the sharing of ‘essences’ among different beings ‘which is present in this species as well as in all the beings subsumed under it in a totemic grouping’.

As with almost all anthropologists, Descola exemplifies totemism, and how his notions differ from Lévi-Strauss’, with reference to Australian indigenous cultures – in this case, von Brandenstein’s (1977) research among the Nungar of southwest Australia. The Nungar divides themselves into two totemic moieties: maarnetj or white cockatoo and warardar the crow, also referred to as ‘the catcher’ and ‘the watcher’. Following Descola these moieties are not the result of inferring arbitrary typical attributes from these animals to designate the totemic division, but from how these beings ‘manifest discontinuities of form and behaviour, an analogical template that could be used to structure social discontinuities’ (Descola 2014, 276). Some of the things that mark the sameness within a totem among Nungar we find ‘flesh (or meat), skin, head, forehead (or face), eyes, side, liver (or temper), or colour (in particular that of the skin)’ (Descola 2013, 155). A totemic worlding then considers the entire body – features that are found both outside as well as on the inside of the body – to distinguish a being (Figure 3). To summarise: totemic beings, being human or other-than-human, share substances and spiritual powers
within their own totem, a *sameness*, but not necessary all substances and spiritual powers with other totemic beings.

The variation between different perceptions of the world has bearings on how people unfold their worlding and subsequently how they materialise it into art and other objects (Figures 2–3). Tim Ingold indicates that neither animic or totemic artworks should be considered ‘art’, as it usually is defined within the western worldview, which he describes as a ‘fragment of the western imagination’, but rather as particular ways of relating to the world (Ingold 2000, 112). In his reading of art objects associated with these worldings, he found that the making of portable art could be attributed to animism, while the making of rock art and bark paintings could be attributed to totemism. Portable art, such as Inuit bone and ivory figurines, often emphasises the natural shape of the animal and are depicting the animals in a way that are often described as ‘naturalistic’ by archaeologists. These objects present the animals as they are, as active and alive nonhumans or – ‘persons’, the animals have ‘attitude’, they portray an ongoing dialogue, and great respect has been paid to their bodily attributes, such as the shape of the body and head, the ear, eyes, colour, in sum: their ‘clothing’ (Figure 2). What are enhanced in these

![Image](image_url)
artworks are ‘the powers that bring forth life’ which are ‘distributed among the manifold beings that inhabit it’ (Ingold 2000, 113).

Ingold illustrates totemic artworks by referring to bark paintings made by different artists from Kunwinjku in western Arnhem Land, Australia. These often depict animals in an x-ray style exposing outer as well as inner attributes and bodily parts, such as the spine and skeleton, organs such as lung, heart, liver and kidneys, et cetera (cf. Figure 3). The depicted humans and animals are usually infilled by cross-hatching known as rarrk patterns, which refer to a specific clan group as well as personal totems. The rarrk contains esoteric knowledge that is revealed in ceremonial contexts where both sacred objects as well as the participants are adorned with rarrk; the latter in the form of body art (e.g. Taylor 1996). These paintings ‘draw its essential form and substance directly from the land, and the land, in turn, embodies the creative powers of the ancestors [it] portray a world that is already made, not one in the making’ (Ingold 2000, 113, 120, see also Descola 2010).

Ingold shows how specific modes of identification, such as animism and totemism, are visualised and materialised in different manners and matters. The art mediates people’s worldings (cf. Figures 2–3). Ingrid Fuglestvedt (2018) has recently advanced these ideas in her thought-provoking study of North European hunter-gatherer societies – Rock art and the wild mind – visual imagery in Mesolithic northern Europe. Instead of linking different kinds of materialities to different worldings, Fuglestvedt explores how these are expressed within a specific assemblage and materiality, in this case, hunter-gatherer rock art, and how alterations and changes within this media are related to different worldings. In her readings of these materailities, Fuglestvedt (2018, 268–269) suggests that ‘animic rock art expresses a focus on the guise of the animal, while totemic rock art expresses a focus on its inner essence’ (Figure 4):

After examining the hunter-gatherer rock art in northern Europe from several perspectives Fuglestvedt arrives at the conclusion that animic rock art often depicts open or fully scooped-out animals. The outline of the head is often defined or the head is fully ‘scooped out’ (fully engraved). She argues that these images often mark elements of the animals ‘clothing’, such as fur, thighs, shoulders, beards, et cetera (Figure 2). Totemic rock art, on the other hand, is focussed on marking the inner body, different skeletons and organs, but also design patterns and body-fill (Figure 3). Following Ingold: ‘what is depicted is not a particular being situated within a world, but rather the world as it is enfolded within a particular being’ (Ingold 2000, 119, my italics). Fuglestvedt argues that human and other-than-human hybrids are common in totemic art, and that these beings are commonly depicted in relation to other beings in ceremonial contexts (cf. Ingold 2000, 111–131), e.g. human and other-than-human beings depicted in circles, rows, and variations on such a theme (cf. Figures 1–4).

Fuglestvedt’s pivotal study is important though she demonstrates that there is not a simple movement or ‘evolution’ from one worlding to another.
People’s worldings in northern Europe during the Mesolithic were enmeshed and altered between different groups of hunter-gatherers, as well as within a single group of hunter-gatherers. Changes occurred in time and space (Goldhahn 2018). People’s worldings are able to oscillate between different beliefs systems being animic or totemic, or rather something in between or even something completely else – and these worldings are contextualised in relation to social, cultural and ideological trajectories (Fuglestvedt 2018).

The third mode of identification that Descola encompasses is founded on a worlding that suppose that the whole world is ‘broken’ into a ‘multiplicity of essences, forms, and substances separated by minute intervals, often ordered along a graded scale’ (Descola 2014, 276). Descola label this worlding analogism and he illustrates it through the Christian thought of the ‘Great Chain of Being, that was conveyed during the Pre-Modern era (Figure 1). Other instances of this worlding are found in China, Asia, West Africa, and among indigenous societies of Mesoamerica and the Andes (Descola 2013, 200–231). These worldings are built on reverberating resemblances and analogies linking different objects and phenomenon to each other in intricate intertwined ways.

During the Medieval Ages and the Renaissance in Europe, it was argued that God established these similarities through his creational acts, and that specific resemblances between different phenomena could be used to understand God’s plan for the world in general, and in particular his plan for sinful humans who were awaiting the return of Jesus Christ. Following this train of thought, humans, other-than-humans, objects and other phenomena, as stars and, yes, all wonders that were created by God in the first place, are entangled into a divine network – a Great Chain of Being – where essential possessions of

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<th>Animic rock art</th>
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<tr>
<td>Open or fully scooped-out animals</td>
<td>Ambiguous inner organs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marking of head-line or head fully scooped out</td>
<td>Design patterns</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marking of elements of the outer body or dress: fur, thighs and shoulders, beard</td>
<td>Body fill (animals, humans, artifacts, frames)</td>
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<td>Humans or human-animal-hybrids in circle or row</td>
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Figure 4. Definition of animic versus totemic elements in hunter-gatherer rock art in northern Europe according to Fuglestvedt (cf. Figures 2–3). (After Fuglestvedt 2018, 299, Tab. 7.3, published with her kind permission.)
each autonomous entity are interrelated according to how they resemble each other. Though God was divine there could be no mistake in his creation, with one big exception that was: iniquitous human beings. The holy script afforded humans with free will, and they strove and struggled with this freedom, with all too well-known outcomes. The rest of God’s creation, however, was without flaws. The diversity in God’s creation was therefore believed to be a mirage and to study this diversity and its resemblance to different phenomena was a way in which a seemingly fragmented world could be mended, and moved towards a fuller understanding of God’s great creation and plan for the human race.

Descola has argued that analogism can be seen as a ‘hermeneutic dream of completeness’ that wishes to fit all of the great wonders of the world into a great whole: ‘… it nurtures the hope of weaving these slightly heterogeneous elements into a web of meaningful affinities and attractions that gives the appearances of constituting a continuity’ (Descola 2013, 202).

The latter, however, is not unique to analogism, it is the task of every worlding including that prevailing in western culture, which Descola (2013, 172–200) labels naturalism. This mode of identification sprung from the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment (Thomas 2004). Naturalism is the only worlding that nourishes a belief that all other-than-human beings and the whole universe exists and acts after rational principles and through a number of natural laws which humans can learn about but which we cannot possess full control over. Everything that happens outside the human domain, follows its own causes, and cannot be interfered with by humans, their will or desire. It is an inverted form of animism. Naturalism is built on a worlding that perceives the world as consisting of a single unifying nature and a multiplicity of cultures. Following from this, naturalism states a discontinuity of interiorities and a material continuity (Figure 1). It nourishes a perception of form inherited from Christianity that humans are bestowed with a free will, but does not extend this proposition to other-than-human beings. Following from this, naturalism places humans in a privileged position above all other beings in the world. ‘What . . . distinguishes humans from nonhuman si st h em i n d , t h e s o u l , s u b j e c t i v i t y , a moral conscience, language, and so forth’ (Descola 2014, 277).

From the art of worldings to the worldings of art

As with most grand-scale theoretical frameworks, Descola’s pivotal outline of modes of identification and humans’ worldings (Figure 1), has been met with both awe and criticism. Some researchers believe that the presented modes of identifications are reductionistic, and that Descola does not do justice to the variability in human worldings (Halbmayer 2012; Coelho de Souza 2014; Feuchtwang 2014; Fischer 2014; Helmreich 2014; Kapferer 2014; Lambek 2014; Lenclud 2014; Sahlin 2014; Hornborg 2015, among others). Others, such as Busacca (2017, 315) have warned us that similar ontological schemes could lead to essentialism that potentially could polarise modern Western and Indigenous understandings of the world. Viveiros
de Castro (2013), in turn, cogitates that Descola has been too modest and not radical enough to challenge his own perception of the world – naturalism.

However, Descola has stressed that his suggested modes of identification are a theoretical model, which should not be mixed up with reality itself. He argues that the model can be usefully applied to study past and present realities but that human worldings do not effortlessly fall into one of the presented labels – animism, totemism, analogism, or naturalism. Human beings often express ‘multiple worlds’ or worldings because of the possible assets and relations afforded to human cognition:

>[O]nce the worlding process has been achieved, once some of these qualities and relations have been detected and systematized, the result is not a worldview, that is, one version among others of the same transcendental reality; the result is a world in its own right, a system of incompletely actualized properties, saturated with meaning and replete with agency, but partially overlapping with other similar configurations that have been differently actualized and instituted by different actants. (Descola 2014, 277–278)

A general conclusion of these considerations, which has clear and important bearings for the present and proceeding volume of *Time and Mind*, is that the world is composed and perceived differently by different people, societies and cultures. The same also goes for other-than-human beings. Following from this, I would argue that it is our task as archaeologists to attempt re-composing these lost worldings to the best of our abilities. For archaeology, this often means that we have to access and assess different material culture to be able to present an informed argument about past worldings. Even though we will never be able to achieve total success, our attempts can serve to challenge our own perception of the world, a contemplation that is necessary in order to navigate the world as moral beings.

In this pursuit, Ingold has accentuated the importance of restraint so as not to fall into the ‘representational trap’. Material culture or artwork is not a passive reflection or representation of people’s worldings – these meanings are not stored in detached places or outside minds or beside material culture or artworks that we use for our studies and analyses. Instead, meanings are formed in the very act of creating and displaying an object or an artwork, and – importantly – different properties of material culture actively participate in these creative acts to unfold and reveal these worldings. Therefore, material culture in general and rock art in particular is the result of the act of encoding and the attribution of meaning through people’s worldings (Ingold 2000, 111–131, see also Gell 1998, 6–7; Descola 2010; Ingold 2011; Jones 2017). The meaning of an artwork would not reside outside the art, in the mind of any onlooker, but it would rather be revealed in the very act of creating these artworks. Meaning is not external to art, but art produces meaning, to make sense of, and unfold people’s worldings.
An important implication of Ingold’s perception of art is that he does not separate cognition from practical knowledge and bodily experience – mind and body are kept entwined – as one. Let us consider some illustrative examples to clarify these focal points. During the Renaissance, the thought of the Great Chain of Being was materialised in so-called Wunderkammer, or cabinets of curiosities. These cabinets gathered the most unthinkable things – and some thinkable ones as well (Figure 5). At a first glance, these cabinets can look rather chaotic, not least for somebody that is acquainted with a world categorised by naturalism. In the cabinet gathered by the Danish scholar Ole Worm, one of the first State Antiquarians in the world, we see how canoes, bows, arrows and spears, polar bears, the calf from an elk, a Sámi doll, are mixed and related to stuffed fish and birds, tortoise shells, and an alligator. On top of which we find some ‘thunderbolts’ – or disguised Neolithic axes, Medieval drinking horns, fossils, horns and trophies from exotic and domestic animals, and much more.

The chaotic representation of the wonders of the world are of course deceptive, these Wunderkammers were carefully arranged according to analogism (Figure 1). The objects were first divided into categories made by nature – which in this case meant created by God – or naturalia, and those made by wearying sinful humans, artificiosa. Subsequently, the objects were arranged by the seeming resemblance an object shared with others. It is important to underline that these items were not

Figure 5. The front piece of ‘Musei Wormiani Historia’ published the same year as Worm died, 1654 CE. (Copyright expired.)
collected because they testified about past societies and cultures, or exemplified different animal taxa. The objects in the cabinets were not thought to possess any historical or chronological value *per se*. It has been argued that objects gathered in a *Wunderkammer* expressed a semantic and allegoric value and represented a microcosm that reflected God’s creation and, ultimately, his incomprehensible plan for humanity (Lovejoy 1936). These representations went two ways, each object in the cabinet also reflected the macrocosms, the greatness of God’s creations. The harmony conveyed through the resemblance between different objects in general and in particular between the micro- and macrocosms was attributed to God who alone was thought capable of creating such perfect cosmic balance. Following this train of thoughts, the meaning of a *Wunderkammer* was to allow people to get a glimpse of and be amazed by the diversity of God’s wonders.

This interpretation could of course be partly true, but following the momentous point made by Ingold, the meaning of these objects was not detached from the things themselves, nor from the bodily practice and experience of collecting, arranging, exchanging, displaying, or visiting and gazing all the marvellous objects in a *Wunderkammer*. God was not represented in these rooms – God and his creation was – to use a phrase form Roy Wagner (1981) – ‘invented’. The meaning of the objects was entangled and unfolding with the very practice of collecting and the first-hand involvement of arranging and viewing the cabinet. During the creation and recreation of peoples’ worldings these bodily experiences were essential, and by engaging in these processes and practices the objects themselves *intra-acted* in presenting the wonders of God, and his Great Chain of Being (e.g. Barad 2007). These experiences engaged body with mind and mind with body (Figure 5). Here people could be tickled with a peacock feather, and also be enchanted by the sparkling splendour of its colour. People could be seduced by the taste of a stuffed elephant foot; get mesmerised by the texture of the skin of a polar bear and marvel at the apparent similarity between a stone axe and a fossil; it was as though they were listening to God’s own voice harboured in a seashell. They could be bamboozled by the remarkable resemblance between a starfish, a flower, and the stars at the gate to Heaven. What does God want to say by that?

In a similar way, we might allow ourselves to rethink the arrangement of the first archaeological museums that were ordered according to a worlding exposed to naturalism (Figure 1).

**Figure 6** is gathered from the National Museum of Denmark in Copenhagen, and it consists of one of the earliest photographs of their Bronze Age exhibition taken around 1880. That said, it exemplifies any national museum from a protestant country in northern Europe from the late nineteenth century (Gräslund 1987).

Unfolding naturalism materialised through a similar invention of gathering, sorting, arranging, exchanging, and displaying as the *Wunderkammer*, but instead of an almighty God, now the assembled objects were guided by the revolutionary theory of evolution. This vision of the past was not built on any resemblance between
objects created by God, but the inherent differences between the objects (Figure 1). Furthermore, it only focused on objects that were created by the ‘not-so-sinful-anymore’ human beings. A linear concept of time was chief (Lucas 2005). Human cultures were thought to evolve and follow the same life course (or should we say ‘life curse’?) as human beings: they are born, grow up and flourish, before they encounter the inevitable end – decay and death. Like humans evolving from monkeys, different objects evolved from other objects in a typological chain reaction reflecting cultural identities as well as cultural changes (e.g. Montelius 1884; Kossinna 1911; Childe 1925; see Jones 1997; Trigger 2006). As Montelius (1884, 1, translated here), one of the co-inventors of the typological method found in naturalism, faithfully declared: ‘What the species are for the natural scientist, the type is for the archaeologist’ (see Montelius 1986). Montelius saw his thesis proven in the obvious fact that ‘one type has evolved from the other’, and he unfolded this worlding through arranging the artefacts from prehistory into typological sequences of different objects.

The Montelian typological methodology was materialised in the prehistoric exhibitions that also shared the worlding of naturalism (Figure 6). The rooms of museums revealed the passage of time and the evolution of man with a capital M. In museums arranged according to naturalism, the Stone Age room leads further to the Bronze Age room, which gave way to the hall of Iron. Each room was staged in a similar thoughtful and heuristic way. Objects from closed find contexts that were, and still are, so imperative for establishing different chronologies, were staged in

Figure 6. ‘What the species are for the natural scientist, the type is for the archaeologist’. The Bronze Age exhibition in the National Museum of Denmark around 1880. (Photograph by the National Museum of Copenhagen, published with their kind permission.)
the middle of each room. This central display is explained by the fact that closed finds, such as burials, depositions, etc., were the solid backbone of the Three Age System of Thomsen (1836), as well as for the typology of Montelius (1986; see Gräslund 1987). Objects that had been found as stray finds or without provenance were placed along the walls. These were not thought to be useful for creating any chronology. Instead they were put into use to reveal the passing of time. These objects were arranged according to chronological periods after their distinct types; axes from period II with axes from period II, swords from period III with swords from period III. Fibulas from period IV with fibulas from period IV. And more of the same (Figure 6). These objects were also arranged following size to amplify the coming and going of specific object types, periods, or epochs. The objects formed a wave-like pattern along the walls, which materialised and revealed the birth, growth and decline of chronological sequences and the passing of time and cultures (Figure 6).

It appeared as though specific types of objects, different periods, epochs, and prehistoric cultures, had a spirit and life of their own. The purpose of this and similar displays in the late nineteenth-century museums was not to represent prehistory but to invent it. To unfold naturalism. The coming and going of ages, such as Stone, Bronze and Iron Age, was thought to represent the coming and going of certain people, leading up to the formation of known nation states and its people that distinguished themselves through specific languages and peculiar cultural traits (Jones 1997). Inventing prehistory was seen as a great endeavour and an important task that served both a nation and its citizens, because, as Hildebrand (1872, 14, translated here), another co-inventor of the typological methodology, declared: ‘...a nation without a prehistory is like an orphan with a history that nobody knows’. Darwin’s thesis on biological evolution had found its application on the evolution of Man, and how the civilisations and nations evolved.

As the Wunderkammer was able to invent analogism, the national museum’s exhibitions of the Stone, Bronze and Iron Age were inventing and unfolding naturalism. There is little to no reason to assume that the objects were considered secondary or passive in these processes. The objects played their parts, and they played them just fine (Jones 1997).

Concluding remarks

The outlined modes of identifications and how different ontologies unfolds through material culture shall not be seen as a bullet-proof map to detect different rock art worldings. Instead it might be viewed as a toolkit which can serve as a template in approaching the case studies that follow in this and the subsequent number of Time and Mind (2019, Issues 2 and 3). Both the authors intention and outcome of their studies alter in accordance with both the present and past worldings they are set to unfold. It is our anticipation that the variation as well as any similarities that can be detected will enforce the important role of rock art in present and past people’s perception of the world.
Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

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