Nuclear Disarmament and the 2010 NPT Review Conference

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in March 1970, has been considered to be one of the great success stories of arms control with some 190 states party to the treaty at the last NPT Review Conference (RevCon) in 2005. Of those 190 states only nine possess nuclear weapons – the five nuclear weapons states recognised under the NPT (US, Russia, China, UK and France), three non-NPT nuclear weapons states (Israel, India and Pakistan) and one that has recently withdrawn from the NPT (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea). Despite this apparent success there are widespread fears that the NPT and the non-proliferation regime that was built around it are under extreme pressure. Such fear is based on the perception that since the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 belief in the effectiveness of the treaty, the viability of the treaty’s core bargains and the general norm against nuclear proliferation has been eroded. Such symptoms have included the nuclear weapons tests of non-NPT states India and Pakistan in 1998, the failure of the US Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1999, the nuclear programs of NPT-members Iraq, the DPRK (a NPT member until 2006) and Iran, the exposure in 2003 of the ‘nuclear Wal-Mart’ of A. Q. Khan, the US abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) in 2001 and the continued maintenance and development of large nuclear arsenals by the recognised nuclear powers (Carranza 2006: 490-493).¹

Despite such challenges the upcoming 2010 NPT RevCon, unlike its predecessor in 2005, appears set to take place in an international climate characterised by a widespread hope that there will be practical movement toward nuclear disarmament, long considered to be a quixotic goal for arms control and non-proliferation
advocates. This renewed push for nuclear disarmament has not only come from the usual arms control and non-proliferation ‘wonks’ but from some renowned US ‘cold warriors’ (Perkovich and Acton 2009; Schultz, Perry, Kissinger and Nunn 2007 & 2008). It has also been felt in the policy realm with the new US administration of President Barack Obama committing itself to actively work towards the goal of nuclear disarmament (White House 2009).

Thus, this brief article will address two key questions: (1) Why is progress on nuclear disarmament seen by many as vital for re-invigorating the international non-proliferation regime?; and (2) What are the prospects for progress on nuclear disarmament at the 2010 NPT RevCon? The answer to the first question lies in an analysis of the core bargains and logic of the NPT itself, and particularly in the priorities that the NWS and NNWS parties to the treaty have attached to those bargains. Nuclear disarmament’s importance lies in its potential to revitalise the relationship between the NWS and NNWS in terms of re-establishing trust and assurance that parties to the treaty will abide by their obligations. To address the second question it is necessary to outline the role of disarmament at the previous RevCons of 1995, 2000 and 2005 in order to provide the context for judging the potential role of the disarmament issue at the 2010 conference.

The Core Bargains of the NPT and Challenges to the Non-Proliferation Regime

The success of the non-proliferation regime until the end of the Cold War was due to the development of a consensus between the US and Soviet Union that further horizontal proliferation would be detrimental to their interests and security. The superpowers also persuaded the majority of non-weapons states that this goal was also
in their interests, while neutralising possible dissenters in their own alliance blocks through the extension of security assurances (Paul 2003: 138-140). However, in the post-Cold War era, and especially the post-9/11 period, the favourable systemic conditions and system-induced interests that made the NPT possible are shifting, calling into question the viability of the regime (Carranza 2006). Of particular importance since 1991 has been the lack of great power consensus on the question of proliferation (Perkovich 2006: 362). One avenue through which consensus has been sought is through the five-yearly NPT RevCons. The purpose of the RevCon is to review the operation of the NPT ‘with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised’ (IAEA 1970: 4). RevCons thus present an opportunity to assess and improve the effectiveness of the NPT and to reaffirm the member states’ commitments to the core bargains of the treaty.

The NPT RevCons since 1995 have revealed, however, an increasingly acrimonious division between the priorities of the nuclear and non-nuclear states parties to the treaty with respect to the core bargains and principles of the NPT (Simpson and Nielsen 2005). The gravity of this malady is highlighted if we briefly consider the nature of international regimes. While international regimes are comprised of four major components - principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures - ‘it is the infusion of behaviour with principles and norms that distinguishes regime governed activity in the international system from more conventional activity guided by narrow calculations of interest’ (Krasner 1983: 2). What makes international regimes possible, particularly in the sensitive realm of security, is the expectation of reciprocity – that a state’s sacrifice of immediate gain will be offset by some future
gain. The principles and norms of an international regime are central to its effectiveness as they ‘inculcate an anticipation of reciprocity’, but if these ‘basic norms and principles’ change, ‘then the regime no longer exists’ (Smith, 1987: 256-7).

The non-proliferation regime is based on the assumption that the further spread of nuclear weapons will be detrimental to international security. From this it follows that the appropriate behaviour for nuclear weapons states (NWS) that adhere to this view is to refrain from assisting others in acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. For the non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS), forbearance of the nuclear option would underpin the goal of preventing further proliferation. This principle has been developed into specific norms through two forms of institutions – the various nuclear-free zone treaties banning the deployment of nuclear weapons in specific geographical regions (such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the NPT. The core institution, however, is the NPT as it stipulates in its six articles the core ‘nuclear bargain’ between the NWS and NNWS. Articles I, II and III require the signatories not to transfer nuclear weapons to NNWS, not to produce nuclear weapons unless they had already succeeded in doing so prior to 1 January 1967, and not to export nuclear materials without international nuclear safeguards (IAEA 1970: 2-3).

Articles IV and V meanwhile establish each signatories ‘inalienable right’ to develop nuclear energy for civilian purposes and stipulates that all parties should facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the ‘fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy’ (IAEA 1970: 3). Finally, article VI commits all parties to the treaty to ‘pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament’ (IAEA 1970: 3-4). Thus, NWS committed at some future point to end their ‘vertical’ proliferation in return for a commitment to prevent ‘horizontal’ proliferation from the NNWS. The basic bargain at the heart of the NPT was one based on the establishment of ‘anticipation of reciprocity’ between the NWS and NNWS parties to it. In return for a commitment from the NNWS to not acquire nuclear weapons the NWS committed themselves to aid the NNWS in acquiring the ‘peaceful benefits’ of the nuclear age and to restrain, and ultimately end, their vertical proliferation.

The NPT was thus constructed to prevent further horizontal proliferation. This was augmented by other agreements intended to stabilize the system of deterrence that had developed between the superpowers and minimise their nuclear arsenals such as the ABM and Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START). The non-proliferation regime therefore came to embody a logic of assurance. For example, under their obligations under the NPT, the NWS by pledging to assist the NNWS in gaining the benefits of civilian nuclear technology sought to assure them that they could do so without introducing the destabilising military element of the nuclear age. In return the NNWS pledged not to receive or manufacture nuclear weapons, assuring the NWS of their commitment to limit horizontal proliferation. Thus, this logic of assurance underpinned the development of the pillars of the international non-proliferation regime, the NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Past and contemporary problems with the non-proliferation regime stem from the fact that these pillars are hierarchical and unequal in nature. The NPT established three
tiers of states based on their nuclear status in 1970, with nuclear weapons temporarily legal in the five NWS (US, Soviet Union/Russia, UK, France, China), illegal amongst the NNWS parties and not illegal amongst those states who are not parties (such as Israel, India, and Pakistan). Moreover, the logic that underpins the treaty is bifurcated with the NWS viewing the further spread of nuclear weapons as the threat to be prevented while the NNWS have perceived nuclear weapons themselves as the core problem. This has led to the ongoing tension and debate within the NPT-IAEA system between privileging Article VI disarmament obligations of all signatories or those under Articles II and III (which commit the NNWS to not seek weapons and commit to IAEA safeguards of their nuclear facilities/materials). The seemingly permanent divide that the NPT has entrenched between nuclear ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ has contributed to the weakening of the non-proliferation norm with many prominent recent proliferators such as Pakistan, India, Iran, and the DPRK portraying the non-proliferation regime as an instrument of ‘nuclear apartheid’ designed to protect the NWS monopoly (Bracken 2003: 400). Arguably, it has been the logic of the five NWS under the NPT that has prevailed within the non-proliferation regime, with a number of NWS and weapons capable states foregoing their capability to join the NPT as non-weapons states – while none of the five recognised NWS have voluntary eliminated their nuclear arsenals.

The logic of assurance that has underpinned the NPT-IAEA system has thus been challenged by three broad developments in the post-Cold War period. First, the cases of recent proliferators have demonstrated that the system is incapable of preventing proliferation and effectively sanctioning proliferating states equally, regardless of their perceived strategic importance to the great powers. Second, the revelations
regarding the A. Q. Khan network highlighted that the proliferation of nuclear
technology and materials has taken on dangerous non-state and trans-national
directions not envisaged by the regime (Braun and Chyba 2004). Third, US counter-
proliferation policies over the past decade have directly challenged the regime’s logic
of assurance by not only questioning the universal right of states to access nuclear
technology under Article IV and the IAEA’s ability to effectively monitor/control this
but also reserving the right to act outside of the NPT-IAEA system in the interests of
national security (Perkovich 2003; Joseph 2005). Given this context why is nuclear
disarmament viewed by many non-proliferation advocates as vital for revitalising the
NPT and the non-proliferation regime?

Nuclear Disarmament and NPT Review Conferences

The Article VI disarmament obligation has long been considered a central element of
the political bargain that the NNWS parties made with the NWS to forgo nuclear
weapons under the NPT (Walker 2009: 14; Harrison 2006). The NWS commitment
under Article VI can be seen as that crucial element of reciprocity that is central to the
effectiveness of any international regime. Throughout the Cold War the case was
made not only that the treaty’s structural inequality was justifiable under the
heightened tensions of the US-Soviet arms race but that this condition effectively
derferred any substantial move toward meeting the NWS’ Article VI obligations (Nye
1985: 124-125). The US and Soviet’s development of massive arsenals of nuclear
weapons, in clear violation of their Article VI obligations, was to an extent
overlooked by the majority of NNWS parties to the Treaty as many based their
security on the ‘nuclear umbrella’ of the extended deterrent of one or other of the
superpowers. The superpowers also sought to manage and/or prevent nuclear
proliferation within their spheres of influence, thus contributing to the non-proliferation purpose of the Treaty (Smith 1987). With the end of such systemic conditions, however, the majority of NNWS parties to the Treaty have increasingly sought to hold the NWS to their Article VI obligations.

In the post-Cold War period the NNWS have highlighted that the articles of the NPT make it clear that the possession of nuclear weapons by the five NWS is a temporary situation, with non-proliferation (Articles II, III) and nuclear disarmament (Article VI) seen as complementary goals (Rauf 2000a: 43). For the bulk of the NNWS state parties to the Treaty nuclear disarmament, ‘dilutes the discriminatory effects of the non-proliferation pillar and strengthens the legitimacy of the regime by creating the expectation that the special rights of the nuclear weapons states will end at some point in the future’ (Rathbun 2006: 233). The reaffirmation of the disarmament obligations of the NWS parties to the NPT was thus central in achieving the NNWS state parties’ agreement for the indefinite extension of the treaty at the 1995 RevCon. The ‘Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament’ agreed to in 1995 called for the completion of ‘negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable’ CTBT ‘no later than 1996’, the ‘immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons’ and ‘the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of elimination those weapons’ (UN Office for Disarmament Affairs 1995a). The 1995 RevCon also produced a ‘Resolution on the Middle East’ which not only called upon all states in the Middle East to ‘take practical steps’ towards a ‘effectively verifiable’
Middle East nuclear free-zone but also specifically called upon the NWS ‘to extend their cooperation’ toward this goal (UN Office for Disarmament Affairs 1995b).

These commitments were reaffirmed at the subsequent 2000 RevCon with that conference’s final document containing the ‘unequivocal undertaking’ of the NWS ‘to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals’ (Arms Control Association 2000). The 2000 RevCon also supplemented this with the so-called ‘13 practical steps’ to systematically and progressively implement Article IV which included a moratorium on nuclear testing pending the entry into force of the CTBT, negotiations on the FMCT, and the preservation and strengthening of the ABM Treaty (Arms Control Association 2000). However, divisions amongst and between the NWS and NNWS parties to the Treaty were increasingly evident. The profile of nuclear disarmament was significantly heightened due to frustration felt by the NNWS regarding the lack of progress in arms control between 1995 and 2000, with the failure of the US Senate to ratify the CTBT and the stalling of US-Russian nuclear arms reduction talks figuring prominently (Rauf 2000b). For the NWS, there was also considerable angst regarding perceived failures in compliance on behalf of some NNWS, such as Iraq, as well as concern regarding developments in the nuclear and security postures amongst their NWS peers with China and Russia particularly concerned with US intentions for missile defence systems and its implications for the future of the ABM Treaty and the potential weaponisation of space (Rauf 2000b). Thus by 2000 the NPT was under pressure from factors internal to the non-proliferation regime itself, such as the long-standing divergence between the NWS and NNWS priorities and factors external to it, such as the proliferation of non-NPT parties India and Pakistan.
Such internal and external problems came to a head in 2005 to produce what many observers regarded as the worst RevCon for many years (Muller 2005; du Preez 2008). The external factors that contributed to this were legion. Most significant was the impact of the events of 9/11 on the Bush administration’s approach to its national security strategy, nuclear posture and nuclear proliferation. Indeed, the Bush administration in the wake of 9/11 adopted a strategic doctrine of pre-emption and a nuclear posture that canvassed first strikes against ‘rogue’ states such as Iraq, Iran, Libya and Syria, as well as against NWS such as China and Russia (US National Security Strategy 2002; Carranza 2006: 491). The US approach to proliferation under the Bush administration also came to be based upon the assumptions that nuclear proliferation was inevitable, there were ‘good’ and ‘bad’ proliferators, multilateral non-proliferation instruments were ineffectual, and US regional security and economic interests trumped non-proliferation (Joseph 2005: 379-80). These assumptions clearly contributed to the US invasion of Iraq, abrogation of the ABM Treaty and underpinned the US-India nuclear cooperation agreement of March 2005 (Perkovich 2003; Potter 2005: 343). Significantly, this development signalled that the US no longer supported the universal application of proliferation standards and implicitly approved the creation of a fourth tier of states in the nuclear hierarchy – outsiders who are nonetheless judged to be ‘good’ proliferators on normative or strategic grounds (Perkovich 2003). Simultaneously, it was also increasingly clear that some NNWS parties to the Treaty (most notably the DPRK and Iran) had utilised Article IV to obtain the expertise and capacity to pursue nuclear weapons programs, violating their Article III obligations to forgo nuclear weapons and their agreements with the IAEA to place their nuclear materials and technology under international supervision (Huntley 2005).
The 2005 RevCon was also further undermined by the refusal of the NWS, particularly the US and France to accept the results of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences as the basis for the proceedings of the conference (Muller 2005: 35). In particular, these two states argued against the ‘13 practical steps’ adopted at the 2000 conference and demanded that the 2005 agenda not to refer to past conference outcomes. Major NNWS such as prominent members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) also contributed to the failure of the 2005 RevCon. For example, Egypt refused to consider any agenda that weakened the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, while Iran argued that the Review Conference should focus on compliance with all the NPT’s objectives, calling attention to what it considered to be the failure of the NWS to meet their disarmament obligations (du Preez 2008; Simpson and Nielsen 2005).

In terms of nuclear disarmament, the US and France disputed the de-linkage of the ‘unequivocal undertaking’ of the NWS to eliminate their nuclear arsenals from the notion in Article VI that conditions nuclear disarmament on ‘general and complete disarmament’ that been achieved in 2000. The US also argued that the pillar of the regime that required urgent attention was that of non-proliferation and, as such, the yardstick by which to judge whether or not the Treaty’s ‘purpose’ and ‘provisions’ were being realised was compliance with the Treaty’s non-proliferation obligations. In this respect, the US was not without support as many states, both NWS and NNWS, were increasingly concerned with closing the loophole through which states can utilise Article IV to acquire nuclear technology and then announce their withdrawal from the Treaty under Article X (Potter 2005: 27-29). Nuclear
disarmament, or rather the lack of it, nonetheless remained a core concern for a large
number of the NNWS parties. (Potter 2005: 29).

**Nuclear Disarmament and the 2010 NPT Review Conference: Hope versus Reality?**

Given the preceding negative outcomes for nuclear disarmament related measures at
previous RevCons what are the prospects for progress at the upcoming 2010 NPT
RevCon? Many analysts would suggest that progress on nuclear disarmament at the
next review would have to involve significant movement on at least three major
aspects: recommitment to the CTBT; agreement on a FMCT; and recommitment to
the ‘13 practical steps’ (Squassoni 2009a and 2009b; Daadler and Nodal 2008). Externally to the NPT process, negotiations toward the conclusion of a new START
agreement between the US and Russia, which is set to expire in December 2009,
would also bolster any progress the RevCon might make on the three issues identified
above (Dunn 2009).

One key development outside of the non-proliferation regime itself – a change in US
administration - has raised the potential for progress to be achieved in 2010. Indeed,
President Obama has committed his administration to achieving the entry into force of
the CTBT, the negotiation of a verifiable FMCT, and the negotiation of a new START
agreement with Russia (White House 2009). Importantly, progress on all of these
issues arguably serves, and is increasingly seen by Washington to serve, key US
national security interests (Walker 2009). The entry into force of the CTBT will
achieve three broad goals that will contribute to US national security interests: (1) it
will constrain the ability of existing nuclear weapons states to develop new warheads;
(2) national and international capabilities to detect clandestine nuclear testing will be
enhanced; and (3) it will provide an avenue through which to strengthen nuclear restraint by bringing in non-NPT weapons states (Israel, India and Pakistan). More broadly, positive movement on the CTBT would reassure the NNWS of the NWS commitment to the principle of equity in the non-proliferation regime by demonstrating the NWS’ intent to meet their Article VI obligations (Gallagher 2006: 6-7; Kimball 2009; Joseph 2009: 80-83).³

The conclusion of a FMCT would also contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament goals of the NPT by limiting the amount of fissile material available and placing controls on the production of such materials in the NWS. However, progress on this has been complicated by the failure to resolve three major political issues: (1) differences over the scope of any verification regime; (2) differences over how any negotiations should address past production and existing stocks of fissile material; and (3) differences over whether a FMCT should be universal in scope (i.e. applicable to all weapons and non-weapons states) (Dunn 1999; Ford 2009). Indeed, the latter two issues have become key obstacles to negotiations on a FMCT. In general the five NWS under the NPT have emphasised that such a ban on fissile material production should focus on any future production rather than address the issue of the stockpiling of such material by the NWS. China, for example, pursued this line of argumentation at the Third Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) in New York in May 2009 (Johnson 2009). The question of universality is also a vexatious one, with one observer recently suggesting that a FMCT should really focus on the existing weapons states as the NNWS are already constrained by their obligations under the NPT (Ford 2009). However, the principle of universality is one that has informed the non-proliferation regime since its inception and any divergence from this is seen in some quarters as
potentially dangerous for the regime’s health. Significantly, disagreement on these issues played a role in stifling any adoption at the May 2009 PrepCom of a detailed set of recommendations for the 2010 RevCon (Johnson 2009; Lynch 2009; Pomper 2009). Despite this, earlier draft recommendations did contain, with significant US support, strong advocacy for the CTBT and FMCT (Johnson 2009). The PrepCom did however affirm the ‘principles and objectives’ of the 1995 Review and Extension conference and the ‘13 practical steps’ of the 2000 NPT Review Conference (Pomper 2009).

There has also been positive movement on the START front, with Presidents Obama and Medvedev agreeing on 1 April 2009 to begin immediate negotiations to achieve a new arms reduction treaty by July 2009 and ratification before the expiration of START II in December 2009 (Larsen 2009). In this respect it is important to note that the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) concluded by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir Putin in May 2002, was viewed by many observers as a stop-gap agreement without substantive provisions (Sokov 2002; Gottemoeller 2003). While SORT committed the US and Russia to ‘reduce and limit’ their ‘strategic nuclear warheads’ to between 1700-2200 by December 2012 it did not contain any verification mechanism to monitor reductions with Article I of the treaty stating that, ‘Each Party shall determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms, based on the established aggregate limit for the number of such warheads’ (Arms Control Association 2002). In this regard, it has been that the Obama administration is seeking to achieve a reduction of up to 40% on the current limit of 2,200 warheads (Weisman 2009).
The ‘atmospheric’ conditions for the 2010 RevCon with respect to the issue of nuclear disarmament thus appear to be the most favorable for some time. US commitment to work toward key disarmament signposts as the CTBT, the FMCT and a new arms control agreement with Russia has significantly impacted on the NPT process. President Obama’s declared commitment to see the CTBT enter into force in particular is perceived by many NNWS as an important step in demonstrating the commitment of the world’s pre-eminent nuclear power to one of the core bargains of the NPT. The Obama administration has also signaled its support for the development of an international ‘nuclear fuel bank’ under the control of the IAEA as a measure to assure the NNWS of their ability to access the ‘peaceful’ benefits of nuclear technology (Bender 2009).

While the climate for a ‘consensus’ outcome at the 2010 RevCon appears likely due to the factors outlined above, there remain core challenges in the strategic realm of nuclear affairs that could further damage not only the non-proliferation regime but the goal of disarmament. Chief among these challenges are the nuclear programs of Iran and DPRK. The DPRK case could be the most corrosive for the regime. As noted previously, Pyongyang has utilized loopholes in the NPT, specifically Articles IV and X, to acquire nuclear technology/materials and withdrawn without sanction from the regime. Arguably, Tehran is also following the DPRK model of proliferation (Fitzpatrick 2007; Lee 2009). The apparent success of Pyongyang and Tehran’s efforts to date puts enormous pressure on the viability of the core principle that frames the obligations of all members of the NPT - reciprocity. Additionally, the DPRK and Iranian cases bode ill for the disarmament agenda as their programs arguably increase proliferation incentives for a number of their respective neighbors in North Asia and
the Middle East and will become a key justification for the maintenance of the nuclear arsenals of the existing NWS in their regions (Bowman 2008; Cossa 2009).

There also remains the challenge of relations between the existing NWS, in particular the US, Russia and China that may work against disarmament. While President Obama’s speech in Prague declared that the US would work toward disarmament, it also stated unequivocally that as long as others possessed nuclear weapons ‘the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies’ (White House 2009). Although we have noted positive movement toward a new US-Russia arms reduction agreement, there remains a significant amount of uncertainty regarding China’s position which has important ‘knock on’ effects in its region. While China’s nuclear arsenal remains much smaller than either the US or Russia’s, it has over the last decade sought to modernise it, while its position on arms control remains one of ‘wait and see’ regarding US-Russian reductions. The dilemma here is will China ‘come to the party’ should the US and Russia achieve major reductions of their nuclear arsenals or not? In North Asia, states that have sheltered under the US nuclear ‘umbrella’ for decades, such as Japan, will be increasingly concerned that any significant reduction of the US arsenal may tempt Beijing to expand its own arsenal in search of strategic advantage (Cossa 2009).

Thus, there remain major challenges to the non-proliferation regime and the disarmament agenda stemming from relations amongst and between the NWS and NNWS parties to the NPT. However, at the very least, the state parties to the NPT will enter into the 2010 RevCon aware that the world’s pre-eminent power has at the
declaratory level reaffirmed its commitment to the core principles and objectives of the NPT.

Endnotes
1. This paper is based on a presentation to a 30 June 2009 workshop of the Australian Research Council project on Australia’s Nuclear Choices.

2. For the Bush administration see Ford 2007. Ford served as US Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation and as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State during President George W. Bush’s second term.

3. In a strong political message regarding his commitment to ratify the CTBT President Obama appointed Vice-President Joe Biden to lead the effort to have the treaty ratified by the US Senate.

References


