

REFLECTIONS ON THE GOVERNANCE OF SECURITY, A NORMATIVE INQUIRY

CLIFFORD SHEARING and JENNIFER WOOD*

This paper overviews current shifts in the governance of security by examining two related developments: the emergence of neo-liberalism and the proliferation of corporate forms of governance. While the literature tends to examine those developments taking place under state auspices, an equally important, yet less talked about development has been occurring in the form of institutions and sites of governance emerging outside of the state. Following a comparison of neo-liberal and corporate developments, the paper examines the normative implications of each for the promotion of democracy and the value of self-directed collective life. The final section of the paper outlines a practical agenda aimed at addressing these normative issues.

INTRODUCTION

This paper is aimed at exploring two distinct yet interrelated questions. First of all, what developments have been occurring in the governance of security? Following this we will ask, what normative response to these developments is appropriate? In reflecting on the first question, we will briefly identify and contrast two parallel sets of developments, the first one being a move to 'reinvent government' (Osborne and Gaebler 1993) that has been taking place under the sign of neo-liberalism. Neo-liberalism represents a shift in the mentalities, institutions and practices of the state, characterized by a critique of centralized forms of rule and a move to engage citizens at local levels in carrying out certain governmental activities. To draw from the title of Eggers and O'Leary's book (1995), this development seeks to "make government smaller, better and closer to home" and to develop partnerships with communities while promoting

* Corresponding Author.

certain forms of self-governance among the citizenry. In the domain of security, one can locate the shift to 'community policing' within this broader neo-liberal development.

The second trend is less talked about, but has pervasively given rise to new institutions and sites of governance outside of state auspices. In particular, we have observed the proliferation of corporate loci devoted to governing security in ways which sometimes resonate with, and at other times stand in contradistinction to, those of the state in general, and of criminal justice in particular. In looking simultaneously at neo-liberalism and the emergence of corporate governance, we would conclude that the governance of security has become the domain of an increasingly diversified series of governmental nodes. Accordingly, we use the term 'nodal governance' to characterize the changing face of security today.

Following a discussion of the emergence of nodal governance, the normative component of this paper discusses the implications of this changing landscape for the notion of democracy. Specifically, we will explore the participatory potential that this model holds for all citizens in the promotion of security. We will argue that neo-liberalism tends to reinforce the principles and practices of representative democracy, so that the potential for communities to be self-directed in their security efforts is limited by the state's desire to retain 'steering' functions. In contrast, we would argue that within corporate forms of governance, new opportunities have emerged for thinking more about direct and participatory forms of democracy. Notwithstanding, a rather large question remains concerning whether all citizens will have the same opportunity to actively participate in, and steer, security efforts.

In response to this last concern, the final section of our paper will outline the normative agenda that we have been building. Our agenda is aimed at creating conditions in which those citizens who have not benefited from either neo-liberal or corporate developments (i.e. the underprivileged) can have access to the material and intellectual resources which will enable them to actively participate in the development of security goals, programs and practices. Specifically, we will outline the work we have been, and will be, undertaking in South Africa and Argentina where the poor have traditionally been excluded and silenced on issues which directly affect them, such as security.

REINVENTING GOVERNMENT

It is commonly accepted in both academic and public policy circles that we are in the midst of a profound re-organization of governance in Canada, Britain, the United States and other parts of the world. The model of the welfare state has sustained a cumulative critique, to the extent that the role of traditional political authorities in governance is being re-evaluated. The term neo-liberalism is commonly associated with Rose and Miller (1992), and has been taken up by scholars such as O'Malley (1996), Osborne (1993) and Stenson (1996), to name a few.

Neo-liberalism is a way of thinking about collective life that weaves together a variety of related threads. Based on a critique of centralized modes of governance, neo-liberalism is premised on the notion that governance is most effective when it taps knowledge and capacities at local levels. Osborne and Gaebler, in what has become something of a neo-liberal classic (1993), argue that the 'rowing' of governance should be shifted away from traditional government institutions. While they maintain that state governments, as the elected representatives of the people, must continue to do the 'steering', they argue that the 'rowing' should be transferred to the variety of organs of collective life. The desire of state institutions to enter into 'partnerships' with citizens and communities reflects this process of re-organizing the steering and rowing functions.

A second feature associated with neo-liberal thinking is a shift away from thinking about the past (i.e. addressing past wrongs) to focusing on the future. Rather than acting in a continually reactive capacity, there has been a drive in government institutions to anticipate and prepare for future challenges and problems. This is made possible through technologies such as 'environmental scans' and surveys aimed at assessing local conditions and characteristics. At the same time, government employees are now encouraged to be innovative and entrepreneurial in the development of programs. While this does not mean that the remedying of the past should be of no concern, governmental attention is shifted explicitly to what Giddens calls the 'colonization of the future' (1991). This shift to a forward-looking orientation therefore reinforces the first feature of neo-liberalism, as it is argued that the effective colonization of the future requires the mobilization of local knowledge and local capacities. Rose and Miller refer to this process as 'rule at a distance', where alliances are formed between political authorities (government) and citizens, commu-

nity groups, professionals and so on (1992). In their words, “[p]olitical forces have sought to utilize, instrumentalize and mobilize techniques and agents other than those of ‘the state’ in order to govern ‘at a distance’ (Rose and Miller 1992: 181).

A third feature of neo-liberalism, which is again linked with the previous two features, has been the infiltration of the language and metaphors of business into state governments. It is now common for citizens to be thought of as ‘consumers’ of government services (cf. Lacey 1994). At the same time, government services are assessed in terms of whether they ‘add value’ to customers or communities. A central part of this has been the emergence of a fiscal (in contrast to an ethical) conception of accountability. The adoption of this market imagery is indicative of the recognition on the part of state governments that they no longer monopolize governance in a variety of areas, including security. Indeed, government services, in some instances, have now entered a competitive marketplace, where consumers have more than one choice for their service provider (cf. Osborne and Gaebler 1993).

Together, these three features of neo-liberalism call for a ‘revolution’ (Eggers and O’Leary 1995) in the ways in which governance is institutionalized and practiced. This movement to reinvent government at these levels is having a profound effect across the globe. As these features are not specific to any particular site of governance, they have had an effect on a wide range of governmental functions. One such area is the governance of security. Of particular significance is the widespread shift toward ‘community policing’, which reflects an attempt to reinvent the governance of security under the influence of a neo-liberal mentality (O’Malley and Palmer 1996). Public police services around the world have decided that in order to be effective, they must cater their services to local conditions and engage in active partnerships with community members. They argue that without knowing the particular conditions and problems of each community, they will not be able to tailor policing services or deploy their resources in appropriate ways.

Community policing also reflects a new future orientation on the part of the police. In recognition of the limits of the traditional policing measures of law enforcement or bandit-catching, police have now adopted the language of prevention, and center as much on developing proactive solutions as they do to reacting to past violations of security. Thus, community policing, and the various programs and arrangements that are collected

under its sign, such as neighborhood watch schemes, problem-solving policing and the like, seek to find ways of networking community resources and knowledge in ways that shift the focus of police attention from the past to the future (Ericson and Haggery 1997).

As in other arenas of governance, this shift in policing has been far from smooth, both because the mentality itself, and the imagery that it requires, is open to a variety of interpretations. Hence, these imaginings have met with resistance from people within existing institutions whose habits and ways of imagining the world embody a different imagery. Accordingly, just what 'community policing' has come to mean has varied considerably.

Despite this variation, however, the influence of neo-liberal thinking is easily discernible. In the various programmatic forms of community policing, the underlying premise is that the ultimate responsibility for the governance of security (i.e. the steering function) should remain securely in police hands in order to ensure political and ethical accountability (cf. Blair 1998, and Shearing 1998). However, various rowing functions have been meted out to community members and groups who have recently been constituted as 'active' and 'prudential' agents of security (O'Malley 1996).

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: TOWARD A NODAL NETWORK

While the developments we have just outlined have been at the forefront of political and scholarly debate, another parallel shift in governance has taken place. Although this shift resonates with the key threads of neo-liberalism, it has distinct manifestations. Unfortunately, due to the similarities between these two shifts, their differences have been blurred. Our intention in this section is to illuminate those critical differences in order to map more comprehensively the contours of change that are reshaping the governance of security.

What we have observed is the emergence of corporate centers of governance outside of established state institutions. While these centers operate independently, they articulate with state agencies and recognize the constitutional and legal bounds set by them. These corporate centers of governance are most visible when they have developed in conjunction with what Shearing and Stenning have termed "mass private property" (1983: 496). These forms of property take a variety of shapes, including residential

communities, recreational complexes, industrial parks and commercial complexes. Perhaps the most visible of these are spaces that have come to be called 'gated communities'. These gated terrains manifest a feudal-like quality – that is, they resemble the walled and gated spaces of feudalism. While it is tempting to use this resonance metaphorically by depicting this as a "new feudalism" as Shearing and Stenning have done (1983: 503), this imagery is misleading. Especially misleading is the implication that these loci of governance are hierarchically related to a unified central state*. To avoid this and other unwarranted implications of the feudal metaphor, we propose the term 'nodal governance' to capture the fracturing of governance that includes both the fracturing of state governance and the emergence of non-state loci.

These nodal sites of governance have established what might be thought of as "bubbles" (Bottoms and Wiles 1995: 20) of security, in which the steering function is no longer monopolized by a unified state. Indeed, both steering and rowing activities are distributed across an assemblage of distinct, and often overlapping, governmental spaces. Accordingly, those governmental activities previously monopolized by states have become the domain of an increasingly diversified series of governmental nodes. Because such governmental spaces and activities overlap, distinctions between institutions of governance are increasingly blurred.

One could argue that this represents a radical appropriation of the neo-liberal imagery, as non-state entities are not simply mobilized by the state, but have themselves developed the capacity to mobilize and direct other resources, including the police (cf. Wood and Shearing 1998). Taking our cue from Rose and Miller, we could refer to this process as reverse 'rule at-a-distance'. Thus, a central and most visible aspect of nodal governance has been the emergence of new governmental agents who undertake the rowing of governance under corporate (rather than state) direction. Foremost among these corporately directed agents are private security persons. These include both 'mercenaries' in the form of 'contract security' companies that provide security services for a fee and who form what is often termed the 'private security industry'. As well, there are 'in house security' persons who work directly for non-state or quasi-state institutions. The considerable size of private security organizations – whose agents outnumber state police by a factor of more than 2 to 1 (Bay-

* We are grateful to Michael Kempa for this valuable insight.

ley and Shearing 1996), is but one of the more obvious manifestations of corporate governance (see Kempa et al. (1999) for a more comprehensive review of this growth).

These new centers of governance also express the features of neo-liberalism we have outlined. The area in which the similarity between the developments of neo-liberalism and corporate governance are perhaps clearest is to be found in their shared commitment to a risk-focused mentality. While academic interest in this future orientation has been stimulated by its presence within neo-liberal developments (cf. O'Malley 1996; Feeley and Simon 1994), this future focus appears to have originated in a corporate context. In a previous paper, Shearing argues that the risk-focused and future-oriented approach of community policing reflects a "belated recognition" of what corporate institutions have been doing for years in the area of security (1997: 227).

A second and closely related area in which similarities between corporate and neo-liberal developments emerge is obviously found in a shift toward non-state institutions. It is this similarity that has led to both these developments being located under the flag of neo-liberalism. There is some truth to this, as both movements celebrate the importance of local knowledge and local capacities as key ingredients of effective governance. However, because these features have been adopted within a business, and specifically market context, the ways in which they have been given concrete expression have been different. In particular, due to the profit motives of business, corporate governments have not had to cope with reinventing institutional structures, mentalities and practices in the way states have. Put simply, corporate institutions – in pursuit of maximum profit – have always been concerned with the characteristics, needs and wants of the 'local'. We would conclude therefore that while there are obvious similarities between the way in which the above threads of neo-liberalism have evolved in state and corporate contexts, there are important differences in their practical translation.

In the domain of security, we can see these translations in the distinct contexts of state versus corporate governance. Unlike community policing that continues to operate within a legal and institutional framework which understands insecurity in criminal terms - what Simon calls 'governing through crime' (1995) – the corporate governance of security has directly challenged the limitations of this framework. While the work of private security – in the specific manifestation of security guards – at times

closely resembles the public police function, they have also engaged in a more radical reinvention of the governance of security. This reinvention includes moving outside the conventional framework organized around 'crime', and toward a framework centered on the notion of 'loss'. As such, a variety of persons who constitute corporate communities are being mobilized as agents of loss prevention, ranging from bank tellers to those portraying Disney characters at Disneyland theme parks (see Shearing and Stenning 1984). As a consequence, what one finds within corporate security governance is a wider range of developments that cannot be neatly organized under a single sign. They range from processes that look remarkably like the crime-focused governance of security, to more radical imaginings that have embedded the governance of security into broader functions such as the reduction of loss and profit-making.

Although the developments we have described thus far are commonly observed in national contexts, this shift is no less apparent across national borders on an international scale. At a global level, nodal governance is manifested in the development of networks that cut across national borders. Although this still tends to be organized around the reach of global corporations (as states develop new alliances through global agreements such as the European Community and NAFTA), the reach of nodal networks across state boundaries has become extended as well. A key implication of this globalization process is that the centrality and authority of the state has become fragmented. Pieterse contends that "[t]he tide of globalization reduces the room of maneuver for states, while international institutions, transnational transactions, regional co-operation, sub-national dynamics and non-governmental organizations expand in impact and scope" (1995: 63; see also Drucker 1993: 4, 10–11) (see Kempa et al. 1999 on the issue of globalization).

Given the emergence of such nodal networks, both inside and outside of national borders, the analytical value of the public/private distinction has diminished. In particular, the state can no longer be said to monopolize the domain of governance, nor can the sphere of the private be regarded as purely the domain of 'the governed'. The same critique applies to the state/civil society distinction, as these two domains have become incorporated into an all-encompassing and horizontally organized terrain of governance. The emergence of a nodal network has, and is, fundamentally reshaping what governance can and should mean in ways that resonate

with, but are far more radical than the changes taking place under the banner of neo-liberalism.

Now that we have provided a sketch of the emerging contours of governance, we will now move on to the second section of our paper concerning the normative implications of such developments. In particular, we will discuss the potential that these developments present for re-thinking democracy and for promoting the value of self-directed collective life.

RE-CONSTITUTING THE POLITICAL

In comparison of neo-liberal developments with corporate developments in the governance of security we would suggest that they are promoting two distinct models for democracy. To be sure, each model assumes a different conception of the nature and degree of citizen participation in the determination of security goals and in the development of strategies and practices aimed at realizing those goals. In essence, we would argue that the governance of security within a neo-liberal mentality reinforces the traditional notion of representative government whereby the state, as the representative of the citizenry, must retain its steering capacities. At best, citizens become junior partners in the governance of security, and at worst, they are tasked with carrying out rowing functions that they had no part in determining. Under corporate auspices, democracy is thought about differently. Although corporate governments must operate within the legal and constitutional frameworks established by the state, corporate communities are in practice highly self-directed in the determination of their collective objectives and strategies. In essence, corporate communities have effectively become self-directed communities.

A principal reason for this is that corporate governments tend to govern through 'contracts' that is very different from the 'social' contracts under which democratic governments operate. The social contracts that legitimize and provide direction to state governments are a product of processes that conceive of democracy in terms of the election of representatives who govern, in theory at least, on behalf of a 'social body'. These contracts, mechanisms and associated processes constitute the political sphere as we know it. Within neo-liberalism then, the central mechanisms for thinking about and promoting collective life leave the notion of the 'social' intact. The funda-

mental unit of collective life remains the state and more generally the social realm that political thinkers from Hobbes to Durkheim did so much to 'discover' (Rose, 1996). Indeed, it is precisely this celebration of representative democracy and indeed the social that makes neo-liberalism attractive. Governance continues to be centered in 'governments' who rule over particular territories, such as national territories. Normatively this is seen as being essential if democratic modes of accountability are to be maintained.

While the mechanisms of governance are being relocated in neo-liberalism, that essential nexus of democratic governance is not questioned or threatened. As authors like Rose have suggested, the downsizing of government that neo-liberalism favors, and its celebration of civil society, has given rise to a re-discovery of 'community' as a way of making collective life thinkable. While this is true, the 'social', especially at the political level, retains its dominance. Accordingly, what emerges is a bifurcation of the way in which collective life is made up, with both 'community' and the 'social' being simultaneously constituted as collective objects. Within neo-liberalism, while it is correct to talk about the "birth of community" (Rose 1996: 331), it is less appropriate to talk of the 'death' or even the demise of the 'social' (ibid: 327; see O'Malley 1996).

In contrast to neo-liberalism, the political domain constituted by corporate governance is very different. Within these realms of governance, the contracts specifying, limiting, directing and legitimating governance operate within collective fragments such as those formed by 'gated communities'. Like social contracts, these corporate contracts constitute the collective sphere to be governed and the authorities and processes of governance. However, in place of 'social contracts', these new collective domains are being identified under the banner of 'community' in the form of 'community' contracts. In this particular usage of 'community', the traditional 'social' conception of collective life is more deeply challenged.

These emerging communities are defined on a territorial basis as a consequence of the development of mass private property, but can also be constructed as interest-based communities or virtual communities that may span the globe. One of the significant features of these community contracts is that they provide for much greater variation in governance and considerable variation in the manner in which 'contracts' are formed. In some cases, for example, when property within a gated domain is purchased, these contracts may well be both explicit and precise. In other circumstances, for example when shoppers enter a shopping area, contracts are

less likely to be explicit. Unlike social contracts, these contracts – given the more fragmented character of collective space – vary across space and time and may be frequently revised. At the same time, such community contracts are creating a political space that is redefining what democracy, understood as the promotion of self-directed collectives, can mean.

In relation to gated communities, when a person buys property within this community, in addition to buying a house and land, they contract to participate in a particular regime of governance. Through the mechanisms established to regulate this space – for instance, a management committee – residents influence the way in which their lives are to be governed and participate directly in the definition of order and disorder that will apply to them and their fellow house owners. For instance, a contract might specify the amount of money they must spend on landscaping, how their houses are to be maintained and so on. In effect, residents of such communities are constituted as ‘customers’ who have purchased a particular form of collective living, or the ‘good life’.

An iconic example of a commercial gated community is Disney World (Shearing and Stenning 1984). As one pays to enter its gates, one is contracting to become a temporary member of this community. Whilst a member, one must conduct oneself in ways which are consistent with the security requirements of the Disneyland corporation. Similar to residential gated communities, one enters into a particular kind of contract on a voluntary basis. Individuals become customers of Disneyland because they are purchasing a particular kind of experience, or a particular kind of life even if it is just for one day. In exchange for their pleasures, customers must not threaten either the physical or financial security of that community (see Kempa et al. 1999).

Airports are another example of a corporate community that is constituted through a community contract. Although we are not obligated to have our body and our bags checked and scanned for illegal materials and other possible ‘threats’ to security, refusal to accommodate such searches would prevent us from boarding the plane and consequently flying to our destination. Examples abound of corporate communities which determine our access into, and out of, such spaces. Library users at most libraries, for example, must be scanned, particularly upon exit, for books that have not been properly discharged from the library. It is also commonplace at retail stores for all clothing and other articles to contain a security tag, which

will set off an alarm upon exit if the item has not been purchased and the tag removed.

Examples such as these demonstrate that on a daily basis, we as citizens comply voluntarily to certain governmental regimes which are not the product of state institutions and practices, but rather, corporate forms of governance. Within corporate communities such as shopping malls or gated communities, a particular kind of order has been established by that community, which has determined its own set of objectives and its own conceptions of what constitute violations of security. Provided that people are willing to conduct themselves within the parameters of what is acceptable in such communities, order is maintained and the visible presence of the public police, or the interventionist measures which they represent, are neither necessary nor relevant.

Clearly, the potential that these corporate forms of governance hold for the promotion of self-directed collectives certainly differs in nature and degree from the neo-liberal developments that are occurring under state auspices. The formation of community contracts, such as the ones described above, suggest a variety of interesting mechanisms designed to ensure the local determination of governmental ends and means.

While these emergent empirical realities are suggestive of a more radical understanding of democracy than we are traditionally acquainted with, Shearing has argued elsewhere that the proliferation of corporate governments tend to favor or benefit institutions and individuals that are well-to-do (Bayley and Shearing 1996). To be sure, Shearing has observed that in corporate governance, "sovereignty shifts from the state to private entities, and democratic control shifts from the vote to the market" (1997: 33). The implication is that those without the financial wherewithal to develop their own governmental programs are being excluded from developments which hold a great deal of democratic potential. In particular, we are referring to the poor or underprivileged, both in developed and developing countries. Thus, we consider it vital to explore the implications of governance within these corporate communities for other kinds of interest-based communities.

In addition to the exclusion of poor people from these developments, there is another normative implication of corporate governance. While the governmental power of corporations might on occasion be used benignly, there is plenty of scope for it to be used in much more sinister ways whenever the interests of corporate institutions do not mesh with those of ordinary citizens. The obvious danger is that in a world of nodal governance,

“outright corporate domination could emerge” (Johnston 1994: 17). Suf-
fice it to say that private security guards in particular are not subjected to
the same mechanisms of accountability that the public police are in terms
of curtailing the abuse of human rights and civil liberties as well as the
excessive use of force (see Shearing 1998).

We share these concerns. However, we do not share the dominant
response to them. This response typically advocates a move back to a Key-
nesian form of liberalism that seeks to return governmental power to the
state. The argument advanced for this retrieval of state power is that it is
only when governmental power is monopolized by the state that demo-
cratic forms of rule are possible. To permit governmental power to be
exercised directly by corporations is to submit to a shift in power to
undemocratic and illegitimate loci of governance (Johnston 1994).

While we are deeply concerned about shifting power to undemocratic
loci of governance, we do not share the optimism of the above normative
stance. Given the crisis which exists over the democratic claims of estab-
lished forms of representative democracy, the notion that very real dangers
of corporate governance should be remedied by a reaffirmation of state
power is neither realistic nor innovative.

This leaves us in a situation where it is essential to rethink our notions of
democracy and its institutions. We contend that the model for self-directed
collective life apparent in corporate communities provides an opportunity
for reinventing democracy in poor communities as well. We argue that this
reinvention is, and must be, consistent with the neo-liberal principles of
mobilizing local knowledge and local capacities and that this mobilization
should be done in and through local experiments. This brings us to the
work that Shearing and others have developed in South Africa through
their Community Peace Program, as well as the work that Shearing, Wood
and Font* are developing for Rosario, Argentina.

REINVENTING THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF SECURITY

Experiments for South Africa and Argentina

The Community Peace Program in Cape Town, South Africa was founded
on a commitment to the principle that any lasting and effective reform to

* Enrique Font, Centre for Studies and Research in Human Rights, University of Rosario,
Argentina.

security in South Africa must respect and take full advantage of the rich civil society that characterizes this country's communities. It focuses its attention on the importance of providing security for the historically disadvantaged in ways that ensure that their autonomy and resources are recognized.

Although a democratic government has been evolving in South Africa, its responses to problems such as crime have tended to shift attention and expenditure away from grass-roots initiatives, resources and knowledge. The result is that many of the vibrant institutions of civil society developed at the community level during the apartheid era are now threatened. At the same time, corporate governments have proliferated in South Africa, serving to privilege well-to-do South Africans and to reinforce the economic and political gaps between blacks and whites.

We have sought to promote a vision of reform for security that recognizes the devolution of governance being promoted both through the advocacy of neo-liberal philosophy and the emergence of corporate governance. In this work we do not accept uncritically the claims that the neo-liberal devolution of governance and the emergence of corporate forms of governance do indeed promote the value of self-directed communities for all.

Our stance in relationship to these developments has two elements. First, we have argued that as these developments are in fact taking place and must be acknowledged and engaged, there is no point in acting as if the old liberal-democratic dream of a state monopoly of governance continues to be desired or even possible. Secondly, we have argued that while there is much that is worrisome about the neo-liberal developments especially for poor people, there is much in the devolution of governance that deserves more than a simple condemnation. We have argued that what is required is not a rejection of the devolutionary tendencies of neo-liberalism and corporate governance, but rather its construction in ways that will challenge its more undemocratic features.

This stance has translated into programs that are seeking to empower communities to operate with the same level of autonomy as corporate governments and to develop a similar level of control and direction over their security as these entities. Our aim has been to explore the possibility of creating a form of 'community policing' that shifts both the rowing and much of the steering to communities. To do this we are developing a conception of community policing for poor people that takes its lead from cor-

porate policing, not state policing. In doing so, we are directly challenging the institutionalization of 'rule at a distance' strategies that have been the hallmark of most state-driven community policing initiatives.

Hence, the conceptual framework guiding this work recognizes two sets of devolutionary strategies in established democracies, one that has provided corporate communities with control of both the rowing and the steering of policing, and the other that has sought to devolve to poor communities the rowing of policing but not its steering.

There are two key components to our agenda. The first is to engage the state in ways that will provide for a relocation of control over tax revenues in a manner that will provide blacks with purchasing power. The second component is to establish blacks as powerful customers with the ability to steer their security. The key strategy for doing this is to develop institutional structures that permit poor people to access tax revenues in a manner that will enable them to become customers. Our thinking here has been influenced by work within the housing arena in which the emphasis is also on finding ways of permitting poor people, and particularly groups who constitute themselves as a community, to function as customers rather than simply as recipients of professional expertise over which they have no control. With the rich it is the customer who controls the housing budget and decides what will and will not be built. With poor people this is not the case. Poor people are clients of experts, not customers assumed to have the expertise necessary to make informed choices.

The empowerment that the corporate model of governance can provide can only be accomplished within the security arena if the above analysis is correct and if solutions can be found to the following problems:

- Identifying communities that share interests.
- Stressing the need for these groups to develop the skills and knowledge required to operate as demanding customers of security services.
- Devising some scheme to provide poor communities with access to buying power. This means finding a way to turn the tax revenues available to governments into purchasing power that can be deployed at the level of specific groups.
- Empowering black people to engage in, and reap the benefits of, problem-solving and risk-focused policing

In a more interventionist capacity, the Community Peace Program is developing a 'Vertical Pilot Project' designed to explore ways of success-

fully integrating state-civil resources through viable partnerships. While it is vital to mobilize the full range of state and civil resources in the promotion of security, local direction (or steering) is essential. The rationale behind this model is to take a vertical slice through a whole set of institutions (state and civil) within one territorial area and then to work with them to explore ways of coordinating their activities. This vertical approach would address itself specifically to questions of integrating change within and between institutions of the state and between the state and civil spheres. The product sought is a repeatable process for developing specific arrangements appropriate to specific locations that will ensure that local diversity is not only recognized but becomes an asset rather than a problem. Thus, another important objective of this project is to establish a network of state and civil resources within these pilot project sites where the communities become 'steerers' and well as 'rowers' in the local governance of security. Each pilot project will identify specific substantive concerns that will act as hubs around which state and community partnerships will be built* .

Similar to South Africa, there has been a shift to democratic rule in Argentina. In this country as well, there exist deeply embedded residues of police structures and practices characterized by rampant corruption and the violation of human rights, particularly those of the underprivileged. In response to this, and apparently escalating crime rates, the Argentinian government has developed strategies to enhance police effectiveness and accountability. However, such initiatives are driven exclusively by the state and for state institutions such as the police. This privileging of the state in the governance of security serves to silence the voices of various communities, which contain within them a tremendous amount of resources and knowledge. The potential that lies at the local level of political and social organization has therefore been untapped.

The emergence of corporate forms of governance has been apparent in Argentina as well. The result has been a widening of the gap between the rich and the poor. In this situation, the rich are increasingly policed by the commercial sector through the logic of prevention, while the poor are policed by the public police through the logic of reactive enforcement. The adoption by the public police of the community policing model for eco-

* A substantial part of the discussion on South Africa draws from a previous piece by Shearing titled "Towards Democratic Policing: Rethinking Strategies of Transformation" (1997)

nomically poor and high-crime areas may seem to be, at least theoretically, an appropriate response to this existing inequity. However, in both developed and developing countries it seems to be the case that the police are often reluctant to deploy this model in such areas.

Similar to the South African project, one way to prevent and diminish this inequitable dualism – given the unavailability of market mechanisms for poor people – is the potential development by underprivileged communities of their own crime prevention capacities. The development of such capacities in high-crime areas requires that people trust one another, possess leadership skills, have a stake in their communities, and are organized politically to achieve it. Also, such programs must serve to represent the interests of people who are inarticulate, unorganized, and marginalized.

We are currently developing a project for Argentina which would involve the implementation of three pilot projects in three low-income housing communities. These pilots would be aimed at fostering a culture of community participation in the identification of safety issues and the development and implementation of community safety and crime reduction plans. This project will borrow the vertical pilot project model developed in South Africa.

Once this culture of community autonomy and participation has been fostered, strategies aimed at enhancing safety must begin. In order for this to occur, we have recommended the development of an institutional mechanism called the ‘community forum’ in both countries. At a designated community building, all partners (state and civil) meet in a forum where community members identify a set of security needs and goals based on their respective experience and knowledge of local issues. After this, partners then begin to develop practical solutions to these problems, which would consist of a range of state and civil resources and strategies. All partners will then participate in the implementation of these strategies.

Our ultimate goal in both countries is for the vertical pilot project model to be replicated in various other communities, not only in South Africa and Argentina, but in other parts of the globe as well. These projects are designed to re-invent democracy by promoting genuine self-direction in communities otherwise excluded from recent developments in the governance of security. We recognize that a return to a system of state-centered representative democracy is neither realistic nor desirable given the emergent system of nodal governance which is becoming established.

In sum, we have developed a normative agenda which addresses the positive and negative implications associated with the emergence of nodal governance, and in particular the neo-liberal and corporate developments which constitute it. While it is tempting to hark back to days which appear in retrospect to be simpler, one must be cognizant of the broad changes in economic and political life which render such an exercise both undesirable and irrelevant. Our biggest concern is obviously the underprivileged, who are being excluded, in a variety of ways, from active political participation in the governance of security. We should note as well that such normative considerations ought to be explored in other areas of governance such as housing, health and education, which pose similar issues. Although this task is ambitious, it is a future worth creating.

CONCLUSIONS

In order to develop realistic and cutting-edge solutions to security problems in both developed and developing countries, it is essential to understand the nature and magnitude of trends in governance more generally. The first part of our paper was designed to capture those trends that are occurring both within, and outside of, state auspices. If one thing is for certain, it is that governance is no longer a state monopoly. Not only has the state fractured, but other institutions have emerged – in particular, corporate governments – as key figures in the changing landscape of governance. It is the emergence of an overall system of nodal governance which has profound normative implications.

In particular, it is within emergent corporate auspices that democracy is being re-invented. Corporate governments have effectively taken over the reigns of governmental control by determining their own objectives and developing their own strategies. As such, institutions of representative democracy are essentially inappropriate and considerably limiting.

For some, this shift away from representative democracy may be threatening, given that corporate governments may exercise power in ways, which are contrary to the 'public' interest. Of concern as well is that the emergence of corporate governments will serve only to widen the gap between the rich and the poor. Although we are concerned that corporate forms of power may not always be benign, we would argue that these

non-state developments provide us with an opportunity, and perhaps even a model, for promoting the value of self-directed collective life in ways which aren't possible within a state-centered conception of governance.

This brought us to the programs that we have developed for South Africa and Argentina. While their institutions of representative democracy may be early on in their development from a Western standpoint, there is tremendous potential in these countries for developing autonomous communities and citizens who can play more than a peripheral role in the governance of security. This move toward a radical version of democracy would ensure that local diversity is recognized and that local direction is ensured and sustained.

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