
The Study of Chinese Scholars in Foreign Policy Analysis: An Emerging Research Program

Huiyun Feng and Kai He

Abstract

A review of studies of China’s foreign policy reveals three dominant methods: the area studies approach, the IR theory method, and the integrated approach. We suggest that it is time to pay close attention to an emerging research program focusing on the study of Chinese international relations (IR) scholars, especially their internal debates, as a new venue to understand China’s foreign policy. Although Chinese IR scholars are normally quoted as valuable sources in the study of Chinese foreign policy in general, there is no systematic study of China’s IR scholars per se. In order to transform the study of Chinese IR scholars to a full-fledged research program, researchers need to pursue theoretical innovations on the relationship between different types of IR scholars and foreign policy inquiries, advance multi-method research designs across the different methods of field interviews, textual analysis, and opinion surveys, as well as encourage international collaboration between Chinese scholars and non-Chinese scholars.

Keywords: Chinese IR scholars; Chinese foreign policy; China’s international relations; scholarly debates; US-China relations; China’s global role

Authors’ Bios:

Huiyun Feng is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Government and International Relations and Deputy Director of the Centre for Governance and Public Policy at Griffith University, Australia. She was a former Jennings Randolph Peace Scholar at United States Institute of Peace. Her publications have appeared in the European Journal of International Relations, Security Studies, The Pacific Review, International Politics, Chinese Journal of International Politics, and Asian Perspective. She is the author of Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-making: Confucianism, Leadership and War (2007) and the co-author of Prospect Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis in the Asia–Pacific (with Kai He, 2013) and How China Sees the World: Insights from China’s International Relations Scholars (with Kai He and Xiaojun Li, 2019). She is a co-editor of China’s Challenges and International Order Transition: Beyond Thucydides’s Trap (with Kai He, 2020).

Kai He is a Professor of International Relations, Griffith Asia Institute and Center for Governance and Public Policy, Griffith University, Australia and a Visiting Chair Professor of International Relations at the Zhou Enlai School of Government, Nankai University, China. He is currently an Australian Research Council (ARC) Future Fellow (2017-2020). He is the author of Institutional Balancing in the Asia Pacific: Economic Interdependence and China’s Rise (Routledge, 2009) and China’s Crisis Behavior: Political Survival and Foreign Policy (Cambridge, 2016). His latest books include How China Sees the World: Insights from Chinese International Relations Scholars (co-authored with Huiyun Feng and Xiaojun Li, Palgrave, 2020) and China’s Challenges and International Order Transition: Beyond “Thucydides’s Trap” (co-edited with Huiyun Feng, University of Michigan Press, 2020).

Acknowledgement:

This project is supported by the Australian Research Council [grant number FT160100355] and a policy-oriented research grant from the Korea Foundation.

Corresponding Author Information:

Kai He
Professor of International Relations
Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University
170 Kessels Rd. Nathan, QLD 4111, Australia
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Introduction

The rise of China and its profound implications for world politics have turned Chinese foreign policy into a fascinating field of study for scholars and policy makers alike. The study of Chinese foreign policy, however, is a tough enterprise. Due to its unique one-party political system, China’s policy making, especially on foreign policy, is a mystery in the eyes of outsiders. On the one hand, China’s foreign policy is clear and simple to understand because almost all Chinese officials and public media seem to follow the same official line on major foreign policies and present one voice predetermined by the central government. As China’s first Premier Zhou Enlai famously put it, ‘there is no small thing in foreign affairs’ (外事无小事). It means that the government is extremely sensitive to anything related to foreign policy, including the articulation and interpretation of China’s foreign policy to the outside world. Therefore, it is easy to discern what China’s foreign policies are because of the high-level control of the subject matter by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

On the other hand, it is quite difficult to analyze the sources of Chinese foreign policy, especially regarding how and why China has made a particular policy decision at a certain time as well as when and under what conditions China will change its foreign policy behavior in the future. The reason is also simple, because scholars and policy analysts have limited access and resources to investigate the decision-making process of Chinese foreign policy. For example, the famous bureaucratic politics model in the study of foreign policy has some inherent difficulties to be well operationalized because scholars have limited evidence about bureaucratic infighting in China. There is no public policy debate among officials or different bureaucratic units on foreign policy. This hierarchical, top-down, decision-making system makes China’s foreign policy more than a monolith. It is clear and simple outside, but opaque and complicated inside.

Through examining three dominant methods in the study of Chinese foreign policy—the area studies approach, the IR-theory method, and the integrated approach—in this essay we suggest that it is time to pay close attention to an emerging research program on the study of Chinese international relations (IR) scholars, especially their internal debates, as a new venue to understand China’s foreign policy. We suggest that this emerging research program should
be taken seriously, because it will complement and enrich the existing three approaches in the study of China’s foreign policy behavior.

The following paper has four sections. First, we briefly review the strengths and weaknesses of the three dominant research traditions in the study of China’s foreign policy. We argue that although Chinese IR scholars are normally quoted as valuable sources in the study of Chinese foreign policy, there is no systematic study of Chinese IR scholars per se. In the second section, we discuss the fourth research approach, which treats Chinese IR scholars as a subject of inquiry in studying Chinese foreign policy. There have been two waves or directions of scholarship in the study of Chinese IR scholars in foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. The first wave focuses more on exploring dominant views or the consensus among Chinese scholars, especially the America Watchers—scholars specializing on US-China relations, so that reliable inferences can be drawn from what America Watchers have perceived regarding what Chinese leaders believed in guiding China’s foreign policy toward the United States. The second wave, however, places more emphasis on the divergent views of Chinese IR scholars on broader issues beyond US-China relations, and this perspective opens a new window for the outside world to understand the dynamics of Chinese ideas and perceptions of international relations.

In the third section, we discuss how to move this scholar-focused research approach forward. We argue that more attention should be paid to theoretical innovations regarding the relationships between different types of IR scholars and foreign policy inquiries, the conduct of multi-method research designs across the different methods of interview, textual analysis, and opinion surveys, and the emerging international collaboration between Chinese scholars and non-Chinese scholars. In conclusion, we argue that this new research program—the study of Chinese IR scholars in the area of foreign policy analysis—will not only deepen the world’s understanding of China’s rise but also bring prominent Chinese IR scholars to the world stage.

**Three Approaches and the Role of Chinese IR Scholars**

There are three research traditions in the study of Chinese foreign policy. One is the traditional area studies approach, which emphasizes the idiosyncratic features of Chinese foreign policy. China experts in this research tradition are normally equipped with Chinese language skills and familiarity with Chinese culture and history. Their research is mainly based on extensive field work in China, gathering original materials and conducting interviews with Chinese policy elites, normally in Chinese. More importantly, the success of this approach depends highly on
personal networks between outside researchers and the different levels of Chinese society from
government officials to the scholarly community.

For example, David Lampton, a leading scholar of China’s foreign policy and US-
China relations, states that his book *Same bed different dreams: Managing US-China relations*
(2001) ‘reflects his unique opportunity to interact with Chinese people and leaders from the
People’s Republic of China (PRC), Hong Kong, and Taiwan for nearly thirty years as a scholar,
as the head of a policy-oriented exchange organization, and as director of Washington think-
tank research programs dealing with China.’ The Chinese leaders with whom Lampton
interacted as the president of the National Committee on US-China Relations for his book
include Zhu Rongji—later Chinese Premier, Wang Daohan—Jiang Zemin’s close friend, as
well as a member of Deng Xiaoping’s family. These kinds of personal interactions and
interview experiences make Lampton’s book one of the most authoritative sources in the study
of China’s foreign policy, because no other scholars have had similar access to such high-level
policy makers or politicians in China.

Similarly, David Shambaugh, another prominent China scholar from the United States,
spent one year as a Fulbright senior visiting scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
to conduct field research and interviews in China during 2009–2010 for his book *China goes
global* (2013). His interview list is also impressive in that he interviewed a politburo Central
Committee member, State Councilor Dai Bingguo, Executive Vice Foreign Minister Zhang
Zhijun, Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai, and a dozen other high-level officials as well as
leading policy analysts and IR scholars in China. Consequently, it is not a surprise that one of
the reasons that his book was selected as a best book of 2013 by *The Economist* and *Foreign
Affairs* was its ‘masterful survey’ of China’s foreign policy. Again, the privileged access to
Chinese officials is one key factor for the success of Shambaugh’s work. However, it is clear
that not all researchers can get such high-level access to Chinese officials when studying
China’s foreign policy.³

One criticism of the area studies approach is that area-specific knowledge and findings
are hard to generalize and apply to other cases due to their limitations on theoretical
contributions. To a certain extent, this research tradition is closer to the disciplines of the
humanities than to the social sciences. Consequently area studies have declined in the United
States and other countries after the Cold War, especially in the context of the scientific and
behavioral movement in the field of comparative politics in particular and political science in
general.⁴ The study of Chinese foreign policy, as Johnston (2006) points out, is also
marginalized within the academic field in the United States as we can see from the declining number of university faculty positions on China’s foreign policy in American universities.

The second approach in the study of China’s foreign policy is to explicitly apply IR theory to examine China’s foreign policy behavior. This is deductive modelling from theory to fact rather than inductive reasoning from fact to theory. For example, John Mearsheimer (2001) applies his offensive realism theory to explain and predict China’s foreign policy behavior after the rapid rise in its economic and military capabilities. His famous analogy is to compare China with the United States in the 19th century by suggesting that China will model the American Monroe doctrine to pursue regional hegemony. In other words, China is not a unique country in its foreign policy behavior compared to other major powers in the eyes of Mearsheimer or other IR scholars. Instead, it is a normal state that intends to maximize its interests in terms of power or security within an anarchical international system.

One advantage of this IR approach is that researchers do not need any China-specific knowledge to analyze Chinese foreign policy behavior. By treating China as a rising power in the international system like other states, IR scholars can apply different theoretical frameworks, such as realism, liberalism, and constructivism, to shed light on China’s foreign policy behavior. Realism, especially Mearsheimer’s offensive realism, seems useful to explain China’s assertive turn in diplomacy after 2010, because the more power China has, the more assertive its policy will be (Mearsheimer 2010). China is a revisionist state just because of its rising military and economic capabilities. On the contrary, according G. John Ikenberry—a leading liberalism scholar, China has no reason to become a revisionist state because China is the greatest beneficiary of the current liberal international order (Ikenberry 2008). The utility of a general IR theory, like realism and liberalism, in explaining China’s foreign policy highlights the weakness of the area studies approach, which emphasizes idiosyncratic explanations for China’s foreign policy behavior.5

However, the problem of the IR theory approach is that it ignores many culture-latent variables in shaping China’s foreign policy behavior. For example, it is debatable whether China’s foreign policy has indeed turned in an assertive direction or not as some media portrayed it in the 2010s (He and Feng 2012; Johnston 2013). In addition, it is too simplistic to argue that China is pursuing regional hegemony like the US did in the 19th century if we consider the positive impacts of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its charm offensive toward its neighboring states. We do not suggest here that China does not want to expand its influence in the region. Instead, how China pursues its influence might be different from others.
For example, David Shambaugh (2005: 94) points out that ‘both the logic and application of offensive realism [in China’s case] are … unsustainable,’ and China’s rise does not necessarily lead to US decline or to inevitable conflicts between the two nations. In a similar vein, David Kang (2003, 2007) echoes and extends Shambaugh’s critique by pointing out that IR theory, especially realism, is always ‘getting Asia wrong,’ because the realist assumption of an anarchical international system is not compatible with the traditional hierarchical nature of Asian international order.

The third approach to China’s foreign policy is to integrate the area studies and the IR theory approaches. Two leading China experts, Thomas Christensen and Alastair Johnston, are pioneers in promoting this approach in the field. Although their own works are based on China’s foreign policy behavior, they synthesize and advance various IR theories with their China-specific case studies. Therefore, their works not only shed light on China studies but also contribute to general theory-building in the IR field. For example, Christensen (1996) is seen as a leading scholar in building neoclassical realism—a realist theoretical framework that integrates both systemic effects and domestic transmission belts in the study of foreign policy, according to Gideon Rose (1998). Similarly, Alastair Johnston (1995, 2014) is a leading scholar with his work on socialization theory and constructivism although his main case studies focus on China’s strategic behavior and its multilateral diplomacy after the Cold War.6

One notable institutional contribution of Christensen and Johnston is their joint effort in building a post-doctoral research program to train a new generation of China scholars with solid IR theoretical foundations and area studies skills.7 For example, Kai He (2008a, 2008b; 2017; 2018; 2019) develops an institutional balancing theory to explain how states use different institutional strategies to pursue influence and power in the era of globalization (also see He and Feng, 2019; Feng and He 2018; Feng and He 2019b). Todd Hall (2015) integrates emotion theory with IR theory to shed light on the role of state-level emotional behavior in states’ strategies and interactions with other states. Ian Chong (2012) enriches state formation scholarship by examining the role of foreign intervention and external rivalries in affecting the institutionalization of governance in weak states. One feature of this new generation of China scholars is that they no longer concentrate on China as their sole research focus, as traditional area studies scholars do. Instead, China is only treated as a case study or an important source in their theory-building endeavors.

It is not our purpose in this essay to evaluate which approach in the study of China’s foreign policy is better or the best. As mentioned before, both the area studies approach and the IR theory method have their respective strengths and weaknesses. While the area studies
approach can go deeper culturally and socially in understanding China’s policy behavior, the IR theory approach can reach a wider generalization in their arguments. The third integrated approach seems to maximize the strengths of the previous two methods, but it has a very high standard for scholars to achieve in both theoretical reasoning and language training.

Another important, but sometimes ignored, approach in the study of China’s foreign policy is to systematically examine Chinese IR scholars. To be fair, the above three methods all take Chinese IR scholars seriously because Chinese IR scholars’ comments and publications are important original sources in the study of China’s foreign policy. Area studies scholars rely heavily on interviews to substantiate their findings. Because of China’s one-party political system, Chinese IR scholars might be one of the most important, if not the only, interviewees who can be approached for most researchers, even though Lampton and Shambaugh did reach top policy makers for their research. Due to the language barrier, researchers with an IR theory approach might not be able to conduct interviews freely with Chinese IR scholars in China. However, they can still rely on printed materials, such as commentaries and scholarly publications written by Chinese scholars to support their arguments.

However, there is a ‘utilitarian bias’ regarding how to cite Chinese IR scholars in the study of Chinese foreign policy. Most research treats Chinese IR scholars as an important source of evidence for substantiating theoretical arguments or empirical findings. Although Chinese IR scholars have diverse views and internal debates, outside researchers might or might not be aware or fully understand what these different perceptions among Chinese IR scholars really mean. Consequently, a cherry-picking practice seems common when scholars selectively cite some Chinese scholars’ publications in supporting their arguments but ignore others.

For example, if a scholar intends to argue for China’s burgeoning nationalism, he or she can easily cite some commentaries written by Chinese scholars in the Global Times, which is a flagship nationalistic newspaper in China. It is not to suggest that the writings in the Global Times should not be cited at all. Instead, just like in any country, Chinese scholars have different views on diverse issues. How to wisely use Chinese scholars’ commentaries in the Global Times is a judgment call for researchers studying Chinese foreign policy. One thing is certain, however, and that is that merely citing Chinese scholars publishing in the Global Times will not be good enough to gauge a complete picture of Chinese nationalism in the whole of society.

Another concrete example can be drawn from Michael Pillsbury’s popular book The hundred-year marathon: China’s secret strategy to replace America as the global superpower
The main argument of the book is to suggest that China has set a secret plan to surpass the United States in the 100 years since the 1950s. This book has been seen as a roadmap of Trump’s confrontational policy toward China (Schreckinger and Lippman, 2018). However, as Johnston (2019: 189–190) points out, the whole book is built on a ‘shaky foundation,’ because the evidence that Pillsbury supplies, however, does not sustain this narrative. Indeed, the claim appears to rest on a misreading of one of his major sources—a book by Colonel Liu Mingfu entitled The China Dream: Great Power Thinking and Strategic Posture in the Post American Era. Liu is a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) political work officer—that is, a propagandist, and not a strategist or commander.

In other words, Pillsbury seems to have become a victim of Chinese propaganda, in that he chose the wrong evidence to reach the wrong conclusion about China’s foreign policy strategies.

The Study of Chinese IR Scholars—A Research Program in the Making

Treating Chinese scholars as a subject of study, instead of a source of evidence, paves a new path in the study of China’s foreign policy. There have been two waves or two directions in the study of Chinese scholars in foreign policy. The first wave is led by David Shambaugh (1991), who published his pathbreaking book, Beautiful Imperialist, in which he examines how China’s ‘America Watchers’ perceived the United States between 1972 and 1990. Using China’s America Watchers—Chinese IR scholars working on US-China relations—as a proxy measure of Chinese policy elites, Shambaugh argues that China’s distorted and biased perceptions of the United States contributed to the fluctuations in bilateral relations between the two nations during the Cold War. Shambaugh’s book is an exemplar of the area studies approach in the study of China’s foreign policy with its extensive use of primary sources and interviews in China.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, other scholars followed Shambaugh’s example in exploring Chinese IR scholars’ perceptions of the United States (e.g. Wang, 2000; Chen, 2003; Zhang, 2005; Glaser and Medeiros, 2007; Callahan, 2008). For example, Yong Deng (2001) examines Chinese scholars’ perceptions of US global strategy after the Cold War. Deng suggests that Chinese analysts have overall perceived a consistent and malign US strategy of global domination as well as the predatory nature of US hegemony. This perception of ‘hegemon on the offensive’ can well explain China’s balancing efforts against the United States in the post-Cold War era.
In a similar vein, Rosalie Chen (2003) explores Chinese IR scholars’ changing perceptions of the United States from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s. She suggests that Chinese IR scholars have seemingly reached a consensus on the hegemonic nature of US foreign policy, particularly its intention of containing a rising China. This negative perception of the United States from Chinese IR experts can also count for the troubled bilateral relations between the United States and China.

In 2012, based on their extensive interviews and fieldwork in Beijing, Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell (2012) published an article, ‘How China sees America,’ in Foreign Affairs, in which they examine ‘the sum of Beijing’s fears’ toward the United States. They suggest that ‘the Chinese believe the United States is a revisionist power that seeks to curtail China’s political influence and harm China’s interests’ (Nathan and Scobell, 2012: 33). However, they point out that ‘mainstream Chinese strategists do not advise China to challenge the United States in the foreseeable future’ (Nathan and Scobell, 2012: 45). Therefore, they suggest that Washington should adopt a reassurance policy toward Beijing to expand common interests between the two nations.

While the first wave of scholarship on the study of Chinese scholars somehow looks for more consensus in Chinese perceptions and views, especially regarding the United States, the second wave of scholarship pays close attention to diverse views, especially the debates among Chinese scholars over various issue areas beyond the United States. For example, Mingjiang Li (2008) investigates the Chinese IR scholars’ debate on soft power. Because of the diverse and contending views on the sources, utilities, and means of soft power among Chinese scholars and pundits, Li suggests that it will be still a long way for China to use its soft power effectively to challenge the international order.

Daniel Lynch (2015) investigates how Chinese academic elites debate China’s economics, politics, and foreign policy through intensive content analyses of Chinese publications and elite interviews. One interesting finding of Lynch’s book is that Chinese IR scholars are more optimistic about China’s future, including its economic and military power and standing in the world, than are Chinese economists. This self-confidence in the field of international relations might partially account for the assertive turn in Chinese diplomacy after the 2008 global financial crisis. Through examining how Chinese scholars debate the construction of a Chinese school of IR theory, Noesselt (2015: 444) also suggests that ‘the search for a “Chinese” paradigm of IR theory [thus] finally reveals itself as part of China’s global positioning ambitions.’
Shaun Breslin, as a leading scholar in the second wave of the study of Chinese scholars, is worth noting in particular. Relying on original Chinese scholarly publications and commentaries, he and his colleagues thoroughly examine Chinese perceptions of human security, the global order, core interests, plus China’s international identity and power. For example, Breslin (2015) examines the evolution of China’s perceptions of human security by delving into scholarly works and media publications. Through exploring how the concept of human security has been ‘Sinicized’ by Chinese scholars to reflect Chinese contexts and preferences, Breslin concludes that China might pursue an ‘anti-norm’ policy in the future global order.

In his widely cited article in *International Affairs*, Breslin (2013) argues that Chinese scholars hold five different views on China’s role in the future global order and these different identities can explain China’s diverse strategies toward different audiences in different issue areas. Breslin’s findings further Shambaugh’s argument on China as ‘a deeply conflicted rising power with a series of competing international identities.’ According to Shambaugh (2011: 7), ‘understanding these competing identities is crucial to anticipating how Beijing’s increasingly contradictory and multidimensional behaviour will play out on the world stage.’

Besides China’s role identity, Breslin and Jinghan Zeng dig into the Chinese debates over the so-called ‘new type of great power relations’ proposed by Xi Jinping in 2012 (Zeng and Breslin, 2016). By analyzing 141 Chinese language articles, they argue that ‘the mainstream discourse views China as both a Great Power and a rising power at the same time’ (Zeng and Breslin, 2016: 775). This double identity makes it hard to pin down what China really wants strategically. However, they argue that China will not behave as a ‘norm taker’ dictated to by the outside powers. Instead, China will become a norm contestor or even a norm shaper in the future international order (Zeng and Breslin 2016: 775).

Another notable project on the study of Chinese scholars’ internal debates regarding international relations is led by Kai He and Huiyun Feng (Feng and He, 2015; Feng and He, 2016; Feng, He, and Yan 2019; Feng, He, and Li, 2019). With support from the MacArthur Foundation in the United States, the ‘He and Feng project’ conducted a three-year project entitled, ‘understanding China’s rise through the eyes of Chinese IR scholars.’ One part of the project is to systematically examine Chinese IR scholars’ debates on China’s key foreign policy perceptions, principles, and strategies, including the future international structure (国际格局), soft power, international status, comprehensive power, national interests, the non-interference
principle, responsibility to protect, use of force, non-alliance strategy, maritime strategy, and economic diplomacy (see Feng, He, and Yan, 2019).\footnote{10}

One interesting feature of the ‘He and Feng project’ is that all the contributors are Chinese IR scholars or originated from China (while holding teaching positions outside China). As mentioned before, one difficulty in the study of Chinese IR scholars is the language barrier, because it will need extensive research on original Chinese scholarly publications and related written sources. One added value of this project, therefore, is to ‘let Chinese IR scholars tell their own stories’ regarding their internal debates on international relations (Feng and He, 2019a). Moreover, the guidelines for the project explicitly asked all contributors to examine whether and how the Chinese IR scholars’ debates have any influence on China’s foreign policy (Feng and He, 2019a).

In particular, the ‘He and Feng project’ (Feng and He, 2019a) proposes four models to illustrate the relationship between Chinese scholars and foreign policy. The first model is the ‘epistemic community’ model suggesting that some Chinese scholars might have some direct influence in shaping China’s foreign policy through shared policy beliefs within an epistemic community. The second model is the ‘free market’ model, in which scholars produce knowledge and make policy recommendations for the policy makers (consumers) to adopt (purchase) in a free marketplace of ideas.

The third model is called a ‘policy signaling’ model, because scholars can help policy makers test and signal some bold and controversial policy ideas and proposals to both domestic and international audiences. It helps the government to measure possible impacts and consequences of certain policy changes or new policies. The last model is called a ‘policy mirroring’ model, in which scholars’ debates can reflect China’s policy deliberations within the government as well as domestic political dynamics in the broader Chinese society.

The project’s findings suggest that all of these four models have some purchase in China although the ‘free market’ model is the most popular one in explaining the relationship between Chinese scholars and foreign policy. Some prominent scholars, such as Wang Jisi, Yan Xuetong, Qin Yaqing, Shi Yinhong, and Wu Xinbo, are good examples of the ‘epistemic community model,’ in which people can draw some direct linkages between individual Chinese IR scholars and some policy outcomes. Qin Yaqing lectured on global governance at a Politburo study session. Shi Yinhong served as an advisor for the State Council. Yan Xuetong’s ‘moral realism’ philosophy is seen as a major theoretical backbone of Chinese foreign policy transformation under Xi Jinping (Feng, He, and Yan, 2019). One widely circulated story is that Wang Jisi’s policy proposal of a ‘moving West strategy’ might have had
some direct influence on China’s Belt Road Initiatives, because both emphasize the strategic importance of Central Asia (on the western side of the China) for China’s grand strategy (Wang, 2012).

An illustration of the ‘free market’ model can be drawn from Wang Yizhou’s ‘creative involvement’ theory and Yan Xuetong’s ‘China-needs-alliances’ argument. Wang (2011, 2017) suggests that China needs to modify its ‘non-interference’ policy principle in order to cope with new challenges in the era of globalization. Yan (2011, 2013a, 2013b) argues that China needs to change its non-alliance policy and consider forming a military alliance with Russia due to its increasing competition with the US as well as system-level pressures. Both arguments are highly controversial and contested in the marketplace of ideas in Chinese academia. However, it seems that Wang’s ‘creative involvement’ was ‘purchased’ by the government as seen from China’s proactive involvement in the UN peacekeeping missions. Yan’s ‘China-needs-alliances’ proposal, however, gets the cold shoulder from Chinese policy makers, because China’s then Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying insisted in her article in *Foreign Affairs*, that China’s relationship with Russia is not an alliance, but a partnership (Fu, 2016).

The ‘policy mirroring’ model also has some empirical support. For example, the intense public debates on China’s non-interference principle might reflect China’s policy changes from ‘keeping-a-low-profile’ to ‘striving-for-achievements.’ However, the ‘policy signaling’ model seems to be not very popular among the contributors to the project. Scholars sometimes seem reluctant to admit that they are playing a signaling role for the government, which might jeopardize their academic integrity and scholarship. However, there are some exceptions. For example, Dingli Shen, a well-known IR scholar at Fudan University, published an article in July 2010 entitled ‘Don’t shun the idea of setting up overseas military bases’ on www.China.org (Shen, 2010).

Shen’s idea of building military bases overseas is very controversial due to China’s defensive military doctrine and ideological constraints. Five years after Shen’s article, China opened its first military base in Djibouti in 2015. According to the *Financial Times*, Shen believed that ‘the lack of international reaction to his article, which was published in English, might have been a factor in the Chinese decision to go ahead with a foreign base’ (Clover and Lin, 2016). It is a good example of the ‘policy signaling’ model. However, it is not clear whether Shen sent this policy signal for the government voluntarily or accidentally.

This special issue of *The Pacific Review* ‘China debates its global role,’ co-organized by Shaun Breslin and Xiao Ren, is a commendable effort in expanding the study of Chinese IR scholars. Seven papers written by leading and emerging Chinese IR scholars in this special
issue cover various aspects of scholarly debates over China’s global role, including the contending views on world order (Chen and Zhang, this issue), the different perceptions of regional order (Wang and Meng, this issue), the various analyses on China’s multilateral diplomacy and global governance (Liu, this issue), the dynamic quests for a Chinese School of IR (Ren), the divergent understandings of policy principle, diplomatic style, and tactics (Wei, this issue), the distinctive understandings of international law and China’s diplomacy (He, this issue), as well as the contending schools of thought on foreign aid (Huang and Hu, this issue).

In particular, Ling Wei (this issue) examines three nuanced adjustments of China’s foreign policy doctrine after the 2008 global financial crisis through Chinese scholarly debates. She suggests that Chinese scholars in general advocate a more balanced foreign policy, a cooperative relationship with the US, and deeper integration into the current international system. Dong Wang and Weizhan Meng (this issue) echo Wei Ling’s argument but from a different regional order perspective. They suggest that Chinese scholars have not accepted the concept of ‘Tianxia’ tributary system’ proposed by a Chinese philosopher Zhao Tingyang. Instead, most Chinese scholars emphasize the importance of mutual accommodation between the United States and China and prefer a ‘concert of great powers’ for regional order.

If the debates of Chinese scholars can be seen as a proxy measure of the views of Chinese policymakers as mentioned before, it seems that the deep-seated American concern over China’s challenge to the liberal international order is unwarranted. China’s global role as discussed in this special issue is not only benign in orientation but also constructive in substance. However, the harsh reality is that Washington has labelled Beijing as a strategic competitor and rival in Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy. The prolonged trade war and the related technological war on 5G and Huawei have signified an inevitable strategic competition or even rivalry between the two nations in the future. The intriguing question is: why do most Chinese scholars, as seen from this special issue, still seem to be optimistic about the future of US-China relations as well as China’s international relations? In order to answer this question, we need to think about how to move this emerging research program forward, theoretically, methodologically, and internationally.

Moving Forward—Theory, Method, and Collaboration

This scholar-focused approach faces both theoretical and methodological challenges along the way to becoming a full-fledged research program in the study of China’s foreign policy. First, the relationship between Chinese scholars and China’s foreign policy still needs to be further
theorized. Most research in the study of Chinese IR scholars focuses on the ‘face value’ of exploring the diverse or consensual views of Chinese scholars on a specific issue. To be fair, even ‘face value’ research is already a notable academic contribution because it assists the non-Chinese speaking world to better understand China’s domestic discourses and debates. In order to answer Jeffery Legro’s (2007) question: ‘what China will want,’ we need to open the black box of the Chinese society and explore its ideational dynamics, especially among Chinese IR scholars. As Shambaugh (2013: 16) points out, ‘the IR discourse in China offers a “window” into official policy thinking, even if it is difficult to decipher (requiring the venerable Sinological tradition of ‘tea leaf reading’).

However, merely presenting what Chinese scholars’ views are and how they debate is only the first step of inquiry in the study of China’s foreign policy. The relationship between scholars and policy is a highly debated question throughout the whole world. There is no simple causal link between Chinese scholars and foreign policies. We can neither argue that Chinese scholars have a direct influence on foreign policies, nor assume that Chinese scholars are simply influenced by the government’s policies. As we have illustrated above, there are intense debates among Chinese IR scholars on various issues although this might or might not be known to the outside world.

The ‘He and Feng project’ (Feng and He, 2015; Feng and He 2016; Feng and He 2019a) has made some preliminary, hopefully inspiring, contributions by exploring the relationship between Chinese scholars and policy outcomes. In order to advance the research program, we need to make more theoretical efforts in deepening our understanding of the link between scholars and policies. For example, it might be useful to classify different types of Chinese IR scholars based on their professions. Bonnie Glaser and Philip Saunders (2002) examined the role of Chinese civilian research institutions, mostly think-tanks, in China’s foreign policy decision-making process. Apparently, think-tank scholars perform a different function from what university-based scholars do in influencing China’s foreign policy. In addition, there is a third type of scholar—‘media scholars’—who are actively involved in the public media space, such as op-eds for newspapers, TV shows, radio broadcasting as well as various social media. These scholars might or might not publish articles in academic journals. However, their influence in society and the policy community cannot be ignored.

After typologizing different IR scholars, we need to draw the theoretical linkages between Chinese scholars and the study of China’s foreign policy. The main job for think-tank scholars is to provide policy analyses and proposals to the Chinese government through internal reporting channels. These internal reports are not accessible for ordinary researchers. However,
these think-tank scholars might also publish some academic articles and commentaries. Although these publications are not their major everyday work products, they might entail some signaling messages for the outside world, intentionally or not. In other words, the ‘policy signaling’ model should be taken seriously when studying the works of Chinese think-tank scholars.

Regarding university-based scholars, academic publication is one of the most important criteria in evaluating their research quality. Although Chinese scholars also intend to conduct policy-relevant research, they might not have direct channels like think-tank scholars to offer policy recommendations or proposals for the policy community. Therefore, the ‘free market’ model will apply to university-based scholars in that they can have more time and energy to produce knowledge-based research and scholarship for the consumer—policy makers—to purchase in the marketplace of ideas. However, as we have discussed above, Chinese university-based scholars will not be able to control how and whether their research is valued or purchased by policy makers or not. Therefore, when we examine scholarly publications by Chinese university-based scholars, we cannot simply draw a causal linkage between scholarly recommendations and China’s policy orientations. However, we can capture the most controversial, but brightest, policy ideas on China’s foreign policy in this marketplace of ideas.

As for the so-called ‘media scholars,’ they deserve some special attention in the study of China’s foreign policy. Although Chinese media have been commercialized in recent years, the party still tightly controls the mainstream or official media in society. Therefore, scholars in this category have the most direct link with government bureaucracies in that they can help interpret and justify China’s official policy to society as well as to the outside world. However, this type of scholar might also serve a propagandist function, and their works might be highly politicalized for domestic purposes. Liu Mingfu, author of *The China Dream* mentioned above, is one of the media scholars in China who advocate strong ultra-nationalism in China. Although ultra-nationalism might serve some political agenda items of the Chinese government, it is by no means the only political and strategic thought that influences China’s foreign policy. Researchers, therefore, need to learn a lesson from Pillsbury’s eye-catching but flawed argument on China’s secret 100-year strategic plan, because it would be misleading to read too much into this kind of propagandist work.

However, researchers should not ignore these ‘media scholars’ at all. In the study of this type of scholars, the ‘policy mirroring’ model might be useful. Since the main function of ‘media scholars’ is to justify China’s foreign policy, we will not be able to get any critical insights on China’s foreign policy from their commentaries and even publications in scholarly
spaces. Academically and intellectually, their writings might have limited research value. Nonetheless, the rise and fall of their appearances and rhetoric in the media might reflect possible policy changes of China’s foreign policy. Hypothetically speaking, if Liu Mingfu and other media scholars advocating ultra-nationalism appear less frequently in various media outlets, we can infer that the Chinese government might be constraining the influence of nationalism in foreign policy. If continued hype of ultranationalist works is seen from the frequent appearance of the ‘media scholars’ in various major media outlets, we can infer that China’s foreign policy might be moving in a more nationalistic direction.

It is worth noting that we do not draw a link between the ‘epistemic community’ model and any type of Chinese scholars. It is not to suggest that the ‘epistemic community’ model is not valid in the study of Chinese scholars. Instead, we argue that this model might apply to any scholar who has a direct and personal connection with the policy community, no matter to which group of scholars in our typology he or she belongs. Guanxi 关系 or personal network might be one of the most important factors for scholars to exert influence in the policy community. However, this type of relationship might not be openly observable or known in public. It is definitely useful for researchers who study China’s foreign policy to interview the most famous and notable IR scholars in China. However, we might need to take it with a grain of salt when we are tempted to equate scholars’ fame with their influence in foreign policy.

We also need to emphasize that the proposed theoretical frameworks for different types of Chinese scholars in this essay are just illustrative or hypothetical in nature. Not only is serious empirical work needed in order to test these models, but also more creative theoretical models need to be introduced and proposed by other scholars. For example, beyond their job affiliations researchers might consider how other factors, such as theoretical inclinations and even geographical locations, might shape the different roles of Chinese IR scholars in influencing China’s foreign policy. In addition, the relationship between scholars and social media as well as how scholars use social media to influence foreign policy are also worth exploring.

Besides theoretical innovation, we also need to consider how to advance the methodology in the study of Chinese scholars in foreign policy. The most traditional approach is to conduct interviews with Chinese scholars and perform textual and content analyses, qualitatively and quantitively, on Chinese scholarly and policy-related publications. As mentioned before, this traditional approach requires a high level of Chinese language skill, both in conversation and writing. In Shambaugh’s words, it will require ‘tea-leaf-reading’ skill. It is
why area studies scholars with intensive language training background are better equipped to pursue this approach than general IR scholars. It is also the reason why this special issue written by Chinese IR scholars on the internal debate on China’s global role is exceptionally valuable, because the insights from these articles are not normally accessible to the English-speaking world.

Opinion surveys of Chinese scholars were also used by the ‘He and Feng project’ although the implementation of such a method has become more and more difficult in China given the tightened control of the government over survey research. He and Feng conducted four years of opinion surveys at the annual conference of the Chinese Community of Political Science and International Studies (CCPSIS) hosted by Tsinghua University in 2014–2017. Although the findings were inspiring and intriguing, one challenge was the limitation of the sample because the participants at the CCPSIS cannot fully represent the whole population of IR scholars in China (Feng, He, and Li, 2019). Nevertheless, their project paves a new methodological path for the study of Chinese IR scholars in foreign policy, which may encourage other scholars to follow in the future.

One methodological innovation of the ‘He and Feng project’ was to compare their survey findings with textual analyses of Chinese scholarly publications in five major Chinese journals during a similar time period (2013–2018). One interesting finding was that there are some discrepancies between what scholars said in surveys and what they published in their writings. For example, more than half of the survey participants state that they support changing China’s non-alliance policy during their four-year surveys. However, in scholarly publications, only a few publications touched on this topic implicitly. In addition, a majority of the survey participants thought that China should have changed its policy toward North Korea in 2014–2017.

In contrast, scholarly publications seem to be silent on this topic although there are some public debates in popular media (Feng, He, and Li, 2020). This result from the ‘He and Feng project’ illustrates the value of encouraging more cross-methodological innovation in studying China’s IR scholars in the future. This discrepancy attests to the fact that Chinese scholars might face ‘double pressures’ from both the government’s censorship and self-censorship in their publications. It is understandable because all scholars, no matter whether they are Chinese or not, might be more cautious in writing than in anonymous surveys. Therefore, researchers who study Chinese IR scholars as a subject of inquiry should consider how to reduce such censorship effects on their findings.
Finally, international collaboration, especially between Chinese scholars and non-Chinese scholars, is of utmost importance for the success of this research program—the study of Chinese scholars in foreign policy analysis. This special issue, co-led by Breslin and Ren, is a good example of such an effort. In a similar vein, the ‘He and Feng project’ would not have been successful without support from Tsinghua University, especially from Professor Yan Xuetong and the Institute of International Relations, who co-sponsored the multi-year scholar surveys as well as international conferences. In the study of Chinese IR scholars in foreign policy analysis, there is an inherent advantage for Chinese scholars to tell their own stories due to their unique understanding of the Chinese way of conducting scholarly debates influenced by Chinese culture and tradition. However, since onlookers may also see most of the game, non-Chinese scholars can provide extra insights that contribute to theoretical development and methodological sophistication in the study of Chinese scholars.

Conclusion

China is one of the most defining actors in world politics in the 21st century. How to understand what Chinese policy makers think and grasp how China will behave is an imperative task for IR scholars, China specialists, and policy analysts. Traditional area studies methods, IR theory approaches, and an integrated approach employing the best of both academic traditions have made significant contributions to the study of China’s foreign policy. One emerging research program, the study of Chinese IR scholars, also deserves special attention in the field due to the unique role that Chinese scholars play in the decision-making process inside China’s one-party political system.

As Daniel Lynch (2015: x) points out, ‘studying these (Chinese scholars’) images can be useful in trying to assess what trajectory is likely to emerge, precisely because the elites are operating inside parameters imposed by the (still) awesomely powerful Party-state.’ There is no direct or easy causal linkage between Chinese IR scholars and China’s foreign policy; however, we can use Chinese scholars to make sense of the policy boundaries and future directions of China’s foreign policy. Through examining the existing research on the study of Chinese IR scholars in foreign policy, in this essay we have proposed three ways to move this emerging research program forward.

First, we need to identify different types of IR scholars and employ specific theories about their research implications. For example, in the study of university-based scholars a free-market model is appropriate to gauge new ideas and proposals in China’s foreign policy. The
writings and works of think-tank scholars might serve as policy signaling for the Chinese government. Writings and publications by media scholars might reflect China’s domestic political dynamics as well as international aspirations. The principle of ‘horses-for-courses’ should be considered in theorizing the role of IR scholars in China’s foreign policy decision-making processes.

In addition, the study of Chinese IR scholars in foreign policy needs to encourage a multi-method approach in which personal interviews, textual analysis, and survey research can complement one another in exploring what Chinese IR scholars think and how they can influence China’s foreign policy. Moreover, international collaboration between Chinese scholars and non-Chinese scholars is also necessary for advancing the level of theoretical and methodological sophistication of this emerging research program. As China becomes a global actor in the future, the study of Chinese IR scholars in foreign policy will also deserve global efforts and international endeavors. It will thereby provide an opportunity to bring Chinese IR scholars and their works to the world stage. Therefore, the rise of Chinese IR scholars will likely accompany the rise of China.
Notes

1 There are some exceptions, for example, please see Jakobson and Knox (2010), International Crisis Group (2012), Lai and Kang (2014), Zhang (2016).

2 Here, we simply classify the major research traditions in the study of Chinese foreign policy for analytical purposes. In practice, scholars might conduct research across different traditions. For more detailed discussions of research methodology, such as Pekingological analyses of statements and discourses, historical analysis, qualitative and quantitative behavioral analysis, content analysis, interviews, surveys and structured interviews, and formal modelling, please see Johnston (2006) and Johnston and Ross (2006).


4 For criticisms of area studies, see Shea (1997).

5 For examples of other works with the IR-theory method, see Legro (2007), Buzan (2010), Allison (2017).


7 The postdoctoral program was first called ‘Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program.’ Later, it was renamed ‘Columbia-Harvard China and the World Program,’ because Thomas Christensen moved from Princeton to Columbia in 2018. For details about the program and related scholars and publications, see https://cwp.sipa.columbia.edu/

8 One related topic that Breslin and his associates focus on is China’s internal debate over ‘core interests’ (Zeng, Xiao, and Breslin, 2015). They suggest that Chinese scholars hold contending views on what constitutes China’s core interests. This vague conceptualization of China’s core interests ‘makes it difficult to predict Chinese diplomatic behaviour.’

9 For details about this project, see https://www.griffith.edu.au/asia-institute/our-research/how-china-sees-the-world

10 In addition to the edited volume (Feng, He, and Yan, 2019), the He and Feng project also published a special issue at the *Chinese Journal of International Politics* in 2017, see Pu (2017), Liu and Liu (2017), Mao (2017), and Qi (2017). The *Chinese Journal of International Relations* has become a major academic platform for Chinese IR scholars to present their views and perspectives on world politics. Other notable examples include Li (2019), Zhao (2019), Zhao and Zhang (2019) and Zhou (2019).
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