Veiled Threats: How Do Identity Threats Shape Muslims’ Support for Terrorism?

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Abstract

In recent decades, Islamic-inspired terrorism has worsened intergroup tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims in western democratic countries, including Australia. Muslims and Islam are often linked with terrorism, and the resulting tension between Muslims and non-Muslims has fostered an “us” versus “them” mentality (Blackwood et al., 2013b). Some research suggests that the alienation Muslims feel as a result of the stigma they have faced in recent years can push some Muslims towards radicalisation (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Dugan & Distler, 2016). In my dissertation, I propose that the disproportionate scrutiny that Muslims face in western democratic countries may lead some Muslims to support terrorism.

Drawing on Social Identity Theory (SIT), my dissertation centres on the proposition that Muslims’ support for terrorism may manifest when some Muslims experience identity threats from non-Muslims. I propose that a feedback loop exists whereby non-Muslims’ attitudes and actions towards Muslims, as well as in-group/out-group tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims, may lead some Muslims in Australia to experience identity threats. I propose that non-Muslims might come to hold punitive views towards Muslims because they perceive Muslims to be a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat and that their national identity as Australians can influence this association. I also suggest that Muslims can come to perceive that their identities are threatened by (1) feeling stigmatised and (2) believing that others are punitive towards Muslims (conceptualised in my dissertation as meta-punitiveness). I further argue that the strength of a Muslim’s national and religious identity might influence how susceptible some Muslims are to these identity threats. Existing studies typically focus on how support for terrorism
may arise amongst Muslims living in Muslim-majority countries. Yet, few studies consider how Muslims come to support terrorism when they constitute a minority group in a western country. My research takes place in Australia. My dissertation focuses on both Muslims and non-Muslims living in Australia to examine the in-group/out-group tensions between the two groups. Doing so will result in a more thorough understanding of how and why some Muslims might come to support terrorism.

My dissertation presents three interrelated studies. Together, these three studies demonstrate how the attitudes and behaviours of one group (i.e., non-Muslims) have the potential to impact the attitudes and behaviours of another group (i.e., Muslims) and vice versa. Studies 1 and 2 utilise survey data I collected from 1,193 non-Muslim Australians. In the *Attitudes to Punishment Survey*, I presented participants with information depicting a terrorist event whereby the motivation for the attack was described as being Islamic-inspired or right-wing-inspired. Study 1 explores if non-Muslims hold more punitive attitudes towards the perpetrator motivated by Islamic-inspired terrorism relative to the perpetrator motivated by right-wing-inspired terrorism. It also explores the extent to which non-Muslims see Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat and believe that Muslims support terrorism. Study 2 draws on SIT to understand how non-Muslims’ attitudes towards Muslims are associated with their support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. Study 2 tests if non-Muslims’ Australian national identity is related to their perceptions of Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat and their support for punitive counter-terrorism policies.

Study 3 draws on secondary survey data from 398 Muslim Australians collected in the *Sydney Immigrant Survey (SIS)*. Study 3 investigates if Muslims’
experiences of identity threat (i.e., feeling stigmatised and feeling non-Muslims are punitive towards Muslims) are associated with their support for terrorism. Moreover, Study 3 considers whether or not identity (i.e., both their Australian national identity and their religious identity) plays a role in mitigating or exacerbating the association between identity threats on Muslims’ support for terrorism.

Together, the findings from Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate a positive association between perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat, holding a strong national identity, and supporting punitive counter-terrorism policies. In Study 1, I find that non-Muslim Australian participants on average: (a) held more punitive views of counter-terrorism policies, (b) viewed Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat, and (c) believed that Muslims support terrorism if they received a vignette describing a suspect inspired by Islamic-inspired compared to right-wing-inspired motives. In Study 2 I find that non-Muslims’ Australian national identity was positively associated with their (a) perceptions of Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat, and (b) support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. Specifically, those non-Muslims who held a stronger national identity perceived Muslims as a greater threat and were more supportive of punitive counter-terrorism policies.

In Study 3, I turned my attention to the perspectives and experiences of the Muslim sample. I tested if non-Muslims’ perceptions of threat towards Muslims and their support for punitive counter-terrorism policies (that often target Muslims more than other groups) translated to experiencing a stronger identity threat amongst my Muslim sample. I considered if Muslims’ feelings that others stigmatised them (e.g., viewed them as a suspect) and perceptions that others were punitive towards Muslims because of their race, ethnicity or religion (i.e., meta-punitiveness) would
be associated with Muslims’ heightened support for terrorism. I found that experiencing one type of identity threat (i.e., meta-punitiveness) was associated with Muslims’ increased support for terrorism. I also found that holding a strong national identity (i.e., as an Australian) had a protective role in reducing Muslims’ support for terrorism.

In sum, I find support for a possible feedback loop, whereby the attitudes and behaviours of non-Muslims may shape an atmosphere instrumental to increasing Muslims’ support for terrorism via their felt identity threats. I argue that support for punitive counter-terrorism policies by non-Muslims may perpetuate the identity threats experienced by Muslims. I conclude that this reinforces the need to address broader public attitudes towards Muslims to prevent the narrative associating Muslims with terrorism. I suggest it is also essential to create an environment conducive to building a national identity amongst Muslim residents. Ensuring that Muslims feel socially included in society and feel a strong affiliation with the nation they live in is vital as other research suggests that people will act in the best interests of groups they feel a secure attachment to (Stephan et al., 2009; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Preventing terrorism necessitates a whole-of-community response and requires that counter-terrorism initiatives do not alienate or disproportionately affect Muslim communities. Examining support for terrorism through Muslim and non-Muslim perceptions will help to reframe the divisive “us” versus “them” discourse into a more collective “we.”
Statement of Originality

This work has not previously been submitted for a degree or diploma in any university. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the dissertation contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the dissertation itself.

(Signed) ________________________________

Harley Mae Williamson
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Declaration by the Author

I declare that I am the sole author of this dissertation. To the best of my knowledge, this dissertation is composed entirely of my original work. It contains no material previously published by any other person except where due acknowledgement has been made. The content of this dissertation contains no material which has been accepted as part of the requirements of any other academic degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution.

I have clearly stated the contribution of others to this dissertation, including survey design, statistical assistance, and editorial advice. Specifically, Professor Kristina Murphy and Dr Elise Sargeant contributed to this dissertation as my primary and associate supervisors, respectively. Throughout my candidature, they have assisted with the conceptualisation of ideas, provided methodological guidance, offered assistance with the survey design of the data used in this dissertation, and offered feedback on drafts of all chapters.

During my candidature, I have published a sole-authored article, parts of which I have incorporated in my dissertation. My article is titled “Pride and prejudice: Exploring how identity processes shape public attitudes towards Australian counter-terrorism policies” and appears in the Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology. Specifically, I have incorporated parts of the literature included in this publication into Chapter 5.

I have also submitted an article to the International Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, which is co-authored with my two supervisors, Professor Kristina Murphy and Dr Elise Sargeant. I am the first author of this article. My contribution to the article involved conceptualisation of the study, data analysis, and drafting and editing the manuscript. Professor Murphy and Dr Sargeant have
contributed by providing feedback and minor edits to the publication through the drafting stages. I have incorporated parts of the literature included in this publication have into Chapters 3, 4, and 6.

(Signed)____________________________________

Harley Mae Williamson
Outputs Produced During Candidature

Publications

Journal Articles

Williamson, H., Murphy, K., & Sargeant, E. (accepted). Mitigating Muslims’ passive support for terrorism: The protective role of a dual identity. *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism.*


Technical Reports


**Government Reports**


**Other Publications**


Conference Presentations


and New Zealand Society of Criminology Conference, Melbourne, Australia, December 7\textsuperscript{th}, 2018.


Dedication

I dedicate my dissertation to

Dorothy

The most sagacious, hilarious, determined and charismatic polyglot I had the pleasure of calling my grandmother. Your pride in me was a driving force for all that I have achieved and continue to achieve in life. Te quiero muchisimo, abuelita.

Ivan

A man who always showed strength and courage in even the most adverse of times, and never forgot to stay young and mischievous at heart. Grandad, thank you for reminding me to nurture my playful side no matter what the situation.
Acknowledgements

In 2019, during a low point in my PhD candidature and Marie Kondo’s rise to fame, I asked some friends “if my dissertation doesn’t bring me joy anymore, can I just Marie Kondo it and throw it out?” I’m glad I didn’t, and I have the following people to thank for helping me persevere to the end.

Firstly, I would like to thank the most incredible supervisory team I could ever have dreamed of guiding me through my PhD, Professor Kristina Murphy and Dr Elise Sargeant. You have both been amazing role models for my own journey as an academic. Because of both of you, I am finishing my PhD with a dissertation I am proud of and an even stronger desire to continue researching.

Tina, you are a phenomenal researcher, source of inspiration, and absolute boss lady. Your email back in 2015 changed my life, and I will be forever thankful that you took me under your wing and exposed me to some amazing ideas and opportunities. I know I am walking away from my PhD with a skill set that you have been instrumental in helping me obtain. Elise, you have this incredible way of viewing ideas through a particular lens, and your insights have provided me with new perspectives for considering my own work. Thank you for being a brilliant source of guidance for me through these latter years of my education.

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I would also like to acknowledge the Australian Government Research Training Program (RTP) and the Australian Research Council (ARC), who assisted me through the PhD program and in obtaining data. I was awarded an RTP scholarship at the commencement of my PhD, which provided financial support throughout my candidature. In addition, the survey data used in Study 3 of this dissertation was collected as part of a project funded by the ARC. The grant was awarded to Kristina Murphy and Elise Sargeant (my dissertation supervisors). I therefore wish to acknowledge the funding support of the ARC (ARC Discovery Project Number: DP170101149).

To my Griffith family, thank you for being the most welcoming, encouraging, energetic, and fun group of people I have ever had the pleasure of working with. From my HDR friends to the administrative staff, and all the academics in-between, you are a wonderful group of people, and I have loved every minute with you during my time at the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice. I would like to especially thank Andrew for being the best pod pal and always being up for a random chat, Amanda for being a brilliant source of honesty, advice, humour and wit, Jacq for being the loveliest presence to greet me in the office every morning, and Brigitte for giving me show recommendations that have been a much-needed distraction during these latter months of my PhD! I must also thank Kerry Wimshurst for providing a welcomed break for me over countless cups of coffee. I will cherish our conversations about travel, art and pop culture!

To my friends and family outside of these university walls, thank you for encouraging me, being a wonderful outlet for me, and being so understanding when I’ve been unable to leave my desk. To those in Australia, Belgium, Spain and the UK, I am so lucky to have you, and I can’t wait to start living my best life with you all
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To my parents Peter and Vanessa, thank you for being my biggest fans and always supporting whatever I do in life. You have instilled in me the confidence to be bold and challenge myself, and the resilience to overcome even the most difficult of tasks. Because of you I know I can do anything I put my mind to. Finally, to my partner and muse David. You always know when to ground me or to lift me up, and I am so happy that I have you by my side to keep me laughing. Juntos, sé que podemos lograr y superar cualquier cosa, mi amor!

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# Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABS</td>
<td>Australian Bureau of Statistics</td>
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<td>ADF</td>
<td>Australian Defence Force</td>
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<td>AES</td>
<td>Australian Election Study</td>
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<td>AFP</td>
<td>Australian Federal Police</td>
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<td>AFPS</td>
<td>Australian Federal Prosecution Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANM</td>
<td>Australian Nationalists’ Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANOVA</td>
<td>Analysis of Variance</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Australian Research Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASA</td>
<td>Adverse Security Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASIO</td>
<td>Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIS</td>
<td>Australian Secret Intelligence Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBD</td>
<td>Central Business District</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIIM</td>
<td>Common In-group Identity Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cth</td>
<td>Commonwealth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESRI</td>
<td>Environmental Systems Research Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>GTD</td>
<td>Global Terrorism Database</td>
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<tr>
<td>GUHREC</td>
<td>Griffith University Human Research Ethics Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDR</td>
<td>Higher Degree Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<td>ID</td>
<td>Identity</td>
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<tr>
<td>INSLM</td>
<td>Independent National Security Legislation Monitor</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>IS</td>
<td>Islamic State</td>
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<td>ISIL</td>
<td>Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant</td>
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<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State in Iraq and Syria</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITT</td>
<td>Integrated Threat Theory</td>
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<td>Jemaah Islamiyah</td>
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<td>M</td>
<td>Mean</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSWPF</td>
<td>New South Wales Police Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization [sic] for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>Ordinary Least Squares</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAF</td>
<td>Principal Axis Factor Analysis</td>
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<td>PDO</td>
<td>Preventative Detention Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>PGAS</td>
<td>Pew Global Attitudes Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>PJCIS</td>
<td>Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security</td>
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<td>P-P</td>
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<td>RQ</td>
<td>Research Question</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTP</td>
<td>Research Training Program</td>
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<td>SD</td>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
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<td>SE</td>
<td>Standard Error</td>
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<td>SIO</td>
<td>Special Intelligence Operation</td>
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<td>SIT</td>
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<td>SPSS</td>
<td>Statistical Package for Social Sciences</td>
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<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEO</td>
<td>Temporary Exclusion Order</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>VicPol</td>
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<td>VIF</td>
<td>Variance Inflation Factor</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

“It’s important that whatever politicians say, whatever the media say, they should be really, really careful about it. If your intention is to stop terrorism, do not try to blame the whole population of Muslims for it because it cannot stop terrorism. It will radicalise more terrorists.”

- Malala Yousafzai, 2015

Youngest ever Nobel Prize Laureate recipient and Education Activist

1.1 Statement of the Problem

Bringing terrorist groups to a standstill is hard to achieve (LaFree, 2017). Because of this, some scholars argue that a key counter-terrorism strategy is to look beyond the terrorists themselves and focus attention and resources on those who support and sympathise with terrorist groups (e.g., Richardson, 2006). Terrorist groups rely heavily on community support (Richardson, 2006; Tessler & Robbins, 2007). Without such support, they become weak and lose their legitimacy (Cherney & Murphy, 2019). Comprehensively understanding the factors that drive public support for terrorist groups is therefore crucial to developing strategies to mitigate such support.

To better understand support for terrorism, my dissertation investigates the interplay between the threat of Islamic-inspired terrorism, the resulting intergroup tensions between non-Muslims and Muslims, and identity threats that may be experienced by some Muslims. I argue that when non-Muslims view Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat, this can elicit felt identity threats amongst some Muslims. I suggest non-Muslims’ negative attitudes towards Muslims can result
in some Muslims’ passive support for terrorism¹. I argue that this process creates a continuous negative feedback loop whereby Muslims’ support for terrorism can exacerbate non-Muslims’ negative attitudes towards Muslims, and lead Muslims to feel their identities are further threatened. At the heart of this process is the role that both Muslims and non-Muslims play in understanding Muslims’ support for terrorism.

1.1.1 Intergroup Tensions Between Muslims and Non-Muslims in the West

The increased incidence of Islamic-inspired terrorism in the West has worsened intergroup tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims in western democratic countries, such as the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), France, Canada, and Australia (Strabac et al., 2014). Blackwood et al. (2013b) argue that in these countries, Muslims and Islam are often linked with terrorism, resulting in tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims and an “us” versus “them” mentality (see also Doosje et al., 2009). Some non-Muslims may, therefore, view Muslims as a threat to their safety and way of life. In this context, Uenal (2016, p. 70) and Velasco González et al. (2008, p. 669) define such threats as a belief that Muslims are a threat to community safety (known as a realistic threat), that Muslims are a threat to a nation’s way of life (known as a symbolic threat), and that Muslims are more likely to be terrorists (known as a terroristic threat). These types of threat can evince non-Muslims’ feelings of animus (i.e., hostility) towards Muslims and can result in non-Muslims perceiving Muslims as the out-group (Uenal, 2016; Velasco González et al., 2008).

Drawing on the work of Unnever and Cullen (2010a), when in-group members derogate perceived out-group members or view out-group members as a threat, these

¹ I use the term support for terrorism to denote passive support for terrorism throughout my dissertation.
in-group members may be more inclined to support policies deemed to control this threat. As such, those non-Muslims who perceive Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat may be more willing to support punitive counter-terrorism policies that target Muslims (Sentas, 2014). My dissertation therefore speculates as to how non-Muslims’ perceptions of Muslims can negatively impact Muslims by contributing to Muslims’ felt identity threats.

The very act of non-Muslims perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat may lead some Muslims to support terrorism via the mechanism of experiencing an identity threat. Identity threats arise when individuals feel that their valued identities have been derogated, devalued, or negatively stereotyped (Steele et al., 2002). There are several ways to conceptualise identity threat. I suggest that feeling stigmatised and feeling that others are punitive against one’s group (i.e. meta-punitiveness) are two types of identity threats that may be important for predicting Muslims’ support for terrorism (Bull & Rane, 2019; Cherney & Murphy, 2016). In research with Muslim samples about how they feel in an environment driven by a heightened vigilance towards terrorism, these two types of identity threat consistently emerge as common themes. These studies report that Muslims feel under threat because they (a) feel stigmatised by the association between Islam and terrorism, and (b) perceive that punitive counter-terrorism policies target Muslims more than other groups (i.e., meta-punitiveness) (Bull & Rane, 2019; Cherney & Murphy, 2016; see also Doosje et al., 2013; Doosje et al., 2009). Stigmatisation is defined in my dissertation as a belief by Muslims that non-Muslims and authorities scrutinise Muslims and view Muslims as a threat to public safety (Murphy et al., 2015). Meta-punitiveness refers to the notion that Muslims feel that others are punitive towards their group due to their religious affiliation. I have created the term meta-punitiveness
for my dissertation. Meta-punitiveness is adapted from the term meta-stereotyping, which is used in social psychology to denote an individual’s view of how their group is perceived by another group (Kim & Oe, 2009).

Strabac et al. (2014) argue that experiencing identity threats can hinder Muslims’ abilities to feel included in society. At the extreme end, reactions to identity threats may result in a self-fulfilling prophecy, whereby one aligns with the threat imposed on their group membership (Bull & Rane, 2019; Kamans et al., 2009). In this sense, some Muslims may come to support terrorism as a reaction to experiencing an identity threat (Strabac et al., 2014). Hence, the intergroup tension between Muslims and non-Muslims can create the very problem that governments around the world are trying to prevent.

To understand Muslims’ support for terrorism, my dissertation draws on Social Identity Theory (SIT). I argue that SIT provides a valuable framework for understanding how some Muslims may feel an identity threat and why they come to support terrorism. It also explains how non-Muslims can perpetuate this feedback loop by viewing Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat and acting punitively towards them.

1.1.2 Can Social Identity Theory Explain Muslims’ Support for Terrorism?

As highlighted above, I propose that anti-Muslim sentiment can create a sense of identity threat amongst some Muslims (Bull & Rane, 2019; Cherney & Murphy, 2016), which risks steering some Muslims towards supporting terrorism. The tenets of SIT present a theoretical argument as to how and why identity threats and reactions to such threats can occur (Victoroff et al., 2012). A rich body of literature in social psychology suggests that social identity processes influence how people perceive others and how they respond to identity threats. SIT is concerned with understanding
how people identify, or not, with social groups. Identity refers to a social category whereby a group of people are “marked by a label and distinguished by rules deciding membership and characteristic features or attributes” (Fearon, 1999, p. 2). SIT conceptualises how individuals assign themselves to specific groups based on if they perceive they are similar or different from others (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). SIT also helps to understand how identity threats may arise.

SIT postulates that identity threats can occur when the value an individual assigns to their own identity is undermined by others (Branscombe et al., 1999b; Tajfel & Turner, 2004). Moreover, social identity theorists argue that the more salient one’s identity is to a particular group, the more negatively affected they will be by perceived threats or biases to their group (Dovidio et al., 2001; Haslam & Reicher, 2006; McCoy & Major, 2003; Tausch et al., 2009). For example, research shows that majority group members (e.g., non-Muslim Australians) who identify very strongly with their majority group (i.e., I am a proud Australian), can perceive out-group members in a more hostile or biased way (Stephan et al., 2002). Similarly, Operario and Fiske (2001) find that minority group members who identify strongly with their minority group (e.g., Muslims) will be more sensitive to hostility directed towards their group. When minorities perceive that they are viewed negatively by others, they can experience an identity threat as a member of that group (Dion, 2002). Such feelings of identity threats amongst Muslims may result in some Muslims’ support for terrorism. SIT can, therefore, be used to understand how non-Muslims may come to negatively evaluate Muslims and view them as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic

2 Fearon (1999, p. 2) argues that identity can also manifest as “socially distinguishing features that a person takes a special pride in or views as unchangeable but socially consequential.” In my dissertation, identity is operationalised as national identity (i.e., as an Australian) and religious identity (i.e., as a Muslim), which are social categories. Thus, I define identity is defined as a social category rather than a personal characteristic.
threat. It can also be used to explain how some Muslims come to feel that their identities are threatened and subsequently support terrorism.

Social identity processes are arguably crucial for understanding how minority groups navigate their identities in the face of threat. It is therefore important to identify strategies that can protect individuals from identity threat. Dovidio et al. (2005), for example, argue that adopting a strong *dual identity* can protect minorities against intergroup biases and perceived threats. A dual identity enables individuals to benefit from strong identification with the majority group (e.g., sharing a common Australian national identity) while simultaneously retaining their distinct minority identity (e.g., religious identity) (Dovidio et al., 2005; Dovidio et al., 2009). Moreover, holding a dual identity is related to one’s more positive evaluations of other groups (Velasco González et al., 2008). In turn, dual identification may mitigate the harms associated with identity threats.

As Muslims are a group with distinct ethnic and religious identities, the dual identity perspective may be useful for understanding how Muslims’ multiple identities can shape their support for terrorism. My dissertation will explore if dual identification mitigates the harms associated with identity threats perceived by Muslims living in Australia. As such, it will extend the knowledge base on dual identity amongst a population of people who so often report feeling stigmatised, vilified and excluded.

1.2  **Aim and Objectives of my Dissertation**

Support for terrorism constitutes one way that terrorist groups can maintain their legitimacy (Cherney & Murphy, 2019). It therefore represents a vital problem amongst broader efforts to counter terrorism. Understanding how support for terrorism manifests and can be reduced will make an important contribution to how to address
the threat of terrorism. Moreover, utilising SIT to understand what might drive support for terrorism will illustrate the complex intergroup processes at play between Muslims and non-Muslims that may shape some Muslims’ support for terrorism.

My dissertation seeks to advance what is currently known about the correlates of support for terrorism by drawing on SIT to demonstrate how identity threats felt by some Muslims can predict some Muslims’ support for terrorism. I argue that a feedback loop may exist whereby some non-Muslims view Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat, and Muslims, feeling their identities are threatened (i.e., via stigmatisation, meta-punitiveness), may come to support terrorism. To examine this process, my dissertation explores the attitudes of both non-Muslims and Muslims. I utilise SIT as it provides an appropriate framework to scrutinise the intergroup processes at play between non-Muslims and Muslims living in Australia. The aim of my dissertation is, therefore, to draw on SIT to better understand how identity processes experienced by Muslims and non-Muslims can help to explain how some Muslims can come to support terrorism.

To address this overarching aim, my dissertation has two objectives. The first objective is to explore if some non-Muslim Australians harbour negative attitudes towards Muslims (i.e., non-Muslims view Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat and believe that Muslims support terrorism) and if such perceptions of threat increase their support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. I will analyse how non-Muslims’ strength of national identification as Australians can influence these attitudes. The notion that Muslims are a threat to non-Muslims can heighten public support for counter-terrorism policies that are considered to control those viewed as “threatening” (Reicher & Haslam, 2016). Unnever and Cullen’s (2010a, 2010b) Racial Animus Model argues that negative portrayals of minority groups are likely to shape
punitive attitudes towards crime control policies. They hypothesise that individuals may believe that the crime control policies they support will target these minority out-group members. In the context of counter-terrorism, evidence suggests that Muslims are over-policed by counter-terrorism policies (Sentas, 2014). As such, Unnever and Cullen’s (2010a, 2010b) argument can extend to understand how perceptions that Muslims (i.e., as a religious out-group) pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat can shape non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. Thus, my dissertation will test the extent to which non-Muslims perceive Muslims as a threatening out-group, and if they may develop more punitive attitudes towards counter-terrorism policies that often target Muslims. Of interest is how non-Muslims’ identification with their nation influences these relationships.

I also seek to determine if some non-Muslims’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat and non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies may translate to identity threats felt by some Muslims. As such, the second objective seeks to understand the extent to which Muslims feel as though non-Muslims view them in a stigmatising or punitive way (hence, experiencing an identity threat), and if such identity threats felt by Muslims predict their support for terrorism. I argue that the degree of Muslims’ feelings of stigmatisation and meta-punitiveness (as two forms of identity threat) may explain how some Muslims can come to support terrorism. However, I theorise that the strength of Muslims’ identities as both an Australian and a Muslim (i.e., dual identification) may serve to protect Muslims against the harmful effects of identity threats. I therefore provide the first empirical test of the importance of holding a strong dual identity, to elucidate if this dual identity may protect against Muslims’ support for terrorism.
By drawing on the perceptions of both Muslims and non-Muslims living in Australia, my dissertation proposes that a feedback loop may exist. Specifically, non-Muslims’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat and non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies may create an identity threat amongst some Muslims who feel under more scrutiny (i.e., stigmatised) or that others view Muslims more punitively (i.e., meta-punitiveness). I argue that Muslims’ feelings of identity threat may predict some Muslims’ support for terrorism. Such support for terrorism may reinforce some non-Muslims’ perceptions that Muslims pose a threat, which demonstrates the potential for a feedback loop to emerge.

1.2.1 Contribution of my Dissertation

By addressing the proposed aim and objectives, my dissertation will contribute to the existing literature in three key ways. First, it explores the perspectives of both Muslims and non-Muslims to more holistically understand how Muslims’ support for terrorism can arise by felt identity threats, and how this may be attributed to both Muslims and non-Muslims. Second, my dissertation expands the utility of Unnever and Cullen’s (2010a) Racial Animus Model to understand if punitive attitudes held by non-Muslims are shaped by hostility towards religious groups in the context of counter-terrorism (i.e., Muslims). Third, my dissertation gauges whether or not holding a dual identity as an Australian and as a Muslim can play a protective role in mitigating Muslims’ support for terrorism, even when they experience high levels of identity threat.

My dissertation also makes a practical contribution to the counter-terrorism context. While Australia has experienced less frequent and smaller-scale terrorist attacks when compared to other countries, the nation still faces a continued threat (Hardy, 2019). According to the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO),
which is Australia’s chief domestic security agency, Islamic-inspired terrorism is Australia’s most significant terrorism threat (Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, n.d.). Consequently, Muslims are scrutinised by law enforcement at a higher rate than non-Muslims (Breen-Smyth, 2014). This trend is identifiable in other similar contexts (for example, in the US, Huq & Muller, 2008; in Canada, see Poynting & Perry, 2007; and in the UK, see Spalek & Imtoual, 2007). As such, results from my dissertation will have practical implications for intergroup relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in the West. It will demonstrate the potential adverse consequences of non-Muslims’ negative perceptions of Muslims and the implications of Muslims’ felt identity threats on some Muslims’ support for terrorism. The results of my dissertation will inform strategies to enhance social cohesion and positive intergroup relationships amongst Muslims and non-Muslims.

1.2.2 The Studies and their Research Questions

To address the aim and objectives of my dissertation, I employ three interrelated studies. Studies 1 and 2 draw on survey data (with an embedded experimental vignette study) from a national sample of 1,193 non-Muslim Australians. Study 1 will canvas the extent to which perceiving that a terrorist suspect is motivated by Islamic-inspired ideals (as opposed to right-wing-inspired ideals) is associated with non-Muslims’: (a) greater perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat, (b) enhanced beliefs that Muslims support terrorism, and (c) their own support for punitive counter-terrorism policies.

Study 1 addresses the following research question:

RQ1 Does a terrorist suspect’s motivation (as either Islamic-inspired or right-wing inspired) differentially shape non-Muslim Australians’:

(a) perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terrorist
threat, (b) perceptions that Muslims support terrorism, and (c) their own support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

Study 2 (A and B) draws on SIT to understand why some non-Muslim Australians may view Muslims as (a) a realistic, symbolic, and terroristic threat (with a focus on identity), and (b) how such perceptions are associated with support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. Study 2 will be divided into Study 2A and Study 2B to explore the predictors of non-Muslims’ perceptions of Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat (Study 2A) and if such perceptions of threat help predict non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies (Study 2B).

Pertinent to both Studies 2A and 2B is how the strength of non-Muslims’ national identity as an Australian can enhance their perceptions of Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat, and how national identification can increase their support for punitive policies that are often applied to Muslims.

Three research questions guide study 2A:

RQ2 Do beliefs that Muslims support terrorism predict non-Muslim Australians’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat?

RQ3 Does the strength of non-Muslim Australians’ national identity (i.e., as an Australian) heighten their likelihood of perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat?

RQ4 Does the strength of non-Muslim Australians’ national identity (i.e., as an Australian) moderate the association between believing that Muslims support terrorism and perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat?
Study 2B tests how much non-Muslims support punitive counter-terrorism policies as a consequence of perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat.

Study 2B seeks to answer six research questions:

RQ5 Do non-Muslim Australians’ beliefs that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat shape non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

RQ6 Do non-Muslim Australians’ beliefs that Muslims support terrorism shape non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

RQ7 Do non-Muslim Australians’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat mediate the relationship between the belief that Muslims support terrorism and non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

RQ8 Does the strength of non-Muslim Australians’ national identity (i.e., as an Australian) heighten their support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

RQ9 Does the strength of non-Muslim Australians’ national identity (i.e., as an Australian) moderate the association between perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat and non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

RQ10 Does the strength of non-Muslim Australians’ national identity (i.e., as an Australian) moderate the association between believing that Muslims support terrorism and non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?
Study 3 turns its attention to Muslims’ experiences and perceptions. Study 3 investigates if Muslims’ feelings of identity threat are associated with their support for terrorism. Study 3 uses cross-sectional survey data collected from a sample of 398 Muslim Australians living in Sydney. It determines if Muslims’ feelings of identity threat shape their support for terrorism. It tests the effects of two types of identity threat: (i) feelings of stigmatisation, and (ii) perceptions that others are punitive towards Muslims (i.e., meta-punitiveness). Moreover, Study 3 seeks to address if holding a strong dual identity as both a Muslim and an Australian plays a protective role in mitigating the impact of identity threats on Muslims’ support for terrorism. As earlier research suggests, adopting a strong dual identity may protect minorities against intergroup biases and perceived threats (Dovidio et al., 2005).

Five research questions guide Study 3:

RQ11 Do Muslim Australians experience identity threat (do they feel stigmatised or feel that non-Muslims are punitive towards Muslims)?

RQ12 Do identity threats (i.e., feeling stigmatised, feeling others are punitive towards Muslims) enhance Muslim Australians’ support for terrorism?

RQ13 Does the strength of Muslims’ Australian national identity reduce their support for terrorism, even when Muslims feel their Australian national identities are threatened?

RQ14 Does the strength of Muslims’ religious identity heighten their support for terrorism, even when Muslims feel their religious identities are threatened?

RQ15 Does identifying strongly as an Australian, as a Muslim, or strongly as both an Australian and a Muslim (i.e. dual identity) moderate the
association between experiencing an identity threat and supporting terrorism?

1.2.3 Conceptual Model

Figure 1.1 graphically displays the proposed feedback loop whereby non-Muslims’ perceptions of Muslims may predict Muslims’ feelings of identity threat and Muslims’ subsequent support for terrorism. This model demonstrates explicitly how Study 1 and 2 (non-Muslim Australian sample) relates to Study 3 (Muslim Australian sample). It shows how non-Muslims may come to view Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat, and how non-Muslims’ perceptions of threat may shape their support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. I speculate that non-Muslims’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat and non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies may translate to a felt identity threat amongst some Muslims. The model then establishes how Muslims’ feelings that (a) others stigmatise them and (b) others are punitive towards them because of their race, ethnicity or faith (i.e., meta-punitiveness) may shape Muslims’ support for terrorism. The feedback loop in Figure 1.1 demonstrates that when Muslims support terrorism, this may result in non-Muslims holding the belief that Muslims support terrorism, thereby re-starting the cycle. Hence, the conceptual model highlights the role that non-Muslims and Muslims can play in both exacerbating and mitigating Muslims’ support for terrorism.
Figure 1. Conceptual Model and Relationships Tested

**Non-Muslim Sample**

- Social Identity: Australian National Identity
- Perceptions that Muslims Pose a Realistic, Symbolic and Terroristic Threat
- Support for Punitive Counter-terrorism Policies
- Suspect Motive Vignette Manipulation: Islamic Extremist vs. Right-wing Extremist

**Muslim Sample**

- Social Identity: Australian National Identity, Religious Identity
- Support for Terrorism
- Identity Threat 1: Stigmatisation
- Identity Threat 2: Meta-punitiveness
1.3 Dissertation Summary

My dissertation includes 11 chapters. Chapter 1 has overviewed the impetus for conducting my dissertation. It has also presented the overarching aim, objectives and research questions addressed in my dissertation, and provided a brief outline of the research design and methods. Before presenting an in-depth discussion of the literature informing my dissertation in Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6, Chapter 2 first gives background to the Australian context and overviews Muslim migration patterns to Australia. It briefly details Muslims’ experiences of discrimination within Australia. Chapter 2 also provides a brief history of terrorism in Australia and how the emergence of Islamic-inspired terrorism has affected Muslims within Australia. Chapter 3 then reviews the existing literature that overviews the predictors of Muslims’ support for terrorism to date. Chapter 3 highlights a gap in the research base on social-psychological antecedents of support for terrorism, which my dissertation seeks to address.

Chapter 4 presents a detailed discussion of SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), which is the theoretical framework adopted in my dissertation. A major focus of my dissertation is how identity processes shape non-Muslim attitudes towards Muslims, Muslims feelings of identity threat, and how identity processes may protect Muslims from experiencing identity threats.

Chapter 5 reviews the literature that has applied SIT to understand how strong identification with majority groups (e.g., national identification) can result in prejudice towards minority groups. Chapter 5 also focuses on how non-Muslims may come to derogate Muslims specifically. It discusses Unnever and Cullen’s (2010a) Racial Animus Model as a way of understanding why non-Muslims come to hold punitive attitudes towards counter-terrorism policies that can disproportionately target Muslims.
Chapter 6 synthesises the literature that has applied SIT to understand how identity threats are formed amongst minority groups. Chapter 6 also outlines literature focusing on how Muslims experience and react to identity threats, as well as how social identity processes may explain Muslims’ support for terrorism. Chapter 6 concludes with a discussion of dual identification and poses the argument that dual identification in Muslims may mitigate the harmful effects of identity threats, thereby reducing Muslims’ willingness to support terrorism.

Chapter 7 overviews the gaps in the literature that my dissertation fills and outlines the methodological approach utilised in each of the three studies undertaken. It overviews the research questions guiding my dissertation, their associated hypotheses, and a justification for these hypotheses.

Chapter 8 presents the specific methods, hypotheses and results for Study 1. Chapter 8 overviews the survey data used in both Studies 1 and 2. Study 1 utilises experimental vignette data to determine if non-Muslims’ attitudes differ depending on whether they received a vignette describing a suspect’s motives as being inspired by Islamic-inspired terrorism or right-win-inspired terrorism. Study 1 focuses on the extent to which non-Muslims perceive Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat and if non-Muslims believe that Muslims support terrorism. It also determines if non-Muslim Australians are supportive of punitive counter-terrorism policies introduced in Australia.

Chapter 9 builds upon Chapter 8 and presents the method, hypotheses and results for Study 2 (A and B). The focus of Study 2A is to consider how non-Muslims come to perceive Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat, and if national identification (i.e., as an Australian) predicts such perceptions of threat. Study 2B investigates how these perceptions of threat as well as the strength of national identity (i.e.,
as an Australian) interact to influence non-Muslims’ punitive stance towards counter-terrorism policies.

Chapter 10 presents the methodology, hypotheses and results of the final study (Study 3). Chapter 10 overviews the survey data utilised in Study 3. Study 3 focuses on Muslims and how experiencing identity threats may influence Muslims’ support for terrorism. Importantly, Study 3 also explores how dual identification may mitigate the effect of experiencing an identity threat on Muslims’ support for terrorism.

Chapter 11 concludes my dissertation by providing a discussion of the key findings arising from the three studies, as well as the theoretical and policy implications of this research. Before concluding, Chapter 11 will also reiterate the contribution of my dissertation, identify the limitations of the three studies, and make recommendations for future research.
Chapter 2: The Australian Context

Muslim Migration to Australia and the Rise of Islamophobic Attitudes

2.1 Introduction

This chapter canvasses immigration into Australia, with a focus on Muslim migration patterns. It also chronicles terrorist events within Australia and overviews Australia’s legal response to terrorism. This chapter sets the scene for why some Muslims in Australia may come to feel they are perceived as a suspect community (e.g., see Cherney & Murphy, 2019). It provides context for my dissertation, which is to understand why some non-Muslim Australians can come to view Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat and support punitive counter-terrorism policies often directed at Muslims. It also provides context for why some Muslim Australians, feeling threatened by how others perceive them, can come to support terrorism.

2.2 Australia as the Research Site

Australia is a commonwealth country situated in Oceania. It comprises of six states (Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia, and Western Australia) and two territories (Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory). Despite its landmass, Australia has a relatively small population, with 23,401,892\(^3\) inhabitants recorded at the last Census conducted by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) in 2016 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016a). The majority of the Australian

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\(^3\) This figure denotes the amount of people recorded living in Australia at the time of the last national Census, which was taken on August 9\(^{th}\), 2016. The projected Australian population at the time of submitting my dissertation (on April, 21\(^{st}\), 2020) is 25,664,692 inhabitants (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2020).
population cluster along the coastline and within the capital cities of each state and territory (n=16,863,707 inhabitants), although population rates in regional and remote areas are slowly increasing (n=8,229,153 inhabitants) (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2019).

Australia is a culturally and linguistically diverse nation, with Indigenous and immigrant residents. Australia’s Indigenous population comprises of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, who at the last Census in 2016 represented 2.8% of Australia’s population (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016a). Almost a third (33%) of Australia’s population are born overseas (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016a). Close to 50% of Australia’s population has at least one overseas-born parent (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2014), and over 300 languages are spoken in households across the nation (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016b). Specifically, over one-fifth (22.2%) of households speak a language other than English at home, with Mandarin (2.5%), Arabic (1.4%), Cantonese (1.2%), Vietnamese (1.2%) and Italian (1.2%) representing the most commonly spoken languages at home (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016b). Within this multicultural mosaic, Australia represents a relatively peaceful and tolerant nation (Harris-Hogan, 2017; James, 2005). Yet, against this backdrop, and mirroring the experiences of other western countries, Australia has become a target of terrorist threats. These threats are often described as “a permanent feature of western societies” (Neumann, 2013, p. 893). While the incidence of terrorism in Australia is limited when compared to other western nations, the threat has remained prominent over time (Harris-Hogan, 2017).

The federal legal system in Australia comprises of state and territory-enacted legislation, in addition to federal criminal laws that govern “matters within the domain of the constitutional powers of the Commonwealth” (Findlay et al., 2014, p. 12). Australia’s
suite of counter-terrorism laws exists within Commonwealth legislation. The Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), which is Australia’s chief national security agency (comparable to the UK’s MI5 and the US’s Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI)) enforce these laws. The Australian Federal Prosecution Service (AFPS) prosecutes them (see Appendix A for an overview of counter-terrorism laws introduced within Australia since 2002).

As the terrorism threat in Australia predominantly focuses on Islamic-inspired terrorism threats, Muslims have come under increased scrutiny (Breen-Smyth, 2014). In Australia, political rhetoric and media reports consistently link Muslims with terrorism. I argue that this disproportionate focus on Muslims may constitute an identity threat amongst some Muslims. In the remainder of this chapter, I describe Muslim migration patterns into Australia, the prevalence of terrorism and the rise of Islamophobia. I also outline the impact of Australian legislative responses to terrorism on Muslims living in Australia.

2.3 Muslim Migration to Australia

According to the 2016 ABS Census, Muslims represent only 2.6% of the Australian population (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016a). Yet, Islam is the second most prominent religion in Australia after Christianity (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016a). Evidence suggests that Muslim migration can be traced back to the 1600s (prior to the 1788 British colonisation of Australia) when Makassarese4 people from Indonesia arrived along the Australian coastline to conduct fishing expeditions (Kabir, 2010). During the first European fleets, small populations of Muslim immigrants from Africa, Southeast

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4 Makassarese people originate from the South Sulawesi province of Indonesia.
Asia and some islands controlled by the British Empire settled in Australia (Kabir, 2010). However, at the start of Australia’s cameleering industry in the 1860s, a large influx of predominantly Afghan migrants settled across central Australia. Kabir (2010, p. 5) explains that Afghan cameleers became the “first official Muslim settlement” in Australia. However, the end of this industry in the 1920s, along with the restrictive White Australia Policy (which is the colloquial term given to the Immigration Restriction Act 1901), significantly reduced Muslim immigration (Hassan et al., 2018).

Following the federation of Australia on January 1st, 1901, the White Australia Policy was enacted to restrict the migration of non-British immigrants into Australia. Moreover, as expressed by then Attorney-General Alfred Deakin, it promoted the deportation of “alien coloured immigration” (Deakin, 1901, pp. 4805-4806). Racism was rife and widely supported. The growth of non-Caucasian migration before 1901 was a catalyst to the White Australia Policy. This policy had an immediate impact, and by 1947, citizens who were not Australian, Irish, or from the UK represented a mere 2.7% of the population (Price, 1999). While a small Muslim migration pattern was observable from parts of Europe after World War I (Pratt, 2011) and World War II (Foroutan, 2008), the Australian Muslim community diminished significantly due to decreased migration (Hassan et al., 2018; Jyaysuriya et al., 2003). Following a series of campaigns that sought to encourage British migration to Australia and a notable impediment on population growth, the immigration policy became more permissive after World War II.

From 1947 to 1971, the Muslim population in Australia increased slightly from 0.04% to 0.17%, even though Australia’s total population more than doubled (Kabir, 2010). The majority of Muslim migrants were originally from Afghanistan during this time. Other cameleers originated from Pakistan, Egypt, Persia, Turkey, Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, Kashmir, and Rajasthan (Muslims Australia, n.d.).
2010). As Muslim migration began to stabilise in the 1970s after the abolition of the *White Australia Policy*, Lebanese-born Muslims who were refugees as a result of the Lebanese civil war represented the biggest Muslim migrant group (Betts & Healy, 2006; Kabir, 2010). Unrest in Afghanistan starting in 1978 and other conflicts such as the Somali civil war beginning in the 1980s, the 1980 Iran-Iraq war, and the first Gulf War from 1990-1991 also contributed to increased Muslim migration to Australia in the 1980s and 1990s (Yasmeen, 2015).

Today, Australia’s Muslim population comprises of Australian-born Muslims (37%), and Muslim immigrants from 183 countries (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016b). Data from the 2016 Australian Census suggests that of the 604,244 recorded Muslims, the largest population of migrants are from Pakistan (9.1%), Afghanistan (7.1%), Lebanon (5.6%), Bangladesh (5.5%), Iraq (3.5%), and Turkey (3.4%) (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016b). As such, Muslims constitute a minority group in Australia.

Muslim immigrants in Australia have settled mainly in urban areas, which is not surprising given the majority of immigrants live in capital cities (Price & Benton-Short, 2008). Within Australia, Sydney and Melbourne are the most populous capital cities and are well-established immigrant entrance points. Almost 75% of the entire Muslim population resides in Sydney (41.9%) and Melbourne (30.9%) (Hassan et al., 2018). However, Muslims comprise only 5.3% and 4.2% of the population in Sydney and Melbourne, respectively (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016a). Amongst the remaining capital cities, Canberra’s total population includes 2.5% of Muslims, followed by Perth (2.4%), Adelaide (2.1%), Brisbane (1.5%), and Darwin (1.5%). The smallest population of

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6 In the 2016 Census, the Canberra *Greater Capital City Statistical Area* extended to the entirety of the ACT (Australian Bureau of Statistics, n.d.). This change represents a greater geographical area, but the difference in population size captured is minimal due to most of the ACT’s population clustering in Canberra.
Muslims reside in Hobart (0.7%) (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016a). In regional and remote areas of each state and territory, Muslims represent less than 1% (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016a). These figures contrast recent political discourses that suggest that Muslims are “taking over” in Australia. One Nation leader Senator Pauline Hanson is outspoken on the issue. In her second maiden speech in the Australian Parliament in 2016, Senator Hanson said Australians “are in danger of being swamped by Muslims” (Hanson, 2017). Only a handful of suburbs contain large Muslim populations in Sydney and Melbourne. Lakemba, for example, in Sydney’s south-west, is the only suburb where over 50% of its population is Muslim (Forrest et al., 2017).

Despite increasingly negative attitudes towards Muslims in Australia amongst some segments of the population post-9/11 (9/11 is the colloquial term for the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks in the US) (Cherney & Murphy, 2017), discourses around migration strongly support the notion of multiculturalism (Cherney et al., 2018; Harris-Hogan et al., 2016). When the White Australia Policy was dismantled, the term multiculturalism was introduced and became quickly embedded in policy documents promoting more diverse migration (Australian Government, 2017b). Since 1973, successive governments have refined policies of multiculturalism that “embrace diversity while emphasising [Australia’s] unique national identity and the importance of being an integrated and united people” (Australian Government, 2017b, p. 4). Some have described Australia as one of the most successful multicultural societies in the world (Ozdowski, 2012; Rajadurai, 2018). The Australian Government’s countering violent extremism

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7 Muslims account for the following proportion of regional and remote areas of each state and territory: 0.07% in NSW, 0.01% in VIC, 0.13% in QLD, 0.09% in SA, 0.13% in WA, 0.48% in TAS, 0.10% in NT, and 0.0% in the ACT (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016a).

8 One Nation is a far-right-wing political party in Australia. The party has a strong nationalist platform and supports anti-immigration, anti-multiculturalism and anti-Islam policies.
policy, *Living Safer Together: Building Community Resilience to Violent Extremism*, also describes Australia as an inclusive, multicultural society (Living Safe Together, 2015). This policy details strategies to boost social inclusion and cohesion amongst Australians (Harris-Hogan et al., 2016; Murphy et al., 2018).

### 2.4 Terrorism and Islamophobia

While Australia has become more multicultural, there has also been a rise in Australia’s growing negative perceptions towards Muslims. Pivotal events in the Middle East between the late 1970s and the 1990s, such as the Iranian Revolution, the Iranian hostage crisis, the rise of Colonel Muammar Al Gaddafi in Libya, and then-President Saddam Hussein’s declaration of jihad in Iraq sparked media attention and increased public consciousness towards the Muslim world (Kabir, 2010). Awareness of militant

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9 The Iranian Revolution on February 1st, 1979 was spurred by public disdain for then leader, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi’s dictatorship (Ozalp, 2018). The Shah came into power following a British- and American-led coup d’état where the democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh was overthrown after he nationalised Iran’s oil industry to oust foreign interests, namely Great Britain (Kinzer, 2003). The Shah’s reliance on western influence to modernise the Iranian defence force, improve the economy, and shape Iranian society had unintended consequences. Outcomes such as the unequal distribution of wealth, the increasing migration of the lower classes to urbanised areas, as well as the widespread suppression of divergent political views was met with public discontent (Ozalp, 2018). Moreover, some people expressed concerns that western culture was diluting Islamic influence within Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini, a prominent figure who was exiled for expressing views in favour of an Islamic state, argued that the people of Iran create an Islamic government based on passages from the Qur’an. He also perceived the (US as Iran’s primary enemy (Kabir, 2010). Khomeini’s rhetoric gained traction that culminated in the Iranian Revolution and Khomeini’s return to Iran to assume supreme leadership of the newly formed Islamic Republic of Iran (Ozalp, 2018).

10 The Iranian hostage crisis began on November 4th, 1979 when a group of Iranian college students who were supporters of the Iranian Revolution, stormed the American embassy in Tehran and held 66 Americans hostage for 444 days from November 4th, 1979 until January 20th, 1981 (Farber, 2009). The students demanded that the US extradite Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, whose authoritarian rule in Iran had sparked protests. By July 1980, 52 hostages remained, after Ayatollah Khomeini ordered all female and African American hostages be released in November 1979, and an additional hostage was released due to illness. Despite negotiations and failed rescue missions, the remaining hostages were not released until January 20th, 1981, following an agreement made between the US and Iran. This agreement stipulated that the hostages be freed in exchange for unfreezing Iranian assets (Farber, 2009).

11 Saddam Hussein used the term jihad in reference to starting a ‘holy war’. Jihad denotes “striving” or an “exerted effort” (Streusand, 1997).
activity also led to a concern about terrorism. Islamic-inspired terrorist attacks in America and a series of plane bombings in the 1980s (e.g., the explosion of a bomb on US flight TWA840 by Libyan terrorists in 1986, the Lockerbie bombing of Pan Am flight 103 in 1988) cemented these concerns (Kabir, 2010). Resultantly, fear of Muslims and discrimination towards Muslims began to flourish (Kabir, 2010).

It was not until the Salman Rushdie affair\textsuperscript{12} in 1988, however, that widespread fear of Muslims was propagated in Australia. This is despite long-standing divisions between Caucasian Australians and ethnic minority groups exacerbated in Australia by political rhetoric (e.g., the \textit{White Australia Policy}). The backlash associated with the Rushdie Affair has led some to believe that it catalysed the rise of Islamophobia worldwide (Dabashi, 2019; Hassan et al., 2018). Twelve years after the Rushdie Affair, the 2001 Al Qaeda-perpetrated\textsuperscript{13} 9/11 terrorist attacks took place in the US.\textsuperscript{14} 9/11 dramatically changed the national security landscape across western democratic nations and perpetuated the stereotype that Muslims should be feared (Abbas, 2004; Abu-Ras & Suarez, 2009; Powell, 2011). The aftermath of 9/11 and other Islamic-inspired terrorist attacks, such as the 2002 Bali bombings perpetrated by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) (the attack killed 202 people,

\textsuperscript{12} The Rushdie Affair created tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims across western countries following the release of Salman Rushdie’s controversial novel, \textit{The Satanic Verses}. Muslims globally condemned the book, believing that it besmirched Islam, the Prophet Muhammad, and passages from the Qur’an (Kabir, 2010). Then leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini, issued a \textit{fatwā} ordering Rushdie’s assassination, which led political leaders in Australia and overseas to refute Khomeini’s actions (Kabir, 2010). Widespread debate in Australia occurred, suggesting that Muslims were not adaptive to western ideas of free speech. This drove a wedge between Australia’s Muslim and non-Muslim communities (Hassan et al., 2018).

\textsuperscript{13} Al Qaeda rose to prominence during the Soviet-Afghan war. Al Qaeda bases itself on a militant Salafist ideology, which denotes the use of defensive tactics to protect Muslims from western aggression or intervention (Wiktorowicz & Kaltner, 2003). Al Qaeda’s primary objective is to establish a caliphate (an Islamic state) under shari‘a law.

\textsuperscript{14} On September 11th, 2001 (9/11), Al Qaeda perpetrated the deadliest terrorist attacks in history to date (McCurry, 2019). The organisation orchestrated the hijacking of four aeroplanes with 19 Al Qaeda operatives onboard who systematically hit the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Virginia. A fourth en route to Washington D.C. crashed into a Pennsylvanian field (Kepel, 2002).
including 88 Australians, and injured more than 200 others) had a particular impact on Australians. The 2004 bombing in Madrid by an Al Qaeda-affiliated terror cell, and the 2005 London bombings perpetrated by homegrown Islamic extremists, further shaped the idea that Muslims were a suspect community (Breen-Smyth, 2014; Cherney & Murphy, 2016; Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009).

Since 9/11, Islamic-inspired terrorist attacks have been recorded 31,800 times across the globe, according to the Global Terrorism Database\textsuperscript{15} (GTD) (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2018).\textsuperscript{16} In 2020 alone, Islamic-inspired terrorist attacks to date have occurred in Afghanistan, Cameroon, Canada, France, Maldives, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, Pakistan, the UK and Yemen. Between 2002 and 2013, almost three-quarters (n=13) of the 20 deadliest terrorist organisations were inspired by Islamic terrorism (LaFree & Dugan, 2016). Since 2014, Islamic-inspired terrorist attacks in OECD\textsuperscript{17} countries have increased substantially (START, 2018). Resultantly, fear of terrorism has increased, especially in western democratic nations (Williamson et al., 2019). Yet, overall, the majority of Islamic-inspired terrorist attacks occur in Muslim-majority countries (Poushter, 2017; START, 2018).

Governments state there is a persistent threat of Islamic-inspired terrorism to global security, and reports of these events have thrust Muslims and Islam into the spotlight (Aly, 2007; Rane & Hersi, 2012). The media often depicts Muslims as a threat to public safety and links Islam with violence. This further fuels Islamophobic attitudes amongst non-Muslims (Martin & Phelan, 2002; Powell, 2011).

\textsuperscript{15} The Global Terrorism Database records terrorist incidents from 1970 to 2018.
\textsuperscript{16} Appendix B overviews the terrorist organisations included in this figure.
\textsuperscript{17} OECD stands for the Organization [sic] for Economic Cooperation and Development.
The political rhetoric surrounding terrorist attacks can also create division between Muslim and non-Muslim Australians. For example, a speech made by Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison after the 2018 Bourke Street knife attack in Melbourne linked Islam to a “radical and dangerous ideology” (Norman & Borys, 2018). Senior Muslim leaders quickly reacted to Prime Minister Morrison’s comments, arguing that “these statements have achieved nothing to address underlying issues, but rather, have alienated large segments of the Muslim community” (Norman & Borys, 2018). In 2016, then Immigration Minister, Peter Dutton, was also criticised for saying “it was a mistake to bring Lebanese refugees to Australia” (Burton-Bradley, 2016). Dutton qualified his statement by arguing that 22 of the most recent suspects charged with terrorism offences were second- and third-generation Lebanese migrants and that the majority of foreign fighters leaving Australia were of Lebanese descent (Burton-Bradley, 2016). After the Christchurch shootings in March 2019, Australian Senator Fraser Anning penned a letter to Prime Minister Morrison attributing the shooting of Muslims in two New Zealand mosques by an Australian citizen to Muslim immigration and connecting Muslim immigration to violence (Baker, 2019b). Anning’s letter was widely condemned and led to his censure in the Parliament of Australia.

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18 The Bourke Street knife attack occurred on November 9th, 2018 when Hassan Khalif Shire Ali lit his car on fire in Melbourne’s CBD and stabbed three people, killing one and injuring two. He then slashed police with his knife before being fatally shot. Ali also had propane gas cylinders in his car, which did not explode (Davey et al., 2018).

19 On March 15th, 2019 Brenton Tarrant, an Australian self-proclaimed white supremacist, drove to two mosques with firearms and shot Muslims during Friday prayer (Ainge Roy & Martin, 2019). Tarrant live-streamed the shootings before fleeing in his car. Tarrant killed 51 mosque-goers and injured a further 49. He was arrested and charged with 50 counts of murder and terrorism offences (Lyons, 2019). On March 26th, 2020 he pleaded guilty to all offences.
In the US, President Donald Trump saw the 2015 San Bernardino terrorist attack as an opportunity to gain traction on a policy to halt Muslim migration into the country (Bump, 2018). Australian Senator Pauline Hanson supported President Trump’s proposal and advocated for a travel ban to restrict Muslims from travelling to Australia (Markus, 2018). European politicians have also expressed similar attitudes. In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders, leader of the Netherlands’ right-wing Party for Freedom, supported US President Trump’s proposed travel ban and suggested Europe should adopt a similar policy (Tait, 2017). Several members of the Sweden Democrats political party have also denigrated Muslims. For example, in 2017, Monika Wollmer said “Muslims have no business here. They want to destroy and take over the country”, while Arnold Boström suggested Muslims could better integrate if they converted to Christianity (Gardell & Muftee, 2017, p. 628). Anti-Muslim rhetoric was also a key component of former French President, Nicolas Sarkozy’s political strategy, who vowed to ban headscarves (Bulman, 2016) and created a policy requiring halal meat to be labelled (Willsher, 2012). Other French politicians and Muslims have described such acts by former President Sarkozy as stigmatising and promoting Islamophobia (Louati, 2017).

Persistent denigration by the media and some politicians in Australia (and internationally) arguably encourages Islamophobia (Hassan, 2017). In a recent report on social cohesion in Australia, attitudes towards Muslims and Muslim immigration was significantly more negative when compared to perceptions of other faith groups (Markus, 2018). Markus (2018) reported that one in four Australians held negative attitudes towards

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20 On December 2nd, 2015 US-born Syed Rizwan Farook and permanent US resident Tashfeen Malik, both of Pakistani descent, entered a banquet room where some government officials were hosting a training event, and opened fire. The couple killed 14 people and wounded 21. They fled by vehicle, before engaging in a shootout with police. Both Farook and Malik were fatally shot (Schmidt & Pérez-Peña, 2015).
Muslims (Markus, 2018). This finding has remained constant over the last eight years that Markus has fielded the Mapping Social Cohesion survey, increasing to 25% in 2014, and decreasing to 23% in 2018. Participants’ negative attitudes towards Muslims were significantly higher than their attitudes towards Christians or Buddhists, whereby negative attitudes formed only 5% and 3% of the sample, respectively (Markus, 2018). A recent poll study by the Pew Research Center [sic] reported that Australians welcome diversity as a critical factor in making somewhere a better place to live (Poushter, 2017). However, participants were divided about whether or not Muslims are willing to adopt Australian customs (Poushter, 2017).

The disjuncture between promoting diversity and cohesion on the one hand, and being cautious of certain groups on the other, is a discourse observed amongst government officials too. A Newspoll exclusively published by The Australian also revealed divided opinion; almost half of the participants (44%) believed that the Australian Government should adopt a travel ban similar to President Trump’s proposal (Karp, 2017). Forty-five per cent disagreed (Karp, 2017). Hassan (2017) argues that anti-Muslim attitudes exist in Australia because of increased Muslim migration to Australia. Hassan (2017) also explains that there is a rise in general fear of terrorism due to government statements outlining the risk terrorism poses.

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21 Participants were asked the following question: “Is your personal attitude positive, negative or neutral towards Muslims?” (Markus, 2018).
22 The Mapping Social Cohesion survey is an annual national survey of 1500 participants (the 2007-2012 surveys employed a national sample of 2000 participants) that gauges participants’ attitudes towards “social cohesion, immigration and population issues” (Markus, 2018, p. 1).
2.5 Terrorism in Australia

Terrorism is intrinsically hard to define. While acts of terrorism can be traced back centuries, lawyers, researchers and practitioners have debated official definitions of the concept (Lynch et al., 2015). Given the ideological and political motivations underpinning terrorism, discerning if an act is considered terrorism is subjective (Ganor, 2002, p. 287; see also Kleinot, 2017). For example, in one of the most comprehensive attempts to create a unified definition, Schmid and Jongman (2005) synthesised 109 academic definitions to produce the following revised definition:

“Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by a (semi-) clandestine individual group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human targets of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorists (organization [sic]), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought” (p. 28).

However, this definition is often criticised as being lengthy and convoluted (Badey, 1998; Weinburg et al., 2004). Other definitions have received scrutiny for being too broad. Despite these pitfalls, there are common features of terrorism definitions, including describing terrorism as an act of violence, which aims to seriously or fatally injure other persons, generally civilians, and elicit fear, intimidate a population, or compel change, usually at a governmental or societal level (Schmid, 2011; United Nations, 1999, 2004; Young, 2006). Some scholars also suggest that political, ideological, or religious motivations are critical components that separate terrorism from other acts of violence (Ganor, 2002; Saul, 2017).
In acknowledging these characteristics and reflecting on the context of my dissertation, the Australian legal definition of terrorism will be employed herein. While not without problems (see Lynch et al., 2015), the proceeding definition is relatively consistent with other definitions. Section 100.1 of the Australian Criminal Code Act (Cth) 1995 defines terrorism as an:

“Act of violence intended to cause death, serious physical harm, serious property damage, the endangerment of life, or the creation of a health and safety risk, driven by religious, political, or ideological motives, and with the intention to influence or intimidate a portion of the public or a government within or outside of Australia.”

Compared to other western democratic nations, Australia has experienced relatively few terrorist attacks. However, Australia’s National Terrorism Threat Advisory System has raised the terrorism threat level in Australia to probable23 (Australian National Security, n.d.-b). Data from the GTD details 117 terrorist events that have occurred in Australia from 1970 to 2018 (START, 2018). This figure is marginal when considering other allied nations such as the UK and the US, which from 1970 to 2018 experienced 5335 and 2926 incidents on their soil respectively (START, 2018). However, these events represent the prolonged threat of terrorism within Australia in the latter half of the 20th century and particularly following 9/11. These terrorist events constitute acts beyond those perpetrated by Muslims. Ethno-nationalist, right-wing, and more recently, Islamic-inspired terrorism has shaped the Australian national security landscape (Harris-Hogan, 2017). However, governments and media reports tend to disproportionately focus on Islamic-inspired terrorism. The following sections discuss the prevalence of Islamic-inspired terrorism.

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23 Probable is defined by the Australian Government as “credible intelligence, assessed by our security agencies, [which] indicates that individuals or groups continue to possess the intent and capability to conduct a terrorist attack in Australia” (Australian National Security, n.d.-b).
terrorism and right-wing-inspired terrorism in Australia. These sections demonstrate a growing Islamophobic sentiment within Australia shaped by extreme right-wing attitudes and the emergence and continued threat of Islamic-inspired terrorism. They further highlight how Muslims within Australia can feel that non-Muslims perceive them and their religion as a threat to public safety.

2.5.1 Islamic-inspired Terrorism

The Australian Government describes Islamic-inspired terrorism as the primary terrorism threat affecting Australia (Council of Australian Governments, 2015). Islamic-inspired terrorism can be defined as the use of violence to achieve religious goals underpinned by Islamic ideologies (Venkatraman, 2007). The threat of Islamic-inspired terrorism on Australian soil can be traced back decades. For example, in the early 2000s, Indonesian Al Qaeda offshoot, JI, was a key threat to Australian interests. The threat JI posed was primarily due to its geographical proximity to Australia as well as social ties it had to some Australians (Harris-Hogan, 2017). In 2000, JI received notoriety after an attack targeting the 2000 Sydney Olympics was foiled (Harris-Hogan, 2017). Had a JI group member not contacted ASIO and alerted them to the impending attack, it would have been the first Al-Qaeda driven act of terrorism in a western country and Australia (Harris-Hogan & Zammit, 2014). Two years later, JI was responsible for the 2002 Bali Bombings that killed 202 people, including 88 Australians. Due to the number of Australian casualties, the Bali Bombings symbolically underscored the terrorism threat Australia faced.

A series of other notable Islamic-inspired terrorist attacks in Australia were also foiled in the early 2000s. In 2003, Zaky Mallah was convicted of threatening to endanger the life of a Commonwealth official (Mullins, 2011). After being refused a passport in
2001, he sparked media attention when he outlined he was planning an attack on either Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) or ASIO. Also in 2003, Pakistani-Australian architect, Faheem Khalid Lodhi was charged and in 2006 convicted of possessing maps of an electrical supply system, aerial photographs of Australian Defence Force (ADF) sites, and a bomb-making manual (Williams, 2009). Lodhi allegedly planned to attack Sydney’s electricity grid (Koschade, 2007; Mullins, 2011). These cases rendered a shift away from internationally funded and directed attacks towards homegrown plots (Harris-Hogan, 2017). Home-grown terrorism can be defined as an act of terrorism perpetrated by an individual(s) who grew up in the country where the attack was committed (Crone & Harrow, 2011). Zammit (2013) argues that the emergence of home-grown terrorism in Australia occurred once key figures with international connections to jihadi cells were removed from the Australian terrorism network.

This home-grown threat manifest in two terrorist cells planning a terrorist attack in 2005. Thirteen suspects in Melbourne and nine suspects in Sydney were subject to the most extensive investigation in Australia’s counter-terrorism history: Operation Pendennis (Harris-Hogan, 2012). Operation Pendennis was a multi-jurisdictional counter-terrorism operation between Victoria Police (VicPol), the New South Wales Police Force (NSWP), the AFP, and ASIO (Schuurman et al., 2014). Nine suspects in Melbourne and nine in Sydney were eventually charged and convicted of preparatory offences. Of the 28 people currently imprisoned in Australia for terrorism offences, 18 from Operation Pendennis constitute the majority of inmates (Harris-Hogan, 2017).

More recently, Islamic extremists have committed a series of attacks in Australia. In September 2014, Afghan-Australian Numan Haider attacked two police officers with a knife outside Endeavour Hills police station in Victoria. At the time, police were
investigating allegations that Haider had opened an Islamic State flag in a shopping centre
and made provocative comments about the AFP and ASIO via social media (Scott &
Shanahan, 2018). The following year on October 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 2015, 15-year-old radicalised
teenager Farhad Khalil Mohammad Jabar fatally shot NSWPF civilian worker Curtis
Cheng. Jabar fired more shots at the Police Headquarters in Parramatta (a suburb in
Sydney), before being fatally wounded by police (McLinden & Barclay, 2018).

The Endeavour Hills attack and the Curtis Cheng murder demonstrates a continued
presence of an Islamic-inspired terrorist threat in Australia. Yet, the event that has captured
the most significant media attention in Australia in recent years is the Sydney siege. In
December 2014, Man Haron Monis (a self-proclaimed Muslim cleric) entered the Lindt
Café in Sydney’s central business district (CBD) and held staff and customers hostage in a
siege that lasted 16 hours. Monis had three demands during the siege: “(1) for an Islamic
State flag to be delivered in exchange for the release of one hostage; (2) for media to
broadcast that the siege was an attack on Australia by the Islamic State; and (3), for
[former Prime Minister] Mr Abbott to contact "The Brother" – understood to be Monis –
on a live feed in exchange for five hostages” (Massola & Wroe, 2014). After the siege, two
hostages were dead and Monis was shot by authorities (McLinden & Barclay, 2018).

Monis was on bail at the time of the attack for unrelated offences, had a lengthy criminal
history since his migration from Iran as a political asylum seeker in 1996, and was deemed
mentally ill at the time of the siege (McLinden & Barclay, 2018). Debates surround
whether the Sydney siege was an act of terrorism or the actions of a deranged individual.
Some say both Monis and the attack itself were characteristic of a lone wolf attack
(Maiden, 2015; Maley, 2014; Wesley, 2014). Others argue that Monis’ actions do not align
with established patterns of Islamic-inspired terrorism (Scott & Shanahan, 2018) and
Monis was motivated by attention rather than a wider ideological or political cause (Aly, 2014). Despite these divergent views, NSW Coroner Michael Barnes concluded in the Sydney siege inquest that “the siege was a terrorist incident” (Hunt, 2017).

Between 2014 and 2017, Australian authorities conducted numerous counter-terrorism operations and successfully disrupted 15 potential attacks, including the foiled Mother’s Day attack in 2015 and the disrupted Christmas Day attack in 2016 (Palin, 2017). In 2018, the majority of counter-terrorism prosecutions involved Muslim defendants who were arrested during the preparatory stages (Zammit, 2019). However, there were two notable attacks, which, while less than the number of attacks that occurred in 2017, demonstrate a persistent threat of Islamic-inspired terrorism. For example, in Melbourne in November 2018, a Somali male stabbed two people and fatally wounded a third, in addition to lighting a car on fire (Chang et al., 2018). A knife attack by Bangladeshi student Momena Shoma in February 2019 represented the first IS-inspired attack perpetrated by a female in Australia (Zammit, 2019). Most recently, in July 2019, three males were arrested following a series of raids across several Sydney suburbs. Two of the arrested males, Radwan Dakkak, 23, and Isaac El Matari, 20 were allegedly members of the Islamic State and were charged with planning a terrorist attack in Australia (Australian Associated Press, 2019). El Matari was also charged with preparing a foreign

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24 A 17-year-old male, groomed by an Islamic State recruiter in the UK, was convicted in 2017 for purchasing materials and building improvised explosive devices (IEDs) intended to be detonated in Melbourne’s CBD, on a train, or at a police station on Mother’s Day in 2015 (McKenzie et al., 2016).

25 Four males, Ibrahim Abbas, his brother Hamza Abbas, 23, their cousin Abdullah Chaarani, 27, and friend Ahmed Mohamed, 25, were convicted and imprisoned in 2018 of conspiring to prepare an Islamic State-inspired terrorist attack in major landmarks of central Melbourne on Christmas Day in 2016 (Percy, 2018). The four co-accused had accessed an Al Qaeda magazine article that detailed how to make a bomb and had purchased materials to make an IED. They were also in possession of machetes, which police seized (Percy, 2018).
incursion and had been monitored by Australian authorities since his return from Lebanon in 2018 (Australian Associated Press, 2019).

In addition to an increase in terrorist attacks, Australia is more frequently responding to the threat of foreign fighters. Since 2012, approximately 220 Australians have fled to Iraq and Syria to fight alongside terrorist groups (Parliament of Australia, 2018). According to ASIO officials, at least 190 have provided financial and recruitment support (Barker, 2017). As the Islamic State in Syria lost its claim to territory in March 2019 (Glenn et al., 2019), attempts have sought to prevent these fighters from returning to Australia.

The Australian Government has responded to the increased terrorism threat as well as the growth in foreign fighters by passing a raft of laws to address this trend. Appendix A provides a detailed review of Australia’s counter-terrorism legislation and highlights the reactive nature of these laws in response to the changing threat of terrorism since 9/11 and the rise of the Islamic State.

2.5.2 Right-wing-inspired Terrorism

Right-wing-inspired terrorism is also important to understand because of its prevalence in Australia and other western democratic societies (Dean et al., 2016). Right-wing-inspired terrorism can be defined as the use of violence that is motivated by conservative values, such as “neo-Nazism, anti-immigration, Islamophobia, preservation of western values, and cultural purity at a societal and state level” (Hutchinson, 2017, p. 16). While right-wing extremist groups and ideologies have existed for close to a century in Australia, violence motivated by this ideology is more infrequent (James, 2005). The emergence of these groups in Australia can be traced back to the 1920s, mainly echoing political changes such as the end of World War I, the threat of Communism, and the rise of
Nazism. It was not until the 1980s that right-wing groups in Australia engaged in acts of violence. The separation of the *Australian Nationalist Movement*\(^{26}\) (ANM) and *National Action*\(^{27}\) in 1984 catalysed a violent campaign that involved murder, assaults, fire-bombings, and wilful damage amongst members of both groups (James, 2005). Events perpetrated by these groups led to an admission in ASIO’s 1989-1990 annual report that right-wing groups were the only identifiable domestic terrorism threat (Harris-Hogan, 2017).

In the early 2000s, several acts of Right-wing-inspired terrorism were perpetrated in Australia with a specific focus against ethnic minority groups. In the early 2000s, Right-wing-inspired terrorism was committed mainly against people of Asian descent (e.g., predominantly from Southeast Asia). In more recent years, the embodiment of “the enemy” amongst right-wing supporters has shifted away from Southeast Asian populations towards those who identify as Muslim. The perceived threat of Muslims and Islamic-inspired terrorism more generally to community safety and cultural values has incited Right-wing-inspired terrorism groups to advocate for Islamophobic and anti-immigration policies (Hutchinson, 2017). Right-wing-inspired terrorism rose in the late 2000s in Australia and internationally (Aly, 2015; Campion, 2019). Right-wing protest groups such as the *Australian Defence League, Right Wing Resistance,* and *Reclaim Australia* have gained national and global traction in their efforts to promote anti-Muslim and anti-immigration rhetoric (Dean et al., 2016). In March 2019, a group of Muslims attending

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\(^{26}\) The *Australian Nationalist Movement* was a right-wing extremist organisation that was underpinned by a white supremacist neo-Nazi ideology.

\(^{27}\) *National Action* was a right-wing extremist organisation underpinned by a white supremacist ideology.
Friday prayer\(^{28}\) at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, were gunned down by an Australian right-wing extremist who was inspired by right-wing ideals (Besley & Peters, 2019). The attack was live-streamed by the perpetrator, and while efforts were made by social media outlets to delete the footage, it was shared globally. Such events suggest that extreme right-wing views are ever-present in Australia.

2.6 The Impact of Australia’s Counter-terrorism Response on Muslims

Policies and legislation introduced in Australia (e.g., Part 5.3 of the *Criminal Code Act 1995* (Cth), the *National Security Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 2014* (Cth), the *Crimes Act 1914* (Cth)) and countries including the US and the UK to address terrorism have consequences for Muslim communities living in those countries. The unprecedented and extraordinary powers given to authorities to police individuals sometimes not even suspected of committing a terrorism-related offence often mean such powers are utilised on Muslim communities more than others (Breen-Smyth, 2014; Zammit, 2017).\(^{29}\) The combination of national security and immigration legislation (e.g., citizenship stripping) in Australia’s counter-terrorism framework (see Appendix A) defines the groups who should be deemed a threat (Crocker et al., 2007). Also, the securitisation of migration as a national security measure arguably reinforces stereotypes that stigmatise minority groups perceived to be outsiders, as highlighted in other contexts including Canada (Faist, 2002) and Europe.

\(^{28}\) Friday prayer, known as *jumah* (meaning congregation, or gathering), is considered the most important prayer in a Muslim’s weekly prayer ritual. Excerpts by the Qur’an stipulate that Friday is the most sacred day and that the Prophet Muhammed chose Friday as a “dedicated day of worship” (Aslan, 2019).

\(^{29}\) For example, in Australia, control orders were introduced to enable authorities to place restrictions, prohibitions, or requirements on certain individuals to protect the wider public from terrorism (Tulich, 2012). Similarly, the US’ *Patriot Act* enabled law enforcement agencies the capacity to access confidential information without a warrant (Welch, 2016). In the UK, counter-terrorism legislation enabled law enforcement authorities to stop and search vehicles and individuals without demonstrating any reasonable suspicion (Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009).
(Robin-Olivier, 2005). In this sense, immigrants with a Muslim background are scrutinised heavily under the guise of preserving national security.

The Australian Government’s response to terrorism is generally pre-emptive (Scanlon, 2014) and is underpinned by a drive to prevent terrorism. Australian laws afford authorities exclusive and unprecedented powers to surveil, detain and interrogate individuals without reasonable suspicion or proof of criminal intent (Lynch et al., 2009). Some legislative powers within Australia have not been matched in other western nations, particularly those who have experienced larger-scale attacks (i.e., the US, Canada, the UK; Lynch et al., 2015). Some research suggests that the nature of the terrorist threat in Australia does not match the strategies in place to respond (Hocking, 2003; Michaelson, 2005). Specifically, the small-scale nature of attacks in Australia compared to other western democratic countries arguably does not justify the introduction of the expansive and punitive counter-terrorism legislation introduced within Australia since 2002 (Hocking, 2003; Michaelson, 2005).

Relatedly, the application of existing laws in recent years has led some to suggest that they disproportionately scrutinise Muslims (Cherney & Murphy, 2016; Doosje et al., 2009; McCulloch & Pickering, 2009; Sentas, 2014). The use of these policies arguably perpetuates the suspect communities phenomenon, which Hillyard argues is the use of extraordinary executive powers towards a particular group of people deemed to be a suspect community (Hillyard, 1993). Hillyard’s (1993) Suspect Communities Framework was used to examine Irish terrorism suspects in the 1970s, with this perspective relevant for Muslim communities in a post-9/11 era (see also Breen-Smyth, 2014; Cherney & Murphy, 2016; Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009). As Australian counter-terrorism policies and legislation are pre-emptive, police agencies have utilised tactics such as stop and search
powers and questioning powers to target Muslims in such a way that it widens surveillance of this population (Cherney & Murphy, 2016; Pickering et al., 2007; Poynting & Noble, 2004). Sentas (2014) argues that the ability of these counter-terrorism policies to criminalise preparatory offences, sometimes without proof of criminal intent, sees their use by police often conflating Islam with terrorism. Consequently, Muslims come under suspicion more often by authorities (Sentas, 2014). In two recent Australian studies, Muslim interview participants described feeling under scrutiny because of counter-terrorism policies that seemingly “clamped down mostly on [their] community” (Bull & Rane, 2019, p. 285; see also Cherney & Murphy, 2016). Despite being punitive and disproportionately affecting Muslim communities, Australia’s counter-terrorism laws continue to receive public support (Williamson, 2019). Public attitudes towards counter-terrorism policies may further perpetuate Muslims’ beliefs that non-Muslims perceive them as a threat. This can serve to alienate members of the Muslim community, resulting in some Muslims condoning the actions of terrorist groups.

2.7 Chapter Summary

There is a long history of Muslim migration into Australia. Yet Muslims (and other immigrants) have experienced numerous challenges from exclusionary immigration policies. Global events have also thrust Muslims and the Islamic faith into the spotlight (e.g., turmoil in the Middle East, the Salman Rushdie affair). Most recently, the rise of Islamic-inspired terrorism, particularly following 9/11, has reignited a debate that denotes the Islamic faith as a violent religion (Almond, 2019). Additionally, Australia’s responses

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30 It is important to note here that feeling like a suspect is not just a product of being over-policed but can also be exacerbated through vicarious experiences (Breen-Smyth, 2014).
to terrorism have become increasingly punitive since 2002. Before 2002, Australian counter-terrorism legislation comprised solely of the United Nations’ *International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999)*. Within Australia and globally, these policies are disproportionately aimed at Muslims because of perceptions that they are a greater threat to public safety (Maoz & McCauley, 2008; Sentas, 2014).

Further, research suggests that anti-Muslim attitudes may be perpetuated through the introduction of counter-terrorism legislation post-9/11 (Lyon & Haggerty, 2012; Poynting & Perry, 2007; Williamson, 2019). How Muslims may react to anti-Muslim sentiment and rhetoric that serves to stigmatise them as a suspect community is timely. Specifically, understanding how and when identity threats elicit Muslims’ support for terrorism is important in the current national security climate.

The following chapter (Chapter 3) synthesises research on known predictors of Muslims’ support for terrorism. Chapter 3 also highlights the limitations of prior research that has analysed these known predictors. It concludes by identifying a gap in the literature on social-psychological explanations of support for terrorism. It is this gap that my dissertation seeks to fill.
Chapter 3 Literature Review: What Predicts Muslims’ Support for Terrorism?

3.1 Introduction

Terrorist groups thrive on public endorsement (Paul, 2010). Whether attitudinal or behavioural, implicit or explicit, terrorist organisations require public support so they can perform operations and legitimise their cause (Tessler & Robbins, 2007). My dissertation examines the social-psychological factors that may drive Muslims’ support for terrorism. In doing so, it seeks to understand how identity processes may mitigate the likelihood for some Muslims to support terrorism, especially when they feel an identity threat. Resultantly, my dissertation will have implications for reducing the legitimacy terrorist groups require to further their cause.

This chapter synthesises prior research that has considered correlates of support for terrorism. The vast majority of these studies focus on political and socio-demographic variables, such as age, gender, education, religion, and income. However, the findings of these studies are inconsistent. Moreover, as most studies are conducted in Muslim-majority countries, their applicability to the western context warrants further inquiry (Victoroff et al., 2012). As a consequence, in this chapter, I argue that more research is needed to understand the drivers of support for terrorism more thoroughly. In particular, I point to the need for additional research to analyse social-psychological predicates of support for terrorism, which provides the impetus for my dissertation. I therefore conclude this chapter by introducing psychological factors, which have recently been identified as possible precursors to support for terrorism. Psychological factors and specifically, social identity
processes form the basis of my dissertation and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.

3.2 Defining Support for Terrorism

Support for terrorism can be active or passive (Sluka, 1986). Active support for terrorism includes behavioural and attitudinal forms of support, such as holding an extremist ideology, aiding terrorist groups (via financing them, providing resources, e.g., weaponry), and often, but not always, engaging in violent terrorist actions (Paul, 2010; Tessler & Robbins, 2007). Passive support for terrorism, in contrast, involves empathetic attitudes or tolerance towards terrorist causes and actions – rather than active supportive behaviours (Boylan, 2015; Khalil, 2014). Studies show that passive support for terrorism can also predict violent behaviours (Pauwels et al., 2018; Pauwels & Svensson, 2017; Schils & Pauwels, 2016). As such, both active and passive support for terrorism is problematic for authorities.

Support for terrorism does not happen in a vacuum. Scholars and policymakers express concern about the threat of active supporters of terrorism because they offer resources and manpower to terrorist operations (Boylan, 2015; Paul, 2010; Tessler & Robbins, 2007). Yet, passive supporters arguably provide the foundations for active supporters to succeed (Cherney & Murphy, 2019; Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009). More explicitly, some scholars suggest that terrorist organisations rely on supporters because they tolerate or endorse the use of violence to achieve specific goals, thereby legitimising their actions (Boylan, 2015; Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006; Schmid, 2017; Tessler & Robbins, 2007). As such, passive support for terrorism may be more intractable (White,
2011). Understanding how individuals come to passively support terrorism is therefore also critical to counter-terrorism efforts.

Knowledge of the processes that may lead an individual to support terrorism will help to inform best practice approaches to counter violent extremism (Crenshaw, 1995; Victoroff et al., 2012). My dissertation examines social-psychological explanations of passive support for terrorism. All research I synthesise in my dissertation examines passive support for terrorism. Herein, I term passive support for terrorism as support for terrorism.

3.3 Why Do People Come to Support Terrorism?

Numerous factors might exacerbate one’s propensity to support terrorism and a growing number of studies have considered these drivers. Common predictors include (1) socio-demographic factors; (2) the influence of conflict, the political context within and between countries, and the emergence of the Internet as a radicalisation tool; and (3) more recently, social identity processes. Researchers have studied different population groups. Several studies examining support for terrorism have been conducted with populations directly impacted by intractable conflict, such as in Northern Ireland (Hayes & McAllister, 2001, 2005), Pakistan (Fair, 2015; Fair et al., 2014; Shapiro & Fair, 2010) and Lebanon (Sidanius et al., 2004). Less have examined how support for terrorism manifests amongst individuals living in countries not directly experiencing conflict.

3.3.1 Socio-demographic and Religious Factors

Some scholars suggest socio-demographic and religious factors may be associated with public support for terrorism (Cherney & Povey, 2013; Fair, 2015; Fair & Shepherd, 2006; Haddad & Khashan, 2002; Shapiro & Fair, 2010; Tessler & Robbins, 2007; Victoroff et al., 2012). Examining socio-demographic and religious predicates of support
for terrorism is based on the argument that individuals distinguished by certain characteristics are more likely to support terrorism. However, the results from these studies contradict each other - some show these factors predict support for terrorism, while others do not.

3.3.1.1 **Age and Gender.**

Several studies have found that *age and gender* are key predictors of support for terrorism. For example, in Lebanon, Haddad and Khashan (2002) sought to identify if there were differences in how males and females may come to support terrorism. The authors used survey data from a stratified random sample of 337 Lebanese Muslims. The dependent variable comprised of four items. These included how much participants approved or disapproved of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, if they believed grievances against the US justifies future terrorist attacks if participants supported the use of follow-up terrorist attacks, and how participants reacted to images of 9/11 (Haddad & Khashan, 2002). Results of this study showed that females were more likely to support 9/11 and future attacks. Most research tends to find that males are more likely to engage in terrorism, yet females appear to be more supportive of terrorism (see also Fair & Shepherd, 2006). Haddad and Khashan (2002) argued that the finding that showed females were more supportive of terrorism may be attributable to female participants being now better educated and therefore more exposed to political issues, which may have affected their attitudes. They further suggested that gender-specific findings may be a product of shifts in gender roles and more opportunities for women in recent times. Despite these findings, it is important to note that such results may be specific to research conducted in Muslim majority countries.
Victoroff et al. (2012) also included demographic factors when conducting their research using poll data from the *Pew Global Attitudes Survey (PGAS)* and the *Pew Public Life Survey of Muslims*. In their first study, the authors drew on *PGAS* data from 16,710 Muslim participants living in Great Britain, France, Germany and Spain. Support for terrorism was measured by assessing the extent to which participants justified suicide bombing. Specifically, participants were asked the following question:

“Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified?” (Victoroff et al., 2012, p. 796).

Findings showed that younger participants were more likely to support terrorism. The authors included two other demographic factors (gender and educational attainment), but neither were associated with participants’ support for terrorism. In Study 2, the authors utilised the *Pew Public Life Survey of Muslims* data, which surveyed Muslim participants living in the US. Similarly to Study 1, Victoroff et al. (2012) also found that the justification of suicide bombings was more likely amongst younger participants.

Finally, Fair and Shepherd (2006) tested the impact of age on attitudes supportive of terrorism amongst a sample of 7,849 Muslims living in Pakistan. Fair and Shepherd (2006) used public opinion data from the 2002 *Pew Global Attitudes Survey (PGAS)*. The authors operationalised support for terrorism by asking participants to rate how much they believed the following statement was justified or unjustified:
“Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified or never justified?” (Fair & Shepherd, 2006, p. 53).

Findings from Fair and Shepherd’s (2006) study showed that younger participants were more likely to support terrorism. Taken together, the results from the studies overviewed in this sub-section offer important insights into how age and gender may be associated with support for terrorism. The following section examines economic factors related to support for terrorism.

3.3.1.2 Economic Status.

Other socio-demographic characteristics, such as economic status, are identified in the literature as more consistent correlates of people’s support for terrorism. For example, poverty is often identified as a type of vulnerability that may be exploited by terrorist groups (Blair et al., 2013). In the same study as mentioned in the previous sub-section, Fair and Shepherd (2006) explored the relationship between poverty and support for terrorism in Pakistan. Results of this study showed that poorer participants were less likely to support terrorism. A later study by Shapiro and Fair (2010) that interviewed 907 urban and rural participants in Pakistan, also found that more impoverished participants were less likely to support terrorists and terrorist actions than more affluent participants.

Other research has found an inconsistent relationship between economic status and support for terrorism. For example, Shafiq and Sinno’s (2010) study using 2005 PGAS
data of 5,668 participants identified an inconsistent relationship between income and support for terrorism in six Muslim-majority countries (Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, and Turkey). Specifically, they found that higher income was associated with greater support for suicide bombings amongst participants from Morocco and Lebanon, but reduced support amongst participants from Jordan, Pakistan and Turkey. The authors cautioned against making generalisations about demographic correlates of support for terrorism. Mousseau (2011) argues that while poverty may translate into politicised grievances because of economic inequalities, the hypothesis is weak, particularly given the extent of global poverty. While many countries experience poverty, impoverished people in these countries typically do not support terrorism (Mousseau, 2011). Other scholars echo this sentiment, finding that economic status has little influence on support for terrorism (Tessler & Robbins, 2007).

3.3.1.3 Religious Affiliation.

Some terrorist movements are influenced by religious ideals, such as distorted interpretations of Islam. Thus, the relationship between religiosity and support for terrorism is of particular interest to researchers seeking to understand what leads some people to support terrorism (i.e., Islamic-inspired terrorism). For example, Cherney and Povey (2013) used poll data from the 2010 PGAS amongst 8,003 participants from seven Muslim-majority countries (Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey) to gauge the antecedents of support for terrorism. The dependent variable in this study mirrored that used by Fair and Shepherd (2006):

31 The measure of support for terrorism used by Fair and Shepherd (2006, p. 53) comprised of the following question: “Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified or never justified?”
“Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified or never justified?” (p. 53).

Analyses revealed that support for terrorism was higher amongst Muslims who identified as Shi’a as opposed to Sunni. The authors suggested that such a finding may be attributable to the constructs used to measure the justification of terrorism. Specifically, by including concepts that asked participants their beliefs towards martyrdom, the justification of terrorism measure may have resonated more with Shiite participants, as martyrdom is a more common feature of Shiite traditions (Cherney & Povey, 2013). The findings from this study highlight a positive association between religious affiliation and support for terrorism.

In a more recent study, Egger and Magni-Berton (2019) sought to understand the relationship between religious identification and support for terrorism. The authors drew on a sample of 5,259 Muslims living in 21 European countries. Participants were asked to select from one of two statements: “there may be certain circumstances where terrorism is

32 Shi’a and Sunni Islam are the two primary denominations of Islam. Conflict between the two denominations stems from a dispute over who was believed to be Prophet Muhammad’s successor. The separation between Shi’a and Sunni denominations of Islam have evolved into a religious movement. While both denominations abide by the teachings of the Qur’an, Sunni Muslims adhere to the Sunnah, which represent social, legal and religious customs as practised by the Prophet Muhammad, and Shiites listen to the word of ayatollahs, who they perceive as an incarnation of God. The majority of Muslims worldwide adhere to Sunni Islam.

33 These countries include France, Germany, the UK, Belgium, Austria, Spain, Luxemburg, Switzerland, Greece, Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Georgie, Russia, Slovenia, Cyprus, Northern Cyprus, Azerbaijan, Kosovo and Albania.
justified” or “terrorism for whatever motive must always be condemned” (Egger & Magni-Berton, 2019, p. 11). Analyses were conducted to identify differences depending on if participants resided in a Muslim-majority or Muslim-minority country. Findings showed that the importance of participants’ religion was related to their justification of terrorism, but only for participants who lived in Muslim-minority countries. The authors observed a negative correlation between the importance of religion and support for terrorism amongst Muslims in Muslim-majority countries. Results of this study also suggest that religion seems to shape support for terrorism in conjunction with other factors (see also Canetti et al., 2010).

Other studies have investigated the association between religious beliefs and religious practice (i.e., attending mosque) on the justification of terrorism. For example, Ginges et al. (2009) used survey data from two surveys of 1,151 (Study 1) and 719 (Study 2) Palestinians, and one sample of 198 Israeli participants to examine their support for suicide terrorism. Support for suicide attacks was measured by asking participants the extent to which they supported martyrdom attacks (Ginges et al., 2009). Ginges et al. (2009) found no association between religious beliefs and willingness to support terrorism but identified a positive correlation between attendance at a place of worship and support for terrorism. Specifically, Ginges et al. (2009) found that frequent mosque attendance was associated with enhanced justification of terrorism, specifically suicide attacks. The authors argued that religious beliefs per se did not drive the justification of suicide attacks. Instead, they suggested that such justification stems from the ability of religion to foster a

34 A martyr is someone who is killed, or who kills themselves, to advocate their religious beliefs (Fierke, 2009). Martyrdom is defined as the death or suffering of a martyr with the primary aim of garnering sympathy. Ginges et al. (2009) suggest an example of martyrdom is committing a suicide attack.
commitment to shared goals and collective identity developed through attending mosque (Ginges et al., 2009).

Another study examining mosque attendance and its association with support for terrorism was carried out by Cherney and Murphy (2019). To measure support for terrorism, Cherney and Murphy (2019) asked participants how much they agreed that terrorists’ grievances are valid. Drawing on a sample of 800 Muslims living in Australia, the authors found that frequent mosque attendance reduced Muslims’ beliefs that terrorists have valid grievances, which contrasts Ginges et al.’s (2009) results. The contexts in which the two studies were conducted may explain why correlates of support differed between them. That is, in Ginges et al.’s (2009) study, the presence of conflict in Palestine may explain why the frequency of mosque attendance was associated with more support for terrorism. Given the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has created tensions, a mosque may be an apt place for Muslims to air their grievances. However, further research is required to clarify this speculation. The findings of these aforementioned studies demonstrate the inconsistent effect of religiosity in shaping support for terrorism.

3.3.1.4 **Politicalised Interpretations of Jihad.**

Relatedly, the *interpretation of jihad* for Muslims is identified in the literature as a predicate of support for terrorism. The basic definition of jihad denotes “striving” or an “exerted effort” (Streusand, 1997). Of Arabic origins, the term jihad appears in several Islamic texts35, although controversy exists surrounding what jihad means in a contemporary context (Gould, 2005). Interpretations are blurred by how differing Islamic

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35 These Islamic texts include the Qur’an, which is the primary Islamic religious text outlining the word of God as presented to the Prophet Muhammad; *hadith*, which are accounts of the Prophet’s life as recorded by those close to him; *sunnah*, which denote social, legal and religious customs as practised by the Prophet, *Fiqh*, which is Islamic jurisprudence, and Sharia law, which are legal scriptures derived by the aforementioned sources (Knapp, 2003).
sects (i.e., Sunni and Shi’a Muslims) understand jihad (Cherney & Murphy, 2019); the political or social agenda behind the individuals or groups using the term (Kepel, 2009); and the violent or non-violent nature of the act that the word represents (Esposito, 2003; Schleifer, 1983). Since 9/11, jihad has been more commonly linked with negative connotations denoting mass violence and the annihilation of the West (Cook, 2015; Kepel, 2009). Yet, according to Kepel (2009), Islamic militants currently control the meaning of the term to signify a “holy war” against those they term infidels in an effort to spread an Islamic way of life. Research in both Muslim-majority countries (e.g., Pakistan, Indonesia) and Muslim-minority countries (e.g., Australia) has analysed the relationship between interpretations of jihad and support for terrorism.

In Pakistan, Fair et al. (2010, 2012) drew on a nationally representative sample of 6,000 people living in Pakistan to understand the impact of religious beliefs on attitudes towards terrorism. The authors gauged attitudes towards religious affiliation, violent and non-violent interpretations of jihad, sharià law and support for the ideals of Pakistani terrorist groups. The aim of Fair et al.’s (2010) study was to understand Pakistani beliefs towards these issues, particularly as they impact foreign policy decisions in Pakistan. Findings of Fair et al.’s (2010) study show that participants who defined jihad as a violent struggle were more likely to support militant groups in Pakistan than those who had a more peaceful interpretation of jihad. However, neither affiliation to a religious sect, nor the intensity of one’s adherence to their religion predicted any variance in support for the ideals of Pakistani terrorist groups. Fair et al. (2012) considered the link between violent interpretations of jihad and support for terrorism. Similar to their 2010 study, Fair et al. (2012) found that a violent interpretation of jihad was linked to stronger support for terrorism (although they noted that there were regional differences). Yet, neither religious
affiliation nor support for Islamist political parties were associated with support for violence. Muluk et al. (2013) mirrored these findings in Indonesia.

Similar results are also observable in Australia where Muslims constitute a minority group within the wider population. Cherney and Murphy’s (2019) study of 800 Muslims living in Australia tested how believing that jihad promotes the use of violence could shape individuals’ support for terrorism. In this study, support for terrorism was operationalised as the extent to which Muslims believe that terrorists have valid grievances. Cherney and Murphy (2019) operationalised attitudes towards jihad using three items measured on a five-point strongly agree to strongly disagree Likert scale. These items were: “(1) the concept of jihad supports a means to an end, (2) jihad is solely a personal struggle for righteousness, and (3) jihad is a militarised struggle that can be conducted by individuals” (Cherney & Murphy, 2019, p. 1057). The study found that the strongest predictor of believing terrorists have valid grievances was participants’ beliefs that jihad supports the use of violence to achieve certain goals. Results of these studies reinforce the relationship between violent interpretations of jihad and support for terrorism.

Taken together, findings are mixed when it comes to socio-demographic and religious factors and their association with support for terrorism, except for the role of violent interpretations of jihad in shaping support for terrorism. Moreover, entering other variables of interest often weakens the effect of demographic characteristics on support for terrorism. These findings suggest that demographic variables alone may not be important for explaining why some people may come to support terrorism. While it is essential to control for these measures, focusing on other predicates of support seems warranted. The following section synthesises research that tests the role of other contextual factors that
may predict support for terrorism. For example, the role of political conflict, the effect of political preferences, the influence of the Internet, and knowledge of terrorist groups have been found to shape support for terrorism.

3.3.2 The Influence of Contextual Factors

In addition to examining socio-demographic characteristics of individuals who may come to support terrorism, it is also important to explore wider contextual factors. For example, support for terrorism may be more likely to flourish in contexts shaped by political conflict, because terrorist groups may exploit conflicts by using them as a rationale to enact what they frame as a justified defence (Al Raffie, 2012). People may then tolerate terrorist actions if they perceive that terrorist groups are acting on behalf of public interests. The Internet may provide a platform to encourage radicalised views and actions, particularly in nations not shaped by protracted levels of terrorism. Political preferences may also shape support for terrorism, because foreign policies that impact Muslim-majority countries may constitute a source of grievance for members of the public, and subsequently can be exploited by terrorist groups. For example, criticism of foreign policies and western intervention in Muslim-majority countries experiencing political unrest has fuelled some terrorism narratives espousing anti-western sentiment (Cherney & Murphy, 2019). The type of issues informing grievances highlight why certain individuals may come to support terrorism (Crenshaw, 1986). Finally, individuals’ knowledge about terrorist groups may also be a precursor to their support for terrorism. Knowledge can shape citizens’ attitudes towards the actions and motivations of terrorist groups, depending on where they obtain their knowledge and who disseminates such knowledge. The following sub-sections provide a more detailed discussion of the influence of political
conflict, the Internet, political preferences, and knowledge of terrorist groups and how these are associated with support for terrorism.

3.3.1.1 Political Conflict.

In countries shaped by conflict, exposure to violence may constitute a crucial factor driving public support for terrorism. More recently, and given the surge in Islamic-inspired terrorism, research on support for terrorism has shifted to spotlight the experiences of Muslims living in western nations as well. Yet, the majority of existing research still tends to focus on the attitudes of Muslims living in Muslim-majority nations.

Early studies examining support for terrorism drew from conflicts occurring at that time, such as the actions of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) (Silke, 2000; Sluka, 1986). They investigated how the experience of conflict and terrorism had an impact on individuals’ support for terrorism. Hayes and McAllister (2001), for example, analysed drivers of support for political violence during the Northern Ireland conflict. The authors drew on the 1998 Northern Ireland Referendum and Election Survey of 950 participants. Their study defined political violence as the use of violence amongst political institutions formed in the aftermath of civil conflict or war (Hayes & McAllister, 2001). Findings showed continued exposure to the conflict was associated with increased support for political violence. The authors further argued that the persistence of the conflict was a key predictor of continued public approval of violence (Hayes & McAllister, 2005).

More recent research has focused on the attitudes of Muslims living in Muslim-majority nations. For example, in Pakistan, Blair et al. (2013) utilised a nationally representative survey sample of 6,000 Pakistani participants. Blair et al. (2013) used an experimental design that determined support for policies amongst four Islamic-inspired terrorist organisations (Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Kashmiri Tanzeems, and the
Sectarian Tanzeems). The authors disaggregated between two groups: residents exposed to terrorism and residents not exposed to terrorism. They found that increased exposure to terrorism was a significant predictor of reduced justification of terrorism. The contradictory findings between the studies by Hayes and McAllister (2001, 2005) and Blair et al. (2013) may be contextual and based on the different conflicts occurring in Ireland and Pakistan. The results of these studies, therefore, highlight the need to further understand the dynamics of the conflict affecting the population under examination. Whatever the case, in both examples, the countries studied had experienced significant conflict and terrorism. Hence, these findings are limited in their application to countries that are not directly experiencing war and conflict (e.g., Australia, Canada, Sweden, France, Belgium, the UK).

3.3.1.2 The Influence of the Internet.

Studies mentioned in the previous sub-section were conducted in countries directly experiencing terrorist attacks. Yet, people can still come to be radicalised and support terrorism even without direct and persistent exposure to terrorism. That is, people may have indirect or vicarious exposure to terrorism and terrorist groups via media outlets, and more specifically, the Internet. Empirical studies linking Internet exposure to support for terrorism is almost non-existent, but anecdotal evidence suggests that many young people have become radicalised via the Internet.

Terrorist groups have long used the Internet for recruitment and propaganda (Coll & Glasser, 2005). Online practices have further evolved with the introduction of social media platforms and encrypted messaging services (e.g., Wickr) (Weimann, 2015). As such, the Internet has enabled terrorist groups to recruit people from further afield (Bott et al., 2009). Terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab, and the Islamic State have a
The Islamic State, in particular, utilises numerous online media outlets (such as YouTube and Twitter) to post live feeds, updates on operations, and high-quality videos of violence and killings (Aly et al., 2017). In March 2019, a shooting attack on a congregation of Muslims attending Friday prayer was live-streamed on social media by the perpetrator and self-professed right-wing extremist Brenton Tarrant (Besley & Peters, 2019). The video was viewed approximately 4,000 times, and Facebook removed 1.5 million copies of the video across its platform (Macklin, 2019). These figures highlight the reach that the Internet can have in attracting audiences.

The successful propaganda strategy of terrorists and terrorist groups who use the Internet has primarily centred around publishing violent imagery which can trigger outrage (Awan, 2007), desensitise viewers (Neumann, 2013), and motivate action (i.e., support for terrorism, engagement in terrorism) (Silke, 2010). Moreover, the use of narratives focusing on mercy (instead of the brutal nature of terrorists’ actions), victimhood, belonging, military gains, and utopianism (the creation of an Islamic caliphate) arguably appeals to a broader audience (Aly et al., 2017). Scholars and practitioners agree that the Internet is playing a key role in garnering support for terrorism and for fuelling radicalisation (Conway, 2017). Without more empirical research, however, the effects of the Internet on support for terrorism remain unclear.

### 3.3.1.3 Political Preferences.

Political preferences have emerged as a consistent predictor of support for terrorism in conflict-prone countries as well as those not shaped by conflict. Understanding the influence of attitudes towards national and international politics that affect Muslim-majority countries on support for terrorism has been a focal point. For example, Fair et al.
(2018) drew on survey data of 16,279 participants living in Pakistan to understand the role that elements of sharià law may have in predicting support for terrorism. Fair et al. (2018) measured support for terrorism by asking participants to indicate the extent to which they supported two Pakistan-based terrorist groups: the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban. The authors utilised six items to measure participants’ perceptions of what a sharià-based government would look like. Participants were asked if they agreed or disagreed that a sharià government meant “(1) a government that provides basic services such as health facilities, schools, garbage collection, road maintenance; (2) a government that does not have corruption; (3) a government that provides personal security; (4) a government that provides justice through functioning non-corrupt courts; (5) a government that uses physical punishments (stoning, cutting off hands, whipping) to make sure people obey the law; [and] (6) a government that restricts women’s roles in public (working, attending school, going out in public)” (Fair et al., 2018, p. 436). Findings showed that participants who perceived a sharià government as one that imposed physical punishments and that restricted females’ civic roles were more likely to support terrorism relationship (see also Fair et al., 2017; Fair et al., 2018; Fair & Patel, 2017).

Research has also tested if the beliefs that Islam should play a role in politics shape support for terrorism. Bueno De Mesquita (2007) explored predictors of support for terrorism using the 2002 PGAS amongst 7,952 participants from 14 Muslim-majority countries.36 Findings demonstrated a weak but positive correlation between the belief that Islam should play a role in politics and participants’ support for terrorism (Bueno De Mesquita, 2007).

36 The fourteen countries in Bueno de Mesquita’s (2007) study were Bangladesh, Ghana, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Lebanon, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, and Uzbekistan.
Mesquita, 2007). However, a later study conducted by Fair et al. (2012) found no link. Fair et al. (2012) drew on a random sample of 6,000 participants in Pakistan to test whether religiosity or support for political Islam would shape participants’ support for terrorist groups. Neither variables predicted support for terrorist organisations in this study.

Other studies have examined the effects of foreign policies on support for terrorism. For example, Tessler and Robbins (2007) drew on two nationally representative surveys in Algeria (n=1,282) and Jordan (n=1,000) to study the predictive effect of attitudes towards foreign policies on support for terrorism aimed at the US. Both surveys were fielded post-9/11 in mid-2002. Two different research teams conducted the surveys, and while some of the questions in each survey instrument were identical, other items measuring participants’ attitudes were different (Tessler & Robbins, 2007). In particular, the dependent variables taken from the Algerian and Jordanian surveys and utilised in this study were nuanced. The Algerian participants were asked a statement to determine how much they approved or disapproved of terrorism.37 Amongst the Jordanian sample, participants were asked a slightly different question.38 The analysis included a series of independent variables, including a scale that measured participants’ attitudes towards American foreign policies. The Algerian participants and the Jordanian participants were asked slightly different questions. The Algerian participants were asked three questions whereby participants expressed whether they agreed or disagreed that “some US policies towards other countries are good”, “almost all US foreign policies are good”, and “almost

37 “As you know, a group of religious extremists hijacked four civilian airliners in September and crashed them into buildings in New York and Washington, D.C., killing several thousand people. What is your opinion of this action?” (response options ranged from strongly disapprove to strongly approve) (Tessler & Robbins, 2007, p. 316).
38 “As you may know, after the military campaign in Afghanistan began, some people called on all Muslims to join in armed jihad against the US. Do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose this call to armed jihad?” (Tessler & Robbins, 2007, p. 316).
all US foreign policies are bad” (Tessler & Robbins, 2007, p. 321). The Jordanian participants were asked only one question that required them to agree or disagree that “The United States often violates other people’s human rights around the world” (Tessler & Robbins, 2007, p. 321).

Additionally, participants were asked to report the extent to which they had confidence in a range of institutions. In the Algerian sample, participants were asked how much confidence they had in Algeria’s government, the parliament, the military and the police. Amongst the Jordanian sample, participants were asked about their confidence in Jordan’s government, the legal system, and the police (Tessler & Robbins, 2007). Findings were similar amongst participants in both countries. Specifically, the authors found that participants with negative attitudes towards foreign policies and domestic political leadership were more likely to support the use of terrorism against the US.

Similarly, Zhirkov et al. (2014) found that perceptions of international politics (such as western economic dominance over Muslims, holding the West accountable for negative relations between Muslims and the West, and the incompatibility of democracy within Muslim nations) were linked to increased support for terrorism. The authors utilised poll data from the Pew Research Center [sic] of 5,051 Muslims living in Muslim-majority countries (these included Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, and Turkey) and 1,627 Muslim participants from four Muslim-minority countries (which included France, Germany, Spain, and the UK). The authors measured support for terrorism by asking participants how much they agreed or disagreed that suicide bombings are justified forms of violence to use against civilians to defend Islam (Zhirkov et al., 2014). Zhirkov et al. (2014) found that support for terrorism was highest amongst Muslims who opposed the applicability of a democratic system of governance within Muslim societies. Amongst the
Muslim sample from the four western European countries, support for terrorism was highest for those who blamed the lack of economic prosperity in Muslim-majority countries on western (and particularly US-led) policies. In the sample from the Muslim-majority countries, support for terrorism was greatest when participants perceived that international relations with western nations were poor.

Scholars suggest that individuals who hold negative attitudes towards foreign policies (namely, policies and actions of the US often in the Middle East) (Berger, 2014; Bueno De Mesquita, 2007; Faria & Arce, 2012; King et al., 2011; Tessler & Robbins, 2007; Zhirkov et al., 2014) and who express anti-American sentiment (Bueno De Mesquita, 2007; Chiozza, 2009; Tessler & Robbins, 2007) are more likely to support terrorism directed towards western nations. Such attitudes arise when citizens (particularly those living in Muslim-majority countries) feel aggrieved by governments (e.g., the US Government) who they believe do not consider the interests or welfare of citizens living in the country they reside in (Tessler & Robbins, 2007).

A recent study utilising two waves of public opinion data amongst 7,337 (Wave 1) and 9,000 (Wave 2) Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip explored the relationship between scepticism towards democratic governance and support for terrorism (Piazza, 2019). Piazza (2019) used two dependent variables to measure support for terrorism. One dependent variable asked if “armed groups are justified in attacking civilians in Iraq in order to resist the American occupation” and the second asked about participants’ attitudes towards the Islamic State (Piazza, 2019, p. 424). Results showed a positive relationship between democratic scepticism and justification of terrorism. Piazza

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39 The other two measures of support for the Islamic State were as follows “To what extent do you agree with the goals of Da’esh [ISIS]” and “To what extent to you support Da’esh’s [ISIS’s] use of violence?” (Piazza, 2019, p. 424).
(2019) noted that participants who justified terrorism were sceptical of democracy for two reasons. First, they perceived democracy to be incompatible with Islamic teachings and customs (see also Zhirkov et al., 2014), and second, they associated democratic systems with poor economic performance (for similar findings see Nivette et al., 2017).

The link between negative attitudes towards foreign policies or domestic governance structures and support for terrorism is consistent. Yet, recent research has demonstrated that favourable attitudes towards governments who enact such foreign policies (e.g., the US who introduce policies that directly affect Muslim-majority regions such as the Middle East), as well as the legitimacy of one’s government, can reduce support for terrorism (LaFree & Morris, 2012). LaFree and Morris (2012) drew on a multistage probability-based sample of 3,645 Muslim participants from Egypt, Indonesia and Morocco to test the effect of support for the US government, one’s government, and American people and culture, on participants’ support for Muslim-based terrorist groups. LaFree and Morris (2012) chose these three countries because they are amongst the most densely-populated Muslim countries, while still being very historically, politically and culturally diverse. The data were collected through face-to-face interviews. The research team employed local research companies in the three countries to complete the data collection. The support for terrorist attacks against the US measure comprised of three variables asking participants how much they approve or disapprove of terrorist groups that attack the US and the actions of Al Qaeda, and the extent to which they support groups originating from Muslim-majority countries that attack Americans.41 Findings from this

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40 Multistage probability-based sampling is a type of cluster sampling that involves the development of a sample over numerous stages.
41 The full wording for these measures is as follows: “first, respondents were asked to think of groups in the Muslim world that attack the United States, and report if they (0) disapprove of all groups, (1) approve of some and disapprove of others, or (2) approve of all groups. Second, respondents were asked, “How do you
study showed that support for terrorist attacks against the US was less likely amongst participants who had favourable attitudes towards US citizens and culture. Furthermore, participants who perceived that the governments and criminal justice systems in their own countries were legitimate were less likely to support terrorist groups that attack Americans (LaFree & Morris, 2012). The authors suggested that exposure to a broader range of information and media sources about countries such as the US may reduce hostile attitudes towards these countries.

### 3.3.1.4 Knowledge about Terrorist Groups.

*Knowledge about terrorism* and terrorist groups may also spotlight how some people can come to support terrorism. While arguably not a standalone predictor, knowledge about terrorist groups can act as a mediator to explain why some people may come to support terrorism. For example, Kaltenthaler et al. (2018) analysed if knowledge about the Islamic State would mediate the relationship between deprivation of a group, the appeal of the terrorist organisation’s ideology, and support for the Islamic State. Kaltenthaler et al. (2018) used public opinion data collected amongst a representative sample of 1,500 Muslims in Iraq to understand if exposure to Islamic State-related news reports was associated with more support for the Islamic State. Support for the Islamic State was measured with one item that asked, “What is your view about these organisations: the Islamic State organisation (ISIL)?” (possible responses ranged on a five-point Likert scale from very positive to very negative) (Kaltenthaler et al., 2018, p. 808).

42 The Islamic State is known by approximately 31 aliases, according to the Australian Government. Common alternatives include the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Daesh (al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham) (Australian National Security, n.d.-a).
Findings showed that participants exposed to national and international news regarding the Islamic State were less likely to support the Islamic State. The authors attributed this finding to the fact that much of the Islamic State-related news published by national and international media outlets focus on the brutality of the organisation (Kaltenthaler et al., 2018).

Together, the studies discussed in this section highlight an increased likelihood of support for terrorism amongst people living in countries affected by terrorism, who are directly affected by foreign policies designed to counter terrorism, or who hold negative attitudes towards western polices. While some studies identify how political contexts can shape support for terrorism in non-violence-prone countries, the literature base is less developed. Thus, research examining predictors of support for terrorism in countries not directly experiencing conflict could be expanded.

3.3.3 Identity Processes

The third grouping of studies that seek to predict support for terrorism focus on social-psychological factors. Recent scholarship has shifted focus towards social-psychological variables to explain support for terrorism (see for example Dean, 2017; Tausch et al., 2009; Victoroff et al., 2012; Zhirkov et al., 2014). This research argues that identity processes are fundamental for Muslims to feel a sense of belonging, yet when feeling under threat, they may be more susceptible to adopting extremist beliefs (Doosje et al., 2013; Dugan & Distler, 2016). For example, discrimination and Islamophobia have shaped Muslim experiences in western nations, particularly since 9/11 (Doosje et al., 2009). Social-psychological processes that explain how people respond to such derogation may determine how some Muslims in western nations come to support terrorism.
My dissertation, therefore, focuses on how social identity plays a role in predicting Muslims’ support for terrorism. Research to date, which I describe in more detail in Chapter 6, has not tested the varying ways that identity processes may shape support for terrorism. To address this gap, my dissertation seeks to expand explanations of support for terrorism using Social Identity Theory (SIT).

3.4 Chapter Summary

This chapter has overviewed the relationship between support for terrorism and key predictors, including demographic characteristics, the influence of politicised interpretations of jihad, the role of political conflict, and the Internet. Notably, much of the research to date has drawn on participant samples from Muslim-majority countries (e.g., Cherney & Povey, 2013; Shafiq & Sinno, 2010; Tessler & Robbins, 2007), and in countries shaped by ongoing conflict (Fair et al., 2012, 2014; Hayes & McAllister, 2001, 2005; Shapiro & Fair, 2010). Less is known about the factors that may predict support for terrorism amongst Muslims living in a western context (i.e., Australia). Understanding the factors that foster Muslims’ support for terrorism in western nations is, therefore, of empirical importance. This is due to concerns surrounding the marginalisation and radicalisation of individuals, home-grown terrorism, and the upsurge of foreign fighters (Dugan & Distler, 2016; Lyons-Padilla et al., 2015; Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009).

In terms of socio-demographic and religious characteristics, only one factor was consistently and significantly associated with support for terrorism: politicised interpretations of jihad (see, e.g., Fair et al., 2010; Fair et al., 2012). The mixed findings regarding the other demographic characteristics discussed (i.e., age, gender, income, religious affiliation) present an opportunity to further understand how demographic factors
may predict support for terrorism amongst a sample of Muslims living in Australia (see also Cherney & Murphy, 2019).

In terms of other contextual factors, studies have determined how political conflict, newer technologies (i.e., the Internet), political preferences, and knowledge about terrorist groups may shape support for terrorism. Research finds a positive correlation between political conflict and support for terrorism (see, e.g., Blair et al., 2013; Hayes & McAllister, 2001; Hayes & McAllister, 2005). However, findings are limited to countries directly experiencing conflict. To understand how some individuals living in countries not marked by conflict may come to support terrorism, scholars have looked into the role of digital technologies. While there is some support for the part of the Internet in attracting individuals and garnering their support (Conway, 2017), more empirical research is required to support this link.

In a similar vein, a small but growing literature base has shown that gaining knowledge about terrorism shapes individuals’ likelihoods of supporting terrorism but does so by reducing the propensity to support terrorism (Kaltenthaler et al., 2018). However, existing research has demonstrated that knowledge is not a standalone predictor of support for terrorism but can mediate the relationship between other factors such as political preferences (LaFree & Morris, 2012). Indeed, much of the research on political preferences shows a positive correlation between attitudes towards domestic and foreign policies (see, e.g., Faria & Arce, 2012; Tessler & Robbins, 2007), preferred systems of governance (e.g., a democracy) (Piazza, 2019; Zhirkov et al., 2014), and support for terrorism. Taken together, the research overviewed in this chapter highlights conflicting findings as well as some limitations, which suggests that other factors may better explain
how and why some people come to support terrorism. One such factor that has been proposed is social identification.

The following chapter overviews SIT. From here, Chapter 5 summarises research utilising SIT to understand how identity processes influence majority group members’ perceptions of minority groups. Chapter 5 focuses on how some non-Muslims may form negative attitudes towards Muslims, thereby creating an identity threat amongst some Muslims. Chapter 6 utilises SIT to demonstrate how social identity processes influence minority group members’ responses to identity threats. Specifically, it describes how some Muslims may come to feel their identities are threatened. Chapter 6 also synthesises literature about the potential pathways to Muslims’ support for terrorism through a social identity lens.
Chapter 4 Theoretical Framework: Social Identity Theory

4.1 Introduction

Social Identity Theory (SIT) is used widely to explain why individuals engage in a variety of antisocial behaviours (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Whitley Jr & Kite, 2016). My dissertation uses SIT to understand: (1) how non-Muslims can come to view Muslims in a negative light, and (2) how some Muslims react to non-Muslims’ perceptions of them to predict some Muslims’ support for terrorism.

The basic premise of SIT is that people can be members of various groups in society and may identify with one group more so than another (Hogg et al., 1995; Huo, 2003). For example, ethnic, racial and religious minority groups may self-identify with multiple groups in society. One group they can identify with might include the nation in which they live, such as being British, Australian or American. Here, they identify with the broader all-encompassing group in society (e.g., I see myself as Australian). Alternatively (or in addition), they may identify with various minority groups within Australia, such as their own ethnic, racial or religious group (e.g., I see myself as Muslim). The groups that individuals feel strongly identified with constitute their in-group, while other groups are referred to as out-groups (Crocker & Major, 1989). In other words, out-groups are defined in reference to a distinct in-group.

41 For Muslims, their ethnic and religious identities are often salient and connected (Fleischmann et al., 2013; Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2014).
How in-groups and out-groups are formed and categorised by individuals is mostly a reflection of contemporary social relations and societal values. These relations and values influence who should be deemed similar and within an in-group, or different and thereby relegated to an out-group status (Turner & Oakes, 1986). More specifically, for in-group members to stigmatise and be hostile or biased towards an out-group, they must see themselves as not only distinct, but as superior to the out-group they are prejudiced towards (Tajfel, 1974).

SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) can explain how membership in and identification with a group is fostered, how groups behave based on shared identities, and how group membership impacts one’s feelings and behaviours towards members who are not part of their in-group (Tajfel, 1969). SIT is also central to understanding how groups (both non-Muslims and Muslims) may experience or react to identity threats.

In my dissertation, I argue that in-group favouritism and out-group derogation is central to understanding Muslim and non-Muslim experiences in western countries (e.g., Australia). Specifically, these social identity processes are useful for discerning (a) how some non-Muslims may come to see Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat, and (b) how some Muslims, feeling that non-Muslims have threatened their identities, may come to support terrorism. I define non-Muslims’ beliefs that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat as the extent to which they perceive Muslims to be a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat (Uenal, 2016; Velasco González et al., 2008). In addition to examining non-Muslims’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat, I also consider Muslims’ experiences of identity threat. I define identity threat as a characteristic relevant to an individual that has been discriminated
against or negatively stereotyped (Major & Schmader, 2018). Identity threats, as well as the three types of perceptions of threat, will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.

The remainder of this chapter presents the theoretical underpinnings of SIT. It explains the utility of SIT in better understanding how people experience and react to identity threats, with a specific focus on the two identity threats I test in my dissertation: stigmatisation and meta-punitiveness. It also highlights the importance of using SIT to examine support for terrorism.

4.1.1 How Does SIT Explain Support for Terrorism

Anti-Muslim attitudes amongst those living in the West (e.g., Australia, the UK, the US, Canada, France) can influence the extent to which Muslims who constitute a minority group are classified as an out-group. Tajfel et al. (1971) argue that simply categorising people into an out-group based on perceived differences can catalyse intergroup biases. Hence, non-Muslims may be more likely to try and protect themselves against Muslims if they perceive Muslims as a realistic, symbolic or terroristic threat. One way that non-Muslims may seek to protect themselves against the perceived source of threat is to support policies that disproportionately target Muslims (Unnever & Cullen, 2010a, 2010b). This can have negative consequences for Muslim communities. As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5, perceptions that certain groups pose a threat often shape punishment policy (Chiricos et al., 2004). This is common to crime control contexts whereby people support the use of the death penalty (for severe interpersonal crimes such as murder and rape) (Chiricos et al., 2004). I argue that a similar process and outcome may be observed when examining non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies and policing approaches that disproportionately target Muslims.
Negative perceptions of Muslims dominate political agendas, media discourses and public sentiment. Such attitudes stem from stereotypes denoting Muslims as a threat to public safety, to the western way of life and as a group to be suspected (Breen-Smyth, 2014). As a result, Muslims living in western democracies often report feeling like outsiders and as though they are members of a stigmatised out-group (Blackwood et al., 2013b; Cherney & Murphy, 2016). According to Paul (2010), Muslims may come to support terrorism as a consequence of experiencing or perceiving anti-Muslim biases (see also Victoroff et al., 2012). Hence, support for terrorism can form because Muslims identify with the sense of struggle that terrorist groups espouse as these groups challenge the stigmatisation and disenfranchisement experienced by Muslims (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Richardson, 2006). This, in turn, provides a feedback loop, whereby non-Muslims further perceive Muslims as a threat. In other words, SIT may help to understand (a) how negative attitudes (such as punitiveness) towards Muslims amongst non-Muslims and (b) how identity threats experienced by Muslims (as a result of non-Muslims’ anti-Muslim views) may lead some Muslims to support terrorism.

The remainder of this chapter outlines SIT. It also overviews the notion of identity threat and the importance of social identity processes in demonstrating how some people may react to an identity threat. This chapter defines and outlines the two forms of identity threat that I will investigate in my dissertation: (1) stigmatisation, and (2) meta-punitiveness. From here, Chapter 5 presents research that applies the theoretical model to understand how identity processes and perceptions of threat can differentially impact individuals who feel they belong to the majority group. Chapter 6 then applies SIT to minority groups, with a specific focus on Muslim populations.
4.2 The Tenets of Social Identity Theory

The origins of SIT can be traced to the seminal work of Henri Tajfel (1974). Tajfel (1974) describes the circumstances that enhance identification with a perceived in-group and the subsequent feelings of superiority one can feel about their in-group as distinct from perceived out-groups. His theory of social identity arose in the aftermath of the Holocaust to understand how individuals could “sanction…violence to others, simply because of their group membership” (Reicher et al., 2010, p. 47). Tajfel (1974) proposed that when individuals feel a sense of belonging or attachment to social groups, conditions conducive to discrimination and prejudice towards others perceived as outsiders can be heightened. This theory is therefore centred on categorising people as being like “us” or “them” (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), or as in-group members versus out-group members. SIT is an important framework for understanding intergroup conflict and out-group derogation.

To evaluate this “us” versus “them” phenomenon, Tajfel and Turner (1986) proposed four inter-related cognitive processes responsible for identity formation and salience. These include (1) social categorisation, (2) social identification, (3) social comparison, and (4) psychological distinctiveness. The first process, social categorisation, defines an individual’s ability to classify groups of people into meaningful categories that are attributable to their social environment. If a person feels a sense of belonging to the groups they have classified, they enter the stage of social identification, whereby they can embrace the group’s identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). The penultimate phase, social comparison, is premised on the individual comparing the group they identify with to other groups to isolate differences (Tajfel, 1974). The final element, psychological distinctiveness, is underpinned by people’s aspiration to align with an identity that is not only distinct but is also perceived as more favourable or superior when compared to other
groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). This fourth element is partly attributable to a set of benefits that deem in-groups attractive, such as a sense of belonging and support from other in-group members, as well as “a system of roles, rules, norms, values and beliefs to guide behaviour” (Stephan et al., 2009, p. 43).

Group membership characterised by religion, nationality, or race, for example, is bound by criteria that include some people and excludes others (Jhangiani et al., 2014). Such criteria involve ways in which people think, feel or behave and that are accepted by group members. For example, amongst a group where members adhere to Christianity (i.e., group membership is characterised by religion), Christian group members may follow a norm whereby they observe the teachings of the Bible and attend church. Consequently, people’s identification with the in-group and what defines group membership in that group, combined with an assessment of what makes out-group members different becomes prominent. These perceived differences can elicit feelings of favouritism and superiority amongst in-group members, and hostility, fear and discrimination directed towards out-group members (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

A key function of social identity is to ensure that the group a person identifies with is positively distinct from other out-groups. As such, in-group and out-group identification differentially affects those who have been categorised as belonging to either group. Tajfel and Turner (1979) argue that those who identify with an in-group strive to sustain a sense of superiority when compared to other out-groups. Yet a consequence of such in-group superiority is that out-group derogation is intensified. Resultantly, those who are deemed to be out-group members may experience discrimination, resulting in a heightened sense of identity threat. The following section defines identity threat and explains how it is formed.
Section 4.3 also overviews how SIT is important for understanding how individuals perceive threats and experience and react to identity threats.

4.3 What is an Identity Threat?

Research highlights that strong in-group identification is a key antecedent of seeing out-group members as a threat (Stephan et al., 2000). The tenets of SIT suggest that individuals who identify strongly with their in-group are more inclined to protect the values and markers of their group when feeling threatened by an out-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Velasco González et al., 2008). In the context of terrorism, for example, non-Muslim groups might perceive Muslims as a threat to public safety and support actions designed to control the “threat” (e.g., by supporting harsh crime control policies directed at Muslims). At the same time, if Muslims perceive that they are stigmatised or viewed punitively by others, it may trigger a threat to their identity as a valued and upstanding member of their in-group (Breen-Smyth, 2014; Cherney & Murphy, 2016).

Identity threats occur when individuals feel their identities have been “devalued, discriminated against, or negatively stereotyped” because of a characteristic relevant to them (Major & Schmader, 2018, p. 86). An awareness of pre-existing biases towards an individual’s group, combined with a situational cue that may remind them of such biases, can elicit an identity threat (Steele et al., 2002). In other words, individuals do not necessarily need to have an identity devaluing personal experience (e.g., being discriminated against because of one’s appearance) for an identity threat to occur. The mere knowledge that others view one’s group negatively or that others devalue their group is sufficient to generate a threat to an individual’s identity (i.e., an identity threat) (Major & Schmader, 2018).
There are many ways that individuals can feel their identities are devalued and subsequently experience an identity threat. For example, government policies can perpetuate an identity threat when they stereotype or derogate a feature of a person’s identity (e.g., when France banned the burqa it specifically targeted and prohibited the use of a visible indicator of a female Muslims’ religious identities) (Nanwani, 2011). Media portrayals that negatively depict an individual’s identity (e.g., when the media draws links between the Islamic faith and terrorism) also exemplify a source of identity threat (Courty & Rane, 2018). Here the threat is to a Muslim’s feeling that they are a law-abiding person of good standing (Bradford et al., 2014).

4.4 What Leads to an Identity Threat?

Stephan et al.’s (2002; 2000; 1996) Integrated Threat Theory (ITT) draws on the tenets of SIT to explain how perceived out-group members can pose a threat to in-group members (Stephan et al., 2009). SIT posits that an in-group can feel that their in-group membership is threatened when the actions and behaviours of out-group members pose a threat to an in-group’s interests (Branscombe et al., 1999b). ITT identifies two types of threat that can predict negative evaluations of out-groups: realistic threat and symbolic threat. Realistic threats refer to threats to the economic or political power of an in-group, as well as threats to the safety and well-being of an in-group (Stephan et al., 2009). A common way that realistic threats can arise is from competition for resources. For example, some people may perceive immigrants as a realistic threat if they deem them to access jobs and housing that native-born residents believe should be reserved for them (as perceived in-group members). Symbolic threats are defined as values, norms, and beliefs that exist in some out-groups that are viewed by in-group members as a threat. Symbolic
threats are premised on the idea that “out-groups have a different worldview [and] can be seen as threatening the cultural identity of the in-group” (Velasco González et al., 2008, p. 669). An example of a symbolic threat may be the Islamic faith, which some non-Muslims in western contexts deem as a threat to western values (Uenal, 2016; Velasco González et al., 2008).

In addition to symbolic and realistic threats, recently, researchers have identified terrorist threat as a distinct form of threat that may drive negative intergroup relations (Crawford, 2014). Uenal (2016) stresses that perceiving some groups as a terrorist threat should be an additional threat type given the current national security climate. A terrorist threat can be defined as an individual’s fear of being a victim of terrorism from a particular group, which can manifest as an individual’s fear that certain people will attack their country (Doosje et al., 2009). As realistic threats often comprise of safety and wellbeing threats and threats to competition or supply of resources, scholars suggest that distinguishing between safety and economic threats may elicit separate findings (Crawford, 2014; Uenal, 2016). Thus, terrorist threats may present a threat against an individual’s sense of safety distinct from other types of realistic threat.

Perceiving that another person or group views one’s group as a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat provides important information for discerning how a person can come to feel their group is viewed negatively by others. For example, a Muslim who perceives that non-Muslims see them as a realistic, symbolic or terrorist threat may result in the Muslim feeling their identity is threatened. Here, some Muslims may come to feel their identities are threatened by perceiving that they are stigmatised and that all non-Muslims are punitive towards Muslims. Likewise, a non-Muslim who perceives a Muslim as a realistic, symbolic or terrorist threat can explain why some non-Muslims view Muslims
in a negative light. It is important to highlight that realistic, symbolic and terroristic threats are definitionally distinct from identity threats. Instead, I suggest that non-Muslims’ perceptions of Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat may lead Muslims to feel that their identities are under threat. The following section identifies two specific types of identity threat that can be experienced by Muslims: stigmatisation and meta-punitiveness.

4.5 Two Types of Identity Threat: Stigmatisation and Meta-Punitiveness

When considering Muslim experiences in Muslim-minority countries post-9/11, two concepts consistently emerge that arguably constitute an identity threat. The first is stigmatisation and the second is the notion that others are punitive towards one’s group purely because of their group membership (e.g., being a Muslim). I term the second identity threat meta-punitiveness.

Feeling stigmatised is one manifestation of an identity threat that some Muslims may experience in response to prejudice against Muslims. Stigmatisation denotes the unfair association of particular groups of people with negative stereotypes (Link & Phelan, 2001). Stigma is contextual and is based on an attribute a person harbours or is perceived to possess that devalues their social identity in a given time or place (Crocker et al., 1998; Goffman, 1963). In other words, a marker of stigma is a social identity that is rejected or deemed as deviant (Goffman, 1963). An example of a marker of stigma is one’s perceived group membership (e.g., Muslim, criminal, an overweight person) (Crocker et al., 1998). Groups who are stigmatised are seen not to embody the values of the in-group and are therefore not worthy of respect (Crocker & Major, 1989). In my dissertation, I operationalise stigmatisation as the unfair scrutiny that Muslim participants feel is directed
towards Muslims by being typecast as a risk to public safety. Hence, Muslim participants will feel stigmatised (i.e., experience an identity threat) if they believe non-Muslims view them in this way.

A second and related type of identity threat experienced by Muslims relates to the extent that Muslims feel they are treated punitively by non-Muslims (i.e., meta-punitiveness). Meta-punitiveness derives from the social-psychological notion that individuals may react to assumptions they have about how others view their group (Gómez, 2002; Gordijn, 2002). Explored initially as meta-stereotyping, this approach focuses on how individuals perceive that others stereotype them (Vorauer et al., 1998). Relatedly, the idea of meta-punitiveness refers to an individual’s feeling that others are more punitive towards them because of their group membership when comparing themselves to other groups. The term *meta* in this context denotes information known by an individual that refers back to them or a characteristic specific to them. For example, a Muslim who feels that non-Muslims are punitive only towards Muslims would see the Islamic faith as the defining characteristic driving non-Muslims’ negative attitudes towards Muslims.

The meta-punitiveness concept is premised on the notion that people may be more punitive towards individuals who they deem as *not* belonging to their in-group (van Prooijen & Lam, 2007). Such a feeling may arise from widely spread stereotypes linking Muslims with the threat of terrorism (Casey, 2017; Kalkan et al., 2009). Muslims’ perceptions that non-Muslims support punitive counter-terrorism policies may thus generate a source of identity threat for Muslims.
4.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter has presented an overview of SIT, the theoretical framework adopted in my dissertation. SIT outlines how individuals categorise themselves into groups and how in-groups distinguish themselves from out-groups. Identification with an in-group is associated with a sense of superiority and in-group favouritism, which can increase the likelihood for intergroup tensions and out-group derogation (e.g., stigmatising the out-group) (Tajfel, 1974). In contrast, out-group status may result in one’s feelings that their out-group is being derogated, subsequently creating an identity threat (e.g., stigma, meta-punitiveness) (Branscombe et al., 1999b). I propose that these social identity processes can help to explain why some Muslims come to support terrorism.

My dissertation responds to calls by researchers to further explore the social-psychological drivers of support for terrorism. It will demonstrate the relevance of SIT in examining the complex interplay between Muslims’ and non-Muslims’ identity processes. Specifically, it investigates 1) if non-Muslims view Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat, and if they support punitive actions designed to control that group, and 2) if Muslims experience identity threats, and how these threats may be associated with Muslims’ support for terrorism. As such, my dissertation uses SIT to understand why some Muslims come to support terrorism and the identity processes experienced by both Muslims and non-Muslims that may shape this relationship.

The following chapter (Chapter 5) will synthesise literature that uses a social identity lens to demonstrate how majority group members can come to form prejudices towards minority groups, including Muslims. Chapter 5 will describe how majority groups’ perceptions of threat towards minority groups may arise, and how support for punitive policies may be shaped by perceiving minority groups as a realistic, symbolic and
terroristic threat. These two outcomes (i.e., perceptions of threat; support for punitive policies) will form the identity threats that I propose may be felt by Muslims and may predict Muslims’ support for terrorism. Chapter 6 will then apply SIT to determine how social identity processes and identity threats may affect minority group members. Chapter 6 will theorise about how two forms of identity threat: (1) feelings of stigma and (2) meta-punitiveness (i.e., one’s perception that others are punitive towards them because of their group membership) may arise amongst Muslim populations. Importantly, Chapter 6 will explore how such identity threats may influence some Muslims’ support for terrorism. Chapter 6 will also discuss ways in which identities can protect Muslims against supporting terrorism.
Chapter 5 Literature Review: Examining How Social Identity Processes Shape Majority Group Experiences

5.1 Introduction

As discussed in the previous chapter, the tenets of Social Identity Theory (SIT) outline how individuals categorise themselves into groups and how they distinguish themselves from other groups. SIT provides a framework to understand how majority and minority groups (e.g., non-Muslims and Muslims in a Muslim-minority country) may react to threats from each other, and the implications of such threats to both their identities and their subsequent attitudes and behaviours. In this instance, majority groups are conceptualised as the in-group and minority groups are conceptualised as the out-group.

This chapter provides a critical discussion of the literature to date that has adopted SIT to understand how majority group members respond to minority group members they perceive as a threat. This chapter also provides a theoretical basis for why some non-Muslims, particularly in Muslim-minority countries, may come to view Muslims as a threat, and in turn, support punitive counter-terrorism policies they perceive will control Muslims deemed a threat.

5.2 Examining Social Identity Processes amongst Majority Groups

Individuals often demonstrate a stronger preference for their own in-group when compared to other out-groups. This phenomenon is known as intergroup bias (Hewstone et al., 2002; Nickerson & Louis, 2008; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Individuals are more likely to express negative, prejudicial or biased attitudes towards individuals they perceive as
belonging to an out-group, particularly when they view the out-group as a threat to their
group’s interests (King & Wheelock, 2007). Intergroup bias stems from the perception that
some individuals belong to one’s group, while others do not and are thereby deemed a
threat (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). It is worth noting here that the terms in-group
and out-group are specific to the individual.

At its core, a threat can be defined as a person, entity, object or phenomenon that
has the potential to cause harm. In a social-psychological sense, threats are often defined
as individuals who are perceived to have the potential to cause harm to others (King &
Wheelock, 2007). As will be shown in this chapter, scholars have operationalised
perceptions of threat in a range of ways. In my dissertation, I borrow concepts from
Stephan et al.’s (2000) Integrated Threat Theory (ITT) and Uenal’s (2016) research on
Islamophobia to define non-Muslims’ perceptions that Muslims pose a threat. I define
perceptions of threat as non-Muslims’ beliefs that Muslims pose a threat to their safety and
wellbeing (i.e., realistic threat); a threat to their culture and way of life (i.e., symbolic
threat); and as a terroristic threat (i.e., non-Muslims feel more at risk of being a victim of
terrorism perpetrated by Muslims).

How people define in-groups and out-groups are relative to each person. For
example, an individual may define their in-group as being strongly identified with their
religion. Others may define their in-group as being strongly identified with their nation or
gender. Strong in-group identification with one’s group is arguably a key antecedent of a
perceived threat from individuals deemed to be out-group members (Brewer, 2001;
Oswald, 2005; Reik et al., 2006; Stephan et al., 2000; Stephan et al., 2009). SIT suggests
that individuals who identify more strongly with their own in-group will be motivated to
protect their group members against out-group members they perceive as a threat (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). For example, by derogating out-group members (Hewstone et al., 2002).

The link between strong in-group identification and out-group derogation is supported empirically (see, e.g., Jetten et al., 1997; Meeus et al., 2010; see also Reik et al., 2006 for a meta-analytic review of the relationship between intergroup threat and out-group bias). For example, Meeus et al. (2010) utilised a sample of Flemish individuals in Belgium to investigate if the strength of participants’ in-group identification as Flemish nationals was associated with greater prejudice against ethnic groups. Findings from a cross-sectional study of 397 Flemish university students and a longitudinal study of 443 Flemish school students showed a positive relationship between national identity and prejudice towards ethnic groups (Meeus et al., 2010). This finding supports the theoretical assumption in SIT that in-group identification is strongly correlated with out-group bias. The following section highlights how majority groups can come to perceive minority groups as a threat. In this context, majority groups are deemed to be the in-group, and minority groups are viewed as the out-group. The next section further demonstrates how individuals may react to such feelings of threat.

5.3 How Majority Groups Perceive Others as a Threat

While research consistently finds a link between in-group identity and out-group derogation, Turner (1999) argues that moderating factors better explain the relationship between identification and bias towards others, such as perceiving others as a threat. Recent research has tested if several types of perceptions of threat interact with an individual’s in-group identity to predict negative out-group attitudes. The findings suggest that they do. For example, Stephan et al. (2002) hypothesised that an in-group’s perception
that out-groups pose a realistic and symbolic threat would be related to out-group bias when individuals strongly identified with their in-group. The authors drew on survey data from 175 students in six American universities (Stephan et al., 2002). Realistic threat was measured by twelve items that gauged economic and political threats. For example, one item asked the extent to which Caucasian participants felt that African American people were in more positions of power. The same questions were asked of African American participants but in reverse. To measure symbolic threats, the authors drew on twelve items that measured perceived differences in values between Caucasian and African American participants. For example, one variable asked the extent to which participants saw their family values to be different from the other racial group (i.e. Caucasian or African American). Twelve items were also used to measure how participants would feel by interacting with the other racial group. Findings confirmed their hypotheses amongst a sample of Caucasian and African American participants. When disaggregating by racial group, results showed that realistic threats were a more reliable predictor of Caucasian participants’ out-group attitudes towards African Americans. In comparison, symbolic threats were a more reliable predictor of African American participants’ prejudicial attitudes towards Caucasian Americans (Stephan et al., 2002). Overall, threat perceptions were most strongly associated with shaping Caucasian participants’ views, which suggests that the impacts of threat differ depending on race. The authors argued that a desire for retaining power as the majority group within the US may be a driving force for Caucasian participants reporting stronger feelings of threat towards African American participants (Stephan et al., 2002).

In another test of symbolic and realistic threats in a Northern Irish sample of 245 university students, Tausch et al. (2007) operationalised in-group identification as the
strength of participants’ religious identities as either a Catholic or a Protestant. The authors drew on the same operationalisations of symbolic and realistic threats as in Stephan et al.’s (2002) study. Results showed that in-group identification (as either a Protestant or a Catholic) and out-group attitudes (towards the religious group each participant did not identify with) were strongest amongst those who perceived symbolic threats. Tausch et al. (2007) suggested that a weaker relationship between in-group identification and realistic threats might be explained by the notion that all group members would likely experience some type of realistic threat, regardless of the strength of their religious identity (Tausch et al., 2007). However, as symbolic threats are more directly related to participants’ identities as either a Catholic or a Protestant, strong in-group identifiers may be more impacted by such symbolic threats. Taken together, the findings from Tausch et al. (2007) and Stephan et al. (2002) highlight the need to better understand the antecedents of threat amongst different groups, as well as the consequences of such threat.

In sum, these studies demonstrate how the belief that out-groups pose a threat to one's in-group can shape intergroup biases. These studies further highlight the moderating role of different types of threat in shaping this relationship. Given the context my dissertation is situated in, there is a need to determine if these same relationships exist when examining non-Muslims’ attitudes towards Muslims when Muslims constitute a minority group in the population. The following section, therefore, highlights how studies that examine non-Muslims’ attitudes towards Muslims display similar patterns of results to the studies presented in this section.
5.4 How Non-Muslims Can Come to See Muslims as a Threat

Anti-Muslim and Islamophobic rhetoric is prevalent in many western nations, particularly since 9/11 (Poynting & Mason, 2007; Saeed, 2007). As discussed in Chapter 2, media portrayals of Muslims are often negative and contribute to stereotypes denoting Muslims as supportive of terrorism and as a security threat (Ahmed & Matthes, 2017; Aly, 2007; Saeed, 2007; Saleem et al., 2017; Saleem & Ramasubramanian, 2017). Similarly, counter-terrorism legislation and policing often targets Muslim communities more than other populations (see Appendix A) (Awan, 2012; Blackwood et al., 2013b; Cherney & Murphy, 2019). Underpinning these factors are intergroup processes where some non-Muslims see Muslims as an out-group whose values are incongruent with western ideals (Cherney & Murphy, 2019).

In recent years, broader public and political sentiment in western jurisdictions have centred on the scrutiny of Muslims as a suspect group because their religion has come to be associated with terrorism (Breen-Smyth, 2014; Cherney & Murphy, 2016). By denoting Muslims as suspects, some non-Muslims in the West categorise Muslims as an out-group. When non-Muslims perceive that Muslims support terrorist ideals, they may be more likely to deem Muslims as a threat and, therefore, more likely to support policies that target and control Muslims (Doosje et al., 2009). The following section overviews research that demonstrates how non-Muslims’ beliefs that Muslims support terrorism can shape negative attitudes towards Muslims in the West.

5.4.1 Beliefs that Muslims Support Terrorism

Negative portrayals of Muslims have a pervasive presence in social and political discourses (Doosje et al., 2013; Doosje et al., 2009; Velasco González et al., 2008). Since 9/11 prejudices and stereotypes that depict Muslims as a terrorist threat have become more
commonplace in western nations such as the US, the UK, and Australia (Oswald, 2005; Welch, 2016). Moreover, rates of Islamophobia and hate crimes directed towards Muslims in western countries continue to rise (Abbas, 2007; Akbarzadeh, 2016; Awan & Zempi, 2016).

As a group under constant scrutiny, Muslims are also often perceived to threaten western culture (Huddy et al., 2005; Velasco González et al., 2008). Despite their ethnic heterogeneity Muslims are often viewed as a homogenous group (Saeed, 2007). Research shows that non-Muslims can stereotype and hold prejudice against Muslims by linking them to terrorism and violence. Scholars point to the perception that Muslims support terrorism as a key antecedent of perceiving Muslims as a threat (Ciftci, 2012; Doosje et al., 2009; Fischer et al., 2007; Oswald, 2005).

For example, Fischer et al. (2007) surveyed 176 non-Muslim Germans living in Germany to determine the extent to which participants perceived Muslims as more aggressive and more likely to support terrorism. On average, participants reported Muslims to be more aggressive and more likely to support terrorism compared to non-Muslims. Fischer et al. (2007) argue that the spurious belief that Muslims are inherently violent and supportive of terrorism may derive from two underlying sources. Firstly, non-Muslims’ exposure to media images depicting Muslim celebrations of terrorist attacks (e.g., after the 9/11 hijackings). Secondly, the fact that many recent terrorist attacks on western soil or against western interests have involved individuals or groups professing to act on behalf of teachings learned through the Islamic faith. The belief that Muslims support terrorism denotes one perception that Muslims pose a threat to public safety and perpetuates the discourse that Muslims are linked to terrorism. Fischer et al.’s (2007) findings are
demonstrative of in-group/out-group identity processes whereby non-Muslims (as the in-group in this study) viewed Muslims (as the out-group in this study) in a biased way.

Work by Doosje et al. (2009) reports similar findings with a random nationally representative sample of 1,409 people living across nine European countries. Doosje et al. (2009) explored if prejudice against Muslims was associated with out-group discrimination and approval of anti-immigration policies. The authors found that when participants perceived Muslims to support terrorism, they were more likely to discriminate against Muslims. Participants were more likely to support airport security checks that specifically targeted Muslims; were more likely to endorse restrictive immigration policies limiting Muslim migration to their country; and were less likely to move near Muslims or send their children to a Muslim-majority school. Doosje et al. (2009) also tested how perceptions of terrorist threat (operationalised as the belief that the participant would be a victim of terrorism) might affect attitudes towards anti-immigration policies. Like Fischer et al. (2007), Doosje et al. (2009) also infer that in-group and out-group identity processes may shape participants’ fear of Muslims. Here they found that for participants who were more fearful of becoming a victim of a terrorist attack, their attitudes towards Muslims became increasingly prejudiced and discriminatory (Doosje et al., 2009).

5.4.2 The Association Between Social Identity and Perceptions of Threat

Social-psychological research consistently shows that people are more intolerant of others they deem to (a) be different to them, or (b) belong to groups they consider to be an out-group (Kalkan et al., 2009) (see Chapter 4). Evidence suggests that highly nationalistic individuals of a non-Muslim background view Muslims (i.e., an out-group) as more

44 Data from the following countries were used in Doosje et al.’s (2009) study: France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Sweden.
threatening, and thus are more likely to adopt a negative view of Muslims (Li & Brewer, 2004; Stephan et al., 2000). For example, Li and Brewer (2004) studied 148 non-Muslim Americans’ views of Muslims shortly after the 9/11 attacks. Using an experimental methodology, Li and Brewer (2004) found that when participants’ national identities were strong, they were more likely to hold prejudiced views of Muslims.

The link between holding a strong nationalistic identity and anti-Muslim attitudes is also notable in other research. For example, Oswald (2005) drew on a non-probabilistic survey sample of 201 American citizens (who represented the in-group in Oswald’s study). The author demonstrated how the perceived risk that America may be the target of another terrorist attack was associated with increased anti-Arab prejudice, discrimination, and negative stereotypes. Oswald (2005) also found that strong national identification as an American significantly predicted anti-Arab reactions.

The findings from both Li and Brewer’s (2004) and Oswald’s (2005) studies highlight the importance of national identity as an antecedent of out-group prejudice. Social and cultural contexts pertinent to a specific nation shape national identification (Ellemers et al., 2002). As 9/11 can be viewed as a threat to Americans’ national identities, it follows that Americans would react to such a threat by developing biased attitudes towards Muslims or people of Arabic appearance who are often perceived as a terrorism threat (Li & Brewer, 2004; Oswald, 2005).

Other research has also tested how social identity processes, specifically national identification, can shape reactions to policy preferences. A Dutch study drew on a non-representative non-Muslim sample of 1,139 secondary school students across ten schools in the Netherlands to test this relationship (Gieling et al., 2014). The authors investigated how Dutch national identity (i.e., the in-group identity in this study) shaped tolerance
towards Muslims and the endorsement of assimilation policies. Tolerance towards Muslims was operationalised through four items relevant to debated issues in the Netherlands. These items asked participants: (1) what they thought the government should do about the opening of Islamic schools that only enrol Muslim students; (2) if schools should take action when students wear hijabs (e.g., by convincing students not to wear a hijab); (3) what schools should do when female Muslim teachers refuse to shake hands with male colleagues and male parents; and (4) what mosque committees should do in response to a recent speech by an Imam where he referred to homosexual people as inferior (Gieling et al., 2014). An additional tolerance measure (tolerance of Muslims persuading others) was included to gauge whether or not participants would allow Muslim stakeholders relevant to each scenario (e.g., parents, teachers, students, the Imam), to convince other Muslims to engage in similar practices. The endorsement of assimilation policies scale comprised of five items that were measured on a five-point Likert scale (ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree). The scale assessed if immigrants should rescind their own culture and assimilate to Dutch culture. They found that strong Dutch national identity was associated with reduced tolerance towards Muslims (minority group) and a stronger likelihood to endorse assimilation policies (Gieling et al., 2014). This finding is grounded in a social identity perspective, whereby high in-group identifiers are more likely to support ideas and policies that protect in-group values. In this case, assimilation refers to a demand for immigrants to conform to the culture of their host country. It is therefore not surprising that strong national identifiers are more likely to be

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45 Mosque committees are groups of individuals who contribute to the workload and functioning of a mosque.
supportive of assimilation, as assimilation speaks to the protection and maintenance of the values and beliefs of the majority group’s identity (Gieling et al., 2014).

In addition to studies examining how perceptions of threat may shape reactions to Muslims amongst individuals who identify strongly with their in-group, other studies have also considered how multiple types of threat can shape derogation towards Muslims. Ciftci (2012) drew on the 2006 Pew Global Attitudes Survey (PGAS) of 4,590 citizens living in Britain, France, Germany, Spain and the US. They explored how perceived threats from Muslims (i.e., realistic and symbolic threat) and national identity (as either American, British, French, German or Spanish – depending on the country the participant reported being from) affected their likelihood of developing Islamophobic attitudes. The author found that participants’ perceptions of Muslims as a realistic and symbolic threat were the strongest predictor of negative attitudes towards Muslims. Both the view that Muslims threatened participants’ culture or beliefs (i.e., symbolic threat) and concern about the threat of Islamic terrorism strongly predicted Islamophobic attitudes.

In a similar study, Velasco González et al. (2008) considered how perceptions of threat shaped a non-representative sample of 1,187 non-Muslim Dutch school students’ attitudes towards Muslims in the Netherlands. In-group identification was measured using six variables that assessed the extent to which participants felt their Dutch national identity was essential to how they saw themselves. Symbolic threat was operationalised using three items adapted from Stephan et al.’s (2002) work that measured how much participants felt Muslims were threatening Dutch culture. Realistic threat was measured by questions about economic threats and job prospects. Three items were adapted from the work of Stephan et al. (2002) that asked participants how much they felt the presence of Muslims in the Netherlands impacted their likelihood of attaining a job or buying a house, and if
unemployment rates would increase due to the presence of Muslims. Velasco González et al. (2008) found that strong in-group identification (as Dutch) was associated with both perceiving Muslims (the out-group in this study) as a symbolic threat and prejudice towards Muslims (see also van der Noll et al., 2010).

In addition to symbolic and realistic threats, scholars identify a third distinct form of threat that is pertinent to my dissertation. As discussed in Chapter 4, terroristic threat denotes a person’s fear that they may come to be a victim of terrorism or that certain groups may be more likely to commit acts of terrorism. It thus depicts a type of safety and wellbeing threat distinct from realistic threats (Obaidi et al., 2018; Uenal, 2016). Obaidi et al. (2018) tested how terroristic threat shaped non-Muslims’ attitudes towards Muslims. The authors drew on two separate survey samples of 205 Norwegian participants recruited through Facebook and 205 American participants recruited through Amazon’s MTurk. Obaidi et al. (2018) showed that amongst the Norwegian sample, symbolic threat mattered more than the fear of a terroristic threat in shaping hostile attitudes towards Muslims (see also Velasco González et al., 2008). Amongst the American participants, realistic and symbolic threats mattered more than the fear of a terroristic threat in shaping hostile attitudes towards Muslims (see also Velasco González et al., 2008). These findings support prior research. This research suggests that symbolic threats may prove more reliable in shaping non-Muslims’ attitudes towards Muslims because they provide non-Muslims with a veiled justification for derogation by implying that their cultural worldviews do not align with those of Muslims (Pereira et al., 2009).

The following section explores the relationship between social identity and perceiving others as a threat to better understand how in-group and out-group identity processes shape support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. I argue that non-Muslim
in-group attitudes towards Muslims (as a perceived out-group in this context) have consequences for how and when non-Muslims’ will support punitive counter-terrorism policies.

5.4.3 How Perceptions of Threat Can Shape Support for Punitive Crime Control Policies

The increasingly punitive nature of counter-terrorism policies since 9/11 is largely a reflection of public support for these policies (Huddy et al., 2005; Huddy et al., 2002). As identified in criminological literature, the broader nature of punishment can be shaped by perceptions that certain groups pose a threat (Chiricos et al., 2004; King & Wheelock, 2007). Punitive sentiment towards criminal offenders and harsh crime control policies correlate with people’s heightened perceptions of threat towards groups deemed to be a criminal “other” (Unnever & Cullen, 2012). While familiar to other crime control contexts (e.g., support for the death penalty for serious indictable offences such as murder) (Chiricos et al., 2004; Unnever & Cullen, 2009; Unnever & Cullen, 2010a), I argue that a similar pattern may be observed when examining public views towards counter-terrorism policies.

The relationship between intolerance of particular groups in society and support for punitive punishments has received substantial empirical support in other crime control contexts (see, e.g., Chiricos et al., 2004; Cochran & Piquero, 2011; Huddy et al., 2005; Kornhauser, 2013; Ousey & Unnever, 2012; Unnever & Cullen, 2010a, 2010b). The Racial Animus Model can explain how perceptions of threat and intolerance towards racial minority groups can shape punitive attitudes towards those groups (Unnever & Cullen, 2010b). Cullen et al. (2010a, 2010b; 2005) suggest that punitive attitudes towards minority groups are more salient when individuals harbour negative evaluations of minority groups.
The Racial Animus Model draws from two prominent theoretical frameworks: the Minority Threat Thesis (Blumer, 1958; Chiricos et al., 2004; King & Wheelock, 2007) and the Racial Typification of Crime Framework. In much the same fashion as SIT predicts out-group derogation when in-groups perceive out-groups as a threat (see Chapter 4 and Section 5.4.2), the Minority Threat Thesis links racial prejudice with increased group-based social control towards minority groups (Blumer, 1958). In a similar vein, the Racial Typification Of Crime Framework centres around denoting the out-group as the “other” and connecting the notion of the “other” with criminality (Chiricos et al., 2004; Unnever & Cullen, 2010a). These beliefs subsequently enhance attitudes in favour of punitive policies that control groups perceived as a criminal or a threat, thereby serving to elevate the in-group’s status and power (Weitzer & Tuch, 2005).

Studies demonstrate a link between racial or ethnic animosity and support for harsh crime control policies (Chiricos et al., 2004; Unnever & Cullen, 2010a, 2010b). For example, Chiricos et al. (2004) analysed if the racial typification of crime was associated with support for punitive crime control policies. The authors defined the racial typification of crime as the association of crime with minority (i.e., African American) perpetrators (Chiricos et al., 2004). They hypothesised that Caucasian participants would be more likely to be punitive when they perceived that African American people committed crimes. The inference here is that people would be more likely to support punitive policies if they deemed such policies would control those they perceived as an out-group (in this case, African American people); suggesting that such support was racially driven. Using a national random survey sample of 885 American adults, findings showed that Caucasian participants were more likely to hold punitive views regarding punishment when they perceived that African Americans committed more crime. This finding held even when
controlling for fear of crime, concerns about crime, and perceptions about the proportion of violent crime. However, participants identifying as African American or Hispanic were not more punitive towards an African American perpetrator even when believing that African Americans committed crimes at a higher rate than other racial groups. The authors concluded that racialised typifications of criminality drove crime control preferences. In other words, these scholars suggest that when majority groups view racial-minority or immigrant groups as a safety threat, they are more likely to endorse actions or behaviours that seek to exclude or control them (Scheepers et al., 2002).

Unnever et al. (2012; 2010a; 2010b) also find a consistent relationship between negative sentiment towards racial minority groups and support for harsh punishment preferences across a range of national contexts, including European countries (Ousey & Unnever, 2012; Unnever & Cullen, 2010a); Canada (Unnever & Cullen, 2010a); and the US (Unnever & Cullen, 2010b). In the US, Welch et al. (2011) have also demonstrated a link between perceiving Hispanic residents as a threat and supporting punitive crime control policies amongst a sample of 885 American participants. Similar findings are observable in the Australian context. For example, Kornhauser (2013) conducted a quantitative analysis of 3,902 Australian participants, finding a significant and positive relationship between racial animus and support for two forms of crime control: harsher prison sentences and the death penalty.

46 The countries included in Ousey and Unnever’s (2012) study comprise all present EU member states: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and (now former EU member state) the UK. The countries included in Unnever and Cullen’s (2010a) study include France, Belgium, the Netherlands, East and West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark, Great Britain, Greece, Spain, Finland, Sweden, Austria, Canada, Ireland, and Portugal.
The link between animus and punitive attitudes to crime control policies is well-documented. Yet, scant research exists that explores the association between animus and punitive sentiment towards counter-terrorism policies often applied to Muslim communities (for exceptions see Piazza, 2015; Welch, 2016; Williamson, 2019). In the Australian context, where harsh and sometimes unprecedented counter-terrorism policies exist, this constitutes a significant gap in the field (Lynch et al., 2015).

5.4.4 How Perceptions of Threat Can Shape Support for Punitive Counter-terrorism Policies

While the literature base is small, research examining public perceptions of punitive counter-terrorism policies has identified a strong relationship between racialised stereotypes, perceived out-group threat, and support for punitive policies. Welch (2016) drew on survey data from 425 adults residing in America to determine whether or not linking individuals of Middle Eastern descent with terrorism predicted support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. Findings revealed that support for punitive counter-terrorism policies was stronger amongst those who stereotyped Middle Eastern individuals as terrorists.

Other studies also find that perceiving Muslims as a realistic threat to public safety can increase public support for policies such as those involving torture (Piazza, 2015), banning headscarves (van der Noll, 2010) and restricting civil liberties (Nisbet et al., 2008). While public support for such extreme and coercive measures is mixed, recent research reveals that people are more punitive towards the punishment of terrorists when they perceive that Muslims are the source of threat. For example, Piazza (2015) drew on a sample of 1,135 individuals in the US to compare the public’s views of a Muslim or non-Muslim hypothetical terrorist suspect. The aim of Piazza’s (2015) study was to discern
differences in punitive sentiment towards the use of interrogation and detention techniques. Using an experimental vignette design, Piazza (2015) manipulated the religious affiliation of a terrorism suspect. Piazza (2015) found suspected terrorists’ religious identities, namely Muslim identities, were positively associated with the public’s support for punitive interrogation and detention policies. Moreover, hypothetical suspects’ affiliations with a specific terrorist organisation were also related to participants’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. Participants were more punitive towards hypothetical suspects linked to groups inspired by distortions of Islam than groups not inspired by these doctrines (Piazza, 2015). Findings of this study demonstrate a link between how individuals typify “terrorist suspects”, their tolerance of harsh punishments and their attitudes towards Muslims more generally (see also Sides & Gross, 2013; Welch, 2016).

In another study, Sides and Gross (2013) explored if support for the “War on Terror” was linked to non-Muslims’ perceptions of Muslims. Sides and Gross (2013) utilised two datasets of election attitudes gathered in the US: 1,187 participants from the 2004 American National Election Studies and 10,000 from the 2006-2007 Cooperative Congressional Election Study. The authors found that negative portrayals of Muslims as violent and untrustworthy were associated with heightened support for the War on Terror (Sides & Gross, 2013). The authors suggested counter-extremism strategies that reinforce these stereotypes, in conjunction with continued violence in Middle Eastern countries, serves to prolong stereotyping amongst non-Muslims towards Muslims in Muslim-minority countries (e.g., the US; Piazza, 2015; Sides & Gross, 2013; Welch, 2016).

To summarise, the studies mentioned above highlight how anti-Muslim attitudes can shape non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. The findings from
this research align with studies linking racial and ethnic prejudice with punitive attitudes towards traditional crime control policies. However, to date, scholarship has not tested the potential relationship between religious intolerance and support for punitive policies. This is a gap my dissertation seeks to address.

5.5 Chapter Summary

This chapter reveals how social identity processes can shape the way majority groups respond to minority “out-groups”, including Muslims, and how perceiving minorities as a threat shapes majority group members’ support for punitive crime control policies. It has also highlighted how these relationships play out when explicitly focusing on perceptions of threat towards Muslims. The following chapter (Chapter 6) draws on SIT to understand how identification and identity threats can shape the experiences of minority groups. Chapter 6 overviews how social identity processes and identity threats operate amongst minority groups in general, before outlining how Muslims as a minority group may react to identity threats.
Chapter 6 Literature Review: Examining How Social Identity Processes Shape Minority Group Experiences

6.1 Introduction

As was discussed in the previous chapter (Chapter 5), the strength of a person’s identity with a valued in-group can have an impact on their perceptions of others (Dovidio et al., 2001; McCoy & Major, 2003). Chapter 5 highlighted how the strength of one’s identity as a majority group member could predict bias towards minority group members perceived to be an out-group. The studies presented in the previous chapter revealed that when majority group members hold a strong national identity (which in the context of the studies outlined in Chapter 5 represents an in-group identity), it can positively predict their prejudice towards minority out-groups. As will be demonstrated in this chapter, when minority groups identify strongly with their minority status, this can make them more sensitive to identity threats and prejudice. However, I argue that when minority group members hold a strong dual identity, the harmful effects of identity threats may be mitigated.

Dual identification refers to an individual’s ability to nurture distinct social identities simultaneously without having to force them to choose to identify themselves into a single, unified category (e.g., I am Australian at the exclusion of all other groups) (Glasford & Dovidio, 2011). Adherence to a dual identity proposes an individual’s ability to identify with two different groups simultaneously (e.g., as a Muslim and Australian).47 Research on dual identities will be overviewed to demonstrate how a dual identity may

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47 Other scholars have conceptualised dual identity as individuals holding multiple identities (see e.g., Dunn, Atie, Mapedzahama, Ozalp, & Aydogan, 2015). However, my dissertation focuses on the idea of dual identity as an individual’s strong identity with two identities, as defined by Gaertner and Dovidio (2000).
play a protective role in mitigating the harmful effects of identity threats amongst minority groups, including Muslims.

The current chapter outlines how identity processes operate amongst individuals within a minority group. It further highlights how identity threats may form and how minority groups may react to such threats. From here, a discussion of identity and identity threats amongst Muslim-minority groups is provided, followed by an overview of how dual identification may play a protective role amongst Muslims who feel their identities are threatened.

6.2 Examining Social Identity Processes amongst Minority Groups

Strong identification with one’s group can elicit a heightened response to threats directed towards their group (Stephan et al., 2000). Resultantly, minority groups may be more prone to experience threats to the value they attribute to their ethnic, racial and/or religious identities because minority identification is often afforded a lower status (Fleischmann et al., 2019; Verkuyten et al., 1996). The status afforded to immigrant, ethnic/racial and religious minority groups is often positioned below non-migrant and non-minority groups (Fleischmann et al., 2019).

From a social identity perspective, identity threats experienced by individuals in minority groups, who often share a more disadvantaged group position (Meeusen et al., 2019), can increase the harmful effects of such threats (Eccleston & Major, 2006; Major et al., 2003; McCoy & Major, 2003; Sellers & Shelton, 2003). Operario and Fiske (2001) argue that those who identify strongly with their minority group will also be more sensitive to hostility directed towards their minority identity. The following section describes how minority groups experience and react to such identity threats.
6.3 How Minority Groups can Experience Identity Threats

Identity threats are defined as biases, negative stereotypes, or forms of discrimination an individual experiences because of a characteristic relevant to their identities (Major & Schmader, 2018). Identity threats can be experienced differently by members of minority groups. As discussed in detail in Chapter 4, an identity threat can occur when an individual experiences or perceives something that communicates to them that their group or their group identity (e.g., one’s identity as a Muslim) is devalued or perceived negatively by other groups (Branscombe et al., 1999b; Dion, 2002). Identity threats can trigger a range of responses. Stephan et al. (2009) argue that these responses may be cognitive, affective or behavioural. Cognitive responses may include a change in how people whose in-group is under threat perceive out-group members. Research has found that minority in-group members may tolerate majority out-group members less than fellow in-group members (Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter, 2006). Minority groups may also oppose policies that favour other out-groups as a result of feeling under threat (Renfro et al., 2006). Of relevance to my dissertation, identity threats may also “make violence against the out-group [i.e., the majority group] more likely and easier to justify” (Stephan et al., 2009, p. 19). In terms of emotional responses, individuals whose in-group identity is under threat (in this case, a minority group member) may react by feeling anger, fear, humiliation, and resentment towards out-groups (in this case a majority group member) (Davis & Stephan, 2011). Finally, behavioural responses can include aggression or hostility (Stephan et al., 2009).

Research shows that identity threats can negatively and disproportionately impact minority groups when compared to majority groups. For example, Operario and Fiske (2001) conducted two experiments to examine the impact of discrimination amongst
minority and majority groups. The first experiment comprised of 111 undergraduates from an American university. Just over half of the sample (52.2%) identified as Caucasian (the majority group in this study). The remaining sample reported being a member of an ethnic minority group (which included Asian or Asian American, Black or African American, Latino or non-Caucasian Hispanic, and Native American) (Operario & Fiske, 2001). The authors conducted a 2x2x2 experiment that tested the differential effect of individual versus group-level discrimination amongst Caucasian and ethnic minority participants whose ethnic identity was either high or low. Findings from an analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed that the ethnic minority sample perceived they were discriminated against more than the Caucasian sample. Additionally, these effects were much stronger when participants felt discrimination was directed towards their group rather than them as individuals (Operario & Fiske, 2001).

In their second experiment, Operario and Fiske (2001) explored if the strength of participants’ ethnic identities shaped perceptions of prejudice. The study utilised a different undergraduate university student sample of 54 ethnic minority participants (i.e., Asian, African American, or Latino). Results from a 2x2 ANOVA showed that Asian, African American and Latino participants who reported a stronger ethnic identity were more aggrieved by prejudice, especially when subtle forms of prejudice were displayed to the participant. Such findings point to the salience of participants’ identities and the negative effect of threats that may devalue their identities (Operario & Fiske, 2001).

Other studies show how stigma towards ethnic minority groups who identify strongly with their ethnic minority identity can negatively affect their psychological wellbeing (Branscombe et al., 1999b; Yoo & Lee, 2008), and economic and health outcomes (Verkuyten, 2008). Branscombe et al. (1999b) investigated if attributions of
stigma impacted participants’ wellbeing when their ethnic minority identity was salient. The authors drew on a sample of 139 African American participants, half of whom were undergraduate students, and half were recruited from predominantly African American organisations (e.g., the Black Student Union, churches). Stigma was operationalised by presenting participants with a series of situations with adverse outcomes that could be interpreted as being a product of racial prejudice. An example situation is “Suppose you go into a fancy restaurant. Your server seems to be taking care of all the other customers except you. You are the last person whose order is taken” (Branscombe et al., 1999b, p. 139). When stigma constituted a threat to participants’ ethnic identity, they were more likely to express hostility towards the majority group who imparted the stigma.

In a similar study, Yoo and Lee (2008) used vignettes amongst a sample of 128 Asian American university students to test if ethnic (i.e., Asian) identity moderated the effect of discrimination on participants’ wellbeing. Participants were randomly assigned to read one of two vignettes. One vignette described a situation where the participant was subjected to racial discrimination once, while the other exposed the participant to racial discrimination multiple times. After reading their assigned vignette, participants completed a questionnaire. Findings showed that participants who received the vignette describing multiple instances of racial discrimination reported lower levels of wellbeing when compared to participants whose vignette described one (Yoo & Lee, 2008). Moreover, those with a strong minority identity (e.g., I am a proud Asian) were more negatively affected by multiple experiences of discrimination (i.e., by taking offence, being more sensitive to repeat instances of discrimination) when compared to those with a weaker affiliation to their Asian identity.
Postmes et al. (1999) argue that the strength of one’s minority identity may make minorities more susceptible to experiencing and reacting to identity threats because they feel more disadvantaged at the outset. The research presented above highlights a clear need to mitigate the negative implications associated with identity threats. As Victoroff et al. (2012) note, identity threats denote instances whereby individuals feel the groups they belong to have been negatively evaluated. In short, as SIT assumes, individuals strive to maintain a positive perception of their in-group and their in-group identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). If these positive perceptions are challenged, individuals can experience a sense of identity threat, which can spark a myriad of negative responses. I propose that one negative consequence of intergroup identity threats directed at Muslims is that some Muslims may be more likely to support terrorism. In the following section, I discuss how identifying as a Muslim and reactions to identity threats might impact Muslims’ support for terrorism.

6.4 The Applicability of Social Identity Processes to Explain Muslims’ Support for Terrorism

Social identity perspectives have been used in recent years to understand how some people can come to support terrorism. Doosje et al. (2013), for example, argue that when individuals feel under threat, they can become more susceptible to extremist ideals. Several studies have examined the role of identity in shaping passive support for terrorism (Cherney & Murphy, 2019; Tausch et al., 2009). All research synthesised herein examines passive support for terrorism, which I term support for terrorism throughout. For example, Cherney and Murphy (2019) drew on a sample of 800 Muslims living in Australia to discern the predictors that could explain how some Muslims may come to support
terrorism. The authors used one item as a proxy measure of support for terrorism. This item asked if participants believed terrorists have valid grievances. Cherney and Murphy (2019) drew on a range of predictors that could explain why some Muslims thought that terrorists have valid grievances. Findings of the study showed that strong identification as an Australian was associated with a reduced likelihood that Muslim participants would believe terrorists have valid grievances. However, religious (i.e., Muslim) identity did not predict participants’ perceptions that terrorists have valid grievances.

In a similar study, Tausch et al. (2009) utilised a sample of 1,000 British Muslims to test the relationship between identity and support for terrorism. The authors used a more direct measure of support for terrorism, asking participants how much they agreed or disagreed that the London bombings in 2005 were justified. Tausch et al. (2009) distinguished between British national identity and religious (i.e., Muslim) identity. Like Cherney and Murphy’s (2019) findings, results of Tausch et al.’s (2009) study found that religious (i.e., Muslim) identity did not predict support for terrorism, while national identity was associated with reduced support for terrorism. Moreover, no evidence suggested a strong religious identity was related to the justification of the London bombings (Tausch et al., 2009). Tausch et al. (2009) argued that how Muslims define their religious identity may explain why there was no relationship between religious identification and support for terrorism. In other words, these findings suggest that most Muslims construct their religious identity in a way antithetical to violence (Tausch et al., 2009). These findings contrast perceptions often held by non-Muslims linking Muslims to terrorism (Fischer et al., 2007).

To further understand the link between identity processes and support for terrorism, Fischer et al. (2007) investigated Muslims’ religious identity and its implications for
supporting terrorism. The authors drew on a 2 (Christians vs. Muslims) x 4 (religiosity, the importance of religious identity, aggression, and attitudes towards terrorism) factorial multivariate design amongst a sample of 51 Christian (n=27) and Muslim (n=24) participants from the Ukraine and Azerbaijan. Fischer et al. (2007) demonstrated that Muslims were not more aggressive or necessarily more religious than Christian participants. However, the importance Muslims assigned to their religious identity and the perceived external threats they felt were directed towards their religious identity influenced their support for terrorism. Muslims’ religious identity salience was associated with increased support for aggression towards others. Results of their study provided evidence that identity threats can contribute to Muslims’ heightened justification of terrorism (Fischer et al., 2007).

The notion of identity threat is only a recent and emerging theme in the literature for understanding drivers of support for terrorism. Perceived discrimination towards Muslims is identified in the literature as a key type of identity threat and predictor of support for terrorism. For example, Victoroff et al. (2012) recently explored the role of discrimination amongst two samples of Muslim participants in four European countries (Great Britain, France, Germany and Spain) in Study 1 (n=1,627) and the US in Study 2 (n=1,050). The authors found those who perceived they were more discriminated against because they were Muslim were more likely to support the acceptance of suicide bombings “to defend Islam from its enemies” (Victoroff et al., 2012, p. 796). Similarly, when comparing the experiences of Muslims in western Europe and Muslim-majority countries, Zhirkov et al. (2014) found that those participants who identified more strongly with their religious (i.e., Muslim) identity than with the identity of their host country were more inclined to support terrorism. The authors speculated that heightened support for terrorism
might be an outcome of perceived discrimination felt more strongly by those whose religious identity was more salient to their sense of self.

Obaidi et al. (2018) also argue that one’s feeling that others view them as a threat can mobilise support for terrorism. The authors conducted two experimental studies with 154 Danish Muslims living in Denmark (Study 1) and 151 Swedish Muslims living in Sweden (Study 2). The authors manipulated meta-cultural threat (i.e., the perception that others deem one’s group as a symbolic threat) using two scenarios. One scenario suggested Danish attitudes towards Muslim immigrants were negative and that Muslim immigrants presented a problem to Danish values (experimental condition). Another scenario presented television viewing habits (control condition). Findings demonstrated a relationship between a Muslim individual’s perceptions that others viewed them as a threat (i.e., meta-cultural threat) and support for and willingness to engage in violence across the two Muslim samples. The results demonstrate how negative meta-attitudes can be associated with more extremist perceptions or behaviours. Obaidi et al.’s (2018) findings also show a relationship between one’s belief that others view them negatively and their subsequent support for terrorism. These findings inform the rationale for examining Muslim Australians’ support for terrorism in my dissertation. Specifically, that support for terrorism may be more likely when participants believe others view them punitively because of their race, ethnicity, or religion.

Relatedly, a study of 88 Dutch Moroccan Muslim teenagers analysed how Muslims’ attitudes and behaviours were influenced by feeling stigmatised (Kamans et al., 2009). In Kamans et al.’s (2009) study, the authors tested how Dutch Moroccan teenagers would react to perceptions that dominant groups in the Netherlands viewed them as “criminal, aggressive, extreme Muslims, and loitering teenagers” (Kamans et al., 2009, p.
Findings showed effects similar to that of a self-fulfilling prophecy whereby participants began to legitimise and align with the stereotypes that stigmatised them. However, legitimising these notions of stigma only occurred when participants viewed dominant Dutch groups negatively. This point is of particular importance when associating certain groups with terrorism. If Muslims feel under threat and perceive that others see them as suspects, a negative stereotype may be activated, whereby Muslims come to support terrorism because others associate them with terrorism (Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010; Wright-Neville & Smith, 2009). This is because when individuals feel their identity to a group is tenuous or under threat, their beliefs and attitudes may align with alternative groups who make them feel accepted (see Kruglanski et al., 2013; Kruglanski & Orehek, 2011; Schwartz et al., 2009).

Lyons-Padilla et al. (2015) also tested the association between identity and support for terrorism. They asked 198 Muslim American participants about feeling segregated (i.e., identifying strongly with their out-group identity but not with their in-group identity) or marginalised (i.e., not identifying with either their out-group or in-group identity). The authors sought to understand how different identity processes were related to support for a hypothetical terrorist group. Asking questions about terrorism is a sensitive endeavour. Thus, the authors asked participants the extent to which they would be likely to (i) know the terrorist group, (ii) “engage in activities on behalf of the group”, and (iii) “sympathize [sic] with the group should it engage in extreme behaviors [sic]” (Lyons-Padilla et al., 2015, p. 5). The authors found that individuals who felt more discriminated against, and neither identified with the culture in their host country nor their Muslim heritage, were more likely to support terrorist groups.
Taken together, these studies demonstrate how identity processes and identity threats have the potential to shape attitudes supportive of terrorism. However, identity processes may also act in a protective way against the harmful effects of identity threats. The following section points to the protective role of identity re-categorisation processes in alleviating the adverse effects associated with identity threats.

6.5 Identity Re-categorisation as a Protective Mechanism against Identity Threats

Within the research base that has determined how identity threats can negatively impact strongly identified minority groups, some research points to the potentially protective nature of re-categorisation. According to Huo (2003), when an individual identifies with a more dominant social group (i.e., a majority group) in which their minority group identity is nested (i.e., I am Australian even when I am a Muslim) a re-categorisation process occurs. This process creates a sense of shared membership that allows individuals to develop common group-level identities (Dovidio et al., 2009). For example, stronger identification with a majority group perceived to have a higher status in society (i.e., sharing a common in-group identity) is hypothesised to protect against the negative effects of identity threats directed towards one’s minority out-group (e.g., discrimination, alienation, exclusion) (Dovidio et al., 2001; Dovidio et al., 2005; Sellers & Shelton, 2003).

This re-categorisation process is hypothesised in the Common In-group Identity Model (CIIM) (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). This model has been tested in a range of contexts. Findings show that re-categorisation into a more common or shared majority group protects individuals, particularly those considered to have low status in the community (i.e., minority groups). For example, in an organisational setting, Huo et al.
Harley Mae Willison (1996) surveyed 305 employees of different races. The authors assessed participants’ identification with their minority racial group (i.e., White, African American, Hispanic and Asian), but also evaluated the strength of shared identification all employees held for their workplace (i.e., the shared in-group). Employees who identified strongly with the workplace had heightened perceptions of the fairness and efficacy of the organisation (Huo et al., 1996). Even when racial/ethnic identity was salient, adhering to a strong majority group identity translated into positive evaluations of the organisation and thus a shared commitment to organisational values (Huo et al., 1996).

Smith and Tyler (1996) also tested if fostering a common in-group identity would shape support for policies that positively impacted all racial groups. A random sample of 352 Caucasians participated in a survey study. Participants were asked a series of questions related to their identities as Caucasian and as American. Questions about participants’ identification as Caucasian included statements asking if participants “were proud to think of themselves as Whites” (Smith & Tyler, 1996, p. 180). To measure American identification, participants were asked to rate on a scale from 0 to 10 how much they identified with Americans generally (Smith & Tyler, 1996). The dependent variable used in this study measured the endorsement of policies that sought to enhance economic justice (e.g., preventing job discrimination amongst individuals with an ethnic or racial minority status). Findings showed that regardless of their identification as a Caucasian person, participants with a strong American identity were more likely to support policies promoting employment equity, which would benefit all racial groups. Such a finding highlights the way in which a higher-level social identity can facilitate individuals’ support for strategies that service other groups (i.e., non-Caucasian ethnic or racial groups) without seeming to preference Caucasian individuals (Smith & Tyler, 1996).
In another study using a student sample, Dovidio et al. (2001) scrutinised how a common in-group identity could diffuse the harmful effects of discrimination, and in turn, improve student commitment to their university. Dovidio et al. (2001) drew on a sample of 485 Caucasian and African American students at an American university to test this hypothesis. Participants were asked if they had ever been personally discriminated against on campus. *Feeling a part of the university community* constituted a measure of common in-group identity. Discrimination was reported more by African American participants when compared to Caucasian participants. Moreover, experiences of discrimination were negatively correlated with feeling part of the university. However, when both variables were entered into the model, feeling part of the university community was positively and significantly associated with commitment to the university. The effects of discrimination became non-significant (Dovidio et al., 2001).

Despite the promise of these findings, the ability to develop a common in-group identity is fraught with practical challenges (Dovidio et al., 2009). A common in-group identity may not be a realistic permanent solution because it may not serve the needs of minority groups whose diverse racial, ethnic, or in my dissertation, religious identities harbour specific functions (Hewstone, 1996). Verkuyten et al. (2019) argue that different identities (e.g. minority and majority or in-group and out-group identities) may fulfil different functions for an individual. For example, an immigrant may derive a more emotional connection from other members of their ethnic or religious group and “a more instrumental view towards their new nation” (Verkuyten et al., 2019, p. 398). In this sense, national identification may serve a particular purpose (e.g., adherence to Australian norms, laws, and values) while not having the same degree of importance as religious or ethnic identity might have for such groups.
In addition, and considering the tenets of SIT, promoting a common in-group identity amongst groups with diverse identities may exacerbate potential biases (Dovidio et al., 2009). This is because the development of common in-group identities may threaten the desire to emphasise group distinctiveness. As a result, such individuals may exercise bias to maintain group distinctiveness, which would counteract the protective mechanism theoretically associated with the CIIM (Dovidio et al., 2009).

The strength of one’s identity as a majority or minority group, therefore, seems to be particularly important to how individuals respond to threats directed towards their valued group. Thus, determining if such identity processes may play a protective role in mitigating the effects of identity threats warrants further inquiry. Recently, researchers have pointed to the applicability of holding a *dual identity* to reduce the impact of identity threats (see, e.g., Tausch et al., 2009). Dual identification enables individuals to feel included within majority groups (e.g., national identification) while simultaneously being able to nurture the distinctiveness of their minority identities (Dovidio et al., 2009; Gaertner et al., 1996). This process is particularly important for minority groups. Through a dual identity process, minority groups are better equipped to feel a sense of belonging achieved by identifying with the majority group identity (e.g., at a national identity level), while still maintaining the strength of their minority identity (e.g., their ethnic, racial or religious identity) (Dovidio et al., 2001). The following section discusses the elements and potentially protective nature of holding a dual identity in mitigating the effects of identity threats amongst minority groups.
6.6 Dual Identification as a More Practical Re-Categorisation Process to Mitigate the Effects of Identity Threat

Dual identification refers to a process whereby an individual’s distinct social identities are salient and can be nurtured simultaneously (Dovidio et al., 2001; Glasford & Dovidio, 2011). Unlike re-categorisation into a single, more unified common in-group, such as being Australian or British (e.g., Gaertner et al., 1996), dual identification is concerned with the ability for individuals to nurture their own minority identities in conjunction with identifying with a majority group (Dovidio et al., 2005; Dovidio et al., 2009).

Salient dual identities enable cohesion at the majority group level while maintaining minority group distinction (Hopkins, 2011). Scholars argue that adopting a strong dual identity may protect minorities against intergroup biases and perceived identity threats (Dovidio et al., 2005; Hopkins, 2011). For Muslims living in Muslim-minority nations, holding a dual identity might encompass their attachment to, and identification with, their religious faith (i.e., a minority group) while simultaneously identifying with their national identity (e.g., majority identity). For example, this may include holding a dual identity as a Muslim and as an Australian.

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48 Berry (1997, 2001) and colleagues (2010) have also defined dual identification in their four-adaptation typology of acculturation. This typology distinguishes between two key elements: (i) one’s desire to retain their cultural heritage and (ii) one’s desire to adhere to the culture and customs of a host society. With this typology, Berry (1997) and colleagues (2010) argue that groups may identify with others in the society they live in (i.e., assimilation), may remain solely connected to the culture of their country of birth (i.e., separatism), may embrace both (i.e., integration) or reject both (i.e., marginalisation). The integration typology defines dual identification as having a strong sense of multiple different identities (e.g., in the case of my dissertation, strong religious (i.e., Muslim) identity and strong Australian national identity). As my dissertation seeks only to test the role of dual identification and no other types of adaptation as identified by Berry (1997, 2001) and colleagues (2010), I will draw on the definition of dual identification made by Dovidio et al. (2009) and Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) which defines dual identity as an individual’s strong identification with two or more identities.
Research suggests a strong dual identity is related to a range of productive outcomes. These include more positive evaluations of others (Velasco González et al., 2008), the diffusion of intergroup tensions (Ufkes et al., 2016), and a stronger likelihood that any grievances the out-group may have will be heard (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2014). However, other researchers suggest individuals do not necessarily need to identify strongly with both identities for dual identification to be activated. For example, Simon and Ruhs (2008) argue that dual identification may be triggered even when an individual identifies with one identity more so than another. Simon and Ruhs (2008) operationalise dual identity as a person’s simultaneous identification with two different types of identity, as opposed to the interaction between separate variables. Despite this divergence in operationalisation, studies highlight the positive outcomes associated with dual identification (González & Brown, 2003; Klandermans et al., 2008). Research suggests that dual identification may enhance intergroup relations because in-group identification enables individuals to feel a sense of inclusion and belonging as a majority group member (i.e., Muslims feel included because they also see themselves as Australian) while ensuring the distinctiveness of their minority identity is nurtured (Dovidio et al., 2009; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000).

The benefits of dual identification are particularly important for diverse minority groups who do not want to relinquish their minority identity in favour of a common majority group identity, despite often identifying strongly with their minority and majority groups (e.g., national identification) (Fleischmann et al., 2013). Dunn et al. (2015, p. 12) argue that a dual or hyphenated identity enables groups such as immigrants to “accentuate and de-emphasise origin and current national identities depending on context.”
In examining Muslim experiences, the strength of their religious identity must be considered. Verkuyten and Yildiz (2007) argue that two of the most important indicators of identity are ethnicity and religion. This is because alignment with these identities offers belongingness and a specific worldview or value system that provides a sense of meaning (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). However, religion adds a layer of complexity for individuals seeking to reduce intergroup tension and enhance their feelings of inclusion (Hopkins, 2011; Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2014). Tajfel (1981) notes that individuals whose religious identity is strong are least likely to identify with a majority in-group, particularly if it compromises their religious beliefs (see also Hopkins, 2008). Other researchers also highlight potential difficulties in managing national and religious group membership (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2014).

When determining how people experience and respond to identity threats, careful consideration of the types of identities that individuals find important is critical (Dunn et al., 2015). For minority groups, acknowledging the strong identification they would likely have with their minority group identity (e.g., as a member of an ethnic or racial group; their religious affiliation) is important for developing appropriate strategies to mitigate the effects of identity threats (Hogg, 2016). When faced with an identity threat, dual identification may provide a buffer against the harmful effects of threat (Dovidio et al., 2009). Resultantly, dual identification may reduce the likelihood of an adverse reaction for those individuals whose identity or identities are threatened. Study 3 of my dissertation seeks to determine whether dual identification mitigates the likelihood for Muslims to support terrorism, even when they feel an identity threat, thereby providing the first empirical test of the Dual Identity Model in this context.
6.7 Chapter Summary

Chapter 6 has demonstrated how minority groups can come to experience and react to identity threats to their minority in-group identities. It has overviewed research highlighting how minority groups, in general, nurture their identities and respond to threats, before discussing these processes amongst Muslims who constitute a minority group in Australia (as well as other Muslim-minority countries). This chapter has demonstrated how identity threats can shape Muslims’ support for terrorism, and that identity with different groups (i.e., as a Muslim; as an Australian) can influence these relationships. Chapter 6 also introduced the concept of dual identity and presented an argument that dual identity may play a protective role in mitigating the likelihood for Muslims to support terrorism, even when experiencing an identity threat.

A review of the literature in Chapter 6 has identified several gaps that my dissertation seeks to address. While existing research denotes a relationship between identity threats and support for terrorism (see, e.g., Victoroff et al., 2012), the effects of stigma and meta-punitiveness as two types of identity threat are less-tested. The relationship between meta-punitiveness and support for terrorism, in particular, has not been empirically tested, despite the presence of harsh and pre-emptive counter-terrorism laws that can be triggered even when individuals are not viewed as a suspect (Lynch et al., 2015). Moreover, if the same identity processes shape the relationship between stigma, meta-punitiveness and support for terrorism in the same way as identified in the existing research base remains to be seen.

Chapter 7 overviews the methodological approach adopted in my dissertation. It reviews the aim my dissertation seeks to address. The three studies and their associated research questions that guide this aim are then outlined. Chapter 7 also overviews the
research design and methodological approach taken to conduct these studies, as well as a justification for adopting this approach and its associated limitations. Finally, Chapter 7 provides a discussion of the research sites the three studies are conducted in and details the ethical considerations.
Chapter 7: The Current Study and its Methodology

7.1 Introduction: The Current Study

Determining how people come to support terrorism (whether that be passive or active) is crucial to reducing the pervasiveness and legitimacy of terrorist groups (Cherney & Murphy, 2019; Richardson, 2006). My dissertation examines the attitudes of both Muslims and non-Muslims to better understand how some Muslims can come to passively support terrorism (which I herein term support for terrorism). My dissertation draws on the Social Identity Theory (SIT) of in-group favouritism and out-group derogation. It seeks to spotlight how: (a) some non-Muslims may come to view Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat and subsequently support punitive counter-terrorism policies, and (b) how some Muslims, experiencing identity threats, may come to support terrorism. It does so in an Australian context.

A review of the literature in Chapter 5 explained how majority group members might construct their identities within a majority group and come to see perceived minority out-group members as a threat (Stephan et al., 2000). I define perceptions of threat as the extent to which non-Muslims (as the majority group in my dissertation) view Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat. Chapter 5 further explored how perceiving Muslims as a threat may shape non-Muslim Australians’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies often seen to control Muslims (Unnever & Cullen, 2010a, 2010b). Yet, a synthesis of this literature revealed that the social identity processes explaining how non-Muslims can (a) come to view Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat and (b) support punitive counter-terrorism policies (that disproportionately target Muslims) has
been less studied than scholarship on the relationship between perceptions of threat towards minority groups and support for crime control policies.

How non-Muslims perceive Muslims also has implications for Muslims’ sense of identity within Australia. Chapter 6 overviewed how Muslims, as a minority group within Australia, may come to perceive that their identities as Muslims are under threat (Blackwood et al., 2013b; Cherney & Murphy, 2016). I define an identity threat as a characteristic pertinent to an individual’s identity that is negatively stereotyped, prejudiced or discriminated against (Major & Schmader, 2018). An awareness of pre-existing biases towards an individual’s group, combined with a situational cue that may remind them of such biases, can elicit an identity threat (Steele et al., 2002). In other words, individuals do not necessarily need to have an identity devaluing personal experience (e.g., being discriminated against because of one’s appearance) for an identity threat to occur. The mere knowledge that others view one’s group negatively or that others devalue their group is sufficient to generate an identity threat (Major & Schmader, 2018).

Chapter 6 focused on two types of identity threats pertinent to the counter-terrorism context: stigmatisation and meta-punitiveness. The literature outlined in Chapter 6 shows the importance of identity processes in explaining how identity threats may result in some Muslims coming to support terrorism. It was further argued in Chapter 6 that holding a dual identity may mitigate the likelihood that Muslims will come to support terrorism, even when they experience an identity threat (i.e., they feel stigmatised or that others are punitive towards their group). However, this relationship has not been tested in the counter-terrorism context.

My dissertation examines how non-Muslims can come to perceive Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat, and the extent to which they support punitive
counter-terrorism policies that disproportionately target Muslims. It provides the first empirical test of how social identity processes may explain how non-Muslim Australians can come to support punitive counter-terrorism policies, and the role of perceptions of threat in shaping this relationship. It further tests how Muslims’ feelings that others stigmatise them (i.e., stigmatisation) and that others are more punitive towards Muslims (i.e., meta-punitiveness) predicts Muslims’ support for terrorism. Limited research provides insight into the attitudes of both Muslims and non-Muslims and how they may contribute to Muslims’ support for terrorism (see Fischer et al., 2007). As such, my dissertation contributes to this growing literature base. It also provides the first empirical examination of the potentially protective role of dual identification in mitigating Muslims’ support for terrorism, even when they feel an identity threat. The following section restates the aim, objectives and research questions guiding my dissertation, before providing an overview of the methodological approach I take.

7.2  Aim, Objectives and Research Questions

7.2.1  Aim

The primary aim of my dissertation is to draw on SIT to better understand how identity processes experienced by Muslims and non-Muslims can help to explain how Muslims can come to support terrorism.

7.2.2  Objectives

Two objectives will address the aim of my dissertation. These objectives guide the research being conducted with (1) non-Muslims living in Australia, and (2) Muslims living in Australia. The first objective is to explore if some non-Muslim Australians harbour negative attitudes towards Muslims (i.e., non-Muslims view Muslims as a realistic,
symbolic and terrorist threat and believe that Muslims support terrorism), and if such perceptions of threat increase their support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. The second objective of my dissertation is to determine the extent to which Muslims feel as though non-Muslims view them in a stigmatising or punitive way (hence, experiencing an identity threat), and if such identity threats felt by Muslims predict Muslims’ support for terrorism.

7.2.3 Research Questions

The aim and two objectives of my dissertation will be guided by a series of fifteen research questions across three studies:

- **RQ1** Does a terrorist suspect’s motivation (as either Islamic-inspired or right-wing inspired) differentially shape non-Muslim Australians’:
  (a) perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat, (b) perceptions that Muslims support terrorism, and (c) their own support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

- **RQ2** Do beliefs that Muslims support terrorism predict non-Muslim Australians’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat?

- **RQ3** Does the strength of non-Muslim Australians’ national identity (i.e., as an Australian) heighten their likelihood of perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat?

- **RQ4** Does the strength of non-Muslim Australians’ national identity (i.e., as an Australian) moderate the association between believing that Muslims support terrorism and perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat?
RQ5  Do non-Muslim Australians’ beliefs that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat shape non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

RQ6  Do non-Muslim Australians’ beliefs that Muslims support terrorism shape non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

RQ7  Do non-Muslim Australians’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat mediate the relationship between the belief that Muslims support terrorism and non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

RQ8  Does the strength of non-Muslim Australians’ national identity (i.e., as an Australian) heighten their support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

RQ9  Does the strength of non-Muslim Australians’ national identity (i.e., as an Australian) moderate the association between perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat and non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

RQ10 Does the strength of non-Muslim Australians’ national identity (i.e., as an Australian) moderate the association between believing that Muslims support terrorism and non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

RQ11 Do Muslim Australians experience identity threat (do they feel stigmatised or feel that non-Muslims are punitive towards Muslims)?
RQ12 Do identity threats (i.e., feeling stigmatised, feeling others are punitive towards Muslims) enhance Muslim Australians’ support for terrorism?

RQ13 Does the strength of Muslims’ Australian national identity reduce their support for terrorism, even when Muslims feel their Australian national identities are threatened?

RQ14 Does the strength of Muslims’ religious identity heighten their support for terrorism, even when Muslims feel their religious identities are threatened?

RQ15 Does identifying strongly as an Australian, as a Muslim, or strongly as both an Australian and a Muslim (i.e. dual identity) moderate the association between experiencing an identity threat and supporting terrorism?

Study 1 addresses RQ1 by determining how non-Muslims currently perceive Muslims within Australia. Of particular interest is if non-Muslims’ attitudes will be shaped by receiving a vignette describing a terrorism suspect’s motivations as being inspired by Islamic-inspired terrorism or right-wing-inspired terrorism. Study 1 will, therefore, test if non-Muslim Australians view Muslims as more of a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat, perceive that Muslims support terrorism, and support punitive counter-terrorism policies if they believe a terrorism suspect is motivated by Islamic-inspired terrorism (as opposed to right-wing-inspired terrorism). Study 1 is descriptive and uses Attitudes to Punishment Survey data from a sample of non-Muslims living in Australia.
Study 2(A and B) follows directly on from Study 1. Specifically, Study 2A addresses RQ2 to RQ4. It utilises *Attitudes to Punishment Survey* data collected from a representative sample of Australian non-Muslims detailed in Study 1. Specifically, Study 2A tests how beliefs that Muslims support terrorism may shape non-Muslims’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. This study provides Australian evidence from a social identity perspective to demonstrate how non-Muslims’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat can be shaped. The impetus for including Study 2A is to infer how some Muslims may come to feel their identities are stigmatised because of how some non-Muslims may perceive them.

Study 2B answers RQ5 to RQ10. Study 2B also utilises *Attitudes to Punishment Survey* data. Study 2B tests whether or not perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat can influence non-Muslims’ attitudes towards punitive counter-terrorism policies. If Muslims are perceived as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat, non-Muslims may become more accepting of punitive policies that are seen to contain the threat (Unnever & Cullen, 2012). This study seeks to provide Australian evidence of how punitive attitudes towards counter-terrorism policies can be formed. As previously mentioned, scant research exists that canvases punitive attitudes towards counter-terrorism policies (but see Piazza, 2015; Welch, 2016). By utilising SIT, Study 2B will demonstrate for the first time empirically if in-group identification (which in my dissertation is Australian national identity) and out-group biases (i.e., by perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat) shape non-Muslim Australians’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. Study 2B will further advance the literature by determining if intolerance towards a group characterised primarily by their religion (as opposed to their race or ethnicity) shapes support for punitive counter-terrorism policies.
Studies 2A and 2B are situated within SIT. They both address the first objective of my dissertation. The first objective seeks to explore if some non-Muslim Australians harbour negative attitudes towards Muslims (i.e., non-Muslims view Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat and believe that Muslims support terrorism) and if such perceptions of threat increase their support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. Both Studies 2A and 2B test if and how identity processes shape non-Muslims’ feelings that Muslims are a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat, and further, their support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. It is expected that the more participants identify with their national (i.e., Australian) identity, the more likely they may be to perceive Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat and support punitive counter-terrorism policies that are deemed to control the “threat”. In addition, both sets of analyses include interaction effects to explore the moderating effect of Australian national identity.

Taken together, Studies 2A and 2B seek to illustrate how a sample of non-Muslim Australians can come to support punitive counter-terrorism policies. As counter-terrorism policies in Australia have become more punitive since their introduction in 2002 (Hardy, 2019), and because the retention of such policies is somewhat dependent on public support (Frost, 2010), Study 2 seeks to understand how such public support can be garnered. Moreover, counter-terrorism policies are disproportionately applied to Muslims as a religious group, particularly in Australia. Thus, determining if non-Muslims’ perceptions of Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat is an antecedent to non-Muslims’ support for counter-terrorism policies is worthy of empirical inquiry. Further, Study 2 will provide evidence to explain how some Muslims may come to feel that their identities are being threatened. Study 2 will inform the key independent variables of interest operationalising identity threat in Study 3 (i.e., stigmatisation; meta-punitiveness).
Finally, Study 3 draws on quantitative cross-sectional survey data from a Muslim sample living in Sydney, Australia, and answers RQ11 to RQ15. Study 3 provides Australian evidence utilising SIT to better understand how social identity processes may predict Muslims’ support for terrorism. Specifically, Study 3 tests the effect of national (i.e., Australian) and religious (i.e., Muslim) identification on Muslims’ support for terrorism. Study 3 also examines if identifying strongly as an Australian and as a Muslim moderates Muslim Australians’ reactions to identity threats. It is expected that dual-identified participants (i.e., those who strongly identify with their Australian national and religious identities) will be less likely to support terrorism even when they feel their identities are threatened. While a growing evidence base points to the role of social identity processes in shaping attitudes towards terrorism (see Chapter 6), Study 3 provides the first empirical test of the potentially protective role of dual identification. Chapter 10 presents a detailed discussion of the methods used to collect data for Study 3. Together, these three studies seek to show how Muslim and non-Muslim identity processes, perceptions of threat (amongst non-Muslims), and identity threats (amongst Muslims) can shape some Muslims’ support for terrorism.

7.3 Research Design and Rationale of the Approach

My dissertation employs a quantitative, positivist methodological approach. The ontological position of this approach postulates that the researcher and the participants being researched are independent and are not influenced by, nor influence, each other (Sale et al., 2002). The epistemological position of the quantitative approach provides a means by which to understand and explain what is known about a specific social reality (Crotty, 2003; Slevitch, 2011). Within the positivist paradigm, obtaining an accurate representation
of a particular social reality can be achieved by separating participant perceptions from the
independent view of the researcher (Slevitch, 2011). A quantitative survey methodology
seeks to ensure that research findings are valid and objective by removing potential biases
through the subjective interpretation of the data. Specifically, involving operationalising
and analysing relationships amongst social constructs to make generalisations (Denzin &
Lincoln, 1994).

A quantitative survey methodology was chosen for each of the three studies in my
dissertation as this approach is designed to empirically test hypotheses derived from theory
(Bernard, 2012; Gorard, 2001). The purpose of my dissertation is to test several
hypotheses from SIT and previous work on identity threats and support for terrorism.
Thus, the use of quantitative methods enables my dissertation to test theoretical
propositions and make inferences about whether or not the proposed hypotheses are
supported by the data (Guba & Lincoln, 1994).

Additionally, utilising a quantitative survey method enables the researcher to
examine the relationship between constructs, some of which may be inter-related (Bryman,
2012). As my dissertation canvasses the role of identity processes and identity threats on
non-Muslims’ punitiveness towards Muslims and Muslims’ support for terrorism, such
concepts may overlap. Thus, a quantitative approach enables the discrete analysis of
potentially inter-related constructs (Bryman, 2012).

It is also important to note that the types of constructs measured in my dissertation
provide further justification for why a quantitative approach is appropriate. Asking
members of the Muslim community about their support for terrorism is a complex
endeavour (Cherney & Murphy, 2019). Gauging public opinions towards terrorism can be
less confronting through a survey than a more qualitative approach, such as semi-
structured interviews. Amongst the Muslim sample in particular, due to the sensitive nature of the questions being asked and the constructs being explored (e.g., stigma; support for terrorism), participants are not forced to give an open-ended response, which could be interpreted subjectively by the interviewer. Moreover, some interview techniques enable the researcher to probe answers given in an open-ended question format, which may deter participation or lead to social desirability outcomes and could subsequently skew the data. As a consequence, much of the work conducted on attitudes to terrorism in the terrorism literature utilises quantitative survey methods (see, e.g., Fair et al., 2012; Tausch et al., 2009; Victoroff et al., 2012; Zhirkov et al., 2014).

The desired data used in this research were also more efficiently gathered through a quantitative approach. A quantitative method that can attract a larger sample in both groups enables more generalisations to be made about participants’ attitudes (Bryman, 2012). This was particularly crucial in Studies 1 and 2, whereby the aim was to gauge non-Muslim Australians’ attitudes towards Muslims and their support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. Moreover, in Study 1, I draw on experimental vignette survey data, and experimental design data necessitates quantitative methods.

My dissertation uses two data sources. Each data source draws on a quantitative survey methodology, with both data sources comprising of a cross-sectional survey, although data used in Study 1 and 2 includes an embedded experimental vignette. Cross-sectional surveys are designed to measure constructs, attitudes and characteristics of a sample population at one point in time (Abercrombie et al., 2000; Bachman & Schutt, 2018). Cross-sectional survey designs enable researchers to gather data to obtain a snapshot of and make inferences about a chosen population (Hall, 2011). They also highlight the strength and direction of the relationship between two measures (Queirós et
al., 2017). Acknowledging that survey samples are often heterogeneous in their characteristics and attitudes, cross-sectional surveys permit researchers to represent the diversity of a survey sample (Lewis-Beck et al., 2004).

Despite the benefits associated with using quantitative survey methods, such as cross-sectional survey designs, there are limitations of this approach that should be addressed. Quantitative survey methods enable established constructs to be measured and tested. However, they do not afford researchers to probe subjective interpretations of the included constructs further. In my dissertation, a limitation of the methodology is the inability to discern more subjective details about how and why individuals may interpret their identities or how and why they perceive threats or experience identity threats. Nonetheless, the identity measures included in my dissertation are widely used in empirical research to measure identity (see e.g., Haslam & Reicher, 2006; Li & Brewer, 2004; Murphy, 2013). Similarly, the constructs used to measure identity threats and perceptions of threat have been strategically chosen because they speak to Muslim and non-Muslim experiences, particularly since 9/11. The stigmatisation measure (operationalised as one type of identity threat) has also been tested in previous research (Murphy et al., 2018).

Another limitation is the design of the quantitative surveys used in each of the three studies. The data in Study 1 utilise an experimental vignette design that enables causal inferences to be made. However, the data used in Studies 2 and 3 are cross-sectional and do not allow causal inferences between constructs to be made. While the research questions and hypotheses proposed in Studies 2 and 3 of my dissertation are informed by theory and prior research, assumptions about the temporal ordering of the key measures of interest cannot be made. In addition, cross-sectional methods do not offer a conclusive
justification as to why a correlational relationship exists between variables (Queirós et al., 2017). However, limited resources and the availability of cross-sectional survey data relevant to my dissertation topic meant that using secondary cross-sectional data was a viable option. However, the use of cross-sectional survey data is a limitation that will be discussed in depth in the General Discussion Chapter (Chapter 11).

Finally, cross-sectional survey designs may be more susceptible to certain biases, including response bias, recall bias or social desirability bias. For example, in self-report data, such as cross-sectional surveys, participants’ responses can skew survey results because of factors such as how they felt at the time of completing the survey or misunderstanding the nature of the question being asked (Rosenman et al., 2011). Survey results may also be affected by a participant’s inability to recall information at the time of completing a survey accurately. Finally, survey results may be affected by social desirability bias. Social desirability bias is especially common in self-reporting surveys of sensitive topics (e.g., terrorism), whereby participants may provide a response that does not align with their beliefs in order to be perceived favourably by others (Rosenman et al., 2011). Often, participants will over-estimate favourable attitudes or behaviours, and under-estimate negative or deviant attitudes or behaviours in an effort to make their responses appear socially desirable (Althubaiti, 2016). Given the sensitive nature of some of the items asked in the surveys employed in my dissertation (e.g., perceptions of threat; support for terrorism), it is possible that some of the responses were subject to bias.

7.4 Research Sites

The studies included in my dissertation were conducted in Australia. Specifically, Studies 1, 2A and 2B utilise survey data from a national sample of non-Muslims living in
each state and territory of Australia. There are six states (Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Tasmania and Western Australia) and two territories (Northern Territory and Australian Capital Territory) within Australia (see Figure 7.1 for a map of Australia and its associated states and territories). Despite Australia’s vast landmass, the majority of its population resides along the coastline and is clustered around the capital cities of each state and territory (Clark & Johnston, 2017). Chapter 2 provided a snapshot of the population details of Australia.

Figure 7.1 Map of Australia

Source: (Geoscience Australia, 2010)

Study 3 uses survey data from a separate sample of Muslims living in Sydney, Australia. A heat map outlining the density of Muslim populations living in Sydney
suburbs was created to illustrate the Muslim population of Sydney (see Figure 7.2\textsuperscript{49}). Sydney was the chosen site because it houses the largest number of Muslim residents in Australia (see Chapter 2 for more details). Almost half (41.9\%) of the entire Muslim population in Australia live in Sydney (Hassan et al., 2018). Sydney is the biggest city in Australia and is home to Australia’s largest immigrant population (Simon-Davies, 2018). Since the 1940s, Sydney has represented a primary entry point for migrants. Hence, Sydney is often termed a more established immigrant gateway when compared to other Australian capital cities (Price & Benton-Short, 2008).

\textsuperscript{49} I generated the map in Figure 7.2 for the purposes of this dissertation. I sourced some ESRI (Environmental Systems Research Institute) shapefiles from the Australian Bureau of Statistics website and obtained geographical information on all Muslims living in Sydney from the Australian Bureau of Statistics Census data available through ABS TableBuilder. From here, I was able to create a heat map in ArcGIS showing which suburbs the Sydney population of Middle Eastern Muslims reside.
Figure 7.2 Map of Muslims Residing in Sydney

Source: (Data Supplied by Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016)
7.5 Ethics

The two quantitative surveys used in the three studies of my dissertation received ethical clearance from the Griffith University Human Research Ethics Committee (GUHREC). Approval to field the survey used in Studies 1, 2A and 2B was granted by the GUHREC in 2017 (Approval number: 2017/927). The GUHREC also approved the data used in Study 3 in 2017 (Approval number: 2017/178). An information sheet outlining the ethical approval obtained for each project was provided to all participants who completed the respective surveys (see Appendix C).

7.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter has overviewed the general methodological approach adopted in my dissertation and outlined the rationale behind, and the limitations of using a quantitative approach. The next three chapters describe the methods of data collection and findings of each study. Chapter 8 outlines the survey data utilised for Studies 1, 2A and 2B, the hypotheses tested in Study 1, and discusses the key findings of Study 1. Chapter 9 outlines the data employed to address the research questions in Study 2. It presents the hypotheses to be tested in Study 2 and the results of Study 2. Chapter 10 presents the methods used to collect data for Study 3 and the hypotheses. Chapter 10 also provides a summary of the findings of Study 3.
Chapter 8: Study 1 Methods and Results

Non-Muslims’ Attitudes Towards Muslims in Australia

8.1 Introduction

Since 9/11, anti-Muslim sentiment has increased across the US (Pew Research Center, 2017), Europe (Wike et al., 2016), and Canada (Zine, 2019). In Australia, Islamophobic attitudes across two nationally representative poll surveys ranged from 10% (Hassan et al., 2018) to an average of 24% (Markus, 2018) of participants who held Islamophobic beliefs. Despite these different poll results, scholars suggest there is an increasing normalisation of anti-Muslim attitudes within Australia, which is nurtured by right-wing politicians and media discourses (Poynting & Briskman, 2018).

Paralleling these attitudes are over 70 counter-terrorism laws that address the threat of terrorism in Australia (Hardy, 2019). The pre-emptive and preventative focus of these laws provides authorities with exclusive and in some instances, unique powers of surveillance, detention and interrogation unmatched in other comparable western democratic countries (e.g., the US, Canada, the UK) (Lynch et al., 2015). Specifically, the ability for the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) to secretly detain individuals not suspected of terrorism for up to one week and question them for up to 24 hours is unique to the Australian context (Lynch et al., 2015; Poynting & Perry, 2007). An unintended consequence of these measures is the anti-Muslim rhetoric surrounding them. Such rhetoric can have a range of implications. For example, they can perpetuate a climate of fear and have the potential to create divisive attitudes. Moreover, they can generate a symbiotic relationship whereby public attitudes can create support for laws, and introduced laws can draw public support (Aly et al., 2009).
This chapter presents the methods and results of Study 1. Study 1 draws on newly collected data from a population sample of non-Muslim Australians to gauge how they perceive Muslims. The *Attitudes to Punishment Survey* explores to what extent non-Muslim Australians perceive Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat, and if they believe many Muslims support terrorism. Study 1 also explores how supportive non-Muslim Australian participants are of punitive counter-terrorism policies. Study 1 utilises an experimental vignette to determine if participant perceptions of these concepts vary depending on whether a terrorism suspect’s motivation is inspired by Islamic-inspired terrorism or right-wing-inspired terrorism.

### 8.2 Aim, Research Question and Hypotheses of Study 1

Study 1 incorporates a range of survey items that tap into public perceptions that Muslims pose a threat to non-Muslims’ wellbeing (i.e., realistic threat), culture (i.e., symbolic threat), and safety (i.e., they represent a terroristic threat). It aims to examine the extent to which non-Muslim Australians believe that Muslims support terrorism. Study 1 also gauges non-Muslim Australians’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. The following research question guides Study 1:

**RQ1**  Does a terrorist suspect’s motivation (as either Islamic-inspired or right-wing inspired) differentially shape non-Muslim Australians’:

(a) perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat, (b) perceptions that Muslims support terrorism, and (c) their own support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

RQ1 maps onto the first objective of my dissertation. The first objective explores if some non-Muslim Australians harbour negative attitudes towards Muslims (i.e., non-Muslims
view Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat and believe that Muslims support terrorism) and if such perceptions of threat increase their support for punitive counter-terrorism policies.

Research suggests that in-group members may be more likely to view out-group members negatively, such as by perceiving them as a threat (Stephan et al., 2000). Studies also find that people may be more inclined to support punitive crime control policies when they deem such policies to control out-groups perceived as criminals or a “threat” (Unnever & Cullen, 2010a). In the terrorism context, for example, non-Muslims might perceive Muslims to be a realistic threat to safety and wellbeing, a symbolic threat to values and identity, and/or a terroristic threat (Breen-Smyth, 2014; Uenal, 2016; Velasco González et al., 2008). The primary terrorism threat is often described as the threat of Islamic-inspired terrorism. Resultantly, Muslims come under suspicion more often by authorities (Sentas, 2014). As such, non-Muslim Australians may be more likely to view Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat.

Non-Muslims may also come to believe that Muslims support terrorism if they see Muslims as a homogenous out-group (Fischer et al., 2007). I therefore expect that non-Muslim Australians in my sample may come to (a) view Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat, (b) believe that Muslims support terrorism, and (c) be more supportive of punitive counter-terrorism policies if they receive a vignette describing a terrorism suspect’s motives as being inspired by Islamic-inspired terrorism. I argue that the vignette may simulate an in-group/out-group process whereby the perpetrator motivated by Islamic extremist views will represent an out-group member to a greater extent than a perpetrator motivated by right-wing extremist views. Hence, RQ1 informs the following hypotheses:
H1 Non-Muslim Australian participants who received the vignette outlining the suspect’s motivation as being inspired by Islamic-inspired terrorism will be more likely to support punitive counter-terrorism policies.

H2 Non-Muslim Australian participants who received the vignette outlining the suspect’s motivation as being inspired by Islamic-inspired terrorism will be more likely to view Muslims as a greater realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat.

H3 Non-Muslim Australian participants who received the vignette outlining the suspect’s motivation as being inspired by terrorism will be more likely to perceive that Muslims support terrorism.

Figure 8.1 presents the relationships to be tested in Study 1.

Figure 8.1 Conceptual Map Guiding Relationships Tested in Study 1

8.3 Methods

8.3.1 Survey Design

To address RQ1, I employ data from the Attitudes to Punishment Survey. Both Study 1 (Chapter 8) and Study 2 (Chapter 9) utilise survey data from the Attitudes to
The *Attitudes to Punishment Survey* is a survey of Australians conducted in 2018 for my dissertation (Williamson et al., 2018). The *Attitudes to Punishment Survey* includes six sections. These sections measure non-Muslim Australian participants’ (i) attitudes towards social identification within Australia (as both an Australian and a member of a racial/ethnic minority group), (ii) attitudes towards the punishment of crime, (iii) attitudes towards the punishment of terrorism, (iv) tolerance and stigma towards diverse groups, (v) beliefs about different types of political violence, and (vi) participants’ demographic information. All survey participants also received two of four hypothetical vignettes. The vignettes were introduced after participants completed three sections: one on demographic characteristics, one on their identification as an Australian and with their racial/ethnic minority group, and one on their support for punitive crime control policies. Following the vignette, participants were asked to answer questions that acted as manipulation checks. From here, participants were asked a series of questions about punitive counter-terrorism policies and participants’ attitudes towards minority groups, including Muslims.

### 8.3.2 Vignette Design

The vignette comprised of a 2x2 between-subjects design. The vignettes presented survey participants with a hypothetical food tampering incident at a fictional fast-food chain. Two independent variables were manipulated in the vignette. The vignette wording was adapted from a vignette originally designed by Nolan (2008). The first vignette manipulated a suspect’s motivation for committing this offence; explicitly, whether the offence was perpetrated by an Islamic extremist or a right-wing extremist. The purpose of

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50 I developed this survey instrument as part of my doctoral dissertation. Other members of the research team (and PhD supervision team) include Professor Kristina Murphy and Dr Elise Sargeant.
the vignette was to determine if participants’ attitudes towards key measures in the survey differed depending on the suspect’s motivation (i.e., as an Islamic extremist or a right-wing extremist). The second independent variable was manipulated to depict a police statement describing the offence as either a terrorist attack or a crime. By manipulating these two independent variables, the aim was to determine if the public was more punitive towards certain groups (i.e., Muslims) and if they held more punitive views towards terrorism than other types of crime. Given the focus of my dissertation examines if non-Muslims’ attitudes are shaped by their perceptions of Muslims, the suspect motivation variable is of interest in Study 1 and as such I draw on a single-factor design (Selvamuthu & Das, 2018).

8.3.2.1 Manipulation of the Suspect’s Motives.

Research in the traditional crime context demonstrates a link between racial and ethnic animosity and support for harsh crime control policies (Chiricos et al., 2004; Unnever & Cullen, 2010a, 2010b). In other words, people who perceive ethnic groups more negatively are more likely to support punitive crime control policies in the belief that those policies will alter the behaviour of minority groups. Relatedly, contemporary public discourses consistently link Muslims to terrorism (Sides & Gross, 2013). In this sense, Muslims are often depicted as a threat to public safety, to the values and identity of a country, and more recently as a terrorist threat by some non-Muslims (i.e., realistic, symbolic and terrorist threats) (Uenal, 2016). Resultantly, they are assigned a criminal (or terrorist) stereotype (Welch, 2016). While generally, public support for such extreme and coercive policies is mixed, recent research reveals non-Muslims harbour more punitive attitudes when they perceive that Muslims are the source of such threat (Piazza, 2015; Welch, 2016). Thus, understanding if such public support may derive from non-Muslims’
perceptions that counter-terrorism policies will be directed towards certain groups, such as Muslims, warrants inquiry. Hence, the independent variable manipulated in the vignette was suspect motive.

The suspect motive variable was operationalised in the vignette by describing a food tampering incident as inspired by Islamic extremist motives or by right-wing extremist motives. If participants received the first vignette, text was included that reported that the suspect expressed their willingness to take action (i.e., committing a food tampering offence) in the name of Allah in a Facebook post on a radical Muslim page. If participants received the second vignette, text was included that reported that the suspect expressed their willingness to take action (i.e., committing a food tampering offence) in support of the anti-immigration movement (i.e., opposition to immigration into a country e.g., Australia) in a Facebook post on a right-wing extremist page. Appendix D presents the survey instrument, which also outlines the exact wording of the vignettes.

Participants were randomly assigned to receive one of the two vignette conditions. Upon reading one of the vignettes, participants who received the Islamic extremist condition were asked if they perceived the perpetrator in the vignette to be an Islamic-extremist who was inspired by Allah. Participants who received the right-wing extremist vignette were asked if they perceived the perpetrator of the vignette to be a right-wing extremist who was inspired by anti-immigration motives. These items were used as a manipulation check to ensure all participants read and understood their respective vignette. Once the manipulation check questions were answered, survey participants were asked to answer a series of other questions in the survey.
8.3.3 Sampling Strategy and Data Collection

The survey was developed and fielded online via Facebook (a social media platform). Data collection began on January 31st, 2018 and the recruitment advertisement published on Facebook closed on March 2nd, 2018 (thus, the survey was fielded through Facebook for a total of 30 days). Scholars are increasingly turning to platforms that enable the collection of online convenience samples to conduct research (Pickett et al., 2018). Facebook is becoming a well-known platform for conducting research (Samuels & Zucco, 2013). Disciplines, including health (Pedersen & Kurz, 2016), education (Forgasz et al., 2017) and social science (Brickman Bhutta, 2012) have used this platform to recruit participants. Facebook is the dominant social media platform in Australia, although the purposive sampling style limits sample representativeness (Roy Morgan, 2019). Thus, utilising Facebook as a conduit to collect data enabled the net to be cast widely and attracted more participants to complete the survey than other dedicated survey platforms (Samuels & Zucco, 2013). A random population sample of participants would have been desirable, particularly as experiments are deemed to be the gold-standard in determining causal relationships. However, they are an expensive type of study and PhD funding constraints limited the amount of money able to be spent on obtaining a truly representative and random population sample.

Facebook was used to disseminate the Attitudes to Punishment Survey and Qualtrics was used as the survey design platform. Participants were recruited through Facebook advertisements and surveys were completed by directing participants to a Qualtrics weblink. A convenience sample of 1,423 participants accessed the survey link in the 30-day fielding period.
To partake, participants were required to confirm that they: (i) were over the age of 18, and (ii) were living in Australia. Following the 30-day window, the Qualtrics survey link was closed to any new participants, but those who had initiated the survey and had not completed it by March 2nd, 2018 had an opportunity to complete the survey after this date. The final participant completed the survey on March 9th, 2018. The survey included a between-subjects vignette and 106 questions and took approximately 30 minutes to complete. As an incentive to complete the survey, participants could enter a prize draw to win a $50 voucher by providing an email address at the conclusion of the survey. As the survey was anonymous, those wishing to enter the prize draw were directed to a separate weblink to record their contact details. This ensured that their survey responses could not be linked to their details. At the termination of data collection, five email addresses were randomly selected, and the prize winners were contacted so they could receive their voucher.

8.3.4 Participants and Procedure

As noted above, 1,423 individuals accessed the survey link. However, after accounting for survey non-response (missing data: n=47) and participants who completed less than 50% of the survey (missing data: n=177), a total sample of 1,199 participants was obtained. A further six participants were removed as they identified as Muslim and the primary purpose of this study was to gauge non-Muslims’ attitudes. Hence, the final total useable survey sample was 1,193 non-Muslim participants. The final sample included 42.8% males, and the average age of participants was 36.2 years old (SD = 14.2; see Table 8.1). Australian-born participants comprised the majority of the sample (84.3%). Almost all participants reported being Australian citizens (96.6%). Over one-quarter of participants (28.2%) had completed a trade/technical certificate or diploma, followed by
those with a bachelor’s degree and those who had completed high school, which constituted 23.1% and 21.5% of the sample respectively. The majority of the sample reported working full-time (37.9%), followed by those who were students (18.4%) and those working part-time (17.7%). Almost two-thirds of the sample reported having no religion (61.3%; see Table 8.1).

Table 8.1 Demographic Characteristics of Attitudes to Punishment Survey Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age$^{51}$</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>57.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Ethnicity</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian (non-ATSI)</td>
<td>66.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander (ATSI)</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British or European</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Attainment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not complete high school</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed high school</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade/Technical Certificate or Diploma</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postgraduate Degree</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Employment Status</td>
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<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home duties</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed and seeking work</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pension</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working part-time</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working full-time</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studying and working</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^{51}$ The age range of the Attitudes to Punishment Survey sample is between 18-83 years old, the standard deviation is 14.23 and participants’ median age is 34 years old.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Casual Worker</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Affiliation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religion(^{52})</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Citizenship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of Birth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian born</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas born</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Orientation</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>11.7</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of the geographical location of each participant, the highest proportion of participants reported residing in Queensland (34.3%). This figure may be due to recruitment occurring on a Facebook page that originated in Queensland by a Queensland-based university (i.e., Griffith University). The second-highest proportion of participants were from New South Wales (24.9%) and Victoria (18.2%). Almost 10% of the sample reported being from Western Australia (9.1%) followed by those in South Australia, the

\(^{52}\) Muslim participants were excluded from the final sample.

\(^{53}\) In Australia, left leaning is more socialist, e.g. the *Australian Labor Party*; the *Greens*, while right leaning would be more conservative e.g., the *Liberal National Party; One Nation*. 
Australian Capital Territory, Tasmania, and the Northern Territory, who represented 6.9%, 2.4%, 3.0%, and 1.3% of the sample respectively (see Figure 8.2).

**Figure 8.2 Number of Survey Participants Residing in each Australian State or Territory**

Source: (Commonwealth of Australia (Geoscience Australia), 2005)
8.3.5 Sample Representativeness of the Attitudes to Punishment Survey

Given the purposive sampling procedure, the survey sample is not nationally representative of the Australian population (see Table 8.2). Specifically, there is a slight under-representation of males (by 6.5%), and a higher proportion of participants aged between 15 and 24 years\(^{54}\) (14.7% more than Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Census figures). Participants aged 65 or over comprised of only 4.6% of the survey, which is 11.2% less than the Australian population. The differences in these demographic breakdowns can be attributable to the characteristics of Facebook users, as there is a higher proportion of young Facebook users (Clement, 2020). This younger demographic of participants may also explain why there was an over-representation of participants who reported being left-leaning (by 26.7%) and who did not affiliate with any religion (by 31.7%). There was also an over-representation of participants from Queensland (14.3% more than Census statistics). As mentioned above, this outcome may be due to recruitment occurring on a Facebook page that originated in Queensland by a Queensland-based university (i.e., Griffith University). Additionally, the majority of the sample had a bachelor’s degree or above, which is 19.9% more than Census figures. This over-representation of tertiary-educated participants may also be because recruitment occurred through a university Facebook page. Moreover, there was an over-representation of participants who were Australian citizens (by 8.1%) or born in Australia (by 17.6%). Finally, there was a slight under-representation of employed participants (by 0.9%).

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\(^{54}\) Survey eligibility criteria required participants to be aged 18 and over, but ABS Census age categories used to determine survey sample representativeness include the 15-24 age range. None of the survey participants were younger than 18 years of age.
Table 8.2 Sample Representativeness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample group</th>
<th>Sample %</th>
<th>Australian Census %</th>
<th>Absolute difference %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>+14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-44</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>+16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>-11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>-6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>+6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Educational Attainment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No educational attainment</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not complete high school</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>-15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed high school</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>+5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade/technical certificate or diploma</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>+3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor’s Degree and above</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>+19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employment Status</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>+0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious Affiliation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>-20.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Muslim participants were excluded from the analyses in Studies 1 and 2.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>+31.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizenship Status</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australian Citizen</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>+8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Australian Citizen</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>-8.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Birth</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australian born</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>+17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas born</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>-17.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Affiliation</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>+26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>-24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of Residence</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern Territory</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>+0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New South Wales</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>-7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Capital Territory</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>+1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queensland</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>+14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>-7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Australia</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

56 Comparisons were made between political partisanship amongst the sample in the *Attitudes to Punishment Survey*, and data collected as part of the *2016 Australian Election Study* (AES). The AES is a longitudinal survey that gauges political attitudes amongst a nationally representative sample of Australians within the Australian electorate. The sample size for the 2016 survey was n=2,818. For more information, see [https://www.australianelectionstudy.org/](https://www.australianelectionstudy.org/).
Western Australia    9.1   10.5   -1.4 
Tasmania            3.0   2.1   +0.9

8.3.6 Measures used in Study 1

Several key concepts were measured in Study 1. The conceptualisation and operationalisation of each concept are described below. Table 8.3 presents the wording of individual items used in the construction of the perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat scale. Table 8.4 lists the wording of individual items used in the construction of the perceptions that Muslims support terrorism scale. Table 8.5 presents the wording of individual items used in the construction of the support for punitive counter-terrorism policies scale.

Perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat.
Seven items comprise the scale measuring non-Muslim Australians’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. This scale measures participants’ perceptions of Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. The measures are adapted from the work of Velasco González et al. (2008). Prior research has used the items in this scale to assess the separate effects of non-Muslim Australians’ perceptions that Muslims pose different types of threats. These threats include threats to one’s values, identity and culture (i.e., symbolic threats) (see, e.g., Pereira et al., 2009; Stephan et al., 2000), safety threats (i.e., realistic threats) (see, e.g., Ciftci, 2012; Pereira et al., 2009), and more recently, terroristic threats (see, e.g., Doosje et al., 2009; Uenal, 2016).

Using a 5-point strongly agree to strongly disagree Likert scale, a higher score on each item means that non-Muslim Australian participants perceived Muslims to be more of a threat (Mean = 2.22; SD = 1.16). Three items are included to measure symbolic threat...
(e.g., ‘Australian identity is being threatened because there are too many Muslims’). Three items are included that measure realistic threat (e.g., ‘Muslims are a threat to our safety’). Finally, one item is added to measure terroristic threat (i.e., ‘Muslims are likely to be potential terrorists’). As will be demonstrated in Table 9.1, a factor analysis revealed that all items in the symbolic, realistic and terroristic threat loaded onto one factor, so an overall perceptions of threat measure was created with all seven items.

**Perceptions that Muslims support terrorism.** Four measures are included to determine the extent to which non-Muslim Australian participants believe that Muslims support Islamic-inspired terrorism.\(^{57}\) Perceptions that Muslims support terrorism denotes a belief by non-Muslims that Muslims are sympathetic towards and supportive of Islamic-inspired terrorism (Doosje et al., 2009). The items used to measure participants’ perceptions that Muslims support terrorism are adapted from the work of Doosje et al. (2009) and have been previously used to measure people’s beliefs that Muslims support terrorism. Each item (e.g., ‘Some Muslims perceive Islamic terrorists as heroes’) is measured on a 5-point strongly agree to strongly disagree Likert scale. A higher score for each item suggests that participants were in stronger agreement that Muslims support terrorism (Mean = 3.68; SD = 1.04).

**Support for punitive counter-terrorism policies.** Eleven items are included to measure non-Muslim Australian participants’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. Within Australia, more than 70 counter-terrorism laws have been introduced to address the threat of terrorism (Hardy, 2019). Some of these laws have been described as

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\(^{57}\) The number of items that comprise of the perceptions that Muslims support terrorism scale differ in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9. In Chapter 8, I present four items that are included in the scale. In Chapter 9, I removed two items because the results of a Principal Axis Factor Analysis demonstrated cross-loading amongst two of the items (see Section 9.3.1).
punitive and disproportionate to the threat Australia faces (Hardy, 2019). The items used to measure participants’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies are adapted from the work of Lambert (2003) and Welch (2016) and tailored to the Australian context. Each item (e.g., ‘Authorities should have the powers to question individuals on matters related to terrorism even if they are not suspects’) is measured on a 5-point strongly disapprove to strongly approve Likert scale. Higher scores denote stronger approval with each item (Mean = 2.91; SD = 0.98).

8.4 Analytic Approach

As noted earlier, Study 1 addresses RQ1: Does a terrorist suspect’s motivation (as either Islamic-inspired or right-wing inspired) differentially shape non-Muslim Australians’: (a) perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat, (b) perceptions that Muslims support terrorism, and (c) their own support for punitive counter-terrorism policies? Descriptive statistics were employed to examine non-Muslim Australian participants’ attitudes towards Muslims and different crime control policies, with a particular focus on counter-terrorism policies. Descriptive statistics serve to describe and summarise variables within the survey dataset (Johnson & Bhattacharyya, 2019). The following section presents measures of central tendency and variability, in addition to between-groups t-test analyses to determine non-Muslims’ perceptions. The scales presented in the next section were also subjected to factor analyses to test for construct validity (the results of this Principal Axis Factor (PAF) Analysis are presented later in Chapter 9; see Table 9.1).
8.5 Study 1 Results

8.5.1 Descriptive Statistics

8.5.1.1 Perceptions that Muslims Pose a Realistic, Symbolic and Terroristic Threat. There is a current discourse that associates Islam and Muslims with terrorism (Akram, 2002; Esposito & Kalin, 2011). Specifically, they suggest that Muslims are often perceived to threaten western culture (Velasco González et al., 2008). Public opinion is arguably shaped by perceptions of symbolic threats (e.g., as a threat to a nation’s way of life), realistic threats (e.g., as a threat to community safety and wellbeing) (King & Wheelock, 2007; Unnever & Cullen, 2009) and more recently terrorist threats (e.g., perceiving some individuals as more likely to be terrorists) (Uenal, 2016). A series of questions were included to gauge the extent to which non-Muslim Australian participants perceived Muslims as a threat (symbolic; realistic; terrorist).

Table 8.3 presents findings to show the extent to which non-Muslim Australians perceive Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat. These findings show attitudes for the full survey sample as well as separately for those survey participants who received each of the two vignette conditions. A higher score on each item meant that non-Muslim Australian participants perceived Muslims as more of a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat. For the overall sample, perceptions of threat were low. All mean scores fell below the midpoint of the scale. Yet, across the full sample, there were differences in levels of agreement across the individual survey items. For example, two measures of symbolic threat had a higher mean score than other items. These scores suggest that participants felt most strongly that *Australian norms and values are being threatened because of the presence of Muslims* (Mean = 2.33; SD = 1.37) and that *Muslims are a threat to Australia’s way of life* (Mean = 2.24; SD = 1.32). Also, a higher mean score was
observable regarding the belief that *Muslims are likely to be potential terrorists* (Mean = 2.31; SD = 1.24); this latter item assesses terrorist threat. These findings suggest that symbolic and terrorist threats may be more important than realistic threats in understanding how non-Muslims in Australia see Muslims as a threat. However, it must be noted that overall mean scores were low.
### Table 8.3 Mean Scores Comparing Non-Muslims’ Perceptions That Muslims Pose a Realistic, Symbolic and Terroristic Threat for the Full Sample and for Those who Received Either the Islamic Extremist Vignette or the Right-Wing Extremist Vignette

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Full Sample (n=1,193)</th>
<th>Islamic Extremist Vignette (n=504)</th>
<th>Right-wing Extremist Vignette (n=491)</th>
<th>T-Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australian identity is being threatened because there are too many Muslims (S)</td>
<td>2.17 1.28</td>
<td>2.31 1.32</td>
<td>2.06 1.21</td>
<td>3.15**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian norms and values are being threatened because of the presence of Muslims (S)</td>
<td>2.33 1.37</td>
<td>2.47 1.4</td>
<td>2.23 1.32</td>
<td>2.71**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims are a threat to Australia’s way of life (S)</td>
<td>2.24 1.32</td>
<td>2.39 1.35</td>
<td>2.13 1.24</td>
<td>3.19***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims are a threat to our safety (R)</td>
<td>2.15 1.21</td>
<td>2.31 1.25</td>
<td>2.04 1.14</td>
<td>3.56***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not trust Muslims (R)</td>
<td>2.12 1.18</td>
<td>2.28 1.23</td>
<td>2.00 1.09</td>
<td>3.82***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am suspicious of Muslims (R)</td>
<td>2.24 1.24</td>
<td>2.39 1.28</td>
<td>2.11 1.16</td>
<td>3.65***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims are likely to be potential terrorists (T)</td>
<td>2.31 1.24</td>
<td>2.44 1.25</td>
<td>2.24 1.21</td>
<td>2.61**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall combined perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat scale mean</strong></td>
<td>2.22 1.16</td>
<td>2.37 1.19</td>
<td>2.12 1.09</td>
<td>3.52***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

S: symbolic threat; R: realistic threat; T: terroristic threat

The seven items were combined to create a scale measuring participants’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat (Cronbach’s α = 0.97). Overall, mean scores suggest that participants did not perceive Muslims as a
realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat (Scale Mean = 2.22; SD = 1.16; see Figure 8.3). When exploring how participants from the two different vignette conditions responded to the items comprising this scale, those who received the Islamic extremist vignette were slightly more likely to perceive Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat (Scale Mean = 2.37; SD = 1.19) when compared to those who had received the right-wing extremist vignette (Scale Mean = 2.12; SD = 1.09; see Table 8.3). An independent samples t-test revealed that the difference between the means for the two vignette conditions was statistically significant, t(993)=3.52, p<0.001 (see Table 8.6). This finding suggests that there was a significant difference in perceptions of threat towards Muslims between non-Muslim Australian participants who had received the Islamic extremist vignette and those who had received the right-wing extremist vignette. T-tests were also conducted for the individual items the comprised the scale, with findings showing significant differences between participants in both vignette groups across all of the items (see Table 8.3).
Perceptions that Muslims Support Terrorism. Understanding if non-Muslim Australians perceive that Muslims support terrorism can provide information to understand why some non-Muslim Australians (1) view Muslims as a greater threat and (2) can come to support punitive counter-terrorism policies that are often aimed disproportionately at Muslims (Doosje et al., 2013; Doosje et al., 2009; Maoz & McCauley, 2008). For example, previous research suggests that when some non-Muslims perceive that Muslims support terrorism, they are more likely to discriminate against Muslims and endorse restrictive immigration policies (Doosje et al., 2009; Fischer et al., 2007).
Four survey items were combined to measure the extent to which non-Muslim Australian participants perceived that Muslims support terrorism (Cronbach’s \( \alpha = 0.89 \)) (see Table 8.4). The two items that participants agreed with most were *some Muslims find Islamic terrorism justifiable* (Mean = 3.71; SD = 1.05) and *some Muslims perceive Islamic terrorists as heroes* (Mean = 3.65; SD = 1.08). The items participants agreed with the least were *Islamic terrorism gets support from many Muslims all over the world* (Mean = 2.75; SD = 1.39) and *Islamic terrorism gets support from many Muslims in Australia* (Mean = 2.55; SD = 1.27).

**Table 8.4 Mean Scores Comparing Perceptions that Muslims Support Terrorism for the Full Sample and for Those who Received Either the Islamic Extremist Vignette or the Right-Wing Extremist Vignette**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Full Sample</th>
<th>Islamic Extremist Vignette</th>
<th>Right-wing Extremist Vignette</th>
<th>T-test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n=1,193)</td>
<td>(n=504)</td>
<td>(n=491)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic terrorism gets support from many Muslims all over the world</td>
<td>2.75 1.39</td>
<td>2.93 1.43</td>
<td>2.64 1.36</td>
<td>3.25***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Muslims perceive Islamic terrorists as heroes</td>
<td>3.65 1.08</td>
<td>3.82 1.05</td>
<td>3.62 1.04</td>
<td>2.99**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Muslims find Islamic terrorism justifiable</td>
<td>3.71 1.05</td>
<td>3.84 1.06</td>
<td>3.69 1.00</td>
<td>2.25*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic terrorism gets support from many Muslims in Australia</td>
<td>2.55 1.27</td>
<td>2.71 1.32</td>
<td>2.44 1.22</td>
<td>3.32***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall Muslims support terrorism scale mean</strong></td>
<td>3.68 1.04</td>
<td>3.83 1.03</td>
<td>3.65 0.99</td>
<td>2.68**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Amongst the full survey sample, on average participants either agreed or neither agreed nor disagreed with the questions about their perceptions that Muslims support terrorism (Scale Mean = 3.68; SD = 1.04; see also Figure 8.4). Non-Muslim Australians’ perceptions that Muslims support terrorism was strongest amongst participants who received the Islamic extremist vignette (Scale Mean = 3.83; SD = 1.03; see Table 8.4). Participants who received the right-wing extremist vignette were less likely to perceive that Muslims support terrorism (Scale Mean = 3.65; SD = 0.99). The mean score was significantly lower than for those who received the Islamic extremist vignette (t(993)=2.68, p<0.01). These findings suggest that perceiving that Muslims support terrorism was stronger amongst participants who had read a scenario describing a suspect’s motivation as being inspired by Islamic-inspired terrorism (see Table 8.6). Similar results were also observable from the t-tests conducted across the individual items (see Table 8.4). Believing that Muslims support terrorism may predict broader perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. Prior research shows a positive relationship between perceiving Muslims as supporting terrorism and anti-Muslim discrimination (Doosje et al., 2009). Results presented in Study 2 in Chapter 9 seek to demonstrate if perceiving that Muslims support terrorism may be associated with the view that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat and non-Muslim Australians’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies.
8.4.1.3 Support for Punitive Counter-terrorism Policies. A consistent finding in traditional crime control research shows a link between perceiving racial/ethnic minority groups as a threat to safety, wellbeing, and culture (i.e., a realistic and symbolic threat) and their perceived involvement in crime (Chiricos et al., 2004). This relationship results in enhanced public support for punitive crime control policies for such groups (Unnever & Cullen, 2010a, 2010b). Analysing punitive sentiment arguably requires acknowledging its symbiotic connection with the oppression of racial and ethnic groups (Frost, 2006). Whether these same relationships exist in a counter-terrorism context and towards a group characterised primarily by their religion as opposed to their race or ethnicity is worthy of empirical inquiry. Yet, scholarship examining punitive attitudes
towards terrorism-specific policies and punishment is scarce (for exceptions see Huddy et al., 2005; Huddy et al., 2002; Piazza, 2015; Welch, 2016). Participant attitudes towards the counter-terrorism policies outlined in Table 8.5 provide important insights into how non-Muslim Australians feel towards certain counter-terrorism policies within Australia.

Non-Muslim Australian participants were least supportive of the *authorities should be able to apply laws that lack human rights protections to suspected terrorists* measure (Mean = 2.27; SD = 1.33); the *authorities should be able to listen to private conversations without a court order* measure (Mean = 2.40; SD = 1.32); and the *authorities should be able to use stressful interrogation techniques to get confessions from suspected terrorists* (Mean = 2.53; SD = 1.39) measure (see Table 8.5). In contrast, participants were most supportive of the following items: *Australian citizenship should be revoked from people with a dual nationality if they are charged with terrorism offence(s)* (Mean = 4.02; SD = 1.28), *suspected terrorists deserve no legal rights* (this item was reverse recoded; Mean = 3.90; SD = 1.22); *suspected terrorists deserve the same legal rights as everyone else* (Mean = 3.79; SD = 1.21); and *prison sentences for terrorists should be more severe than they currently are* (Mean = 3.73; SD = 1.23). Table 8.5 also presents t-tests comparing attitudinal differences amongst participants in both vignettes across the individual items that comprise the support for punitive counter-terrorism measures scale.
Table 8.5 Mean Scores Comparing Support for Punitive Counter-Terrorism Policies for the Full Sample and for Those who Received Either the Islamic Extremist Vignette or the Right-Wing Extremist Vignette

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Full Sample (n=1,193)</th>
<th>Islamic Extremist Vignette (n=504)</th>
<th>Right-wing Extremist Vignette (n=491)</th>
<th>T-test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorities should have the powers to question individuals on matters related to terrorism even if they are not suspects</td>
<td>3.32 1.22</td>
<td>3.40 1.19</td>
<td>3.29 1.23</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities should be able to detain terrorist suspects without criminal charged for up to 48 hours</td>
<td>3.66 1.24</td>
<td>3.79 1.22</td>
<td>3.61 1.23</td>
<td>2.30*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities should be able to use stressful interrogation techniques to get confessions from suspected terrorists</td>
<td>2.53 1.39</td>
<td>2.64 1.39</td>
<td>2.45 1.38</td>
<td>2.23*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities should be able to apply laws that lack human rights protections to suspected terrorists</td>
<td>2.27 1.33</td>
<td>2.34 1.34</td>
<td>2.26 1.35</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities should be able to listen to private conversations without a court order</td>
<td>2.40 1.32</td>
<td>2.50 1.31</td>
<td>2.34 1.33</td>
<td>1.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities should be able to intercept emails and other personal electronic information</td>
<td>3.11 1.35</td>
<td>3.20 1.36</td>
<td>3.05 1.34</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities should be able to conduct searches and seizures of the belongings of suspected terrorists without proper warrants</td>
<td>2.61 1.40</td>
<td>2.76 1.40</td>
<td>2.50 1.40</td>
<td>2.93**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prison sentences for terrorists should be more severe than they currently are with terrorism offences</td>
<td>3.73 1.23</td>
<td>3.85 1.21</td>
<td>3.70 1.24</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian citizenship should be revoked from people with a dual nationality if they are charged</td>
<td>4.02 1.28</td>
<td>4.18 1.21</td>
<td>3.89 1.34</td>
<td>3.60***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspected terrorists deserve the same legal rights as everyone else</td>
<td>3.79 1.21</td>
<td>3.72 1.26</td>
<td>3.78 1.19</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspected terrorists deserve no legal rights (R)</td>
<td>3.90 1.22</td>
<td>3.80 1.27</td>
<td>3.96 1.20</td>
<td>1.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall support for punitive counter-terrorism policies scale</strong></td>
<td>2.91 0.98</td>
<td>3.04 0.98</td>
<td>2.83 0.97</td>
<td>2.61***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R: item reverse-scored in the creation of the overall punitive terrorism scale.
The items presented in Table 8.5 were combined to create an overall scale measuring participants’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies (Cronbach’s α = 0.93). For the full sample of survey participants, mean scores suggest that participants were almost neutral towards their support for punitive counter-terrorism policies (Scale Mean = 2.91; SD = 0.98; see also Figure 8.5). Participants who received the Islamic extremist vignette were more likely to support punitive counter-terrorism policies (Scale Mean = 3.04; SD = 0.98) when compared to those who had received the right-wing extremist vignette (Scale Mean = 2.83; SD = 0.97; see Table 8.5). However, the mean scores were low overall. There was a statistically significant difference in non-Muslim Australians’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies amongst those who received the Islamic extremist vignette when compared to those who had received the right-wing extremist vignette (t(993)=2.61, p<0.01). This finding shows that participants who received the Islamic extremist vignette were more supportive of punitive counter-terrorism policies than those who had received the right-wing extremist vignette (see Table 8.6). In other words, these findings suggest a link between the motivations of a perpetrator and public support for policies seeking to control such individuals.
8.5.2 Frequency Distribution of All Scales

Frequency distributions of the scales included in this chapter are presented in Figure 8.6. Just over two-thirds (64.3%) of the sample agreed or strongly agreed with statements about the perception that Muslims support terrorism. Only 11.5% of the sample perceived Muslims to be a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat. These results mirror findings in other recent Australian polls (see, e.g., Markus, 2018). Additionally, just over one-half (52.4%) of the survey sample supported punitive counter-terrorism policies. Given this finding, a better understanding of why some non-Muslim Australians come to support punitive counter-terrorism policies, particularly given the rarity of terrorism events, is worthy of inquiry. As numerous participants in the survey expressed negative attitudes towards Muslims, determining if non-Muslim Australians’ negative perceptions
of Muslims are a predicate of punitive attitudes towards counter-terrorism policies is warranted. Chapter 9 explores these relationships utilising SIT.

**Figure 8.6 Frequency Distribution of All Scales Presented in Chapter 8**

![Frequency Distribution of All Scales](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scales</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree/Disagree</th>
<th>Agree/Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perceptions that Muslims Pose a Realistic, Symbolic and Terroristic Threat</td>
<td>74.4%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceptions that Muslims Support Terrorism</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>64.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Punitive Counter-terrorism Policies</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 8.5.3 Independent Samples T-Test Analyses

This section presents a summary of the t-tests presented throughout Chapter 8 that compared differences in the mean scores for some of the key survey scales (see Table 8.6). The suspect motive variable was the predictor variable (right-wing extremist = 0; Islamic extremist = 1). An examination of these mean score differences is an attempt to explain if punitive attitudes, tolerance towards minority groups, and perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat differ depending on the motivation of the perpetrator in the experimental vignette.
The results are consistent with prior literature. Firstly, participants who received the Islamic extremist vignette were more likely to support punitive counter-terrorism policies than those who received the right-wing extremist vignette ($t(993)=2.61$, $p<0.01$; **Hypothesis 1 supported**). This finding aligns with recent research examining punitive attitudes towards counter-terrorism policies. This research finds that some non-Muslims harbour more punitive attitudes when they perceive that Muslims are a source of threat (Welch, 2016). It further lends support to Unnever and Cullen’s (2010a, 2010b) Racial Animus Model. The Racial Animus Model posits that members of the public are more likely to be punitive when they negatively evaluate minority groups. While the Racial Animus Model has found support in examining public attitudes towards punitive crime control policies, this study demonstrates its application to counter-terrorism policies (see also Piazza, 2015; Welch, 2016).

Additionally, those who received the Islamic extremist vignette were more likely to perceive Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat ($t(993)=3.52$, $p<0.001$; **Hypothesis 2 supported** or believe that Muslims support terrorism ($t(993)=2.68$, $p<0.01$; **Hypothesis 3 supported**), when compared to those who received the right-wing extremist vignette. Taken together, the findings of these significant t-tests demonstrate how exposure to a scenario outlining a suspect’s motivation as Islamic-inspired exacerbates non-Muslim Australian participants’ attitudes towards Muslims.

The descriptive findings in this chapter highlight how some non-Muslim Australians can come to view Muslims negatively (i.e., by perceiving them as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat or by believing that Muslims support terrorism). The findings also suggest that non-Muslim Australians can support punitive counter-terrorism policies. These
findings are highlighted when participants are presented with a scenario depicting a suspect as being motivated by Islamic extremist ideals.

**Table 8.6 Summary of Independent Samples T-Tests with Suspect Motive as the Predictor Variable (i.e., Comparing Survey Participants who Received the Islamic Extremist Vignette vs. the Right-Wing Extremist Vignette)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Full Sample (n=1,193)</th>
<th>Islamic Extremist Vignette (n=504)</th>
<th>Right-wing Extremist Vignette (n=491)</th>
<th>T-test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for Punitive Counter-terrorism Policies</td>
<td>Mean (SD)</td>
<td>Mean (SD)</td>
<td>Mean (SD)</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceptions that Muslims Pose a Realistic, Symbolic or Terroristic Threat</td>
<td>2.91 (0.98)</td>
<td>3.04 (0.98)</td>
<td>2.83 (0.97)</td>
<td>2.61**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceptions that Muslims Support Terrorism</td>
<td>2.22 (1.16)</td>
<td>2.37 (1.25)</td>
<td>2.11 (1.21)</td>
<td>3.52***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Punitive Counter-terrorism Policies</td>
<td>3.68 (1.04)</td>
<td>3.83 (1.03)</td>
<td>3.65 (0.99)</td>
<td>2.68**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p<.01; ***p<0.001; df=993**

### 8.6 Chapter Summary

The results in this chapter presented survey data from non-Muslim Australian participants responding to the *Attitudes to Punishment Survey*. Findings revealed some attitudinal differences amongst non-Muslim Australian participants when examining their perceptions depending on the type of vignette they received. Specifically, Study 1 evidences that some non-Muslim Australians perceive Muslims as more of a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat, are more supportive of punitive counter-terrorism policies, and are more likely to believe that Muslims support terrorism when exposed to a hypothetical vignette depicting a suspect as being motivated by Islamic extremist ideals.
By utilising this vignette measure, the findings of Study 1 suggest that non-Muslim Australians’ feelings towards Muslims somewhat drive attitudinal differences amongst participants. Taken together, these results in Study 1 answer RQ1. It was confirmed that a terrorist suspect’s motivation (as either Islamic-inspired or right-wing inspired) differentially shapes non-Muslim Australians’: (a) perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat; (b) perceptions that Muslims support terrorism; and (c) their own support for punitive counter-terrorism policies.
Chapter 9: Study 2 Methods and Results

Examining How Identity Processes and Perceptions that Muslims Support Terrorism Shape Non-Muslims’ (a) Perceptions that Muslims Pose a Realistic, Symbolic and Terroristic Threat and (b) Support for Punitive Counter-terrorism Policies

9.1 Introduction

Research suggests that non-Muslims perceive Muslims to be more sympathetic and supportive of terrorism (see, e.g., Doosje et al., 2009; Fischer et al., 2007). The belief that Muslims support terrorism may be associated with wider hostility directed towards Muslims (e.g., perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat) and beliefs that Muslims need to be dealt with more punitively than other groups. Scholars have also noted a relationship between perceptions that some groups pose a threat (e.g., to safety) and punitive attitudes towards those groups. Unnever and Cullen (2010a, 2010b) argue that negative evaluations of minorities (i.e., perceiving them as criminals) are likely to shape punitive attitudes towards crime control policies. They hypothesise that individuals may believe that the crime control policies they support will target these minority groups. Thus, perceiving Muslims as a threatening out-group may elicit non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies that often unduly target Muslims (Doosje et al., 2009; Maoz & McCauley, 2008). The results of Study 1 (see Chapter 8) support this claim, finding that participants were more supportive of punitive counter-terrorism policies when they received a vignette describing a suspect’s motive as being inspired by Islamic-inspired terrorism compared to right-wing-inspired terrorism.
The tenets of *Social Identity Theory* (SIT) suggest that intergroup threat emerges when members of an in-group negatively evaluate perceived out-group members (e.g., Muslims; see Oliveira & Murphy, 2014; Stephan et al., 2000). Specifically, in-group identification (e.g., national identification) is a key antecedent of perceiving out-group members as a threat (Stephan et al., 2000). I define perceptions of threat as non-Muslim Australians’ beliefs that Muslims are a threat to community safety (i.e., a realistic threat), that Muslims are a threat to a nation’s way of life (i.e., a symbolic threat), and that Muslims are likely to be terrorists (i.e., a terroristic threat). A perceived threat may lead individuals to act to reduce the threat by, for example, supporting punitive crime control policies deemed to control the threat (Unnever & Cullen, 2010a). Research supports this hypothesis by suggesting that people are more punitive towards members of out-groups they consider to be a criminal or a threat (Unnever & Cullen, 2012).

The two studies presented in this chapter (Chapter 9) apply SIT to a non-Muslim Australian sample. Chapter 9 pays particular attention to national in-group identification, which I operationalise as Australian national identity in Study 2 (A and B), to examine two key outcome measures. The first is how the strength of Australian national identity is related to non-Muslims’ perceptions of Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat (Study 2A). The second is how such perceptions of threat predict non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies while taking account of levels of Australian national identity (Study 2B). Both Studies 2A and 2B draw on the same *Attitudes to Punishment Survey* data collected from a national sample of 1,193 non-Muslim Australians (see Chapter 8 for more detail about the survey design and data collection process).
9.2 Aim, Research Questions and Hypotheses of Study 2

Study 2 (A and B) maps onto the first objective of my dissertation. The first objective is to explore if some non-Muslim Australians harbour negative attitudes towards Muslims (i.e., non-Muslims view Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat and believe that Muslims support terrorism) and if such perceptions of threat increase their support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. The following sub-sections outline the research questions and hypotheses associated with Studies 2A and 2B and demonstrate how they each address the first objective.

9.2.1 Study 2A

Study 2A aims to determine if strong majority in-group identification (i.e., strong Australian national identity) increases non-Muslims’ perceptions of Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. Study 2A tests if non-Muslim Australians’ beliefs that Muslims support terrorism affects their perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. Study 2A also examines the moderating role of Australian national identity on the relationship between non-Muslim Australian participants’ beliefs that Muslims support terrorism and their perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. Study 2A addresses the following three research questions:

RQ2 Do beliefs that Muslims support terrorism predict non-Muslim Australians’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat?

RQ3 Does the strength of non-Muslim Australians’ national identity (i.e., as an Australian) heighten their likelihood of perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat?
RQ4 Does the strength of non-Muslim Australians’ national identity (i.e., as an Australian) moderate the association between believing that Muslims support terrorism and perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat?

As there are political and media discourses that link Muslims with terrorism (Sides & Gross, 2013), the belief that Muslims support terrorism may strengthen people’s perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. Prior research has explored how perceiving that Muslims support terrorism is a predictor of anti-Muslim discrimination and support for anti-immigration policies (Doosje et al., 2009). As such, I expect that non-Muslim Australians in Study 2A will be more likely to perceive Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat if they believe that Muslims support terrorism.

Perceptions of threat stem from evaluating others as less favourable than oneself (Oliveira & Murphy, 2014). These attitudes derive from SIT, which conceptualises how individuals assign themselves to specific groups based on whether they perceive they are similar or different from others (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Evidence suggests that highly nationalistic individuals of a non-minority background express out-group racial or ethnic minority members as more threatening (Stephan et al., 2000). As such, I expect that non-Muslim Australians in Study 2A will be more likely to perceive that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat when they identify strongly with their Australian national identities.

Relatedly, Doosje et al. (2009) argue that non-Muslims are more likely to view Muslims as a homogeneous out-group if they believe that Muslims support terrorism. As such, I expect that high Australian national identifiers will be more likely to view Muslims
as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat when they perceive that Muslims support terrorism.

The following three hypotheses are tested in Study 2A:

H4 Believing that Muslims support terrorism will be associated with non-Muslim Australians’ higher perceptions of Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat.

H5 Stronger national identification will be associated with non-Muslim Australians’ greater perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat.

H6 Australian national identity will interact with the belief that Muslims support terrorism to influence non-Muslim Australians’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. Specifically, participants with a stronger sense of national identity will be more likely to perceive Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat when they perceive that Muslims support terrorism.

9.2.2 Study 2B

In addition to examining how the wider Australian public may come to perceive Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat, Study 2B aims to understand if such perceptions are associated with the public’s greater support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. Study 2B will test the direct effect of Australian national identification on non-Muslim Australians’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. Study 2B will also test how Australian national identification moderates the relationship between (a) perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat and (b) beliefs that Muslims support terrorism on non-Muslim Australians’ support for punitive counter-
terrorism policies. Finally, Study 2B will test if non-Muslim Australians’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat mediates the relationship between non-Muslim Australians’ beliefs that Muslims support terrorism and their support for counter-terrorism policies. Like Study 2A, Study 2B draws on survey data from a national sample of 1,193 non-Muslim Australian residents to address the following six research questions:

RQ5  Do non-Muslim Australians’ beliefs that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat shape non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

RQ6  Do non-Muslim Australians’ beliefs that Muslims support terrorism shape non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

RQ7  Do non-Muslim Australians’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat mediate the relationship between the belief that Muslims support terrorism and non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

RQ8  Does the strength of non-Muslim Australians’ national identity (i.e., as an Australian) heighten their support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

RQ9  Does the strength of non-Muslim Australians’ national identity (i.e., as an Australian) moderate the association between perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat and non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

RQ10 Does the strength of non-Muslim Australians’ national identity (i.e., as an Australian) moderate the association between believing that
Muslims support terrorism and non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

Public sentiment towards Muslims in the West has become increasingly negative due to the threat of terrorism and a pervasive belief that Muslims are threatening to individual safety and national security (i.e., as a terroristic threat) (Cherney & Murphy, 2016; Uenal, 2016). The normalisation of this rhetoric within social and political narratives can perpetuate reactive responses to national security threats (Unnever & Cullen, 2010a, 2010b). It is therefore expected that non-Muslim Australian participants’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat may elicit more punitive attitudes\(^{58}\) to counter-terrorism policies that often target Muslims (Doosje et al., 2009).

Another predictor of support for punitive counter-terrorism policies may be non-Muslims’ beliefs that Muslims support terrorism. Prior research has found a link between perceiving that Muslims support terrorism and discrimination towards Muslims (Doosje et al., 2009). The authors suggest that when an individual perceives that a group (e.g., Muslims) supports a different worldview (e.g., Islamic terrorism), they may view these group members as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. As such, these individuals may be more inclined to support discriminatory treatment towards those group members as a means of defence (Doosje et al., 2009). Based on these prior findings, it is expected that non-Muslim Australian participants in my sample will be more likely to support punitive counter-terrorism policies because they believe that Muslims support terrorism.

\(^{58}\) Punitive attitudes can be defined as an individual’s need for or beliefs about punishment (Adriaenssen & Aertsen, 2015).
In a similar vein, strong in-group identification is a key antecedent of perceiving out-group members as a threat (Stephan et al., 2000). The tenets of SIT suggest that individuals who identify strongly with their in-group are more inclined to protect the strength of their identities (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) by, for example, acting to reduce a threat against their group from a perceived out-group (Velasco González et al., 2008). Unnever and Cullen (2010a) propose that in-group members are more likely to support punitive crime control policies if they perceive that these policies target individuals who are threatening to in-group members. As such, I expect that participants who identify more strongly as Australians will be more likely to support punitive counter-terrorism policies.

Evidence also suggests that highly nationalistic individuals see minority out-group members as more threatening (Stephan et al., 2000), and thus adopt more punitive attitudes towards minorities (Doosje et al., 2009). I therefore expect that it is likely that high Australian national identifiers will be more likely to support punitive counter-terrorism policies when they view Muslims as a greater threat (Unnever & Cullen, 2010a), or when they have a heightened belief that Muslims support terrorism (Doosje et al., 2009).

Hence, based on this prior body of research, Study 2B tests six hypotheses:

H7 Perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat will be associated with non-Muslim Australians’ stronger support for punitive counter-terrorism policies.

H8 Perceiving that Muslims support terrorism will be associated with non-Muslim Australians’ stronger support for punitive counter-terrorism policies.
H9  Non-Muslims’ beliefs that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat will mediate the relationship between the belief that Muslims support terrorism and non-Muslim Australians’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies.

H10  Stronger national identification will be associated with more support for punitive counter-terrorism policies amongst non-Muslim Australians.

H11  Australian national identity will interact with beliefs that Muslims support terrorism to influence non-Muslim Australians’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. Specifically, participants with a stronger sense of national identity will be more supportive of punitive counter-terrorism policies when they perceive that Muslims support terrorism.

H12  Australian national identity will interact with perceptions of Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat to influence non-Muslim Australians’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. Specifically, participants with a stronger sense of national identity will be more supportive of punitive counter-terrorism policies when they see Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat.
Figure 9.1 presents the relationships to be tested in Studies 2A and 2B.

**Figure 9.1 Conceptual Map Guiding Relationships Tested in Study 2(A and B)**

![Conceptual Map](image)

9.3 Methods

The design and sampling strategy of the survey data used for Studies 2A and 2B is outlined in Chapter 8 (see Section 8.3). Moreover, several of the items used in Studies 2A and 2B are outlined in Section 8.3.6.1 in Chapter 8 (i.e., *perceptions that Muslims support terrorism; perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat, support for punitive counter-terrorism policies*). The following section details additional items not outlined in Chapter 8 that are included in the analyses of Study 2 (A and B).

9.3.1 Measures used in Study 2

9.3.1.1 Key Concepts of Interest. Several key concepts were measured in Study 2 (A and B). The conceptualisation and operationalisation of each concept not mentioned in Chapter 8 are described below. Table 9.1 presents the wording of individual items used in the construction of all scales.
Perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. The perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat scale is used as a dependent variable in Study 2A and as an independent variable in Study 2B. As mentioned in Chapter 8, prior research has used the items in this scale to assess the separate effects of perceiving Muslims as different types of threats, such as symbolic threats to an individual’s beliefs, values and identity (see, e.g., Pereira et al., 2009; Stephan et al., 2000); realistic threats to individuals’ economic wellbeing and personal safety (see e.g., Ciftci, 2012; Pereira et al., 2009); and more recently, terroristic threats (see e.g., Obaidi et al., 2018; Uenal, 2016). However, a Principal Axis Factor (PAF) Analysis (see Table 9.1) was conducted and revealed one factor that captured overall perceptions of threat containing all three subcomponents of realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. As such, in both Studies 2A and 2B I utilise a combined scale to measure non-Muslim Australians’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat (see Section 8.3 for a full description of the conceptualisation and operationalisation of this scale). A higher score on this scale suggests that participants perceived Muslims to be a greater threat (Mean = 2.22; SD = 1.16).

Australian National identity. The Australian national identity measure was used as an independent variable in both Studies 2A and 2B. People can identify with various groups and may identify with one group more so than another (Huo, 2003). For example, ethnic, racial and religious minority groups may self-identify with several groups in society. One group they can identify with might include the nation they live in, such as being British, Australian or American. As the data used in my dissertation were collected in Australia, Australian national identity is conceptualised as the majority in-group identity.
Three items are included to understand the extent to which participants in the sample identify as an Australian. The Australian national identity scale uses variables adapted from Murphy (2013) and is a widely used scale to measure the strength of in-group identification (Bradford, 2014; Bradford et al., 2014; Cherney & Murphy, 2019). The three items are measured on a 5-point strongly agree to strongly disagree Likert scale (‘I identify strongly with being Australian’). A higher score on each item indicates that participants identified more strongly as Australian (Mean = 3.81; SD = 0.93).

**Perceptions that Muslims support terrorism.** This measure is used as an independent variable in Study 2A and Study 2B. Perceptions that Muslims support terrorism denotes a belief by non-Muslims that Muslims are sympathetic towards and supportive of Islamic-inspired terrorism (Doosje et al., 2009) (see Section 8.3 for a full description of the conceptualisation and operationalisation of this scale). A PAF Analysis revealed that two items in the perceptions that Muslims support terrorism scale cross-loaded, so these items were removed. The final scale comprises of two items (i.e., ‘some Muslims perceive Islamic terrorists as heroes’; ‘some Muslims find Islamic terrorism justifiable’; see Table 9.1). A higher score suggests that participants were in stronger agreement that Muslims support terrorism (Mean = 3.68; SD = 1.04).

**Support for punitive counter-terrorism policies.** The support for punitive counter-terrorism policies scale is used as a dependent variable in Study 2B. Eleven items about current counter-terrorism policies used in Australia are included that measure participants’ approval or disapproval with these measures (e.g., ‘Authorities should have the powers to question individuals on matters related to terrorism even if they are not suspects’). These eleven items are presented in Table 8.5 in Chapter 8). The items are adapted from the work of Lambert (2003) and Welch (2016) and tailored to the Australian
context. Each item is measured on a 5-point strongly disapprove to strongly approve Likert scale. Higher scores denote stronger support for punitive counter-terrorism policies (Mean = 2.91; SD = 0.98) (see Section 8.3.6 for a full description of the conceptualisation and operationalisation of this scale).

9.3.1.2 Principal Axis Factor Analysis. A PAF analysis was conducted in the SPSS statistical program to determine the construct validity of the key scales used in Studies 2A and 2B (see Table 9.1). Factor 1 includes three items that measure Australian national identity. Factor 2 contains seven items that measure the perception that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat. Factor 3 comprises of two items measuring the perception that Muslims support terrorism. Factor 4 includes eleven items that measure participants’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies.
Table 9.1 PAF Analysis: Constructs and Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
<th>Factor 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Australian National Identity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>I am proud to be an Australian</em></td>
<td>.80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>I identify strongly with being Australian</em></td>
<td>.87</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Being an Australian is important to the way I think of myself as a person</em></td>
<td>.72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Perceptions that Muslims Pose a Realistic, Symbolic and Terroristic Threat</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Australian identity is being threatened because there are too many Muslims</em></td>
<td>.86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Australian norms and values are being threatened because of the presence of Muslims</em></td>
<td>.84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Muslims are a threat to Australia’s way of life</em></td>
<td>.90</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Muslims are a threat to our safety</em></td>
<td>.88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>I do not trust Muslims</em></td>
<td>.89</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>I am suspicious of Muslims</em></td>
<td>.85</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Muslims are likely to be potential terrorists</em></td>
<td>.73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Perceptions that Muslims Support Terrorism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Some Muslims perceive Islamic terrorists as heroes</em></td>
<td>.90</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Some Muslims find Islamic terrorism justifiable</em></td>
<td>.90</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Support for Punitive Counter-terrorism Policies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Authorities should have the powers to question individuals on matters related to terrorism even if they are not suspects</em></td>
<td>.60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Authorities should be able to detain terrorist suspects without criminal charges for up to 48 hours</em></td>
<td>.70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Authorities should be able to use stressful interrogation techniques to get confessions from suspected terrorists</em></td>
<td>.64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Authorities should be able to apply laws that lack human rights protections to suspected terrorists</em></td>
<td>.63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9.3.1.3 Control Variables. Demographic and control variables are also included in Study 2 (A and B). Previous research examining out-group derogation includes demographic and control variables to determine the types of people more likely to perceive minority groups in a negative way (Billig & Cramer, 1990). Specifically, age, gender (0=female; 1=male), country of birth (0=overseas born; 1=Australian born), educational attainment (ranging from 1=did not complete high school to 6=postgraduate qualifications), and employment status (0=not employed; 1=employed)\textsuperscript{59} are included in Study 2. In addition, a suspect motive variable controlling for the type of vignette each

\begin{tabular}{lrrrr}
 & Eigenvalues (before rotation) & & & \\
 & 11.10 & 2.52 & 1.90 & 1.24 \\
 & Eigenvalues (after rotation) & & & \\
 & 9.14 & 8.25 & 3.78 & 3.74 \\
\end{tabular}

Extraction method: PAF Analysis with oblimin rotation. Only factor loadings $>0.40$ are presented.

\textsuperscript{59} Employment (1) represented participants who identified that they were working part-time, working full-time, studying and working, self-employed, or a casual worker. Those who were not employed (0) identified that they were a student, had home duties, were unemployed and seeking work, retired or on a pension.
participant received was added to determine if participants’ attitudes were shaped by receiving a vignette describing a suspect’s motivations as being inspired by (a) Islamic-inspired terrorism or (b) right-wing-inspired terrorism.

Finally, measures of political orientation and fear of terrorism are included. A positive association between political conservativism (i.e., more right-wing) and perceiving minorities as a threat has been consistently highlighted by researchers (Brandt et al., 2014; Chambers et al., 2013; Crawford & Pilanski, 2013). For the political orientation measure, participants were asked to rank how left or right-leaning they were on a scale from 1 to 10 (where 1 is more left-leaning (less conservative), and 10 is more right-leaning (more conservative)). Prior studies demonstrate that punitive attitudes are stronger when participants have more conservative, nationalistic beliefs (Ousey & Unnever, 2012; Pickett et al., 2014; Welch, 2016). Additionally, previous research also highlights the importance of controlling for fear of terrorism as a potential predictor of support for punitive counter-terrorism policies (Welch, 2016). As such, a single-item measure of fear of terrorism is used in the analysis. This item asked participants to rate how much they worried about becoming the victim of a terrorist attack in the future on a 1 (very rarely) to 5 (very frequently) Likert scale.

9.4 Analytic Approach

Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analyses were conducted in Studies 2A and 2B. Regression analysis techniques are employed to gauge if there is a relationship between a set of independent variables and a dependent variable (Tabachnick et al., 2007).

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60 In Australia, left leaning is more socialist, e.g. the Australian Labor Party; the Greens, while right leaning would be more conservative e.g., the Liberal National Party; One Nation.
Variables were entered in blocks to determine the unique variation offered by each group of variables on the dependent variable. All continuous variables were mean-centred before undertaking the regression analyses, as suggested by Aiken and West (1991). If scales are centred, it helps to address high correlations between each of the main effect variables and any interaction terms used in the analysis.

9.5 Study 2 Results

9.5.1 Construct Validity of Concepts of Interest

9.5.1.1 Cronbach’s Alpha Test. Four key scales were of interest in Study 2. As noted in section 9.3.1, these scales were: Australian national identity, perceptions that Muslims support terrorism; perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat; and support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. Reliability analyses were also conducted to determine the Cronbach’s Alpha scores for each multi-item scale. Table 9.2 presents the mean scores for each of the four scales, as well as the Cronbach’s Alpha reliability coefficients for each scale. Reliability analyses show Cronbach’s Alpha scores all exceed 0.70, which demonstrates that the four scales have strong internal reliability (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011).
Table 9.2 Mean Scores, SDs and Reliability Scores for Key Variables used in Study 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables of Interest</th>
<th>Number of items</th>
<th>Cronbach’s Alpha (α)</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for punitive counter-terrorism policies</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian national identity</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceptions that Muslims support terrorism</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9.5.2 Bivariate Correlations

Bivariate relationships were conducted for all variables (except dichotomous variables) used in the analyses in Studies 2A and 2B (see Table 9.3). Significant relationships were identified amongst the key measures of interest as well as some of the control variables. Firstly, age was positively related to Australian national identity ($r = 0.170$, $p<0.001$) and perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat ($r = 0.263$, $p<0.001$). These relationships suggest that older participants identify more strongly with their Australian national identity and perceive Muslims as more of a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. Education was negatively associated with the perception that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat ($r = -0.141$, $p<0.001$). This correlation suggests that the more educated participants were, the less they saw Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat, which supports prior research (see, e.g., King & Wheelock, 2007).

61 Two of the original items pertaining to non-Muslims’ perceptions that Muslims support terrorism discussed in Chapter 8 were dropped due to cross-loading issues in the factor analysis results presented in Chapter 9. As such, the Cronbach’s Alpha score is slightly different in Chapter 9.
Turning to the other two control variables, both political orientation and fear of terrorism were positively correlated with the key variables of interest. Participants saw Muslims as more of a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat when they reported having more right-wing political views \((r = 0.576, p<0.001)\). A wealth of research finds a link between political conservativism and perceiving individuals deemed to be members of an out-group as a threat (see, e.g., Crawford, 2017). Specifically, research suggests that people are more likely to adopt conservative views as a way to manage feelings of threat. This is because conservative ideologies tend to favour and promote mechanisms of social control that can manage the threats people perceive (Crawford, 2017). Additionally, participants in Study 2 who viewed Muslims as more of a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat were more fearful of terrorism \((r = 0.406, p<0.001)\). Prior studies show that those who are more fearful of crime view minority groups as a greater criminal threat (Chiricos et al., 2004; Eitle & Taylor, 2008). While less research has focused on the link between fear of terrorism and perceptions of threat, it is not surprising that a similar correlation was revealed in the data. There is also a positive correlation between national identity and perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat \((r = 0.347, p<0.001)\). This correlation concurs with evidence suggesting that highly nationalistic in-group members perceive out-group members as more threatening (Stephan et al., 2000).

Lastly, a series of significant correlations were observed between the variables included in Study 2B and the dependent variable: support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. Several demographic characteristics were associated with the dependent variable. For example, age \((r = 0.125, p<0.001)\) was positively correlated with support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. This finding suggests that older participants were more likely to support punitive counter-terrorism policies. Prior studies tend to find that older people are
more punitive, although this trend holds less consistently when examining international literature (King & Maruna, 2009). However, those with higher education ($r = -0.155$, $p<0.001$) were less likely to support such policies. This relationship between education and punitive attitudes is consistently found in research (Adriaenssen & Aertsen, 2015).

In addition to the demographic characteristics, both the political orientation and fear of terrorism variables were correlated with stronger attitudes towards punitive counter-terrorism policies. In particular, participants who identified as being more politically right-wing ($r = 0.477$, $p<0.01$) and those who were more fearful of terrorism ($r = 0.467$, $p<0.01$) were more likely to support punitive counter-terrorism policies. Scholars suggest that fear of crime impacts punitive attitudes in the traditional crime context such that those who are more fearful of crime tend to be more supportive of harsh crime control policies (Armborst, 2017; Baker et al., 2015). Moreover, research consistently finds that punitive attitudes are stronger amongst people who identify as more politically conservative (Adriaenssen & Aertsen, 2015).

Finally, the independent variables of interest were positively associated with the dependent variable. Specifically, non-Muslim Australian participants with a stronger sense of Australian national identity ($r = 0.362$, $p<0.001$), those who perceive Muslims as more of a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat ($r = 0.639$, $p<0.001$) and those who believe that Muslims support terrorism ($r = 0.334$, $p<0.001$) were more likely to support punitive counter-terrorism policies. The correlation between Australian national identity and support for punitive counter-terrorism policies mirrors other research that finds people tend to hold more punitive views towards those they perceive as an out-group (see, e.g., Unnever & Cullen, 2012). The inference here is that people with a strong in-group identity may be more supportive of certain laws if they perceive that those laws punish people from
the out-group. This relationship has not been explored in the terrorism context, so it is included in the present study. Moreover, the correlations between the perception that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat and support for punitive counter-terrorism policies and the belief that Muslims support terrorism and support for punitive counter-terrorism policies measures also concur with existing literature. This literature highlights how negative perceptions towards minority groups, namely Muslims, impacts subsequent attitudes towards counter-terrorism policies (Piazza, 2015; Welch, 2016).
Table 9.3 Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations for all Variables and Scales

| Items                                                                 | α  | M  | SD  | 1   | 2   | 3   | 4   | 5   | 6   | 7   | 8   |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| 1. Age                                                                | 1  | N/A| 36.2| 14.2| 1   |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 2. Educational attainment                                            | 1  | N/A| 4.2 | 1.2 | .18***| 1   |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 3. Political orientation                                             | 1  | N/A| 4.1 | 2.3 | .16***| -.05| 1   |     |     |     |     |     |
| 4. Fear of terrorism                                                  | 1  | N/A| 2.0 | 1.1 | -.03 | -.15***| .20***| 1   |     |     |     |     |
| 5. Australian national identity                                      | 3  | 0.84| 3.8 | 0.9 | .17***| -.05 | .29***| .18***| 1   |     |     |     |
| 6. Perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat | 7  | 0.97| 2.2 | 1.2 | .26***| -.14***| .58***| .41***| .35***| 1   |     |     |
| 7. Perceptions that Muslims support terrorism                        | 2  | 0.89| 3.7 | 1.0 | .32***| .03  | .34***| .16***| .20***| .55***| 1   |     |
| 8. Support for punitive counter-terrorism policies                    | 11 | 0.90| 3.2 | 1.0 | .13***| -.16***| .48***| .47***| .36***| .64***| .33***| 1   |

Note: *** indicates a significant relationship at p<0.001.
9.5.3 **Study 2A Regression Analysis**

Study 2A aimed to understand if in-group identification and non-Muslims’ beliefs that Muslims support terrorism predicts non-Muslim Australians’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. The dependent variable in Study 2A was *perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat*. The independent variables used to predict the dependent variable were Australian national identity and perceptions that Muslims support terrorism. Study 2A further tested the moderating role of Australian national identity on the relationship between beliefs that Muslims support terrorism and non-Muslim Australians’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. An OLS regression analysis was performed, whereby control variables and the independent variables were entered into the model in blocks to determine the variance each set of variables contributed to the model.\(^{62}\)

9.5.3.1 **OLS Regression Analysis.** Demographic and control variables were entered in Block 1 to predict non-Muslims’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. In Block 2, the Australian national identity scale and the perception that Muslims support terrorism scale was entered. In the final Block, a two-way interaction term was entered. The interaction was between the national identity and perceptions that Muslims support terrorism scales. All

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\(^{62}\) I controlled for the second vignette (that manipulated whether the incident was a crime or an act of terrorism) in the regression analysis but there was no significant effect across any of the Blocks in the model. For ease of interpretation I removed the second vignette and report analyses that do not include this control variable.
continuous variables (i.e., age; political orientation; fear of terrorism) and scales were mean-centred before being entered into the regression model.63

Demographic and control variables entered in Block 1 accounted for 48.0% of the variance in non-Muslim Australian participants’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat (see Table 9.4). Fear of terrorism ($\beta = 0.299$, $p<0.001$) and political orientation ($\beta = 0.468$, $p<0.001$) were most strongly and positively associated with non-Muslim Australian participants’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat. In other words, those who fear terrorism and those with more conservative views were more likely to perceive Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat. Such findings concur with existing research that suggests perceiving minority groups (such as Muslims) as a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat is strongest amongst those who are more fearful of crime (Skogan, 1995) and those with more right-wing political beliefs (see e.g., Brandt et al., 2014; Chambers et al., 2013; Crawford & Pilanski, 2013).

Tests for multicollinearity were conducted to ensure that the relationship between variables entered in the model was not too high to affect the model fit. Tolerance values were computed to determine the variance of each independent variable not accounted for by other independent variables. Small tolerance values demonstrate an almost perfect correlation, and as such should be removed from the regression analysis (Pallant, 2013). In the present analysis, the lowest tolerance value was 0.774, which suggests multicollinearity was not present. Variance inflation factors (VIFs) are also indicators of multicollinearity, with a VIF of 10 or more determining multicollinearity of variables in the analysis. VIFs were computed and no factor exceeded 1.292, which eliminates the likelihood for any multicollinearity between items in the analysis (Pallant, 2013). Tests of normality were conducted using a Predicted Probability (P-P) plot. The output showed that the data points followed a linear line, thereby demonstrating the normal distribution of the data. A scatterplot was computed to determine the homoscedasticity of the data. Homoscedasticity denotes equal error variance amongst all levels of each independent variable inserted into the regression model (Osborne & Waters, 2002). Heteroscedasticity suggests the error variance differs, which could distort the accuracy of the findings (Osborne & Waters, 2002). In Study 2A, the scatterplot revealed that the data used is homoscedastic. As the tests conducted demonstrate that the data is normally distributed and homoscedastic, it can also be inferred that the independent variables are linear with the dependent variable.

---

63 Tests for multicollinearity were conducted to ensure that the relationship between variables entered in the model was not too high to affect the model fit. Tolerance values were computed to determine the variance of each independent variable not accounted for by other independent variables. Small tolerance values demonstrate an almost perfect correlation, and as such should be removed from the regression analysis (Pallant, 2013). In the present analysis, the lowest tolerance value was 0.774, which suggests multicollinearity was not present. Variance inflation factors (VIFs) are also indicators of multicollinearity, with a VIF of 10 or more determining multicollinearity of variables in the analysis. VIFs were computed and no factor exceeded 1.292, which eliminates the likelihood for any multicollinearity between items in the analysis (Pallant, 2013). Tests of normality were conducted using a Predicted Probability (P-P) plot. The output showed that the data points followed a linear line, thereby demonstrating the normal distribution of the data. A scatterplot was computed to determine the homoscedasticity of the data. Homoscedasticity denotes equal error variance amongst all levels of each independent variable inserted into the regression model (Osborne & Waters, 2002). Heteroscedasticity suggests the error variance differs, which could distort the accuracy of the findings (Osborne & Waters, 2002). In Study 2A, the scatterplot revealed that the data used is homoscedastic. As the tests conducted demonstrate that the data is normally distributed and homoscedastic, it can also be inferred that the independent variables are linear with the dependent variable.
In terms of demographic characteristics, age ($\beta = 0.201$, $p<0.001$) was positively associated with participants’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. Specifically, older participants were more likely to perceive Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. Educational attainment was also related to non-Muslim Australian participants’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. Results show more educated participants were less likely to perceive Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat ($\beta = -0.135$, $p<0.001$). This relationship is consistently found in research examining perceptions of minority group threat (see Hello et al., 2002 for an overview). Gender ($\beta = -0.075$, $p<0.01$) was also negatively associated with the dependent variable. In other words, females were less likely to view Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. The suspect motive vignette manipulation measure was also positively associated with participants’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. This finding suggests that participants who received the vignette describing the perpetrator’s motivations as being inspired by Islamic-inspired terrorism were more likely to perceive Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat.

In Block 2 ($R^2 = 57.4\%$), the two key independent variables of interest were entered. When combined with variables in Block 1, they added 0.098% of the variance in the model. Both Australian national identity ($\beta = 0.107$, $p<0.001$) and the belief that Muslims support terrorism scales ($\beta = 0.322$, $p<0.001$) were positively and significantly associated with non-Muslim Australian participants’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. These findings suggest that the more participants identified as Australian, and the more they perceived that
Muslims support terrorism, the more likely they were to see Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat. These findings suggest that both in-group (i.e., national) identification and perceiving that Muslims support terrorism is positively related to non-Muslim Australian participants’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat. In Block 2, age (β = 0.098, p<0.001), educational attainment (β = -0.134, p<0.001), political orientation (β = 0.364, p<0.001), and fear of terrorism (β = 0.248, p<0.001) retained statistical significance.
Table 9.4 OLS Regression Analysis Predicting Non-Muslims’ Perceptions that Muslims Pose a Realistic, Symbolic and Terroristic Threat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Block 1</th>
<th>Block 2</th>
<th>Block 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.942 (0.180)</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>2.758 (.164)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect motive¹</td>
<td>.137 (.053)</td>
<td>.059*</td>
<td>.084 (0.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.016 (.002)</td>
<td>.201***</td>
<td>.008 (.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender¹</td>
<td>-.173 (.057)</td>
<td>-.075**</td>
<td>-.071 (.053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of birth¹</td>
<td>-.134 (.076)</td>
<td>-.042</td>
<td>-.040 (.070)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational attainment</td>
<td>-.127 (.023)</td>
<td>-.135***</td>
<td>-.126 (.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment status¹</td>
<td>.095 (.056)</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>.031 (.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political orientation</td>
<td>.237 (.013)</td>
<td>.468***</td>
<td>.184 (.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of terrorism</td>
<td>.316 (.026)</td>
<td>.299***</td>
<td>.262 (.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceptions that Muslims support terrorism</td>
<td>.363 (.027)</td>
<td>.322***</td>
<td>.369 (.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian national ID</td>
<td>.133 (.029)</td>
<td>.107***</td>
<td>.134 (.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian national ID x Perceptions that Muslims support terrorism</td>
<td>.058 (.024)</td>
<td>.052*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                            |               |               |               |
| R²                         | .480          | .572          | .574          |
| Adjusted R²                | .476          | .567          | .569          |
| R² change                  | .480          | .091          | .003          |
| F²                         | 0.923         | 1.336         | 1.347         |
| F Change                   | 112.250       | 103.331       | 5.926         |

NOTE: ¹Reference categories for the dichotomous variables include: Suspect motive vignette manipulation (0=right-wing extremist motivation; 1=Islamic extremist motivation), Gender (0=male; 1=female), Country of birth (0= Australian born; 1 = overseas born), Employment status (0 = not employed; 1 = employed), * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.
In the final Block of the regression ($R^2 = 57.4\%$), a two-way interaction term between Australian national identity and the perception that Muslims support terrorism was entered into the model. This interaction term was included to determine if Australian national identity moderated the association between non-Muslim Australian participants’ beliefs that Muslims support terrorism and non-Muslim Australian participants’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. The interaction effect was positive and significant ($\beta = 0.052$, $p<0.05$) and is depicted graphically in Figure 9.2.

Figure 9.2 Significant Interaction Between Australian National Identity and Perceptions that Muslims Support Terrorism on Perceptions that Muslims Pose a Symbolic, Realistic and Terroristic Threat
To further explore the nature of the interaction effect, simple effects tests were conducted at -1 (low) and +1 (high) standard deviations of Australian national identity. Results showed that the simple slope was steeper for high Australian national identifiers (β = 0.369, p<0.001), when compared to low Australian national identifiers (β = 0.273, p<0.001). In other words, the association between believing that Muslims support terrorism and seeing Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat was much stronger amongst those who identified as Australian. For weak Australian national identifiers, the association was significantly weaker.

9.5.4 Study 2B Regression Analysis

Study 2B builds on Study 2A by exploring how Australian national identity and negative attitudes towards Muslims (i.e., seeing Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat; perceiving that Muslims support terrorism) shape non-Muslim Australian participants’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. As such, the dependent variable was support for counter-terrorism policies, while Australian national identity, perceptions that Muslims support terrorism, and perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat were the independent variables. The same demographic and control variables used in Study 2A were also used in Study 2B.  

9.5.4.1 Regression Analysis. An OLS regression analysis was conducted to determine if non-Muslim Australian participants’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies was shaped by their Australian national identity, their

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64 I controlled for the second vignette (that manipulated whether the incident was a crime or an act of terrorism) in the regression analysis but there was no significant effect across any of the Blocks in the model. For ease of interpretation I removed the second vignette and report analyses that do not include this control variable.
beliefs that Muslims support terrorism and their perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat (see Table 9.5). Variables were entered in Blocks to explore the variance each Block contributed to the final model. In Block 1, demographic variables and three control variables of interest (suspect motive, fear of terrorism and political orientation) were added. In Block 2, the perceptions that Muslims support terrorism and Australian national identity scales were entered. In Block 3, the perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat scale was added. Block 3 enables a test of how perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat mediates the association between believing that Muslims support terrorism and non-Muslim Australians’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. In Block 4, two two-way interactions were included in the model: (1) Australian national identity x perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat, and (2) Australian national identity and perceptions that Muslims support terrorism. All continuous variables (i.e., age; political orientation; fear of terrorism) and scales were mean-centred before being entered into the model.\textsuperscript{65}

The demographic and control variables added in Block 1 accounted for 41.0% of the variance in non-Muslim Australian participants’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. Fear of terrorism ($\beta = 0.359$, $p<0.001$) and political orientation ($\beta = 0.405$, $p<0.001$) were most strongly and positively associated with

\textsuperscript{65} Results of the tolerance and VIF scores showed there was no multicollinearity between variables. Specifically, the lowest tolerance value was 0.433, and VIF factors did not exceed 2.311, which suggests there is no multicollinearity between variables. Normality tests were also conducted to confirm that the data was normally distributed and homoscedastic.
non-Muslim Australian participants’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. Those who were more fearful of terrorism, or who were more right-leaning (i.e., conservative) were more supportive of punitive counter-terrorism policies. These findings mirror previous research on punitive attitudes towards crime control policies, which suggests that more conservative people (Hogan et al., 2005; Serrano-Maillo & Kury, 2008; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997; Unnever et al., 2005) and those who are more fearful of crime (Brookman & Wiener, 2017; Nellis & Lynch, 2008; Ramirez, 2015; Serrano-Maillo & Kury, 2008; Spiranovic et al., 2012) tend to be more punitive.

In terms of demographic predicates, older participants (β = 0.142, p<0.001), females (β = 0.101, p<0.001), and those who were employed (β = 0.099, p<0.001) were more likely to support punitive counter-terrorism policies. More highly educated participants (β = -0.127, p<0.001) and participants born outside of Australia (β = -0.081, p<0.001) were less likely to support punitive counter-terrorism policies. While the former finding supports prior research (King & Wheelock, 2007), less work has focused on immigrant perceptions of crime control policies. Studies demonstrate differences in perceptions between Caucasian people and people who identify as an ethnic or racial minority group (Bobo & Johnson, 2004). However, research would benefit from canvassing immigrants’ perceptions of harsh crime control policies as well.

In Block 2, (R² = 0.446), the perceptions that Muslims support terrorism scale and the Australian national identity scale were entered into the model. Together with the demographic and control variables, they contributed an additional 3.2% of the variance in non-Muslim Australian participants’ support for punitive counter-
terrorism policies. Those who perceived that Muslims support terrorism ($\beta = 0.130$, $p<0.001$) and those whose identified strongly with their Australian national identity ($\beta = 0.149$, $p<0.001$) were more likely to support punitive counter-terrorism policies. The demographic variables described in Block 1 were all still significant in this step.

In Block 3 ($R^2 = 0.517$), the perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat scale was entered into the model, contributing an additional 7.6% of the variance of the model). Findings in this Block reveal that perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat were strongly associated with non-Muslim Australian participants’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies ($\beta = 0.421$, $p<0.001$). The perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat scale was also included in this Block to determine if it mediated the relationship between the perception that Muslims support terrorism and non-Muslim Australian participants’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. The relationship between non-Muslim Australians’ perceptions that Muslims support terrorism and non-Muslim Australians’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies completely lost significance upon entry of the perceptions of threat scale. This finding is suggestive of a full mediation effect. A Sobel test was conducted to confirm that non-Muslims’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat did fully mediate the relationship between non-Muslim Australian participants’ beliefs that Muslims support terrorism and non-Muslim Australian participants’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies ($z = 9.17; p<0.001$).
Table 9.5 OLS Regression Analysis Predicting Support for Punitive Counter-terrorism Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Block 1</th>
<th>Block 2</th>
<th>Block 3</th>
<th>Block 4</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
<td>β</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>***</td>
<td>2.984 (.159)</td>
<td>***</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2.792 (.149)</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.802 (.148)</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
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<td>Suspect motive(^{1})</td>
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<td>.036</td>
<td>.041 (.047)</td>
<td>.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.011 (.044)</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.014 (.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.010 (.002)</td>
<td>.142***</td>
<td>.006 (.002)</td>
<td>.080**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.003 (.002)</td>
<td>.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.002 (.002)</td>
<td>.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender(^{1})</td>
<td>.199 (.052)</td>
<td>.101***</td>
<td>.226 (.051)</td>
<td>.114***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.251 (.048)</td>
<td>.127***</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.247 (.047)</td>
<td>.125***</td>
</tr>
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<td>-.142 (.068)</td>
<td>-.052*</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>-.047*</td>
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<td>-.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-.097 (.020)</td>
<td>-.121***</td>
</tr>
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<td>-.064**</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.056 (.019)</td>
<td>-.070**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>.076 (.012)</td>
<td>.175***</td>
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<td>.293 (.023)</td>
<td>.325***</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.199 (.022)</td>
<td>.221***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceptions that Muslims support terrorism</td>
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<td>(1.30***)</td>
<td>(-.006 (.026))</td>
<td>(-.006)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.110 (.026)</td>
<td>.104***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>.359 (.029)</td>
<td>.421***</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>.368 (.029)</td>
<td>.432***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat</td>
<td>(1.24 (.026))</td>
<td>(1.30***)</td>
<td>(-.006 (.026))</td>
<td>(-.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian national ID x Perceptions that Muslims support terrorism</td>
<td>.094 (.027)</td>
<td>.098**</td>
<td>(-.109 (.025))</td>
<td>(-.123***)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian national ID x Perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat</td>
<td>.094 (.027)</td>
<td>.098**</td>
<td>(-.109 (.025))</td>
<td>(-.123***)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R^2)</td>
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<td>.526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted (R^2)</td>
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<td>.440</td>
<td>.517</td>
<td>.526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>---------------------------</td>
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<td>$R^2$ change</td>
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<td>1.11</td>
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<td>F^2</td>
<td>85.726</td>
<td>28.322</td>
<td>154.020</td>
<td>10.230</td>
</tr>
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</table>

NOTE: Reference categories for the dichotomous variables include: Suspect motive vignette manipulation (0=right-wing extremist motivation; 1=Islamic extremist motivation), Gender (0=male; 1=female), Country of birth (0= Australian born; 1 = overseas born), Employment status (0 = not employed; 1 = employed), * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.
Finally, in Block 4 of the regression, two two-way interaction effects were included in the model: (1) Australian national identity x perceptions that Muslims support terrorism; and (2) Australian national identity x perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat \((R^2 = 0.526)\). The first interaction effect between Australian national identity and perceptions that Muslims support terrorism was positive and significant \((\beta = 0.098, p<0.001; \text{ see Figure 9.3})\). The second interaction effect between Australian national identity and perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat was negative and significant \((\beta = -0.123, p<0.001; \text{ see Figure 9.4})\). Simple effects tests were computed for both interaction effects separately.

For the Australian national identity x perceptions that Muslims support terrorism interaction, simple effects tests were computed at -1 (low) and +1 (high) standard deviations of Australian national identity (see Figure 9.3). Results of the simple effects tests suggest that for high Australian national identifiers, the association between perceiving that Muslims support terrorism and support for punitive counter-terrorism policies was significant and positive \((\beta = 0.079, p<0.05)\). For low Australian national identifiers, there was a negative association between the two concepts \((\beta = -0.103, p<0.01)\). In other words, high national identifiers became more supportive of punitive counter-terrorism policies when they perceived that Muslims support terrorism. Low national identifiers became less supportive of punitive counter-terrorism policies when they perceived that Muslims support terrorism.
As noted above, the second interaction term between *Australian national identity* x *perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat* was negative and significant (-0.123, p<0.001). Simple effects tests were again conducted to more explicitly examine the nature of this interaction effect. Simple effects tests were computed at -1 (low) and +1 (high) standard deviations of Australian national identity and are depicted graphically in Figure 9.4. Confirming what can be seen in Figure 9.4, perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat was positively associated with non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies for both low (β = 0.568, p<0.001) and high (β = 0.330, p<0.001) Australian national identifiers. However, this positive association was much stronger for low national identifiers. In other words, perceiving Muslims as a
realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat appeared to have a much stronger effect on support for punitive counter-terrorism policies for low Australian national identifiers. Support for punitive counter-terrorism policies was very low for low Australian national identifiers who did not perceive Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. Yet, when low Australian national identifiers perceived Muslims to be a greater realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat, their support for punitive counter-terrorism policies became just as high as for high Australian national identifiers.

Figure 9.4 Two-way Interaction Between Australian National Identity and Perceptions that Muslims Pose a Realistic, Symbolic and Terroristic Threat on Support for Punitive Counter-Terrorism Policies

Before discussing the findings of Study 2, it must be noted that on average, participants in Study 2B were not overly supportive of punitive counter-terrorism policies regardless of whether they were low or high national identifiers. As can be
seen in both Figures 9.3 and 9.4, the average score on non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies was low.

9.6 Discussion of Study 2 Findings

9.6.1 Study 2A

Study 2A aimed to understand how non-Muslim Australian participants can come to perceive Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. The analyses were guided by three research questions:

RQ2 Do beliefs that Muslims support terrorism predict non-Muslim Australians’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat?

RQ3 Does the strength of non-Muslim Australians’ national identity (i.e., as an Australian) heighten their likelihood of perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat?

RQ4 Does the strength of non-Muslim Australians’ national identity (i.e., as an Australian) moderate the association between believing that Muslims support terrorism and perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat?

I found that participants who believed that Muslims support terrorism were more likely to see Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat (Hypothesis 4 supported). This finding extends prior work by Doosje et al. (2009) to demonstrate how believing that Muslims support terrorism is associated with non-Muslim Australian participants’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. Doosje et al. (2009) found a relationship between perceiving that
Muslims support terrorism and believing that too many Muslims live in the country, which the authors termed blatant prejudice, or viewing Muslims as a symbolic threat. However, the findings from Study 2A in my dissertation demonstrate how the belief that Muslims support terrorism can shape public perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. In other words, when participants perceived that Muslims support terrorism, they were more likely to view Muslims as a threat to their wellbeing (i.e., realistic threat), their values as Australians (i.e., symbolic threat), and as a terroristic threat.

Australian national identity was also positively associated with non-Muslim Australian participants seeing Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. Those with a stronger sense of national identity as Australian were more likely to perceive Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat (Hypothesis 5 supported). Findings also revealed that the Australian national identity variable moderated the association between non-Muslim Australian participants’ beliefs that Muslims support terrorism and non-Muslim Australian participants’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. As expected, participants who believed that Muslims support terrorism were most likely to view Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat when they identified strongly with their Australian national identity. Both high and low national identifiers were more likely to perceive that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat when they believed that Muslims support terrorism. However, the relationship between believing that Muslims support terrorism and perceiving that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat was more pronounced amongst high Australian national identifiers (Hypothesis 6 supported). These findings suggest that high identification with one’s Australian national identity (which was
conceptualised in my dissertation as the majority in-group, i.e., Australian) can be detrimental to Muslims, as it seems to make non-Muslims view Muslims in a more negative light.

Taken together, these findings support the role of majority in-group identification in shaping perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat (Brewer, 2001; Oswald, 2005; Reik et al., 2006; Stephan et al., 2009). These results extend the current literature base by demonstrating a link between in-group identity and three types of perceptions of threat (i.e., realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat). They also show how in-group identification can play a moderating role in shaping non-Muslim Australian participants’ perceptions of threat. Prior research suggests that in-group identification can moderate the relationship between negative attitudes towards minority groups and perceptions of threat (see, e.g., Stephan et al., 2002; Tausch et al., 2007). Study 2A provides new evidence of the moderating effect of majority in-group identification. Specifically, these findings demonstrate that the impacts of believing that Muslims support terrorism on non-Muslim Australians’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat differs depending on the strength of participants’ national identification (i.e., as an Australian).

9.6.2 Study 2B

Study 2B offers insight into why some non-Muslim Australians are more supportive of punitive counter-terrorism policies that disproportionately affect Muslim communities. Six research questions guided Study 2B:
RQ5 Do non-Muslim Australians’ beliefs that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat shape non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

RQ6 Do non-Muslim Australians’ beliefs that Muslims support terrorism shape non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

RQ7 Do non-Muslim Australians’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat mediate the relationship between the belief that Muslims support terrorism and non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

RQ8 Does the strength of non-Muslim Australians’ national identity (i.e., as an Australian) heighten their support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

RQ9 Does the strength of non-Muslim Australians’ national identity (i.e., as an Australian) moderate the association between perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat and non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

RQ10 Does the strength of non-Muslim Australians’ national identity (i.e., as an Australian) moderate the association between believing that Muslims support terrorism and non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

Overall, findings highlight that non-Muslim Australian participants’ perceptions of Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat matter most for explaining non-Muslim Australians’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies,
when compared to all other items included in the model. Those who perceived Muslims to be a greater realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat were more supportive of punitive counter-terrorism policies (Hypothesis 7 supported). Further, participants whose Australian national identity was more important to them and those who perceived that Muslims support terrorism were also more approving of punitive counter-terrorism policies (Hypothesis 8 and Hypothesis 10 supported).

The regression analysis identified a full mediating effect in the relationship between non-Muslim Australians’ beliefs that Muslims support terrorism and non-Muslim Australians’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. When the perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat scale was entered into the model, it fully mediated the relationship between participants’ beliefs that Muslims support terrorism and their support for punitive counter-terrorism policies (Hypothesis 9 supported). This result suggests that non-Muslim Australian participants’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat explains why believing that Muslims support terrorism is associated with participants’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. In other words, believing that Muslims support terrorism may promote greater support for punitive counter-terrorism policies because participants view Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. The results of this mediation lend support to the notion that perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat is linked to non-Muslims’ punitive attitudes towards counter-terrorism policies (Welch, 2016).

In addition to examining a mediation effect in the model, two interaction effects were included to examine how Australian national identity moderated the association between key concepts in the analyses. Specifically, the relationship between perceiving that Muslims support terrorism and non-Muslims’ punitive
attitudes towards counter-terrorism policies was tested further by exploring the moderating effect of the strength of Australian national identity. The interaction term between Australian national identity and perceiving that Muslims support terrorism on non-Muslim Australians’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies was statistically significant. This interaction effect showed that perceiving that Muslims support terrorism increased strong national identifiers’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies but did not do so for low national identifiers (Hypothesis 11 supported).

The second interaction effect revealed that perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat was much more strongly associated with support for punitive counter-terrorism policies for low national identifiers. This finding was unexpected, as it was hypothesised that participants with a strong Australian national identity would be more supportive of punitive counter-terrorism policies when they perceived Muslims to be a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat (Hypothesis 12 supported).

While not a major focus of Study 2B, the findings also revealed positive associations between non-Muslim Australians’ fear of terrorism and political orientation, and their support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. Specifically, those who were more fearful of terrorism and those who were more right-leaning were more likely to support punitive counter-terrorism policies. These findings support prior research conducted to examine support for punitive crime control policies (e.g., the death penalty) (Adriaenssen & Aertsen, 2015; Armbrorst, 2017).
9.7 Chapter Summary

Research on public attitudes towards Muslims has increased in recent years. Indeed, the perception that some non-Muslims deem Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat is supported in the literature (Fischer et al., 2007). Specifically, there is a pervasive attitude that Muslims are linked to terrorism. As such, studies have started to explore the relationship between perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat and believing that Muslims support terrorism (see, e.g., Doosje et al., 2009; Fischer et al., 2007). Study 2A examined the extent to which Australian national identity and perceptions that Muslims support terrorism predicted non-Muslim Australians’ perceptions that Muslims pose three different types of threat (i.e., a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat), finding a positive association.

Additionally, the threat of terrorism has led to divisive policies aimed at restricting immigration and targeting certain groups, namely Muslims. Given such directed policies, subsequent heightened punitiveness may drive a wedge between those perceived to be within a majority in-group and a minority out-group. It can also threaten the identities of those belonging to out-groups. Study 2B therefore tested if anti-Muslim attitudes (i.e., perceiving that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat; perceiving that Muslims support terrorism) and national identity shaped non-Muslim Australians’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. Results showed that they did.

Findings from Study 2A and Study 2B provides Australian evidence of non-Muslim Australians’ attitudes towards Muslims and its effect on support for controversial counter-terrorism policies in a climate where right-wing political
groups and ideologies are gaining increasing traction. Whether or not this has a subsequent impact on Muslim Australians’ experiences of stigmatisation, feelings of meta-punitiveness, and support for terrorism is unclear.

With this in mind, the following chapter details the findings from Study 3, which gauges the attitudes of Muslims themselves. In particular, Study 3 tests if Muslims feel their identities are under threat (i.e., by feeling stigmatised or that others are punitive towards their group (i.e., meta-punitiveness)). Moreover, Study 3 examines if these feelings of identity threat will affect Muslims’ support for terrorism (Bull & Rane, 2019). Finally, Study 3 determines if adhering to a dual identity as both a Muslim and an Australian mitigates the impacts of identity threat on Muslims’ support for terrorism.
Chapter 10: Study 3 Methods and Results

Examining How Identity and Identity Threats Shape Muslims’ Support for Terrorism: Does Holding a Dual Identity Serve a Protective Role?

10.1 Introduction

Understanding how terrorist groups may garner support for their violent actions is important for informing how such support can be mitigated. When individuals support terrorism, they are legitimising terrorists’ actions (Cherney & Murphy, 2019; Richardson, 2006; Tessler & Robbins, 2007). More fully understanding the processes that drive support for terrorism (whether that be passive or active support) is therefore crucial to developing strategies to mitigate terrorism. I examine how social-psychological processes may shape some Muslims’ passive support for terrorism, which I term support for terrorism throughout this chapter.

Within Australia, perpetrators identifying as Muslim have committed the majority of terrorist attacks (Zammit, 2017). On a more global level, an analysis of 33 OECD member states found that since 2014 18 OECD countries experienced Islamic State-directed or inspired attacks, which accounted for three-quarters of all terrorism-related deaths in these countries (Global Terrorism Index, 2017). The authors excluded Israel and Turkey from their analyses as they argue that “the nature of the terrorist threat in these countries is not directly comparable with the other OECD member states” (Global Terrorism Index, 2017, p. 52)

This study was published in 2017 when the following 35 member states comprised of the OECD: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK, and the US. On July 5th, 2018, Lithuania became the 36th country to join the OECD.
prevalence of Islamic-inspired terrorism has seen counter-terrorism laws being applied more frequently to Muslims, particularly in western democratic countries (Maoz & McCauley, 2008) such as Australia (Zammit, 2017). I argue that as a result, some Muslims may feel they are scrutinised more than other groups, which can result in them feeling an identity threat (Williamson, 2019). In this vein, it is important to understand how Muslims’ feelings that others hold negative views about their group may influence their likelihood to support terrorism as a consequence of the identity threat they experience.

Social Identity Theory (SIT) assumes that individuals strive to maintain a positive perception of their group and collective identity (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Victoroff et al. (2012) state that when perceived out-groups challenge an individual’s positive perception of themselves, they can experience an identity threat. This threat can spark a myriad of negative emotional and behavioural responses. One of these outcomes may be support for terrorism.

Meta-punitiveness or the perception that others are punitive towards one’s group is one form of identity threat. Meta-punitiveness signals that an individual does not belong (Tait, 2017; van Prooijen & Lam, 2007). Instead, people who deem the individual to be an out-group member perceive the individual as a criminal other, which can trigger an identity threat (Unnever & Cullen, 2010a). Stigmatisation is another type of identity threat. Stigmatisation can result when others associate one’s group with a negative stereotype (in the context of my dissertation; an example is that all Muslims are a threat to individual safety). Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010) argues that support for terrorism may manifest from frustration Muslims may endure as a result of the stigma they feel. My dissertation seeks to understand if these two types of identity threat (i.e., meta-punitiveness and stigmatisation) are associated with
Muslims’ support for terrorism, and how identification as a Muslim and as an Australian might influence this relationship.

This chapter presents the findings of Study 3. Study 3 examines a survey sample of 398 Muslims living in Sydney, Australia, to understand how identity and identity threats influence some Muslims’ likelihoods of supporting terrorism. This chapter describes the survey data utilised in Study 3 and the methods and measures employed to conduct Study 3. This chapter also overviews the descriptive statistics and correlations between all key variables of interest. Also, it presents the results of the regression analysis with support for terrorism as the dependent variable.

10.2 Aim, Research Questions and Hypotheses of Study 3

The aim of Study 3 is to test how social identity (as both a Muslim and an Australian) and two forms of identity threat (i.e., stigmatisation and meta-punitiveness) are associated with Muslims’ support for terrorism (see Figure 10.1). Of particular interest is if holding a dual identity as a Muslim and as an Australian can serve to protect against the negative association between feeling an identity threat and supporting terrorism.

Study 3 seeks to address the second objective of my dissertation. The second objective is to understand the extent to which Muslims feel as though non-Muslims view them in a stigmatising or punitive way (hence, experiencing an identity threat), and if such identity threats felt by Muslims predict their support for terrorism. Five research questions guide Study 3:
RQ11 Do Muslim Australians experience identity threat (do they feel stigmatised or feel that non-Muslims are punitive towards Muslims)?

RQ12 Do identity threats (i.e., feeling stigmatised, feeling others are punitive towards Muslims) enhance Muslim Australians’ support for terrorism?

RQ13 Does the strength of Muslims’ Australian national identity reduce their support for terrorism, even when Muslims feel their Australian national identities are threatened?

RQ14 Does the strength of Muslims’ religious identity heighten their support for terrorism, even when Muslims feel their religious identities are threatened?

RQ15 Does identifying strongly as an Australian, as a Muslim, or strongly as both an Australian and a Muslim (i.e. dual identity) moderate the association between experiencing an identity threat and supporting terrorism?

As mentioned above, SIT assumes that individuals strive to ensure their group membership is perceived positively (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). When these positive perceptions are challenged or derogated, an identity threat can be triggered. Victoroff et al. (2012) argue that negative emotional and behavioural reactions can manifest when individuals feel an identity threat. One such reaction may be support for terrorism. As such, I expect that participants who report feeling a stronger identity threat (i.e., stigmatisation; meta-punitiveness) will be more likely to support terrorism.
Scholarship also finds that strong identification with a majority group (e.g., Australian national identity) may protect against the adverse effects of identity threats (Dovidio et al., 2005; Sellers & Shelton, 2003). Prior research has found that holding a strong national identity is associated with reduced support for terrorism (Cherney & Murphy, 2019; Tausch et al., 2009). As such, I expect that participants who identify strongly with their Australian national identity will be less likely to support terrorism. I also predict that those who identify more strongly as Australian will be less likely to support terrorism when they feel their identities are threatened.

An individual’s strong identification with a minority group (e.g., as a Muslim) may exacerbate the effects of perceived identity threats from others (Eccleston & Major, 2006; Sellers & Shelton, 2003). Moreover, strong minority identification is also arguably associated with an individual’s likelihood to support actions or behaviours that defend their group’s interests (Tausch et al., 2009). Thus, I expect that Muslims who identify strongly with their Islamic faith (high religious identifiers) will be more likely to support terrorism. Importantly, religious identity will interact with feelings of identity threat to increase Muslims’ support for terrorism. I suggest this finding may occur as a result of defending the interests of their religious affiliation.

Previous research suggests that adopting a strong dual identity may protect minorities against intergroup biases and perceived threats (Dovidio et al., 2005). This is because a dual identity enables individuals to benefit from identifying with numerous identities simultaneously (Dovidio et al., 2005; Dovidio et al., 2009). Research on dual identification processes highlights how individual with numerous identities can feel a sense of inclusion with the majority group while being able to express perceived injustices experienced from a minority perspective (Dovidio et al.,
I therefore expect that when participants strongly identify as both an Australian and as a Muslim, they will be less likely to support terrorism. Importantly, I expect support for terrorism will be lower when Muslims hold a strong dual identity, even when they experience an identity threat.

Based on this prior research, the following seven hypotheses are tested.

**H1**

Identity threats will be associated with greater support for terrorism; specifically: (a) a heightened feeling of meta-punitiveness will be associated with greater support for terrorism (H1A), and (b) a heightened feeling of stigmatisation will be associated with greater support for terrorism (H1B).

**H2**

A strong Australian national identity will be associated with reduced support for terrorism.

**H3**

A strong religious identity as a Muslim will be associated with increased support for terrorism.

**H4**

A strong Australian national identity will reduce the harmful effect of identity threat (i.e., stigma; meta-punitiveness) on support for terrorism.

**H5**

A strong religious identity as a Muslim will exacerbate the harmful effect of identity threat (i.e., stigma; meta-punitiveness) on support for terrorism.

**H6**

The significant positive association between religious identity and support for terrorism will be much weaker for those who also identify strongly as Australian.
H19 Holding a strong dual identity as both a Muslim and an Australian will reduce the likelihood of supporting terrorism when the individual feels a heightened sense of identity threat (i.e., stigma; meta-punitiveness).

Figure 10.1 presents the conceptual model that is tested in Study 3.

**Figure 10.1 Conceptual Map Guiding Relationships Tested in Study 3**

10.3 Methods

10.3.1 Survey Design

Study 3 utilises survey data from the *Sydney Immigrant Survey* (SIS). The SIS was undertaken as part of a Griffith University Australian Research Council grant (Grant Number DP170101149) held by Professor Kristina Murphy and Dr Elise Sargeant (my PhD supervisors), Associate Professor Adrian Cherney (University of Queensland) and Professor Ben Bradford (University College London). The grant involved surveying three immigrant groups (the UK/Irish immigrants, Vietnamese immigrants and Middle Eastern Muslim immigrants). Study 3 only utilises survey data from Middle Eastern Muslim immigrants. I was able to include several
questions in the SIS for use in my dissertation (see Appendix E for a copy of the SIS survey instrument).

The SIS included 164 questions and sought to gauge immigrants’ attitudes towards police and government. Also measured were immigrants’ perceptions of identity threat from police and the public, feelings towards other groups and their sense of identity and perceived status within Australia (see the SIS technical report for more details) (Murphy et al., 2019). The SIS included five sections. Section 1 comprised of a series of questions canvassing participants’ background information. Section 2 included a range of questions asking about participants’ identity with various groups in society. Section 3 comprised of questions about how included participants feel in Australian society by members of the public and authorities. Section 4 asked participants about the presence of crime within their communities, as well as their experiences of victimisation. Finally, Section 5 included a range of questions overviewing participants’ views of police and government. Due to space limitations in the survey, some of the control items identified in Chapter 3 (e.g., perceptions of jihad) are not included in the analyses in Chapter 10.

10.3.2 Sampling Strategy and Data Collection

A quota-based sampling strategy was used to obtain the desired sample of 900 participants across the three immigrant groups (180 participants from the UK/Ireland, 360 Vietnamese participants and 360 Middle Eastern Muslim participants). The sampling strategy of the Middle Eastern Muslim subsample is of relevance to my dissertation (Murphy et al., 2019). As such, only the sampling strategy and procedure used to generate the Muslim sample will be discussed in this chapter.
All participants in the SIS were drawn from Sydney. Given the low proportion of Muslims living in Australia (<3% of the population and <5% in Sydney), normal random probability sampling techniques were considered inappropriate to reach the desired sample. Instead, an ethnic naming system was used to generate a sampling frame. A total of 7,477 names for the Middle Eastern Muslim cohort was generated from the publicly available electronic telephone directory (e.g., Ahmed, Mohammad). From here, potential participants living in Sydney were contacted at random by telephone and invited to participate in the survey. This sampling technique is statistically reliable (Challice & Johnson, 2005) and can produce representative samples of hard-to-reach population groups (Himmelfarb et al., 1983; Murphy et al., 2015; Murphy et al., 2012).

The survey was fielded between February and May 2018 via face-to-face interviews with participants (Murphy et al., 2019). Cultural Partners, a Sydney-based company specialising in recruiting research participants from culturally and linguistically diverse communities, was engaged to administer the survey. Muslim facilitators employed by Cultural Partners contacted potential participants from the sampling list. On initial telephone contact, the facilitator asked to speak to a person in the household who was next to celebrate their birthday. Two screening questions were then asked to ascertain eligibility for the study: (1) was the participant Muslim and (2) were they over the age of 18. This person was then invited to participate in a face-to-face interview at a time convenient for them. Quotas were also placed on gender (50% men; 50% women), age (50% younger than 30; 50% older than 30), and immigrant status (50% first-generation immigrant; 50% second-generation immigrant). A total of 395 participants meeting these criteria completed a survey (Murphy et al., 2019).
Several months after the data collection had been completed, an error in sampling was detected. Hence, the survey was fielded again in March 2019 to replace 17 out-of-scope Middle Eastern Muslim participants found in the initial dataset (Murphy et al., 2019). These out-of-scope cases did not comply with the survey eligibility criteria. They included multiple participants from the same household, Middle Eastern participants who were not Muslims, and some participants under the age of 18. The analyses presented in my dissertation draw on in-scope survey data only. A final sample of 398 Middle Eastern Muslims was obtained (Murphy et al., 2019).

10.3.3 Participants and Procedure

The final sample of 398 Middle Eastern Muslim participants represented a 34.85% response rate. The Middle Eastern Muslim sample included 50.0% males, and the average age of participants was 32.6 years old (SD = 11.3) (Murphy et al., 2019). Just over half of the sample were born in Australia (51.1%), 100.0% were Australian citizens, and 49.5% were first-generation immigrants. Almost half of the sample had a certificate/diploma, or trade certificate (46.0%), followed by those who had completed secondary school (20.4%), and those who had not (13.4%). The remaining sample had completed a bachelor’s degree (11.1%) or had postgraduate qualifications (9.3%). More than half of the sample reported being married (56.8%), followed by those who were not married (43.2%; this included participants who reported being divorced or separated (10.1%), and those who were widowed (1.3%)) (Murphy et al., 2019). Participants who worked full time made up 52.3% of the sample. Those who worked part-time (13.3%) and those who selected home duties (12.3%) represented the next largest groups, followed by those who were studying and working (7.5%), and those solely studying (6.3%). The remaining sample
included unemployed participants (6.0%), and those who were retired (2.3%). Participants earned an average of $60,000 per year (see Table 10.1) (Murphy et al., 2019).

Table 10.1 Demographic Characteristics of SIS Muslim Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Mean%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>32.6(^{68})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Citizen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of Birth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>51.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas</td>
<td>48.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant Status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-generation</td>
<td>49.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second-generation</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Attainment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not complete high school</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed secondary school</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade/Technical Certificate or Diploma</td>
<td>46.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor’s Degree</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postgraduate Degree</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working full-time</td>
<td>52.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working part-time</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studying and working</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed and seeking work</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed and not seeking work</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home duties</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>56.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{68}\) The age range of the sample in the SIS is between 18-80 years old, the standard deviation is 11.3 and participants’ median age is 30.
### Variable Mean Mean/%

#### Unmarried

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Mean/%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$0</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$5,000</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10,000-15,000</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$20,000</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$25,000</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$30,000</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$35,000-40,000</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$45,000-50,000</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$55,000-65,000</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$70,000-75,000</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$80,000-90,000</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$95,000-100,000</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$110,000-150,000</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$160,000+</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Sample Representativeness of the SIS Survey

As a quota-based sampling strategy was used in this survey, the final sample was not expected to be representative of the Middle Eastern Muslim population in Sydney (see Table 10.2). For example, females were slightly over-represented in the SIS (by 1.7%). Participants were over-represented in the 15-24 and 25-44-year-old age groups, by 9.1% and 28.1% respectively. Participants were slightly under-represented in the older age groups by 6.0% amongst those aged 45-64 years old and 4.3% amongst those aged 65 and above. These differences were expected given the requirement to include a quota of 50% Muslims under the age of 30. Single and married participants were also over-represented by 26.4% and 1.1% of the sample respectively, while widowed and separated participants were under-represented by 1.3% and 2.2% respectively. Australian-born participants were also over-represented by 2.4% in the sample. Finally, lower-income earners were under-represented in the
sample, while higher-income earners were over-represented. For example, participants who reported earning between $10,000-20,000 were under-represented by 20.1%, while those earning between $35,000-$75,000, and $80,000+ were over-represented by 25.9% and 20.4% respectively.
### Table 10.2 Sample Representativeness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample group</th>
<th>Sample %</th>
<th>Sydney Census %</th>
<th>Absolute difference %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-24*</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>+9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-44</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>+28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>-6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>-4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>+1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marital Status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>+1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>+26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced or separated</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country of Birth</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian born</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>+2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas born</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>-12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$5,000</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>-5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10,000-15,000</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>-10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$20,000</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>-10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$25,000</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>-4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$30,000</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>-4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$35,000-40,000</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>+4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$45,000-50,000</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>+6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$55,000-65,000</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>+9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$70,000-75,000</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>+6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$80,000-90,000</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>+7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$95,000-100,000</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>+4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$105,000-150,000</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>+5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$155,000+</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>+2.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

69 ABS category ranges from $1-$7,799; $7,800-$15,599; $15,600-$20,799; $20,800-$25,999; $26,000-$33,799; $33,800-$41,599; $41,600-$51,999; $52,000-$64,999; $65,000-$77,999; $78,000-$90,999; $91,000-$103,999; $91,000-$103,999; $104,000-$155,999; and $156,000 or more.
10.3.5 Measures used in Study 3

Five key concepts were included in Study 3. The conceptualisation and operationalisation of each concept are described below. Table 10.3 presents the wording of individual items used in the construction of each scale.

10.3.5.1 Key Concepts of Interest. Support for terrorism. A support for terrorism scale is included as the dependent variable. Examining support for terrorism is a sensitive topic. Challenges arise with recruiting participants in studies about their perceptions of terrorism, and in minimising non-response rates because of the nature of the questions (Fair et al., 2012). There is a trend in terrorism research to develop questions that indirectly gauge attitudes towards terrorism to avoid non-response. Three items are used in Study 3 as a proxy measure for participants’ support for terrorism (see Table 10.3). This scale uses constructs adapted from a scale used by van den Bos et al. (2009) to measure support for terrorism (e.g., ‘It is justifiable for people to use violence against other people to achieve something that they think is very important’). The items in this scale asked participants to rate on a five-point Likert scale (i.e., 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) the extent to which they support terrorism (or not; Cronbach’s alpha = 0.94). A higher score on this scale indicates stronger support for terrorism (Mean = 1.71; SD = 0.92).

The mean score demonstrates that the majority of Muslims in the sample disagreed with the statements. When breaking down responses by each item, on average, 30.67% of participants agreed or strongly agreed with each statement. The support for terrorism scale was positively skewed so a log transformation was

70 Twenty-eight participants agreed or strongly agreed with the first item presented in Table 10.3, 30 participants agreed or strongly agreed with the second item and 28 participants agreed or strongly agreed with the third item.
computed to normalise the measure prior to analysis (Tabachnick et al., 2007). This log-transformed measure is used in subsequent analyses.

**Australian national identity.** As discussed in detail in Chapter 4, people can harbour various identities (Huo, 2003). One such group they may identify with is the country that they live in, such as by identifying as British, American, or in the case of my dissertation, Australian. Here this group is denoted as the majority group because it constitutes the majority of a country’s population that the individual identifies with.

A 3-item Australian national identity scale adapted from Murphy’s (2013) work is used in Study 3. Items are measured on a 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree Likert scale. This scale measures Muslims’ strength of national (i.e., Australian) identity (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.78). An example of an item used in this scale is ‘I identify strongly with being Australian’. A higher score on the Australian national identity scale indicates a stronger sense of national identity (as an Australian). Muslim participants in the sample reported identifying strongly as Australian (Mean = 4.41; SD = 0.57).

**Religious identity.** Alternatively or in addition to identifying with majority groups, individuals may also identify with other minority groups (Huo et al., 1996). Examples of other groups can include ethnic, racial, or religious groups. As a key component of my dissertation focuses on Muslims living in Australia, a separate item was included to measure religious identity.

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71 All analyses were repeated using the dependent variable without the log transformation, and the same pattern of results was found. However, the interaction effect did not reach significance at the p<0.05 level. As such, the findings presented in this chapter draw on the analysis with the log transformed dependent variable.
The religious identity measure comprises of one item (i.e., ‘How important is your religion to who you are as a person?’ and is measured on a 1=very unimportant to 5=very important scale). A higher score on the religious identity measure indicated a stronger sense of importance ascribed to participants’ identities as Muslims. Muslim participants in the sample identified strongly with their religion (Mean = 4.10; SD = 1.40).

Identity Threat: Stigmatisation. Feeling stigmatised can be defined as an individual’s feeling that they are unfairly associated with a negative stereotype (Link & Phelan, 2001). Goffman (1963) describes a marker of stigma as being a social identity that is rejected or seen as deviant (e.g., being overweight, a criminal).

I operationalise stigmatisation as a type of identity threat. It is measured as feeling scrutinised as a threat to safety by authorities, the media and the public. Recent research has highlighted the propensity for Muslims to feel highly scrutinised by authorities, the media and the public (Breen-Smyth, 2014; Murphy et al., 2018). As such, four items are included in the scale to measure participants’ self-reported feelings of stigmatisation from authorities, the media, and the public (e.g., ‘I sometimes feel under scrutiny by police and authorities because of my ethnicity, race or religion ’). Items were measured on a 1=very unlikely to feel this to 5=very likely to feel this Likert scale and are adapted from the work of Murphy et al. (2015; 2018). A higher score denotes a heightened feeling of stigma (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.91). Overall, participants felt somewhat stigmatised (Mean = 3.30; SD = 1.07).

Identity Threat: Meta-punitiveness. In addition to stigmatisation, the second type of identity threat - meta-punitiveness - is included in Study 3. The term meta-punitiveness describes one’s feeling that others are more punitive towards them because of their group membership. As discussed in Section 4.4 of Chapter 4, a sense
of meta-punitiveness may arise amongst Muslims as a result of widespread stereotypes that link Muslims with terrorism (Casey, 2017).

The single-item measure of meta-punitiveness asks participants how much they agree or disagree with the following statement (1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree scale): ‘People like you are usually punished more harshly for committing crimes than other Australians because of your race, ethnicity, or religion.’ Muslim participants generally felt that others are punitive towards their groups (Mean = 3.43; SD = 1.11). The meta-punitiveness item was developed for my dissertation but has been adapted from other similar measures of feelings of meta identity threat in the literature (see, e.g., Kazemi et al., 2008).

10.3.5.2 Principal Axis Factor Analysis. Table 10.3 presents the results of a Principal Axis Factor (PAF) Analysis. It outlines the survey items used to construct the support for terrorism, the Australian national identity, and the stigmatisation scales (see Table 10.3). Factor 1 comprised of three items measuring Australian national identity, Factor 2 included four items measuring stigmatisation, and Factor 3 contained three items measuring support for terrorism. The three scales were created by calculating the mean of each item in the factor groups. The meta-punitiveness and religious identity items were not included in the PAF Analysis as they are single-item measures.
Table 10.3 PAF Analysis: Constructs and Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Australian National Identity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am proud to be an Australian</td>
<td></td>
<td>.72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I identify strongly with being Australian</td>
<td></td>
<td>.88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being an Australian is important to the way I think of myself as a person</td>
<td></td>
<td>.61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Stigmatisation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I sometimes feel under scrutiny by police and authorities because of my ethnicity, race or religion</td>
<td></td>
<td>.85</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I sometimes feel under scrutiny by the media because of my ethnicity, race or religion</td>
<td></td>
<td>.84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I sometimes feel police view me as a potential threat to public safety because of my ethnicity, race or religion</td>
<td></td>
<td>.89</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I sometimes feel the Australian public views me as a threat to public safety because of my ethnicity, race or religion</td>
<td></td>
<td>.82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Support for Terrorism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using violence to achieve one’s political, ideological or religious cause is sometimes ok</td>
<td></td>
<td>.87</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is sometimes appropriate for people to use violence to support a political, ideological or religious cause</td>
<td></td>
<td>.99</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is justifiable for people to use violence against other people to achieve something that they think is very important</td>
<td></td>
<td>.90</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Eigenvalues (before rotation)                                        | 3.35   | 2.84| 1.80|
Eigenvalues (after rotation)                                         | 2.97   | 2.64| 1.88|

Extraction method: PAF Analysis with oblimin rotation. Only factor loadings >0.40 are presented.
10.3.5.3 **Control Variables.** A range of demographic variables are also measured in Study 3. Prior research shows various demographic factors can be associated with Muslims’ support for terrorism (e.g., Cherney & Murphy, 2019; Fair & Shepherd, 2006; Shafiq & Sinno, 2010). It is important to note that some of the predicates of support for terrorism mentioned in Chapter 3, such as perceptions of jihad, were not available in the SIS data. The demographic characteristics included in Study 3 are age, gender (0 = male; 1 = female), marital status (0 = never married; 1 = has been married), educational attainment (ranging from 1 = no schooling to 7 = postgraduate qualifications), annual income (ranging from 1 = less than $20,000 to 6 = $101,000-$120,000) and immigrant status (0 = first-generation immigrant; 1 = second-generation immigrant).

10.4 **Analytic Approach**

Descriptive statistics, bivariate correlations, and an OLS regression analysis were conducted in Study 3. Variables were entered into Blocks to determine the variance each group of variables had on the dependent variable. All continuous variables and scales were mean-centred before undertaking the regression analyses.

10.5 **Study 3 Results**

10.5.1 **Construct Validity of Variables of Interest**

10.5.1.1 **Cronbach’s Alpha Test.** Three multi-item scales were computed to represent three of the five key variables of interest in Study 3: Australian national identity, stigmatisation and support for terrorism (see Table 10.3 for the wording of items used in each scale). Reliability analyses were executed to obtain the Cronbach’s Alpha scores for each multi-item scale. Scores for all scales
were over 0.70, which demonstrates that the scales had high internal consistency and were all reliable scales (see Table 10.4) (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). Table 10.4 also presents the descriptive statistics of the five key variables of interest.

### Table 10.4 Mean Scores, SDs and Reliability Scores for Key Variables used in Study 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables of Interest</th>
<th>Number of items</th>
<th>Cronbach’s Alpha (α)</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australian national identity</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>4.41</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious identity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stigmatisation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meta-punitiveness</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for terrorism</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 10.5.2 Bivariate Correlations

Bivariate correlations were computed to identify significant relationships between the demographic variables and the five key variables of interest. As shown in Table 10.5, several demographic variables were associated with both identity threat items. Firstly, age ($r = -0.115$, $p<0.05$) was negatively associated with feelings of stigmatisation. In other words, the older a participant was, the less stigmatised they reported feeling. In terms of the second identity threat measure, income ($r = 0.101$, $p<0.05$) was positively associated with meta-punitiveness. This correlation means that participants with a higher income were more likely to report feeling that others were punitive towards their group (i.e., meta-punitiveness). This finding suggests that participants with a higher status felt more affected by perceived hostility directed towards their group (i.e., by feeling that others are punitive towards
them). Both the identity threat measures were positively correlated with each other ($r = 0.623$, $p<0.001$). These results demonstrate that the more participants felt stigmatised, the more they also felt that others were punitive towards their group.

Turning to the identity measures, age ($r = -0.133$, $p<0.01$) and educational attainment ($r = 0.113$, $p<0.05$) were correlated with religious identity. These findings suggest that older Muslim participants were less likely to identify with their religious identity. Those with higher education were more likely to have a stronger religious identity. In terms of Australian national identity, stigmatisation ($r = -0.175$, $p<0.001$) and meta-punitiveness ($r = -0.165$, $p<0.001$) were negatively related to Australian national identity. These findings suggest that the more participants identified strongly as Australian, the less stigmatised they reported feeling and the less likely they were to feel that others were punitive towards their group.

Finally, a series of significant relationships were also observed between the items of interest and the dependent variable, support for terrorism. In terms of the demographic variables, educational attainment ($r = -0.118$, $p<0.05$) was negatively associated with support for terrorism. This finding suggests that those with more education were less likely to support terrorism. Research tends to find that males are more supportive of terrorism, although there are notable exceptions (i.e., Haddad & Khashan, 2002). In terms of educational attainment, previous studies have found an inconsistent association between educational attainment and support for terrorism (Shafiq & Sinno, 2010; Victoroff et al., 2012).

Of the key items of interest, Australian national identity ($r = -0.150$, $p<0.01$) and meta-punitiveness ($r = 0.137$, $p<0.01$) were significantly associated with support for terrorism. These correlations show that those with a stronger Australian national identity were less likely to support terrorism. Those who perceived others as more
punitive towards their group were more likely to support terrorism (see Table 10.5). In terms of the former correlation, research to date examining social-psychological explanations of support for terrorism have found that a strong majority or in-group identity is associated with reduced support for terrorism (Cherney & Murphy, 2019; Tausch et al., 2009). The latter correlation includes a variable conceptualised and operationalised specifically for my dissertation; thus no prior work has explored the antecedents of meta-punitiveness. Finally, it must be noted that both stigmatisation and religious identity were not significantly correlated with support for terrorism. These findings are unexpected as prior research has found a correlation between similar identity threats (e.g., discrimination) and support for terrorism (see, e.g., Victoroff et al., 2012), and religious identification and support for terrorism (see, e.g., Tausch et al., 2009).
Table 10.5 Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations for all Variables and Scales

| Items                                      | α   | M     | SD    | 1    | 2    | 3     | 4     | 5    | 6    | 7    | 8    |
|--------------------------------------------|-----|-------|-------|------|------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Age                                        | 1   | N/A   | 32.6  | 11.3 |     |       |       |      |      |      |      | 1    |
| Educational Attainment<sup>1</sup>          | 1   | N/A   | 5.81  | 2.13 | -.13<sup>**</sup> | 1      |       |      |      |      |      |      |
| Income<sup>2</sup>                          | 1   | N/A   | 13.07 | 6.97 | -.08 | .32<sup>***</sup> | 1      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Australian national identity               | 3   | 0.78  | 4.41  | 0.57 | .01  | .03   | .004  | 1    |      |      |      |      |
| Religious identity                         | 1   | N/A   | 4.10  | 1.40 | -.13<sup>**</sup> | .11*   | .06   | -.00 | 1    |      |      |      |
| Meta-punitiveness                          | 1   | N/A   | 3.43  | 1.11 | -.05 | .08   | .10*  | -.17<sup>***</sup> | .10* | 1    |      |      |
| Stigmatisation                             | 3   | 0.91  | 3.30  | 1.07 | -.12* | .08   | .10   | -.18<sup>***</sup> | .13** | .62<sup>***</sup> | 1    |      |
| Support for terrorism                      | 3   | 0.94  | 1.71  | 0.92 | -.03 | -.12* | -.07  | -.15<sup>**</sup> | .00  | .14<sup>**</sup> | -.01 | 1    |

Note: Most scales were measured on a 1-5 Likert scale; higher scores indicated stronger agreement with the construct. <sup>1</sup>Educational attainment: reflected an average 12-year attainment level. <sup>2</sup>Income: reflected an average salary of AUD$60,000, * indicates a significant relationship at p<0.05; ** indicates a significant relationship at p<0.01; *** indicates a significant relationship at p<0.001.
10.5.3 Study 3 Regression Analysis

Study 3 employed an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis to determine the relationship between a series of demographic variables and the key independent variables of interest on Muslim participants’ support for terrorism. Variables were entered in Blocks to observe their unique amount of variance. In Block 1, demographic variables were entered. In Block 2, the Australian national identity and religious identity variables were added. The two identity threat measures (i.e., stigmatisation; meta-punitiveness) were entered in Block 3. In Block 4, five two-way interaction terms were entered into the model. These included: (1) stigmatisation x Australian national identity, (2) meta-punitiveness x Australian national identity, (3) stigmatisation x religious identity, (4) meta-punitiveness x religious identity and (5) Australian national identity x religious identity. Finally, in Block 5, two three-way interaction terms were entered into the model \((stigmatisation \times \text{Australian national identity} \times \text{religious identity}; \ meta-punitiveness \times \text{Australian national identity} \times \text{religious identity})\). All scales were mean-centred before interaction terms were computed and before each item was entered into the regression analysis.\(^{72}\) It should be noted that the dependent variable was highly skewed. As such, the log transform of this variable was used in the analysis.\(^{73}\)

\(^{72}\) Assumption tests were conducted. The log of the dependent variable was calculated to normalise the variable due to its skewness. Also, the VIF and tolerance values were assessed to ensure there was no multicollinearity amongst variables. It is suggested that VIF scores above 10 denotes multicollinearity between variables (Hair et al., 1995; Mela & Kopalle, 2002). In the final model, the lowest tolerance score was 0.798 and the highest VIF score was 1.253.

\(^{73}\) A regression was run using the untransformed dependent variable, which yielded the same result, except for a significant interaction effect at \(p<0.05\). As such, the analysis using the log transformed dependent variable was used in Chapter 10.
In Block 1, the demographic variables only accounted for 3.2% of the overall variance in support for terrorism. Gender (β = -0.124, p<0.05) was negatively associated with support for terrorism (see Table 10.6). Females were less likely to support terrorism. Immigrant status was not significantly associated with support for terrorism. This finding suggests that there is no statistically significant difference in how first- or second-generation immigrants perceive terrorism.

In Block 2, (R² = 0.055), the Australian national identity and religious identity scales were entered into the model. The addition of the two identity measures contributed 2.3% of the variance in the model. Australian national identity was negatively and significantly associated with support for terrorism (β = -0.151, p<0.01). In other words, the more participants identified as Australian, the less likely they were to support terrorism. Religious identity was not a statistically significant predictor of support for terrorism. This finding suggests that amongst the sample, the strength of one’s identification with their faith is not associated with support for terrorism, contrary to other research (e.g., Cherney & Povey, 2013; Egger & Magni-Berton, 2019). Gender remained the only significant control variable in this Block of the analysis.

In Block 3 (R² = 0.089), two types of identity threat measures were entered into the model. These two identity threat measures added 3.4% of the variance in support for terrorism. Meta-punitiveness was positively associated with support for terrorism (β = 0.222, p<0.001), which suggests that participants who feel others are more punitive towards Muslims are more likely to support terrorism. Stigmatisation was negatively associated with support for terrorism (β = -0.205, p<0.01). As no correlation was found between stigmatisation and support for terrorism, the significant relationship identified in the regression model was unexpected.
I re-ran the regression models and removed the stigmatisation scale in one model and the meta-punitiveness item in another model to see if the regression coefficients were affected. When stigmatisation was removed, meta-punitiveness remained significant at p<0.05 (β= 0.099). The coefficient more than halved and was not as strongly significant as with the inclusion of the stigmatisation scale (β=0.222, p<0.001). When the meta-punitiveness item was removed from the model, stigmatisation was not significant (β=0.070, p>0.05). As the stigmatisation scale was non-significant in the correlation matrix but significant in the regression model, it is suggestive of a suppression effect.

A suppression effect occurs when an independent variable is entered into a model that is not correlated with a dependent variable but is correlated with other independent variables, and as such improves the overall prediction of the dependent variable (Lancaster, 1999). In other words, when included in the regression model, the suppressor variable increases the regression coefficient between an independent variable and the dependent variable (Cohen et al., 2013).

The results in my regression model demonstrate a suppression effect whereby the relationship between meta-punitiveness and support for terrorism is improved by including the stigmatisation scale in the model. Thus, the stigmatisation scale helps to explain why Muslim participants who felt a strong sense of meta-punitiveness were more likely to support terrorism, even though the direct effect between stigmatisation and support for terrorism was negative. This suppression effect may suggest that Muslim participants’ feelings that others are punitive towards Muslims because of their group membership may present a source of stigma for Muslims. Resultantly, such feelings of meta-punitiveness may predict support for terrorism. However, when examining the separate effects of stigmatisation and meta-
Punitiveness on Muslim participants’ support for terrorism, findings suggest that identity threats may differentially impact Muslims. Reasons for the difference in these findings between meta-punitiveness and stigmatisation, and their differential association with support for terrorism are discussed in more detail in Chapter 11.

In Block 4 of the regression, five two-way interaction terms were entered into the model \( (R^2 = 0.108) \). There was no significant relationship between the stigmatisation x Australian national identity and stigmatisation x religious identity interaction terms on support for terrorism. These findings suggest that the negative association between stigmatisation and support for terrorism did not differ by participants’ strength of identity with their nation or their faith. Specifically, stigmatisation was negatively associated with support for terrorism for both high and low Australian national identifiers and both high and low religious identifiers. Similarly, there was no significant interaction effect between meta-punitiveness x Australian national identity or meta-punitiveness x religious identity. The null results of these two interaction terms also show that the positive association between meta-punitiveness and support for terrorism did not differ by the strength of participants’ identities as Australian or as Muslims.
Table 10.6 OLS Regression Analysis Predicting Support for Terrorism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Block 1</th>
<th>Block 2</th>
<th>Block 3</th>
<th>Block 4</th>
<th>Block 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$B$ (SE)</td>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>$B$ (SE)</td>
<td>$\beta$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.804 (.152)</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>.797 (.150)</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.002 (.003)</td>
<td>-.059</td>
<td>-.003 (.003)</td>
<td>-.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender$^l$</td>
<td>-.114 (.047)</td>
<td>-.124*</td>
<td>-.104 (.046)</td>
<td>-.113*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status$^l$</td>
<td>-.049 (.050)</td>
<td>-.053</td>
<td>-.043 (.049)</td>
<td>-.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Attainment</td>
<td>-.022 (.012)</td>
<td>-.103</td>
<td>-.021 (.012)</td>
<td>-.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.003 (.004)</td>
<td>-.047</td>
<td>-.003 (.004)</td>
<td>-.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant Status$^l$</td>
<td>-.009 (.058)</td>
<td>-.010</td>
<td>-.025 (.058)</td>
<td>-.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian national ID</td>
<td>-.122 (.040)</td>
<td>-.151**</td>
<td>-.120 (.041)</td>
<td>-.148**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious ID</td>
<td>.007 (.016)</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.008 (.016)</td>
<td>.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meta-punitiveness</td>
<td>.092 (.026)</td>
<td>.222***</td>
<td>.088 (.027)</td>
<td>.212***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stigmatisation</td>
<td>-.089 (.027)</td>
<td>-.205***</td>
<td>-.092 (.028)</td>
<td>-.212**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian national ID x Religious ID</td>
<td>.032 (.049)</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.045 (.053)</td>
<td>.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meta-punitiveness x Australian national ID</td>
<td>.007 (.150)</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.000 (.052)</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stigmatisation x Religious ID</td>
<td>-.023 (.017)</td>
<td>-.085</td>
<td>-.024 (.017)</td>
<td>-.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meta-punitiveness x Religious ID</td>
<td>.016 (.018)</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td>.018 (.019)</td>
<td>.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stigmatisation x Australian national ID x Religious ID</td>
<td>.018 (.027)</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>.018 (.027)</td>
<td>.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meta-punitiveness x Australian national ID x Religious ID</td>
<td>-.014 (.032)</td>
<td>-.031</td>
<td>-.014 (.032)</td>
<td>-.031</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$R^2$ | .032 | .055 | .089 | .108 | .109
<p>| | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td>.073</td>
<td>.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$ change</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F^2$</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>.058</td>
<td>.098</td>
<td>.121</td>
<td>.122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F$ Change</td>
<td>2.146</td>
<td>4.677</td>
<td>7.255</td>
<td>1.675</td>
<td>.222</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: | Reference categories for the dichotomous variables include: Gender (0=male; 1=female), Marital status (0=married; 1=not married); immigrant status (0=1st generation; 1=2nd generation), * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.
The two-way interaction term between Australian national identity x religious identity on Muslims’ support for terrorism was positive and significant ($\beta = 0.108$, $p<0.05$). This association between Australian national identity and religious identity is displayed graphically in Figure 10.2. Simple effects tests were conducted at -1 (low) and +1 (high) standard deviations of religious identity to explore the nature of the effect. Figure 10.2 shows that the combination of holding a low religious identity (as a Muslim) and a high Australian national identity was associated with lower support for terrorism. For those who identified less with their religion, holding an Australian national identity had a much stronger effect on their support for terrorism ($\beta = -0.236$, $p<0.001$). For those who identified strongly as Muslim, however, the strength of Australian national identity had no impact on their support for terrorism; this relationship was non-significant ($\beta = 0.041$, $p>0.05$). The findings of this interaction effect suggest that identifying as Australian serves as a protective factor against support for terrorism, but only for those Muslims who identify weakly with their Muslim faith.
Finally, two three-way interactions were included in Block 5 ($R^2 = 0.109$). These two three-way interactions examined the effect of holding a dual identity and feelings of identity threat on participants’ support for terrorism. Neither interaction reached significance. The results of the two non-significant interaction terms suggest that holding a dual identity (strong identity with both Australia and one’s religion) does not offer protection from Muslims’ supporting terrorism when they feel their identities are under threat.

10.6 Discussion of Study 3 Findings

Study 3 sought to test how two forms of identity threat (i.e., stigmatisation; meta-punitiveness) and identification as both a Muslim and an Australian were related to Muslims’ support for terrorism. Five research questions guided Study 3:
RQ11  Do Muslim Australians experience identity threat (do they feel stigmatised or feel that non-Muslims are punitive towards Muslims)?

RQ12  Do identity threats (i.e., feeling stigmatised, feeling others are punitive towards Muslims) enhance Muslim Australians’ support for terrorism?

RQ13  Does the strength of Muslims’ Australian national identity reduce their support for terrorism, even when Muslims feel their Australian national identities are threatened?

RQ14  Does the strength of Muslims’ religious identity heighten their support for terrorism, even when Muslims feel their religious identities are threatened?

RQ15  Does identifying strongly as an Australian, as a Muslim, or strongly as both an Australian and a Muslim (i.e. dual identity) moderate the association between experiencing an identity threat and supporting terrorism?

Only one demographic factor predicted support for terrorism: gender. Women were less likely to support terrorism. These results refute other research that has examined gendered differences in support for terrorism (see, e.g., Haddad & Khashan, 2002). These results may be a reflection of contextual differences; prior research finding that females are more supportive of terrorism has been conducted in Muslim-majority countries (Fair & Shepherd, 2006; Haddad & Khashan, 2002). However, it must be reiterated that previous research examining the socio-demographic correlates of support for terrorism reveal inconsistent results (see Chapter 3).
Interestingly, results showed that second-generation Muslim participants were no more likely to support terrorism than first-generation participants. This variable was included in the analysis in response to calls to explore if generational differences exist in attitudes towards terrorism (Stroink, 2007). The sparse research that exists to date finds that second-generation immigrants may be more aggrieved by identity threats (Yoo & Lee, 2008; Yusoufzai & Emmerling, 2017). A key reason scholars suggest generational differences may be pronounced is because second-generation immigrants may be more susceptible to experiencing identity threats (Yoo & Lee, 2008). However, the first empirical evidence of potential generational differences presented in this study shows that there are no significant generational differences in support for terrorism in the Australian context.

More importantly, the main effects tested in this study show that experiencing identity threats does predict Muslims’ support for terrorism. However, while meta-punitiveness was associated with greater support for terrorism (Hypothesis 13A supported), stigmatisation was associated with reduced support for terrorism (Hypothesis 13B not supported). There are several reasons why there was a discrepancy in the results concerning the two identity threats included in Study 3. These results may suggest that different types of identity threats differentially impact individuals. Specifically, results may suggest that Muslim participants in Study 3 felt more aggrieved by others’ punitive attitudes regarding Muslims. One reason that people may feel a greater sense of threat feelings of meta-punitiveness is that they believe that they come under the scrutiny of authorities more so than other groups. This is particularly relevant for Muslims in Muslim-minority countries, as counter-terrorism policies and their enforcement have been applied to this group more than others (Maoz & McCauley, 2008). The negative effect of stigmatisation on support for terrorism, in contrast, may be explained by stigma management theory. It is possible that Muslim participants who felt stigmatised were less likely to support terrorism because they have developed ways to
manage the stigma directed towards them (Marvasti, 2005; Naderi, 2018). It is also important to mention that the results presented in this chapter seem to suggest that the stigmatisation concept also provided a suppression effect in the model. This apparent suppression effect suggests that stigmatisation may help to explain the relationship between meta-punitiveness and support for terrorism. Specifically, Muslim participants’ feelings that others are punitive towards their group may present a source of stigma for Muslims. These findings and their associated implications are discussed in more detail in Chapter 11.

Study 3 also found that Australian national identity was an important predictor of support for terrorism. Participants with a strong Australian national identity were less likely to support terrorism (Hypothesis 14 supported). However, there was no association between participants’ strength of religious identity as a Muslim and their support for terrorism (Hypothesis 15 not supported). These findings confirm prior research conducted in the Australian context, which has found a negative relationship between Australian national identity and support for terrorism, and a null relationship between religious identity and support for terrorism (Cherney & Murphy, 2019). Other studies have also found either a null or negative association between religious identification and support for terrorism amongst Muslim samples (Tausch et al., 2009; Zhirkov et al., 2014). The null relationship between religious identification and support for terrorism identified in Study 3 does not support stereotypes that link religious identification with support for terrorism (Fischer et al., 2007). It also adds to the existing evidence base that suggests religious identification is not a predicate of support for terrorism (see also Tausch et al., 2009).

Despite the finding mentioned above, it is important to note that religious minority groups are often viewed to be of lower status in society when compared to non-migrant and non-minority groups (Verkuyten et al., 1996). As such, they are arguably more prone to experiencing threats to their minority identities (Fleischmann et al., 2019). Indeed, prior
research has revealed that those who identify strongly with their minority status can be more sensitive to identity threats (Stephan et al., 2009). Operario and Fiske (2001), for example, found that their ethnic minority sample of African American, Asian and Latino participants perceived that they were subject to and aggrieved by attributions of prejudice more than their Caucasian counterparts. However, the findings of Study 3 did not support this prior scholarship as the regression analysis failed to reveal an interaction effect between the religious (i.e., Muslim) identity and identity threat variables on participants’ support for terrorism (Hypothesis 17 not supported).

This unexpected null finding between religious identification and support for terrorism when participants felt an identity threat might speak to how Muslim-minority groups construct their identities in a country like Australia. Muslims’ sense of religious identity is often generalised to be a strong and central feature of their lives (Fleischmann et al., 2013). As such, Muslim-minority groups may be more resilient to threats to their religious identities because of the way they identify as a Muslim (also see Kahani-Hopkins & Hopkins, 2002). Research conducted with African American participants in the US speaks to this notion. For example, Brown and Tylka (2010) found that African American participants were more likely to be resilient when confronted with racism if they received racial socialisation messages that reinforced cultural pride with their racial group (see also Cinnirella et al., 2013). It is therefore possible that Muslim participants in Study 3 felt a sense of pride with their religious identity, which may have increased their resilience to perceived identity threats. It is also worth mentioning that my sample comprised of first- and second-generation Muslim immigrants. Prior work examining the effect of religious identification on Muslims’ support for terrorism has found no relationship between religious identification and support for terrorism when participants reported residing in countries with more recent migration
patterns (Egger & Magni-Berton, 2019). Thus, the null findings in Study 3 might also be reflective of my sample comprising of first- and second-generation immigrants.

Similarly, there was no difference in how Australian national identity affected the association between Muslims experiencing an identity threat and their support for terrorism (Hypothesis 16 not supported). Prior studies examining social-psychological predictors of support for terrorism have found that the strength of a participant’s affiliation with a majority group identity reduces the likelihood of support for terrorism, particularly when they feel an identity threat (Victoroff et al., 2012). Thus, the null findings between Australian national identity and identity threat on support for terrorism are also unexpected. Research suggests that felt identity threats may impede the development of minority groups’ identities (Kunst et al., 2012). Two models explain potential outcomes for minority group members who feel their identities are threatened. For example, the Rejection-Identification Model (RIM) posits that a perceived identity threat may lead an individual to increase their identification with their in-group (Branscombe et al., 1999a). Alternatively, the Rejection-Disidentification Model (RDIM) suggests the opposite; namely that individuals who feel their identities are threatened cope by decreasing their national identities (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009). Based on the propositions made in the RDIM, it is possible that national identification did not matter for participants in Study 3 who felt their identities were threatened.

Of the interaction terms entered into the model in Study 3, only the Australian national identity x religious identity interaction was significant. It examined if holding a dual identity as both an Australian and as a Muslim served as a protective factor in reducing participants’ support for terrorism. The interaction effects showed that a dual identity did not serve as a protective factor against support for terrorism when participants felt their identities were threatened (i.e., Hypothesis 19 not supported). However, the result did highlight the potentially protective nature of weak religious identifiers identifying strongly as Australian.
Specifically, the interaction between Australian national identity and religious identity showed that support for terrorism was least likely amongst participants who identified strongly as Australian but who also identified weakly as Muslim (partial support for Hypothesis 18). Thus, the findings of this interaction suggest that bolstering a sense of Australian national identity amongst Muslims living in Australia might be necessary for reducing their likelihood of supporting terrorism. The failure to find any other significant interaction effects points to the complex and subjective nature of religious identity (Tausch et al., 2009). A discussion of these findings and their policy implications will be outlined further in Chapter 11.

10.7 Chapter Summary

In recent years, calls have been made to draw on social-psychological approaches to better understand people’s attitudes towards terrorism (Dean, 2017). Public support for terrorism is the cornerstone of terrorist groups’ success (Richardson, 2006). Thus, determining the factors that may shape such support has important implications for terrorism research.

Study 3 sought to understand if Muslim Australians experience identity threat (do they feel stigmatised or feel others are punitive towards Muslims) (RQ11) and if identity threats (i.e., feeling stigmatised; feeling others are punitive towards Muslims) are associated with Muslim Australians’ support for terrorism (RQ12). Study 3 also tested if identifying strongly as an Australian (RQ13), as a Muslim (RQ14), and strongly as both a Muslim and an Australian (i.e., dual identity) (RQ15) moderates Muslim Australians’ reactions to identity threats. It provided the first empirical examination of the association between holding a dual identity and support for terrorism.
Findings showed that religious identity was not significantly associated with Muslims’ support for terrorism. However, a strong sense of Australian national identity reduced Muslims’ support for terrorism. Participants were also more likely to support terrorism when they felt others were punitive towards them because of their racial, ethnic or religious identity. However, stigmatisation was associated with a reduced likelihood to support terrorism. Finally, results showed that holding a strong Australian national identity was negatively associated with Muslims’ support for terrorism and that this relationship was especially strong amongst Muslims who identified weakly with their faith. Overall, the findings in Study 3 demonstrate how Australian national identification plays a role in reducing the likelihood for Muslims to support terrorism.

The following final chapter of my dissertation provides an overall discussion of the significance of the findings described in Chapters 8, 9 and 10. Furthermore, it highlights the theoretical and policy implications of the present research, overviews the limitations of the studies, and makes suggestions for future scholarship. My dissertation concludes with a discussion of the contribution of my three studies.
Chapter 11: General Discussion and Conclusion

“*The best way to defeat this hatred is not by turning on one another but it’s by focusing on the values that bind us.*”

- Sadiq Khan, 2019
  London Mayor

11.1 Introduction

Better understanding how people can come to support terrorism is a crucial component of reducing the prevalence of terrorist groups. Terrorist groups rely on community support, and without such support, they lose their legitimacy (Cherney & Murphy, 2019; Richardson, 2006). As such, my dissertation seeks to understand the social-psychological predictors of passive support for terrorism and the role that Muslims and non-Muslims can play in shaping or mitigating passive support for terrorism. Throughout this chapter, I term passive support for terrorism as support for terrorism.

In recent years, the threat of Islamic-inspired terrorism has exacerbated tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims, particularly in western democratic nations (Blackwood et al., 2013b). Resultantly, some non-Muslims have come to view Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat (Uenal, 2016; Velasco González et al., 2008). Anti-Muslim attitudes can have a range of negative implications. For example, there is mounting public support for right-wing political parties worldwide who propagate the view that Muslims are a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat and that they support terrorism (Bump, 2018; Markus, 2018; Norman & Borys, 2018; Tait, 2017). Once in power, these conservative parties can leverage off public fears towards Muslims to gain support for punitive counter-
terrorism policies that often disproportionately target Muslims (Baker, 2019a; Bulman, 2016; Bump, 2018; Markus, 2018; Tait, 2017).

As a result of being perceived as a threat and associated with terrorism by non-Muslims, such Islamophobic attitudes can also negatively impact Muslims. Doosje et al. (2009) argue that negative sentiment directed towards Muslims can result in Muslims experiencing threats to their identities. At the extreme end, such identity threats may spark a self-fulfilling prophecy, whereby individuals come to adopt the traits and behaviours that are imposed on them (Bull & Rane, 2019; Kamans et al., 2009). For example, if Muslims are consistently associated with terrorism, some Muslims may respond by aligning themselves with these stereotypes. I argue that the experience of feeling stigmatised and believing that others are punitive towards Muslims may spur such a self-fulfilling prophecy, whereby some Muslims come to support terrorism via mechanisms of identity threat (see Bull & Rane, 2019; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010 for a similar argument).

Hence, the overarching aim of my dissertation is to draw on Social Identity Theory (SIT) to better understand how identity processes experienced by Muslims and non-Muslims can help to explain how some Muslims can come to support terrorism. Specifically, I seek to understand how intergroup tensions between non-Muslims and Muslims might play a role in shaping Muslims’ support for terrorism. My dissertation addresses this issue in Australia by conducting three empirical studies. Together, these studies interconnect by demonstrating how the attitudes and behaviours of one group (i.e., non-Muslims) can have an impact on the attitudes and behaviours of another group (i.e., Muslims) and vice versa. As shown in my conceptual model in Figure 11.1, I propose an explanatory pathway from non-Muslims’ perceiving Muslims negatively (i.e., that they support terrorism and are a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat) and non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies, and the role of these attitudes in explaining Muslims’ feelings of identity threat and Muslims’
subsequent support for terrorism. I also propose that this pathway will serve as a continual feedback loop whereby Muslims’ support for terrorism will, in turn, lead to non-Muslims perceiving Muslims as a threat.

Most studies that seek to examine Muslims’ support for terrorism focus solely on Muslims’ attitudes. I argue that studying Muslims in isolation ignores the important role that non-Muslims might play in shaping Muslims’ attitudes towards terrorism. Studying both Muslim and non-Muslim perceptions allows for a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the processes that lead some Muslims to support terrorism. My dissertation adopts SIT to understand this process.

While the extant literature has explored a number of antecedents of support for terrorism (such as socio-demographic factors, political conflicts, and the rise of the Internet), social-psychological explanations of why some Muslims may come to support terrorism are still in their infancy (Dean, 2017; but see Tausch et al., 2009; Victoroff et al., 2012; Zhirkov et al., 2014). In particular, the application of SIT to understand Muslims’ support for terrorism has received minimal empirical attention. Moreover, examining how the attitudes of both Muslims and non-Muslims may be associated with Muslims’ support for terrorism has not been tested in the Australian context. My dissertation addresses these gaps in the literature.

Fifteen research questions guide my dissertation:

RQ1 Does a terrorist suspect’s motivation (as either Islamic-inspired or right-wing inspired) differentially shape non-Muslim Australians’:
(a) perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat, (b) perceptions that Muslims support terrorism, and (c) their own support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?
RQ2 Do beliefs that Muslims support terrorism predict non-Muslim Australians’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat?

RQ3 Does the strength of non-Muslim Australians’ national identity (i.e., as an Australian) heighten their likelihood of perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat?

RQ4 Does the strength of non-Muslim Australians’ national identity (i.e., as an Australian) moderate the association between believing that Muslims support terrorism and perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat?

RQ5 Do non-Muslim Australians’ beliefs that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat shape non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

RQ6 Do non-Muslim Australians’ beliefs that Muslims support terrorism shape non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

RQ7 Do non-Muslim Australians’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat mediate the relationship between the belief that Muslims support terrorism and non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

RQ8 Does the strength of non-Muslim Australians’ national identity (i.e., as an Australian) heighten their support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

RQ9 Does the strength of non-Muslim Australians’ national identity (i.e., as an Australian) moderate the association between perceiving
Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat and non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

RQ10 Does the strength of non-Muslim Australians’ national identity (i.e., as an Australian) moderate the association between believing that Muslims support terrorism and non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies?

RQ11 Do Muslim Australians experience identity threat (do they feel stigmatised or feel that non-Muslims are punitive towards Muslims)?

RQ12 Do identity threats (i.e., feeling stigmatised, feeling others are punitive towards Muslims) enhance Muslim Australians’ support for terrorism?

RQ13 Does the strength of Muslims’ Australian national identity reduce their support for terrorism, even when Muslims feel their Australian national identities are threatened?

RQ14 Does the strength of Muslims’ religious identity heighten their support for terrorism, even when Muslims feel their religious identities are threatened?

RQ15 Does identifying strongly as an Australian, as a Muslim, or strongly as both an Australian and a Muslim (i.e. dual identity) moderate the association between experiencing an identity threat and supporting terrorism?

Figure 11.1 presents the conceptual model adopted in my dissertation and the relationships that were tested. It demonstrates the significant and non-significant relationships that were revealed in the three studies reported in Chapters 8, 9 and 10.
Figure 11.1 Conceptual Model and Relationships Found in Dissertation

Non-Muslim Sample

Social Identity
Australian National Identity

Perceptions that Muslims Pose a Realistic, Symbolic and Terroristic Threat

Support for Punitive Counter-terrorism Policies

Perceptions that Muslims Support Terrorism

Suspect Motive Vignette Manipulation
Islamic Extremist vs. Right-wing Extremist

Path A ✔
Path B ✔
Path C ✔
Path D ✔
Path E ✔
Path F ✔
Path G ✔
Path H ✔
Path I ✔
Path J ✗
Path K ✗
Path L ✗
Path M ✗
Path N ✔

Muslim Sample

Social Identity
Australian National Identity
Religious Identity

Identity Threat 1: Stigmatisation
Identity Threat 2: Meta-punitiveness
Support for Terrorism

Path A ✔
Path J ✗
Path K ✗
Path L ✗
Path M ✗
Path N ✔

*Dual identity relationship not supported; religious identity relationship not supported; **Australian national identity relationship supported

✔ and ✗ marks denote the relationships that were found in my dissertation.
11.2 Summary of Findings

The research undertaken in my dissertation revealed clear answers to some of the 15 research questions presented above while offering less clear answers to others. In summary, I found that a terrorists’ motivation (as either Islamic-inspired or right-wing inspired) did shape non-Muslim Australians’ (a) perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat; (b) perceptions that Muslims support terrorism; and (c) support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. Study 1 answered Research Question 1 and revealed that when non-Muslim participants were exposed to a vignette depicting a terrorist incident perpetrated by a Muslim, they were more likely to perceive that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. Non-Muslim participants who received the vignette denoting the perpetrator as being inspired by Islamic-inspired terrorism were also more likely to believe that Muslims support terrorism, and they were more likely to support punitive counter-terrorism policies.

Research Questions 2, 3 and 4 were also very clearly answered in Study 2. Study 2A revealed that non-Muslim participants were more likely to perceive Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat when they held a strong national identity, and when they believed that Muslims support terrorism. Interestingly, for those non-Muslim participants who identified very strongly with Australia, the association between believing that Muslims support terrorism and perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat was much stronger. Study 2B also clearly answered Research Questions 5 to 10. Study 2B found that in the non-Muslim Australian sample, participants’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat were associated with participants’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. Non-Muslim Australian participants’ beliefs that Muslims support terrorism was also positively associated with their support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. Strong Australian national identification was also positively
associated with participants’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. Similarly to Study 2A, for the non-Muslim Australian sample who identified strongly as Australian, the association between believing that Muslims support terrorism and supporting punitive counter-terrorism policies was stronger than for non-Muslims who identified weakly as Australian. Additionally, for participants with strong Australian national identities, the association between perceiving that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat and support for punitive counter-terrorism policies was also stronger.

Where the research questions were less clearly answered was in Study 3 in its attempt to understand Muslims’ support for terrorism. Study 3 revealed that Muslim participants felt others were punitive towards their group (i.e., meta-punitiveness) but they did not report feeling stigmatised in this study. Therefore, Research Question 11 was only partially answered. Muslim participants who felt a heightened sense of meta-punitiveness were also more likely to support terrorism (Research Question 12 partially answered). Muslim participants who strongly identified with their Australian national identity were less likely to support terrorism (Research Question 13 answered). Similarly, Muslim participants with a strong religious identity were also less likely to support terrorism, although it was expected that those with a strong religious identity would be more likely to support terrorism as a way of defending their minority group (Research Question 14 was not answered in the hypothesised direction). Additionally, the answer to Research Question 15 was less clear. It was expected that participants’ strong identification as an Australian and as a Muslim (i.e., dual identification) would mitigate the likelihood for participants to support terrorism, even when they felt stigmatised or that others were punitive towards their group. However, support

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74 In Study 3, there was a negative and significant association between stigmatisation and support for terrorism, but this result emerged because the stigmatisation measure was acting as a suppressor variable (see Chapter 10, Section 10.5.3).
for terrorism was lowest amongst participants who strongly identified with their Australian
national identity and weakly identified with their religious identity. There was no association
between identification and support for terrorism when participants felt their identities were
threatened.

Each of the results chapters (Chapters 8, 9 and 10) contained a Discussion section
which proffered some specific explanations for both the expected and unexpected results
contained within them. Rather than reiterate all of the findings and their explanations here,
the remainder of this General Discussion chapter instead focuses on explanations for some of
the more important findings in the research. It also discusses the broader implications of the
findings for the applicability of SIT to understand Muslims’ support for terrorism, and the
implications of the findings for public policy strategies designed to address terrorism. After
discussing the results from Studies 1 to 3 in the following section, I present an overview of
the implications for policy and practice in Section 11.4. I also outline the limitations of the
research conducted in my dissertation and highlight some directions for future scholarship
(Section 11.5). I close my dissertation with a statement of the contribution it makes to social-
psychological understandings of why Muslims support terrorism (Section 11.6).

11.2.1 What Does my Dissertation Offer by Way of Understanding Support for Terrorism?

I conducted three empirical studies. These studies independently examined how non-
Muslim participants can come to view Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat,
how non-Muslim participants come to support punitive counter-terrorism policies, and how
Muslim participants may come to feel their identities are threatened and support terrorism.
These three studies were interconnected by demonstrating how the attitudes and behaviours
of one group (i.e., non-Muslims) have the potential to impact the attitudes and behaviours of
another group (i.e., Muslims) and vice versa. As shown in Figure 11.1, I proposed that there
would be a pathway from non-Muslims perceiving Muslims negatively (i.e., they support
terrorism and are a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat) and supporting punitive counter-terrorism policies to explaining Muslim participants’ feelings of identity threat and subsequent support for terrorism. I argued that this relationship would serve as a feedback loop whereby Muslims’ support for terrorism would, in turn, lead to some non-Muslims perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. The direct relationship between and implications of the punitive attitudes of one group and another group’s perceptions that they are viewed punitively is not directly measured in my dissertation but is speculated upon.

11.3 Discussion and Implications of Key Findings

For decades, social identity theorists have observed how people categorise themselves and others into specific groups. These theorists have also discussed the outcomes associated with intergroup biases that may occur from perceiving that some groups belong, while others do not (Oliveira & Murphy, 2014; Stephan et al., 2000; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Central here is the process of in-group favouritism and out-group derogation.

11.3.1 Non-Muslim Findings (Study 1 and 2)

The first objective of my dissertation was to explore if some non-Muslim Australians harbour negative attitudes towards Muslims (i.e., non-Muslims view Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat and believe that Muslims support terrorism) and if such perceptions of threat increase their support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. By addressing this objective, I sought to determine if non-Muslims do derogate Muslims when they see them as a threatening out-group. In Study 1, I tested if non-Muslim Australian
participants’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies and their negative attitudes towards Muslims was shaped by receiving a vignette of a media article that portrayed a terrorism suspect as either an Islamic or a right-wing extremist. I used the vignette to test if participants’ attitudes differed depending on whether the hypothesised suspect was motivated by Islamic-inspired terrorism or right-wing-inspired terrorism. I expected that the Islamic-inspired terrorism vignette would simulate more of an out-group than the right-wing-inspired terrorism vignette. Resultantly, participants who received the Islamic-inspired terrorism vignette would be more punitive and view Muslims more negatively (i.e., perceiving that Muslims support terrorism; perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat). My findings showed that negative views of Muslims and support for punitive counter-terrorism policies were stronger amongst participants who had received a vignette describing a terrorism suspect as being motivated by Islamic extremist ideals.

Why non-Muslim participants who received the Islamic extremist vignette were more punitive and held more negative views of Muslims may be explained by participants’ more favourable evaluations of their in-group. Social identity theorists posit that individuals strive to see the groups they identify with in a positive light (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Resultantly, in-group members are evaluated more favourably than others. A recent experiment conducted with a sample of 1,400 American participants found that a fictional terrorist attack was more likely to be labelled as terrorism when the perpetrator was Muslim (Huff & Kertzer, 2018). Two similar experiments conducted with two samples of 60 non-Muslim British participants also found that participants judged the behaviours of the suspect in the Muslim condition more harshly (West & Lloyd, 2017). My findings may be reflective of similar mechanisms.

75 I used two measures to understand non-Muslim Australian’s negative attitudes towards Muslims. The first was to gauge if non-Muslim Australians viewed Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat. The second examined if non-Muslim Australians believed that Muslims support terrorism.
Specifically, non-Muslim participants in my study may be more likely to perceive Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat and support punitive counter-terrorism policies when they received the Islamic extremist vignette because they viewed the perpetrator as an out-group member. They may, therefore, judge Muslims more harshly by supporting punitive counter-terrorism policies that are known to disproportionately target Muslims as a perceived out-group.

Another way to interpret these findings may stem from contemporary media discourses that consistently associate terrorism with the Islamic faith (Blackwood et al., 2013a). Citizens’ knowledge of current affairs primarily comes from the information they consume from the media (Williamson et al., 2019). These media reports often reflect dominant social structures present at a given time. For example, in a mostly Caucasian Anglophone country (e.g., Australia, the US, the UK), the media will often depict Caucasian Anglophone in-groups more favourably than other members of racial, ethnic or religious minority groups (Kearns et al., 2019). This pattern is observable in media reports of terrorist attacks. Since 9/11, media portrayals of terrorism have overwhelmingly focused on acts of Islamic terrorism (Kearns et al., 2019). A recent study using data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) found that Islamic-inspired terrorism attracted 357% more media attention than terrorist attacks committed by non-Muslim perpetrators (Kearns et al., 2019). In this sense, the media perpetuates a sense of “otherness” by focusing predominantly on Islamic-inspired terrorism and Muslims as terrorists (Akbarzadeh & Smith, 2005). West and Lloyd (2017, p. 211) term this phenomenon “identity-based bias” as terrorism has become increasingly associated with Muslims and the Islamic faith. As such, when audiences consume media reports that engage with these narratives, it simulates in-group and out-group distinctions and lays the foundations for negative views of perceived out-groups to develop.
The findings pertaining to Study 1 offer important insights into how the motivations of terrorism suspects can shape perceptions of threat and support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. However, the nature of the vignette outlining terrorism suspects’ motivations as being inspired by either Islamic extremism or right-wing extremism pose limitations that must be acknowledged. Specifically, the description of the right-wing motivation suggests the suspect was inspired to act in the name of the anti-immigration movement. The decision to use anti-immigration issues as the motivation the hypothetical right-wing extremist suspect was inspired by in the vignette is reflective of the issues right-wing extremist groups in Australia base their platform on (Dean et al., 2016). However, it is possible that participants who received the right-wing extremist vignette may have been inclined to steer away from supporting such an ideology. This may provide an explanation for why participants who received the right-wing extremist vignette were less likely to perceive Muslims as a threat. Thus, drawing on another right-wing issue that does not relate as directly to Muslims as the issue selected for my dissertation (i.e., immigration) may elicit more clear-cut differences in participant attitudes.

Study 2 of my dissertation sought to more explicitly test if identity processes were associated with non-Muslim participants’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat and non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. SIT posits that the strength of an individual’s identity with their in-group shapes how they evaluate each other (Dovidio et al., 2001; Haslam & Reicher, 2006; McCoy & Major, 2003; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Tausch et al., 2009). Results of my dissertation support this assumption. My findings demonstrate an association between the strength of non-Muslim Australians’ majority group identities (i.e., Australian national identity) and perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat.
SIT also posits that people strive to protect the image and value of their identities (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). One way to protect one’s group identity is to support policies perceived to target and control those deemed a threat to the in-group (Chiricos et al., 2004). Findings from my dissertation show a similar pattern: those who reported having a stronger majority (i.e., national) identity were more supportive of punitive counter-terrorism policies. Previous research has identified these relationships when examining public attitudes towards crime control policies (e.g., the death penalty) (Barkan & Cohn, 1994; Cochran & Chamlin, 2006; Unnever & Cullen, 2012). These studies suggest that crime is racially typified, such that African American people are often deemed to be the criminal “other” (Chiricos et al., 2004). Resultantly, individuals are more likely to protect their identities by supporting policies believed to control those relegated to an out-group status and considered an “other” (Chiricos et al., 2004). My dissertation observes a similar pattern of results in a counter-terrorism context. Taken together, the findings of Study 1 and 2 provide overwhelming support for SIT.

Results of my dissertation also support the predictions made by the *Racial Animus Model*. Stereotypes and prejudices often directed towards minority groups perceived as criminals can explain how non-Muslims can come to support punitive counter-terrorism policies when they regard Muslims as suspects or terrorists (Chiricos et al., 2004; Unnever & Cullen, 2010a, 2012). By examining non-Muslims’ attitudes towards Muslims, who are a minority group characterised primarily by their religion, my dissertation extends the existing application of Unnever and Cullen’s (2010a, 2010b) *Racial Animus Model* to consider terrorism as a type of crime and religion as a defining out-group feature. As such, my dissertation demonstrates the applicability of the *Racial Animus Model* by showing that it is not just racial and ethnic animus, but also religious intolerance that can shape support for punitive counter-terrorism policies.
**11.3.2 Muslim Findings (Study 3)**

The second objective of my dissertation was to understand the extent to which Muslims feel as though non-Muslims view them in a stigmatising or punitive way (hence, experiencing an identity threat), and if such identity threats felt by Muslims predict their support for terrorism. I sought to determine if Muslim participants’ identification as an Australian (i.e., national identity) and as a Muslim (e.g., religious identity) had any bearing on participants’ support for terrorism. I further tested if experiencing identity threats (i.e., operationalised as stigmatisation; meta-punitiveness) predicted Muslim participants’ support for terrorism and how their identity as a Muslim and/or an Australian moderated this relationship. Existing research has tested the separate effects of holding a strong national or religious identity on support for terrorism, but studies to date have not scrutinised the role that holding a strong dual identity (i.e., strong identification as an Australian and as a Muslim) may play in reducing Muslims’ support for terrorism. My dissertation also addressed this research gap.

Prior scholarship with minority groups has shown that a strong sense of identification with a majority group can reduce the harmful effects of identity threats and promote more beneficial intergroup relations (Dovidio et al., 2009). Findings in my dissertation similarly suggest that Muslims’ strong identification with a majority group (i.e., Australian national identity) serves to protect against the effects of experiencing an identity threat on Muslims’ support for terrorism. This result is perhaps not surprising when considering Islamic-inspired terrorism is largely directed towards majority groups, particularly in western democratic nations.

The finding showing that strong Australian national identity is associated with reduced support for terrorism may also support assertions made by the *Common In-group Identity Model* (CIIM). This model posits that intergroup hostility can be reduced when
individuals identify with a majority in-group that denotes “we”, as opposed to minority groups that may perpetuate an “us” versus “them” divide (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Gaertner et al., 1996). The CIIM suggests that a minority group member’s identification with a more common or shared group identity (e.g., a majority group) protects against perceived identity threats directed towards a minority group’s minority identity (Huo et al., 1996; Smith & Tyler, 1996). Previous research has found common in-group identity processes positively shape a range of outcomes for majority and minority group members who adopt a common in-group identity (i.e., with the majority group). Such outcomes can include positive intergroup relations and commitment to intergroup goals amongst majority and minority group members, support for policies that may benefit one’s group, as well as intergroup inclusion (Dovidio et al., 2001; Dovidio et al., 2009; Smith & Tyler, 1996; Snider & Dovidio, 1996). Thus, the findings from my dissertation provide evidence to suggest that bolstering a sense of Australian national identity may have a positive effect on preventing Muslims’ support for terrorism (e.g., in the UK, see Tausch et al., 2009; in Europe, see Victoroff et al., 2012).

While a minority group’s identification with a majority group may buffer against the effects of identity threats and support for terrorism, strong identification with their minority group may have the opposite effect. Existing social identity research posits that the strength of one’s identity can predict the extent to which they may react to perceived injustices in an effort to protect their religious group (Dovidio et al., 2001; Stephan et al., 2002). Specifically, if a minority identifies strongly with their minority group, they can be more sensitive to signs of injustice and prejudice (Dovidio et al., 2009). In the context of my dissertation, the ideals and motivations of terrorist groups often reflect group-level concerns, such as injustices directed towards Muslims (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010). Thus, social identity processes are arguably central to eliciting public support for terrorism. In particular, the strength of a
person’s identity may drive their support for terrorism if they perceive that terrorist organisations commit terrorism in part to refute perceived injustices directed towards a marker of the person’s identity (Tausch et al., 2009).

In my dissertation, I hypothesised that Muslim participants whose sense of religious identity (as a Muslim) was stronger would be more likely to support terrorism. However, I found that, at least in the sample of 398 Muslim Australian participants analysed in my dissertation, the importance attributed to participants’ religious identities was not significantly associated with Muslims’ support for terrorism. This unexpected finding raises several noteworthy points.

Firstly, the null association between religious identity and support for terrorism may result from the way that Muslims identify with their religion. In my dissertation, I asked Muslim participants how important religion is to who they are as a person. A higher score denoted a stronger sense of importance ascribed to their religious identity. Egger and Magni-Berton (2019) used a similar construct in their study of support for terrorism amongst a sample of Muslims from 21 European countries. They found that religious importance was positively associated with support for terrorism, especially when Muslim participants constituted a minority group in their country. However, this relationship was non-significant when examining Muslims’ attitudes who lived in countries with more recent migration patterns (Egger & Magni-Berton, 2019). In considering Egger and Magni-Berton’s (2019) findings in light of my dissertation, the null relationship between religious (i.e., Muslim) identity and support for terrorism may be attributable to my sample having a more recent migration history.

It is also worth mentioning that the relationship between religious identification and support for terrorism depends on the way devoutness is measured. For example, there are differences in religious subgroups of Islam. As such, Muslims’ affiliations as a Shiite Muslim
or a Sunni Muslim may elicit differences in their attitudes towards terrorism because of the varied values and meanings attached to those subgroups of Islam. Cherney and Povey (2013) tested this notion amongst a sample of Muslims from seven Muslim-majority countries, finding that participants who adhered to the Shi’a sect of Islam were more likely to support terrorism.

Other research uses the frequency of mosque attendance as a proxy measure for religious identification. However, research testing the relationship between mosque attendance and support for terrorism has revealed inconsistent results (Cherney & Murphy, 2019; Ginges et al., 2009). For example, Ginges et al. (2009) found a positive relationship between mosque attendance and support for terrorism in their sample of Palestinian Muslims. However, in their sample of Muslim Australians, Cherney and Murphy (2019) found that mosque attendance reduced the likelihood for participants to support terrorism. The inconsistent findings in Ginges et al.’s (2009) and Cherney and Murphy’s (2019) studies may also point to contextual differences in support for terrorism. Indeed, Ginges et al. (2009) drew on a sample of Muslims in a Muslim-majority sovereign state (i.e., Palestine), while Cherney and Murphy (2019) examined the attitudes of Muslims who constitute a minority group within Australia. Thus, results in my dissertation concur with the synthesis of prior research outlined in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3.1.3), which demonstrates that the relationship between religious identity and support for terrorism may be better understood in conjunction with other factors.

A third explanation for the lack of an association between religious identity and support for terrorism may be explained by the persistent condemnation of terrorism.

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76 In Cherney and Povey’s (2013) study, participants were from Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey.
perpetrators by many Muslim community members and leaders (Foroughi & Hutson, 2019). SIT posits that group members consistently strive to portray a positive image of their group and their group identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Individuals may, therefore, protect the image of their group by evaluating deviant group members harshly, such as by rejecting or excluding them (Van Leeuwen et al., 2010). As such, it is possible that the null finding between religious identity and support for terrorism may be due to participants rejecting the notion that Islam is linked to terrorism. This approach can be described as stigma management.

Stigma management refers to varying ways in which individuals manage feelings of stigma towards their identities, such as adapting their behaviours to differentiate themselves from other members of their stigmatised group and in so doing, altering public perceptions of them (Marvasti, 2005; Naderi, 2018; O’Brien, 2011; Ryan, 2011). Prior research has demonstrated ways in which Muslims may manage the stigma they have experienced in the wake of an increase in Islamic-inspired terrorism (Marvasti, 2005; Naderi, 2018; O’Brien, 2011; Ryan, 2011). Studies suggest that Muslims utilise one of three stigma management strategies. The first strategy is passing, whereby an individual alters their appearance to give the impression they are unrelated to their stigmatised group. Secondly, stigmatised individuals may be inclined to disclose the stigma, by using tools such as humour, education or by challenging those who stigmatise them. The third strategy is disavowal, whereby the stigma is ignored (Marvasti, 2005; O’Brien, 2011). As such, my finding may similarly be reflective of participants refuting stereotypes that link the Islamic faith with terrorism (see also Tausch et al., 2009).

In addition to examining the separate effects of Muslim participants’ identification with majority and minority groups (i.e., as an Australian and as a Muslim), my dissertation sought to address calls to understand if holding a dual identity (i.e., I am an Australian and a
Muslim) is a relevant predictor of support for terrorism (Tausch et al., 2009). In so doing, it uniquely contributes to the social identity literature by providing the first empirical examination of the effect of dual identification on Muslims’ support for terrorism. Unfortunately, results within my dissertation do not support the Dual Identity Model as described by researchers instrumental in its development i.e., as an individual’s simultaneous and strong identification with two or more identities (e.g., Dovidio et al., 2009).

Prior research suggests that adopting a strong dual identity may protect minorities against intergroup biases and perceived threats to their identities (Dovidio et al., 2005; Hopkins, 2011). Thus, I hypothesised that Muslims’ strong identification as both an Australian and as a Muslim would mitigate participants’ likelihood of supporting terrorism, even when they experienced heightened feelings of identity threat. Only strong Australian national identification reduced Muslims’ likelihood of supporting terrorism. Moreover, dual identity was not associated with Muslims’ support for terrorism when they felt their identities were threatened. As my dissertation empirically tests the application of the Dual Identity Model on Muslims’ support for terrorism for the first time, I offer a possible explanation for my unexpected finding below.

An explanation for the finding that dual identity was not associated with support for terrorism may come from the construction of dual identity. As mentioned above, I defined dual identity as an individual’s strong affiliation with their majority and minority group identities (Fleischmann & Verkuyten, 2016). However, recent studies suggest that dual identities may be measured in numerous ways (Verkuyten et al., 2019; Wiley et al., 2019). For example, Simon and Ruhs (2008) suggest that my operationalisation of dual identity may
be too restrictive. They elaborate by arguing that a strong and simultaneous sense of identity with one’s heritage and one’s host country is unlikely because of “consistency concerns and/or the anticipation of loyalty conflicts” (Simon & Ruhs, 2008, p. 1355). In their political action study drawing on Turkish migrants living in Germany, Simon and Ruhs argue that “against the backdrop of a strong Turkish identification, a moderate level of German identification may already acquire sufficient self-relevance to prompt a sense of dual identity” (Simon & Ruhs, 2008, p. 1355). The authors used two measures of dual identity, one that stated “I feel I belong to both the Turks and the Germans” and another that stated “Sometimes I feel more as a German and sometimes more as a Turk – it depends on the situation” (Simon & Ruhs, 2008, p. 1357). As such, it is unclear whether the strength of Turkish (i.e., minority), German (i.e., majority), or both identities were associated with participants’ support for political action (e.g., certain government policies, protesting, signing a petition).

Based on Simon and Ruhs’ (2008) operationalisation of dual identity, it is possible that my finding in Study 3 is reflective of an association between dual identity and support for terrorism. Specifically, I found that the combination of a strong majority (i.e., Australian national) identity and weak minority (i.e., religious) identity was associated with the biggest reduction in Muslims’ support for terrorism. As such, considering Simon and Ruhs’ (2008) conceptualisation of dual identity - whereby strong identification with one group and a moderate level of identification with another group may elicit dual identity - my findings may also be suggestive of the effects of dual identification on Muslims’ support for terrorism.

77 In my dissertation, I operationalised dual identity by examining participants’ strong identification with their Australian national identities and religious (i.e., Muslim) identities.
Dual identity researchers have recently emphasised the need to continue to theorise about how dual identity is formed and call for further research on dual identity and the effect of dual identification on immigrant groups (Verkuyten et al., 2019; Wiley et al., 2019). My dissertation provides the first empirical examination of the application of the Dual Identity Model on support for terrorism. Thus, I also suggest that further research utilising different operationalisations of dual identity may create a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between these identity processes and attitudes towards terrorism.

In addition to examining the relationship between the strength and development of Muslims’ identities and their support for terrorism, my dissertation also tested if Muslim participants’ experiences of identity threat would be associated with their support for terrorism. Despite the expectation in Study 3 that both types of identity threat measured (feeling stigmatised and experiencing meta-punitiveness) would positively predict Muslim participants’ support for terrorism, only meta-punitiveness was found to be positively associated with Muslim participants’ support for terrorism. Contrary to theoretical assumptions that experiencing stigmatisation would predict participants’ support for terrorism (Victoroff et al., 2012), stigmatisation was negatively associated with support for terrorism. However, the negative relationship between stigmatisation and support for terrorism was reflective of a suppression effect.

Turning first to the meta-punitiveness finding, I found that Muslim participants who felt that others are punitive towards their group were more likely to support terrorism. Muslims have historically been charged with terrorism offences more than any other group in Australia (Zammit, 2017). Subsequently, Muslims may feel they are being targeted by counter-terrorism policies more so than others (Williamson, 2019). In this sense, Muslim participants in my dissertation who reported a heightened sense of meta-punitiveness may be more likely to support the motives underlying Islamic-inspired terrorism because such
support serves as a way of rejecting the denigration of and scrutiny towards Muslims. This is because the terrorist groups they support commit violence partially in reaction to such denigration. Interestingly, the positive association between meta-punitiveness and support for terrorism speaks more directly to the feedback loop model I proposed at the outset of my dissertation. I sought to examine if non-Muslim participants’ perceptions of threat and their support for punitive counter-terrorism policies may create an identity threat amongst some Muslim participants who felt stigmatised or that others were punitive towards their group. My findings indeed point to some non-Muslim participants’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies, some Muslim participants’ feelings of meta-punitiveness, and Muslim participants’ support for terrorism.

Turning to the stigmatisation finding, it was expected that stigmatisation would also be a positive predictor of Muslim participants’ support for terrorism. A growing body of research links similar identity threats such as discrimination with support for terrorism (Victoroff et al., 2012; Zhirkov et al., 2014). These studies suggest that support for terrorism may manifest in response to frustration and anger resulting from felt identity threats, such as stigmatisation (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010). However, a negative association between stigmatisation and support for terrorism presented a somewhat unexpected finding. I suggest this finding may also be suggestive of a stigma management approach.

A common source of stigma experienced by Muslims is the discourse that portrays Muslims as a suspect and links Muslims with terrorism (Breen-Smyth, 2014; Cherney & Murphy, 2016). These stereotypes have become particularly pronounced post 9/11 (Mansouri & Marotta, 2012). As such, Muslim participants within my dissertation who felt stigmatised may have been less likely to support terrorism in an active effort to manage the stigma that associates Muslims and Islam with terrorism; in other words they are practicing the stigma management techniques of disclosure or disavowal. Upon further examination of the results,
it became clear that the stigmatisation measure was also creating a suppression effect in the model. This suppression effect suggests that stigmatisation also helps to explain the association between Muslim participants’ feelings of meta-punitiveness and Muslims’ support for terrorism.

### 11.3.3 How a feedback loop may shape Muslims’ support for terrorism

My findings demonstrate a complex story for how identity processes amongst non-Muslim and Muslim participants in Australia can shape Muslims’ support for terrorism. By examining the attitudes of Muslims and non-Muslims living in Australia, the findings of my dissertation provide new evidence to suggest that a feedback loop may exist between non-Muslims’ negative attitudes towards Muslims, Muslims’ feelings of identity threat, and Muslims’ support for terrorism. I argue that non-Muslims’ perceptions that Muslims pose a realistic, symbolic, and terroristic threat and non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies may create the conditions for Muslims to feel their identities are threatened, and Muslims’ subsequent support for terrorism.

Non-Muslims’ perceptions that Muslims pose a threat and their support for counter-terrorism policies that often disproportionately affect Muslims in Australia may be explained by their knowledge and/or endorsement of stereotypes that depict Muslims in a threatening way. Devine (1989) suggests that knowledge of stereotypes obtained through socialisation processes are often spontaneously or subconsciously activated when individuals evaluate perceived ‘outgroup’ members. Yet, the extent to which individuals endorse these stereotypes (e.g., by supporting policies deemed to control the perceived outgroup) depends on an individual’s level of prejudice. Those high on prejudice may display explicit negative reactions to those they perceive to be an ‘outgroup’. In contrast, low prejudice individuals are more likely to acknowledge that “the stereotype is an inappropriate basis for behaviour[sic] or evaluation and hence [they] experience a conflict between the automatically activated
stereotype and their personal beliefs” (van den Bos, 2018, p. 148). The ability for individuals to control these automatic reactions to stereotypes requires them to situate such stereotypes within a broader context (van den Bos, 2018). In the context of my dissertation, political and media rhetoric about terrorism consistently spotlights Muslim communities. Such discourses are relevant to individuals’ evaluations of prejudice. Thus, participants in my study may not necessarily be overtly prejudiced towards Muslims but may accept stereotypes of Muslims because of external factors such as media reporting of terrorism. Providing more balanced information about terrorism that is accessible for the wider public is important and a point I discuss in detail in Section 11.4. To explain how non-Muslims’ perceptions of Muslims can contribute to Muslims’ feelings of identity threat, I draw on the symbolic interactionist perspective of identity formation. Bradford et al. (2014, p. 529) suggest that “people’s identities develop in reflexive reaction to the opinion of others.” This conceptualisation of identification mirrors Cooley’s (1922) concept of the looking-glass self. The concept of the looking-glass self denotes one’s identity formation based on how they believe society views them (Gecas & Schwalbe, 1983). More specifically, the extent to which an individual feels accepted by other members of society (Cooley, 1922). The looking-glass self contributes to criminological understandings of the labelling theory of deviance, whereby deviance can become salient among individuals who have been labelled as such (Gecas & Schwalbe, 1983). Labelling theory is defined by two propositions. The first suggests deviance is a subjective concept whereby deviant behaviour does not necessarily constitute the violation of norms, but instead denotes any behaviour that is defined as being deviant in a given context (Abercrombie et al., 2000). The second proposition suggests that deviant behaviour is stabilised or exacerbated by labelling (Abercrombie et al., 2000). Findings from my dissertation indicate the potential impacts of labelling among Muslims living in Australia. My findings cannot provide a causal link. However, my dissertation demonstrates non-Muslims’
perceptions of Muslims as a threat and non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies can activate a negative label among Muslims. I argue that these findings suggestive of a labelling effect upon Muslims have implications for Muslims’ feelings of identity threats. This is because such labels serve to demarcate who does and does not belong with a group, and in doing so, stigmatises individuals who are labelled (Becker, 1963).

In my dissertation, I argued that non-Muslims’ negative perceptions of Muslims may explain how Muslims come to feel their identities are threatened. My finding that shows a positive association between meta-punitiveness and support for terrorism signifies a labelling process. Meta-punitiveness can be described as a form of labelling because it constitutes one’s feeling that others are more likely to be punitive towards them because of their religious, ethnic, or racial identity (Williamson et al., 2018). In this sense, meta-punitiveness implies that Muslims feel they are viewed as suspects, which I argue denotes a form of labelling, albeit a perceived label. Labelling can have detrimental effects on individuals who have been labelled. As mentioned above, labelling can stabilise or aggravate deviant behaviours. Lemert (1967, p. 17) argues that deviant behaviours can occur as a “means of defense[sic], attack, or adaptation” to problems associated with labelling. In my dissertation, identity threats triggered among Muslims who felt others viewed them punitively was associated with their support for terrorism. Thus, I argue that non-Muslim participants’ perceptions that Muslims are a group to be suspected created the conditions for some Muslim participants to be more supportive of terrorism. This finding may also be reflective of a self-fulfilling prophecy. A self-fulfilling prophecy can be activated not only because of an individual’s belief about how others view them, “but also because [they] accept a false definition of [themselves] from which real consequences emerge” (Gordon & Harvey, 1978, p. 34). In my dissertation, such “real consequences” are Muslims’ support for terrorism. The irony here is that the disproportionate focus on Muslim communities in counter-terrorism
strategies may actually exacerbate support for the very act these strategies seek to prevent (i.e., terrorism).

Taken together, the results of my dissertation contribute to the research base on social identity processes by testing the appropriateness of SIT for understanding how non-Muslims’ and Muslims’ attitudes towards each other can shape the conditions conducive to leading some Muslims to support terrorism. As demonstrated from the discussion of findings above, the results of my dissertation find some support for the tenets of SIT, specifically in examining non-Muslims’ attitudes towards Muslims. However, findings revealed that SIT is less reliable when examining Muslims’ support for terrorism. It was shown that the strength of national identification (as an Australian) was associated with Muslim participants’ reduced support for terrorism. Experiences of meta-punitiveness (i.e., an identity threat) were also associated with increased support for terrorism. However, the interaction between identity and identity threats on support for terrorism received less support. One of the central predictions of SIT was that the strength of identity with valued in-groups would act as a moderator in the relationship between identity threat and support for terrorism. This was not the case in my dissertation.

11.4 Policy Implications

The findings of my dissertation highlight a need to challenge harmful views towards Muslims and dispel the myth that Muslims are intrinsically linked to terrorism. However, media discourses and political rhetoric often undoes any efforts to contest this harmful link (Martin & Phelan, 2002; Powell, 2011). For example, following the 2019 Christchurch shootings, Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison expressed sympathy for the victims of the shootings and condemned the actions of the perpetrator, Brenton Tarrant (Morrison, 2019). Yet, his words were quickly overshadowed by references to his previous speeches
which contained inflammatory statements about the link between Muslims and terrorism (Tingle, 2019). This anti-Muslim sentiment was exacerbated when Australian Senator Fraser Anning openly blamed the shootings of Muslims on Muslims themselves (Baker, 2019b). These statements reinforce the view that Muslims pose a threat to public safety and continue to associate Muslims with terrorism. As such, it is necessary not only to challenge biased depictions of Muslims but to emphasise and encourage accurate portrayals of Muslims, particularly amongst politicians and media sources who have a responsibility to share factual information (Williamson et al., 2019).

Relatedly, ensuring the ethical, sensitive and accurate media reporting of Islam and terrorism is important for shaping public attitudes. Research examining media coverage of Muslims shows that the way the media reports on Muslims may explain increased tensions and division amongst some Muslims and non-Muslims (see, e.g., Grossman & Tahiri, 2015). Moreover, research indicates a tendency amongst journalists to link terrorism with Islam (Ewart & Pearson, 2018). These practices have implications for some Muslims’ feelings of isolation as well as some non-Muslims’ negative attitudes towards Muslims (Ewart et al., 2017). Recent findings from an Australian project on best practice approaches to media reporting of Muslims have made a series of recommendations underpinned by a drive to promote social cohesion (Ewart & O'Donnell, 2018). The authors developed educational and training packages aiming to better educate journalists on religious and cultural considerations specific to Muslims, suggesting that these approaches can enhance inclusive reporting of Muslims (Ewart & O'Donnell, 2018). Echoing the need to address appropriate media reporting, Grossman and Tahiri (2015, p. 19) call for a more “concerted focus on greater media accountability and responsibility” when reporting on Muslims. The findings in my dissertation support this need to ensure public information regarding Muslims is accurate and culturally and religiously sensitive.
Findings from my dissertation also point to a need to ensure counter-terrorism policies are reflective of the terrorism threat within Australia. The public approval of counter-terrorism policies that afford authorities exclusive powers to restrict freedoms to members of the public points to the potential for the dismissal of fundamental civil liberties, democratic processes and human rights (Piazza, 2015). This possibility is particularly problematic in the Australian context where the majority of counter-terrorism laws are federal pieces of legislation and where no formal Bill of Rights exists at a national level (Lynch et al., 2015). When human rights standards exist, they can be used to prevent human rights impingements, refute inconsistent legislation, and trigger the reform of laws if required (Lynch et al., 2015).

Yet, despite the introduction of the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth), which serves to inspect Bills to ensure adherence to international human rights treaties, the treaties themselves are not legally binding (Lynch et al., 2015). Consequently, counter-terrorism laws in Australia often undermine democratic freedoms, especially when compared to other similar western democratic countries, some of which are experiencing a greater terrorism threat (e.g., the UK, the US). This is particularly the case in Australia, whereby laws are often adapted from the UK, which has experienced more large-scale domestic terrorist events (Williams, 2011). The adaptation of these laws to the Australian context means they are being enacted without the human rights safeguards used in the countries these laws originated from and are thus at risk of breaching fundamental human rights in Australia (Lynch et al., 2015). As such, enacting appropriate and proportionate counter-terrorism policies is crucial when their introduction and continued use are influenced by public support for such policies (Lynch et al., 2015).

The results of my dissertation further highlight a need for grassroots strategies to reduce division and promote inclusion and cohesion amongst Muslims and non-Muslims. Indeed, findings in my dissertation showed that non-Muslim participants perceived Muslims
as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat, which highlights the potential to create division between Muslims and non-Muslims. The influence of such perceptions of threat towards Muslims reflects more extensive “mechanisms of social exclusion” (Chiricos et al., 2004, p. 379). This is ironic as a major focus of counter-terrorism in Australia revolves around strategies to boost social inclusion and cohesion (e.g. the Australian Government’s Living Safer Together initiative) (Cherney et al., 2018; Harris-Hogan et al., 2016). The Living Safer Together initiative is the Australian Government’s current strategy to “build community resilience to violent extremism” (Australian Government, n.d.). It aims to empower communities to enhance social cohesion. This initiative encourages local community-building activities; mentoring and education to assist individuals to “build their resilience to harmful influences”; as well as support those at-risk of radicalising so they are better equipped to reconnect with their social networks and the wider community (Australian Government, n.d.). The findings from my dissertation reinforce the necessity to do more to ensure these strategies are effective. However, to be effective they must confirm that all members of the community (i.e., beyond Muslim populations) have access to resources that provide a balanced and sensitive account of the current terrorism threat to avoid a disproportionate focus on Muslims. Moreover, as such strategies require a whole-of-community approach, positive intergroup interactions are important. Yet, as Muslims are often the target of counter-terrorism policies, divisive attitudes may flourish and social cohesion may further erode, which can negatively impact the efficacy of these approaches. Thus, ensuring community strategies are effective in uniting diverse communities is important not only for shaping wider attitudes towards counter-terrorism responses, but also in enhancing social cohesion.

Bolstering social inclusion is also important for Muslim communities. While I did not examine social inclusion in my dissertation, I found that some Muslim participants were
more likely to support terrorism when they felt that others viewed them in a punitive light (i.e., their identities were threatened). This finding is concerning given a national priority within many western nations, including Australia, is to enhance inclusion, equality, collective values, and diversity across cultures, languages and religions (Bowen & Lundy, 2011). Research suggests that identity threats may lead to hunkering down, whereby Muslims alter their behaviours, such as avoiding discussing their faith with others, voicing their concerns about any terrorism-related topic for fear of drawing security agencies’ attention or being reluctant to engage with authorities (Blackwood et al., 2013a, 2015; Cherney & Murphy, 2016). Yet, the results of my research suggest that strengthening a sense of national identity amongst minority groups may serve as a protective mechanism when they feel their identities are under threat (Cinnirella et al., 2013). Feeling a strong affiliation to Australia will require Muslims who feel isolated and marginalised to feel more included.

A central component of Muslims’ feelings of inclusion as an Australian is also acknowledging and ensuring Muslims feel they can nurture their numerous and heterogeneous identities. Doing so may assist in helping Muslims who perceive that their identities are threatened to feel included and less affected by threats to their identities. Social identity and the differentiation between in-groups and out-groups are context-dependent (Hogg, 2016). Thus, future research should explore the ways that Muslims define their multiple identities to better contextualise the extent to which identity threats impact them. This knowledge may also reduce intergroup biases. Unnever and Cullen (2010a) suggest that denouncing public acceptance of policies driven by racial, ethnic or (in the case of my dissertation) religious intolerance is contingent upon empowering individuals who do not hold prejudiced attitudes to challenge these biases. For example, empirical evidence indicates that profiling is an ineffective counter-terrorism strategy, particularly because Muslims are disproportionately targeted (Harcourt, 2007). By focusing on appearance, profiling widens
the net to encompass innocent individuals. Resultantly, profiling can erode public trust in and cooperation with authorities, which is fundamental to effective counter-terrorism policing (Blackwood et al., 2013b; Spalek & Imtoual, 2007). Therefore, developing whole-of-community strategies that promote diversity and denounce harmful views towards minority groups is needed when countering terrorism. Thus, the Resilience Framework may be useful here.

Resilience denotes the ability of individuals or wider communities to recover from an adverse situation (Hardy, 2015). Fostering resilience has become a key feature of counter-terrorism. It is used as a tool to equip communities to both prevent and respond to terrorism (Hardy, 2015). For example, governments may attempt to increase a community’s resilience by educating them to look out for suspicious activity, which in turn complements the role of authorities to conduct preventative counter-terrorism duties. Moreover, politicians’ choice of narrative in the aftermath of a terrorist attack may serve to promote unity and facilitate people’s “return to life as it was before the terrorist attack occurred” (Hardy, 2015, p. 8).

Following the November 2019 London Bridge terrorist attacks, London Mayor Sadiq Khan said: “the best way to defeat this hatred is not by turning on one another, but it’s by focusing on the values that bind us” (McMahon & Craw, 2019). Such a statement seeks to highlight the power in the diversity of populations as opposed to blaming diversity. Thus, the efficacy of resilience frameworks is arguably contingent on ensuring governments acknowledge the diversity of citizens who are encouraged to engage with such frameworks (Grossman, 2014). Providing communities with tools and strategies to be resilient in the face of terrorism may also have knock-on effects for how they perceive each other.
11.5 Limitations and Future Research

My dissertation extends understandings of the impact of identity processes and identity threats on Muslims’ support for terrorism, and non-Muslims’ perceptions of threat and support for punitive counter-terrorism policies in Australia. However, some limitations must be acknowledged. The two datasets used to conduct my analyses across the three studies are not directly connected. As such, I can only speculate as to the existence of a feedback loop between non-Muslims’ attitudes and Muslims’ attitudes. However, the examination of both Muslim and non-Muslim attitudes in my three studies provides important insights into how Muslims can come to feel their identities are threatened. The three studies further highlight the role of both Muslims and non-Muslims in exacerbating or mitigating these identity threats and their associated outcomes (which in the context of my dissertation is support for terrorism).

Additionally, the survey data employed to conduct two of the three studies within my dissertation were cross-sectional. This means the temporal ordering of the relationships between the tested variables could not be determined. For example, it is unclear from the data whether Muslims who felt their identities were under threat were more likely to support terrorism, or if Muslims who supported terrorism were more likely to feel their identities were under threat. Similarly, whether non-Muslims who perceived Muslims to be a realistic, symbolic or terroristic threat were more supportive of punitive counter-terrorism policies, or if non-Muslims who supported punitive counter-terrorism policies were more likely to perceive Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat cannot be ascertained. Hence, only associations between key concepts could be made with such data. Longitudinal data is required to make claims about the causal and temporal relationships between the variables.
used in my dissertation (Wiley et al., 2019). Hence, the findings should be considered with this limitation in mind.

The data used in the three studies do not comprise of nationally representative samples, which limit the generalisability of the findings to all Muslim and non-Muslim Australians. The Muslim sample was purposively collected from within Sydney suburbs, as the majority of Muslims living in Australia reside in Sydney (Hassan et al., 2018). Sydney is also home to the largest immigrant population when compared to all other Australian states and territories (Simon-Davies, 2018). Moreover, an analysis of known terrorism offenders in Australia shows that both completed and foiled terrorist attacks, as well as terrorism perpetrators, are overwhelmingly from Sydney (Shanahan, 2019). As such, it presented a pertinent research site to acquire the desired sample of first- and second-generation Muslim participants. However, an examination of religious identity processes and attitudes towards terrorism in more newly established immigrant destinations (e.g., Brisbane, regional or remote areas) may advance what is known about Muslims’ attitudes towards terrorism in Australia (Singer, 2004). When considering divergent attitudes towards immigrants within Australia, feelings of identity threat may be felt differently by Muslims depending on where they live. Evidence suggests that places with more established migration patterns are more receptive towards immigrants (Singer, 2004). As such, people residing in Brisbane and Perth may be less receptive to immigrants when compared to other Australian capital cities (e.g., Melbourne, Canberra) because these cities are newer immigrant gateways (Markus, 2018). Research with Muslim populations also suggests that Muslims living in cities other than Sydney may be more critical of counter-terrorism approaches (Murphy et al., 2015). Thus, overviewing identity processes and the nature and extent of identity threats amongst Muslims in cities other than Sydney may yield differing findings.
Relatedly, the non-Muslim dataset utilised in Studies 1 and 2 also contained some limitations which must be considered when interpreting the findings. Data were collected through a social media platform (i.e., Facebook). Thus, the sample size (n=1,193) was determined by those who clicked the link and agreed to participate. The Facebook recruitment method attracted younger participants than would generally be captured in survey research. Most traditionally administered Australian surveys are conducted via telephone or mail and tend to oversample older participants (for an example in the Australian context see Murphy, 2013). However, while not representative by age, findings from Studies 1 and 2 do show attitudes from a younger sample (n=36.2 years old). Older people are often found to hold more punitive attitudes towards punishment practices than younger people (Adriaenssen & Aertsen, 2015). Had older participants been better represented in the present study, findings may have revealed heightened perceptions of threat and more support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. A more nationally representative replication of the analyses presented in Studies 1 and 2 may, therefore, highlight more generalisable attitudes towards Muslims and punitive counter-terrorism policies in Australia. Moreover, determining immigrant attitudes towards punitive counter-terrorism policies may expand understandings of how such policies attract public support beyond examining attitudes amongst majority and minority groups. Despite these differences in sample characteristics as a result of completing data collection via Facebook, it is important to note that researchers are increasingly utilising online convenience samples such as those gathered through social media platforms (Pickett et al., 2018). One reason for this trend is the reduction in landline phone connections amongst the wider community.

There are also some limitations associated with the measures used in my dissertation, which present avenues for future inquiry. In the non-Muslim sample, the perceptions of Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terrorist threat measure—which combined feelings
towards realistic, symbolic and terroristic threats—may prevent the ability to develop a more nuanced understanding of how perceptions of threat can form. A factor analysis revealed that all of the perceived threat items loaded onto one factor. Other research has tested the individual effects of realistic threats to participants’ feelings of wellbeing and social welfare, symbolic threats to individuals’ ways of life, and terroristic threats to individuals’ safety (Obaidi et al., 2018; Uenal, 2016; Velasco González et al., 2008). It is therefore possible that these types of threat may have a differential impact on individuals’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. Examining if such differences exist will also elicit divergent implications for research on the effects of perceptions of threat.

The inclusion of a 2x2 experimental vignette design presented a novel approach to determining attitudinal differences towards perceiving Muslims as a threat and supporting punitive counter-terrorism policies amongst a sample of non-Muslim Australians. Specifically, the vignette enabled me to empirically test if non-Muslims’ attitudes differed based on whether participants received a scenario depicting a hypothetical terrorism suspect motivated by Islamic extremist ideals or right-wing extremist ideals. The focus of my dissertation was to examine the role of identity processes and perceptions of threat in shaping non-Muslims support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. However, future research may also benefit from testing these relationships in a right-wing extremism context. For example, developing items that measure threats from right-wing extremism may elicit comparable findings to those I have presented herein. Notions of identity and patriotism are central in right-wing narratives. Moreover, the role of the threat perceived “out-groups” pose is a key component in garnering support for right-wing groups, particularly in the Australian context. As such, identity processes and perceptions of right-wing threat may also help to further explain how individuals come to support punitive counter-terrorism policies, especially given the rise of right-wing extremism in Australia and elsewhere.
The construction of the identity variables presented in the analyses does not account for the numerous ways in which individuals develop and nurture their identities. Amongst the non-Muslim sample utilised in Studies 1 and 2(A and B), an Australian national identity scale was created and used as a proxy for the strength of majority in-group identification. However, it is possible that recent immigrants who are Australian citizens also identify very strongly as Australian and see themselves as a member of the majority in-group. As such, the measure may not be ideal for assessing in-group identification. Additionally, the boundaries that denote who does and does not belong within an in-group is not always clearly defined (Meeus et al., 2010). Therefore, future research may also wish to canvas identity formations in terms of who belongs within the in-group. Meeus et al. (2010) suggest that how people categorise who should be included within an in-group is important for shaping hostile attitudes towards those deemed to belong in an out-group.

Similarly, constructions of national and religious identity amongst the Muslim sample in Study 3 may not capture the diverse ways that Muslims see themselves as Australians and identify with their religion. Moreover, as religious identity was operationalised through a one-item measure, it may not have thoroughly described the varying components regarding how Muslims define their religious identity (Wiley et al., 2019). It is also important to note that how Muslims construct their differing identities also impacts the extent to which they are affected by identity threats (Wiley et al., 2019). In this vein, it may be important to continue to determine how different identity threats shape Muslims’ experiences and reactions to such threats. Moreover, investigating differing sources of threat from both majority groups as well as minority groups may illuminate other predicates of dual identification and/or support for terrorism (Cárdenas, 2019).

Future research can, therefore, consider alternative or expanded operationalisations of identity. Doing so may provide a more in-depth exploration of how Muslims and non-
Muslims understand identity processes and how such processes may shape their reactions to identity threats. Understanding differences in attitudes based on diverse constructions of social identity will better highlight the nature of identity processes in influencing the strength and variance in Muslims’ support for terrorism (Tausch et al., 2009) as well as non-Muslims perceptions of threat (Velasco González et al., 2008) and punitive attitudes (Unnever & Cullen, 2010a). Future research would also benefit from considering Muslims’ dual identities not just in terms of their national or religious identities, but also their heterogeneous ethnic identities. After all, Muslims do not come from one ethnic or racial group but instead come from many different countries and ethnicities (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2014). How Muslims construct their identities and react to identity threats may, therefore, be dependent on the nuances associated with their cultural heritage.

The items used to gauge Muslims’ support for terrorism in Study 3 were adapted from other research that measured support for the use of violence to achieve political, ideological, or religious goals (van den Bos et al., 2009). As such, these items did not measure support for specific extremist ideologies or actions, nor if participants understood or condoned the activities of terrorist groups. Support for terrorism is a complex concept, and one that the current measure utilised in Study 3 was only able to approximate. Future work should develop items that measure more concrete measures of ideological support as well as extremist actions (Nivette et al., 2017).

Finally, it is important to note that the data I drew upon for Study 3 was a secondary dataset of 1st and 2nd generation Muslim immigrants living in Australia. The immigrant sample was recruited to capture immigrants’ attitudes. Moreover, 100% of the sample reported being Australian citizens. This 100% citizen rate was also a deliberate feature of the desired sample and because it was secondary data, I had no control over the nature of the desired sample that was recruited. These two aspects of the survey sample may have
contributed to how participants identified as Australian and as Muslim, and such constructions of identity may differ when compared to non-citizens, or Muslims whose families have resided in Australia for generations. Thus, future research may wish to canvas Muslim attitudes towards identity processes, identity threats and terrorism amongst non-citizens and participants from different immigrant generations. However, it must be noted that given recent migration patterns in Australia (see Chapter 2), it is unlikely there will be generational differences amongst an Australian sample.

Despite these limitations, the findings in my dissertation demonstrate how identity processes and perceived threats felt by Muslims and non-Muslims act as key predicates to their support for actions that seek to fend off such threats. Specifically, these actions are non-Muslims’ support for punitive counter-terrorism policies and Muslims’ support for terrorism. Moreover, my dissertation has achieved its intended goal, which was to demonstrate the role that both Muslims and non-Muslims can play in preventing harmful attitudes towards terrorism.

11.6 Concluding Comments

The prevention of and response to terrorism dominates political agendas worldwide. Preventing terrorism requires a whole-of-community response. Yet there is often a disproportionate focus on the Muslim community as both the problem and the solution to countering terrorism (Cherney & Murphy, 2016). When non-Muslims associate Muslims with terrorism, some Muslims can come to feel their identities as Muslims are threatened (Bull & Rane, 2019). Understanding how such identity processes may shape some Muslims’ support for terrorism was, therefore, the focus of my dissertation.

The findings of the three studies within my dissertation demonstrate that identity processes and identity threats are central to understanding how some non-Muslims can: (a)
come to view Muslims a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat, and (b) support punitive counter-terrorism policies. They also reveal how some Muslims can come to support terrorism. Specifically, my dissertation provides empirical evidence that some Muslims may come to support terrorism when they experience an identity threat from non-Muslims (i.e., meta-punitiveness). Yet holding a strong Australian national identity does seem to protect some Muslims from supporting terrorism.

Taken together, the three studies comprising my dissertation contributed to the literature in three key ways. Firstly, they explored the perspective of both Muslims and non-Muslims to more holistically understand how Muslims’ support for terrorism can arise and the role that Muslims and non-Muslims can play. Secondly, findings in my dissertation expanded the utility of the Racial Animus Model to understand whether punitive attitudes are shaped by hostility towards religious groups (i.e., Muslims), as opposed to those defined by race or ethnicity. Finally, it provided the first empirical test of the Dual Identity Model to determine if dual identification reduced Muslims’ likelihoods of supporting terrorism. The results of my dissertation demonstrate that the attitudes and behaviours of non-Muslims may shape an atmosphere conducive to increasing Muslims’ support for terrorism. Hence, my dissertation reinforces the need to address wider public attitudes towards Muslims to prevent the narrative that links Muslims with terrorism. Further, it highlights the importance of ensuring that Muslims feel empowered to identify with the values they perceive characterise Australian national identity.

To conclude, efforts are made to understand how terrorist groups gain traction and develop strategies that can impede their ability to gain momentum. In recent years, attention has turned away from terrorist groups themselves and focused more resources on those who support terrorism. This is because terrorist groups rely heavily on community support, and without this support, they become weak and lose their legitimacy (Cherney & Murphy, 2019;
Richardson, 2006; Tessler & Robbins, 2007). As such, my dissertation sought to understand how identity processes can shape Muslims’ support for terrorism. It did so by drawing on the attitudes of both Muslim and non-Muslim community members living in Australia. My dissertation demonstrated how support for terrorism can be fostered and reduced, and the role that both Muslims and non-Muslims can play in shaping Muslims’ support for terrorism. Gauging the attitudes of Muslims and non-Muslims was critical, as the wider prevention of terrorism necessitates counter-terrorism initiatives to be inclusive of both Muslims and non-Muslims. By examining support for terrorism through the lens of both Muslim and non-Muslim perceptions, the divisive “us” versus “them” discourse can be reframed into a more collective “we”.
Appendices

Appendix A: The Introduction of Counter-terrorism Laws in Australia

International terrorism events, particularly 9/11, the 2002 Bali Bombings, and the London bombings in 2005 have spurred the introduction of numerous counter-terrorism laws in Australia. Despite Australia’s more limited exposure to terrorism than many other western democratic countries, its counter-terrorism framework is extensive, and even contains unique laws unseen in other countries (Pickering et al., 2007; Williams, 2011). For example, the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) can secretly detain individuals who are not suspected of terrorism for up to one week and question them for up to 24 hours to gather terrorism-related intelligence (Lynch et al., 2015; Poynting & Perry, 2007).

Federal Criminal Law

Since 2002, the Australian Government has introduced an arsenal of over 70 counter-terrorism laws (Hardy, 2019). The Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) details the definition of terrorism (Division 100), what constitutes a terrorist act (Division 101), preparatory offences (Division 101), who are the proscribed terrorist organisations (Division 102), and laws regarding the suppression of terrorist financing (Division 103). In the aftermath of the 2005 London bombings, and largely following the UK’s lead, the Australian Government introduced the control order regime (Division 104) and the preventative detention order (PDO) regime (Division 105). PDOs are a unique feature of Australia’s counter-terrorism laws and are not legislated in similar countries (e.g., the UK, the US, Canada) (Hardy, 2019). The legislation within most of these divisions is underpinned by a drive to prevent terrorism. Initially framed as a temporary response to the initial post-9/11 threat, these laws are now a more permanent feature of Australia’s counter-terrorism machinery due to a federal...
government assessment that a terrorist attack is probable (Australian Government, 2017a; Williams, 2011).

Also in reaction to the 2005 London bombings, the *Anti-Terrorism Act 2005* (Cth) came into effect. This Act legislates that a terrorism offence can be committed even if a terrorist act does not occur or if a preparatory act is not able to be directly related to a specific terrorism plan or attack (Lynch et al., 2015). This Act also included a sedition offence, which prohibited an individual from urging another person to use violence to overthrow a state or monarch, to assist an enemy or to engage in armed hostilities. Concerns about the restrictions of this legislation on the right to free speech, as well as the appropriateness of the term *sedition* to describe such conduct, led to an Australian Law Reform Commission Review. But, it was not until 2010 that reforms occurred and the offence of sedition was replaced with *urging violence* (Lynch et al., 2015).

In 2014, the Australian Government introduced the *Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Act 2014* (Cth). This Act was developed in response to the growing number of Australians travelling overseas to engage in hostile activity in alliance with a known terrorist organisation (Henderson-Lancett, 2016). Specifically, this Act has created offences applicable to Australian residents or citizens who are: (1) preparing to enter a foreign country with the intention of engaging in hostile activities, (2) entering a foreign country with the intention of engaging in hostile activities and (3) engaging in hostile activities overseas (Lynch et al., 2015). This legislation has also created an offence of advocating terrorism, which applies to any individual who “counsels, promotes, encourages or urges [the commission of] terrorism” (Lynch et al., 2015, p. 41). Finally, this Act includes the *declared area offence* and has expanded passport cancellation powers to enable the Minister for Foreign Affairs to suspend an individual’s travel documents upon advice from ASIO’s Director General (Lynch et al., 2015).
Further to these security provisions, the introduction of the *Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Act 2015* (Cth) intertwines immigration restrictions in its counter-terrorism framework. Relevant to suspects with dual citizenship, the *Allegiance to Australia Act* introduced three offences. Citizenship can be revoked if: (1) a dual national commits an offence pertaining to terrorism, foreign incursions or recruitment into a terrorist organisation; or (2) a dual national serves in the armed forces of a country in direct conflict with Australia (Pillai & Williams, 2017). The third gives Federal Ministers the discretion to revoke citizenship when a dual citizen has engaged in a terrorism offence prescribed under Australian law (Pillai & Williams, 2017).

In 2016, the *Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 2016* (Cth) was introduced to simplify authorities’ abilities to monitor individuals under control orders, declare the offence of advocating for the crime of genocide, provide more safeguards to protect sensitive information, and reduce the legal age for a person to be placed on a control order to 14. In 2018, provisions marked by a sunset clause\(^78\) were proposed to be expanded in the *Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 2018* (Cth). These proposed provisions include the extension of the control order and PDO regimes, the declared area offence and the stop, search and seizure powers for three years (Barker & Portillo-Castro, 2018). Questioning warrants and questioning and detention warrants have also been proposed to be expanded for a further year. Finally, a range of recommendations made by a recent review by the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (INSLM) and the

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\(^78\) A sunset clause puts a time constraint on certain laws. Sunset clauses can be activated to revoke an existing law, initiate a review of an existing law or stipulate the continuation of a particular law unless it is repealed within a specific timeframe (Finn, 2010). Sunset clauses are common in counter-terrorism legislation as they trigger expiration dates of laws made obsolete by the changing threat of terrorism.
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) have been introduced (Barker & Portillo-Castro, 2018).

In July 2019, the most recent counter-terrorism Act was introduced into Parliament. After two males were arrested on suspicion of being members of the Islamic State during counter-terrorism raids in Sydney, Minister for Home Affairs Peter Dutton presented the Counterterrorism (Temporary Exclusion Orders) Bill 2019 (Cth). Described as a way of managing foreign fighters re-entering into Australia, this Bill proposes to restrict foreign fighters over the age of 14 from re-entering Australia for two years. A temporary exclusion order (TEO) can be issued if a minister believes that the individual presents a security risk and reasonably suspects that a TEO could prevent a terrorism-related act. Upon terminating a TEO, the individual would be placed on a return permit that would regulate their re-entry movements within Australia, according to the proposed Bill.

**Policing Powers**

In addition to the suite of laws designed to criminalise acts related to terrorism, policing powers have also expanded to deal with the changing terrorism threat since 9/11. Most policing powers are outlined in the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), which are enforced by the Australian Federal Police (AFP). The Act also applies throughout state and territory police organisations (s. 3A). State and territory legislation also outlines some specific policing powers, such as covert search warrants and the ability to extend PDOs for up to 14 days. Finally, the Australian Security Intelligence Act 1979 (Cth), which governs the actions of ASIO, has been amended in the aftermath of 9/11 and the Bali Bombings.

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79 Under federal legislation, the AFP can issue an initial PDO for a period of 24 hours and can request a continued PDO which extends the detention period for an extra 24 hours (maximum 48 hours in total) (Lynch et al., 2015).
The *Crimes Act 1914* (Cth) details a range of federal policing powers, such as the ability for police to make arrests without a warrant (s. 3WA) and conduct delayed notification search warrants (s. 3ZZBD), which enables AFP officers to enter a suspect’s premises, perform a search, and provide a warrant retrospectively. Both the AFP and state and territory police officers can use other powers, which include the ability to stop and search an individual (s. 3UD) in a prescribed security zone, even if the individual is not suspected of committing an offence. Should an officer find a terrorism-related or a serious offence-related\(^\text{80}\) item during the search, they are permitted to seize the item under s. 3UE of the *Crimes Act 1914* (Cth). These police powers were extended in the *National Security Legislation Amendment Act 2010* (Cth) and now enable AFP officers to conduct warrantless searches and seizures of items in individuals’ private premises. If officers find relevant items, they must secure a warrant prior to seizing the item (Lynch et al., 2015). Finally, federal police officers also draw on the *Surveillance Devices Act 2004* (Cth) to apply for a warrant to install a surveillance device when three grounds are met. These grounds are: (1) authorities have reasonable suspicion to believe an offence has been committed, is in progress or is likely to occur, (2) authorities have conducted, are conducting, or will conduct an investigation and (3) a surveillance device is crucial for authorities to collect relevant evidence during the course of their investigation (*Surveillance Devices Act 2004* (Cth), s. 14).

Police officers at a federal, state or territory level can also detain terrorism suspects prior to being charged for twice as long than for ordinary criminal offences (i.e., 24 hours for terrorism offences as opposed to 12 hours for other criminal offences) through a period of

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\(^{80}\) A serious offence-related item is any item that could be used in the commission of a ‘serious offence’, which is defined as “an offence under the law of the Commonwealth, or a State offence that has a federal aspect, punishable by a maximum penalty of imprisonment for life or five or more years” (*Crimes Act 1914* – s.23WA Definitions).
pre-charge detention (s. 23DB of the *Crimes Act 1914* (Cth)). The rationale for pre-charge detention is to provide authorities with additional time to conduct further investigations or obtain evidence (Lynch et al., 2015). However, the ability for police to request extensions that enable them to detain suspects for prolonged periods was reformed following the Haneef affair.81 Specifically, reforms were made to the *Crimes Act 1914* (Cth) which now stipulates a seven-day dead time82 limit that police can apply for (s. 23DE) (Lynch et al., 2015). Overall, while the AFP enforces a raft of federal laws designed to prevent and respond to terrorism, state and territory police services also perform terrorism prevention and response roles in their jurisdictions (Australian National Security, n.d.-c).

In addition to federal, state and territory police functions, the role of Australia’s chief domestic security agency, ASIO, has significantly expanded. ASIO plays a preventative role in gathering intelligence related to domestic threats to Australia’s national security and advising Australian Federal Ministers on issues related to national security (Lynch et al., 2015). The *Australian Security Intelligence Act 1979* (Cth) primarily governs ASIO. After the Bali Bombings in 2002, the Act was amended to enable ASIO officers to obtain a warrant to use tracking devices, monitor individuals via telephone, access computers and open other people’s mail (Findlay et al., 2014). The *Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act*

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81 Mohamed Haneef became embroiled in a counter-terrorism investigation in 2007 when authorities found a SIM card belonging to him in a vehicle used in a terrorist attack in Glasgow, Scotland (Lynch et al., 2015). Following his pre-charge arrest, police made several successful applications which extended his detention period to 12 days before he was charged with intentionally supplying resources to a terrorist organisation. Police were able to extend Haneef’s detention time by claiming exemptions for ‘dead time’. At the time, police could claim an unlimited amount of dead time. However, a lack of evidence linking Haneef to the Glasgow attack, Haneef’s wrongful detention, and his subsequent deportation after the Immigration Minister cancelled his visa during the saga was heavily criticised and led to an independent inquiry. In 2010, Haneef was compensated an undisclosed amount by the Australian Government (Lynch et al., 2015).

82 Dead time is a period of time that is excluded from the maximum allowable time that individuals are legally allowed to be detained by police. Dead time can be activated if, for example, police need to conduct further investigations or gather additional intelligence, or if detainees need time to communicate with a legal representative (Lynch et al., 2015). The maximum amount of dead time that a Magistrate can approve is seven days.
1979 (Cth) (TIA) also permits ASIO officers to access an individual’s metadata\textsuperscript{83} without a warrant. In 2015, this Act was amended to require telecommunications companies to retain their users’ metadata for two years. These data can be accessed not only by ASIO but also the AFP and other state and territory policing agencies so they can conduct a counter-terrorism function.

The introduction of the \textit{National Security Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 2014} (Cth) has provided even further powers in addition to greater protections for ASIO, particularly when conducting operations. For example, ASIO officers now have greater access to an unlimited number of computers with a warrant, which some argue are broad enough that in theory, suggests ASIO could monitor the whole Internet (Knott, 2014). Notably, this Act permits ASIO officers to conduct special intelligence operations (SIO), which are undercover operations whereby ASIO officers are granted immunity from criminal or civil liability.\textsuperscript{84} This power is unique when compared to other similar western democratic countries (e.g., the US, the UK; Lynch et al., 2015). This Act also permits collaboration between ASIO and the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), whose role up until this point focused on international threats. Specifically, these new laws allow ASIS to collate intelligence on people within Australia, which arguably blurs the line between the traditional intelligence functions of ASIO and ASIS.

Relatedly, ASIO can request that Australian government agencies perform certain actions on their advice. Specifically, ASIO has powers to issue \textit{Adverse Security Assessments} (ASA), which recommends a type of action be taken. Actions can include denying an 

\textsuperscript{83} Metadata refers to “the date and time, duration and place of communication” (Lynch et al., 2015, p. 153).

\textsuperscript{84} There are safeguards in these new laws, which state that during an SIO, ASIO officers are prohibited from committing any act that may constitute torture, that may cause serious injury or death to another person, that involves sexual assault or that significantly damages property.
individual refugee status, refusing someone a passport, prohibiting a person from obtaining employment in a sensitive area (e.g., an airport) or restricting a person from registering to purchase industrial chemicals. Powers such as these demonstrate that ASIO does not have a policing function. In fact, ASIO is prohibited from acting on any intelligence they obtain and as such, cooperation with other law enforcement agencies is critical to their counter-terrorism capacities (Lynch et al., 2015). However, ASIO demonstrates an increasing collaboration between some of Australia’s security agencies and extraordinary powers that impact privacy, liberties, and human rights (Hardy, 2019).
Appendix B: Terrorism Events Since 9/11

In Chapter 2, I state that 31,800 Islamic-inspired terrorist attacks have occurred since 9/11 (and up until December 31st, 2018). This figure was calculated by examining the number of terrorist attacks (as defined by the GTD) that occurred between September 12th, 2001 and December 31st, 2018 by all terrorist groups inspired by Islamic extremist motives.

The groups included in the analysis are: Abdullah Azzam Brigades; Abu Nidal Organization; Abu Sayyaf Group; Adan Abyan Islamic Army; Ajnad Misr; Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade; Al-Aqsa-Group; Al-Ashtar Brigades; Al-Badr; Al-Ittihaad al-Islami; Al-Nusrah Front; Al-Qaida; Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula; Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent; Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb; Al-Shabaab; Al-Umar Mujahideen; Ansar Al-Khilafa (Philippines); Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (Ansar Jerusalem); Ansar al-Din; Ansar al-Islam; Ansar al-Sharia (Tunisia); Ansarul (Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan); Arakan Rohingyaya Salvation Army; Armed Islamic Group; Army of Islam; Asa'ib Ahl al-Haqq; Asbat al-Ansar; Babbar Khalsa International; Badr Brigades; Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement; Boko Haram; Caucasus Emirate; Dukhta-ran-e-Millat; Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Al-Jihad); Great Eastern Islamic Raiders Front; Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement); Haqqani Network; Harakat al-Nujaba; Harakat ul-Mujahidin; Harakat ul-Mujahidin Al-Almi; Harakat ul Ansar; Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami; Hasam Movement; Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham; Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami-yi Afghanistan; Hezbollah; Hizbul Mujahideen (HM); Hofstad Network; Houthi extremists (Ansar Allah); Indian Mujahideen; Islamic Jihad Union (Uzbekistan); Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan; Islamic Revolutionary Command; Islamic State in the Greater Sahara; Islamic State of Iraq; Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant; Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (Muhajireen Army); Jaish-e-Mohammad; Jamaah Ansharut Tawhid; Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM);
Jamaat-al-Fuqra; Jamaat-ul-Ahrar; Jamiat ul-Mujahedin; Jemaah Islamiya; Jund al-Aqsa; Jund al-Khilafa; Jundallah (Pakistan); Kata'ib Hezbollah; Kata'ib al-Imam Ali; Khalistan Commando Force; Khalistan Zindabad (Long Live Khalistan); Komala; Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK); Lashkar-e-Jhangvi; Lashkar-e-Taiba; Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam; Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa; Mujahidin Indonesia Timur; Muslim Brotherhood; Palestinian Islamic Jihad; Saraya al-Mukhtar; Servants of Islam Organization; Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries; Sipah-e-Sahaba/Pakistan; Students Islamic Movement of India; Takfir wal-Hijra (Excommunication and Exodus); Taliban; Tanzim; Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan; Turkestan Islamic Party; Turkish Hezbollah; and Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade (START, 2018).

Please note that no data was available for the following groups: Naqshbandi Army; Deendar Anjuman; Gülen Movement; Hamas Al Qassam Brigades; Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Bangladeshi; Hezbollah Al-Hejaz; Holy Land Foundation; Jamait al-Islah al-Idzhtimai; Jamait-e Islami; Islamic Jihad (Jamaat Mujahideen); Liwa Fatemiyoun; Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia; Mujihadeen Shura Council of the Environs of Jerusalem; Congress of the Peoples of Ichkeria and Dagestan; Promised Day Brigade; Sabireen Movement; Tablighi Jamaat; Al-Quds Army; Supreme Military Majilis ul-Shura of the United Mujahideen Forces of Caucasus; Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammad; Usbet al-Thaireen; Vanguards of Conquest; al-Haramain Foundation; al-Mourabitoun; Harakat Sham al-Islam; Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan Province; Libyan Islamic Fighting Group; Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group; Society of the Revival of Islamic Heritage; al-Jamaa al Islamiyya; Al Ghurabaa.

I also calculated all Islamic-inspired terrorist attacks that had occurred between September 12th, 2001 and December 31st, 2018 by terrorist groups proscribed by the Australian Government (Australian Government, 2020). The GTD detailed 17,651 attacks
committed by the following groups: Abu Sayyaf Group; Al-Marabitun Revolutionary Committee; Al-Qaida; Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula; Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent; Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb; Al-Shabaab; Boko Haram; Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement); Hezbollah; Hezbollah Palestine; Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; Islamic State of Iraq; Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant; Jaish-e-Mohammad (Iraq); Jaish-e-Mohammad; Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh; Jamaah Ansharut Daulah; Jemaah Islamiya; Kurdish Workers' Party; Lashkar-e-Jhangvi; Lashkar-e-Taiba; Palestinian Islamic Jihad (START, 2018).
Appendix C: Ethical Approval for Surveys used in my Dissertation

*Attitudes to Punishment Survey*

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**Project Description**
Griffith University is examining public perceptions towards crime within Australia. The project aims to explore how Australians perceive crime and responses to crime.

**What the Project Entails**
Participation in the study will comprise of answering a series of questions in an anonymous survey. Your views are vital to understanding how Australians view crime and punishment.

**The basis by which participants will be selected or screened**
You will be invited to participate in the study if you meet the following specifications: 1) participants represent a nationally representative sample, 2) are Australian citizens, and 3) are over the age of 18. Participants will be recruited through the Facebook platform. In order to participate, the Facebook user must click the SIGN-UP button in order to be taken to a Qualtrics page.

**Your participation is voluntary**
Participation in this survey is entirely voluntary. The survey should take approximately 20 minutes to complete. You are free to skip specific questions or withdraw from participating in the survey at any point, without penalty or judgment.

**The expected benefits of the research and risks to you**
There are no direct benefits as a result of participating in this study. There are no foreseeable risks associated with participating in this study. As a participant, you will be asked to complete a survey. Participants will be presented with one of two hypothetical scenarios in the survey. The content in the scenarios may be upsetting to some people. No vulnerable or specific populations are being targeted to participate in the research. Should you feel uncomfortable answering any question, they are free to skip the question.

**Confidentiality**
Responses from completing the survey will be retained by the research team. This study has been approved by Griffith University’s Human Research Ethics Committee (GU ref no: 2017/927). Responses to the survey are anonymous and all information provided will be stored securely by the research team. Data will be securely downloaded from the Qualtrics website and stored in a password-protected folder. Griffith University offers a Research Drive storage space which enables researchers to securely store their data. The research team will use this Research Drive to ensure that the data for this project remains confidential and secure. Only the chief investigators (Ms Harley Williamson, Professor Kristina Murphy, and Dr Elise Sargeant) will have access to the data. Griffith University guidelines stipulate that data must be stored for at least 5 years after the conclusion of the project. As such, the data will not be disposed of prior to this time.

**The ethical conduct of this research**

This project has received ethical clearance from the Griffith University Human Research Ethics Committee (GU ref no: 2017/927). Griffith University conducts research in accordance with the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research. If you have any concerns or complaints about the ethical conduct of the research project they should contact the Manager, Research Ethics on 3735 4375 or research-ethics@griffith.edu.au.

**Feedback to you**

Given the anonymous nature of the survey, we will not be able to directly provide you with feedback about the results of the study. However, if you wish to obtain a 1-page summary of the findings please contact one of the research team, provide them with some details about where to send the information, and when the summary report has been provided we will send it to you.

**Publication of the Data**

The data will be analysed and reported in an academic PhD dissertation that is being written by a member of this research team. Results from this research may also be disseminated via journal articles and/or conference presentations.

**Questions / further information**

Should you have any questions or wish to discuss the study further, please feel free to contact a member of the research team, **Ms Harley Williamson** from Griffith University via email at h.williamson@griffith.edu.au.

Thank you for your participation.
By selecting the box below, I confirm that I have read and understood the above information and in particular have noted that:

- I understand that my involvement in this research will include participation in a survey of approximately 20 minutes duration
- I understand the risks involved
- I understand that there will be no direct benefit to me from my participation in this research
- I understand that my participation in this research is voluntary
- I understand that if I have any additional questions I can contact the research team
- I understand that I am free to withdraw at any time, without explanation or penalty
- I understand that as this project has been conducted through Facebook, it is advisable not to comment on the original Facebook post
- I understand that as this project has been conducted through Facebook, it is advisable to be mindful of preserving my own privacy and the privacy of others
- I understand that as this project has been conducted through Facebook, all comments on the Facebook post will be monitored and deleted accordingly
- I understand that I can contact the Manager, Research Ethics, at Griffith University Human Research Ethics Committee on (07) 3735 4375 (or research-ethics@griffith.edu.au) if I have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the project.

☐ I agree to participate in the project.
☐ I do not agree to participate in the project.
Why is the research being conducted?

We are conducting research on how different immigrant groups have settled into Australia and how they respond to police. We know that immigrants can sometimes be distrusting of police. This can affect their willingness to contact police to report victimisation or crimes that affect them or their community. We are undertaking this project in order to identify effective strategies police can use to improve relationships with immigrant communities.

What participants will be asked to do

Volunteering immigrants will participate in a face-to-face survey with an interviewer. The survey will take 50 minutes and will include questions about how immigrants feel about living in Australia, if they identify as Australian and feel part of the community, and how they perceive crime in their community.
Participants will also be asked about their experiences with police and the extent to which they might be willing to assist police in their crime and terrorism prevention efforts. Participants will not be asked about any illegal activities that they or their acquaintances have engaged in, or plan to engage in.

**The basis by which participants will be selected or screened**

People will be invited to participate in this research if they indicate to us that they are a first- or second-generation immigrant to Australia from either Vietnam, the Middle East, or the UK/Ireland. We believe that they will hold valuable insights into how members of their immigrant community feel about migrating to Australia and how they perceive the police and crime in Australia.

**The expected benefits of the research**

Participation in this research will help us provide police with recommendations on how to improve their encounters with different immigrants. It will also assist police to work with your community to address local problems and to prevent crime and terrorism.

**Risks to participants**

We do not expect there to be any personal risks to research participants by participating in this study. Responses to the survey will be confidential (which means no one outside the research team will know a participant’s identity). We will simply ask people about their opinions on a range of matters, from living in Australia, opinions of the police, and views on what police can do to build trust amongst immigrants. If at the conclusion of the survey any participants would like to access a support service you can do so on the following two contact numbers: Ethnic Community Services Cooperative on 02 9569 1288; LifeLine on 13 11 14.

**Confidentiality**

All research data (survey responses and analysis) will be retained in a locked cabinet and/or a password protected electronic file at Griffith University for a period of five years before being archived in a public repository to be used by other researchers. There will be no identifying
information about research participants in the data file provided to the archived repository. We will use data collected for the project to compile a report and academic publications about how different immigrant groups in Australia view the police and their willingness to assist police in their crime and terrorism prevention efforts. A student researcher is also involved in this study and will use some of the survey data in their academic program.

**Participation is voluntary**

Participation in this study is voluntary and research participants will be compensated for their time with a $40 Coles-Myer voucher.

**The ethical conduct of this research**

This research has received clearance by the Griffith University Ethics Committee (GU ref no: 2017/178). Griffith University conducts research in accordance with the *National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research*. If you have any concerns or complaints about the ethical conduct of this research project you should contact the Manager, Research Ethics on (07) 37354375 or research-ethics@griffith.edu.au.

**Your privacy**

The conduct of this research involves the collection, access and/or use of your identified personal information. The information collected is confidential and will not be disclosed to third parties without your consent, except to meet government, legal or other regulatory authority requirements. A de-identified copy of this data may be used for other research purposes. However, your anonymity will at all times be safeguarded. For further information consult Griffith University’s Privacy Plan at [http://www.griffith.edu.au/about-griffith/plans-publications/griffith-university-privacy-plan](http://www.griffith.edu.au/about-griffith/plans-publications/griffith-university-privacy-plan) or telephone (07) 3735 4375.

**Feedback to you**

Upon completion of the study, the research team at Griffith University will compile a summary report
of the main findings from the survey. We expect this to be available by the end of October 2018. You can access this information from Professor Kristina Murphy’s Griffith University website at https://www.griffith.edu.au/criminology-law/school-criminology-criminal-justice/staff/associate-professor-tina-murphy.

Questions / further information

If you have any questions about the study please contact Professor Kristina (Tina) Murphy at Griffith University at t.murphy@griffith.edu.au.

Please retain this information sheet for your records.
### Appendix D: The Attitudes to Punishment Survey instrument

**Attitudes to Punishment Survey – WAVE 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>SECTION 1: ABOUT YOU</strong></th>
<th>This section asks about yourself. Your responses to these questions will not be used to identify you.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Q1.1 What is your sex?

- [ ] Male  
- [ ] Female

Q1.2 In what year were you born?

Year

Q1.3 What is your primary ancestry?

- [ ] English  
- [ ] Irish  
- [ ] Scottish  
- [ ] Australian born (non-ATSI)  
- [ ] Australian-born ATSI  
- [ ] German  
- [ ] Chinese  
- [ ] Italian  
- [ ] Indian  
- [ ] Greek  
- [ ] Dutch  
- [ ] Other  
- [ ] Other Text Response
Q1.4 What is your current employment status?

Working full-time ☐  Retired ☐
Working part-time ☐  Unemployed and seeking work ☐
On a sick/disability pension ☐  Home duties ☐
On a sole parent’s pension ☐  Student ☐
On an aged pension ☐  Other ☐  Please specify:

Q1.5 What is your highest educational achievement?

No School ☐  Bachelor’s degree ☐
Primary school ☐  Postgraduate qualification ☐
Completed junior high school (year 10) ☐  Other ☐  Please specify:
Completed senior high school (year 12) ☐
Trade/Technical certificate or diploma ☐

Q1.6 Were you born in Australia?

Yes ☐

No ☐  → What country were you born in?
      → What year did you arrive in Australia?

Q1.7 In politics, people talk of being left leaning or right leaning. In Australia, left leaning would be more socialist e.g., the Australian Labor Party (ALP); the Greens, while right
leaning would be more conservative e.g., the *Liberal National Party (LNP); Family First.*

How would you describe your political affiliation?

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
Left 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Right

Q1.9 What is your religion?

Catholic ☐ Buddhist ☐
Protestant ☐ Hindu ☐
Christian - Other ☐ No religion ☐
Jewish ☐ Other ☐ Please specify:
Muslim ☐

Q1.10 Do you consider yourself to be a member of an ethnic or racial minority group in Australia?

Yes ☐ No ☐

Q1.11 What is your postcode?

Q1.12 Are you an Australian citizen?

Yes ☐ No ☐
### SECTION 2: SOCIAL IDENTITY

This section of the survey asks about your identification with different groups in society. Please state the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Superordinate Identity</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>97</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I am proud to be an Australian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I identify strongly with being Australian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being an Australian is important to the way I think of myself as a person</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subordinate Identity</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>97</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Within Australia, I see myself first and primarily as a member of my racial/ethnic group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is important for me to be seen by others to be a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I am proud to be a member of my racial/ethnic group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member of my racial/ethnic group</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

SECTION 3: ATTITUDES TO PUNISHMENT
This section asks you about your attitudes towards punishment within Australia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The death penalty should be the punishment for murder</th>
<th>1 (Strongly Disagree)</th>
<th>2 (Disagree)</th>
<th>3 (Neither Agree nor Disagree)</th>
<th>4 (Agree)</th>
<th>5 (Strongly Agree)</th>
<th>97 (I don’t know)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People who break the law should be given harsher sentences</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts are too soft on offenders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The tougher the sentence, the less likely an offender is to commit more crime</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Rehabilitation is not taken seriously by criminals


High crime rates are an indication that punishments are not severe enough


Harsher sentences are the most effective response to crime


The tougher the sentence, the less likely an offender is to commit another act of terrorism


SECTION 4: A HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO

This section asks you to read a hypothetical statement about an incident occurring in Australia and answer some questions about the statement.
Please imagine you are reading a hypothetical media report about an incident that has been identified by police in an Australian state or territory:

**The reported incident (Muslim suspects)**

**The Media Report:**
Police are investigating a possible food-tampering incident at a fast-food chain in Australia that has potential to put Australian consumers at harm.

Authorities were alerted to the incident when several customers collapsed at four of the fast-food restaurants with undiagnosed conditions.

Police have apprehended an individual suspected of carrying out this incident in Australia.

In a Facebook post on a radical Muslim page, the suspect expressed their willingness to take such action in the name of Allah.

Another group of four individuals who are known associates of the suspect have also been detained. The four individuals expressed support for the suspect’s actions on Facebook on numerous occasions.

All foodstuffs from the affected fast-food restaurants have been destroyed. Customers who

NOTE: Use these manipulation checks for the Muslim suspect scenario

Do you think the suspect in the scenario is likely to be an Islamic extremist?

Yes ☐ No ☐

Was the motive for the incident in the name of Allah?

Yes ☐ No ☐
The reported incident (Non-Muslim suspects)

**The Media Report:**
Police are investigating a possible food-tampering incident at a fast-food chain in Australia.

This incident has the potential to put Australian consumers at harm.

Authorities were alerted to the incident when several customers collapsed at four of the fast-food restaurants with undiagnosed conditions.

Police have apprehended an individual suspected of carrying out this incident. In a Facebook post on a right-wing extremist page, the suspect expressed their willingness to take such action in support of the anti-immigration movement (i.e., opposition to immigration into a country e.g., Australia).

Another group of four individuals who are known associates of the suspect have also been detained. The four individuals expressed support for the suspect’s actions on Facebook.

All foodstuffs from the affected fast-food restaurants have been destroyed. Customers who

NOTE: Use these manipulation checks for the non-Muslim suspect scenario

Do you think the suspect in the scenario is likely to be a right-wing extremist?

Yes ☐    No ☐

Was the motive for the incident in support of the anti-immigration movement?

Yes ☐    No ☐

Now, imagine you are reading further details of the incident from a police spokesperson:
Police statement of the incident (Terrorism)

The Police Statement:
“This is a clear example of how terrorism can endanger lives. The individual suspected of carrying out this terrorist act has been apprehended. Our investigation of the suspect involved in this incident and our willingness to prosecute this terrorist act must be evident to all. Our rapid response is in the best interests of the public.

What is also troubling is individuals who support those willing to use

How did the police statement depict the event? (please select one only)

- Terrorism
- A crime
- I don’t know

Police statement of the incident (Crime)
The Police Statement:
“This is a clear example of how crime can endanger lives. The individual suspected of carrying out this crime has been apprehended. Our investigation of the individual involved and our willingness to prosecute this crime must be evident to all. Our rapid response is in the best interests of the public.
What is also troubling is individuals who support those willing to use criminal tactics that may harm the wider community. We have intelligence

How did the police statement depict the event? (please select one only)

Terrorism □       A crime □       I don’t know □

Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>97</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Neither Agree nor Disagree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>I don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think the event described in the above</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The scenario seems to describe an act of terrorism. I think the event described in the above scenario is a crime. I think the individuals associated with the suspect should have been arrested.

Now imagine that the suspect of the food tampering incident has been charged by police and is now considered a perpetrator of the act. Please rate the extent to which you believe this perpetrator should be punished:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>97</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The perpetrator deserves to be punished</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The perpetrator should accept legal responsibility for</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
committing the act described

The perpetrator’s actions are justified

It is fair that the perpetrator is punished

Penalising the perpetrator would deter other people from committing a similar act

Punishment would deter the perpetrator from committing another act

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Please answer all)</th>
<th>1 Very inappropriate</th>
<th>2 Somewhat inappropriate</th>
<th>3 Neither appropriate not inappropriate</th>
<th>4 Somewhat appropriate</th>
<th>5 Very appropriate</th>
<th>97 I don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monetary fine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the following, what do you think would be an appropriate penalty for the perpetrator:
Imagine the perpetrator is given a prison sentence. What do you think an appropriate prison sentence should be for this act?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prison sentence</th>
<th>Short sentence (less than 3 years)</th>
<th>Medium sentence (3 years)</th>
<th>Long sentence (greater than 3 years)</th>
<th>Prison is not appropriate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Please think about the above scenario and rate the extent to which you believe the four associates should be punished:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>97</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Neither Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>I don't know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

April 2020 - 325 - Harley Mae Williamson
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>nor</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The associates deserve to be punished</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☒</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The associates should accept legal responsibility for supporting the actions of the perpetrator</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☒</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The associates’ actions to support the perpetrator are justified</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☒</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is fair that the associates are punished</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☒</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penalising the associates would deter other people from supporting others who commit acts</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☒</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punishment would deter the associates from supporting others who commit acts</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☒</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the following, what do you think would be an appropriate penalty for the associates:
Imagine the associates are given a prison sentence. What do you think an appropriate prison sentence should be for this act?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Punishment Type</th>
<th>Very inappropriate</th>
<th>Somewhat inappropriate</th>
<th>Neither appropriate not inappropriate</th>
<th>Somewhat appropriate</th>
<th>Very appropriate</th>
<th>I don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monetary fine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prison sentence</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community service</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Compulsory education program</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No punishment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please outline the extent to which you worry about becoming the victim of a terrorist attack in the future:
Please outline the extent to which you worry about becoming the victim of crime in the future:

Very rarely  □  Rarely  □  Occasionally  □  Frequently  □  Very frequently  □

We would now like you to think about some laws that have been enacted in response to threats of terrorism in Australia. On the below scale, please rate the extent to which you approve or disapprove of the use of each:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>97</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Disapprove</td>
<td>Disapprove</td>
<td>Neither Approve nor Disapprove</td>
<td>Approve</td>
<td>Strongly Approve</td>
<td>I don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities should have the powers to question individuals on matters related to terrorism even if</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They are not suspects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities should be able to detain terrorist suspects without criminal charges for up to 48 hours</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities should be able to use stressful interrogation techniques to get confessions from suspected terrorists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities should be able to apply laws that lack human rights protections to suspected terrorists</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities should be able to listen to private</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversations without a court order</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities should be able to intercept emails and other personal electronic information</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities should be able to conduct searches and seizures of the belongings of suspected terrorists without proper warrants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities should be able to profile people at airports based on their appearance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prison sentences for terrorists should be</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECTION 6: ATTITUDES TOWARDS DIVERSE GROUPS
We would like to gauge your opinion towards diverse groups. Please select the response that most closely resembles your own view.

| more severe than they currently are | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|---|---|---|---|
| Australian citizenship should be revoked from people with a dual nationality if they are charged with terrorism offence(s) |   |   |   |   |
| Suspected terrorists deserve the same legal rights as everyone else |   |   |   |   |
| Suspected terrorists deserve no legal rights |   |   |   |   |

1 Strongly Disagree
2 Disagree
3 Neither Agree
4 Agree
5 Strongly Agree
97 I don’t know
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diversity from Muslims</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I respect the way Muslims lead their lives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I respect what Muslims contribute to Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I respect the Muslim faith</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diversity from racial and/or ethnic minority groups</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Racial and/or ethnic minority groups bring diversity and interest to Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is a good thing for society to be made up of different cultures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial and/or ethnic minority groups make Australia open to new ideas and cultures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Strongly Disagree  2 Disagree  3 Neither Agree nor Disagree  4 Agree  5 Strongly Agree  97 I don’t know
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity threat from Muslims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australian identity is being threatened because there are too many Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian norms and values are being threatened because of the presence of Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims are a threat to Australia’s way of life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims are a threat to our safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not trust Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am suspicious of Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims are likely to be potential terrorists</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity threat from Ethnic/Racial Minority Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australian identity is being threatened because there are too</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>many racial/ethnic minority groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian norms and values are being threatened because of the presence of racial/ethnic minority groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial/ethnic minority groups are a threat to Australia’s way of life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial/ethnic minority groups are a threat to our safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not trust racial and/or ethnic minority groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am suspicious of certain racial/ethnic minority groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial/ethnic minority groups are likely to be potential terrorists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the past, I have personally been a target of discrimination because of my race or ethnicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the past, I have personally been a target of discrimination because of my religion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SECTION 7: VIEWS ON DIFFERENT TYPES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE**
This section asks about your views on terrorism. Please select the response that most accurately reflects your own view.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>97</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Neither Agree nor Disagree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>I don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passive support for terrorism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using violence to achieve one’s political, ideological,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
or religious goals is legitimate

It is sometimes appropriate for people to use violence to support a political, ideological, or religious cause

It is justifiable for people to disturb public order to achieve something that they think is very important

It is justifiable for people to use violence against other people to achieve something that they think is very important

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Muslims’ Perceived Support for Terrorism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Strongly Agree
2 Disagree
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree
4 Agree
5 Strongly Agree
97 I don’t know
Islamic extremists perpetrate violence in the name of Islam/Allah. Please rate the extent to which you believe the following about Islamic extremism:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>97</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islamic terrorism gets support from many Muslims all over the world</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Some Muslims perceive Islamic terrorists as heroes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Muslims find Islamic terrorism justifiable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic terrorism gets support from many Muslims in Australia</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Support for Right-wing Extremism

Right wing extremists commit acts of terror in the name of political grievances e.g., threats to nationalism; anti-immigration (whereby anti-immigration is an opposition to immigration)
Please rate the extent to which you believe the following about right-wing extremists:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Not Applicable</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

I understand why some right-wing extremists may use violence against people who have the power in Australia (i.e., politicians).

I can understand right-wing extremists who disrupt social order.

I can understand right-wing extremists who use violence against others.

This is the conclusion of the survey. As part of your participation in this survey, you are eligible to enter the draw to win a $50 shopping voucher. If you would like to enter the draw, please type your email address into the box below. Winners will be contacted via email at the conclusion of the data collection phase.

Please enter your email here: ______________________________________

Thank you for your participation.
Appendix E: The Sydney Immigrant Survey instrument

Interviewer: Good afternoon/evening. My name is [name of interviewer] and I work for the company ‘Cultural Partners’ who are conducting a survey on behalf of researchers at Griffith University. The survey examines how first and second-generation immigrants from different backgrounds feel about living in Australia. The survey will cover a range of topics, including whether you feel socially included in Australia. There will also be questions about your views on crime, safety, and policing in Australia.

This study has Griffith University ethics clearance (GU ref no: 2017/178) and findings from this research will assist in our understanding of how both new and established immigrants experience living in Australia. Your participation is voluntary, and your responses will be kept confidential. You can refuse to answer any particular questions or discontinue your involvement in the study at any time. The survey will take approximately 50 minutes of your time and you will be offered a $40 Coles-Myer gift voucher for your participation. Are you willing to participate? If so can we arrange a suitable time to conduct a face-to-face survey with you at a place of your choice.

Q0.1 ‘Cultural Partners’ to pre-select by immigrant group membership

UK immigrant
Middle Eastern Muslim immigrant
Vietnamese immigrant

Q0.2 ‘Cultural Partners’ to pre-select by immigrant status

1st generation immigrant
2nd generation immigrant
SECTION 1: BACKGROUND ITEMS

Q1.1 What is your gender?

Male □ Female □

Q1.2 What is your age?

Q1.3 In which country were you born?

Q1.4 If you were born overseas, in which year did you first arrive in Australia to live? (skip Q4 if born in Australia)

Q1.5 How would you best describe your ancestry? Provide up to 2 ancestries only (e.g., Lebanese, Vietnamese, Pakistani, British, Scottish, Irish, etc).

□ □

Q1.6 Would you say you speak English well?

Yes □ No □

Q1.7 What suburb do you live in?
Q1.8 What is your current marital status? *(Please circle one)*

- Married (including defacto relationships) 
- Single (never married)  
- Widowed  
- Divorced or separated

Q1.9 What is your current employment status?

- Working full-time  
- Working part-time  
- Not employed and looking for work  
- Not employed and not looking for work  
- Retired  
- Studying full-time  
- Studying and working  
- Home duties

Q1.10 What was your household income in 2017 – how many thousand dollars, before taxes?

$0  
5  
10  
15  
20  
25  
30  
35  
40  
45  
50  
55  
60  
65  
70  
75  
80  
85  
90  
95  
100  
110  
120  
130  
140  
150  
160  
170  
180  
190  
200  
225  
250+  

Q1.11 What is your highest educational achievement?

- Did not have any or much formal schooling  
- Primary school  
- Junior Secondary/ Intermediate/ Form 4/ Year 10  
- Senior Secondary/ Leaving/ Form 6/ Year 12  
- Certificate (Level I, II, III or IV)  
- Trade Certificate or Nursing Diploma  
- Diploma or Advanced Diploma  
- Bachelor’s Degree  
- Graduate Certificate or Graduate Diploma  
- Post-graduate Degree (e.g., Masters or Doctorate)

Q1.12 What is your religion?

- Christianity (e.g., Catholic, Protestant, Anglican, etc.)  
- Islam  
- Judaism  
- Buddhism  
- Hinduism  
- Other  
- Please specify:
No religion

Q1.13 How important is your religion to who you are as a person?

Very unimportant
Unimportant
Not unimportant nor important
Important
Very important

SECTION 2: YOUR IDENTITY

Q2.1 People can identify with many different groups in society. The following questions ask you about how you identify and see yourself. There are no right or wrong answers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I am proud to be an Australian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I identify strongly with being Australian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being an Australian is important to the way I think of myself as a person</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am proud to be a member of my ethnic/racial group</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is important for me to be seen by others to be a member of my racial/ethnic group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being a member of my ethnic/racial group is important to the way I think of myself as a person</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being a law-abiding person is important to the way I think of myself as a person</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I identify strongly as a law-abiding person</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is important for me to be seen by others as a law-abiding person</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q2.2 The following questions ask about what is important to you. Tell us what you think….

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q2.2</th>
<th>1 Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>2 Disagree</th>
<th>3 Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>4 Agree</th>
<th>5 Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is important for me to have influence over other people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is important for me to be seen as a person of value in Australia</td>
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<tr>
<td>It is important to me to be influential and recognized for my contribution to society</td>
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<tr>
<td>It is important to me to have status in society</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is important to me that people have a say in decisions made in Australia</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is important to me that all people in society be treated with dignity and respect</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is important to me that all people play a role in making decisions that affect their community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is important to me that all people be able to make free and independent decisions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is important to me that a person’s freedom of choice is not restricted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is important to me to avoid situations where someone tells me what to do</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q2.3 generally speaking, I think…..
Most people can be trusted
Most people try to be fair

**SECTION 3: SOCIAL INCLUSION**

This section of the survey asks if you feel accepted by members of the Australian community and by those in authority.

Q3.1 First, what do you think about the opportunities available to you in Australia?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>2 Disagree</th>
<th>3 Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>4 Agree</th>
<th>5 Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you feel disadvantaged because of your race, ethnicity or religion when it comes to getting a job in Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are many opportunities for you to succeed in Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>You have the same chance of achieving success as anyone else in Australia</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q3.2 The following questions ask you about how others in Australia view people like you. By this we mean people with your ancestry. Do you think………

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>2 Disagree</th>
<th>3 Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>4 Agree</th>
<th>5 Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australians respect what people like you contribute to Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australians are disrespectful of people like you</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australians view people like you as worthy members of Australian society</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q3.3 Now some questions about how police in Australia might view people like you. By this we mean people with your ancestry. Do you think: ……

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>1 Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>2 Disagree</th>
<th>3 Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>4 Agree</th>
<th>5 Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australians are suspicious of people like you</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police view people like you as having high status in society</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police view people like you as important</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police view people like you as worthy members of Australian society</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The way police behave prevents people like you from getting ahead in life</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police respect what people like you contribute to Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police are disrespectful of people like you</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police are suspicious of people like you</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police view people like you as a threat to community safety</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police are disinterested in what people like you have to say about local issues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police let people like you influence their decisions about policing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police listen to people like you</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Police do a good job dealing with community problems that concern people like you</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police view people like you as law-abiding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Police view people like you as usually trying to do the right thing

Police often make negative judgements about people like you

Police view people like you as criminals

Police often restrict the freedom of people like you

Police often tell people like you what to do even when it is not warranted

Police regulate the behaviour of people like you for no good reason

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1 Very unlikely to feel this</th>
<th>2 Unlikely to feel this</th>
<th>3 Maybe</th>
<th>4 Likely to feel this</th>
<th>5 Very likely to feel this</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I sometimes feel under scrutiny by police and authorities because of my ethnicity, race or religion</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I sometimes feel under scrutiny by the media and public because of my ethnicity, race or religion</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I sometimes feel police view me as a potential threat to public safety because of my ethnicity, race or religion</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>I sometimes feel the Australian public views me as a threat to public</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>safety because of my ethnicity, race or religion</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4.1 Overall, would you say that crime in your suburb is……</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Somewhat low</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About average</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat high</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Q4.2 Please consider the following crimes and tell me if you have ever</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<tr>
<td>been a victim of that crime in Australia. Have you ever been a victim</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>of …?</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary/house break-in?</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Theft of a motor vehicle</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other property theft?</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damage, vandalism or graffiti to your property or car?</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical assault?</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual assault?</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence at home by someone you know?</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q4.3 If you have experienced being a victim of crime in Australia, was there an occasion where you DID NOT report the incident to police?

Yes  [ ]
No  [ ]

Q4.4 Some people believe that society has become more violent and that instances of violence have increased in the community. We would like to ask you a few questions about how you view violence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Using violence to achieve one’s political, ideological, or religious cause is sometimes ok…</th>
<th>1 Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>2 Disagree</th>
<th>3 Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>4 Agree</th>
<th>5 Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is sometimes appropriate for people to use violence to support a political, ideological, or religious cause</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is justifiable for people to use violence against other people to achieve something that they think is very important</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SECTION 5: YOUR PERCEPTIONS OF GOVERNMENT AND POLICE**

This section of the survey asks about your views of the government and particularly police. Below are a number of general statements that describe the way people may view the government or police in Australia. Tell us what you think.
Q5.1 First, how do you feel about the **Australian government** in general?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>2 Disagree</th>
<th>3 Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>4 Agree</th>
<th>5 Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I have trust and confidence in the Australian government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Australian government operates in the best interests of people like you</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q5.2 Now turning to **police**, how many people in Australia with your ancestry do you think……:

Q5.3 How do **you** personally feel about the police in Australia?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 Nobody</th>
<th>2 Not Many People</th>
<th>3 Some People</th>
<th>4 Most People</th>
<th>5 Everyone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have trust and confidence in the Australian police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support the actions of the Australian police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obey the Australian police with good will</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believe the Australian police often abuse their power</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q5.4 Here are some more questions about how **you** feel about police in Australia.
Q5.5 Below are some more statements that describe the way people may view police in Australia. Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with the following statements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>1 Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>2 Disagree</th>
<th>3 Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>4 Agree</th>
<th>5 Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To what extent do you perceive police officers to be like you</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent do you share things in common with the average police officer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent do you perceive police officers and yourself to be members of different groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I identify strongly with police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel a sense of solidarity with police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| My own feelings about what is right and wrong generally align with how the police act in my community |                     |            |                             |         |                 |
| The police share the same values as people like me                        |                     |            |                             |         |                 |
| My own feelings about what is right and wrong usually agree with police rules and policies |                     |            |                             |         |                 |
| I feel a moral obligation to obey police                                  |                     |            |                             |         |                 |
| Overall, I obey police with good will                                     |                     |            |                             |         |                 |
| Obeying police ultimately advantages everyone                             |                     |            |                             |         |                 |
| It is our moral duty to obey police even when we don’t like the way they treat us |                     |            |                             |         |                 |
| I only obey the police because I am afraid of them                        |                     |            |                             |         |                 |
Q5.6 How do you think police in Australia behave?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>People like me have no choice but to obey the police</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If you don’t do what the police tell you they will treat you badly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q5.7 The following set of questions ask about whether you think Australian police are biased against people like you. Tell us what you think.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>People like you are usually punished more harshly for committing crimes than other Australians because of their race, ethnicity or religion</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Q5.8 Please indicate how often you think the police in Australia……

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 Never</th>
<th>2 Seldom</th>
<th>3 Sometimes</th>
<th>4 Often</th>
<th>5 Always</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overstep the boundaries of their authority</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act as if they are above the law</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bother citizens for no good reason</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Get involved in situations they have no right to be in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q5.9 On the whole, how good a job are police doing at……

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 Very poor job</th>
<th>2 Poor job</th>
<th>3 Neither good nor poor job</th>
<th>4 Good job</th>
<th>5 Very good job</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solving crime</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing with problems that concern you</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working with people in your suburb to solve local problems</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detering criminals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catching criminals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventing crime</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Q5.10 Please give your opinion on the following statements…**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Keeping order</th>
<th>Very little</th>
<th>A little</th>
<th>Some</th>
<th>A lot</th>
<th>A great deal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Keeping the community safe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Q5.11 Now give your opinion on the following statements…**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How much power do you think police have over people like you?</th>
<th>A lot less than now</th>
<th>Less than now</th>
<th>The same as now</th>
<th>A bit more than now</th>
<th>A lot more than now</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How much influence do you think people like you have over the police?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Q5.12 To what extent do you agree or disagree with these statements?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I am comfortable allowing the police to decide how best to deal with problems of crime and disorder</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I am happy to accept the ability of the police to intervene in people’s lives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q5.13 Below are some statements that ask you to think about how people might behave toward police. Circle the number that most closely resembles your own view.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is important not to let police push you around</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As a society we need more people willing to take a stand against rude police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is important that people lodge a formal complaint against disrespectful police behaviour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If police used unjustified force against me, I would become aggressive toward them</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If police were disrespectful with me, I would not cooperate with them</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t really know what the police expect of me and I’m not about to ask</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If I find out that I am not doing what the police want, I’m not going to lose any sleep over it</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I try to avoid contact with police at all costs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Even if I needed help from police, I would prefer to avoid making contact with them…</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q5.14 People value different things from the police. How important is it for police to do the following when interacting with members of the public…

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police SHOULD exert their authority in encounters, so they are not viewed as weak</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q5.15 People contact the police for many reasons (to report a crime; because they need help; or because they require information about crime prevention). If you saw or heard about the following activities, how likely would you be to………

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>1 Very unlikely</th>
<th>2 Unlikely</th>
<th>3 Maybe</th>
<th>4 Likely</th>
<th>5 Very likely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Call the police to report a crime</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call police if you were a victim of crime</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide the police with information to catch a criminal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report dangerous/suspicious activities to the police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingly assist the police if asked</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call the police if you needed help</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q5.16 The slogan for the Australian Government’s National Security Campaign is: ‘If it doesn’t add up, speak up’. If you saw or heard about the following activities, how likely would you be to report them to the police ……..

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>1 Very unlikely</th>
<th>2 Unlikely</th>
<th>3 Maybe</th>
<th>4 Likely</th>
<th>5 Very likely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A person overheard discussing their plans to carry out a terrorist attack</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Police SHOULD be able to do whatever it takes to catch criminals, even if it means offending certain people

Obedience and respect for authority are the most important values children SHOULD learn

People who break the law SHOULD be given harsher sentences
Q5.17 In the last 2 years, how many times have you had contact with a police officer in Australia (do NOT include any work or social contact)?

time/s

Q5.18 Thinking about the last time you had contact with a police officer, who initiated the contact you had with police? (Please circle one)

You

Police

Q5.19 Overall, how satisfied were you with your most recent contact with police?

Very dissatisfied

Dissatisfied

Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied

Satisfied

Very satisfied

Q5.20 Before we conclude we would like to ask if you would be willing to participate in an in-depth face-to-face interview with a Griffith University researcher. You will be paid for your time, and the interview will be an opportunity for you to share your experiences of being an immigrant in Australia in your own words. Would you be willing to do an interview with a Griffith University researcher?

Yes

No

If Yes to Q5.20 record participant ID number, name and phone number

SECTION 6: CONCLUSION OF THE SURVEY
That is the end of the survey. We thank-you very much for participating in this research. We know that it was a long survey, but the questions are important for learning more about how immigrants experience settling into Australia. We really appreciate your dedication to seeing the survey through to the end. If you have any further questions about the research you can contact the Lead Researcher Professor Tina Murphy at Griffith University by email at t.murphy@griffith.edu.au or by phone on (07) 37351092.
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