Global Justice and Global Citizenship

Luis Cabrera
Griffith University

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Abstract: While the concept of global citizenship has a pedigree dating back more than two-thousand years, as well as many current advocates and interpreters, scholarly critics tend to dismiss it as simply incoherent. How, they ask, can it be possible to practice global citizenship in the absence of some global state? This chapter argues that, although the full formal trappings of citizenship are not likely to emerge anytime soon at the global level, individuals can make important contributions toward realizing its substance there. In assuming duties to promote comprehensive rights protections for others who do not share their state citizenship, and promoting the sort of suprastate institutional transformation that could more reliably secure such protections, they can enact some key elements of global citizenship. Further, such an institutionally developmental approach to global citizenship is shown to be less distinct than claimed from many domestic conceptions, which define citizenship partly in terms of ideals and practices that are acknowledged to need further development.

Keywords: global citizenship, global democracy, human rights, global duties, global government

1. Introduction

One way in which the concept of global citizenship can be understood is as a means of giving clarity to individual duties in a framework of global justice or universal human rights. Citizenship, with its typically highly elaborated ‘legal dimension’ of rights and duties, and its understanding of individuals as joined in community, sharing some collective aims and working toward their realization, offers a useful way to conceptualize the possible roles of individuals within current states in advancing justice beyond the state.

Critics, however, have long held that the idea of global citizenship is incoherent when there are no global political institutions within which it could actually be practiced. Citizenship, they say, is appropriately tied to existing states.¹ This chapter engages with these
and related criticisms, arguing that the coherence of citizenship beyond the state depends in large part on the view adopted of citizenship’s substance and corresponding theory of the state, or political institutions more broadly. It details an approach which views the primary purpose of political institutions as protecting individual rights and securing the discharge of corresponding duties. While such institutions remain mostly absent above the state in the current system, individuals may still assume citizen-like duties, or enact key aspects of a global citizenship, by working to help protect the rights of others who do not share their state citizenship. They also can support the development of institutions above the state capable of playing rights-protective and reinforcing roles, and do so in a frame of equal partnership in the global human community.

Such a developmental approach, while it cannot claim to identify ways in which individuals can formally “be” global citizens in the current global system, offers insight into how it is possible to enact meaningful practices of global citizenship. This approach is assessed against some leading critiques. These include ones claiming that global citizenship cannot embody the reciprocity between individual citizens, or equal membership among them, that is at the core of the concept of citizenship. Both critiques, or more specifically the approaches to citizenship which lie behind them, are shown to have important developmental features. Domestic citizenship is defined in part according to practices that are acknowledged to be in need of further development. Such features, it is argued, weaken claims that global citizenship is incoherent, especially in the case of an institutionally-developmental global citizenship.

2. Citizenship
The focus here, consistent with that of the critiques, will be on democratic political citizenship. A theory or conception of democratic political citizenship will be taken to consist of at minimum the following elements:

1. The first element is an understanding of the nature of the agents acting as citizens. This includes whether they are individual citizens of a political system, nation-states acting as ‘international citizens’, etc. Also considered is the psychological nature of actors, e.g., in terms of the sorts of duties they can be expected to routinely assume.

2. The second element is the understanding of community, or what binds citizens together in political community. This could be a presumption of common political culture, national or ethnic culture, shared normative commitments, shared territory or governing institutions, or simply shared humanity or capacities for sentience.

3. The third element is the understanding of rights held by the citizen agents. These are typically presumed to include a range of civil, political and social rights, or institutionally backed entitlements to protections, democratic participation, services and opportunities. Specific rights guarantees may vary widely according to the understanding of the substance of citizenship in play.

4. The fourth element is the understanding of duties corresponding to those rights, and the emphases to be placed on duties relative to rights. It also includes an understanding of where lines are generally to be drawn between minimal enforceable duties, standard but non-enforceable duties of citizenship, and more demanding acts of ‘good citizenship’.

5. The fifth element is the substance of citizenship, or the overarching good that citizenship practice is to realize, and toward which rights and duties are oriented. This could be some form of minimal rights provision, more comprehensive and robust rights guarantees, or some ideal of equality, reciprocity, enabling human flourishing, etc.

6. The final element is comprised of the status and institutions of citizenship. These are formal markers of standing to claim citizen rights which are backed and regulated by political institutions. They include birth certificates, passports and related trappings or evidence of citizen membership and standing.

Significantly, separate elements often can be found at different stages of development within the same system or set of political institutions. For example, individuals may possess many of the trappings of citizenship without element three, citizen rights, actually being guaranteed. This could occur in a state that is highly fractious in its democratic practice, or
especially one which is under strain from endemic internal conflict, possibly approaching state failure. Likewise, the trappings can be in one’s possession even if one contributes very little in element four, duties of citizenship, towards realizing element five, the presumed substance of citizenship.

Most accounts of domestic citizenship go beyond the bare trappings to specify non-enforceable but standard duties oriented to realizing the substance of citizenship. These could be, for example, duties to observe reciprocity toward co-citizens. Beyond those are non-obligatory ‘good citizen’ acts, which may be more demanding or expose the agent to risk, but which may also be necessary to promote the realization of the substance. That substance again will inform understandings of the role or moral purpose of the state, or other political institutions within which citizenship is practiced. For example, liberal conceptions of citizenship, as well as those not focused narrowly on liberty rights but on securing a more comprehensive set, will tend to work from a protective conception of the state. The coercion exercised by shared political institutions will be seen as justified primarily by their instrumental value as protectors and enablers of individual rights or justice: the presumed substance of citizenship. Republican approaches have been typically more concerned with the state as enabler of human flourishing within a community of highly participatory citizens, or enabler of individual freedom through political participation.

Finally, we can note that element two, the understanding of community, will be crucial in determining whether a specific conception of citizenship might extend beyond the state. This element is concerned with what it is that ties co-citizens together, makes it possible for the substance of citizenship to be realized among them -- and justifies excluding non-citizens from membership. If the answer to such questions is that only ties of nationality or shared national political culture can do the job, then full citizenship must be confined to the nation. If it is existing ties of territory or political and communal practice, then citizenship
is properly bounded by existing states. If the ties are, or plausibly could be, ones of shared normative commitments – to certain individual rights, democratic institutions, etc. – then the boundaries of citizenship should be more fluid and potentially much more extensive.

3. Global Citizenship

3a. Ethical and Institutional Accounts

How, then, has citizenship of global extent been conceived? Diogenes the Cynic, the 4th Century BCE philosopher, is typically cited as the first to declare himself a citizen of the world and seek to challenge local mores from that vantage point. The idea of individuals belonging to a global community, envisioning themselves as filling a role within it and taking some ethical guidance from it, is then traced through such Stoic thinkers as Cicero (106-43 BCE) and especially the Roman Emperor-philosopher Marcus Aurelius (121-180). Later thinkers touched on some of the same themes, but arguably it is not until Immanuel Kant’s political works of the 1780s and 1790s that we see a clear conception of global citizenship re-emerging. For Kant, individuals were to imagine themselves as co-legislators in a “kingdom of ends,” subscribing to moral laws that all in the world should see as incumbent to follow. He is not, however, typically understood to support the creation of some world state or similar institutional framework.

From Kant, the thread can be followed perhaps most clearly, and in more institutionally ambitious form, through the various mid-20th Century authors who advocated forms of global citizenship under global government, especially in the aftermath of the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan by the United States in 1945. More recently, the literature falls into two broad camps: those similarly focused on global institutional development, and those focused on identifying or promoting some modern ethic of global citizenship. The latter tend to give emphasis to the transformation of individual
attitudes, and the former to transforming and creating the salient global institutions: ones in which the legal dimension of global citizenship would be specified and backed by relatively strongly empowered and democratic global institutions.¹⁷

Many recent global ethic accounts offer some form of rooted global citizenship. These hold that individuals should view themselves as citizens of states first, generally observing strong priority to compatriots in distributions of resources and opportunities. Duties to noncompatriots are seen as important but secondary, comprising mainly ones to pressure our own states to give due consideration to outsiders’ interests in foreign policy actions. These conceptions are strongly influenced by theorists’ understanding of the connective ties of citizen community, generally ones oriented to shared national sentiment. From such understandings flow a conception of state purpose, in particular for Parekh and Walzer, focused on enabling forms of self-determination and self-expression for domestic (national) citizen communities.¹⁸

Other global ethic accounts would give far less emphasis to domestic belonging and more to actual or potential ties across borders between activists and other non-state actors. They seek, especially in Richard Falk’s account, to identify ways in which such actors can join together across borders to counter some negative effects of global economic integration and promote more just outcomes generally.¹⁹ Falk also has advocated the creation of a limited world parliamentary body to facilitate such efforts, though not a more fully integrated and strongly empowered set of global institutions in the near term.²⁰

Those offering more fundamentally institutional accounts tend to be skeptical that the substance of global citizenship can be realized in the absence of strongly empowered global political institutions. The primary aim would be to make possible a concrete practice of global citizenship within suitably transformed or newly created trans-state and ultimately global institutions.²¹ Other institutional accounts are not focused on extending citizenship per
se, but on the possible importance of extending democratic participation beyond the nation-
state in a comprehensively integrated and strongly empowered set of global institutions.22
Such an extension, however would have the effect also of extending a formalized practice of
democratic citizenship, or in David Held’s words, create an institutional context in which ‘the
elusive and puzzling meaning of global citizenship becomes a little clearer’.23

I would also include here, contra Mason,24 some recent accounts which focus on
global justice rather than global citizenship per se, specifically those which recommend the
creation of comprehensive sets of global institutions. They call for extensive global
integration to secure more just outcomes globally.25 Democratic institutions and practices
would be features of such accounts, and thus a practice of world citizenship would be
formally constituted.

3b. A Rights-Protective Institutional Account of Global Citizenship

In this account of global citizenship, the presumed connective tie (element two), is a set of
normative commitments to recognizing individual rights and corresponding duties. In
detailing it, I have previously drawn on a primarily interest-based approach to identifying
specific rights, where they are viewed as closely connected to the protection of vital human
interests.26 A rights-protective account could be compatible with a range of other rights
foundations, however. Its rights emphasis arguably would go beyond a narrow focus on
individual liberty that again many would put at the heart of liberal citizenship,27 to a much
more comprehensive conception. This would likely include some robust equal opportunity
rights, and some rights against unjust discrimination,28 which in the global citizenship frame
could be constituted as mobility rights across borders similar to those possessed by European
Union citizens,29 as well through South America’s Mercosur and other organizations.
Whatever the specific conception or comprehensive package of rights, however, the
substance of global citizenship – the ultimate aim of the practice – would be reliable
guarantees of rights protections for all persons. That substance again deeply informs an
understanding of the overarching moral purpose of political institutions, and by extension the
likely need for global ones to reliably secure even a moderately comprehensive set of rights
for all persons.

It can be noted that, unlike in some accounts in the liberal citizenship tradition,
including Locke’s, political community is not viewed here as a fully discretionary
association. In Locke’s account, individuals choose to join in political union and become co-
citizens in order to themselves escape the potentially deadly inconveniences of the state of
nature.30 The rights-protective account would see the process as conditionally non-
discretionary. It is non-discretionary because all are viewed as having a duty to contribute to
rights protections, though it is a duty mediated by institutions. It is conditional because it is
only if there is good reason to think that political institutions will advance rights protections,
etc., that we have a duty to support their development.

Various ‘good reasons’ to pursue global integration and institutional creation have
been proposed. These have focused, for example, on the way a system of competitive
sovereign states naturally throws up barriers to the comprehensive realization of rights,31 or
contributes to avoidable harms to the rights of especially the global poor.32 I have given
additional emphasis to ways in which a states system reinforces tendencies to give strong
priority to domestic co-citizen insiders in provision, and to strongly discount the rights and
interests of those perceived as outsiders.33 Thus, if the ultimate aim is reliable rights coverage
for all persons, full global political integration should be pursued.

Such an approach is presented here as an account of global citizenship, rather than
one more narrowly focused on identifying individual duties of justice in a global frame,34 in
part because of the indispensability to it of element two: community. It would, for example,
reject stringent ‘fair share’ claims that an individual’s duties to help protect the rights of others could be fully discharged in isolation from community by directly aiding some requisite number of persons. Such uncoordinated, personalized protection may at times be the chief available option, as in situations where institutional authority has broken down. As a standard solution, however it would be highly likely to leave the rights of most persons precariously protected at best. Thus, the underlying imperative to achieve and sustain comprehensive rights protection for all persons would be unmet. Ultimately, the creation of an actual democratic political community – and with it a concrete practice of global citizenship – is seen as crucial to realizing this presumed substance of a rights-protective account. Individual global citizens would be equal partners within such a community. They would have actionable rights to make claims on co-citizens and their shared institutions, and clear responsibilities toward co-citizens to make their own contributions. They also would have mechanisms of challenge and various concrete avenues of participation. Yet, such integration is far from being achieved. Some commentators, notably Robert Goodin, argue that an early-stage world government is emerging. He sees the current global system as having weakly developed but growing powers of political authority, military and revenue-raising capacity, analogous to a state such as the United States in its very early development. Such a process, however, must at least be many generations away from producing the sorts of global institutions discussed here, which would be able to reliably ensure rights coverage and duties compliance globally. How, then, can we speak of ‘global’ citizenship in their absence? The answer I would offer is that, while it is not possible to be a global citizen in such a system --to claim the status and entitlements of citizenship within a concrete legal dimension -- it is possible to enact important aspects of global citizenship by assuming some duties oriented toward realizing its substance. These include duties related to immediate rights protections, and also more developmental ones related to institutional
transformation and creation. The more fully elaborated claim is those seeking to enact key aspects of global citizenship will:

(a) reach across international boundaries, or internal boundaries of differential citizenship;

(b) to help secure those fundamental rights that would be protected if there were an appropriately rights-protective system of global institutions in place;

(c) and (in a more institutionally oriented vein) work to help put such a system in place.\textsuperscript{38}

I will now consider a central critique of global citizenship, that it is an incoherent concept in the absence of some world state, before offering further details on the institutional approach and defending its coherence.

4. Critiques of Global Citizenship

I will begin by noting a critique separate from incoherence, that global citizenship is little more than repackaged Western, neo-colonial normative imperialism, especially in its institutional variants.\textsuperscript{39} Briefly, it can be noted in response that in the current global system, powerful, mostly Western states already exercise enormous influence in international relations, within intergovernmental organizations such as the World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund and United Nations Security Council, and elsewhere. The development of practices of global citizenship with more accountable, and ultimately more democratic suprastate institutions can be seen as a potentially significant check on the power of such agents.\textsuperscript{40} Further, there is nothing inherent to the concept of global citizenship per se which means it must be construed as focused on global ‘haves’ reaching out to ‘have nots’.

Persons of relatively limited means in less-affluent countries can be seen to engage in myriad practices of global citizenship, including rendering aid to migrants, reaching out for international support to protect the rights of their own co-citizens, and in other ways.\textsuperscript{41} I have
discussed related issues around diversity and global or cosmopolitan citizenship in some detail elsewhere.\textsuperscript{42}

Here I will focus on the most formidable recent incoherence critiques, in particular those offered by David Miller and Andrew Mason.\textsuperscript{43} Both develop potentially important challenges around the ultimate coherence of global citizenship, and by extension challenge the utility of global citizenship approaches for advancing understandings of individual duties in a global justice frame. Miller, for example, argues that the necessary conditions for concrete political citizenship, as opposed to the purely ethical or ‘philosophical’ conceptions he identifies with global citizenship, include a shared acceptance of the legitimacy of rule and a practice of reciprocity among co-citizens. Legitimacy, or a willingness to accept binding decisions, is said to be the primary condition for a genuinely political relationship and citizenship. It is a circumstance in which individuals, ‘even if in other respects they are fierce rivals or competitors … should be willing, in general, to accept the decisions made by the authority as having normative force’.\textsuperscript{44}

Reciprocity involves a further willingness by co-citizens to accept decisions that may go against their immediate interests, but with the background expectation that later decisions will be to their benefit.\textsuperscript{45} In addition, observing reciprocity means that they should not press for outcomes that they know cannot be acceptable to other citizens. An understanding of such acceptability is said to involve forms of shared knowledge, where co-citizens must know enough about each other to know in advance which outcomes could not be accepted. It also is said to involve a form of trust, where co-citizens can expect one another ‘to act as citizens, that is to say be motivated to achieve whatever form of political agreement is appropriate to the particular relationship in question’.\textsuperscript{46}

I discuss below Miller's further claim about necessary expectations about mutual advantage that obtain domestically but not globally. Here, it can be noted that he is offering
developmental ideals of legitimacy and reciprocity. Consider that the legitimacy claim is presented as a conditional: co-citizens “should” be willing to accept binding collective decisions as authoritative. It is not claimed that they invariably accept such decisions, and nor could it be. Yet, such acceptance is presented as a core definitional component of domestic citizenship. In terms of reciprocity, Miller has in fact acknowledged that much of the time it is in need of extensive development or inculcation by political institutions, which much take steps to “instill the ethos of citizenship in everyone who is formally admitted to … [citizen] status”. He cites France as an exemplar of such efforts, and a model preferable to ones which seek to allocate separate citizen status to diverse groups and would be unable to generate reciprocity and a genuinely shared public culture among them.

Thus, in Miller’s account, some of the core definitional components of the concept of citizenship at the domestic level are framed as developmental even in some of the most consolidated democracies. Further, in states where democracy is only incompletely consolidated, as well as those situated toward the ‘failed states’ end of the continuum, any such legitimacy and reciprocity claims must be far more tentative. The elements and institutions of citizenship are in need of extensive development. Miller also has highlighted elsewhere the extension of full citizen status to women in most societies, which itself can be understood as the development of relations of reciprocity with them by enfranchised men.

The overall implication is that Miller cannot so easily reject the coherence of global citizenship. He cannot categorically claim that a citizenship practice which is still under development cannot count as citizenship, given that he also defines domestic citizenship as a set of practices in development. The example of women gaining citizen status (element five) over time also has important implications for other possible extensions of citizenship. That is, men would have had to develop understandings of what would be acceptable (legitimate) outcomes to their new female co-citizens, and be willing to be constrained by the set of such
outcomes. Such a requirement would entail significant efforts to establish relations of reciprocity among a broader set of persons through extending membership status to them, just as many global citizenship theorists aim to do beyond the state.\(^{50}\)

Miller’s second central claim is that a set of citizens is properly understood as those who are joined in a cooperative enterprise -- one which is to their mutual advantage. This fact of shared enterprise is said to give aid rendered to co-citizens a public-spirited character, rather than simply a charitable one, as he says is the case with overseas aid.\(^{51}\) Yet, even if we presume that such a circumstance of mutual advantage for all co-citizens does obtain in current sets -- a dubious claim when shirkers or other non-co-operators are considered -- we are actually left with little justification for the present boundaries around those sets. Given that the boundaries of mutual advantage are simply presumed to coincide with the boundaries of current domestic citizen sets, we are effectively told that citizenship cannot be extended beyond the nation-state because citizens are to be defined as those who share the same state. Such an argument cannot establish that it is not possible for mutual advantage boundaries to be so extended, or that the initial setting of boundaries was itself justifiable. Miller thus appears inadvertently to arrive at the position for which he critiques Hannah Arendt: a plain stipulation that ‘A citizen is by definition a citizen among citizens in a country among countries’.\(^{52}\)

Further, if we presume, as is implied in Miller’s critique of global citizenship, that robust citizenship practice requires some strongly shared national identity,\(^{53}\) then the limits of citizenship would be the limits of the nation-state. Any strong such claim, however, would seem to face immediate challenges in the contexts of many multinational states; for example, India, whose constitution recognizes more than 20 official languages and where hundreds of millions of co-citizens do not share a common language with one another. More crucially perhaps, significant difficulties would arise in determining who ‘genuinely’ belongs to a
national community, and with determining who should determine genuine belonging, and determining the determiners of the determiners, and so on. Thus, bounding a citizen community according to shared national sentiment or like criteria could be a non-starter.

In Mason’s account, the presumed substance of citizenship is the good of equal membership, defined as ‘equal opportunity to participate on equal terms and treat each other as equals’. Mason critiques Miller’s account as being in one sense too developmental: confusing what it means to be a citizen with what it means to take more demanding ‘good citizen’ action. Those who are politically inactive might be described as bad citizens, he says, ‘yet they are surely citizens nonetheless’. Mason here is asserting that citizen status, and the definition of the concept of citizenship, is closely tied to its trappings. Yet, his presentation of the equal membership conception of citizenship is also strongly developmental.

We can note, for example, that elements three and four, citizen rights and duties, are said in Mason’s account to arise from the necessary conditions for securing equal membership, the presumed substance of citizenship. ‘To act as a citizen is to act in a way that is oriented towards this good. This includes acting in order to express or promote it … and acting to secure the conditions necessary for its realization’. Definitionally then, the citizen is one who helps to develop the substance. Mason then adds that in non-ideal circumstances, meaning those where not all individuals comply with their duties, individuals can be good citizens ‘by striving to bring the good of equal membership fully into existence’. Both citizen actions and good-citizen actions thus involve duties to promote equal membership. In normal, non-ideal circumstances, and given the relatively demanding conception of political equality Mason sees as arising from the good of equal membership, it is likely that any particular society will require large numbers of those with citizen status to take on fairly stringent developmental duties. These would entail rejecting bad citizenship, developing in
themselves capacities to fully recognize the equal membership of others, and helping to develop the same among their co-citizens. Mason thus also offers a developmental account of domestic citizenship. Any objection that global citizenship does not ‘count’ because it is also developmental in some elements loses some force.

Mason offers two separate objections to extending citizenship comprehensively beyond state boundaries, and both deserve engagement. The first is based in the nature of citizenship itself, as analogous to the good of friendship. He notes that part of what it must mean to be a friend is to have special duties to another person. Part of what it means to be a citizen is also to have special duties to co-citizens – the duties are partially constitutive of the concept of citizenship. This analogy, however, will be of little help in showing that citizen sets must be confined to their existing state configurations. That is because individuals will be quite limited in the total number of those to whom they can discharge the presumed special duties of friendship. The limits of citizenship appear far more malleable. Existing citizen sets, after all, range in size from those of the micro-states of the South Pacific or Europe to behemoths such as those in India and China, each of which has more than 1.2 billion citizens. Three other countries have more than 200 million citizens, and a further seven more than 100 million. China, of course, remains a hierarchical, one-party state, and so does not fully fit the democratic citizenship frame – though its citizens do observe enforceable distributional and many other duties toward one another. India, with 1.2 billion citizens and counting, is a longstanding democracy with vigorously contested elections and a highly politically active citizenry, though it also has faced challenges specific to lower- and middle-income democracies. The narrow point here is that there does not seem to be an obvious numeric limit on the special duties that are partly constitutive of citizenship, in the same way there would be on individual friendship.
At most, then, if we accept a claim that citizens by definition owe special duties to one another, all the friendship analogy can show is that, whoever your co-citizens happen to be, you owe them some special duties. It gives no reason by itself to think that co-citizen sets could not extend across multiple countries, for example, the more than two-dozen member states of the European Union, where formal regional citizenship was implemented with the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. EU citizens have rights of free movement across national boundaries, can vote in local elections in their host country, have regional ombuds rights, and portable non-discrimination rights in a range of subject areas.\textsuperscript{60} Nor does it necessarily show that ‘special duties’ in a conception of global citizenship could not be interpreted to include all humans, as distinct from duties to different species of animals; or indeed special duties owed to current humans, as possibly distinct from ones to future generations.

The second claim for limiting citizen membership is based in the nature of political coercion. Mason argues for bounding citizen sets, or the set of those who should have full citizen participation rights in democratic decisions, according to an ‘all actually subjected’ principle. Such a principle would limit membership to those subjected to a common system of law, meaning that ‘most of the laws that comprise it are directed at her (or apply to her) and they are enforceable’.\textsuperscript{61} This principle, he argues, also appropriately defines the set of those who should have the opportunity to become citizens, while leaving due space to include in decision processes some who reside in other countries, if a domestically produced law would clearly apply to them.

Typically at the root of such all-subjected or ‘all-affected’\textsuperscript{62} accounts for setting the bounds of democratic participation is some intrinsic good which whose realization is seen as limited by the coercion that political institutions can exercise in securing compliance with law. Often the good cited is autonomy: individuals are said to deserve a democratic say as a means of appropriately respecting and enabling their autonomy.\textsuperscript{63} Mason’s account would
give greater emphasis to the intrinsic good of equality. Equal democratic input would be required to ensure appropriate respect for the equality of those subject to a system of shared law. In either case, the problem with offering such an approach as the answer to who should be included, or be given the opportunity to later be included, is again that it begs the question by answering ‘those who are included’, or who already are subjected to law produced within a state.

Mason goes one step beyond Miller’s ‘including of the already included’ by extending participation to those from other states who clearly would be made subject to specific laws. But those extensions will themselves be deeply conditioned by existing inclusions—the agendas that will arise from them, the decisions that will be made. As with Miller’s account, this approach cannot show why those included in the first place should have been included. That is, it cannot provide an independent, non-circular justification for accepting historically contingent boundaries as appropriately demarcating citizen and future-citizen insiders from outsiders. Further, the underlying claims around limitations of freedom or equality by which such accounts ultimately justify the exclusion of outsiders are themselves suspect. In a rich, stable democracy, for example, subjection to politically authoritative coercion may not be so much a limitation on individuals as an enabling condition for enjoying the relative wealth and stability provided to them.

5. Enacting Practices of Global Citizenship

Where does that leave us then, in terms of developing a fully coherent conception of global citizenship? I will reinforce first that the strength of an incoherence critique depends in part on the understanding of the substance of citizenship in play. If we were to adopt a stringently Aristotelian-republican understanding, for example, it would indeed seem incoherent to claim to be realizing the overarching good of citizenship by ‘ruling and being ruled’ in a democratic
global public sphere that does not yet exist. If the presumed substance of citizenship is securing reliable rights protections, however, then it is coherent to speak of working toward the realization of that substance in the current system, including by supporting the development of the salient political institutions.

It is the case that the rights-protective global citizenship account is more fundamentally developmental than the domestic conceptions of citizenship offered by Miller or Mason, because both the substance and institutions of global citizenship remain mostly to be realized. There is, of course, a nascent legal dimension of citizenship embodied in international law, in particular the major United Nations human rights covenants, but few individual entitlements are formalized at the global level. Nor are there strongly empowered political institutions whose governance is informed by the presumed substance of citizenship. In the current system, there are primarily individual agents who can act to promote the realization of the substance of citizenship, and also act to avoid impeding it.

The situation of these agents, I will suggest, is importantly analogous to that of citizens of a fragile state, one again that can assert only incomplete coercive authority over portions of its territory – because of an insurgency, local warlords or criminal organizations exerting their own control. In unstable regions of such states, the trappings of domestic citizenship may confer few claimable entitlements, and the state may have little capacity to ensure rights coverage or compliance with duties. In a meaningful sense, then, it is not possible to fully ‘be’ a democratic citizen in such circumstances. Citizen duties would be institutionally developmental, aimed first at filling the gaps in rights coverage by helping to provide protections to others as and where possible. Standard duties in such a situation also could entail institutionally developmental ones to contribute to the construction or reconstruction of crucial political institutions. Those formerly able to act as co-citizens would
seek to reconstitute the conditions under which domestic citizenship could actually be practiced, and through which its substance could be most effectively promoted.

An even closer analogy can be drawn between the duties and actions of those seeking to develop a concrete global citizenship, and those who hold formal citizenship in non-democratic states, or states in a process of transition to more democratic rule. Here also, it is not possible to ‘be’ a democratic citizen. This is not because of the collapse of political institutions but because of the absence of key elements of democratic citizenship, including full participation rights and adequately protected civil rights. In such a situation, both the trappings and substance of democratic political citizenship are in need of development, and individuals seeking to become actual citizens must assume a range of developmental duties, including ones to transform existing institutions or create new democratic political institutions. In much the same vein, those enacting key aspects of global citizenship will contribute to rights protections for others, and to institutional creation and transformation, toward developing a global system in which a robust and concrete practice of global citizenship could be constituted.

In such a frame, three general categories of individual ‘global citizen’ duties can be identified. These are interactive contributory duties, accommodation duties, and duties of institutional advocacy. Contributory duties include direct contributions of time, energy and expertise to provide protections to others, generally those who do not share one’s citizenship; as well as aid rendered across borders for disaster relief, development efforts and rights promotion. They also may include efforts to generate international support for domestic rights struggles. Accommodation duties, involving a willingness to accept the dislocations that would arise from more expansive distributive and immigration regimes in an institutionally integrating global system, are a cousin to toleration. They are distinct,
however, in that they will be discharged with the understanding that all persons are co-equal partners in the global human community, with equal standing to make claims.

Institutional advocacy duties can take several forms, including interstate advocacy duties, involving pressure on one’s own state to promote global rights protections and support integrative transformation. These are structurally similar to the ‘rooted cosmopolitan’ duties noted above, but would likely be more stringent and aimed at transforming states and the states system, rather than solely pressing states to engage in more ethical foreign policy behaviour. Institutional duties also include ones of suprastate institutional advocacy, more directly focused on the transformation and deeper integration of global institutions, and the creation of new global political institutions as needed to promote a concrete practice of global citizenship.

Further, individuals may enact aspects of global citizenship through acts of global principled resistance, as when unauthorized migrants act as though they have a form of global-citizen mobility rights, crossing borders in search of economic and other opportunities. In doing so, they both violate and serve to challenge entry laws and the restrictive global immigration regime. Others could be said to have negative duties not to impede such disobedience or evasion, and rather to support focusing attention on root causes of mass migration. There also could be more general duties not to impede existing projects of regional integration and global institutional development, and lend them critical support as appropriate.

Taken together, these duties, arising from a rights-protective conception of global citizenship, give some guidance for element four, the kinds of duties that those seeking to act as if they were global citizens, could assume. The conception also offers specific understandings of connective ties in a global human community, of the overarching substance of a global citizenship practice, and the presumed moral purpose of political institutions that
follows. Thus, it should represent a coherent approach to conceiving of global citizenship. It offers a vision of how we can put into practice some meaningful elements of this form of citizenship in the current system. It also gives guidance on developing a more formalized practice which could significantly advance comprehensive rights protections and global justice.

Further Reading:


2 I have previously presented the distinction as one between ‘being’ a global citizen and ‘acting as’ one. Luis Cabrera, *The Practice of Global Citizenship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), at 73. Mason has objected that to act as a global citizen would be to actually assume a role that does not exist: *Living Together*, 201-2. I believe it was clear from the context that the sense implied was acting as if one were a global citizen in some important respects, but to avoid any such confusion I will not use the “act as” construction here.

3 Related critiques around the coherence of duties of global justice are engaged in Luis Cabrera, *The Humble Cosmopolitan: Rights, Diversity and Trans-State Democracy* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2019), Ch.6.
4 States are the presumed citizen agents in theories of good international citizenship. For a wide-ranging dialogue on states’ possible ethical or moral duties, see Richard Beardsworth, Garrett Wallace Brown, and Richard Shapcott, eds., The State and Cosmopolitan Responsibilities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).
5 See the Fragile States Index for rankings of states on a dozen indicators related to political, social and economic stability: Fund for Peace, ‘Fragile States Index’ (2019). Online: https://fragilestatesindex.org/ Of the 178 countries assessed, nine were ranked as severely unstable, in the Alert category, and 61 others in the Warning category. Another 53 were ranked Stable, and 28 as most stable, or Sustainable.
7 Mason, Living Together, 36.
13 Derek Heater, World Citizenship and World Government: Cosmopolitan Ideas in the History of Western Political Thought (New York: St. Martin’s, 1996), Ch.1.
23 Held, Global Covenant, 115.
24 Mason, Living Together, 205, fn.12.

26 Cabrera, Practice, Ch. 2; Buchanan, *Justice, Legitimacy*; Caney, *Justice Beyond Borders*.


29 Cabrera, *Practice*, Ch.7.

30 Locke, 65-67 (Sections 123-128); see Buchanan, *Justice, Legitimacy*, 99.


32 Pogge, *World Poverty*.

33 Cabrera, *Practice*, Chs. 2-3; see also Cabrera, The Humble Cosmopolitan, Ch.6, for a discussion of ways in which a sovereign states system is conducive to political arrogance and related collective vices which also contribute to rights underfulfillment.


40 Held, *Global Covenant*; Archibugi, *Global Commonwealth*.

41 For some exemplar practices, see Cabrera, *Practice*, Chs. 5-6.

42 Cabrera, The Humble Cosmopolitan, esp. Chs. 6, 8.


48 Miller, Citizenship and National Identity, 89.


50 See Cabrera, *The Humble Cosmopolitan*, Ch.6, for further engagement with such disanalogy claims.


56 Ibid., 44; see Miller, *Citizenship and National Identity*, 83.

57 Mason, *Living Together*, 43-44.

58 Ibid, 36.

59 Ibid.

Together, 194. On the 2016 referendum vote by Britons to end their EU membership, see Cabrera, The Humble Cosmopolitan, Ch.9.

61 Mason, Living Together, 73.

62 Held, Global Covenant, Ch.6; see Pogge, World Poverty, 190-92.


65 Though see Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol and Matthew Hawk, ‘Traveling the Boundaries of Statelessness: Global Passports and Citizenship’, Cleveland State Law Review 52(2004-2005): 97-118. The authors offer an innovative proposal, based in emerging practices of dual citizenship, for a formal, treaty-based global citizenship designed to help individuals better claim the rights enshrined in international human rights treaties.

66 Fund for Peace, ‘Fragile States Index’

67 See Cabrera, Practice, Ch.4; see also Hans Schattle, The Practices of Global Citizenship (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008). Schattle offers numerous examples of others putting global citizenship principles into practice.

68 See Cabrera, Practice, Ch. 5; Temi Ogunye, “Global Justice and Transnational Civil Disobedience,” Ethics & Global Politics 8, no. 1 (2015): 1-23; for more general discussions of institutionally oriented duties, see Cabrera, The Humble Cosmopolitan, Ch.6.