Bruce Buchan

_Duo pezzi in su la piazza:_
The Death of the Body Politic in Western Political Thought

**The Scene of (Political) Death**

A death deliberately inflicted and publicly displayed makes it a political death.¹ One of the most (in)famous such deaths in Western political thought took place in the town square of the Italian city of Cesena sometime in the early morning of December 26, 1502. The scene resonates in the subsequent history of Western political thought, but its fame rests, in large part, on its figurative rather than its actual significance. This figurative significance derives from the uses to which this particular death was put by one of the most notorious of political thinkers, Niccolò Machiavelli. For Machiavelli, this death was used as a theatrical demonstration of the efficacy of princely power and was integral to his innovative and shocking political advice.² I want to suggest another, rather different dimension to this figurative significance. This particular death, I will argue, can be seen as a symbol of a particular way of thinking about political dynamics, which led to another kind of death, one more prolonged and in essence metaphorical—the death of the body politic. To begin, it is necessary to set the scene of death in Cesena on December 26, 1502.

Cesena lies toward the northern part of
a region of central Italy known during the Renaissance as the Romagna. Under the nominal authority of the pope its unified name belied a complex and unstable patchwork of relations among a myriad of petty lordships and city communes. In 1501–2 this unpromising territory formed the object of the political ambitions of Pope Alexander VI and his illegitimate son, Cesare Borgia. Cesare’s ambition was to become a great prince in his own right. To this end, as Machiavelli admiringly records, Cesare appointed a lieutenant, Remirro de Orco, in 1501 to impose order and bring this unruly region under his will. It is de Orco’s death in late 1502 that Machiavelli recounts in his remarkable tract of 1513, *The Prince*. Machiavelli uses de Orco’s death to demonstrate the audacity and cunning that any prince who wishes to be politically successful must emulate, and he underscores the importance of the lesson by laconically describing a chillingly cruel spectacle:

After the Duke [Cesare] had conquered the Romagna, he found that it had been controlled by violent lords, who were more disposed to despoil their subjects than to rule them properly, thus being a source of disorder [*disunione*] rather than of order [*unione*]; consequently, that region was full of thefts, quarrels and outrages of every kind. He considered it necessary to introduce efficient government, because he wanted the region to be peaceful and its inhabitants obedient to his monarchical authority. He therefore sent there messer Remirro de Orco, a cruel and energetic man, giving him full powers [*pienissima potestà*]. Remirro quickly restored order and peace, and acquired a very formidable reputation. Later, the Duke considered that such great power was undesirable, because he was afraid it would incur hatred. In order to dispel this ill-feeling and win everyone over to him, he wanted to show that if any cruel deeds had been committed they were attributable to the harshness of his governor, not himself. And availing himself of an appropriate opportunity, one morning the Duke had Remirro placed in two pieces in the square [*duo pezzi in su la piazza*] at Cesena, with a block of wood and a blood-stained sword at his side. This terrible spectacle [*La ferocita del quale spettacolo*] left the people both satisfied and amazed.

What seems so amazing about Machiavelli’s use of this story is his blunt- ness. Machiavelli says to his readers that the necessities of politics do not always conform to the ordinary rules of morality or virtue. Indeed, de Orco’s story encapsulates Machiavelli’s key lesson in *The Prince*: unless a prince can display (manly) *virtù* by anticipating and thereby trying to control the fickleness of (female) fortune, then all his vigorous *crudele ed espedito* (cruel and energetic) activity will not avail, and even his reputation will fall away.
In that case, Machiavelli warns, the living prince will end up as abject as de Orco, in *duo pezzi in su la piazza*. In his own time, as in ours, Machiavelli’s message constituted a radical challenge, which is conveyed in the significance he invested in setting the scene for de Orco’s death. Sebastian de Grazia, in particular, locates the phrase *duo pezzi* as the key to both Machiavelli’s theatricality and his lesson on the necessity of cruelty. The phrase, along with the presence of a wooden block and bloody sword, implies the body has been butchered, possibly after garroting, as a public display of Cesare’s awesome power. The secrecy of the murder but publicity of the displayed body, all of it so deliberately calculated, is a potent reminder that Cesare’s mastery of visceral politics rested on his capacity to satisfy, stupefy, and amaze the masses.

In this essay I want to explore the figurative significance of de Orco’s death and display, particularly the conception of politics that this story communicates, which is centered on death. De Orco was selected as Cesare’s governor because he was cruel and vigorous and because death and disorder were rife in the Romagna. De Orco diligently restored order by means of cruelty and death. When his job was done, de Orco was himself dispensed with in a cruel and calculated execution. Machiavelli’s recommendation of all this cruelty and death challenged an established view that politics should be guided by virtue. It also served to challenge another key assumption: that the polity itself constituted an embodied community. The life of the embodied community might be spoken of as more or less vigorous or healthy. Its office bearers might be admitted to rise and fall and even pass away, but the essence of the embodied polity was thought to be perpetual. What de Orco’s story and the rest of Machiavelli’s teachings in *The Prince* represent is a fundamental challenge to that view. The embodied polity, Machiavelli suggests, may be subject not only to debility and disease but to its own death. The consequence is that princes must be ready to use violence in order to prevent political death or to create the polity anew. This violence was conceptualized as constituting sovereignty: to be exercised over the bodies of the subjects of sovereignty in the name not of preserving the health of the body politic per se but of securing political order, social stability, or economic prosperity. I suggest that the decline and death of the ancient metaphor of the body politic can be interpreted in light of the rise of the modern concept of sovereignty with its characteristic concern to promote popular health and welfare even while claiming a lethal power over individual bodies.

In the next section, I explore the difficulties presented by the “body
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politic” metaphor in grasping the nature of supreme political power. In the early modern period this power was coming to be defined as sovereignty, the violent power of sovereigns over subjects. Although not new in early modern Europe, the idea of sovereignty sat awkwardly alongside older, medieval metaphors of an organic body. In the third section, I argue that one of the strains on the old metaphor was that the integrity of the “body politic” made the violent exercise of sovereign power, or ferocita del quale spettacolo, a potentially self-destructive activity. Finally, I turn to another source of strain on the metaphor, that perceived sources of disunione in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century European polities called into question the social and political unione integral to the metaphor. The result was that early modern European political thinkers groped for less organic or mystical accounts of sovereignty and increasingly posited a functional and contractual separation between sovereigns and subjects. This separation effectively rendered the body politic an outdated, if not dead, metaphor.

The Power of Metaphor: Pienissima potestà in the Body Politic

What made Machiavelli’s challenge so confrontational was his apparent rejection of the classical and Christian view that moral, social, and political orders were thought to correspond to the order of nature. One of the most significant and influential of these correspondences was the image of human society as a body, in which the different social groups formed the organs or members, whose unity, interconnection, and mutual reliance reinforced the presumed need for social harmony. In early Christian thought, the pressure to sustain a harmonic view of the community of the faithful was overlaid by more hierarchical claims about the need to defend the community, if necessary by amputating unsound limbs from the body of the church. By the mid-nineteenth century the Catholic Church had established its prerogative to dispense a divine sanction for royal power, the essence of which was “the legitimate right to decree violence.” Although secular rulers were invested with this power, the formula of divine sanction through the church laid the foundation for later disputes between church and monarchs over the supremacy of spiritual authority or political power. At issue in these disputes was the location of what Machiavelli called pienissima potestà, or supreme political power. While it has been argued that the medieval idea of the body politic originated in the effort to overcome this problem, it would be more accurate to say that the metaphor reflected rather than resolved the dilemma.
Cary J. Nederman argues that medieval body politic metaphors oscillated between hierarchical and harmonic imagery. Derived from classical and Christian sources, harmonic metaphors stressed the interdependence of all members, from the exalted head to the lowly feet working together, while hierarchical imagery emphasized the due order, rank, or proportion of all members under the direction of the head. Although the parameters of the metaphor might change, “the vision remained . . . one of a single entity defined by a divinely-given common end, yet made up of distinct parts with distinct roles—roles that must not be confused if the whole is to function properly.”

John of Salisbury invoked a hierarchical image of the body politic as consisting in several connected members, in which the church occupies the supreme place of the soul, which “stimulates and rules” the prince or head of the polity and other subordinate members. John also imbibed the harmonic image of the body politic in arguing that the seemingly humble feet that “coincide with peasants” are “justly owed shelter and support.” Thus notions of bodily subordination to the head jostled with more harmonic images of the beauty, proportion, or proper function of the body and its members.

Hierarchical and harmonic images were repeatedly invoked in long-running debates over the relationships between secular and spiritual authority and between bodies politic and bodies mystical. This prompted extended and often tortured analogical speculation throughout the medieval period. Ernst Kantorowicz argues that papal sponsorship of the idea of the church as a *corpus mysticum Christi* in the early fourteenth century rested on the presumed “real presence of Christ in the sacrament.” The *corpus mysticum* rested on the duality of Christ’s own body natural and body mystical, and it could thus be used, as by Nicholas of Cusa, in highly elaborate metaphors to suggest the correspondence of the church and its members with the body of Christ. Such claims were far from being universally accepted, but the articulation of critical counterclaims stretched the biological limits of the head and body metaphor. In responding to the supposed heresy of the schismatic pope at Avignon, John XXII, William of Ockham argued that although Christ is the head of the church, there must nonetheless be another human head “under Christ” who governs it as “someone . . . visibly ruling it, and physically accessible to the faithful.” In response to the concern that a single body with two heads would be monstrous and contrary to nature, Ockham replied that “although a natural body would be monstrous if it had two or more physical heads . . . nevertheless one mystical body can have many spiritual heads, one under
another: and this is not monstrous, but natural.”23 Here Ockham strains the metaphor to reconcile political power with supreme spiritual authority. Ockham’s tortured analogy occluded a central concern in medieval political thought: the issue of whether a ruler’s sovereignty was to be regarded as equal and independent from, or derived and subordinate to, the spiritual authority of the church.24 This issue had multiple possible resolutions within the parameters of medieval political thought.25 I will argue in the next section that the very integrity of the body politic metaphor made the essence of sovereignty—the sovereign’s right to exercise violence over and against subjects—difficult to envisage and defend.

**Metaphorical Sovereignty: Ferocita del quale spettacolo**

When John of Salisbury wrote of princes as the head of the body politic, he likened them to physicians who must “cure an affliction [of the body politic] with palliatives and gentle medicines” and if need be “harsher cures . . . [of] fire and iron.”26 While this analogy equated the health of the body politic with virtue (of the princely head and the subject members), disease consisted of any kind of vice that afflicted the body politic. This made the administration of sovereign violence a form of self-torture, reminiscent of early Christian recommendations of martyrdom as a form of “cauterization” to heal the body of the church.27 Such notions of metaphorical self-surgery were not uncommon, but in medieval political thought the question of which power (secular or spiritual) or which figure (pope or king) could authorize and wield that surgical authority remained a matter of persistent debate.28 Marsilius of Padua attempted a more subtle delineation of secular from spiritual powers by locating them in different jurisdictions.29 The inference that the physical should always be subordinate to the spiritual in his view rested on a spurious conflation of two separate jurisdictions. Therefore the jurisdiction of the “ruler of souls” relates only to the perfection of souls and not to the coercive authority of secular rulers.30 To the objection that the more noble concerns of perfection should not be subject to the less noble concerns of secular authority, Marsilius replied that just because the eye might be considered a “more perfect member” of the body than the hand or foot, it is still “dependent on those others” and they on it.31

The imagery of the community as a body under the leadership of a head was widely invoked throughout the fifteenth century in debates over the relative powers of popes and church councils.32 The polemicists around
the Fifth Lateran Council (1512–17) widely employed the same analogies of secular or religious institutions as organic bodies and of supreme leadership of the church as the head of subordinate bodies. Tommaso de Vio of Gaeta, known as Cajetan, stridently defended the sovereignty of the pope by arguing that the purpose of government, following the teachings and example of Christ, is to achieve unity, which is best accomplished under the rule of one head. Cajetan’s conciliarist critic, Jacques Almain, employed a natural law argument to suggest that the people constituting a “civil association” were like “one body” whose unity or health had to be preserved. Almain was particularly interested in defending the power of princes to exercise the “authority to kill those whose life leads to harm to the commonwealth,” an authority derived not from God but from “the community itself” that princes must use for the good of the commonwealth. In arguing so, Almain could represent that authority of all rulers—princes and popes—as delegated or conferred by those over and in whose interests the ruler’s authority is exercised. In this way, papal or princely powers could be both limited and revocable. Almain did continue to refer to the “gathering of believers in Christ” as constituting “Christ’s mystical body” but pointedly distinguished it from the civil power (not the civil body), whose essence is the power “to kill bodies.” We can detect here a more contractual understanding of the role of sovereigns in relation to their subjects that challenges the parameters of the body politic metaphor in two ways. First, the power of sovereigns (as opposed to the princely heads) is not derived from an order of nature (represented in analogies of body and members) but in artificial arrangements in which power is delegated by people to rulers for specific purposes. Second, chief among those purposes is the wielding of a lethal sovereign power for the benefit (security) of the community. This power was difficult to represent in terms of an organic unity of the body because it had to be exercised over bodies divisible from, not inherent parts of, the whole.

A key problem in the old metaphor, then, was its integrity or wholeness. The metaphor seemed unable to accommodate a clear separation of sovereigns from subjects. On the contrary, the old metaphor implied a mutual interdependence that left princes at the mercy of rebuke from the members and even of amputation or decapitation. It also rendered members subject to an ambiguous sovereignty either under one spiritual or political head or multiple spiritual and political heads. The tension inherent in the metaphor between bodily integrity and the multiplicity of heads was exacerbated by religious division and conflict as well as the economic
and social transformations in Western Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.\textsuperscript{39} Such challenges prompted thinkers such as Thomas Starkey to lament that the “spiriytualle bodye” of the English church had been “dissevered and in sondrye partes devyded and rent.”\textsuperscript{40} The increasingly apparent divisions between members reinforced the need for some form of political unity under a single sovereignty. In coming to define the nature of this sovereignty, political thinkers in the early modern period grappled with what appeared to be the redundancy of the metaphor.

\textit{Unione and Disunione: The Disintegration of the Body Politic}

Within the terms of the metaphor of the body politic the violence of rulers (and of subjects) was often conceptualized in terms of political illness. The violence in question was seen, as it was by Desiderius Erasmus and John Ponet, as either a symptom or cure of illness.\textsuperscript{41} The idea of a body politic prone to infections and diseases seemed a particular feature of English political thought throughout the early modern period.\textsuperscript{42} As Alan Cromartie suggests, such perceptions often belied a utopian aspiration that the commonwealth may become whole again, as “members of one body mystical of our savior Christ.”\textsuperscript{43} The aspiration to a unified and integrated polity in sixteenth-century England reflected growing unease over apparent religious and economic division within the polity.\textsuperscript{44} For Starkey, the healthy order of the body would be reflected in its good proportion and beauty. Likewise, the ill-health and disease of the body politic would show as deformity.\textsuperscript{45} George Hale argues that Starkey’s \textit{Dialogue}, with its diagnosis of the diseases of the body politic, is at once an affirmation of the ancient assumption of organic correspondence, while also a profound challenge to it.\textsuperscript{46} Underlying Starkey’s Galenic diagnoses is in fact a series of prescriptions based on a careful empirical study of the various social, economic, and political ills of England. For others, such as Richard Morison and John Cheke, invocations of the body politic metaphor were a familiar trope expressing disdain for social unrest, political disorder, and divided loyalties amid the turmoil of religious reformation and conflict; for, “order must be kept in the common welth, lyke helth in the body, and all the drift of policie loketh to this ende.”\textsuperscript{47}

According to Hale, the major development leading to the decline of the metaphor was the rise of contractual understandings of the basis of sovereignty.\textsuperscript{48} Another explanation lies in the profound shocks to traditional notions of organic political unity in the endemic civil unrest, religious war,
and especially the English Civil War (1642–51) and ensuing trial and execution of Charles I. As Charles stood before the chopping block and executioner’s axe on the scaffold he reflected that the liberty of the people “consists in having of Government” and law, but “not for having [a] share in government . . . [for a] subject and a soveraign are clean different things.” Interestingly, Charles made no claim to the traditional and timeworn rhetoric of body political integrity. There was no Machiavelli present to record whether the crowd that day was stupefied or amazed by the spectacle. Those in the crowd were clearly moved, for unlike de Orco’s death in 1502, in 1648 an anointed king was executed before the people’s eyes. It must have seemed to some that kingship also died with Charles on the scaffold.

Whatever the crowd’s reaction, sovereigns and subjects had indeed become different things, and their relationship was coming to be defined in contractual rather than organic body political terms. Perhaps nowhere else in seventeenth-century English political thought was this shift more clearly seen than in Thomas Hobbes’s contractual argument for sovereign power to ensure the “Peace of the Subjects within themselves, and their Defence against a common Enemy.” Hobbes’s express purpose was to construe the relationship between sovereign and subject so that the purpose of political association hinged on protection (of life and property) by a sovereignty that could be thought of as based on mutual contracts among the subjects who agree to establish it.

Hobbes’s sovereign was thus a strange amalgam: part embodied agent and part anonymous entity. Its substance and power were derived from the contractual agreement of all its subjects to obey its will. In his earlier formulation of the argument, Hobbes described this union in terms familiar within the parameters of English political discourse: “a BODY POLITIC or civil society . . . which may be defined to be a multitude of men, united as one person by a common power, for their common peace, defence, and benefit.” Hobbes’s use of the term body politic, however, bears only a tenuous resemblance to the older, more elaborate medieval concept that incorporated a complex arrangement of articulated correspondences. In contrast, Hobbes’s later formulation deliberately lacked any organic substance at all. Hobbes construed the body politic as an artificial person to separate it physically from but relate it politically to natural persons. A natural person, Hobbes argued, is a rational individual who may “personate” or act for himself or herself. In so doing, the natural person owns his or her thoughts, words, and actions and is therefore the author of those thoughts, words, and actions. This self-ownership or authoring of oneself, Hobbes argued, gives
one the authority to act for oneself. Such authority, he maintained, “Children, Fools, and Mad-men” lacked. It is precisely this self-ownership that allowed Hobbes to envisage the mutual contract between natural persons to establish an artificial person or sovereign authorized to act as his or her representative.56

The radical purport of this argument was that sovereignty was conceived as instituted not by god but by human beings for their mutual protection. The whole substance of Hobbes’s argument was that mutual protection and security required a sovereign with truly awesome powers who may inflict the ultimate, lethal punishment on its subjects. The awesome sovereignty of Hobbes’s Leviathan was not quite the same as Machiavelli’s account of the “amazed” masses in Cesena. For Hobbes, awesome sovereignty was to be registered privately (rather than publicly) in each subject’s mind and heart by means of individual calculation. Crucially Hobbes reinforced his argument with a vivid description of the chaos that would follow if sovereignty collapsed or simply failed to develop, a life of “continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short.”57 The radical possibility Hobbes conceded was that the polity may itself die. When the commonwealth is dissolved, he argued, “every man [is] at liberty to protect himselfe” by any means at his disposal: “For the Soveraign, is the publique Soule, giving Life and Motion to the Common-wealth; which expiring, the members are governed by it no more, than the Carcasse of a man, by his departed (though Immortal) Soule.”58 In Hobbesian and other contractual political doctrines, the comforting illusion of an eternal body politic no longer held.59

**Conclusion: The Body Politic in **_duo pezzi in su la piazza_**

It might be argued that the Machiavellian challenge I began with, expressed so memorably in his terse description of de Orco’s bloody demise, was misplaced. If medieval political thinkers were already aware of the tensions in and limitations on the body politic metaphor and if Hobbes finally dispatched it with his contractual political thought, why should Machiavelli be a significant presence in this story and in what exactly did his challenge to the body politic consist? Machiavelli’s challenge lies precisely in its bold envisaging of political authority as dependent on its efficacy. In other words Machiavelli’s teaching, summed up in de Orco’s story, was that the justification of political power rested only on its effectiveness, and this required bold, decisive, and, if need be, violent action. Machiavelli envisaged a kind
of politics in which effective action provided its own raison d’être. Without it the polity would collapse and chaos would follow. This was a political world without the comforting illusions of divine order or spiritual unity. The body politic of medieval political thought was an eternal body. Its health may wax and wane, it may need treatment or even amputation, but its death was rarely imagined. For Machiavelli, however, the political world was at least potentially finite. To stave off the chaos that followed finitude, it was necessary for someone to exercise pienissima potestà, if need be by a terrible spectacle, all of which shunned the spiritual and moral connotations of the body politic.

In the 1970s, Michel Foucault lamented the obsession with sovereignty in Western thought. He called for a conceptual decapitation in the practice of political theory—a removal of sovereignty from the center of Western political thought.60 Foucault had Hobbes in mind when he called for this decapitation, but he might equally have had Machiavelli in his sights. What they both made possible was the consideration of the end of polities. In one of the most startling later invocations of the metaphor, Jean-Jacques Rousseau speculated on the possible end of his ideal state.61 Rousseau’s state was as artificial and as contractual as Hobbes’s had been, and for this reason, his use of the metaphor was deliberately archaic.62 Unlike earlier invocations of the metaphor, Rousseau’s was not concerned with the justification of political authority or with asserting its organic integrity. Rather, it was invoked solely to underscore the possibility that both Machiavelli and Hobbes had envisaged so dramatically: without effective sovereignty (in Rousseau’s case, popular) the polity would end and all would dissolve in total chaos. Rousseau’s use of the metaphor and his obsession with political death thus illustrates how far the metaphor had declined. Indeed, by that time the body politic was already fast becoming a dead metaphor. The contractual separation between subjects and sovereigns rendered the metaphor as inert as de Orco’s body in Cesena on that December morning in 1502. Both were now lifeless bodies left in duo pezzi in su la piazza.

Notes

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1 The infliction of death is, on Carl Schmitt’s terms, the ultimate expression of the

Schmitt was dismissive of Machiavelli’s political advice because he merely envisaged the possibility of a friend-enemy distinction without conceptualizing it. Schmitt, *Concept of the Political*, 65–66.


In contrast to this, on the role of love in Machiavelli, see Haig Patapan, *Machiavelli in Love: The Modern Politics of Love and Fear* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006).


For example, the fourteenth-century podestà (chief magistrate) of Florence possessed titles implying both secular and spiritual power. Randolph Starn, *Contrary Commonwealth: The Theme of Exile in Medieval and Renaissance Italy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 63.


Ernst Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology (1957; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 196.


Ibid.


Ibid., Discourse I, ch. 7, sect. 8, p. 71; ch. 15, sect. 2, pp. 88–89; ch. 17, sect. 11–12, pp. 120–22; ch. 18, sect. 3, pp. 124–5.

Ibid., Discourse II, ch. 3, sect. 4, p. 419.


Jacques Almain, A Book Concerning the Authority of the Church (1512), in Conciliarism, 135–36.

Ibid., 136.


Almain, Concerning the Authority, 137.

Ibid., 139. For Cajetan’s response, see Cajetan, The Apology of Brother Tommaso de Vio . . . Concerning the Authority of the Pope Compared with That of the Council (1514), in Conciliarism, 202–5.


Erasmus, Education of a Christian Prince, 39; and John Ponet, A Short Treatise of Politik Power (1556), ch. 6, British Library no. W462573.


Starkey, A Dialogue, 53–56.

Hale, A Dialogue, 61–68.


Hale, Body Politic, 77–79.

King Charles His Speech Made on the Scaffold at Whitehall-Gate, Immediately before His Execution, on Tuesday the 30 of Ian. 1648 (London: Peter Cole, 1649). King Charles’s speech is also available at AnglicanHistory.org, http://justus.anglican.org/resources/pc/charles/charles1.html (accessed July 9, 2004).


Ibid., part 1, ch. 19, p. 107.


This and the following quotations in this paragraph all come from, Hobbes, Leviathan, part 1, ch. 16, pp. 111–14.

Ibid., part 2, ch. 18, pp. 120–21.

Ibid., part 1, ch. 13, p. 89.

Ibid., part 2, ch. 29, p. 230.

See Agamben, Homo Sacer, 99.

