The Political Dissent of a Senior General: Tamogami Toshio’s Nationalist Thought and a History Controversy

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ABSTRACT: Confronted with a period of socio-economic and political stagnation and the volatility of territorial disputes, contemporary Japanese conservative nationalists are dismayed by the deterioration of national consciousness and waning of traditional values. The policymakers’ recent East Asian unity campaign accelerated their concern over the “marginalization” of the value of the sovereign state and consequent apathy over the danger of losing their national identity. In this context, the paper explores the thought of General Tamogami Toshio through an examination of his political dissent in 2008, which elevated him to be a torch bearer for the popular conservative nationalists’ agenda. The paper sheds light on his popular nationalist cause that, on the one hand, accentuated the ideological divide between conservative nationalists and skeptical and caustic ideologues, and on the other, galvanized previously politically uninterested citizens to demand rigorous epistemic investigation of national history.

Keywords: Japan, thought, Tamogami Toshio, nationalism, politicization of history

In 2008 General Tamogami Toshio, 1 then Chief of Staff of the Air Self-Defence Force, encountered fierce criticism from the media and opinion makers, and subsequently attracted more than a degree of interest from international observers of Japan over his controversial essay “Nihon wa shinryaku kokka de atta no ka?” (Was Japan a State of Pillagers and Plunderers?). 2 The dense media coverage surrounding his controversial essay and subsequent dismissal accentuated a polarization of the nation. General Tamogami was denounced by the media, and some historians and opinion makers as a dangerous man and his public dissent as a coup d’état verbal indicative of the resurgence of an aggressive militarist Japan. Nevertheless, the views expressed in his essay received substantial public support and his popularity has increased to the extent that he has been bombarded with demands for public lectures and for his publications, most of which have become best-sellers.
The public reaction to General Tamogami reveals the volatile nature of contemporary Japanese society and highly complex and deep issues highlighting problems that have faced the nation for some time. These issues include the strengthening of national defence and security, reforms and amendments to the Constitution and the Self-Defence Law, historical revisionism, territorial disputes, a bill for foreigners’ right to vote in local elections, and, above all, apprehensions over the deterioration of national consciousness and the waning of moral and traditional values. Such issues are indeed central concerns of contemporary Japanese conservatives as found in the views and activities of a complex network of associations, study groups and such individuals as Toida Tōru, Nakayama Nariaki, Takaichi Sanae, Hiranuma Takeo, Inada Tomomi, Sakurai Toshiko and Fujioka Nobukatsu. Reinterpretations of the Great East Asia War and a rejection of some of the existing mainstream interpretations have been seen in various sectors of society over decades with periodic dismissals of public servants who aired their interpretation of history contrary to the orthodoxy. And yet, the intensity of media coverage and reactions surrounding Tamogami’s dissent as a misconduct of a senior general was unprecedented.

With this context, the paper will examine General Tamogami’s thought and his advocacy of revisions of Japanese history that reflect concerns of contemporary Japanese conservative nationalists. His historicism will be treated as demanded for the articulation of the ontology of the present, extraneous from the premise of history as the construction of a “veracious” account of a “past”. Tamogami’s revisionism will be explored through the investigation of some major issues revealed by the controversy. By so doing, the paper will offer a different view from that of the current dominant assessment of the Tamogami dissent as a pivotal part of the increasingly contorted politicization of history in twenty first century Japan. The paper will contend that his action and conduct are rather symptomatic of conservatives’ growing concerns. They see their country being increasingly dominated by the idea of “Asianization”, fear that the Japanese were being “marginalized” within their own land and apprehend losing national identity. In this regard, Tamogami’s political dissent has facilitated the sustaining of a balance in society of diversity and uniformity. It may be claimed that this balance contributes to the stability of the nation by allowing the embrace of, on the one hand, a public anxiety over the threat of sharing Japan’s sovereignty with neighboring countries and, on the other, the promotion of greater autonomy, a principal concern of the conservative nationalists.
(i) History Controversy in Contemporary Japan

The Tamogami incident has had two major consequences in Japanese society. Firstly, the manner in which Tamogami was dismissed from his post and the controversy surrounding his contentious historical views accelerated the public’s growing concern over the perceived degenerating state of the nation. Secondly, amid rapid socio-political change, the Tamogami dissent has sharpened the ideological divide between conservative nationalists and skeptical zealous critics. His campaign for the nationalist cause has stimulated a surge of the former as the heterodoxy challenging the latter’s dominance. In countering the social dominance of the interpretation of history by the existing orthodoxy it augmented awareness of epistemological disputes. Thus, it reinvigorated the public reevaluation of an uncritical embrace of national history.

Controversies surrounding historical revisionism in contemporary Japan have mostly focused on the dispute over historical knowledge on the Great East Asia War, more specifically on the Nanjing incident, the second Sino-Japanese War and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. In this regard, the contemporary contestations surrounding the question of reinterpretation of national history, which accelerated in the 1990s have been focused on the conflict between the protectors and defenders of the established, dominant mainstream interpretation and the sceptics and advocates of reinterpretations and challengers of the epistemic foundation of the orthodoxy. Individual historians, opinion makers and professionals such as Suzuki Akira, Kitamura Minoru, Higashinakano Shūdō and Nishio Kanji gained public support for their revisionist stance. Civil associations and groups also emerged to become actively involved in alternative approaches to the orthodoxy. For example, Jiyūshugi shikan kenyūkai, the Association for the Advancement of an Unbiased View of History, which consisted mainly of academics, school teachers and concerned lay historians, emerged in 1995 as one of the most influential historical revisionist groups in late twentieth century Japan. It began with promotion of an historical approach formulated by liberal ideals that value balance and diversity with the aim to shed the burden of unnecessary guilt and masochism.

The extent of the impact of such groups in society was indicated by the popularization of the term jigyaku shikan (self-torturing historicism), which is believed to have been coined by Fujioka Nobukatsu, the founder of the Association, and his publication of the bestseller...
Kyōkasho ga oshienai rekishi (History that Textbooks do not Teach) in four volumes. In 2007 a group of 90 LDP Diet members also entered the historical debate by setting up the Japan’s Future and History Education Sub-Committee, with the intent to conduct research into the Nanjing Incident with empirical and positivist approaches. Earlier, 48 local legislators set up a group, “shūeisha mondai wo kangaeru chihō gi’in no kai” (the Association of Local Legislators to Examine the Problem of the Shūeisha. In 2004 the Association lodged a protest against the publisher of Yangu jampu (Young Jump), a weekly comic, that published Motomiya Hiroshi’s comic series, Kuni ga moeru (The Country Burning) arguing the detrimental impact such comics would have on the minds of the young. The legislators denounced Motomiya’s comic on the grounds that, although it was fiction, he set the story against the background of the Nanjing massacre and prominent historical figures with a representation of some of the Nanjing photos that have been contested as of dubious provenance.

The phenomenon of members of the public taking action against the dominance of orthodox historicism was reflected in the lawsuit brought by students against the University Entrance Examination Centre in 2004. The 7 Waseda University students claimed that a question set by the Centre was inaccurate and inappropriate. They charged that in order to gain marks, they had no choice but to select as correct the answer that stated that Koreans were forcibly taken to Japan during the Second World War. The Centre was accused of making a highly contentious statement the only correct answer in order to impose their ideological conviction and historical straitjacket upon students. The litigation became a public controversy. Indeed, one Diet member demanded that the name of the producer of the examination paper be made public.³

For the protectors and defenders of the orthodoxy, the strengthening of the popularization of historical revisionist views became a great concern. Critics of Jiyūshugi shikan kenyūkai such as Kumagai Shin’ichirō, Sakai Yasuo and Yamada Akira have been vocal about the detrimental effect of “rekishi shūseishugi” (historical revisionism), the Japanese rendition of the negative sense of historical revisionism. While historical revisionists vary in the degree and depth of their rejection of the orthodoxy, denunciation as rekishi shūseishugisha (historical revisionists) seems reserved for those who challenge the dominant understanding of Japan’s atrocities and exploitation in Asia, or those who reject the national burden of guilt. Such a critic of rekishi shūseishugi as Yamada Akira would not generally be held a rekishi shūseishugisha for arguing that the Shōwa Emperor was an expansionist who executed real political dominance during the
War. *Rekishi shūseishugi* as popularly used has thus tended to carry an exclusive connotation of fabrication, denial, manipulation and distortion of Japan’s war guilt and crimes with the revisionists’ specific intention to promote therapeutic values for apologists, and extreme political ideology. A fierce critic of *rekishi shūseishugi*, Gotō Masataka (1998), who set up the Rekishi shūsei shugi wo kangaeru handai renrakukai (The Association of Osaka Universities for Examining Historical Revisionism) even lamented that there was no legislation in Japan to stop reinterpretations of historical revisionists from being disseminated in society.

The impact in society of the Jiyūshugi shikan kenyūkai line of a historical revisionist movement is further found in the decision by the Yokohama City Education Board in August, 2009 to use in middle high schools in eight districts the history textbooks produced by the Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho wo tsukurukai (the Society to Make New History Textbooks). Yamaemori Tsuyoshi and Kimura Kenji (2009) reported that Imada Tadahiko, the Chair of the Education Board, stressed the importance of avoiding at all costs selecting textbooks that made the Japanese abhor being born in Japan. Among the critics who lodged the protest against the Board’s decision were the Korean Residents Union in Japan which feared that new textbooks would encourage Japanese children to discriminate against Korean children in Japan, and citizens’ groups which accused the Board of endorsing a glorification of Japan’s colonization while justifying wars and being antagonistic towards the Constitution.

The anxiety expressed by Gotō and others over the impact of the Jiyūshugi shikan kenyūkai line of historical reinterpretations on society is shared by Yamada who supports the preservation of the contentious article nine of the Constitution. In his criticism of Tamogami’s controversial essay, Yamada echoes the criticism of the popular reception of historical reinterpretations of the revisionists. He sees Tamogami’s action to air his revisionist views on the Great East Asia War as a sign for the SDF to make a dangerous move, a move to push for his ambition to expand the power and influence of the SDF. Yamada (2009) insists that the SDF personnel in the twenty first century should be introspective and self-reflective to seek a conscience over Japan’s acts of atrocity in the past.

As seen in the disputations over the spread of *rekishi shūseishugi*, the fundamental problem of recent controversies surrounding reinterpretations of Japanese national history may lie in the faith held for historiography as a provider of “facts” and “truth” of the past. Narrators and critics of both the orthodoxy and historical revisionists are inclined to hold a strong belief that they can
construct in the present a “veracious” and “truthful” past. At the same time, we tend to burden history with the role of provider of moral consciousness, underpinned by an assumption of the existence of an absolute and universal moral system, independent of time. More significantly, historical knowledge is inevitably dependent on those who reconstruct and reshape the past. Hence, exploration into history often encounters the partial efforts of those who control the present with a “past” as an instrument to serve the interests of political and ideological hegemonies of the present. In the context of historical disputation and the politicization of history, Tamogami’s essay manifestly questions unwholesome aspects of the relationship between politics and history and historical views controlled by politics, though it does not criticize government policy.

(ii) “Nihon wa shinryaku kokka de atta no ka?”

In the summer of 2008 Motoya Toshio, a businessman and active revisionist, organized an essay competition with the theme “shin no kin-gendai shikan” (the true account of modern Japanese history) to coincide with the launching of his book, Hōdōsarenai kin-gendai shi (An Unreported Modern-Contemporary History). Motoya’s organization of the competition and a provision of the winner’s prize of 300,000 Yen may be seen as a case of a private individual taking action to raise public awareness on the restrictions imposed on alternative interpretations of Japanese history.

Tamogami’s entry “Nihon wa shinryaku kokka de atta no ka?” questions if Japan was the only “shinryaku kokka” (a plundering and marauding state) and whether the Japanese should continue to accept the long established stigma attached to the nation (Tamogami, 2008b, n.p.). The word “shinryaku” has been widely used in Japan in school textbooks, in the Murayama danwa (the Murayama Statement), and as the translation of “a war of aggression” used in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 to describe Japan’s actions during the Asia-Pacific War. However, no precise translation exists in English. The word shinryaku is derived from the Chinese classics where it meant to burgle and steal property, but was utilized in the second half of the nineteenth century by the Japanese to connote the invasion and plunder of property and land of another country. This Japanese usage was then adopted by the Chinese to use interchangeably with the term qinlüè and came to have the added meaning of the act of invading a country with the sole intent to ravage and plunder its land and property, rob it of its sovereignty.
and independence and enslave its people. Conservative thinkers would argue that action taken to improve the defence and security of one’s country or to rectify dangerous policies or situations that might be considered as potential threats should not be described as “shinryaku”. Echoing this standpoint, Tamogami contends that Japan was not a “shinryaku” state.

In the essay, General Tamogami expresses his concerns for the security and independence of Japan and the position of the nation in an increasingly shifting, fragile politico-economic balancing in the East Asia region and in relations with America. Tamogami perceives Japan’s current national problems regarding defence issues as primarily stemming from the burden imposed on the Japanese by their dutiful acceptance of the guilt placed on them for the war. It is the interpretation of the history of the Great East Asia War dominating the teaching of Japanese history over sixty years that he sees as a major problem and the cancer stopping Japan becoming a truly independent nation. Tamogami is convinced that the removal of this misconception of Japanese history through the process of rigorous scrutiny and verification of new documents and sources and inculcation of what he regards as truthful history in schools is of paramount importance and the fundamental key to the strengthening of the nation. For him, the public acceptance of this reinterpretation of the Great East Asia War is of vital importance. He is convinced that the Japanese in the twenty first century have an urgent need to regard their country in a positive light as a country worthy of invoking a national pride and love, not as a sinful nation burdened with wrongdoings of the past. He laments that the majority of Japanese are restricted in raising questions relating to the War and rigorously debating historicism.

Thus, General Tamogami’s rejection of Japan’s being eternally labeled as a “shinryaku” state impels him to stress Japan’s urgent need to abjure such a stigma. First and foremost, General Tamogami rejects the proposition that Japan was the sole aggressor. In his view it should be extremely disconcerting that Japan’s attempt to remove the ‘aggression’ label that had adhered to the country has encountered highly emotional protests from the media and leftist activists both at home and abroad. He could not find any other major advanced powerful country, then, that was not a shinryaku kokka (a plundering and marauding state) during the first half of the twentieth century. Moreover, he argues that the Japanese colonial rule was rather a benevolent one. In his understanding of Japan’s colonization policies in Korea, Manchuria and Taiwan, they were in principle, and to some extent in practice, an extension of those of the development of Hokkaidō towards the end of the nineteenth century. He argues that in comparison with Western imperialist
counterparts, Japan was more committed to the development of colonial regions: Japan helped to raise the standard of living by stimulating the economy, providing social stability, constructing various public facilities such as water systems, roads and power stations, and building many schools, together with imperial universities in Korea in 1924 and Taiwan in 1928. To demonstrate the success of Japan’s policies in providing stability and prosperity, Tamogami adduces the growth in population of 20 million during 13 years of Japan’s colonization in Manchuria, and of 12 million during 35 years in Korea.

Tamogami further argues to support his rejection of the _shinryakukoku_ (a robber country) label that just as the Western military presence in China rested on treaties and agreements with the Chinese, so did Japan’s. Moreover, Japan had never established garrisons without obtaining agreement from the Chinese. Japan was provoked into taking preemptive military measures to defend against a series of terrorist attacks on Japanese army bases and Japanese nationals in China.

Another factor he raises as a basis of his rejection of the “_shinryaku_” label is the active Comintern espionage and plots during the World War Two. He offers a theory of Russian agents penetrating deeply into the Guomindang and the Roosevelt Administration. In his view they were responsible for the way in which Japan was dragged into an all out Second Sino-Japanese War: the bombing of the train that killed Zhang Zuolin in 1928 and the Lugouqiao Incident in 1937. He embraces the theory that the Comintern penetrated the Roosevelt Administration through Harry Dexter White, a Senior Treasury official, and White’s influence on Henry Morgenthau Jr., Secretary of Treasury sheds considerable light on the influences upon the Japan policy adopted by the Roosevelt Administration. Tamogami argues that Cordell Hull’s provocatively arrogant outline of “Proposed Basis for Agreement between the United States and Japan” sent to Japan in November 1941, allegedly drafted by Henry White, was regarded by the Japanese government as the last straw. Japan had already been suffering from American imposition of a number of sanctions including the freezing of Japanese assets in America and embargoes on oil, rubber and tungsten exports to Japan. He is convinced that the Japanese had no choice but to seriously contemplate looking for natural resources in South East Asia and found open conflict with America increasingly difficult to avoid. He feels strongly that given a whirlwind of international conflicts, with the world powers vying for the attainment of politico-economic and military hegemony, Japan could not have avoided the physical conflicts if she wished to maintain real
independence. Hence, he rejects the justice of Japan being singled out as a “shinryaku” country. He warns against those Japanese, who claim Japan unnecessarily engaged in a foolish war in the first half of the twentieth century and naively believe both that Japan could have maintained a peaceful and thriving society as a bystander, and that the country’s leaders of the time were all fools and criminals who victimized the Japanese people. Instead, he argues that the Japanese need to be aware of the law of nature that those who do not fight are invariably controlled and coerced into submission.

Tamogami rejects outright as a common misconception that Japan’s possession of strong military capabilities would instantly lead to her invasion of other countries. He bemoans that while the concern for national defence as the essence of national polity, and the exploration of ways to strengthen the armed forces is normal and a national priority in other countries, when embraced in Japan, it attracts a highly emotional criticism from some people domestically. Given that historical views and interpretations Tamogami offered in his essay had already been explored and argued by both domestic and international scholars for decades, the intensity of the emotional reaction against him may appear perplexing. Nonetheless, most vocal, fierce, criticism seems to come from some historians and intellectuals alleging abundant inaccuracies and misinformation. They seem to treat Tamogami’s call for historical revision of the Great East Asia War and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, as well as his offer of epistemic evidence, as simply perverse and scorn them as a right-wing, conservative apologist approach. The emotion of their reaction may suggest they feel threatened. Their fear would emanate in part from the wide support given to Tamogami’s embrace of the reinterpretation of history and for the argument that the embrace of the victors’ version of Japanese history robs the country of its tradition and independence. They may also see the threat to the domination of their existing, authoritative orthodox historical knowledge buttressed as it is by the stress laid on the crimes and atrocities Japan is held to have committed in the Great East Asia War.

Internationally, his essay provoked immediate reaction from some Japan observers such as Gavan McCormack in his article, ‘Facing the Past: War and Historical Memory in Japan and Korea’. McCormack seems to have sensationalized its negative impact on Japanese society. Taking Tahara Sōichirō’s branding of Tamogami’s act of submitting an essay as a coup d’état verbal and an act of kekki (rising to action), which he translates as “uprising”, McCormack opines that “[i]f [Tahara] is right, the Tamogami affair should be viewed with foreboding, a sign
of things to come, as much as, or more than, of things past” (McCormack, 2008, p.2). Further, he claims that Tamogami urges in the essay that Japan must “take back the glorious history”. In the context in which he introduces Tamogami’s view, the reader can easily be misled to judge that Tamogami refers to the Japan of World War II as a glorious period of history, and is advocating that twenty first century Japan should return to that period. McCormack asserts that Tamogami refuses to acknowledge the “sort of skeletons in the national cupboard” while Koreans have been “engaged on a massive enterprise designed to explore, documenting the claims of countless victims of former regimes” (McCormack, 2008, p.3). Ironically, what Tamogami has represented is a contemporary movement in Japan to call for exploring the claimed “skeletons in the national cupboard” to challenge the historiographical orthodoxy. McCormack also makes an assertion that Tamogami “had no criticism of the steps taken by ‘conservative’ and ‘nationalist’ governments to deepen Japan’s subjugation to US regional and global purposes” (McCormack, 2008, p.2). What Tamogami advocates in the essay is for Japan to be totally independent and self-reliant in the matter of defence and security and he is critical of Japan’s dependence on the United States.

Apart from its content, criticism Tamogami has received reveals the highly unusual situation Japan has suffered, one which Tamogami attempts to articulate. If some Japanese call for strengthening national security and defence, they are branded as right-wing nationalists, or warmongers. This is so in spite of the criticism of the country as militarily dependent on the United States. Indeed, Tamogami points to how the extreme constitutional restrictions on the use of weapons other than in defence hobbles the SDF. He provides recent examples of its inability to fully defend the territory: the Defence Force can do nothing to Russian surveillance planes flying over Okinawa, or to North Korean ships in Japanese waters.

His stance for ethnic nationalism seems to resonate with conservative nationalists such as Sakurai Yoshiko, whom Kevin Doak describes as a kokumin nationalist (Kevin Doak, 2007, p.213), and whose advocacy of the strengthening of the state and the promotion of national independence through a greater civil participation diverges from military or expansionist nationalism.

What he advocated in the essay was regarded as political dissent by the Minister of Defence and the government. Yet, he claims that what he expressed in the controversial essay is identical to what he had expressed publicly for several years and did not constitute anything radically new.
In May, 2008 by the invitation of a student organization, the Society for the Study of State Security, Tamogami had given a lecture to 1,200 students in the Yasuda Auditorium of the University of Tokyo. During the lecture he articulated the state of the SDF and problems facing the Japanese defence force, as well as the highly unusual nature of the Japanese defence system and organization when compared with foreign counterparts. His intention to raise awareness is evident in his argument that contemporary Japan would face the question of the power balance in the region in light of Japan’s shrinking defence budget while neighboring countries such as Russia, China and Korea were increasing military funding. Drawing on accounts of the history of Japanese colonial policies in Korea and China, Tamogami raised the question of whether the term *shinryaku* should justifiably be attributed to the Japan of the first half of the twentieth century (Tamogami, 2009b, pp.26-41).

Earlier Tamogami had published lengthy articles expressing his views on the matter of national defence and the state of Japanese society and history. His lengthy three part series, entitled ‘*Kōkū jieitai wo genkini suru 10 no teigen*’ (Ten Suggestions to Improve the Morale of the ASDF) was published in the SDF internal journal, *Hōyū*, from 2003 to 2004 when he was serving as the President of the Joint Staff College. General Tamogami expressed in ‘Ten Suggestions’ his concerns with less reservation over the state of Japanese defence and security and articulated in more detail the pressing problems contemporary Japan faced than in the controversial essay. Indeed, ‘Ten Suggestions’ expounds the basis for the action that was to make some sectors of the media and public observers hound him as a “political” dissenter. Nonetheless, while ‘Ten Suggestions’ is essentially a kind of practical guide that contains information the officers of the ASDF might find useful and instructive, the series is clearly designed to provide them with ways to regain vitality and pride. It reveals in greater depth his emphasis on the cultivation of individuals as a basis of national strength and his concerns for the inability of Japanese to pursue the strengthening of defence.

*(iii) An Advocacy for Strengthening Japan and Self Cultivation*

In ‘Ten Suggestions’ Tamogami argues that the most urgent and fundamental task to revitalize and strengthen the national defence and security must be to raise awareness of the duty and responsibilities of citizens and to instill the people with patriotism and love for their country. Echoing the growing concern by the conservatives, Tamogami’s resolve stems largely from his
fear that the so-called *han’nichi undō* (an anti-Japanese movement) within Japan had accelerated in recent years. According to Tamogami, this had sapped the strength of the state and accelerated the weakening of the nation. He sees enemies against Japan within and is convinced that Japan is in the middle of a “cold civil war” with the anti-Japanese movements vying to damage the defensive strength of the country. He sees a disquieting parallel between the plight of Japan and that of the SDF as the “anti-Japanese” movement targets the SDF as one of the major sources of danger to the nation. His sense of urgency may be justified given the result of a survey conducted by the University of Michigan in the “world values survey 2000” in which 1,000 people from 60 countries were asked “if your country is involved in a war, do you fight for the country?” Only 15.6% of the Japanese answered in the positive, placing Japan at the bottom of the participating countries (Shakai jitsujō dētā zuroku, 2000, n.p.). For conservative nationalists the evidence of such surveys marks an acceleration of the deterioration of the national ethos.

In ‘Ten Suggestions’, Tamogami had already iterated contemporary Japan as weak in responding to unjustified criticism of the country by neighboring countries. It had made little effort to rectify a distorted image of the country and her history, or to lessen the power and control of internal “anti-Japanese” forces. For Tamogami a correct understanding by the public of Japanese history and tradition is the key to the strengthening of national defence and security. It alarms him as he sees the orthodox interpretation as illusionary, carefully designed by the victors of the war with selective sources of information to be imparted without undergoing rigorous research and investigation (Tamogami, 2004, n.p.). He argues that alternative interpretations should legitimately challenge the existing conformist approach to Japanese history, which has so long been established as factual and “official”, as a healthy exercise in a democratic country with freedom of expression fully practiced. He sees as a serious suppression of that freedom of expression the restriction imposed on a call to rectify the existing teaching of false history (Tamogami, 2004, n.p.). He urges that the public should be allowed to freely express views on Japanese history at variance with the “official” orthodoxy without this automatically being labeled as a right wing attempt at reviving militarist powers and the romanticism of valour. The alternative would be to become simply resigned to submissively letting them continue with a false notion of the past, which he has rejected outright.

Tamogami articulates in ‘Ten Suggestions’ another element that is detrimental to the national defence and security: the widening gap between constraints of the existing Constitution and the
demands of the present world. He declares that Japan must undertake urgent constitutional reforms. In his view a glaring anomaly exists between the letter of the law and its practice concerning matters of national defence and security, one that has attracted criticism. Moreover, there has been little progress in constitutional reform, despite increasing public support. Provisions of the existing Constitution such as Article 9-2 and Article 3 of the SDF Law restrict, for instance, the ability of the SDF to function strictly in the capacity of defence at a time of aggression against Japan. Together with a prohibition of collective defence, the existing legal restrictions prevent the SDF from meeting increasing international demands and any expectation of the provision of multilayered support for the international community. Since he wrote ‘Ten Suggestions’ he has reiterated repeatedly that the law that prohibits Japan’s right to collective defence should be changed to allow Japan the right to assist their allies in time of urgency and, more importantly, that the prohibition effectively deprives Japan of being totally independent in making judgments on national defence and security.

His foremost concern in ‘Ten Suggestions’ was to inspire the ASDF staff to raise their national consciousness and patriotism so as to effectively combat those bent on subverting efforts to strengthen the country. In this mission ‘Ten Suggestions’ sees the SDF as the most fundamental, and the physical as well as psychological, bastion for the defence of the country (Tamogami, 2004, n.p.). It is the defender of the nation and a “citadel” prepared to act decisively at a time of emergency without being afraid of conflict and war.

Tamogami may be seen as one reformist in a line with a long tradition. And indeed, there are distinct similarities between Tamogami’s approaches to the role and function of the SDF officers and those designated to samurai of the past. Evidently, Tamogami himself sees a parallel between the way of bushi and that of the staff officers of the SDF, and views the defence force as an outstanding organization that continues the legacy of the spirit of Bushidō (Tamogami, 2008a, p.151). Tamogami sees Bushidō as the spiritual and moral foundation military officers must look to as the basis of national security and defence. In this he conforms to Japanese reformist thought that promoted at times of political instability and social malaise an infusion of moral and spiritual revitalization to strengthen the tradition. This characteristic reformist pattern remerges time and again in the course of Japanese history. Examples are found in the writers of the Köyō gunkan in the sixteenth century and of the mystic, sentimental and idealistic vein of the way of samurai in the seventeenth century. These writers inveighed against the samurai trend of the
times towards “feminization”, or “merchantization”. It is also seen in scholars of Shidō, the rationalist vein of Tokugawa Bushidō heavily influenced by Neo-Confucian moral values, that condemned the samurai for having an unsophisticated coarse philosophy and unrighteous practice and stressed the need of learning and moral principles. Further, we find the pattern in the reformism of the educated former samurai and those of samurai descent in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, who, greatly concerned about the moral decline of the society, and the rebuilding and strengthening of the country, attempted to systematize Bushidō into statist Bushidō or imperialist Bushidō while combining it with Western liberal moral values. In the twenty first century, the pattern is found in reformism advocated by intellectuals and businessmen and prominent politicians such as Hiranuma Takeo, a former LDP Minister and a leader of a new political party.

(iv) Tamogami’s Advocacy of Self Cultivation and the Reformist Tradition

Tamogami’s pursuit of the SDF officers’ adherence to the ideal principles of Bushidō in a pattern of the Japanese reformist tradition is manifested, for example, in his approaches to the practice of self cultivation. He repeatedly argues in ’Ten Suggestions’ that strict rigidity for the sake of abiding by regulations should be avoided and senior officers should provide more leeway to their subordinates. While he stresses that the officers in the pursuit of excellence by individual success and personal glory should never be driven by concern for the self, but to serve the country, he instructs them not to blindly follow orders, or the letter of manuals and rules. Rather, they should be resolute in remonstrating and take initiatives in making judgments as critical thinking individuals, and not avoid inevitable conflicts, or disagreements (Tamogami, 2003, n.p.). Such approaches correspond with the Shidō thinkers of the Tokugawa period who encouraged the retainer to remonstrate with the lord if he did not follow principles, and leave his service if he did not accept the retainer’s advice, or with liberal thinkers of modern Japan who strongly adhered to practical and moral value elements of Shidō in their liberal democratic beliefs. For example, in the early twentieth century Uchimura Kanzō rejected the falseness of the idealistic, emotional Hagakure line of absolute loyalty. He condemned those who blindly obeyed orders from their lord and master (Uchimura, 1901, pp.9-10).
Tamogami’s emphasis on self-cultivation and the pursuit of excellence by the individual SDF staff extends to his encouragement of his officers to acquire knowledge beyond their expert knowledge and technical skills as highly trained ASDF personnel and to become enlightened and articulate (Tamogami, 2003, n.p.). In a sense this line of the pursuit of professionalism in the manner of revitalization of the Japanese cultural tradition is reflected in the promotion of monozukuri (making things) that emerged in the late twentieth century. The Japanese consciously coined the word to reinforce the notion that the high standards and quality of the Japanese manufacturing industries are underpinned and sustained by the revitalizing of existing Japanese traditional values. This was a conscious attempt to diverge from the impact of Western manufacturing and industrial skills and techniques with the consequent weakening of national cultural identity. Essentially, it was driven by a need to invigorate, in parallel with the high information technology, the traditional idea of craftsmanship to encourage creativity, innovation and a pursuit of high quality in non-lineal, regional and small-scale operations. For the pursuit of a successful monozukuri, however, it is of vital importance to cultivate hitozukuri, literally “making people”, which refers to the creation of experts, artisans, who pursue the elevation and cultivation of individual skills and moral disciplines. It represents the idea of exclusively focusing on character building and the nurturing and educating of dedicated craftsmen. Before producing goods of high quality, the monozukuri practice requires the creation of skilled artisans who not only excel in making goods, but also demonstrate balanced minds and moral characters. Monozukuri, thus, extends the concept of hitozukuri to not only complete the process of monozukuri, but attain excellence in both artefacts and artisans. Likewise, Tamogami’s urging of his officers to strive for self-cultivation stems from his belief that the state’s strength must be derived from individual qualities of the people, finding in revitalization of traditional values ways to rejuvenate a stagnated nation.

With regard to a characteristic feature of a Bushidō virtue of sincerity, he stresses that the recognition of the unity of regulations and practice is of great importance. Sincerity in the form of the harmonious unity of thought and action, or of the inner and the outer, or bu and bun (learning, knowledge), or the Constitution and its observation is an essential value element. In this context of sincerity as attainable through the unity of thought and action, Tamogami feels that the SDF has plenty of sincerity, but lacks courage, a resolute spirit, decisiveness and critical thinking. Behind his criticism lies his concern over the stigma still attached to the role and
function of the SDF and their anomalous existence. While he boasts the SDF is one of the best armed forces in the world, he expands on the highly unusual situation the SDF is in as a national defence force in the eyes of international community. He points out that the SDF were dispatched to provide miscellaneous support and backup for international forces without proper weapons to defend themselves. Consequently, even in hostile territory, any tasks to aid reconstruction had to be completed either without armed protection or with one provided by foreign countries. The SDF staff’s tasks undertaken overseas were seen as undervalued, fundamentally so as not to emphasize the glaring anomalies existing between the Constitution and activities of the SDF engaged in non-combatant support at times of international conflicts. He may even feel the injustice in the highly abnormal situation in which the activities of the SDF, even its very existence, provoke an instant general reaction in the public as if aggression and the SDF were synonymous. In such circumstances peculiar to Japan, he saw a lack of the practice of sincerity and a situation where risks undertaken by the SDF staff and the display of their skills, expertise and dedication are hardly recognized.

In this context, Tamogami no doubt recognized as of vital importance defence reforms that could lead to the attaining of dignity and respect both domestically and internationally and achieve an equal footing with countries such as the United States. He considered a fundamental obstacle to such reforms the deep-rooted discord and friction in the Defence Ministry between administrators, the seibo gumi (the “suit group” of the Administration Bureau), and professionals, the seifuku gumi (“uniform group” of the SDF) within the Defence Ministry. For over sixty years, the existing mechanism for the operation of the military section of first the Agency, and then the Ministry, has remained essentially the same. It created a system in which the seifuku gumi structurally came under the sebiro gumi and took on a subordinate role. This is indicated by the fact that the only direct communication between the Defence Minister and the SDF is through the administrative office, and then only with the approval of the Chief Secretary.

(iv) Tamogami’s Reformist Views and the Strengthening of the SDF

Tamogami supported a structural reform to merge the two groups into one centralized administration for the Defence Ministry. He strongly felt the need to establish a mechanism that allowed the SDF’s advice on matters relevant to defence and security to be considered by the Diet. This should also allow a degree of autonomy to the SDF in such matters as education and
training of their personnel and matters that require highly specialized knowledge and skills (Tamogami, 2008a, p.81). Behind his eager support for the radical reforms probably lay his concern that there remained a glaring power imbalance between the seibiro gumi and the seifuku gumi: the substantial administrative control by the former over the latter, but the latter’s minimal influence on the former.

The exposure to an intense media scrutiny of his essay, ‘Nihon wa shinryaku kokka de atta no ka?’, and his subsequent dismissal from his post coincided with the Defence Ministry’s launch of radical structural reforms in 2008. This followed the prosecution of Moriya Takemasa, the former Undersecretary, on corruption charges, and the Aegis Guided Missile Destroyer Atago’s collision with a local fishing boat early in 2008. At one level, the radical structural reform appears a move by the government to demonstrate their commitment to improve the function of the Ministry, at another, it was interpreted as an attempt to give more autonomous power and control to the SDF division than in the past. Certainly such a radical structural reform would be welcomed by conservative nationalists who shared Tamogami’s concern that the continuation of the tension and the imbalance of power between the seibiro gumi and the seifuku gumi would be harmful to the strengthening of Japan’s defence and security.

While the schism between the seibiro gumi and the seifuku gumi, intensified by the Ministry’s launching of its reform, may have contributed to the ire towards Tamogami, a strong supporter, the authorities treated his dismissal as simply flowing from the misconduct of a high ranking official. The government’s swift decision to remove him from the Defence Ministry could be judged as partly designed to facilitate the implementation of their radical structural reform without intense scrutiny from the media, especially at a time when the popularity of the government was plummeting rapidly. In this context the Defence Ministry’s treatment of the former Chief of Staff of the ASDF has considerable implications. The Ministry’s Report on Structural Reform explains in nine pages the process and reasons for the dismissal, together with recommendations. It treats Tamogami as violating civilian control. His essay was judged as an expression by a high ranking officer of opinions clearly contrary to the officially recognized government view and thereby damaging domestically and internationally both to the Defence Ministry and the SDF. (Bōeishō, 2008, p.13). The officially recognized government stance the Report by the Defence Ministry adduces must refer to the Murayama danwa, translated as the Murayama Statement, which avers:
“......During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express my feelings of profound mourning for all victims, both at home and abroad, of that history......” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1995, n.p.).

The Murayama danwa has been of great concern for prominent figures such as Watanabe Shōichi and Murata Ryōhei. They have called for the government to cast it aside, or revise it to more accurately reflect the reinterpretation of Japanese history that has emerged with new findings through the epistemic investigations undertaken in recent years. Their apprehension about the existence of the Murayama danwa has been heightened by its dominant role in the government’s case against General Tamogami and the vision of Hatoyama Yukio, a former Prime Minister, who resigned in June 2010. As Prime Minister Hatoyama both declared his endorsement of the danwa and his envisioned East Asia Unity Bloc.

(v) Political Dissent and a Contemporary Fumie

With the dismissal of General Tamogami, the government’s continuing endorsement of the Murayama danwa came to attract greater scrutiny from the public, providing increasing support to conservative nationalists’ claim that the “apology” Statement is a fumie, a fumie to punish those who advocate historiographical heterodoxy. For them the Murayama danwa is a glaring anomaly in the nurturing of liberal democratic practice that prevents people from embarking on rigorous inquiry and engaging in open debate.

The Murayama danwa was created under moot circumstances. In June 1995 a proposal to renew a declaration on peace, with the history of the Great East Asia War used to provide a moral
lesson, was put before the Diet by Yamasaki Hiraku and two others at the time of the multi-party coalition government with the Socialist leader as the Prime Minster. The astonishingly quick resolution for the Yamasaki proposal was achieved by a questionable process of parliamentary decision-making at the session held on 9 June, 1995. It is widely believed that the proposal would not have passed the Lower House had all members been present. It never went to the Upper House and therefore remained an empty resolution. The proposed “apology” statement inspired a significant public protest. Over five million people signed a petition against the government move to pass the “apology” resolution. In light of popular sentiment and that of the Diet, Murayama then produced a diluted “apology” statement, assisted by scholars and others, as a PM’s danwa (talk) and sought its endorsement by the Cabinet on 15 August, 1995, with no objection voiced. Thus, the origins of the so-called Murayama danwa are not above criticism and led to public protest against the formalization of such a statement as Japan’s political stance.

The Murayama danwa is not a piece of legally binding legislation. Nonetheless, it has been considered as an expression of the government stance by successive Prime Ministers. It has been canonized by some sectors of the media, some peace movement activists and supporters of the orthodox historical interpretation. While neither Tamogami in his essay nor the government in judging his violation made any reference to the Murayama danwa, the Defence Ministry’s reason for his dismissal is tacitly, yet undoubtedly directly linked with the danwa. Thus, Tamogami was judged as infringing a public service regulation. For those who oppose the political power vested in the Murayama danwa, Tamogami’s dismissal is seen as the result of the general undergoing the Defence Ministry’s rekishi ninshiki no fumie (fumie for historicism), and then judged as violating a “history law”. It has alarmed conservative nationalists and other concerned citizens in that Murayama’s interpretation of history is treated as “fact” and “truth”, and that it establishes the nation’s identity and polity based upon historical knowledge with shaky epistemic foundations. They charge that it initially came about under questionably democratic circumstances, and survives despite a strong public protest, and disregard for epistemological verification.

Tamogami’s failure to pass the fumie for historicism was denounced as a violation of bunmei tōsei (civilian control), though the Report on the Defence Ministry’s Structural Reform did not provide a rational explanation as to how his dissent constituted that violation. The term, bunmin tōsei, is frequently used in the report on the Tamogami case. However, no details are given in the
Report as to how Tamogami supplanted, for example, the democratic decision-making process through intimidation or sheer physical force, embarked on the unwarranted politicization of military matters, or jeopardized the control and security of civilian government. The vagueness in the way the term *bunmei tōsei* was used is also evident when the former Defence Minister Ishiba Shigeru argued that Tamogami lacked the understanding of *bunmei tōsei* and that therefore his dismissal was just (Ishiba, 2008, n.p.). In response, Tamogami sympathizers insist that it remained vague as to how his public airing of his interpretation of history violated “civilian control”. Tamogami snipes at opponents who criticized him for ignoring and jeopardizing the function of civilian control and publicly airing his “dangerous” thoughts in his essay. He asserts that there is no other democratic country where the concept has been more strictly observed than Japan. On the other hand, he laments that leaders of Japanese society have not grasped the true meaning of “civilian control”, but only a very vague notion of it with even MPs in the House of Representatives seeming to think that it is for the SDF staff to simply obey bureaucrats (Tamogami, 2008a, p. 188). He remarks that the Japanese interpretation of the concept of “civilian control” is much closer to the North Korean or Chinese systems than those of liberal democratic countries (Tamogami, 2008a, p.87).

The repercussions of the airing of Tamogami’s interpretation of history contrary to the danwa, and thus considered as a violation of “civilian control”, were immediate and had rippling effects on the SDF. It is evident that the Defence Ministry has launched a much tighter control over the SDF’s individual freedom to express views against the orthodoxy. The Report on the Defence Ministry’s Structural Reform outlines preventative measures to be implemented. First priority was placed on reeducation of high ranking officials who were to be restricted on airing their views outside, as well as inside, the Ministry (Bōeishō, 2008, pp.16-17). The course, ‘Historical Views: Concepts of States’, instituted by Tamogami when he was the Director of the Joint Staff College, was abolished in early 2009 and a thorough investigation into ideological beliefs of the SDF staff was undertaken. Thus, the government’s insistence on historical orthodoxy as a litmus test for serious misconduct was in place. By making such recommendations the Defence Ministry revealed that they were imposing uniformity and undermining an individual’s fundamental right to express views differing from Murayama’s interpretation. In effect, it implies the SDF staff officers need to go underground in order to express their personal views if they are contrary to the danwa. While debates persist regarding the question of the freedom of expression
of individuals and Tamogami’s right as an individual to express his historical views as a private citizen, it is observed that even with a new government on board the seriousness of any violation of the non-legally binding statement that constitutes a contentious view of historiography unwavering in upholding “irrefutable facts” of history remains very much alive.

Critics and observers such as Momochi Akira and Nakajō Takanori believe that the SDF has been at the mercy of the politics of the day and for so long kept at a distance by the public and even feared as a symbol of aggression and the atrocity of war. It is common knowledge that laws concerning national defence and security expected to exist in any other country do not exist in Japan. Laws that ensure the right to defend the country, possess armed forces and uphold the people’s duty to defend the country were essentially patched up according to political expediency and the military demands of foreign countries, and subsequently through the enactment of self-defence force laws outside the main body of the Constitution. Therefore, fundamental policies on the matter of national defence that should be regulated according to the Constitution or the basic laws have been left subject to the political convenience of the ruling government and decisions at Cabinet meetings. Matsushima Yūsuke, a retired general and the former Head of the Central Division of the Ground Self-Defence Force, suggests the first priority must be Constitutional reform with the immediate need of the SDF to pursue amendment of the Constitution, and legislation to deal with emergencies and confidential protection laws. Like Matsushima, Tamogami sees the root of problems as lying in the fundamental inconsistency between the existing Constitution and the existence of the SDF, the theory and the practice. This concern has been shared by a growing number of citizens in recent years, gathering a momentum through a movement for constitutional reform. The Defence Ministry’s decision to dismiss Tamogami as a political dissenter and a subsequent, swift “thought” control of the SDF staff has galvanized the conservatives and in spite of the media’s label of him as a dangerous man, he has gained substantial support and a grassroots movement in support of his stance.

Conclusion

The impact of Tamogami Toshio’s political dissent has raised the question of balancing diversity and uniformity in a conforming society. It has sharpened the schism between those who attempt to preserve the orthodoxy and endorse political idealism sympathetic to East Asianist approaches and those who are alarmed by the impairing of national interests and the deterioration
of the Japanese cultural tradition in the face of constant criticism of the country and the painting of the society in a negative light. His stance contributed to the escalation of the ideological conflict between the advocates of the orthodoxy and those of the heterodoxy, with disputation over questions of the bases of their historical revisionism and epistemological approaches. A case in point is the series of protests in May 2009 against NHK (the National Broadcasting Corporation) on the grounds that “Ajia no ittōkoku” (The First-Class Power of Asia), the first installment of their series, Japan debyū (Japan’s Debut), was a deliberate distortion, and fabrication, of Japan-Taiwan relations during Japan’s colonization of Taiwan. The programme was seen by protesters as intended to create discord between the Japanese and the Taiwanese, and promote the political interests of the People’s Republic of China. It has spawned a popular movement and a lawsuit against the Corporation with over 10,000 plaintiffs including some Taiwanese. Persuaded by the potential threat posed by the vulnerability of the defence and security of the nation given the volatility of the situation in East Asia, they now charge the champions of the orthodoxy with utilizing their own version of historical revisionism to protect their arguments on the past misdeeds of Japan and the Japanese. Such a movement has reflected a public sensitivity and the strength of readiness in the informed communities and among the general public to take actions to counter the orthodoxy. In this context, the Tamogami incident was pivotal in steering public attention to sharply focus on the link between various long running controversies and the question of national dignity and identity. It was also pivotal in inducing generally politically uninterested Japanese citizens to voice their concerns in public and engage in debate along with concerned professionals and an informed public resonating with Tamogami’s nationalist agenda.

The perception of Japanese national consciousness has been challenged in recent years by Hatoyama Yukio, who as Prime Minister created a controversy by his 2009 declaration that “Japan is not the property of the Japanese people only”, thus, as viewed by some people, challenging a sovereign right resting in the Japanese people. In such a political climate in Japan, Tamogami, through his on-going activities as a military and socio-political critic, looks to continue his rigorous campaign for the preservation of the national identity and independence. Despite the continuing earnest invitations from various political parties to join their campaigns, the timing of his direct involvement in the political reshaping of the conservative force remains
uncertain. Nonetheless, the significant impact on society of his nationalist stance will no doubt be sustained through popular support.

Notes

1 General Tamogami Toshio was born in the Fukushima Prefecture in 1948, graduated from the National Defence Academy of Japan in 1971, served as the President of the Joint Staff College between 2002 and 2004 and as the Air Defence Commander between 2004 and 2007. He served as the Chief of Staff of the Air Self-Defence Force between 28 March, 2007 and 31 October, 2008. After the essay became available on the internet in October, 2008, the media furore against him made his position as the Chief of the Staff of ASDF untenable and he was dismissed from his post, which triggered an automatic retirement policy by the Ministry, and formally made to retire on 4 November 2008.

2 Henceforth, the Self-Defence Force will be abbreviated as SDF and Air Self-Defence Force as ASDF respectively.

3 The dispute was centred on the words kyōsei renkō (taken by force) of Koreans used in the examination paper. Park Kyong is believed to be the first to use the words, kyōsei renkō in his Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō no kiroku, published in 1965. Those who rejected the claim that the kyōsei renkō of Koreans by the Japanese army occurred during the colonization period argue that of approximately 2 million Koreans living in Japan just before the end of the War about 11,300 Koreans were believed to have come to Japan under the chōyō regulation, the non-military, national duty applied to Koreans in September, 1944, and of 11,300, 245 Koreans decided to remain in Japan after the war. The phrase kyōsei renkō has also been a focal point of the dispute over the comfort women controversy. Jūgun ianfu (comfort women attached to the army), coined by Senda Kakō in 1984, became the focus of a widespread controversy in late 1980s and early 1990s. Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese scholars and professionals such as An Byeong-Jik, Chi Man-Won, O Seon-Hwa, Huang Wenxiang, Nishioka Tsutomu and Fujioka Nobukatsu have rejected the existence of kyōsei renkō of Koreans as Jūgun ianfu.

4 The Murayama danwa is a statement made by a former Prime Minister Murayama Tomi’ichi in August 1995 to coincide with the 50th anniversary of the end of the Asia Pacific War.

5 Somezaki Nobufusa’s work Kisai kibun in 1874 uses the term shinryaku to mean an invasion while Fukuzawa Yukichi adopted the modern meaning of the word in his Bunmei ron no gairyaku.

6 The Venona files which are available on the NSA site contain hefty volumes of cryptanalysis of messages sent by several intelligence agencies of the Soviet Union between 1940 and 1948.

7 General Tamogami served as the President of the Joint Staff College between 2002 and 2004. The objective of the College is to provide advanced knowledge and skills for senior officers of the SDF. Henceforth Kōkū jieitai wo genki nisuru 10 no teigen will be abbreviated as ‘Ten Suggestions’. We shall examine more closely his work on Kōkū jieitai wo genki nisuru 10 no teigen later in the paper.

8 As employed by Tamogami the term han’nichi undō (an anti-Japanese movement) does not refer to hostile foreigners, but to a powerful force intent on weakening Japan and inciting hatred towards fellow citizens, as well as to those intent on destroying the cultural and spiritual tradition and the essence of the “Japaneseness”.

9 Fumie is a wooden or bronze image of Christ or Mary which was used during the Tokugawa period to identify Christians. Those who refused to stamp on it were judged as believers and prosecuted accordingly.

10 We have coined “history law” in this paper to denote a regulation imposed on public servants in which the expression of views contrary to the historical orthodoxy is a punishable offence.

11 Tamogami is not the first prominent figure dismissed as a political dissenter for violating historiographical orthodoxy. Such prominent figures as Fujio Masayuki, the Minister of Education in 1986, Okuno Seisuke, Director General of National Land Agency, and Fukuchi Atsushi, a historian and a chief investigator of textbooks in the Ministry of Education in 1988, Sakurai Shin, the Secretary of State and Nagano Shigeto, the Minister of Justice in 1994, and Etō Takami, the Director of General Affairs, in 1995 were all forced to resign from their respective posts for dissenting from the government view on the history of the Great Asia War.

12 Matsushima Yūsuke is a retired general and the former Head of the Central Division of the Ground Self-Defence Force. His public lecture to the National Assembly for a Restoration of the Sovereign Right Commemoration Day held in Tokyo on 28 April, 2009.
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