RESTRUCTURING OF CORPORATE OWNERSHIP IN AUSTRALIA THROUGH THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS

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The global financial crisis through 2007-2009 was a critical period for finance capital in the USA and UK, and to a lesser extent continental Europe. The viability of many banks and other financial corporations was seriously questioned: some disappeared while many others only survived because of state dispensation of large amounts of taxpayer-funded largesse. Australian finance capital, by contrast, escaped the crisis relatively unscathed. Two significant banks were swallowed up by members of the Big Four, and the viability of the banking system was crucially reliant on an open-ended state guarantee, but these were minor developments compared to the traumatic experiences in the US and Europe. With the discrediting and debilitation of much of global finance capital, it might have been expected that this would have taken a step back in terms of its control and ownership of the Australian economy. Because of the relatively strong performance outcomes of the Australian economy it might have been expected that Australian finance capital would have reasserted a new role for itself in ownership and control within the local economy. But has it?

We address such questions in this article by reference to a global data set that enables us to estimate ownership of corporations in Australia and overseas. We do this in the context of recurring debate about Australian ownership and efforts from time to time by policy makers or advocates to promote Australian ownership. The central character in this drama is finance capital. The research question is about the nature of finance capital in our era of capitalist ‘financialisation’. Financialisation is a ‘pattern of accumulation in which profit making occurs increasingly through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production’ (Kripzpner 2004:14, also in 2005). But we are not just interested in the process here but also in the finance capital entities and their operations; for example, the rentier class of financiers, described by Gerald Epstein as those creating óperiodic explosions of financial trading with a myriad of new financial instruments [emphasizing the] importance of financial markets, financial motives, financial institutions, and financial elites in the operation of the economy and its governing institutions, both at the national and international levelsö, (Epstein 2006: 3).

Financialisation, Class and the Financial Crisis

Ted Wheelwright was amongst the first to quantify the significance of foreign investment and ownership in Australia, in particular by focusing on the extent to which multinational corporations dominated product markets in Australia. He suggested that Australia always had a órelationship with and dependence on, its powerful friendsô (1980:xiv). This relationship was reinforced from the 1980s by the neoliberal re-capture of the free market ideology, resulting in the degradation not just of environmental sustainability but also trust, financial stability and general humane sociability (OöHara, 2006). Wheelwrightös numerous works, including *Ownership and Control of Australian Companies* (1957), the *Anatomy of Australian Manufacturing Industry* (1967, with Judith Miskelly) and Hilda Rolfe (Rolfe, 1967) showed the fundamental redistribution of class power. In Wheelwrightös later work, *The Third Wave* written with Abe David (1989), he looked at how interlocking directorates helped concentrate and centralise the power of capital. Subsequent research has validated the importance of interlocking directorates in understanding class power in Australia (Murray 2001, Robbins & Alexander 2004). Our interest here is not in the position of directors or subsidiaries of overseas-owned companies in Australian production. Rather it is in the patterns of ownership of óAustralianô production ï to be precise, of large óindustrialô (i.e. non-financial) corporations listed on Australian share markets ï and how that has been changing in the context of the global financial crisis. We will show the significance of finance capital in ownership, is in no small part due to the ófinancialisationô of the economy.

Paul Sweezy argues that the function of financialisation is to concentrate and centralize capital within three underlying trends in the history of capitalism since 1975. These were ‘(1) the slowing down of the overall rate of growth, (2) the worldwide proliferation of monopolistic (or oligopolistic) multinational corporations, and (3) what may be called the financialization of the capital accumulation process’ (1997, 3-4). All three trends are tied to the cyclical internal processes within the circuit of capital (Marx 1956; Robinson and Harris 2000; Murray 2012). Although the unique role and central regulation of trading banks in Australia were being eroded by the emergence of non-bank financial institutions through the 1970s (Nowicki & Tsokhas 1979), we consider that the critical juncture here was when federal Treasurer Paul Keating deregulated the finance system by floating the Australian dollar on 8 December 1983. Other key moments occurred when he granted forty new foreign exchange licenses in June 1984; and when he gave licenses to sixteen foreign banks in February 1985 (see Sykes, 1998).

Capital does not remain the same. This may be due to cycles of capital (as described in pioneering work by Mandel 1972, Kontratief 1984, and Schumpeter 1934) that are based respectively on too little money spent on labour, a fall in commodity prices, or a lack of innovation or a combination of all three. Or, as Dick Bryan suggests, a lack of surplus may have been created by the ‘difference between the commodity dimension of labour, the value of labour power, and its non-commodity dimension - the value added by labour, over and above the value of inputs, or the cost of reproducing the workforce’ (Bryan 2010: 1). According to Bryan, the most recent financial crisis meant ‘a sudden drying-up of the widely assumed basis of profitability and capital accumulation - reward for entrepreneurship or risks’ (Bryan 2010).

We aim to understand what the financialisation processes means for ownership in the context of the break in the accumulation cycle associated with the global financial crisis (or ‘Great Recession’, as it is often known in the US) during the period 2006-7 to 2009-10. This global financial crisis was recognized as occurring when the ‘world stock markets have fallen, large financial institutions have collapsed or been bought out, and governments in even the wealthiest nations have had to come up with rescue packages to bail out their financial systems’ (Shah 2012:1). It arose from the emergence of complex and ultimately incomprehensible derivative financial instruments such as ‘collateralised debt obligations’, promoted *inter alia* by inappropriate incentive structures in financial corporations, which led to the failure of sub-prime loan markets, a crisis of confidence and the freezing of credit between institutions.

In looking at the ownership of the largest corporations we follow on from a long-standing literature on the Australian ruling class (e.g. Rawling, 1937; Fitzpatrick, 1939; Fox, 1940; Wheelwright, 1957; Martin, 1957; Kiddle, 1961; Campbell, 1963; Waterson, 1974; Serle 1971; Connell, 1977; Crough, 1976, 1977a, 1977b, 1981; Nowicki & Tsokhas 1979; Tsokhas 1984, 1986, 1990; Connell & Irving, 1992; OœLincoln, 1996; Alexander, 2003; Bryan 1995; Harrigan, 2008), although it is beyond the scope of this paper to enter into all the debates raised by that literature. There is also a globally focused literature on the transnationalisation of capitalism and class with which our research tries to engage. Christopher Chase Dunn (2009a), for example, refers to old and new forms of capital, whereby óboth the old interstate system based on separate national capitalist interests, and new institutions representing the global interests of capitalists exist and are powerful simultaneouslyô (Chase Dunn, 2009a: 34). The parallel existence of a national and a transnational capitalist class can occur, whereby each nation-state has a ruling class fraction allied with the transnational capitalist class. Chase Dunn writes:

there has always been a global capitalist class and it is differentially nationalist as the world economy and the world polity cycle [move] between waves of national autarky versus globalization but it is more integrated now than ever before because the U.S. economy is such a large portion of the world economy and because institutions of coordination have gotten much stronger in the most recent wave of globalization. (Chase Dunn, 2009b pers com).

Bill Carroll (2009) suggests caution against making óabstract, polarized characterizations ï as in either national or transnational capitalist class; either an American hegemon bent on world domination or a Washington that acts at the behest of the transnational capitalist class;ô (Carroll, 2009, 22). Rather, he says that óthe global partly inhabits and partly arises out of the nationalö. His work (2009) shows that key transnational capitalist class members can be found in northern cities ï Paris, London, New York, Brussels, Frankfurt, The Hague, Zurich and in Montreal - wielding huge amounts of executive power over resources. Suzanne Soederberg (2006: 666) also shows how economic liberalism, post 1970s, has enabled transnational capitalist class interests to prevail over local capitalist class interests - through the employment of transnational state apparatuses (e.g. the WTO, WB and IMF) and think tanks to help them initiate, impose and enforce economic liberalism (Soederberg, 2006).

Other research by Robinson, Harris (2000), and Bryan (1995) demonstrates how the transnational capitalist class uses global as well as national circuits of accumulation. The accumulation process transcends many (but not all) local, national and regional territories and polities in the search for globally produced goods, markets, labour, new technologies and services in a worldwide market. This new capitalism is characterised by the rise of transnationalised capital; the hegemony of a transnational capitalist class; the emergence of a transnational state apparatus (TNS); and the appearance of new forms of power and inequality with the rise of novel relations of inequality and domination in global society.

In light of the above, the questions we ask are:

- what are the patterns of ownership of large Australian corporations?
- how significant is the role of finance capital in ownership in Australia?
- has the role and significance in ownership of finance capital, and particularly of overseas finance capital or Australian finance capital, receded or expanded through the global financial crisis?

Our interest is, therefore, not in the role of equities in finance (e.g. what is the relative importance of debt versus equity financing?) ï but rather, in *the role of finance in equities.* Our lens for this paper is Australian data but it is part of a broader project on international ownership patterns (Peetz & Murray, 2012, 2013) on which we draw in passing.

Methodology

The principal source for our analysis is a large dataset we have created from the Osiris global database on corporations operated by Bureau van Dyk (BvD) in the Netherlands. It includes information on, amongst other things, market capitalisation, revenue and the names and nationality of shareholders and their direct and indirect shareholdings for most listed corporations in most countries. We have focused on the Australian óindustrialô (non-financial) corporations that were in the top 200, ranked by revenue, in either of two points of time. Our first period, T1, is 2006-

07; most of the data there relates to the second half of 2006. Our second period, T2, is 2009-10; most of the data there relates to the first half of 2010. Because of movement in and out of the top 200 over that period (comprising, on average, three and a half years), there are a total of 234 ótargetô corporations in our database for this analysis (i.e. corporations that are ótargetsô of shareholders). When we refer to the ótop 200ô corporations, this is the group under discussion. The shares recorded in our database for these 234 firms, totalling $600 billion, account for roughly half of the total market capitalisation of $1.25 trillion for all shares of all 2050 corporations in mid 2010 (ASX 2012). Further details on our methodology are contained in Appendix 1.

We use the terms óshareholdersô and óownersô interchangeably, and readers will notice that when we talk of ócontrolô we are normally referring to control of the *shares*, not necessarily control of the target corporations.

It is also important to note that the use of nominee shareholdings increased over the period concerned. Table 1 shows that nominee shareholdings represent 42 per cent of recorded shareholdings in the T1 database, but this rose to 50 per cent in T2. Nominee shareholdings appear under the name of the company that is acting as the nominee ï typically a bank (93 per cent of nominee holdings were in the names of banks). The nominee bank normally is not exercising its own discretion in investment decisions ï rather, the (often secret) beneficial owner of the shares exercises decision-making power and control. This is quite different to the funds management role typically exercised by banks, financial corporations, mutual and pension funds and other arms of finance capital, whereby the funds manager mobilises money owned by other people and makes decisions on their behalf as to where the money should be invested. Thus changes in the ownership of fund managers have a direct impact on control in financial decision-making.

The impact of changes in the ownership of nominee firms on investment decision-making is much less clear, possibly minor. Accordingly, we treat nominee and what we call óordinaryô (non-nominee) shareholdings differently in this analysis. The removal of traceable double counting, and the separate treatment of nominee shareholdings, is a distinct difference between this analysis and earlier use of global BvD data by Glattfelder and Battiston (2009).

Table 1: Value of Nominee/Depository Shareholdings in Relation to Value of Total and Recorded Shareholdings

Firms in top 200 in either T1 or T2:	2006-07 ($b)	2009-10 ($b)
Nominee/depository shareholdings	104	256
Total recorded shareholdings	247	509
Total market capitalisation	489	600
Recorded nominees as a proportion of all shareholdings	21%	43%
Recorded shareholdings as a proportion of total market capitalisation	51%	85%
Recorded nominees as a proportion of all recorded shareholdings	42%	50%
N of firms with data	202	232
N of shareholding units in database	3311	7332

Differences in data quality between T1 and T2 meant that a cautious approach needed to be employed in comparisons between the two years. For several tables we focus on ósignificantô shareholdings ï those where the holding represents 1 per cent or more of a target corporationøs market capital. This is not only for data quality reasons: it is also because, if we are interested in questions of influence, shareholdings of less than 1 per cent are of little real relevance in influencing a corporationøs behaviour. (On the other hand, when we are interested in questions of ówho benefitsö, these smaller recorded shareholdings of less than one per cent are relevant, but not overly important.)

In analysing our data we avoid the terms ómultinationalô or ótransnationalô for overseas capital and instead refer to such entities as óoverseasô or óforeignô capital. We do this simply because many of the large Australia-based share owners (such as the large banks) are themselves transnational corporations. We return to this matter in the discussion and conclusion.

Findings

Table 2 shows the nation of ownership of ordinary and nominee shareholdings in target companies. Where a company holds shares under several linked and identifiable names we have used the nation of the parent company. (Thus while Shell Energy Holdings Australia Limited is an Australia-registered company, it is 100 per cent owned by Royal Dutch Shell, which is registered in the UK and so it treated as a UK-based owner in these data.) The left hand half of the table refers to all recorded shareholdings. As shown there, amongst ordinary recorded shareholdings, a substantial 5.5 percentage point drop in Australian ownership occurred during the years of the global financial crisis. Whereas before the crisis, a (very slight) majority of ordinary recorded shares was held by Australian interests, by 2009-10 a majority was foreign owned. A drop of 11 per cent was also recorded in shares held by British investors. The biggest shift was a 13-percentage point increase in ownership by American shareholders. The USA went from being the second to the largest overseas-based holder of shares in top 200 companies. Between them, these three ï Australia, UK and USA-countries accounted for four fifths of all recorded ordinary shares. The Netherlands, Singapore, and tax havens Bermuda and Switzerland were ranked next but accounted for much smaller percentages. China was well below with a mere 0.2 per cent of shares (though note that some additional Chinese companies are registered in Singapore). One factor in the decline in British relative to US ownership was the purchase by US firm BlackRock of Barclayøs Global Investors, at the time one of the worldøs largest fund managers and with a significant Australian presence, from British bank Barclays during the financial crisis.

There is, however, potential for these data to be influenced by the changing composition of the BvD database between T1 and T2. We control for this possibility, in the right hand side of Table 2, by restricting our sample to significant shareholdings (i.e. those above 1 per cent of a company) in those companies which had relatively stable availability of data between T1 and T2 (that is, the shareholdings data were available for both T1 and T2 and the total value of shareholdings in the BvD database in T2 differed from T1 by no more than 20 percentage points). This means we restrict our sample to 128 companies where like-with-like comparisons can be made. The impact on the net level of and shift in overseas ownership is surprisingly small. The shift towards overseas ownership is as pronounced (around 6 percentage points) when like-with-like comparisons are made. A bigger impact is had upon the internal composition of the overseas portion: the drop in UK ownership becomes much less marked, at just 5 percentage points.

Table 2: Changing Composition of National Attributions of Shareholdings, Top 200 Target of Australian Corporations

	All Recorded Shareholdings			Significant Shareholdings in Firms with Relatively Stable Data Availability *		
	2006-07	**2009-10**	**Change**	**2006-07**	**2009-10**	**Change**
Ordinary Shareholdings						
Australia	50.5	45.0	-5.5	50.3	44.0	-6.3
USA	12.1	25.1	13.0	15.0	28.1	13.1
UK	21.1	9.7	-11.4	17.2	12.7	-4.5
Netherlands	6.2	3.5	-2.7	6.9	3.6	-3.2
Singapore	0.0	2.5	2.5	0.1	0.0	-0.1
Bermuda	1.0	1.9	0.8	0.8	2.0	1.1
Switzerland	1.1	1.6	0.5	1.8	1.1	-0.7
Canada	0.9	1.4	0.5	0.9	0.0	-0.9
France	0.4	1.3	0.9	0.5	1.4	1.0
Norway	0.7	1.0	0.3		0.3	0.3
Hong Kong	0.1	1.0	0.9		1.3	1.3
Japan	0.7	0.9	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.2
Germany	2.0	0.7	-1.3	3.5	0.5	-3.0
New Zealand	0.9	0.3	-0.7	0.7	0.3	-0.4
Sweden	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.1		-0.1
China	0.0	0.2				
Others	1.0	.9	0.0	1.2	1.5	0.3
n.a.	0.8	2.8	1.9	.9	2.7	1.9
Total ordinary	100.0	100.0	-0.2	100.0	100.0	0.0
Nominee Shareholdings						
USA	23.6	34.3	10.7	22.7	37.2	15.0
Australia	63.4	32.0	-31.4	65.3	30.0	-35.3
UK	5.0	31.4	26.4	4.8	32.1	27.4
Switzerland	4.2	1.6	-2.6	3.6	0.4	-3.2
Canada	3.9	0.6	-3.3	3.6	0.3	-3.2
Others		0.1	0.1		0.0	0.0
Total nominee	100.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	0.0

* óRelatively stable data availabilityô means that data on shareholdings are available for both T1 and T2 and the total value of shareholdings in the BvD database in T2 differs from T1 by no more than 20 percentage points.

This is in large part because of developments in the second largest firm in our sample, Rio Tinto Ltd. (Rio Tinto Ltd is the Australian arm, and Rio Tinto PLC the UK arm, of the Rio Tinto Group). A large portion of the shares in Rio Tinto Ltd in T1 were held by Tinto Holdings, a subsidiary of the UK arm Rio Tinto PLC. In 2009 there was a major buy-back of the shares in Tinto Holdings by Rio Tinto Ltd, so by T2 the portion held by Tinto Holdings disappears from the data. As the change in total recorded shareholdings in Rio Tinto was more than 20 per cent, it is excluded form the right hand, but not the left hand side, of Table 2.

The bottom half of Table 2 shows nominee shareholdings. Here there has been a very large shift towards foreign ownership ï this time increasing substantially the share of UK owners but also, to a lesser extent, US owners. The overall proportion of Australian ownership collapsed from 63 per cent to 32 per cent (though on paper virtually all nominee ownerships are Australian as overseas banks set up Australian-registered offshoots to house them). The biggest single element in this was the sale by Westpac of its ósub-custodyô (nominee) business to British bank HSBC. At the time, Westpacçs was the largest nominee business in the Australian market. The impact on foreign control is less certain, however, as the nominee shareholders usually do the bidding of the ultimate owners. In the immediate term this would have had little impact on overseas control of Australian shares (let alone control of Australian corporations) though, in the long run, it could be expected to increase overseas share control due to greater marketing of Australian nominee shares in the UK. To avoid overstating the shift to foreign capital during the financial crisis we treat ordinary and nominee shares separately in this analysis.

Table 3 shows industry patterns of foreign ownership. The industry categories are derived from those used in the BvD database and hence not aligned with ABS categories. Again, the left hand side of the table refers to all recorded shareholdings, whereas the right hand side refers to significant shareholdings in firms with stable ownership data availability. We see substantial variations in foreign ownership by industry within the top 200 target firms, with the highest rates of foreign ownership being in the mining sector in both years, which in turn accounted for over a third of market capitalisation in the top 200 firms. Overseas ownership also increased in most industries. However, the relatively small increase in foreign ownership in mining is somewhat of a mirage, due largely to comparison being masked by the Tinto Holdings buy-back mentioned above. The like-with-like, restricted sample comparison in the right hand half of Table 3 shows a 12 percentage point increase in overseas ownership in that industry, double the national average increase and despite the rise of local mining billionaires such as Andrew Forrest, Gina Reinhart and Clive Palmer. That said, the restricted sample comparison shows more inter-industry variation in overseas ownership changes than the unrestricted comparison (as shown by the standard deviations shown in the last row of Table 3), implying that the main variability in ownership changes is occurring within firms as specific holdings are bought and sold, rather than as a result of compositional changes in the data between T1 and T2.

Table 3: Identified Foreign Ownership of Ordinary Shares 2006-2010, by Industry of Target Companies

	Unrestricted			GE1 LE20		
	Overseas Ownership			Overseas Ownership		
	2006	2010	% Change	2006	2010	% Change
Coal, oil & Metals Mining	70%	70%	0%	64%	77%	12%
Food & Other Manufacturing	57%	69%	11%	63%	78%	15%
Health Manufacturing & Supply	38%	55%	17%	37%	57%	19%
Transport & Utilities	46%	49%	4%	59%	48%	-11%
Finance & Inv & EITs	46%	47%	1%	56%	50%	-6%
Construction & Heavy Manufacturing	39%	36%	-2%	38%	26%	-12%
Hospitality, Retail and Other Services	31%	32%	2%	31%	32%	1%
Broadcasting, IT, Communication, etc	24%	30%	6%	18%	44%	27%
Total	49%	52%	4%	49%	53%	4%
Standard Deviation	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.06)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.15)

Note: This table excludes missing data so numbers differ slightly from the previous table

Table 4 categorises significant shareholders amongst ordinary shares, principally using the taxonomy employed by BvD. We focus on significant shareholdings here because we are interested in seeing where the locus of control lies. The principal difficulty with the BvD taxonomy is that the distinction between some of the categories is quite fungible ï for example, a ófinancial companyô or a bank may also run ómutual fundsö. So we have also aggregated six elements of finance capital into a single category with that name. The table reveals the continuing increase in the importance of finance capital as an owner, not just a financier, of large industrial corporations in Australia. Finance capitalös proportion of ordinary shareholdings rose from 56 to 59 per cent in the study period. Industrial companiesô share ï that is, the proportion of top, listed Australian non-finance corporations that were owned by other non-finance corporations from Australia and overseas, including parent corporations ï fell from 38 per cent to 34 per cent. There was an increase in the proportion owned by named individuals (due for example to the rise of wealth by mining magnates such as Andrew Forrest), but these remained small, at below 5 per cent of market capitalisation (though some individual control was exercised through what appeared in the database as óindustrial companiesö).

More substantial were the internal changes within finance capital. Banks, who in 2006-07 were the dominant form of finance capital, saw their portion of significant share ownership drop by a third to just 14 per cent in 2009-10. Other financial companies (headed by BlackRock) more than made up for this, more than doubling their proportion from 11 to 23 per cent, to become the dominant institutions of finance capital. The share held by mutual and pension funds and comparable entitles remained fairly stable at around 14 per cent. Included in this are those held in the name of superannuation funds, but less than half of superannuation funds are directly invested (the majority are placed with an investment manager or invested in life office statutory funds) (APRA 2010) and few of the shareholders on our database have ósuperannuationô as part of their name. Still, as a result of compulsory superannuation, Australia has the fourth largest pension fund pool in the world, with superannuation funds rising from 43 per cent to 53 per cent of Australian funds under management between 2006 and 2011, and this adds to the resources available to banks, other asset managers and insurance companies (ASX 2011; AFMA 2011).

Table 4: Significant Ordinary Shareholdings by Type of Shareholder, Top 200 Non-Financial Australian Corporations, 2006-07 and 2009-10

	Value 2006-07 ($m)	Value 2009-10 ($m)	Portion (%) 2006-07	Portion (%) 2009-10	Change in Portion (% points)
Industrial Company	50,444	63,242	38.1	33.7	-4.4
Finance Capital - comprising	71,832	110,546	55.9	58.9	3.0
- Financial company	13,794	43,889	10.7	23.4	12.7
- Bank	26,986	26,331	21.0	14.0	-7.0
- Mutual & Pension Fund/ Nominee/ Trust/Trustee	19,039	26,438	14.8	14.1	-0.7
- Insurance company	11,265	11,506	8.8	6.1	-2.6
- Private equity firms	750	2,365	0.6	1.3	0.7
- Venture capital		18		0.0	0.0
One or more named individuals or families	3,001	8,104	2.3	4.3	2.0
Public authority, State, Govt.	3,757	3,268	2.9	1.7	-1.1
Foundation/ Research Institute	338	2,498	0.3	1.3	1.1
Employees/ Managers/ Directors	405	77	0.3	0.0	-0.3
Other	228.1	19.2	0.2	0.0	-0.2
Total	130,004	187,755	100.0	100.0	0.0

At least as significant were the ways in which overseas ownership interacted with the form of capital. In particular, as Table 5 shows, over the period there was a substantial increase (5.6 percentage points) in the holdings of overseas finance capital, while domestic finance capital actually experienced a reduction of nearly 3 percentage points in its holdings. Whereas in T1 domestic finance capital had dominated overseas finance capital, by T2 this ordering has been reversed. The restructuring of ownership had decisively shifted to overseas finance capital. The principal component in this was the growth of overseas financial corporations ï in 2006-07 only 31 per cent of ófinancial corporationô shareholdings were under overseas control but, by 2009-10, this figure had doubled to 65 per cent. There were also increases in overseas penetration, but of much smaller magnitudes, amongst banks (from 41 to 52 per cent), insurance companies (44 to 48 per cent) and mutual funds. (53 to 56 per cent). This was a quite remarkable development as the financial crisis was concentrated in North America and Europe, and Australia appeared, on the surface, to be relatively protected from its effects. Yet overseas foreign capital increased its dominance over domestic finance capital during this period.

Interestingly, the reverse occurred amongst óindustrial capitalô (i.e. non-finance capital). Ownership of industrial corporations by Australian industrial corporations and by Australian individuals increased, while ownership by overseas industrial corporations decreased. This was partly an artefact of the Rio Tinto buy-back, but also again reflects the growth of some wealthy Australian industrialists associated with the minerals boom (despite high foreign ownership in that sector).

An important point of caution, however, needs to be applied in the interpretation of what is meant by óindustrial companiesô or óindustrial capitalô in this context. Some industrial capital is controlled by wealthy families or individuals ï although much, when traced back far enough, is principally in the hands of finance capital. In the US, where many transnational industrial corporations are based, our analysis of the ownership of the top 200 industrial firms there found only 16 per cent of significant shareholdings to be in the hands of other óindustrial companiesô or individuals or families (Peetz & Murray 2013). The vast majority was owned by finance capital.

Also noteworthy in the Australian data was an increase in ownership of significant shareholdings by overseas-based state organisations, and a decline in ownership of significant shareholdings by state institutions in Australia. On the one hand, overseas sovereign wealth funds (such as the Norwegian sovereign fund, financed by taxation and partial state ownership of natural resources) and overseas state-owned pension funds have increased their exposure in Australia and elsewhere, investing in corporations in many countries. On the other hand, Australia has no sovereign wealth fund, and its major pension funds (e.g. the Future Fund) or state investment houses (in particular Queensland Investment Corporation (QIC)) have either divested Australian assets (the Future Fund sold many of its shares in Telstra, though this is not fully reflected in the data) and bought some overseas assets, or in the case of the QIC lost a major funds management customer (QSuper), leading to QSuper investments shifting from a óstateô to ómutual fundô classification. In addition, both domestic and overseas state funds have substantial assets below the ósignificantô threshold of 1 per cent, so Table 5 suggests a more dramatic shift than is really the case. Nonetheless, foreign states are now more substantial owners of major Australian industrial corporations than is the Australian state in its various forms.

Table 5: Proportion of Ordinary Shareholdings by Type of Capital, 2006-07 and 2009-10

	2006-07	2009-10	Change
Overseas finance capital	25.0%	30.6%	5.6%
Australian finance capital	31.1%	28.2%	-2.9%
Overseas industrial corporations	24.9%	17.7%	-7.2%
Australian industrial corporations	13.2%	16.0%	2.8%
Australian individuals/families	2.3%	4.3%	2.0%
Overseas state	0.1%	1.4%	1.3%
Australian state	2.8%	0.4%	-2.4%
Other	0.6%	1.4%	0.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	0.0%

Note: Excludes where nation not known

Table 6 names the major holders of significant shares in large Australian non-financial corporations in T1 and T2, as well as total recorded shareholdings in T2. It separately lists holders of ordinary and nominee shares. Amongst ordinary shareholders, there is a mixture of finance and industrial capital at the top in both years. Several features stand out. First, the largest significant shareholder, by a considerable margin, was BlackRock, a New York-headquartered financial corporation which was almost absent from Australia in 2006-07 and was barely noticed in global analyses predating the financial crisis (e.g. Glattfelder and Battiston 2009). BlackRock is the largest funds manager in the world, and is also the largest shareholder in the world. Managing funds in the Americas, Europe, Asia, Australia, the Middle East and Africa with a staff of over 9,000 in 26 countries, it is a true transnational finance corporation (Peetz & Murray 2012). In Australia, and globally, its most important step in reaching this ranking was its purchase of Barclays Global Investors, ranked eighth amongst holders of Australian shares in T1. However, it has also made a strategic decision to invest in Australian equities since T1, something it had largely ignored until then. BlackRock largely avoided the negative fallout from the financial crisis in the US; and its CEO is Larry Fink, who became a key advisor to the US state during the financial crisis bailout. Illustrating the divisions within finance capital that have occurred during the financial crisis, Fink is described as a óDemocrat votingô financier who óhates Goldman Sachsô (Andrews 2010). We discuss him more elsewhere (Peetz & Murray 2012). BlackRockøs rise is a major factor in the growing importance of foreign finance capital in Australia between T1 and T2 shown in Table 5.

Several other observations can be made. Number four rank in both years was held by American financial corporation, Capital Group, which was also the second largest shareholder in the US in 2009-10 (Peetz & Murray 2013). Three other overseas finance capital groups (ING, Fidelity and Vanguard) featured in the top 20 ordinary shareholders that year. The Commonwealth Bank, the prime exemplar of domestic finance capital, slipped from first to third rank. AMP, Perpetual, Macquarie Bank and National Australia Bank are other major owners of ordinary Australian shares in both years. For the first three their proportion of holdings fell, but the ranks of the first two improved slightly due to the dropping out of Tinto Holdings and Barclays Global Investors. Tinto Holdings disappeared from the list after T1 because of the share buy-back, but Rio Tinto PLC slightly increased its ranking due to its controlling interest in major listed resource assets (e.g. Coal and Allied, in the Hunter Valley of NSW). Royal Dutch Shell held number 2 rank in 2009-10 due to its position in Woodside, from which it has since announced it is selling out. Other major holdings by parent companies include Hochtief (via a majority holding in construction corporations Leightons) and the Coca Cola Company. Billionaire Andrew Forrest, the Soul Pattinson group and James Packerøs Consolidated Press represent domestic capital. Shining Prospect, at 8th rank in T2, is a company established by Chinese corporation Chinalco (originally in joint venture with Canadian Alcoa) to gain a large minority shareholding in Rio Tinto, seen by many as a bid to block BHP Billiton's hostile takeover of the latter. The apparent rise of the Australian Government to number 10 rank in T2 is slightly illusory as its earlier, higher holdings of Telstra in T1 (via the Future Fund) were not recorded in the BvD database, and it has been on a ongoing process of selling its remaining stake in Telstra.

In contrast, amongst nominee shareholdings, HSBC took over Westpac's number one rank, with NAB and JP Morgan also staying above 20 per cent each. Citicorp, a major beneficiary of US bailout funds, became a significant player. Most of the banks with major nominee holdings had relatively small ordinary holdings.

Table 6 shows a considerable degree of concentration of ownership of large Australian corporations, with one shareowner holding 11 per cent of significant shareholdings amongst the top 200. This is a higher concentration than in Canada (where the top owner, BlackRock, held around 7 per cent of significant shareholdings in top 200 corporations in 2009-10) but slightly lower than in the US (where the top owner, again BlackRock, held 13 per cent of significant shareholdings in the top 200) (Peetz & Murray 2013). It is notable, of course, that the same organisation is the top shareholder in three major countries. The number four-ranked owner in Australia, Capital Group, is also ranked second in the US and sixth in Canada. Fidelity and Vanguard, both in Australia's top 20, take two of the remaining three places in the US top five; with Fidelity also in Canada's top three.

Between T1 and T2, the portion held by the top ranked shareholder in Australian increased from 8 per cent to 11 per cent, through the total share of the top three was relatively stable – these three accounted for 21 per cent of significant shareholdings in both years. The top 20 ordinary significant shareholders held 53 per cent of significant shareholdings in T2, a high figure though notably less than the 62 per cent of T1. Still, what might appear on the surface to be a weakening of concentration below the highest-level disguises the greater concentration of ownership in the hands of foreign finance capital.

Table 6a: Top Ranked Significant Ordinary Shareholdings, 2006-07 and 2009-10

2006-07 rank and shareholder	2006-07 significant shareholdings		2009-10 rank and shareholder	2009-10 significant shareholdings		2009-10 recorded shareholdings	
	Value ($m)	%		Value ($m)	%	Value ($b)	%
Ordinary			**Ordinary**				
Commonwealth Bank Of Australia	10,076	7.8	Blackrock, Inc.	20,903	11.1	21,267	8.6
Tinto Holdings Australia Pty Ltd	10,055	7.7	Royal Dutch Shell Plc	10,299	5.5	10,299	4.2
Royal Dutch Shell Plc	6,888	5.3	Commonwealth Bank Of Australia	7,959	4.2	8,250	3.3
Capital Group	6,295	4.8	Capital Group	6,052	3.2	7,125	2.9
Ing Groep Nv	5,181	4.0	Amp Limited	5,736	3.1	9,041	3.7
Amp Limited	5,095	3.9	Rio Tinto Plc	5,698	3.0	5,701	2.3
Rio Tinto Plc	4,569	3.5	Perpetual Limited	4,670	2.5	5,422	2.2
Barclays Global Investors Limited	4,567	3.4	Shining Prospect Pte Ltd	3,799	2.0	3,799	1.5
Perpetual Limited	4,395	3.0	Ing Groep Nv	3,781	2.0	4,714	1.9
Consolidated Press Holdings	3,653	2.8	Government Of Australia	3,673	2.0	4,991	2.0
State Of Queensland	2,955	2.3	Forrest Andrew	3,300	1.8	3,300	1.3
Macquarie Bank Ltd	2,560	2.0	Hochtief	3,124	1.7	3,124	1.3
Maple-Brown Abbott Ltd.	2,447	1.9	Macquarie Bank Ltd	3,041	1.6	4,482	1.8
Hochtief	1,972	1.7	Washington H Soul Pattinson & Company	2,883	1.5	2,893	1.2
Chevron Energy Solutions L.P.	1,710	1.5	Fidelity Group	2,758	1.5	4,335	1.8
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.	1,702	1.3	National Australia Bank Limited	2,337	1.2	2,338	0.9
Fidelity Group	1,601	1.3	Coca-Cola Company	2,306	1.2	2,306	0.9
Stichting Pensioenfonds Abp	1,590	1.2	Consolidated Press Holdings	2,283	1.2	2,287	0.9
Ioof	1,440	1.2	Vanguard Group, Inc. The	2,123	1.1	4,509	1.8
Coca-Cola Company (The)	1,330	1.1	Lowy Family And Associates	1,992	1.1	1,992	0.8

Table 6b: Top Ranked Significant Nominee Shareholdings, 2006-07 and 2009-10

2006-07 rank and shareholder	2006-07 significant shareholdings		2009-10 rank and shareholder	2009-10 significant shareholdings		2009-10 recorded shareholdings	
	Value ($m)	%		Value ($m)	%	Value ($b)	%
Nominee/depository	-		**Nominee/depository**	-		-	
Westpac Banking Corporation	27,466	27.9	Hsbc Holdings Plc	70,095	29.8	70,345	28.6
National Australia Bank	23,490	23.8	National Australia Bank	54,916	23.4	55,057	22.4
J P Morgan Chase	23,415	23.8	J P Morgan Chase	53,136	22.6	53,169	21.6
Australia And New Zealand Banking Group	9,877	10.0	Citicorp Nominees Pty Ltd	29,132	12.4	30,766	12.5
Ubs Ag	3,476	3.5	Australia And New Zealand Banking Group	12,298	5.2	13,199	5.4
Rbc Dexia Investor Services	3,187	3.2	Cogent Nominees Pty Ltd	5,838	2.5	6,751	2.7
Rbc Global Services Australia Nominees Pty	3,170	3.2	Rbc Dexia Investor Services	4,644	2.0	6,735	2.7
Chase Manhattan Nominees	1,640	1.7	Rbc Global Services Australia Nominees	1,438	0.6	1,469	0.6

In 2006-07, the top five Australian finance capital entities held 19 per cent of significant shareholdings but, by 2009-10, this had fallen by nearly a third, to 13 per cent. By contrast, the top five foreign finance capital entities grew from 15 per cent of significant shareholdings to 19 per cent of significant shareholdings by 2009-10.

We also see in Table 6 that the nominee business is extraordinarily concentrated, with the top three banks in both years controlling over 75 per cent of the market. Its importance lies not so much in explaining patterns of control, as that control is hidden by nominee arrangements, as in depicting market concentration in a particular financial product market.

It is also worth noting that different parts of capital have quite different strategies for investment. Shareholdings by industrial corporations are often large, sometimes controlling interests in only one or a small number of other large listed companies. Finance capital controls shares across a large number of target companies, with smaller holdings per company. Even within finance capital there are wide variations in investment strategy. These may be categorised along several lines, such as principally active or passive (see Peetz & Murray 2012), but our interest in these data is in the extent to which shareholders seek to obtain óprimacyô (number one rankings) in shareholdings in target corporations.

Table 7 takes a sample of finance capital entities with large investments (a minimum of investments in 30 target companies) and shows how their shareholdings are distributed between different ranked holdings within target corporations in 2009-10. For example, BlackRock has shareholdings in 130 target corporations and 6 per cent of those shareholdings are the top ranked ordinary shareholding ï that is, BlackRock is the number 1 ordinary shareholder in 6 per cent of top 200 firms in which it holds shares. It is the number 2 ranked shareholder in another 11 per cent of firms. This shows the relatively high priority it evidently attaches to achieving primacy in investments. Capital Group also attaches priority to primacy ï 23 per cent of its holdings are ranked 1 or 2 within target companies. Four large Australian finance capital corporations also adopt what we call óhigh primacyô strategies: Commonwealth Bank, Westpac, Macquarie Bank and, most strongly, Perpetual. High primacy provides the potential (though this might not always be realised) for major institutional shareholders to exercise control over the behaviour of the target corporations.

Another group we call ólow primacyô shareholders, are those who spread their investments more thinly with little opportunity to influence target corporation behaviour. An example is State Street Corporation ï the third largest shareholder in the USA ï which has investments in 49 of Australiaõs top 200 companies but all of them are ranked 11th or lower, therefore implying minimal opportunity to directly influence target behaviour. Dimensional Funds, a Texas-based investor has holdings in 163 of Australiaõs top 200 firms ï more than any other- but only 3 per cent of its holdings are ranked first or second in the companies in which it invests, and 56 per cent ranked 11 or below. Pension funds (such as the Australian Reward Investment Alliance, covering Commonwealth public service pensions) tend to adopt low-primacy strategies. The resource-based Norwegian sovereign wealth fund, which holds shares in 130 of the top 200 Australian corporations, also adopts a low-primacy strategy, though it has at various times sold out of companies such as Wal-Mart and Rio Tinto due to concerns about the ethical behaviour of those corporations.

Table 7: Distributions of Rankings of Shareholdings, Selected Major Shareholders 2010

	No of target corporations in which this holder own shares	Distribution of ranking of shareholdings within target corporations				
		1	2	3-5	6-10	11+'
High-primacy shareholders						
Perpetual Limited	66	14%	23%	29%	11%	24%
Capital Group	44	14%	9%	23%	30%	25%
Westpac Banking Corporation	43	9%	12%	37%	9%	33%
Commonwealth Bank Of Australia	81	7%	11%	30%	33%	19%
Macquarie Bank Ltd	78	6%	5%	9%	26%	54%
Blackrock	130	6%	11%	35%	21%	28%
Low-primacy shareholders						
National Australia Bank Limited	35	0%	9%	37%	31%	23%
Dimensional Fund Advisors Lp	163	1%	2%	11%	30%	56%
Government Of Australia	73	1%	1%	0%	19%	78%
Vanguard Group, Inc.	69	0%	0%	10%	28%	62%
State Of Queensland	116	0%	1%	3%	30%	66%
Government Of Norway	130	0%	0%	3%	25%	72%
Australian Reward Investment Alliance	42	0%	0%	0%	26%	74%
Stichting Pensioenfonds Abp	95	0%	0%	2%	24%	74%
Axa	81	0%	2%	9%	10%	79%
State Street Corporation	49	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%

While Table 6 suggests that Vanguard Group or NAB, which appear in the top 20 holders of significant holdings of ordinary shares, may have the capacity to exercise more power through their shareholdings than does Westpac, which is not in that list, the reality is probably the reverse. This is because Vanguardôs and, to a lesser extent, NABôs holdings rarely involve primacy, whereas Westpac has a considerable portion of holdings in which it is the number 1 or 2 shareholder. These patterns are shown in Table 7.

This difference in strategies also means it is necessary to qualify our interpretations of increasing foreign penetration of ownership. Amongst the most strategic shareholdings ï the number 1 holdings in the top 200 firms ï domestic finance capital had 32 per cent of these top spots in 2009-10, compared to 20 per cent for overseas finance capital, 27 per cent for Australian industrial corporations, 13 per cent for overseas industrial corporations, and 7 per cent for wealthy Australian individuals. In a straight count of companies, Australian capital seems to have more opportunities to exercise *influence*, even if the opportunities to *benefit* are weighted more heavily towards foreign capital. But this count across the top 200 companies gives no attention to the relative size of target companies. If we weight the data by market capitalisation, we find that domestic finance capital had the number one shareholdings in firms representing 29 per cent of market capitalisation in top 200 firms in 2009-10, little more than the 27 per cent accounted for by overseas finance capital, while the 13 per cent for Australian industrial corporations was dwarfed by the 23 per cent accounted for by overseas industrial corporations, and 4 per cent represented by wealthy Australian individuals. Domestic finance capitalôs number one rankings dropped from 43 per cent of market capitalisation in T1 to 29 per cent in T2. Overseas industrial capital, and overseas financial capital with primacy strategies evidently focused attention on the largest firms within the Australian top 200.

Another way of looking at this is to consider the most strategic holdings in firms who were the 20 largest by revenue in T2. Amongst those top 20 firms, domestic finance capital had 35 per cent of top ranking shareholdings in 2009-10, but this was less than the 45 per cent held by overseas finance capital (up from 35 per cent in 2006-07), 10 per cent by Australian industrial corporations, and 10 per cent by overseas industrial corporations. In other words, those overseas-based investors who adopted shareholding primacy as an investment strategy also chose to focus on the largest of the Australian target corporations in which to invest.

Discussion

At the beginning we raised the possibility that the global financial crisis may have led to some restraining of the role of finance capital in terms of its control and ownership of the Australian economy ï or a shift in favour of Australian finance capital at the expense of transnational finance capital. These expectations failed to materialize. The proportion of the top 200 non-financial firms in Australia held by finance capital increased, and the relative importance of Australian finance capital declined. Finance capital ï particularly, finance capital based in the heart of the financial crisis, the USA - increased its ownership of Australian industry. Foreign ownership was most prominent in the top 200 firms in those involved in the rapidly expending mining and metals sector. True, many foreign investors dispersed their shareholdings across large numbers of target corporations, and so exercised little or no effective control over the behaviour of these companies whereas some of the largest Australian finance capital institutions took a more óprimacyô-oriented approach and concentrated their shareholdings in target corporations to give them *potential* to exercise some influence over those companies. Nonetheless, the more activist of foreign investors took strategic approaches that focused on obtaining key shareholdings in the largest of Australian corporations. Prominent shareholders in the US, such as BlackRock, Capital Group, Fidelity and Vanguard have become prominent shareholders in Australia and, in the case of the first two, they give attention to taking strategic positions in target corporations.

The end result is that, at the very top, the ownership of Australian corporations has become more concentrated than before. It is more concentrated than in Canada, for example. Although by some indicators (e.g. the share of the top 20 owners), concentration in Australia may appear to have diminished (in contrast to the US and Canada), what has really happened is that concentration in the hands of foreign finance capital has intensified while that in Australian finance capital has declined. That is, the role of ï and concentration of power in ï overseas capital, and implicitly the transnational class, has increased in Australia during the global financial crisis. While large Australian share owners such as the big four banks are themselves transnational corporations, their global reach is less than that of the overseas-based finance capitals that are increasing their ownership of the Australian economy ï for example, despite the high Australian dollar and one of the highest profitability rates in the world, no Australian banks were in the top 30 banks by assets worldwide in 2011 (Global Finance 2011). The tendency towards greater concentration needs to be understood in the context of financialisation and transnationalisation. In Australia, a significant minority of shareholdings (albeit a declining one) is in the hands of what are classed as óindustrialô (i.e. not financial) companies, based in Australia or overseas. However, when you trace back to the USA where many industrial corporations are based, it turns out that the great majority of industrial companies are themselves ultimately owned by finance capital.

Meanwhile, the use of nominee shareholdings, a mask behind which share ownership is often hidden, also increased substantially between 2006-07 and 2009-10, and there was a very large increase in overseas ownership of the nominee shareholding industry.

The explanation for these developments does not really lie in the better performance by overseas finance capital,as measured for example by rates of return. Rather, much of the restructuring of ownership has been just that - the outcomes of mergers and acquisitions within finance capital. For example, BlackRockôs acquisition of crisis-ridden Barclayôs Global Investors; HSBCôs purchase of Westpacôs sub-custody business, and strategic decisions by overseas finance capital (for example, BlackRock, a truly transnational firm) to move into or increase their acquisition of Australian corporations. These were expansions of finance capital through these purchases of accumulation under contemporary financialised capitalism.

Nor does the explanation lie entirely within the funds made available through the US and European bailouts, as several of the top US-based shareholders in Australia did not directly benefit from bailout largesse. That said, the crisis enabled BlackRock to assume a strategic position within the US that it did not possess previously, partly due to the damage inflicted on others, partly due to the key advisory roles it assumed with several governments, and partly because of its own merger and acquisition behaviour. And although the global financial crisis was fundamentally a crisis of lending and borrowing rather than one of equities, bailout largesse meant that some parts of finance capital that would otherwise have had to liquidate their assets were able to prosper and continue growing. JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch, Citicorp and State Street were all corporations that benefited by billions of dollars under the Troubled Assets Relief Program.

Conclusion

Overall, while the global financial crisis has demonstrated the dangers of financialisation to capitalist societies, the crisis has not abated the financialisation of capitalism nor, in Australia, the transnationalisation of finance. If anything, those processes have been strengthened by it - financialisation and transnationalisation have intensified - as the validity of distinctions between financial and industrial, Australian and overseas, and national and transnational capitals diminish. Such analytical categories remain a useful heuristic device, perhaps most of all for identifying the trends that are making these ódistinctions without distinctionô, but attempts by policy makers or advocates to favour óAustralianô firms will do little of substance, as ownership of óAustralianô firms is increasingly transationalised anyway.

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Appendix – Data and Methods

Bureau van Dyk (BvD) updates its data on an ongoing basis, so data for different shareholders within the same corporation may be entered and current at different times. Our database has a separate observation for each shareholder within each target corporation for each of T1 and T2.

There are therefore 10644 óshareholding unitsô in our database. Often a shareholding by a bank (or other financial entity) may represent the bank mobilising other peopleôs investment funds: the financial returns (minus a hefty fee) go to the original investors, but the control of the funds rests with the bank, and the shares are owned in its name.

Many shares are held indirectly ï entity A may directly own shares in entity C, but often A owns shares in entity B (for example, a subsidiary or a nominee company) which in turn owns shares in C, giving A indirect ownership of C. The BvD data is quite good at identifying these indirect ownership trails, assisted in Australia by stock exchange requirements for disclosure of large indirect interests. That said, the process of creating our database is surprisingly long, as once company level data (N=234) are joined with shareholder unit level data (N=10644) a substantial amount of ócleaningô is necessary because of the potential for double counting of information for the same shareholding, entered by BvD under different names and/or at different points of time. For many targets, the total value of shareholdings appeared greater than 100 per cent. While every effort has been made to ensure anomalies are removed, it is feasible that some instances of double counting remain, mostly amongst the smaller shareholders in the smaller target corporations.

A more common cause of problems is information on shareholders not being entered in the first instance by BvD, especially in the earlier, T1, period. Thus we have 3311 shareholding unit observations in T1 but 7332 in T2. Only 202 of the companies have shareholder data for both T1 and T2. There was a substantial improvement in data quality between T1 and T2. Most of those with missing data for one year (mostly T1) are smaller corporations, with 22 out of those 30 being ranked lower than 100 by revenue. Most of the difference in data between T1 and T2 concerns smaller shareholdings. In T1 there were 999 shareholding units in which the shareholder had an interest of 5 per cent or more in a target corporation, and in T2 that number had risen by a quarter to 1264. By comparison, in T1 there were only 887 shareholding units with an interest of between 0.2 per cent and 0.99 per cent in a target company, but in T2 this number more than trebled to 2876. Thus the composition of T2 data more heavily favours smallholdings. In both years, shareholdings of less than 0.2 per cent appear to be under-represented (comprising about 19 per cent of records but barely 1 per cent of the value of shareholdings in the database) although this has minimal material impact on our overseas findings.

Shareholdings large enough to exert formal direct ćcontrolô over a company (typically over 15 per cent, though it depends on the magnitudes and motivations of other shareholders) are rare in our dataset. However, shareholdings below that size still provide opportunities for influence ï if not through holding board positions, then through explicit, implied or imagined threats to sell shares, or through discussions over objectives that may be held with board members or executives. Some comparisons over time also are restricted to the 128 target companies with relatively stable availability of data ï that is, where shareholding data are available for both years and where the absolute movement in total recorded shareholdings between T1 and T2 is less than 20 percentage points. Restricting the coverage in this way makes some differences to the data though, as we shall see, overall it confirms the impression created by the unrestricted findings.

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