The limits of transnational solidarity: The Congress of South African Trade Unions and the Swaziland and Zimbabwean crises

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Abstract

The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the main union federation in South Africa, was instrumental in ending apartheid. This paper evaluates COSATU’s post-apartheid role in working for democracy elsewhere in southern Africa through deepening transnational solidarity, focusing on its role in Zimbabwe and Swaziland. Although the federation successfully mobilised trade union members to oppose the contravention of human and labour rights, its ability to affect lasting change was limited by contradictory messages and actions by the South African government, the dualistic nature of institutional formation in these countries, strategic miscalculations and structural limitations on union power.

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COSATU remains the largest union federation in Africa, notwithstanding recent breakaways and internal divisions.¹ COSATU retains an effective shopfloor organisational structure within many South African workplaces, and remains a partner in the ruling African National Congress (ANC)-headed Tripartite Alliance, together with the South African Communist Party (SACP).² In addition to its domestic role, COSATU has sought to engage in transnational solidarity activities abroad, particularly in support of organised labour in Swaziland and Zimbabwe.

In the past, the federation sought to restrain reforms by the ANC related to liberalisation and privatisation, and to represent both the workplace and wider political concerns of the urban working class, in many respects fulfilling the role of a broadly based social movement.³ At the same time, COSATU pursued regime change in two crisis-ridden neighbouring states, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.⁴ These activities provided real assistance for unions and civil society groupings, yet in the period under study failed to bring about the desired results. Part of the reason for this failure was the sporadic nature of its engagement, reflecting limitations in rank and file backing. Also, COSATU’s strident and consistent opposition to both the Swazi and Zimbabwean regimes stood in contrast to the acquiescence towards, and, at times, sympathy and support for, the regimes by influential sections of the ANC. This article highlights the limited influence that COSATU had on South African government policy, and its miscalculation of the sway that the dominant ideologies of both Swazi and Zimbabwean regimes held within those countries, and, indeed, across Africa at large. Although COSATU mounted a number of high profile campaigns against both national governments, such activities were episodic, involved relatively few rank-and-file COSATU members, and yielded limited results. Moreover, within both countries, formal constitutional arrangements were paralleled by secondary tribal (Swaziland) and security (Zimbabwe) institutional arrangements; in focusing attention on reforms to the formal institutions, the
durability of the latter ones was apparently underestimated. These general characteristics highlight an important dimension in labour history: the importance of broad historical processes, but also the actions and counter responses of individuals and associations.

In this paper, we draw on a wide range of secondary and primary evidence to examine the nature of COSATU’s engagement in Zimbabwe and Swaziland, according particular attention to the period between 1980 and 2008; since then, COSATU’s campaigning in these countries has tailed off, largely owing to intensifying political and workplace contestations in South Africa. We briefly evaluate the role that the Southern African Trade Union Coordination Council (SATUCC), the main regional trade union organisation in Southern Africa, has had in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Thereafter, and in greater depth, we discuss the nature and consequences of COSATU’s various interventions and campaigns in Zimbabwe and Swaziland. Finally, we assess why COSATU failed to achieve the desired results, and identify the broader lessons of this experience for our current understanding of transnational union activities.

Within Southern Africa, the SATUCC, formed in 1983, has been the main regional trade union organisation in the SADC, consisting of all of the major trade union federations in the SADC region. During the 1980s and early 1990s, SATUCC focused on the support of liberation struggles against oppressive colonial and apartheid regimes in the region. Following political liberation in the SADC region, SATUCC’s political goals moved toward labour and social standards, embarking on solidarity and campaigns, social dialogue and advocacy in the quest for equity, social justice and regional integration. However, SATUCC has been beset by a range of problems, including threats posed by alliances between labour movements and ruling parties, the impact of economic liberalisation on labour standards, a growing informal sector and inadequate financial resources. Moreover, there has been vast unevenness in organisational power and efficacy among the various trade unions in Southern Africa.
Africa, a lack of active member participation and organisational power at the national level, and limited active cooperation in areas such as collective bargaining. As the largest federation in the region, COSATU has played a leading role in the programs and policies of SATUCC. However, federations in other countries have been wary about South African unions encroaching on their territory. They have also questioned COSATU’s reliance on those in political power.

SATUCC has often focused on the political situation of Zimbabwe and Swaziland, whose governments’ rule, according to the national spokesperson for COSATU, lacks a popular mandate. SATUCC has consequently passed resolutions on both countries and created a Solidarity Committee in order to: coordinate and deepen worker solidarity in the region, encourage trade unions to boycott goods, work with civil society, monitor progress in Zimbabwe and Swaziland, and mobilise international allies.

In common with SATUCC, COSATU independently chose to target Swaziland and Zimbabwe. Events in these countries had a direct impact on COSATU’s members, including the large scale migration of unemployed workers from Zimbabwe to South Africa. However, COSATU’s interest in Zimbabwe predated the collapse of the Zimbabwean economy in the 2000s, representing both class solidarity and reciprocity for support for the liberation struggle in South Africa. Less attention was paid by COSATU to other neighbouring countries. However, it periodically engaged in campaigns in Lesotho: in the mid-1990s, COSATU had the ambitious goal of incorporating Lesotho into South Africa, but this was abandoned, and subsequent interventions were more episodic.
Zimbabwe

Colonial era Zimbabwe was characterised by large scale European settlement, and the erection of institutions that mirrored those of the colonial power, with Westminster-style constitutional arrangements, and common law notions of private property. At the same time, the large scale settlement necessitated the dispossession of the African majority, their disciplining into a labour force for European owned farms and mines, and the suppression of regular waves of resistance. In turn, this led to militarised policing. The 1970s war of liberation accentuated these tendencies, with the heads of the armed services presiding over a parallel system of authority to that of the civilian settler politicians; the security services routinely operated outside of any legal strictures. During the colonial era, most productive land was expropriated and allocated to white farmers; as late as the 1950s, waves of forced removals banished large numbers of peasants to remote tsetse fly infested areas. The negotiated settlement allowed for land reform on a willing seller basis, but, in practice, this was slow. White farmers retained large holdings, with the government reluctant to undermine the agricultural mainstay of the economy. Through the early 1980s, there was an upsurge of illegal squatting on vacant land, although such squatters were generally evicted by the authorities.

In 1980, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) won Zimbabwe’s first democratic elections and headed the government on independence. The ZANU-PF leader and incoming President Robert Mugabe soon impressed domestic investors and the international community with his apparent pragmatism. Far reaching land reform was placed on the back burner, and a formal emphasis was placed on reconciliation with the white minority. An armed insurrection by supporters of Zimbabwe’s second liberation movement, the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), was, however, brutally crushed,
against general silence from the international community, and ZAPU was forced into a merger with ZANU.19

In terms of the impact on workers, the early years of independence were characterised by labour market regulation, wage policies aimed at raising living standards, and extension of the education system.20 In 1981, the Zimbabwean Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) was established by ZANU-PF. Originally, the intention was for it to serve as a transmission belt for the ruling party. However, once the initial corrupt leadership had been ousted, it developed a mass power base among the urban working class.21 Thereafter, the ZCTU gradually became more critical of ZANU-PF.22

Through the 1990s, ZANU-PF alienated large areas of the urban working class, in response to World Bank/IMF prompted reforms.23 There was a precipitous decline of the Zimbabwean economy and a rise in brutal state repression. In the late 1990s, ZANU-PF turned on the white farmers who owned 42% of the total land; land redistribution without compensation was authorised in 2000.24 This move bolstered support from peasants and war veterans, who had gained little to date from independence.25 Although the policy of land redistribution was overturned by court rulings, the government chose to ignore them. The ZCTU – supported by civic groups, elements of the middle class, the bulk of the urban community, intellectuals and students – began protesting against state policies.26 Then in September 1999, this coalition of forces established an opposition political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The MDC made great progress in the 2000 parliamentary and 2002 presidential elections, despite widespread intimidation, benefitting from reactions to the land invasions.27

By 2003, 78% of white owned land was in the hands of black peasants, at the cost of a collapse in agricultural production, and job losses and evictions for farm workers. The new owners included: some successful middle sized black farmers, vulnerable and failing peasants
and semi-peasants, and those who accumulated large landholdings through patronage and corruption. The Zimbabwean trade unionists were in a difficult position, being keen to expose ZANU-PF’s anti-imperialist rhetoric and the reality of Mugabe’s repressive and divisive labour policies, yet aware of support among black South Africans for Mugabe’s land reform policies. They looked to COSATU for assistance in building the labour movement.

COSATU’s role was limited by its national government. Under Mandela, South Africa’s policy was characterised by support for liberal human rights, which led to a poor relationship with the Zimbabwean government. In 1998, Mandela was succeeded by Thabo Mbeki, who abandoned this policy for one of engagement, with ideologies of African unity overriding past personal and party political mistrust. Under Mbeki’s presidency, the ANC went to great lengths to protect the Mugabe regime from sanctions and international pariah status. Indeed, key figures in the ANC issued statements glorifying Mugabe as a “revolutionary” and portraying ZANU-PF as the “best hope for socialism” in the region. Arguably, such concerns were prompted by African nationalism, rather than a real desire to promote socialism.

COSATU took a very different position than the ANC toward Zimbabwe, and, in the early 2000s, began to intervene more directly in the Zimbabwean crisis. Although the South African government declared the 2002 elections free and fair, COSATU challenged the fairness of both, and declared its support for a three-day strike by Zimbabwean unions. COSATU also met with the ZCTU, and resolved in favor of an interim government in Zimbabwe and the drafting of a new constitution on the basis of fresh elections. COSATU argued that the land reform program was ruining the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of people. On 18-19 March, 2003, a two-day general strike took place in Zimbabwe, and scores of trade unionists were arrested, leading to sharp condemnation from COSATU, but a general lack of response from the ANC government. Less than one year later, during
February 2004, a mass strike took place, which COSATU formally supported.\textsuperscript{36} Then in October 2004, 13 COSATU members were deported from Zimbabwe.\textsuperscript{37} The South African government formally “regretted” the deportations, but added that the Zimbabwean government was fully within its rights to take this action.\textsuperscript{38} In the run up to the 2005 parliamentary elections, COSATU dispatched a fact finding delegation, which, once more, was deported.\textsuperscript{39} The Zimbabwean state-owned newspapers accused COSATU of acting as a tool for the ICFTU and US imperialism, while leading figures within ZANU-PF accused COSATU of representing a “colonialist” agenda.\textsuperscript{40} The ANC government defended the Zimbabwean government’s action, and issued a reassurance to the Zimbabwean government that the deportations would not affect South Africa’s relations with Zimbabwe.\textsuperscript{41} Tensions between COSATU and the ANC worsened without a resolution in sight.

The 2008 presidential elections were so violent that Morgan Tsvangirai withdrew from the second round, having won the first, leaving the field open for a Mugabe victory.\textsuperscript{42} Although SADC called the 2008 presidential elections free and fair, COSATU was quick to condemn them.\textsuperscript{43} Subsequent South African-brokered talks resulted in a Global Political Agreement (GPA) that brought main parties into government, but did not terminate ZANU-PF’s parallel rule through violence and repression. In May 2008, COSATU picketed the South African parliament to call for freedom in Zimbabwe and an arms boycott of that country, and restated its demands for democratisation and the end of repression.\textsuperscript{44}

Meanwhile, in South Africa, Mbeki had problems of his own. After a bitter internal struggle, in 2008 the ANC withdrew its parliamentary support for him, forcing his resignation. His ejection, and his replacement by a caretaker president, Kgalema Motlanthe, raised COSATU’s hopes that Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy would be abandoned. However, in practice, COSATU leaders found that the new president’s policies were not very different to
those of the former one.\textsuperscript{45} Anxious to secure the support of COSATU, president-in-waiting Zuma meanwhile publicly criticised Mugabe and his regime.

In February 2009, a Government of National Unity (GNU) was established in Zimbabwe. COSATU argued that the GNU made little difference on the ground, and that the democratic rights of Zimbabweans remained a remote possibility. It continued to call for the liberation of the country, and for Mugabe to be denied any recognition as a legitimate head of state abroad.\textsuperscript{46} Yet, unconstrained by formal commitments to the GNU, the Zimbabwean government continued to arrest trade union leaders.\textsuperscript{47} It also evicted remaining white farmers and farm workers; the police played a prominent role in these evictions.\textsuperscript{48} Expulsions of farm workers and general industrial decline had, in the meantime, prompted large scale migration of Zimbabwean workers into South Africa, reenergising the Zimbabwean economy through remitted wages.\textsuperscript{49} In the period after 2009, COSATU’s political attention was increasingly occupied by internal contestations within the ANC, and there were no new major public campaigns against the Zimbabwean regime. Periodic fears were expressed within sections of the ANC that the federation was planning to emulate its Zimbabwean counterpart and ultimately set up an independent opposition party in South Africa.\textsuperscript{50} Ironically, it is conceivable that the biggest legacy of COSATU’s Zimbabwean connections may be a shakeup of the political order in South Africa.

**Swaziland**

Swaziland was made a protectorate of the Transvaal in 1894, and a British protectorate in 1903. Variations in colonial rule in Africa have left different formative institutional legacies.\textsuperscript{51} In the case of Swaziland, there were few settlers, and colonial rule was upheld through appointed “traditional” chiefs; the colonial authorities sought to weaken the influence
of modernising urban elites by further bolstering traditional authorities.\textsuperscript{52} Hence, in the run up to independence in 1968, the role of chiefs was strengthened at the same time as parallel modern constitutional arrangements were put in place. In 1973, one year after the first post-independence elections, parliament and the constitution were suspended by the King. Later, in 1978, a new Parliament of Swaziland Act strengthened his power and the indirect nature of the electoral process via the Tinkhundlas, rural councils dominated by royalist chiefs.\textsuperscript{53}

In 1982, King Sobhuza II died, and one year later, the underground Peoples United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO) was formed, an organisation that aimed to bring about democratic reform.\textsuperscript{54} The interregnum was marked by a power struggle between royalist modernisers and traditionalists.\textsuperscript{55} The latter won, and King Mswati III was enthroned in 1986.\textsuperscript{56}

The Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU) had been established in 1973; like its Zimbabwean counterpart, the federation became an increasingly outspoken opponent of the government. Inspired by the South African experience, in the 1990s it sought to form a broad anti-government front with other pro-democracy forces such as PUDEMO and the Swaziland Youth Congress (SWAYOCO), transforming the Swazi polity.\textsuperscript{57} In January 1996, the SFTU organised mass demonstrations and strike actions that paralyzed the Swazi economy for about two weeks. The South African government perceived political turmoil in Swaziland as a threat to its own stability and newfound democracy, and the then President Nelson Mandela intervened in the Swazi conflict, calling for King Mswati to undertake democratic reforms. COSATU also applied pressure on King Mswati, threatening that unless he acceded to the democratic demands of civil society, their members would not handle goods to and from Swaziland. The SFTU organised a national strike on 4 February, supported by the ANC-led alliance, and COSATU held a demonstration outside the Swazi Embassy in Pretoria.\textsuperscript{58} The federation also joined Mozambique’s trade union federation in a highly
effective one-day blockade of border crossings.\textsuperscript{59} King Mswati and the state-owned media condemned what they called COSATU’s “incitement of violence” and “unwarranted interference”.\textsuperscript{60} Mswati lodged a formal complaint against COSATU with the South African government, and issued a statement reminding the ANC of the Swazi government’s support during the struggle for liberation.\textsuperscript{61} He also ordered the striking workers to return to work, blamed foreigners for the country’s troubles, and threatened the opposition with outright war.\textsuperscript{62}

The 2003 elections were marked by widespread fraud and vote buying.\textsuperscript{63} A 2004 Constitution Act entrenched the Tinkhundla’s role as a vehicle of royal power, whilst confirming the ban on political parties.\textsuperscript{64} The political climate gradually worsened: leading members of Swaziland’s banned opposition party were arrested in 2006 in connection with a series of petrol bomb attacks on government structures. Despite this, the South African government refused to openly criticise the King. In contrast, COSATU and elements within the ANC and the SACP, together with the Swaziland Youth Congress, petitioned the African Union (AU) to take action. Under intense internal and external pressure, the Swazi government introduced a number of reforms, allowing for freedom of speech and assembly, with the proviso that the king could suspend these rights if he deemed them contrary to the public interest.\textsuperscript{65}

As in Zimbabwe, COSATU picketed key border posts. The federation held demonstrations in 2006, 2007 and 2008, and, finally, in April 2011, a new wave of border protests was launched in coordination with internal protests in Swaziland.\textsuperscript{66} The latter were brutally put down, with COSATU and local activists subject to assaults by the Swazi police.\textsuperscript{67} COSATU condemned the Swaziland government for its “naked show of brutality and intensified repression”.\textsuperscript{68} Taking a leaf out of Zimbabwe’s book, the Swazi authorities deported COSATU’s Deputy President when he visited that country in September 2011.\textsuperscript{69}
The 2008- global economic crisis seriously impacted on the mining, manufacturing and sugar industries, and key social programmes, such as the Anti-AIDS initiative, were shut down. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Swaziland’s economy was close to collapse. Despite this, and the Swazi dependence on the South African financial system, the South African government still refused to criticise the Swazi status quo, and, as was the case in Zimbabwe, called for dialogue between competing parties. It also offered a financial bailout if Swaziland undertook financial reforms.

In 2012, the Trade Union Congress of Swaziland (TUCOSWA) was launched, bringing together the SFTU, the smaller Swaziland Federation of Labour, and the unaligned Swaziland National Association of Teachers. The new federation called for democratic reforms, but the government dismissed this as blackmail, withdrew its registration, and set up a rival workers’ grouping, the Swaziland Economic Empowerment Workers Union. On the one hand, individual TUCOSWA affiliate unions remain legal, and the federation has continued to operate, despite police harassment. On the other hand, the federation is by no means unified; the National Association of Teachers has expressed unease at COSATU’s involvement in Swaziland. However, COSATU has continued to campaign for: the unbanning of political parties; unconditional return of Swazis in exile; repeal of laws preventing freedom of association and public assembly; and freedom for the Swazi people to choose their political path for the future.

Discussion and Conclusions: the limits of transnational solidarity

This paper has explored COSATU’s campaigns to bring about regime change in two of South Africa’s neighbouring countries. COSATU’s abortive attempts in Zimbabwe were an important display of solidarity in the face of violations of labour rights, and a challenge to the
claims by an authoritarian state to use the issue of sovereignty as a legitimisation for abusing such rights. In the context of SADC’s continued public support for the repressive Mugabe regime, this constituted an important political statement.

COSATU’s campaigns against the dominant political order in Zimbabwe and Swaziland failed to yield the desired results for four broad reasons. First, the campaigns underestimated the tenacity of ruling elites, and their desire to cling on to lucrative revenue streams. Second, elites in both countries were able to marshal significant support among rural peasants to counterbalance the discontented working class. In Swaziland, this was through the operation of extended family networks. Conversely, in Zimbabwe, support was achieved through the promise of land restitution. Meanwhile, in both countries, economic decline - and, in Zimbabwe, the expulsions of farm-workers - seriously weakened the relative position of the working class in relation to other groupings in society; large scale migration into South Africa allowed both regimes to rid themselves of a large proportion of the unemployed urban working class, whilst at the same time, to enjoy the spillover effect of remitted wages from South Africa.

Third, in focusing on legal channels for protest and on party politics, parallel structures of political power to the formal modern-constitutional ones were underestimated: both the Swazi and Zimbabwean authorities were willing and able to ignore or rewrite constitutional strictures, and make use of security forces to extend and underwrite their rule by extra-legal means. Contemporary institutional approaches to understanding historical development in Africa have tended to assume that colonial authorities took one of two approaches. The first was to erect coherent institutional arrangements with the simple purpose of labour or other resource expropriation. A second approach was to erect mini-Europes in order to service the interests of white settlers. In practice, Swaziland and Zimbabwe were characterised by institutional duality. In the case of Zimbabwe, formal
democratic constitutional arrangements were paralleled by largely extra-legal security structures; in the case of Swaziland, tribal structures overshadowed representative constitutional arrangements. In focusing its attention on democratic processes and rights (probably owing to a lack of viable alternatives), COSATU was unable to seriously challenge the power of parallel authoritarian institutions.

Fourth, the Zimbabwean regime was able to effectively deploy an ideology of nationalism and ongoing liberation struggle.\(^{82}\) This ideology aimed to bring sections of South Africa’s ruling ANC onto their side. Meanwhile, Mbeki’s policy of “quiet diplomacy” was motivated by a range of concerns, and had a range of consequences.\(^{83}\) The shared identity of African countries in relation to land, race and colonial legacy struck a sympathetic cord with the ANC membership. Consequently, when opponents of ZANU-PF framed their criticisms of the regime through a discourse of human rights and democracy, they struggled to find resonance above the language of anti-imperialism.\(^{84}\) In addition, the South African government did not wish to appear as a bully, nor stand against a liberation hero in order to appease former colonial powers: opposition to the Nigerian military in 1996 and the military intervention in Lesotho in 1998 had elicited the wrath of other African countries.\(^{85}\) Mbeki may also have been concerned that COSATU, increasingly hostile to his policies, would follow the ZCTU in launching an opposition movement, supported by Western powers.\(^{86}\) Finally, in Swaziland, the elite’s ideology of traditionalism may have been sufficient to ensure South African government support for a bailout loan, and COSATU failed to overcome the influence of this ideology through a discourse of human rights.

Were COSATU’s interventions worth the resources invested in them, especially given the challenges that COSATU faced within South Africa itself? The campaigns reinforced an ethos of idealism within the federation that was arguably eroded through compromises with employers, radical breakaways and opaque union investment funds, yet may have provided a
valuable training ground for mobilising in repressive circumstances and when the relative size of the traditional working class was eroding. The federation also bravely took a stand for humanitarian ideals. Yet, their solidarity campaigns were sporadic and brief, and lasted no more than one or two days at a time, allowing elites in Zimbabwe and Swaziland to absorb or wait out the pressure. In addition, they did not mobilise the vast majority of COSATU members, which may have reflected a fear of alienating populist-nationalist elements among the rank-and-file, and/or a lack of sympathy for the plight of family and relatives of COSATU members from Zimbabwe and Swaziland who were competing for scarce jobs in South Africa. Perhaps most importantly, the federation was constrained by national government policy, the (in)activities of powerful political elites, and the influence of formal and informal institutions.

More generally, this study highlights the extent to which long institutional legacies, stretching back to the colonial era – and more specifically, the institutional dualism which has characterised not only Swaziland and Zimbabwe, but also many other countries across the continent – can mould present contestations. The existing literature on institutional formation in Africa has tended to underestimate this duality. Its other consequences may constitute a valuable area for future research.

**Notes on Contributors**

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Notes

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6. Jauch, “Regional Labour Movement”; Mosoetsa and Vlok, “Revitalise or Marginalise?”
12. Ibid.
15. Moorcroft, “Rhodesia’s War of Independence”.
17. Ibid.


26. Adler et al., “Unions Without Comrades”; Alexander, “Zimbabwean Workers”; van der Walt, “This is Class Warfare”.


28. Scoones et al., “Land Reform”.


31. Ibid.


33. Bond, “Zimbabwe, South Africa and Power Politics”.


37. Ibid., 26 October, 2004.


39. Ibid., 8 February 2005.


42. Raftopoulos and Mlambo, “The Hard Route to Becoming National”, xvi.


44. Ibid., 17 May 2008.
45. Ibid., 29 January 2009.
47. Ibid.
50. Mail and Guardian, 2 November 2010.
52. See Levin, “Swaziland’s Tikhundla”, 4-8.
53. Ibid.
54. Maree, Trade Unions, 17; Bohler-Muller and Lukhele-Olorunju, Swaziland: The Last Gasps, 2; Joubert et al., Consolidating Democratic Governance, 59.
55. Picard, “Traditionalism in Swaziland”.
56. Levin, “Swaziland’s Tikhundla”, 3-5.
60. Matlosa, Vulnerability and Viability, 129.
61. Matlosa, Democracy and Conflict, 336. In reality, the Swaziland government’s position was rather ambiguous.
62. Dlamini, “King Mswati III Dreams”.
64. Ibid.; Motsamai, “Swaziland Monarchy”, 45-6; Bohler-Muller and Lukhele-Olorunju, Swaziland: The Last Gasps, 2; Acheampong and Domson-Lindsay, “Security Puzzle”, 5-6.
67. Mail and Guardian, 9 September 2011.
68. Kenworthy, “Democratisation in Swaziland?”

69. Ibid.

70. Mail and Guardian, 17 November 2011.

71. Kenworthy, “Democratisation in Swaziland?”

72. For Swazi dependence on South Africa, see Aziakpono, “Financial and Monetary Autonomy”, 207-9; regarding South African government calls for dialogue, see Motsamai, “Swaziland”, 47-9.

73. Mail and Guardian, 30 August 2012.

74. Ibid., 24 August 2012; see also: Dlamini “Interesting Times”, 173.


76. SALB, “COSATU on Zimbabwe”.

77. Motsamai, “Swaziland”, 47, 49.


79. Ibid.


81. Ibid., 514.

82. Maree, Trade Unions, 18.

83. Sidiropoulos, “South African Foreign Policy”, 107-120.


85. Ibid.


87. Webster, Global Labour.


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