Whose Norms Prevail? Policy Networks, International Organisations and ‘Sustainable Forest Management’

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Abstract

This article examines the role played by a Canadian forestry policy network in promoting an ‘economistic’ norm of sustainable forest management in regional negotiations known as the Montreal Process. The article outlines the policy network approach, applies it to the Canadian forest sector, and analyses how a policy network centred in the Canadian Forest Service and the Canadian Council of Forest Ministers worked to have the network’s preferred conception of SFM internationally endorsed. It provides a detailed account of the Montreal Process negotiations that occurred between 1993 and 1995 that established a set of criteria and indicators (C&Is) to measure progress towards SFM in temperate and boreal forests. The article highlights the importance of investigating which social actors champion which international norms rather than assume that such norms necessarily reflect a global consensus.

Introduction

A substantial literature on international norm development exists (Florini 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Wiener 2004; Dimitrov 2005; Nagtzaam 2009; Gabler 2010). However, the vast majority of this literature is statist in nature, viewing international norm development as the outcome of interstate bargaining. This paper takes a different approach and argues that international norms sometimes emerge from well-organized domestic interests. Taking seriously the
injunctions regarding the importance of domestic politics in the study of international negotiations (Katzenstein 1976; Martin and Simmons 1998), we argue that intergovernmental institutions are often permeable to national vested interests and that this permeability explains why these and not those norms emerge nationally, are promoted internationally, and cascade through the system.

To illustrate the argument, two conceptions of ‘sustainable forest management’ (SFM) are contrasted which vary in the relative priority they give to timber production, biodiversity protection, and community consultation.¹ In the first, ‘economistic’ meaning, SFM emphasises growing and harvesting timber for downstream processing while taking account of the broader ecological and social impacts. This interpretation of SFM is now entrenched in many countries as a consequence of the launching of several regional processes in the 1990s to negotiate criteria and indicators (C&Is). This conception of SFM can be contrasted with an ‘eco-social’ one that places primary emphasis on the protection of biodiversity and the involvement of indigenous peoples and community livelihoods, while recognising the need for continued timber harvesting. The clearest expression of this conception of SFM is in the principles and criteria for responsible forest management of a global civil society organization, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC).²

To illustrate the role that domestic forest policy networks played in norm development, a detailed analysis of how C&Is for temperate and boreal forests were negotiated is undertaken. These C&Is were agreed remarkably rapidly via a regional intergovernmental arrangement known as the ‘Montreal Process’, which was steered

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¹ These two meanings do not exhaust conceptions of SFM. Other writers treat SFM as equivalent sustained-yield forestry, multiple use forestry, plantation forestry, agro-forestry or ecoforestry. For a recent overview of meanings of SFM in a tropical forest management context, see Nazi and Frost (2009).

² This debate reflects the rise of an ecosystem-based approach to forest management in the 1990s. See Gillis (1990); Grumbine (1994); and Dellert (1998).
by a domestic, clientelistic forest policy network centred in Canada. The economistic SFM norm that emerged from the Montreal Process negotiations has been consequential. Several post-UNCED forest agreements reference C&I processes when referring to SFM including, especially, the *Non-Legally Binding Instrument on All Types of Forests* agreed in 2007 at the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNGA 2007). Domestically, countries reference the norm when undertaking national assessments of progress towards SFM.

The article is organized as follows. In the next section, a conceptual framework is presented that sets out how domestic interests in forested states form closed forest policy networks to influence government policy. In section three, the structure and operation of Canada’s forest policy network in the 1990s is described prior to analysing, in section four, how it strategized to internationalize this norm through the Montreal Process. Section five compares the economistic norm of SFM that emerged from Montreal Process negotiations with an eco-social SFM norm that emerged at the same time from FSC negotiations. In the Conclusion, we recapitulate our argument and highlight a key general implication for research on international norms.

**Domestic Politics and International Norms**

What is the relationship between domestic politics and international negotiations? One account comes from Putnam, who develops the image of a Chief Negotiator playing a ‘two-level’ game at the international and domestic level (Putnam 1988). At the international level, the Chief Negotiator aims to generate a ‘win-set’ that can be ratified through domestic political process. In this account, domestic political processes act as a constraint on what can be negotiated internationally. An appreciation of domestic constraints can significantly limit the size of the win set
creating the conditions for result negotiation failure. On the other hand, the disregard of domestic constraints can result in implementation failure, as occurred when the US Senate failed to ratify the 1947 Havana Charter that would have established an International Trade Organization and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol that would have led to earlier and more effective action on climate change.

Implicit in Putnam’s two-level image is a view of a society-centred state that seeks to balance its international obligations with domestic political realities. We share Putnam’s society-centric view of the state but investigate what can occur when the state is ‘over-socialised’ and captured by domestic societal interests. Instead of assuming, as Putnam does, that the Chief Negotiator is independent from domestic societal interests, we examine a case where the Chief Negotiator appears to negotiate on behalf not only of the state but also of a specific set of interests within the state.

To undertake such an analysis, we draw on the now well-developed policy network literature. In a seminal article, Atkinson and Coleman (1989) develop a typology of policy networks based on an analysis of state structures and business mobilization. According to Atkinson and Coleman, states vary along two dimensions: the degree of autonomy they exercise from societal actors and how concentrated they are with respect to the policy arena. Where a policy arena is governed by a single agency, a highly concentrated arrangement exists. In contrast, where a policy arena is the responsibility of several state agencies, a level of interagency competition occurs. In the Atkinson and Coleman model, four types of state organisation interact with two types of business associability (highly organised or disorganised) to generate six possible policy network types.

The policy network approach has been widely applied in the past two decades at the domestic and regional level to understand comparative policy development within
and across states and sectors. Building on Atkinson and Coleman’s framework, Howlett and Rayner (1995) develop an alternative approach, reproduced in Table 1, which distinguishes among policy networks based on number of societal actors and whether states dominate, or are dominated by, societal relations. As with Atkinson and Coleman’s model, several policy network types are identified. For our purposes, what is interesting is that many of these are clientelistic in nature being composed of one (usually business) or two (usually business and labour) actors that operate under the direction of, or actually direct, the state in the formulation and implementation of policy. These policy network types are labelled ‘clientelistic’, ‘triadic’, ‘captured’ and ‘corporatist’ by Howlett and Rayner. They stand in contrast to pluralistic and issue network types where there is wider participation from social actors including environmental, social and indigenous civil society organisations; and from bureaucratic and participatory networks where the state exercises some level of autonomy.

**Table 1: A Taxonomy of Policy Networks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number/Type of Participants</th>
<th>State Agencies</th>
<th>One major societal group</th>
<th>Two major societal groups</th>
<th>Three or more groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>State-Directed Relations</strong></td>
<td>Bureaucratic</td>
<td>Clientelistic</td>
<td>Triadic</td>
<td>Pluralistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Society-Dominated Relations</strong></td>
<td>Participatory</td>
<td>Captured</td>
<td>Corporatist</td>
<td>Issue Networks</td>
</tr>
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Howlett (2002) has applied this framework to understand the process of policy making in four Canadian policy sectors: education, trade, transport and banking.
Others have applied variations of the policy network approach to study agricultural, health, policing and economic policies in a wide range of countries (Marsh 1998). The approach has proven to be robust in relating the structure of policy networks to policy outcomes, particularly when it comes to identifying clientelistic networks and their resistance to the inclusion of new actors and new ideas (Gale and Haward 2011). Notably, variations of the policy network approach have been applied in several countries to understand the process of forest policy making. Howlett and Rayner (1995), Wilson (1998), and Elliott (1999) have applied variations of the approach to understand the evolution of Canadian forest policy and Winter (1996) identifies the operation of a forest policy network at the centre of forest policy making in the United Kingdom. In each case, the forest policy network that emerged is described as closed, clientelistic and resistant to new actors articulating new ideas.

**Clientelistic Networks in the Forest Policy Arena**

A rich literature on clientelistic forest policy networks in developed and developing countries exists, although the precise terms analysts use to characterise these relationships varies. Wilson (1998) explains the emergence of forest policy largely as the interaction of two ‘streams’. The pressure stream is replete with interest groups, political parties and other influential actors that contend over the direction that policy should take. However, actors in the pressure stream must deal with existing and emerging knowledge emanating from the ideas stream, which can legitimate or undermine current policy and promote alternative courses of action. Thus, for Wilson, the introduction of environmental ideas in the 1970s, and especially the articulation of the new paradigm of sustainable forest management in the 1990s, altered the policy terrain for groups operating in the pressure stream and reduced, while not eliminating,
the privileged position of the forest industry while simultaneously enhancing the influence of the BC wilderness movement.

Howlett and Rayner (1995) also emphasise the importance of ecological ideas in their account of the shifting nature of Canadian forest policy in the post-war era. They distinguish between a larger forest policy community and a smaller forest policy network. The forest policy community consists of all those actors with an interest in forest protection and use, and includes government departments, business, workers, environmentalists, tourism operators, recreationists, woodlot operators, indigenous peoples and a range of other groups. However, in most Canadian provinces, policy formulation is dominated by a much smaller group composed in most cases of government and integrated forest companies linked to unionized workers and operating within ‘clientelistic’ or ‘captured’ policy networks.

The presence of clientelistic forest policy networks in developing countries is also identified in the literature. Dauvergne (1997) has examined the forest policies of a range of Southeast Asian countries including Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and the Solomon Islands. He notes the presence of significant patron-client networks in the forest sector, which exist regardless of whether states are governed via authoritarian or proto-democratic arrangements. Moreover, these patron-client relations use a variety of legal and illegal means to secure profits, revenues and jobs to the detriment of the environment. In Indonesia, and following failed efforts to persuade Japanese investors to undertake downstream processing of raw logs, the Indonesian government embarked on a development strategy that saw the promotion of a small number of domestic ‘crony capitalists’ as timber barons. The most
notorious of these was Bob Hasan, who increased his control over domestic timber processing via control of the state-owned body Apkindo.³

Given that closed clientelistic forest policy networks exist at the subnational and national level in many timber-dependent states, it would be naïve to assume that these networks are either unaware of their power or unwilling to use it to consolidate their objectives at the global level. Charting exactly how this influence is exercised, however, is a difficult task—made even more so by the conceptual categories utilised by many IR theorists where states are treated as unitary actors unproblematically representing the national interest. In order to demonstrate how intergovernmentalism facilitates the considerable economic, political and discursive power of forest policy networks, we analyse the Montreal Process, a major regional intergovernmental endeavour to negotiate the norm of SFM in the post-UNCED era.

The Montreal Process

The Montreal Process was launched in 1994 and aimed to develop ‘criteria and indicators’ (C&Is) for ‘sustainable forest management’ in an effort to define the international meaning of SFM which could then be tailored to domestic circumstances. The Montreal Process gave rise to a large number of other regional C&I processes. These included the Helsinki Process, which developed C&Is for European temperate and boreal forests; and the Tarapoto Process, which developed C&Is for countries managing tropical forests in Amazonia.⁴ What is remarkable about these various C&I processes is the rapidity of the agreement that was reached within them. This stands in stark contrast to the largely failed negotiations that occurred at

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³ For a detailed account of the operation of crony capitalism in Indonesia in the Suharto era, see Robison (1996).
⁴ Other C&I processes were the African Timber Organization process, Dry forest in Asia process, Dry-zone Africa process, International Tropical Timber Organization process, Lepaterique process of Central America, and Near East process (FAO 2012).
UNCED in 1992 over a forestry convention and subsequent efforts to negotiate a legally binding instrument at the post-UNCED forest institutions (Humphreys 2006). While C&I processes can be viewed as state-based ‘coalitions of the willing’ that came together to negotiate the meaning of SFM, the fact that an economistic interpretation of the SFM emerged from their negotiations reflects the dominance of their respective forest policy networks and the capacity of those networks to exclude other actors and interests from the negotiations. To see how this occurred, we examine the structure and operation of the Canadian forest policy network that was central to the Montreal Process negotiations.

As noted above, several detailed accounts of Canada’s forest policy network exist. While there is some variability in the descriptions, accounts agree that the network includes federal and provincial forestry and natural resources departments linked to industry associations and unions. Of the various accounts, Elliott (1999, p. 284) provides the most specific and identifies the core of the Canadian forest policy network as consisting of the Canadian Pulp and Paper Association (CPPA), the Council of Forest Industries of British Columbia (COFI), the International Woodworkers of America (IWA), the provincial forest ministries (organised under the Canadian Council of Forest Ministers (CCFM)) and the Canadian Forest Service (CFS). Of these network members, the CCFM and CFS played a pivotal role with respect to developing and ‘internationalising’ C&Is.

By the early 1990s, Canada’s forest policy network was under siege. Not only was a recession ravaging the sector leading to mill closures and downsizing, but increasingly savvy environmental civil society organizations were calling for a boycott of British Columbia’s forest products, dubbing it the ‘Brazil of the North’.

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5 The phrase is attributed to environmental campaigner, Colleen McCrory; see Pralle (2007).
Preparations for UNCED were not going well and it appeared unlikely that the network’s core objective of negotiating a global forest convention would be achieved. Moreover, the conventional forestry paradigm of sustained-yield that had guided Canadian forestry was being undermined by the discipline of conservation biology and demands for ecosystem-based approaches that diminished the importance of timber production and encouraged consideration of other forest values (Maser 1990). The network was also under severe pressure from the US-based Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports, which continued to plead the case for trade protection from ‘subsidised’ imports (Cashore 1997).

It was in this context that the policy network began to focus on developing C&Is for sustainable forest management. First, network members realised that the shift from ‘old’ to ‘new’ forestry required them to rethink conventional approaches to forest management based on the concept of sustained-yield. The development of C&Is for sustainable forest management offered a useful mechanism for identifying the broad conditions under which the principles of forest management could be categorised (criteria), which could then be broken down into more precise parameters (indicators) which could be measured to determine levels of compliance (van Bueren and Blom 1997). Second, a set of national C&Is would enable Canada to deflect ongoing criticism from environmentalists, indigenous peoples and foreigners by demonstrating that the country was taking its forest obligations seriously and working to achieve SFM. Finally, members of the network were monitoring with alarm the emergence of non-state forest governance initiatives, particularly certification and labelling. They were deeply concerned over the negotiations to establish the Forest Stewardship Council to certify forest practices to a standard developed by environmentalists. A set of national C&Is would offer a coherent and defensible alternative to FSC, one which...
could later be appended to the national certification scheme under development by the Canadian Standards Association with funding from the Canadian Pulp and Paper Association.

Canada’s forest policy network’s efforts to develop C&Is proceeded along two tracks in parallel. The first track involved developing a set of national C&Is for Canada’s forests, while the second aimed at internationalising the process to ensure other countries developed their own C&Is and also recognised Canada’s. Domestically, the forest policy network worked through the Canadian Council of Forest Ministers to establish the Canadian Criteria and Indicators Working Group (CCIWG) in February 1994. Its mandate was to ‘develop and recommend a framework of scientifically sound criteria and indicators of sustainable forest management in Canada’ (Riley 1995). The key word in the terms of reference was ‘scientifically’, which justified the recruitment of a narrow range of forestry professionals on the CCIWG’s three committees, consisting of a Science Panel, a Technical Committee and a Steering Committee. The Science Panel was to ‘act as a source of scientific (CFS 1994a). It consisted of 13 members, all of whom were professionally engaged in forestry. Nine were employed by the Canadian Forest Service, while the remaining four were forestry academics based in Canadian universities. No experts on social or environmental matters were included on the Science Panel.

The Science Panel was assisted in its deliberations by a Technical Committee (TC) composed of 11 members. The Terms of Reference for the Technical Committee were to ‘provide relevant information on data needs and information to Science Panel’, ‘provide technical review and analysis of information on criteria and indicators and monitoring systems put forward by the Science Panel’ and ‘assess implications for
provincial policy and determine provincial acceptance in principle of recommendations put forward by the Science Panel’ (CFS 1994b). Membership of the TC was drawn from provincial departments with responsibility for forest management across Canada. In British Columbia, for example, its member was employed by the Ministry of Forests, in Ontario by the Ministry of Natural Resources, and in New Brunswick by the Department of Natural Resources and Energy. Again, government departments with responsibility for environment or social matters were not specifically included in the Technical Committee for that expertise, although Alberta’s representative on the Committee was located in the Department of Environmental Protection.

Finally, both the Science Panel and the Technical Committee were responsible to a Steering Committee (SC) composed of 22 members. The terms of reference of the SC included to ‘oversee and guide the Canadian initiative to develop criteria and indicators and an associated monitoring system for sustainable forest management’ and to deliver the same to the CCFM ‘by the beginning of 1995’ (CFS 1994c). The SC reported to the CCFM and was chaired by Jagmohan Maini, Canada’s Special Advisor on forestry with the CFS. The Alternate Chair was David Brand, also with the CFS, while a third member of the CFS, L. F. Riley, acted as Secretary. Of the remaining 18 members of the SC, eight came from government departments such as the federal Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, BC’s Ministry of Forests and Ontario’s Ministry of Natural Resources. Unlike the Technical Committee, however, there were other interests represented on the SC, including the federal Environment Department and Alberta’s Department of Environmental Protection. The remaining 10 non-government members represented stakeholder interests, oriented towards forestry. These included three representatives from the forest industry (Canadian Pulp and Paper Association, the BC Council of Forest
Industries and the Canadian Forestry Association) and three forestry academics (from Laval University, Quebec; UBC, British Columbia; and University of Alberta, Alberta). The remaining four SC members represented environmental and social interests. They were Elizabeth May (Cultural Survival Canada), David Neave (Wildlife Habitat Canada), Harry Bombay (National Aboriginal Forestry Association) and James Sullivan (Task Force on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility).

It is evident, therefore, that the CCIWG was heavily biased towards technical forest management. Its three committees worked through 1994 and 1995 to develop a set of national C&Is for Canada, a task subsequently achieved in October 1995 when the CCFM approved the document: Defining Sustainable Forest Management: A Canadian Approach to Criteria and Indicators. The document identified six criteria of SFM: conservation of biological diversity, maintenance and enhancement of forest ecosystem condition and productivity, conservation of soil and water resources, forest ecosystem contributions to global ecological cycles, multiple benefits to society and accepting society’s responsibility to sustainable development. While some of the language may appear ecological, core concepts of the eco-social norm of SFM are missing (see below for a more detailed discussion).

At the same time as Canada’s forest policy network was developing national C&Is, it was also progressing a set of international C&Is through the Montreal Process. It achieved a major strategic victory with respect to this effort when it succeeded in inserting language on C&Is into the 1992 UNCED forestry principles. Delegates attending UNCED’s preparatory meetings quickly realised that the objective of agreeing a global forest convention would be thwarted over disagreement on whether forests were to be viewed as the ‘common heritage of mankind’ or the ‘sovereign wealth of nations’ and over how SFM should be funded. Rather than concede to a
complete failure, delegations compromised around a Statement of Forest Principles.\(^6\)

While these were voluntary, vague and unfunded, Canada was able to insert language on the development of national C&Is within the document. Paragraph 8d of the UNCED Forest Principles states: ‘Sustainable forest management and use should be carried out in accordance with national development policies and priorities and on the basis of environmentally sound national guidelines. \textit{In the formulation of such guidelines, account should be taken, as appropriate and if applicable, of relevant internationally agreed methodologies and criteria’}. Building on this UNCED element, Canada took the lead in developing C&I processes for non-European temperate and boreal forests.

In October 1993, Canadian delegates organised a meeting of forestry officials from North America and Europe under the auspices of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Montreal (Humphreys 1996, 140-41). The meeting produced two summary documents, the first focusing on possible C&Is in the environmental area and the second, on possible C&Is in the socio-economic area. However, at a follow up meeting of a smaller number of officials from key countries held in the Canadian embassy in Washington, DC in December, European representatives informed those present that they would pursue their own ‘Helsinki’ process and develop C&Is for temperate and boreal European forests. Non-European countries decided to forge on by themselves, and in a series of meetings through 1994 and early 1995 created an international framework for C&Is for non-European temperate and boreal forests. At the outset, representatives from eight countries participated in the process (Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Russian Federation and the USA).

\(^6\) The official title was: \textit{Non-legally binding authoritative statement of principles for a global consensus on the management, conservation and sustainable development of all types of forests}. See (UNGA 1992).
In April 1994, an informal meeting on C&Is occurred in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Its major purpose was to follow up on the original 1993 CSCE meeting and establish objectives and a work plan for the coming year. This meeting was followed by the first formal meeting of the Working Group on Criteria and Indicators for the Conservation and Sustainable Management of Temperate and Boreal Forests (MPWG) held in Geneva in June. Subsequent meetings were held in New Delhi, India (July 2004), Olympia, Washington (September 1994); Hull, Quebec (October 1994); Tokyo, Japan (November 1994) and Santiago, Chile (1995). At the Santiago, Chile meeting, delegates agreed the Santiago Declaration and appended a list of seven criteria and associated indicators of SFM. These were subsequently ratified by the Third Session of the Commission on Sustainable Development in Costa Rica in April 1995, which was dedicated to progressing UNCED matters related to forestry (Humphreys 1996, 143-44).

The output of the MPWG was a set of C&Is that strongly resembled Canada’s. The only notable difference, more style than substance, was that the Montreal Process contained seven criteria compared to Canada’s six. In a comparison of the two, Brand notes that whereas the Canadian C&I contained a single Criterion 2 on the ‘maintenance and enhancement of forest ecosystem condition and productivity’, the Montreal Process broke this criterion in two. For the Montreal Process, these two criteria were: Criterion 2 ‘maintenance of productive capacity of forest ecosystems’ and Criterion 3 ‘maintenance of forest ecosystem health and vitality’ (Brand 1997).

Given the very slow progress on international forestry negotiations, the extraordinary rapid progress on developing international C&Is requires explanation. Part of the answer lies in the composition and operation of the MPWG, which brought together a small number of like-minded forestry diplomats, who were closely
connected to their respective forest policy networks, and very ably led by Canada’s chief negotiator, Jagmohan Maini. If the CFS was at the centre of Canada’s forest policy network with respect to C&I development both nationally and internationally, then Maini was at the centre of the CFS. Although born in India, Maini had undertaken his PhD in Canada and later joined the Canadian Forest Service (CFS), where he rose through the ranks to become Assistant Deputy Minister in the 1980s. From 1990, Maini occupied a pivotal position in Canadian forest policy both domestically and internationally. He was instrumental in securing agreement to insert references to C&Is in Canada’s 1992 National Forest Strategy; chaired Canada’s CCIWG that developed the country’s national C&Is; was Canada’s chief negotiator with respect to UNCED forest matters and instrumental in obtaining a commitment to developing C&Is via its Forest Principles; and subsequently chaired the early, formative sessions of the MPWG to ensure compatibility with Canada’s arrangements (MPWG 1994a & 1994b).

Another part of the answer lies in the structure and operation of the MPWG itself, which was diplomatically unusual. It consisted of a small group of forest officials from non-European boreal and temperate forested countries such as Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand and Chile. These officials knew each other well as a consequence of the almost endless stream of forest diplomacy that had occurred around in the world in the pre- and post-UNCED period. Building on strong personal ties, early meetings of the MPWG had an ambivalent diplomatic status. At the second meeting in Delhi, India some participants noted ‘that, while the Helsinki Process was supported politically and conducted under the auspices of the Ministerial Conference on the Protection of Forests in Europe, no similar intergovernmental mechanism was sponsoring this Working Group’s activities. Rather, this process was
the result of like-minded countries simply agreeing to work together’ (MPWG 1994a). Following an inquiry by Maini on the level of political support for the process, it was agreed that the ‘round table exchange revealed that in all participating countries, there was strong political commitment to development criteria and indicators for sustainable forest management’ (MPWG 1994a). Only later, however, did officials agree to formalise the arrangement and consider domestic public input. At the Fourth Meeting, in Hull, Quebec, it is reported that ‘Beginning in Tokyo, the process will be moving to a more intense stage. The group has started talking about gaining the endorsement of countries, which means it is starting to move into a more formal process. This also means that there is a need to move into a more transparent, open process at home’ (MPWG 1994b).

Finally, another part of the explanation for the rapid progress on C&Is is that Montreal Process countries were able to build on the extensive work being done in Canada to develop a national approach. While the United States actually presented the first draft of the Montreal Process C&Is at the second, New Delhi meeting in July 1994, the draft was closely modelled on drafts being developed in parallel in Canada. The US proposal was reportedly well received and general agreement emerged on the seven criteria identified (MPWG 1994a). In short, personal friendships, informal processes, like-minded groups and established templates enabled the MPWG to negotiate international C&Is with incredible speed within the space of about eight months from the first meeting in July 1994 to the Santiago Declaration in February 1995.

**Comparative Forest Norm Development**
The ‘economistic’ norm that emerged from the MPWG was not the only forest norm to be developed in the post-UNCED era. A second ‘eco-social’ norm also emerged from a consultative process undertaken by a diverse range of business and civil society organisations groups that included the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), the British Do-It-Yourself retailer B&Q, and the Rainforest Alliance. These and other organisations set up the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) in 1993 to certify forests that were responsibly managed from an economic, environmental and social perspective (Cadman 2011). In contrast to the MPWG’s emphasis on the economic importance of forests and their role in timber production, the norm that informs the FSC and which is set out in its ten principles and 57 criteria (P&Cs) places more emphasis on social and ecological attributes of SFM (FSC 2012).

While space does not permit an exhaustive discussion of the substantive differences between the MPWG and FSC norms, we provide two illustrative examples with respect to the treatment of indigenous peoples and high conservation value forests. With respect to the treatment of indigenous people, FSC’s Principle 3 explicitly states that: ‘The legal and customary rights of indigenous peoples to own, use and manage their lands, territories, and resources shall be recognized and respected’ (MPWG 1995). Four criteria elucidate this Principle, requiring that ‘free and informed consent’ be given to any other agencies managing indigenous peoples lands, that forest management will not diminish the resource and tenure rights of indigenous peoples, that sites of special cultural value are protected, and that compensation is paid for the appropriation of indigenous peoples knowledge. FSC’s P&Cs are further elaborated in a set of indicators at the national and sub-national level to ensure a high level of protection of indigenous peoples’ rights. It is for these reasons that indigenous peoples have supported the FSC system. In contrast, in the
Montreal Process C&Is, indigenous peoples rights are mainly addressed by Criteria 7, which focuses on the ‘extent to which the legal framework (laws, regulations, guidelines) supports the conservation and sustainable management of forests…’ (MPWG 1995). Indicator 7a required data to be collected on the extent to which the legal framework ‘clarifies property rights, provides for appropriate land tenure arrangements, recognizes customary and traditional rights of indigenous peoples, and provides means for resolving property disputes by due process’ (MPWG 1995). This wording provided much weaker protection to indigenous peoples, because the criterion addresses all communities, not indigenous communities specifically, did not require ‘free and prior informed consent’ by agents managing operations on indigenous peoples territories, while ‘due process’ arrangements in many countries have historically failed indigenous peoples due to their domination by individuals under the sway of positive rather than customary law traditions.

The second example of substantive difference between the two norms relates to their treatment of old growth forests with ‘high conservation values’. FSC’s Principle 9 directly addresses this aspect of forest management, broadly defining such high conservation value forests (HCVFs) as requiring protection for their biodiversity, hydrological, tourism, heritage and other values. It requires managers to complete an assessment to determine the presence of HCVFs on their forest management units in consultation with a wide range of groups (including indigenous peoples, regulatory agencies, local communities and conservation organizations). Management plans must ensure the maintenance of such conservation attributes of these forests based on the precautionary principle, with implementation monitored to ensure the effectiveness of the measures put in place to safeguard them. In contrast to this expressed concern over forests with high conservation values, the Montreal Process C&Is focuses
attention in Criteria 3.1 on ‘Conservation of Biological Diversity’. There are three indicators associated with the Criterion that seek to conserve biodiversity at the ecosystem, species and genetic level. Old-growth, native-forest, or high-conservation value forests are not explicitly referenced, however. Rather, the emphasis is on data collection of extent of forests ‘by forest type’, ‘by age class or successional stage’, and ‘in protected areas’ (MPWG 1995). The relatively weak focus on high conservation value forests is further revealed in the Montreal Process C&Is by the definition provided of ‘forest type’. This is defined as ‘A category of forest, defined by its vegetation, particularly composition, and/or locality factors, as categorized by each country in a system suitable to its situation’ (MPWG 1995). In effect, the Montreal Process C&Is devolve to the national level the definition of forest types—and if a country does not then distinguish between high conservation value forests and non-high conservation value forests, the Montreal Process C&Is have nothing to say about it.

From the above review, it is evident that there are substantive differences between the FSC and MPWG norms. The MPWG norm is far weaker than the FSC’s on indigenous peoples’ rights and high conservation value forest protection. An extended discussion would explain how it is also much weaker on chemical use, genetically modified organisms, clearcutting, and the conversion of native forests to plantations. In short, the FSC norm emphasises the ecological and social values of sustainable forest management, balancing these against forests’ economic values. In contrast, the Montreal Process emphasises the economic value of forests and downplays its ecological and social significance.

**Conclusion**
The argument put forward in this article is that nationally based policy networks can seize opportunities to manipulate intergovernmental negotiations to secure global norms that support, or at worst do not challenge, their sectoral interests. The argument was illustrated in a detailed analysis of how a closed forest policy network centred in Canada and led by the CFS and CCFM secured an economistic norm of ‘sustainable forest management’ for temperate and boreal forests through regional, Montreal Process, negotiations defending, in the process, the interests of large Canadian forest companies.

Were other SFM C&I processes similarly managed to secure economistic SFM norms? Anecdotal evidence suggests they were, but more detailed investigations are required. For example, although European foresters were invited to participate in the Montreal Process, they eventually decided to set up an alternative ‘Helsinki Process’ under the auspices of the Ministerial Conference for the Protection of Forests in Europe (MCPFE). At its second, 1993 meeting, the MCPFE defined SFM and established a technical process to develop C&Is to measure progress towards it. As with the Montreal Process, this resulted in speedy agreement on a European set of C&Is in 1995 (MCPFE 2001).

More generally, our analysis points to a problem in the literature on norm emergence and cascades. As noted, much of the literature on norms adopts an intergovernmental perspective and assumes rather than proves that the norms states promote in international forums reflect a national rather than a specific sectoral interest. Our analysis suggests that this assumption should be tested by international relations scholars. We do not deny that robust domestic consultative processes can lead to the specification of norms reflective of the national interest in some sectors. However, many norms are domestically contested and this is especially the case with
complex norms related to the management of natural resources. Rapid agreement in national and international spheres suggests, therefore, that the views of some groups have been promoted over the views of others. An important mechanism, though perhaps not the only one, by which this can occur is through the establishment of closed, clientelistic policy networks such as we described here.
References


