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dc.contributor.authorSu, Kaileen_US
dc.contributor.authorChen, Qing-liangen_US
dc.contributor.authorSattar, Abdulen_US
dc.contributor.authorYue, Wei-Yaen_US
dc.contributor.authorLv, Guan-Fengen_US
dc.contributor.authorZheng, Xi-Zhongen_US
dc.date.accessioned2017-05-03T14:39:32Z
dc.date.available2017-05-03T14:39:32Z
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.date.modified2007-08-07T04:52:24Z
dc.identifier.issn10009000en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10072/11407
dc.description.abstractThis paper introduces a new methodology that uses knowledge structures, a specific form of Kripke semantics for epistemic logic, to analyze communication protocols over hostile networks. The paper particularly focuses on automatic verification of authentication protocols. Our approach is based on the actual definitions of a protocol, not on some difficult-to-establish justifications. The proposed methodology is different from many previous approaches to automatic verification of security protocols in that it is justification-oriented instead of falsification-oriented, i.e., finding bugs in a protocol. The main idea is based on observations: separating a principal executing a run of protocol from the role in the protocol, and inferring a principal's knowledge from the local observations of the principal. And we show analytically and empirically that this model can be easily reduced to Satisfiability (SAT) problem and efficiently implemented by a modern SAT solver.en_US
dc.description.peerreviewedYesen_US
dc.description.publicationstatusYesen_AU
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.language.isoen_AU
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.publisher.placeNew Yorken_US
dc.publisher.urihttp://www.springerlink.com/content/j13u70468p744626/en_AU
dc.relation.ispartofstudentpublicationNen_AU
dc.relation.ispartofpagefrom932en_US
dc.relation.ispartofpageto943en_US
dc.relation.ispartofissue6en_US
dc.relation.ispartofjournalJournal of Computer Science and Technologyen_US
dc.relation.ispartofvolume21en_US
dc.rights.retentionYen_AU
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode280403en_US
dc.titleVerification of Authentication Protocols for Epistemic Goals via SAT Compilationen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.type.descriptionC1 - Peer Reviewed (HERDC)en_US
dc.type.codeC - Journal Articlesen_US
gro.facultyGriffith Sciences, School of Information and Communication Technologyen_US
gro.rights.copyrightCopyright 2006 Springer : Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher : The original publication will be available at SpringerLink (use hypertext links)en_AU
gro.date.issued2006
gro.hasfulltextNo Full Text


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