Kazakh Responses to the Rise of China: Between Elite Bandwagoning and Societal Ambivalence?

Abstract

Official Sino—Kazakh bilateral ties reached new heights during Chinese President Hu Jintao’s official visit to Astana in June 2011 when he, and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, signed a joint declaration announcing their country’s intentions to develop an ‘all-round strategic partnership’. Significantly this declaration means that the Sino—Kazakh relationship is the only Sino—Central Asian relationship to have achieved this status in the Chinese diplomatic lexicon. This ‘all round strategic partnership’ would be achieved by striving ‘to deepen pragmatic and mutually beneficial cooperation and strengthen coordination in a bid to realize common development and prosperity’ (Xinhua 2011). The Sino—Kazakh bilateral relationship has in fact deepened considerably in economic and political/security terms since the establishment of official ties after the collapse of the Soviet Union. China, according to recent reports, is about to eclipse Russia as Kazakhstan’s major trading partner with total Sino—Kazakh trade volumes reaching some US$25 billion worth in 2011. This is projected to increase further with both governments declaring in 2011 their commitment to drive the value of total Sino—Kazakh trade to US$40 billion by 2015 (McDermott 2011). Beyond economic and trade ties Kazakhstan has also emerged over the past two decades as a major security partner for China in Central Asia in combating what the region’s pre-eminent multilateral organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), terms the ‘three evil forces’ of ‘separatism, extremism, and terrorism’.