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dc.contributor.authorParkinson, Johnen_US
dc.contributor.editorMin Reuchamps and Jane Suiteren_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-12-19T12:30:40Z
dc.date.available2018-12-19T12:30:40Z
dc.date.issued2016en_US
dc.identifier.isbn9781785522031en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10072/143460
dc.description.abstractThis volume is dedicated to the idea of specifically ‘constitutional’ deliberative democracy. What does that adjective add? For some of the contributors, the answer to that question is rather obvious – it is a deliberative event or series of events directed to constitution-making rather than policy-making, deliberation about the rules of collective life rather than specific decisions within it. But that ‘obvious’ answer relies on some prior assumptions about what constitutions are and what deliberative democracy is. If we start with different assumptions, new possibilities emerge. This concluding chapter sets out some of the implications of three understandings of constitutions, and three approaches to deliberative democracy, for constitution-making and research The idea of constitutional deliberative democracy is not new (see Ackerman 1991), although it is certainly not yet a mainstream concern either; as presented here, it is more an application of existing ideas and processes to a less traditional domain than a radical change of approach; and the word ‘turn’ is perhaps overused, as Dryzek (2010: 6) ever-so-gently suggests. But it seems a logical step, given that the systems move in deliberative theory has re-opened room for thinking about how the various parts of democratic systems work together (Bohman 2012); and because there are issues to do with constitutions and constitution-making that deserve more attention, not least because of long-standing but often forgotten arguments between constitutionalists – who, traditionally, want to bracket off the principles of democracy and justice from interference by potentially tyrannical majorities – and proceduralists – who argue either that justice is best secured by democratic means or that what counts as just is, itself, a matter for democratic deliberation. If we move that disagreement to the foreground, constitutional deliberative democracy is far more than an attempt to apply innovative techniques to realms beyond local policy-making.en_US
dc.description.peerreviewedYesen_US
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.publisherECPR Pressen_US
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdomen_US
dc.publisher.urihttp://press.ecpr.eu/book_details.asp?bookTitleID=395en_US
dc.relation.ispartofbooktitlefiCfiofinfisfitfiifitfiufitfiifiofinfiafilfi fiDfiefilfiifibfiefirfiafitfiifivfiefi fiDfiefimfioficfirfiaficfiyfi fiifinfi fiEfiufirfiofipfiefien_US
dc.relation.ispartofchapter9en_US
dc.relation.ispartofpagefrom147en_US
dc.relation.ispartofpageto168en_US
dc.subject.fieldofresearchPolitical Theory and Political Philosophyen_US
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode160609en_US
dc.titleIdeas of Constitutions and Deliberative Democracy: A Conceptual Conclusionen_US
dc.typeBook chapteren_US
dc.type.descriptionB1 - Book Chapters (HERDC)en_US
dc.type.codeB - Book Chaptersen_US
gro.facultyGriffith Business School, School of Government and International Relationsen_US
gro.hasfulltextNo Full Text


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