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  • What sort of minded being has language? Anticipatory dynamics, arguability and agency in a normatively and recursively self-transforming learning system Part 1

    Author(s)
    Thibault, P.
    Griffith University Author(s)
    Thibault, Paul J.
    Year published
    2005
    Metadata
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    Abstract
    Theories of cognition that are based on information processing and representation are reactive (Rosen, 1985) or backwards looking, not anticipatory. In a previous article (Thibault, 2005a), I looked at the reasons why humans and bonobos do not need an innate language faculty in order to be minded, languaging beings. The present article takes up some of the questions explored there, but, it asks, on the other hand, what sort of a minded agent has language and what kind of account of language and more broadly meaning do we need to explain minded, languaged agents and the activities they participate in? Following Rosen (1985), ...
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    Theories of cognition that are based on information processing and representation are reactive (Rosen, 1985) or backwards looking, not anticipatory. In a previous article (Thibault, 2005a), I looked at the reasons why humans and bonobos do not need an innate language faculty in order to be minded, languaging beings. The present article takes up some of the questions explored there, but, it asks, on the other hand, what sort of a minded agent has language and what kind of account of language and more broadly meaning do we need to explain minded, languaged agents and the activities they participate in? Following Rosen (1985), I also take up and further develop a point first raised in Thibault (2004a: 187) on language as an anticipatory system, rather than a reactively 'representational' one (see also Bickhard, 2005).
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    Journal Title
    Linguistics and the Human Sciences
    Volume
    1
    Issue
    2
    Subject
    Cognitive Sciences
    Linguistics
    Publication URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/10072/16711
    Collection
    • Journal articles

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