Remuneration committees, shareholder dissent on CEO pay and the CEO pay-performance link
Author(s)
Kent, Pamela
Kercher, Kim
Routledge, James
Griffith University Author(s)
Year published
2016
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract
We provide evidence on whether the adoption of the full Australian Securities Exchange recommendations for remuneration committee formation and structure are associated with a lower shareholder dissenting vote or a stronger CEO pay–performance link. We find some evidence that a minority‐ and majority‐independent remuneration committee and a committee size of at least the recommended three members are associated with lower shareholder dissent. Companies with an independent committee have a stronger CEO pay–performance link. In addition, a majority‐independent committee strengthens the link between performance and growth in CEO pay.We provide evidence on whether the adoption of the full Australian Securities Exchange recommendations for remuneration committee formation and structure are associated with a lower shareholder dissenting vote or a stronger CEO pay–performance link. We find some evidence that a minority‐ and majority‐independent remuneration committee and a committee size of at least the recommended three members are associated with lower shareholder dissent. Companies with an independent committee have a stronger CEO pay–performance link. In addition, a majority‐independent committee strengthens the link between performance and growth in CEO pay.
View less >
View less >
Journal Title
Accounting and Finance
Note
This publication has been entered into Griffith Research Online as an Advanced Online Version.
Subject
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability not elsewhere classified
Applied Economics
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability
Banking, Finance and Investment