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dc.contributor.authorSampford, Charles
dc.contributor.authorRound, Tom
dc.contributor.editorBrian Galligan and Winsome Roberts
dc.date.accessioned2019-03-13T23:40:39Z
dc.date.available2019-03-13T23:40:39Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.date.modified2014-08-11T00:43:57Z
dc.identifier.isbn9780195555431en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/acref/9780195555431.001.0001en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10072/18367
dc.description.abstractAlthough there is deep academic disagreement on exactly what the ‘rule of law’ is, and whether it is a good thing, there is—paradoxically—widespread consensus that Australia exhibits the rule of law to a high degree; more so than most other nations. There are two broad ways in which the rule of law may be conceived: as ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ theories of the rule of law. Each can be taken to extremes. An extreme version of the ‘thin’ theory is seen as purely formal: as long as coercive acts are clothed with the official authorisation of the governing regime, they are ‘law’ and the regime is a ‘law‐governed state’. The concern with this conception is, in Jefferson's words, that ‘law is often but the tyrant's will, and always so when it violates the rights of the individual’. Geoffrey Robertson (1999) records being assured by officials of one African dictatorship that their state ‘embodied the rule of law: the Constitution laid down that there shall be only one party, and there was’. An extreme example of a ‘thick’ theory makes the rule of law too substantive, so that it exists only when the laws are just and wise, both in their origin—from some font of acknowledged authority, such as democratic consent or divine command—and their outcomes, when they sufficiently protect rights, maximise utility, or uphold God's law. Thus the International Congress of Jurists, meeting at New Delhi in 1959, defined the rule of law to include ‘the social, economic, educational and cultural conditions … essential to the full development of… [the individual's] personality’. Raz (1977) criticises this ‘promiscuous’ expansion of the term: ‘we have no need to be converted to the Rule of Law … to believe that good should triumph’—and advocates instead a version of the more balanced position held by other jurists of the political left.en_US
dc.description.publicationstatusYesen_US
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherOxford University Pressen_US
dc.publisher.placeSouth Melbourneen_US
dc.publisher.urihttp://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195555431.001.0001/acref-9780195555431-e-325?rskey=5VE9G1&result=322en_US
dc.relation.ispartofbooktitleThe Oxford Companion to Australian Politicsen_US
dc.relation.ispartofchapter18en_US
dc.relation.ispartofstudentpublicationNen_US
dc.relation.ispartofpagefrom524en_US
dc.relation.ispartofpageto525en_US
dc.rights.retentionYen_US
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode390103en_US
dc.titleRule of Lawen_US
dc.typeBook chapteren_US
dc.type.descriptionB2 - Book Chapters (Non HERDC Eligible)en_US
dc.type.codeB - Book Chaptersen_US
gro.rights.copyrightSelf-archiving is not yet supported by this publisher. Please refer to the publisher's website or contact the author(s) for more information.en_US
gro.date.issued2007
gro.hasfulltextNo Full Text
gro.griffith.authorSampford, Charles J.


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