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  • Changing Conditional Beliefs Unconditionally

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    4792_1.pdf (1.075Mb)
    Author(s)
    Nayak, Abhaya
    Y. Foo, Norman
    Pagnucco, M.
    Sattar, Abdul
    Griffith University Author(s)
    Sattar, Abdul
    Year published
    1996
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    Abstract
    Although the AGM account of belief change tells us how to change unconditional beliefs, it fails to guide us in changing our conditional beliefs. That explains why, in the AGM account of belief change proper, a decent account of iterated belief change is not forthcoming. Darwiche and Pearl provide an account of changing conditional beliefs. We argue that the Darwiche-Pearl postulates are, on the one hand, limited in scope and, on the other, excessively strong and suggest how they should be supplemented. We show, contrary to the generally held view, that the revision operation changes to a new (though in some cases the ...
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    Although the AGM account of belief change tells us how to change unconditional beliefs, it fails to guide us in changing our conditional beliefs. That explains why, in the AGM account of belief change proper, a decent account of iterated belief change is not forthcoming. Darwiche and Pearl provide an account of changing conditional beliefs. We argue that the Darwiche-Pearl postulates are, on the one hand, limited in scope and, on the other, excessively strong and suggest how they should be supplemented. We show, contrary to the generally held view, that the revision operation changes to a new (though in some cases the same) revision operation after each instance of belief change. Finally, we prove what may be viewed as representation results connecting the acount offered in this paper with entrenchment kinematics.
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    Conference Title
    Proceedings of the Sixth Conference on Theoreticl Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK)
    Publisher URI
    http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1029705&CFID=900310660&CFTOKEN=51589046
    Copyright Statement
    © 1996 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE.
    Publication URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/10072/19881
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    • Conference outputs

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