Institutions, motivations and public goods: An experimental test of motivational crowding
Author(s)
F. Reeson, Andrew
Tisdell, John
Griffith University Author(s)
Year published
2008
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract
Contributions to public goods can be motivated by intrinsic factors such as warm glow altruism and fairness, as well as extrinsic incentives such as sanctions and payments. However, psychological studies suggest that formal extrinsic incentives may crowd out intrinsic motivations. In an experimental study of individual contributions to a public good we find that suasion crowded in voluntary contributions, while an extrinsic incentive in the form of a regulation led to crowding out. This has implications for the design of public policy where ranges of motivations are present.Contributions to public goods can be motivated by intrinsic factors such as warm glow altruism and fairness, as well as extrinsic incentives such as sanctions and payments. However, psychological studies suggest that formal extrinsic incentives may crowd out intrinsic motivations. In an experimental study of individual contributions to a public good we find that suasion crowded in voluntary contributions, while an extrinsic incentive in the form of a regulation led to crowding out. This has implications for the design of public policy where ranges of motivations are present.
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Journal Title
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Volume
68
Issue
1
Publisher URI
Copyright Statement
© 2008 Elsevier. Please refer to the journal's website for access to the definitive, published version.
Subject
Economic Theory
Applied Economics
Econometrics