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  • Institutions, motivations and public goods: An experimental test of motivational crowding

    Author(s)
    F. Reeson, Andrew
    Tisdell, John
    Griffith University Author(s)
    Tisdell, John G.
    Year published
    2008
    Metadata
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    Abstract
    Contributions to public goods can be motivated by intrinsic factors such as warm glow altruism and fairness, as well as extrinsic incentives such as sanctions and payments. However, psychological studies suggest that formal extrinsic incentives may crowd out intrinsic motivations. In an experimental study of individual contributions to a public good we find that suasion crowded in voluntary contributions, while an extrinsic incentive in the form of a regulation led to crowding out. This has implications for the design of public policy where ranges of motivations are present.Contributions to public goods can be motivated by intrinsic factors such as warm glow altruism and fairness, as well as extrinsic incentives such as sanctions and payments. However, psychological studies suggest that formal extrinsic incentives may crowd out intrinsic motivations. In an experimental study of individual contributions to a public good we find that suasion crowded in voluntary contributions, while an extrinsic incentive in the form of a regulation led to crowding out. This has implications for the design of public policy where ranges of motivations are present.
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    Journal Title
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
    Volume
    68
    Issue
    1
    Publisher URI
    http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo
    DOI
    https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.04.002
    Copyright Statement
    © 2008 Elsevier. Please refer to the journal's website for access to the definitive, published version.
    Subject
    Economic Theory
    Applied Economics
    Econometrics
    Publication URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/10072/21477
    Collection
    • Journal articles

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