Accounting window Dressing and Template Regulation: A Case Study of the Australian Credit Union Industry
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This paper highlights the response of cooperative institutions that are required to adhere to new capital adequacy regulation traditionally geared for profit-maximizing organizations. Using data from the Australian credit union industry, we demonstrate that the cooperative philosophy and internal corporate governance structure of cooperatives will lead management to increase capital adequacy ratios through the application of accounting window dressing techniques. This is opposite to the intended purpose of template regulation aimed at efficiently increasing operating margins and lowering risk. Our results raise several debatable issues regarding the ethics of accounting management and the imposition of one-shoe-fits-all external regulation
Journal of Business Ethics
© 2008 Elsevier. This is the author-manuscript version of this paper. Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. Please refer to the journal's website for access to the definitive, published version.