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dc.contributor.authorLevy, Ronen_US
dc.date.accessioned2017-04-04T21:49:44Z
dc.date.available2017-04-04T21:49:44Z
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.date.modified2013-05-28T04:23:26Z
dc.identifier.issn00249041en_US
dc.identifier.doihttp://lawjournal.mcgill.ca/documents/Levy.pdfen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10072/23221
dc.description.abstractThe author examines impartiality in cases of politically contentious decision making. Many jurisdictions delegate decisions over matters such as the establishment of fair election ground rules to independent bodies. Some of these bodies, including Canada's Federal Electoral Boundaries Commissions (FEBCs), attract widespread trust and are by most accounts substantially impartial. In contrast, commissions empanelled to draw electoral boundaries in the United States, and to a lesser extent in certain Canadian provinces, are often plagued by partisanship. The author canvasses approaches to controlling partisanship, relying on a series of interviews conducted with boundaries commissioners and on interdisciplinary literature on trust and trustworthiness in governance. Commentators often favour bolstering formal constraints on FEBC discretion. However, the author concludes that traditional administrativelaw models favouring such constraints are often inadequate. In politically sensitive cases these methods frequently catalyze partisanship. Proposals for more nuanced design-design sensitive to the complex interactions between law and administrative culture in cases where the potential for partisanship is high-are better but rarer. The author focuses in particular on the use of ambiguity in legal and institutional design. Although this approach is counterintuitive in light of rule-of-law assumptions favouring clarity, it has nevertheless gained traction in commentary and has long been at work in practice. The author argues that extensively ambiguous design, as displayed by the complex federal readjustment processes in Canada, has helped to develop the widely admired impartial decision-making cultures of the FEBCs.en_US
dc.description.peerreviewedYesen_US
dc.description.publicationstatusYesen_US
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherMcGill Law Journal of Canadaen_US
dc.publisher.placeMontreal, Canadaen_US
dc.publisher.urihttp://lawjournal.mcgill.ca/en_US
dc.relation.ispartofstudentpublicationNen_US
dc.relation.ispartofpagefrom1en_US
dc.relation.ispartofpageto57en_US
dc.relation.ispartofissue1en_US
dc.relation.ispartofjournalMcGill Law Journalen_US
dc.relation.ispartofvolume53en_US
dc.rights.retentionYen_US
dc.subject.fieldofresearchConstitutional Lawen_US
dc.subject.fieldofresearchAdministrative Lawen_US
dc.subject.fieldofresearchComparative Lawen_US
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode180108en_US
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode180103en_US
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode180106en_US
dc.title"Regulating Impartiality: Electoral Boundary Politics in the Administrative Arena"en_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.type.descriptionC1 - Peer Reviewed (HERDC)en_US
dc.type.codeC - Journal Articlesen_US
gro.facultyArts, Education & Law Group, School of Lawen_US
gro.rights.copyrightSelf-archiving of the author-manuscript version is not yet supported by this journal. Please refer to the journal link for access to the definitive, published version or contact the authors for more information.en_US
gro.date.issued2008
gro.hasfulltextNo Full Text


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