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dc.contributor.authorSharman, J.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2017-05-03T15:21:02Z
dc.date.available2017-05-03T15:21:02Z
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.date.modified2009-10-20T22:11:55Z
dc.identifier.issn10357718en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/10357710500494622en_AU
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10072/25325
dc.description.abstractThe world's richest and most powerful countries have become increasingly concerned about revenue lost to tax havens, and fear that tax competition might spark a fiscal 'race to the bottom', yet they have failed to pressure much smaller and weaker tax haven states into reform. This article argues that the OECD-sponsored campaign against 'harmful' tax competition has been unsuccessful because regulative norms have severely constrained the means legitimately able to be employed. Early decisions on how the campaign was designed subsequently brought norms into play which have not only ruled out the use of coercion, but also the use of side payments, despite the massive potential benefits available to both sides from a deal between tax havens and OECD states. The failure to strike a deal cannot be explained by high transaction costs nor by corporate lobbying in defence of tax shelters. Regulative norms can thus affect economic bargaining in the international arena by preventing mutually advantageous exchanges that are nevertheless regarded as inappropriate.en_US
dc.description.peerreviewedYesen_US
dc.description.publicationstatusYesen_AU
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.language.isoen_AU
dc.publisherTaylor and Francisen_US
dc.publisher.placeCanberraen_US
dc.publisher.urihttp://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db=all~content=t713404203en_AU
dc.relation.ispartofstudentpublicationNen_AU
dc.relation.ispartofpagefrom143en_US
dc.relation.ispartofpageto169en_US
dc.relation.ispartofissue1en_US
dc.relation.ispartofjournalAustralian Journal of International Affairsen_US
dc.relation.ispartofvolume60en_US
dc.rights.retentionYen_AU
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode360100en_US
dc.titleNorms, Coercion and Contracting in the Struggle against ‘Harmful’ Tax Competitionen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.type.descriptionC1 - Peer Reviewed (HERDC)en_US
dc.type.codeC - Journal Articlesen_US
gro.date.issued2006
gro.hasfulltextNo Full Text


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