Can the Executive Influence the “Independence” of the Auditor-General under the Auditor-General Act 1997 (Cth)?
View/ Open
Author(s)
Lawson, Charles
Griffith University Author(s)
Year published
2009
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract
This article addresses the "independence" of the Auditor-General under the Auditor-General Act 1997 (Cth), and how the formal regulation (the matrix of legalities) applies to promote the Auditor-General's role in making the Executive transparent and accountable. The article demonstrates that the "independence" delivered under the Act is essentially symbolic and that avenues remain for the Executive to influence the Auditor-General. The article concludes that the effectiveness of the formal regulation of the Auditor-General's "independence" under the Act depends on a vigilant Parliament.This article addresses the "independence" of the Auditor-General under the Auditor-General Act 1997 (Cth), and how the formal regulation (the matrix of legalities) applies to promote the Auditor-General's role in making the Executive transparent and accountable. The article demonstrates that the "independence" delivered under the Act is essentially symbolic and that avenues remain for the Executive to influence the Auditor-General. The article concludes that the effectiveness of the formal regulation of the Auditor-General's "independence" under the Act depends on a vigilant Parliament.
View less >
View less >
Journal Title
Australian Journal of Administrative Law
Volume
16
Issue
2
Copyright Statement
© 2009 Thomson Legal & Regulatory Limited. The attached file is reproduced here in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. Please refer to the journal's website for access to the definitive, published version.
Subject
Administrative law