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dc.contributor.authorO'Neil, Andrewen_US
dc.date.accessioned2017-05-03T15:44:34Z
dc.date.available2017-05-03T15:44:34Z
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.date.modified2010-09-15T07:05:39Z
dc.identifier.issn1833-1459en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10072/30906
dc.description.abstractPredictions of nuclear proliferation since the 1950s have proven to be almost wholly unreliable.Not only has the widely held expectation that the international system would be populated by a 'nuclear-armed crowd' failed to come to pass, the degree of restraint exercised by nuclear capable states has undermined one of the most powerful tenets of realist international relations theory-that states in an anarchic international system will inevitably opt for the most powerful military capabilities they are able to acquire. A range of factors account for proliferation restraint, including the norms promoted by the non-proliferation regime, the role of extended deterrence, and a genuine moral aversion to nuclear weapons on the part of national leaders. One of the key policy related questions of our time is whether this restraint is sustainable in the twenty-first century. This article challenges some of the alarmist predictions about proliferation and argues that the disincentives for states acquiring nuclear weapons will remain robust in spite of the dramatic expansion of nuclear energy worldwide and the difficulties confronting the non-proliferation regime.en_US
dc.description.peerreviewedYesen_US
dc.description.publicationstatusYesen_AU
dc.format.extent89112 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.language.isoen_AU
dc.publisherKokoda Foundationen_US
dc.publisher.placeAustraliaen_US
dc.publisher.urihttp://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePages/vol5no4O%27Neil.htmlen_AU
dc.relation.ispartofstudentpublicationNen_AU
dc.relation.ispartofpagefrom39en_US
dc.relation.ispartofpageto57en_US
dc.relation.ispartofissue4en_US
dc.relation.ispartofjournalSecurity Challengesen_US
dc.relation.ispartofvolume5en_US
dc.rights.retentionYen_AU
dc.subject.fieldofresearchInternational Relationsen_US
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode160607en_US
dc.titleNuclear weapons and non-proliferation: Is restraint sustainable?en_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.type.descriptionC1 - Peer Reviewed (HERDC)en_US
dc.type.codeC - Journal Articlesen_US
gro.rights.copyrightCopyright 2009 Kokoda Foundation. The attached file is reproduced here in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. Please refer to the journal's website for access to the definitive, published version.en_AU
gro.date.issued2009
gro.hasfulltextFull Text


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