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dc.contributor.authorQu, Charles Zhenen_US
dc.date.accessioned2017-04-24T08:15:05Z
dc.date.available2017-04-24T08:15:05Z
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.date.modified2010-07-30T07:20:19Z
dc.identifier.issn08115796en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10072/33088
dc.description.abstractUnder China's company law regime, the power to represent the company resides not in the board of directors but in an individual senior corporate officer called the legal representative (fading daibiaoren). The office of the legal representative, however, is often rendered ineffective as it is inherently susceptible to abuse. The mechanism becomes dysfunctional when the legal representative who is capable of faithfully implementing the decision of the company is unavailable. The unavailability of the legal representative, especially where the board of directors is also ineffective, raises questions as to the general meeting's power to control corporate actions. This paper makes an attempt to answer this question by considering a range of issues relating to corporate powers and three recent cases wherein the general meeting's litigational powers were raised. This article supports the view that the legal representative functions as an agent rather than, as argued by most of scholars of China's company law, an organ of the company. It will be argued that given the nature of the legal representative's role and the power allocation arrangement under China's company law regime, the general meeting has power, subject to the 'no abuse of rights' principle, to control corporate actions where the board of directors and the legal representative are ineffective.en_US
dc.description.peerreviewedYesen_US
dc.description.publicationstatusYesen_AU
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.language.isoen_AU
dc.publisherLa Trobe Universityen_US
dc.publisher.placeBundoora, Vic.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofstudentpublicationNen_AU
dc.relation.ispartofpagefrom53en_US
dc.relation.ispartofpageto76en_US
dc.relation.ispartofissue2en_US
dc.relation.ispartofjournalLaw in contexten_US
dc.relation.ispartofvolume25en_US
dc.rights.retentionYen_AU
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode1801en_US
dc.titleThe role of shareholders’ meeting’s reserve power in corporate governance in Chinaen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.type.descriptionC1 - Peer Reviewed (HERDC)en_US
dc.type.codeC - Journal Articlesen_US
gro.date.issued2007
gro.hasfulltextNo Full Text


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