• myGriffith
    • Staff portal
    • Contact Us⌄
      • Future student enquiries 1800 677 728
      • Current student enquiries 1800 154 055
      • International enquiries +61 7 3735 6425
      • General enquiries 07 3735 7111
      • Online enquiries
      • Staff phonebook
    View Item 
    •   Home
    • Griffith Research Online
    • Journal articles
    • View Item
    • Home
    • Griffith Research Online
    • Journal articles
    • View Item
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

    Browse

  • All of Griffith Research Online
    • Communities & Collections
    • Authors
    • By Issue Date
    • Titles
  • This Collection
    • Authors
    • By Issue Date
    • Titles
  • Statistics

  • Most Popular Items
  • Statistics by Country
  • Most Popular Authors
  • Support

  • Contact us
  • FAQs
  • Admin login

  • Login
  • A Simple and Flexible Alternative to Stability and Growth Pact Deficit Ceilings: Is it at Hand?

    Author(s)
    Muscatelli, Vito A
    Natale, Piergiovanna
    Tirelli, Patrizio
    Griffith University Author(s)
    Tirelli, Patrizio
    Year published
    2012
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Abstract
    We model a monetary union where fiscal discretion generates excessive debt accumulation in steady state and inefficiently delayed debt adjustment following shocks. By setting a debt target and raising the political cost of deviating from the optimal pace of debt reversal¸ institutional design induces fiscal policymakers to implement unbiased responses to shocks. This is partly achieved by increasing the transparency of the decision-making process. We therefore call for more focused supervision tasks for the European Commission and for parliamentary discussion whenever a disagreement arises between the Commission and a national ...
    View more >
    We model a monetary union where fiscal discretion generates excessive debt accumulation in steady state and inefficiently delayed debt adjustment following shocks. By setting a debt target and raising the political cost of deviating from the optimal pace of debt reversal¸ institutional design induces fiscal policymakers to implement unbiased responses to shocks. This is partly achieved by increasing the transparency of the decision-making process. We therefore call for more focused supervision tasks for the European Commission and for parliamentary discussion whenever a disagreement arises between the Commission and a national government.
    View less >
    Journal Title
    European Journal of Political Economy
    Volume
    28
    Issue
    1
    DOI
    https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.07.004
    Subject
    Economic theory
    Applied economics
    Applied economics not elsewhere classified
    Political science
    Publication URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/10072/336486
    Collection
    • Journal articles

    Footer

    Disclaimer

    • Privacy policy
    • Copyright matters
    • CRICOS Provider - 00233E
    • TEQSA: PRV12076

    Tagline

    • Gold Coast
    • Logan
    • Brisbane - Queensland, Australia
    First Peoples of Australia
    • Aboriginal
    • Torres Strait Islander