Reconsidering AGM-style belief revision in the context of logic programs
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Belief revision has been studied mainly with respect to background logics that are monotonic in character. In this paper we study belief revision when the underlying logic is non-monotonic instead—an inherently interesting problem that is under explored. In particular, we will focus on the revision of a body of beliefs that is represented as a logic program under the answer set semantics, while the new information is also similarly represented as a logic program. Our approach is driven by the observation that unlike in a monotonic setting where, when necessary, consistency in a revised body of beliefs is maintained by jettisoning some old beliefs, in a non-monotonic setting consistency can be restored by adding new beliefs as well. We will define two revision functions through syntactic and model-theoretic methods respectively and subsequently provide representation theorems for characterising them.
ECAI 2016: 22nd European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
© 2016 IOS Press. This is the author-manuscript version of this paper. Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. Please refer to the publisher website for access to the definitive, published version.
Artificial Intelligence and Image Processing not elsewhere classified