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dc.contributor.authorTimothy Besleyen_US
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-19T02:25:54Z
dc.date.available2017-06-19T02:25:54Z
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10072/340283
dc.description.abstractImproving governance requires both that incentives be improved and that the right people are selected to make decisions. The former has been analyzed extensively, but the latter has received much less attention among scholars of political economy. This talk will review some general arguments for the importance of selection. It will also discuss alternative means of selection and what makes democratic selection work better. Finally, it will discuss the emerging evidence on the importance of selection in improving government performance.en_US
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.publisherGriffith Universityen_US
dc.publisher.urihttp://pandora.nla.gov.au/tep/145783en_US
dc.relation.ispartofpagefrom57en_US
dc.relation.ispartofpageto70en_US
dc.relation.ispartofissue1en_US
dc.relation.ispartofjournalGovNet eJournalen_US
dc.relation.ispartofvolume1en_US
dc.titleSelection and Incentives in Governmenten_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
gro.description.notepublicGovNet eJournal was published between 2007 and 2008. An archived version of the original journal website is available via PANDORA - http://pandora.nla.gov.au/tep/145783en_US
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  • GovNet eJournal
    The seminal publication of the ARC's Governance Research Network. Published from 2007 to 2008, it focused on institutional governance, from small firms to global institutions, maladministration, corruption and state failure.

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