Belief-based and analytic processing in transitive inference depends on premise integration difficulty
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Three experiments investigated belief-based versus analytic processing in transitive inference. Belief-based and analytic processing were inferred from conclusion acceptance rates for problems with conclusions that were either valid or invalid and believable or unbelievable. Premise integration difficulty was manipulated by varying premise integration time (Experiment 1), premise presentation order (Experiment 2), and the markedness of the relational terms in the premises (Experiment 3). In all the conditions, reasoning accuracy and rated confidence were lower on conflict problems, where belief-based and analytic processes yielded different responses. Participants relied more on analytic processing and less on belief-based processing in conditions in which premise integration was easier. Fluid intelligence and premise integration ability predicted analytical reasoning on conflict problems after reasoning on the no-conflict problems was controlled for. The findings were related to three dual-process models of belief bias. They provide the first evidence of belief bias in transitive inference.
Memory & Cognition
© 2010 Psychonomic Society, Inc. Published by Springer New York. This is an electronic version of an article published in Memory & Cognition, Volume 38, Number 7, pp. 928-940. This document may not exactly correspond to the final published version. Psychonomic Society Publication disclaims any responsibility or liability for errors in this manuscript. The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
Psychology and Cognitive Sciences not elsewhere classified