Role of corporate governance in mitigating the selective disclosure of executive stock option information
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We examine the nature and extent of statutory executive stock option disclosures by Australian listed companies over the 2001-2004 period, and the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on these disclosures. Our results show a progressive increase in overall compliance from 2001 to 2004. However, despite the improved compliance, the results reveal managements' continued reluctance to disclose more sensitive executive stock option information. Factors associated with good internal governance, including board independence, audit committee independence and effectiveness, and compensation committee independence and effectiveness are found to contribute to improved compliance. Similarly, certain external governance factors are associated with improved disclosure, including external auditor quality, shareholder activism (as proxied by companies identified as poor performers by the Australian Shareholders' Association) and regulatory intervention.
Accounting and Finance
© 2010 Blackwell Publishing. This is the author-manuscript version of the paper. Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher.The definitive version is available at www.interscience.wiley.com
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability not elsewhere classified