• myGriffith
    • Staff portal
    • Contact Us⌄
      • Future student enquiries 1800 677 728
      • Current student enquiries 1800 154 055
      • International enquiries +61 7 3735 6425
      • General enquiries 07 3735 7111
      • Online enquiries
      • Staff phonebook
    View Item 
    •   Home
    • Griffith Research Online
    • Conference outputs
    • View Item
    • Home
    • Griffith Research Online
    • Conference outputs
    • View Item
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

    Browse

  • All of Griffith Research Online
    • Communities & Collections
    • Authors
    • By Issue Date
    • Titles
  • This Collection
    • Authors
    • By Issue Date
    • Titles
  • Statistics

  • Most Popular Items
  • Statistics by Country
  • Most Popular Authors
  • Support

  • Contact us
  • FAQs
  • Admin login

  • Login
  • Asymmetric reference points and the growth of executive remuneration

    Thumbnail
    View/Open
    66974_1.pdf (150.3Kb)
    Author(s)
    Peetz, David
    Griffith University Author(s)
    Peetz, David R.
    Year published
    2010
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Abstract
    Various explanations have been put forward for the recent divergence in growth rates of CEO pay and average earnings, but those which most clearly match the evidence concern power and the institutions of remuneration setting. Executive pay is characterised by 'dual asymmetric pattern bargaining', whereby firms seek to benchmark their CEO pay to higher-paying firms, and grant CEOs, with whom corporate decision makers share a social milieu, increasing benefits which also confer status benefits on the firm - in sharp contrast to the distributional pay negotiations which occur with workers. Executive remuneration rises ...
    View more >
    Various explanations have been put forward for the recent divergence in growth rates of CEO pay and average earnings, but those which most clearly match the evidence concern power and the institutions of remuneration setting. Executive pay is characterised by 'dual asymmetric pattern bargaining', whereby firms seek to benchmark their CEO pay to higher-paying firms, and grant CEOs, with whom corporate decision makers share a social milieu, increasing benefits which also confer status benefits on the firm - in sharp contrast to the distributional pay negotiations which occur with workers. Executive remuneration rises disproportionately during boom periods, but fails to symmetrically fall during poor times. Thus 'everybody knows' that CEOs are overpaid, but firms are unwilling to do anything about it, because to do so would damage internal class relations and firm status. The different methods of pay setting for workers and CEOs reflect core differences in class power and changes in that balance of power during a period of neoliberalism.
    View less >
    Conference Title
    AIRAANZ: Work in Progress: Crises, Choices and Continuity. Proceedings of the 24th Conference
    Publisher URI
    http://www.alloccasionsgroup.com/AIRAANZ2010
    http://airaanzweb.weebly.com/2010-conference-main.html
    Copyright Statement
    © 2010 Association of Industrial Relations Academics Australia & New Zealand (AIRAANZ). The attached file is posted here in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher, for your personal use only. No further distribution permitted. Use hypertext link for access to publisher's website.
    Subject
    Industrial Relations
    Publication URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/10072/35965
    Collection
    • Conference outputs

    Footer

    Disclaimer

    • Privacy policy
    • Copyright matters
    • CRICOS Provider - 00233E

    Tagline

    • Gold Coast
    • Logan
    • Brisbane - Queensland, Australia
    First Peoples of Australia
    • Aboriginal
    • Torres Strait Islander