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dc.contributor.authorRowell, David
dc.contributor.authorNghiem, Son Hong
dc.contributor.authorConnelly, Luke B
dc.date.accessioned2018-11-11T23:41:49Z
dc.date.available2018-11-11T23:41:49Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.issn0165-1765
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.044
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10072/373309
dc.description.abstractThe disentanglement of adverse selection from ex ante moral hazard remains an empirical challenge. Our comment dissects a natural experiment proposed by Chiappori and Salanié (2000) to test for ex ante moral hazard. Firstly, we argue that their test, as proposed, is too simple and too general to enable reliable inferences about the existence of ex ante moral hazard to be drawn and the reported negative coefficient does not rule out moral hazard. Secondly, their analysis strongly suggests that their proposed instrument (inherited bonus malus) is endogenously determined and therefore does not satisfy the technical requirements of a natural experiment.
dc.description.peerreviewedYes
dc.description.sponsorshipTownsville Hospital and Health Service
dc.description.sponsorshipCommonwealth Department of Health
dc.description.sponsorshipGriffith University
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.relation.ispartofpagefrom4
dc.relation.ispartofpageto5
dc.relation.ispartofjournalEconomics Letters
dc.relation.ispartofvolume150
dc.subject.fieldofresearchIndustry Economics and Industrial Organisation
dc.subject.fieldofresearchEconomics
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode140209
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode14
dc.titleTesting for asymmetric information in insurance markets: A test for ex ante moral hazard revisited
dc.typeJournal article
dc.type.descriptionC1 - Articles
dc.type.codeC - Journal Articles
dcterms.licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.description.versionAccepted Manuscript (AM)
gro.rights.copyright© 2017 Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) which permits unrestricted, non-commercial use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, providing that the work is properly cited.
gro.hasfulltextFull Text
gro.griffith.authorNghiem, Son H.


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