Decision-theoretic paradoxes as voting paradoxes
MetadataShow full item record
It is a platitude among decision theorists that agents should choose their actions so as to maximize expected value. But exactly how to define expected value is contentious. Evidential decision theory (henceforth EDT), causal decision theory (henceforth CDT), and a theory proposed by Ralph Wedgwood that I will call benchmark theory (BT) all advise agents to maximize different types of expected value. Consequently, their verdicts sometimes conflict. In certain famous cases of conflict-medical Newcomb problems-CDT and BT seem to get things right, while EDT seems to get things wrong. In other cases of conflict, including some recent examples suggested by Egan 2007, EDT and BT seem to get things right, while CDT seems to get things wrong. In still other cases, EDT and CDT seem to get things right, while BT gets things wrong.
© 2010 Duke University Press. The attached file is reproduced here in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. Please refer to the journal's website for access to the definitive, published version.
Cognitive Science not elsewhere classified