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dc.contributor.authorHumphries, Fran
dc.date.accessioned2019-06-19T13:00:55Z
dc.date.available2019-06-19T13:00:55Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.issn1567-9764
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10784-018-9403-3
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10072/384902
dc.description.abstractInternational regimes regulating access and benefit sharing were originally designed to promote conservation and fairness objectives concerning the use of the world’s biological resources for their genetic material value. These regimes determine from whom permission is required to take the resources and who obtains the benefits of their use. They have evolved separate frameworks in three distinct jurisdictional areas—within national jurisdiction, beyond national jurisdiction and in the Antarctic Treaty Area. This article argues that if these regimes continue to evolve separately, there is a strong temptation for countries to play ‘chicken’ with biological resource governance through forum shopping or opting out of agreements that do not suit their political ends. Using game theory and a transgenic tilapia fish example incorporating genetic material from the three jurisdictional areas, it illustrates the legal and ethical dilemmas that can arise from the territorial (jurisdictional) approach to access and benefit sharing—to the detriment of fairness and conservation in tilapia’s countries of origin. Tilapias are known as the ‘chicken of the sea’ because they dominate global farmed production and developing countries depend on them as their primary source of protein, livelihoods and trade. This means there will be serious consequences if the regimes do not achieve their fairness and conservation objectives for sharing their genetic material. This article concludes that a purpose-driven cooperative governance approach can sidestep the game of chicken and promote fairer and more conservation focused outcomes than the current jurisdictional approach for the developing country providers of migratory aquatic resources.
dc.description.peerreviewedYes
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherSpringer Netherlands
dc.publisher.placeNetherlands
dc.relation.ispartofpagefrom1
dc.relation.ispartofpageto16
dc.relation.ispartofjournalInternational Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics
dc.subject.fieldofresearchEnvironmental and resources law
dc.subject.fieldofresearchGenetics
dc.subject.fieldofresearchPolicy and administration
dc.subject.fieldofresearchPolitical science
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode4802
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode3105
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode4407
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode4408
dc.titleSharing Aquatic Genetic Resources Across Jurisdictions: Playing 'chicken' in the sea
dc.typeJournal article
dc.type.descriptionC1 - Articles
dc.type.codeC - Journal Articles
dc.description.versionAccepted Manuscript (AM)
gro.rights.copyright© 2018 Springer Netherlands. This is an electronic version of an article published in International Environmental Agreements, August 2018, Volume 18, Issue 4, pp 541–556. International Environmental Agreements is available online at: http://link.springer.com/ with the open URL of your article.
gro.hasfulltextFull Text
gro.griffith.authorHumphries, Fran


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