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dc.contributor.authorNai, Alessandro
dc.contributor.authorMartínez i Coma, Ferran
dc.date.accessioned2020-01-14T03:24:05Z
dc.date.available2020-01-14T03:24:05Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.issn2183-2463en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.17645/pag.v7i2.1940en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10072/390223
dc.description.abstractWhy do parties and candidates decide to go negative? Research usually starts from the assumption that this decision is strategic, and within this framework two elements stand out: the prospect of electoral failure increases the use of negative campaigning, and so does time pressure (little reaming time to convince voters before election day). In this article, we contribute to this framework by testing two new expectations: (i) political actors are more likely to go negative when they face unfavourable competitive standings and voting day is near; and (ii) they are less likely to go negative when they faced a substantive degradation in their competitive standing over the course of the campaign. We test these expectations on a rich database of newspaper ads about national referenda in Switzerland and provide preliminary empirical evidence consistent with those expectations. The results have important implications for existing research on the strategic underpinnings of campaigning and political communication.en_US
dc.publisherCogitatioen_US
dc.relation.ispartofpagefrom278en_US
dc.relation.ispartofpageto278en_US
dc.relation.ispartofissue2en_US
dc.relation.ispartofjournalPolitics and Governanceen_US
dc.relation.ispartofvolume7en_US
dc.titleLosing in the Polls, Time Pressure, and the Decision to Go Negative in Referendum Campaignsen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dcterms.bibliographicCitationNai, A; Martínez i Coma, F, Losing in the Polls, Time Pressure, and the Decision to Go Negative in Referendum Campaigns, Politics and Governance, 7 (2), pp. 278-278en_US
dcterms.licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0en_US
dc.date.updated2020-01-14T03:21:46Z
dc.description.versionPublisheden_US
gro.rights.copyright© Alessandro Nai, Ferran Martínez i Coma. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 license, which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction of the work without further permission provided the original author(s) and source are credited.en_US
gro.hasfulltextFull Text
gro.griffith.authorMartinez Coma, Fernando


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