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dc.contributor.authorHarcourt, Mark
dc.contributor.authorGall, Gregor
dc.contributor.authorWilkinson, Adrian
dc.contributor.authorCroucher, Richard
dc.contributor.authorLam, Helen
dc.date.accessioned2020-06-25T02:24:53Z
dc.date.available2020-06-25T02:24:53Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.issn0954-5395
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/1748-8583.12261
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10072/394888
dc.description.abstractThis article provides an innovative defence of codetermination by way of exploring two of the most significant theorised objections to it from neo‐liberal and libertarian perspectives, namely the defence of the right to manage as freely chosen by employees and employers alike, and the right to manage being the most efficient, lowest transaction cost mode of employee governance. Instead, we focus upon management preference emanating from the endowment effect, and manifested in management style and ideology, as a more credible explanation for management's support for its prerogative to manage. The endowment effect prompts both strong employer and manager objections to codetermination and weak employee willingness to seek it because humans place more value upon items currently in their possession than upon those they do not possess. We explore this argument by examining the experience of codetermination in Germany. The significance of our argument lies in identifying managerial preference as the key variable to be challenged and changed in order to pacify management opposition to codetermination through political, ideological, and institutional means.
dc.description.peerreviewedYes
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherWiley
dc.relation.ispartofpagefrom149
dc.relation.ispartofpageto163
dc.relation.ispartofissue1
dc.relation.ispartofjournalHuman Resource Management Journal
dc.relation.ispartofvolume30
dc.subject.fieldofresearchBusiness and Management
dc.subject.fieldofresearchPsychology
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode1503
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode1701
dc.subject.keywordsSocial Sciences
dc.subject.keywordsIndustrial Relations & Labor
dc.subject.keywordsManagement
dc.subject.keywordsBusiness & Economics
dc.subject.keywordscorporate governance
dc.titleUsing the endowment effect to explain managerial resistance towards codetermination: Implications for employment relations from the German case
dc.typeJournal article
dc.type.descriptionC1 - Articles
dcterms.bibliographicCitationHarcourt, M; Gall, G; Wilkinson, A; Croucher, R; Lam, H, Using the endowment effect to explain managerial resistance towards codetermination: Implications for employment relations from the German case, Human Resource Management Journal, 2019, 30 (1), pp. 149-163
dc.date.updated2020-06-25T01:56:44Z
dc.description.versionAccepted Manuscript (AM)
gro.rights.copyright© 2019 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Using the endowment effect to explain managerial resistance towards codetermination: Implications for employment relations from the German case, Human Resource Management Journal, Volume 30, Issue 1, January 2020, Pages 149-163, which has been published in final form at 10.1111/1748-8583.12261. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving (http://olabout.wiley.com/WileyCDA/Section/id-828039.html)
gro.hasfulltextFull Text
gro.griffith.authorWilkinson, Adrian J.


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