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  • “That’s Unhelpful, Harmful and Offensive!” Epistemic and Ethical Concerns with Meta-argument Allegations

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    Author(s)
    Breakey, H
    Griffith University Author(s)
    Breakey, Hugh E.
    Year published
    2020
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    Abstract
    “Meta-argument allegations” consist of protestations that an interlocutor’s speech is wrongfully offensive or will trigger undesirable social consequences. Such protestations are meta-argument in the sense that they do not interrogate the soundness of an opponent’s argumentation, but instead focus on external features of that argument. They are allegations because they imply moral wrongdoing. There is a legitimate place for meta-argument allegations, and the moral and epistemic goods that can come from them will be front of mind for those levelling such allegations. But I argue there is a dark side to such allegations, and ...
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    “Meta-argument allegations” consist of protestations that an interlocutor’s speech is wrongfully offensive or will trigger undesirable social consequences. Such protestations are meta-argument in the sense that they do not interrogate the soundness of an opponent’s argumentation, but instead focus on external features of that argument. They are allegations because they imply moral wrongdoing. There is a legitimate place for meta-argument allegations, and the moral and epistemic goods that can come from them will be front of mind for those levelling such allegations. But I argue there is a dark side to such allegations, and their epistemic and moral costs must be seriously weighed. Meta-argument allegations have a concerning capacity to derail discussions about important topics, stymieing argumentational interactions and the goods they provide. Such allegations can license efforts to silence, punish and deter—even as they provoke the original speaker to retaliate in kind. Used liberally, such allegations can escalate conflicts, block open-mindedness, and discourage constructive dialogues. In response, I defend “argumentational tolerance”—a principled wariness in employing meta-argument allegations—as a virtue of ethical argument.
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    Journal Title
    Argumentation
    DOI
    https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-020-09538-8
    Copyright Statement
    © 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG. This is an electronic version of an article published in Argumentation, 2020. Argumentation is available online at: http://link.springer.com/ with the open URL of your article.
    Note
    This publication has been entered as an advanced online version in Griffith Research Online.
    Subject
    Philosophy
    Applied ethics
    Publication URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/10072/396705
    Collection
    • Journal articles

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